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CONSTI2_2ND WAVE CASE DIGESTS

1. SOLIVEN VS MACASIAR
167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit
Must Be Invoked by the President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
2.
CRUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS: On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal
possession of a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside
the Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila.
On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, an information[3] against the accused for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866[4].
The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally
offered its evidence, the trial court issued an order admitting in evidence the gun and

ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had
rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to
evidence. The trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his
evidence. Instead, the petitioner filed an MR, which the trial court denied
ISSUE: Whether the trial court made a reversible error in admission of evidence against
the petitioner.
HELD: The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, squarely
addressed the latters contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was
admissible, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the
accused presented no contrary evidence.
We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on
these issues. Thus, upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present
his evidence. After trial on the merits and the court issues a verdict of conviction,
petitioner may seasonably appeal such decision, raising once again his defenses and
objections.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to
present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is
rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE
Lim vs Felix 194 SCRA 292 ( 1991)
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the
airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts,
namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator
filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente
Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the
airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused..

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On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation
of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of
Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by
respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several
motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal
of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal
Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its
personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as
well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of
the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself
been personally convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations
and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying
on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where
all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al
Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53,
72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and
his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to
take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios
deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the
Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search
Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Alvarez vs COA - A Case Digest
158 SCRA57 G.R. No. L-59621 February 23, 1988
MAXIMILIANO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,ET AL
PADILLA, J.:
Nature of the case:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals

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Facts:
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide with Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province.
After trial, the court rendered judgment against the accused.
The Court found him guilty and of negligence was senteced to pay a fine and indemnities
to the victims. Maximiliano Alvarez, the employer of herein accused (Renato Ramos) was
found to be subsidiarily liable and to pay the amount above-mentioned to the persons
concerned jointly and severally with Renato Ramos. The accused appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted that part
thereof making herein petitioner, as employer of Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for
payment of the adjudged indemnities to the offended parties. After finality of the Court of
Appeals judgment, the private prosecutor filed a "Motion for Issuance of Subsidiary Writ of
Execution" after the writ of execution against the accused was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner opposed the Motion.
Consequently, on 29 November 1979, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of appeals, questioning the acts of the respondent Judge and the Sheriff who had levied on
his properties pursuant to said subsidiary writ of execution. The Court of appeals granted
the petition and declared the Orders of the respondent Judge and the Subsidiary Writ of
Execution null and void. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion was
granted.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer can be subsidiarily liable for the wrongful acts of his
employee;
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of Subsidiary Writ of Execution.
Held:
Petition denied and the Resolutions affirmed. Respondent Court has not committed any
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned orders for such issuance has
been made in pursuance of law and jurisprudence.

Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.

438 SCRA 224 Mercantile Law Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Probable
Cause in Issuing Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares
(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows.
For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC.
He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought
by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a
probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by
Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its
decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name
hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano
and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some
cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does
not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings
simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit
goods is not in his name.

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PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of
Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly
leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and
that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate
charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach
warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence
makes the warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional
requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties
to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace
officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search
warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and
all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that
technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a
technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.
Tambasen vs People
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search
warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his
possession at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles
(Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and
Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal
purposes]. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the
application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team

searched the house of petitioner and seized among others, 2 envelopes containing cash in
the total amount of Php 14,000.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized articles. MTCC issued an order
directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel
submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of
law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a
complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested
that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not
present when it was served. On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a
motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles
be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner, however the Solicitor General
alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not
entitled to its return citing the rulings stating that pending the determination of the legality
of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia legis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid.
HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense.
The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the
Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and
totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their
seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. "The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People
v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759)
As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the
pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
abhors."
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
PEOPLE VS VELOSO
FACTS: In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was
used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that

