LUZON

DEVELOPMENT BANK, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON

DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA
in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995.
ROMERO, J p:

FACTS:
From submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB)
and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

"Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated
April 1994, on promotion."

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary
Arbitrator rendered a decision finding that the Bank has not
adhered to the CBA provision nor MoA on promotion.

LDB filed petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside
the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.

ISSUE: w/n the decision of voluntary arbitration is appealable
to NLRC


HELD: NO . the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with
that of the regional trial court. Hence, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As
a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of
Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

RATIO:

While there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a
labor arbiter to NLRC, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to
an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the settled
premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled
that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as
judgments of a court.

In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court
ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and
apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the
latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of
the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of

voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel
are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the
very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the
voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent
arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, that the broader term
"instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted
provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which
a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word "instrumentality," with respect
to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function. An
individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner
that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a
defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function
pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the
provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the
aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and
powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that,
although the Employees Compensation Commission is also
provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the
forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions
to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and
this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec.
9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of
Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-
judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary
arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a
petition for certiorarifrom that award or decision, the Court of
Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court.

RULING: As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand
to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 102976. October 25, 1995.
FELICIANO, J p:
SYLLABUS:

POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR
INSTRUMENTALITIES; INCORPORATED OR NON-
INCORPORATED; CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPIRATION OF
STATUTORY TERM. It is worth noting that the term
"Authority" has been used to designate both incorporated and
non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-
assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers,
duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such
expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of
that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of
the Corporation Code. The procedural implications of the
relationship between an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic itself are, at least in part, spelled out
in the Rules of Court. The general rule is, of course, that an action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest. (Rule 3, Section 2) The Rules of Court at the same time
expressly recognize the role of representative parties.

FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order,
generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in
the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a
term of five (5) years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's
original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended
for another ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31
August 1979.

The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is
itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other
things the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City.
Pursuant to the expansion program Proclamation was issued
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land
and reserving land for NSC use.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of
Proclamation were occupied by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by private respondent
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of
Instruction, was issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with the
owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject
land." Should negotiations fail w/in 60 days, ISA to exercise
eminent domain under PD 272 and initiate expropriation
proceedings.

Negotiations failed, ISA initiated proceeding, depositing in court
P1.7M (10% of declared MV of property). PNB as mortgagee of
plant was impleaded as party-defendant.

On 17 September 1983 a writ of possession was issued by the
trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession

and control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant

installation. However as trial was ongoing ISAs statutory
existence expired. Motion to dismiss was filed since no decision
can be rendered against ISA, it ceased to be a juridical person.
Motion granted.

ISA filed MR, contending that despite the expiration of its term, its
juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs
could be completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that
the Republic of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest,
should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. In this
connection, ISA referred to a letter from the Office of the
President dated 28 September 1988 which especially directed the
Solicitor General to continue the expropriation case.

RTC Denied motion stating that property to be expropriated
was not for public use or benefit but for the private business
venture of NSC .

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner ISA, "a government
regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions," did not have
the same rights as an ordinary corporation and that the ISA,
unlike corporations organized under the Corporation Code, was
not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after expiration
of its legally mandated term. Also, CA held that it was premature
for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was
not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had not yet
rested their respective cases

Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and prosecuted
the action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic, as principal of ISA, is
entitled to be substituted and to be made a party-plaintiff after
the agent ISA's term had expired.

Private respondent MCFC, upon the other hand, argues that the
failure of Congress to enact a law further extending the term of
ISA after 11 August 1988 evinced a "clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA.

ISSUE: whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled
to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.

Held: YES,]
RATIO:

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes
normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no
provision in P.D. No. 272recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that
of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast
in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical
personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. Among
such incorporated agencies or instrumentalities are: National Power
Corporation; 6 Philippine Ports Authority; 7 National Housing
Authority; 8 Philippine National Oil Company; 9 Philippine National
Railways; 10 Public Estates Authority; 11 Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration; 12 and so forth. It is worth noting that the
term "Authority" has been used to designate both incorporated and
non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or

delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply
of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as
"legal personality."

The relevant definitions are found in the Administrative Code of
1987:

"SECTION 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words
of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute,
require a different meaning: cdt

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
forms of local government.

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of
that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of
the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or
transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first
instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since,
in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets
and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed
once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having
been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other
entity or agency of the Republic.

The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the
Philippines and not the National Steel Corporation, even though the
latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the
condemnation suit be eventually successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.
While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily
in the legislative department of the government, we believe and so
hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic

decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to

prosecute the expropriation proceedings. For the legislative
authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to
exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on
behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The
1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time
of the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings
before the Iligan Regional Trial Court
In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly
delegated under both the 1917 and 1987 Revised Administrative
Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary and
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf
of the Government of the Republic and accordingly directed the
Solicitor General to proceed with the suiT.

Ruling: Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to
the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the
expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow
the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner
Iron and Steel Authority and for further proceedings consistent
with this Decision.

SOLID HOMES, INC. vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 84811. August 29, 1989.
CRUZ, J

SYLLABUS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY;
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. (P.D. 957 as amended by P.D. 1344)
FACTS:
Complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal
against Solid Homes before RTC of QC. She alleged that the
defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina
on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total
amount of P38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests, but
Solid homes failed to deliver CoT despite repeated demands. It
was found that the property was mortgaged to a financing
company.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National
Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The
defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3
of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree."