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time a member of the House of Representatives. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief
of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25,
1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for,
and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided,
the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon. They
found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police
including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the
house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police.
One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the
latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was
Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the
house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket
was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him
the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the
policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso
insisting in his refusal to submit to the search. Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso
only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a
blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the
combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and
long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from
his pockets.
ISSUE: Whether the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of
the John Doe search warrant.
HELD: No. John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said
regarding the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused,
and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true
name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name
in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant
must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the
person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should
state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of
residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the
other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
Yousef Al Ghoul vs CA
FACTS: Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were arrested and charged with
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court
of Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search conducted pursuant to the
search warrants issued by the RTC of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a
motion for bail. However, the resolution of the same was held in abeyance by the trial court
pending the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently, the trial court issued the
Order dated February 19, 1996 denying petitioners motion for bail on the ground that the
law under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion perpetua and
that the evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned orders issued by the
trial court admitting the evidence of the prosecution and denying petitioners motion for
bail. In its Decision dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the assailed orders of trial
court, hence this case. On October 30, 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging
that with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866, the penalty for the
offenses under which petitioners are being charged has been reduced from the penalty
ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty ranging from
prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless
of the strength of evidence against them.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, thru the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D.
1866 reducing the penalty for the crime charge against him is now entitled to bail.
HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and
3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which
petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum
period[11] and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively.
Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by
the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which provides
as follows:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.x x x. (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule.

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UY vs BIR
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises
of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue
thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy
were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging
illegal activities being practiced by the said company among others, selling thousands of
cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing receipt.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch
of the BIR, applied for several search warrants.The application sought permission to
search the premises of Unifish.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that it violates constitutional right
to unreasonable search and seizure.
xxxx
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
xxxxx
ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional mandates.
HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said Resolutions upheld the
validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the
rest of the articles subject of said warrants.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the
other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down
petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a
manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police
station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal
charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the
lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has
been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant
lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of
lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and
actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issues:
(1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld
the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in
an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident,
thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were
derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither
expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a
complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been
scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is
entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is
required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary
investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.
PADILLA VS CA
PADILLA vs CA
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on
apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered
firearms were found in his possession:

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1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to
include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994,
Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of
Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years.
4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied
by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor
General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying
for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
ISSUE:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms
and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule
HELD: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is
no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in
Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo,
petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another
offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because
arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion
based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official
duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c)
evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
?
Search of moving vehicle
?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule
126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search

(not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees
custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court
begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with
settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established,
viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess.
The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized
from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are
inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift
from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is
also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the
Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of
Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as
stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot
be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and
cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a
democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court
should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the
reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the
penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is
cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent
court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the
offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty
of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent
court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.

8
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the
same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of
proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice
by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal
possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants
grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive
who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret
and apply the laws
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms &
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED
to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were
taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining
the proper period should be applied.
ESPANO VS CA
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
13976 dated January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II,
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twelve
(12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5
grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan,
shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat.
Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District
(WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm

reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his
house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea
bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and
the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section,
testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of
a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight
of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house
and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the
policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the
latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for
possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version
of the prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused
Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to
Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179,
and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however,
affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis
of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of
his constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of
regularity, (c) he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory
process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not
properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling
reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.

9
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the
trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his
findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more
credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat.
Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb
drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession
of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust
team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were
motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer
whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on
the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant,
as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . . , must
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He
simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court
has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the
accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the
"claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court
with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common
and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his
defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant
in court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit,
since failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment
especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust
operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen
who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified
him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is
no compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of
Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward spontaneous and

convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that
petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was
proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information
received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana
seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the
same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court
correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well
as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such
search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited
to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that

10
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at
bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search
made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers
were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and
control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the
passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the
imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People
v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal.
Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory
provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams,
the penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2)
years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith

dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of
whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant
was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was
among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that
he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him
at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113
sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense
that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by
Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad
daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay

Manalili vs CAFacts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in affirming TCs
decision on convicting Manalili of

11
illegalpossession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425.Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas
and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of Kalookan Cemetery basedon
the information that drug addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a man who
appeared to be high on drugs andintroduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided
them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man washolding in his hand, the man
held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found what he suspected to
becrushed mj leaves. The man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be
Manalili. The substance found on
Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section and was confirmed as
mj.Manalilis version of the story was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle
and informed them of the suspected possession of mj, the policemen bodily searched both
Manalili and the driver andupon finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver go but
brought Manalili along to the police station. Manaliliwhile on the way to the station saw a
neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and when he was again searched in thestation,
he was asked to strip his pants where they found nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked
the policemen to letManalili go seeing as they had not found anything illegal but Manalili
was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later thatday and was told not to say anything
despite his saying that the policemen had not found mj on his person. Said tricycledriver
and neighbor testified on court as to
how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis person.
Issues:
1.
W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.2.
W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3.
W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.
Ruling:
I.
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right
of a police officer to stop a citizenon the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons:
W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leadshim reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom heis dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identified himself asa policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel

hisreasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct acarefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used toassault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may
properly beintroduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.It did
not, however abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by
exigent circumstances. As People vs Lacernaenumerated 5 recognized exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search incidental to lawfularrest; 2)
search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the
accused of his rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus experience as a member of the Anti
-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City
Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high.
II.
SGs contention that Manalili effectiv
ely waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed toraise this
issue or object during trial. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable searches and
seizures require theconcurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2)
the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/shehad actual intention to relinquish the
right. In this case however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such right for failureto
raise its violation before the trial court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleadedfor the first time on appeal.
Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to extort money and testimonies of
the arresting officers were
inconsistent, it held that the tri
al courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is
accorded great weight and respect as it had opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testifiedbefore it.The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be aprohibited drug; b)
such possession is not authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said
drug. The substance found on Manalilis w
allet was identified as mj which was prohibited and knowingly without authority.Considering
that he was high and tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew
he was holding mj andit was prohibited by law
PEOPLE VS COGAED
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to
avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against
dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law

12
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they
pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that
were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accuseds
whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious
was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to
be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully
apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and
frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently,
knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence,
the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior
Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La
Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin
Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay
LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered
SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set
up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating
the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago
Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed
and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then
muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates
to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested
[Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao
"were still carrying their respective bags"16inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3
Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was
"four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayaos yellow
bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found
that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from
Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaeds
sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092
grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos bags.27
According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for
a jeepney to take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He
boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao
allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag
and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was
when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what
was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked
to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35Thereafter, SPO1
Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These
facts were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the
parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The
bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The
information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel,
Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted
with discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being
authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and
sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act
No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao
because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44Trial against
Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found
Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

13
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer
life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that
time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas
about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal,
the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated
that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such
irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself,
asked him to open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE
RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and
seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through
the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the
requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It
has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches
and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that
meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of
probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must
be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59 In
the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a
separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential
instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and
frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the
Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed
in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the
person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop
and frisk situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual

14
or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information."66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen
dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience
ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on
facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place
frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police
officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts
observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man
was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the
man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found
an unlicensed "homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder
the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search
warrant first."82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on
their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk
civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding
a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed
was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the
passenger jeep?

WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to
believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85 Anything less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right to
security of ones person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer
with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the
earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be
probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to
serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers
must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more
than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and

15
seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that
Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still
remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the
purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis
supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and
frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an
informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio
City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The
informant pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling
Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them
to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109 There
were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the subsequent search
and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend
her.111 The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the polices
informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the
National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody
possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin
while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected

Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The
court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police
had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different
karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug
dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police
that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his
car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was
holding.128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chuas situation
when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstop-and-frisk."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe
arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest
of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to
bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were missing when
Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified
for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

16
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he
did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted)
Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned
again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their
bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents
ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the
bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis
supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatacs responses to
Judge Florendos questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was
somewhat frightened.1wphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was already
stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "whats that," and he answered, "I
dont know because Marvin only asked me to carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that
the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.1wphi1 The
police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part

will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not
amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There
must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or
her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no
less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of
his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence
left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this
menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their
duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our societys fundamental
values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the
very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City,
La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal
grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FAJARDO VS PEOPLE
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
The facts:

17
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025
and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine
of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen
(14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from
their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence
Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan.[3]
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
[4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case
who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August
27, 2002 but does not live therein;
4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;
5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
morning of August 28, 2002; and
6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the
arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in
possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[5]
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,[6] these are the chain of
events that led to the filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent
Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG
proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered
and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber
pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of
her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house
but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of
the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes
later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops.
No agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio
Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge
twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall
of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava,
together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter
of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025,
and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then
surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them
in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with
a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the
police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to
confiscate the following:
1.
2.
3.

Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;

Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to
possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information
for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed
against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant
was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by

18
SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of
the application:
That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial
Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7]
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner,
who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the
policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room
(sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito
Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding
team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing
garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying
the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not
appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio
were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial
by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have
effectively waived such irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar
with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former
soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and
ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by
Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government
property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those
items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.
xxxx

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones
control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to
possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the
presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no
license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject
firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two
(2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model
M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber
and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their
possession during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police
Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129
of the Revised Rules of Court.[9]
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
R.A. No. 8294, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which

19
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability
of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio
charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, viz.:

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with
the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions
of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal
knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by
law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the application.
Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms
and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best
evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a
firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not presented, or
even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the warrant. Such vital
evidence was simply ignored.[10]
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the
house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to
the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a
firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They
were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twentyone (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution
dated December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.

A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles
confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of
Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13] Illegal possession of two (2)
pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16
ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is
punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.[14]
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model
no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
[15]
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which
categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license,
according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different
penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification, unlike in

20
the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of
firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now
particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified,
and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped
according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866.
It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state
Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,[16]because
different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do
so would result in duplicitous charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner
and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver,
and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the information.
[17] This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the
search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review
since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted
from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the
conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does
not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion
was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when
he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers
recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that
petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.
Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized
in plain view, hence, admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the
same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus,
evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any
of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right
to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.[19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20]

21
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45
caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought
refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio
when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the
policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search
warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances,
Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly,
considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable
ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the
offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered,
they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:
Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A They were cordoning the house.
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did
he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police
officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside
the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.
COURT: (to witness)
Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if
any?
A I shouted to seek cover.
xxxx
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the
place where something was thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.
xxxx
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall
another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the
roof of another house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?
A Zaldy Valerio again.
xxxx
Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.
Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?

22
A He was on top of the house.
xxxx
Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
xxxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial
discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized
contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer
observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence.
The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal
possession of part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the
following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person
for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is,
however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important
in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may
be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority
or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind
of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no
offense committed.[23]
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed
when the holder thereof:
(1)
(2)

possesses a firearm or a part thereof

lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the
house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal.

23
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners
house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in
Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

(b)
the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm
to which the seized part/component corresponds.

Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed
from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert
such assumption into concrete evidence.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States
Property and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm
parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by
DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28]

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses
are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which
are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by
law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns
when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that
the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with
Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence
indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act
committed by Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by
the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence
of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not
have the corresponding license for it.[26]
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must
yield these requisites:
(a)

the existence of the part of the firearm; and

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained
that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of
firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification[30] to that effect
and identified the same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Malacat v CA 283 SCRA 159 (December 12, 1997)
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu ofthe Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of
the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo,Manila,
near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslimlooking men, with eachgroup, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of
the corner of
stop and frisk, where a warrant andseizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information
; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession ofexplosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On

24
18February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, therecord of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, theCourt of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving
very fast. Yu and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about
30 minutes. The police officers thenapproached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehendedSammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at PlazaMiranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2
others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade
tucked inside the latters front waist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a.
38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station
3 where Yu placed an X mark at the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recoveredfrom Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on
9October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that heonly recently arrived in Manila. However,
several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner
wasonce again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented. In its decision dated 10February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was
akinto a
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same.The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without avalidly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)has been
deno

minated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a hotpursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5)
a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk.
The concepts of a stop
-andfrisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof beforethey may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrestdetermines the validity of
the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuitarrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting officer, or an overtphysical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going tobe committed.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the
other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it neverthe
less holds that mere suspicion or
a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about
him. Finally, a stop
-andfrisk serves a two
-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underliesthe recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach aperson for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressinginterest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person withwhom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the stop
-andfrisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim
that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neithersupported by any police report or record nor corroborated by

25
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.Second, there was nothing in
Malaca
ts behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicionother
than that his eyes were moving very fast
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and histeammates were nowhere
near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companionswere merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground,probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of Malacat, and
from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacats rights
solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals[GR 123595, 12 December 1997]Facts:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of theWestern Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of
the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was onfoot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo,
Manila, near the MercuryDrug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to fourmen, posted at opposite
sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were
actingsuspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observedboth groups for about 30 minutes. The police
officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different
directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuchas allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others
attempt todetonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line."Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered.Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an
"X" mark at the bottom of the grenade andthereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not
issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On
30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866
. At arraignment on 9 October 1990,petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a
plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he onlyrecently arrived in
Manila. However, severalother police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and
guns. Petitioner wasonce again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the
grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decisiondated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and
seizure ofMalacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by anarrest" and "whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
moreinformation"; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a
lawful arrest. The trial court thus foundMalacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer thepenalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than
30 years ofReclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice
of appeal indicating that he was appealing to theSupreme Court. However, the record of
the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988).In its decision of 24
January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with theSupreme Court.
Issue:

26
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly ef fect the same. TheConstitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issuedwarrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rulesof Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "inflagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3)seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." Theconcepts of a "stop-and-frisk"
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of
warrantlesssearches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope. In asearch incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there couldhave
been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on thepart of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act,
on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed,was being
committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could
not have been oneincidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it neverthelessholds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
policeofficer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed abouthim. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner,approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the morepressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
personwith whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why
the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat
was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2days earlier. This
claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other
police officer whoallegedly chased that group.Second, there was nothing in Malacat's
behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion otherthan
that his eyes were "moving very fast"

an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates werenowhere

near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his

companions were merely standingat the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble.Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat
was armed with a deadly weapon. None wasvisible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from allindications
as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat
was indeed hiding a grenade,could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then
are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed inSections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani wasordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt.
Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaperwrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully
buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned
themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was
going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and
came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened
and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and
the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living
room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and
stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed
to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was
then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted
as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or

27
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented asevidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the
accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen insearch for other evidences where
they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot
be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
132 People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4
concur Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness
SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12
grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw
that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At
about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives
knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana
wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the
items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police
operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along
with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams
and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried
leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.
Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for
possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358,
respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its

decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation
of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00,
respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the
admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him
on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and
(3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of drug Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the
plain view doctrine. Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity
of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no
probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not
warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit's
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege
the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in
an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal
Case Q-95-64357 only.
People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur Facts:
Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they
were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen,

28
who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving
her after a "thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 108 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Issue: Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against
Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs. Held: It is not disputed,
and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had
no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who
reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest (this was the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.),
another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25." There was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of
probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, Aminnudin was not caught
in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify
the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The present case
presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with
the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was
not necessary."
People vs Mariacos Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been
loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with
O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top

thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other
passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were
already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on the
women got away.
DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of
the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held
to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs,
the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum

29
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informantthat a certain Aling
Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a
team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from
Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about
the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidencealleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that
she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about
to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she
was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman
and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972
Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the
accused.
Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street
and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was
committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the
accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so.
The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

30
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority,
may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if
the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been
made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with
and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log
book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and
other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Papa v. Mago
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized member of the Bureau of Customs,
together with Alagao and other elements of the counter-intelligence unit, seized 9 bales of
goods from two trucks. Said items, according to an information, were misdeclared and
undervalued. The cargo owner, respondent in this case, claimed that the MPD seized said
goods without a search warrant.

Facts:
Petitioner Martin Alagao (head of the counter-intelligence unit of the MPD), having
received a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects were allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued and were to be released from the customs zone of the port
of Manila, conducted surveillance of said zone. With him were petitioner Ricardo Papa,
the Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized member of the BOC, and other
elements of the counter-intelligence unit. The information which reached Alagao specified
that said misdeclared and undervalued items were loaded on two trucks.
The trucks left the gate where Alagaos group conducted surveillance. However, such
trucks were later intercepted. The load of the two trucks consisted of 9 bales of goods.
The cargo was owned by Remedios Mago while the truck was owned by Valentin Lanopa.
In their petition in the CFI of Manila, they claimed that the MPD seized the goods without
search warrant issued by a competent court, and that Papa denied the request of Magos
counsel that the bales be not opened and the goods not examined.
The respondent judge issued an order restraining petitioners from opening the nine bales
in question. However, some bales were already opened by examiners of the BOC when
the restraining order was received.
Respondent contended that, since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any
article of prohibited importation, such articles should be released upon her posting of the
bond to be determined by court. Petitioners contended however that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were thus subject to forfeiture. Respondent
judge issued an order releasing the good upon the filing of the bond in the amount of Php
40,000.00 to which the respondent complied with.
Issue: Is there a need to procure a warrant before search be made?
Ruling:
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
In the case at bar, the moment the BOC actually seized the goods in question, the BOC
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Petitioner Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited articles.

31
People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim) and Reynaldo
Tia
Reynaldo Tia, a deep penetration agent of the SOG, reported of his undercover activities
on the suspected criminal syndicate led by Lo and Lim. Moreover, Tia informed his
superior regarding their return to the country. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Lo and Tia
rode in one taxi cab while Lim rode in another. They were pursued by the members of the
NARCOM and were stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia, a tin can of tea was taken out
of the red travel bag and, upon examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, contained
metamphetamine. Petitioner contend that a warrant was needed.
Facts:
The Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers about an organized
group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods and
gunrunning. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and deep
penetration agents was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited
was Reynaldo Tia.
Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim) where the latter expressed a desire to
hire a male travel companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and
was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one of the meetings in China, was introduced to Lo Ho
Wing (Peter Lo) whom tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu
of Lim.
As deep penetration agent, Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on
the suspected criminal syndicate to Capt. Luisito Palmera, head of Oplan Sharon 887 the
group created in order to bus the suspected syndicate. Tia informed Palmera of their
return to the Philippines after they (Lo and Tia) left for Hong Kong.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. After Lim and Lo finished their
conversation, Lo hailed a taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the taxicab while Lim followed in
another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of the NARCOM (Narcotics Command),
having been notified by Palmera, stationed themselves in strategic places around the
arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia leave the airport, the operatives followed them.
Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia
and cut into its path which forced the taxi driver to stop. The other tax cab carrying Lim,
however, sped away but was later caught on Retiro Street, Quezon City.
Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached the taxicab and asked the driver to
open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back
compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from Lo and Tia permission to
search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red travel bag owned by Lo. A
certain Sgt. Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag
from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling crushed aluminium came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened
the tea bag and examined its content more closely. He had the three travel bags opened
for inspection. From the red travel bag, 6 tin cans were found, including the one previously
opened and nothing else was recovered from the other bags.

The tea bag contained metamphetamine after examination by the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory. One of metamphetamines derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu/poor mans cocaine).
The three were charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He contends that the officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed
of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time. Moreover, as
claimed by Lo, the fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving
vehicle does not automatically make the warrantless search fall within the coverage of
exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect search.
Ruling:
The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. As set forth
in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-recognized exceptions, namely:
(a) a search incidental to an arrest, (b) a search of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of
evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, there is a clear showing that the search in
question, having been made in a moving vehicle, does not need a valid warrant to effect
search.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to
the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress
and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he
was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a
brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages,
and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics

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Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages
was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI
agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the
Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation
of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti
of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Marti appealed. Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
the accused's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. Held: In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.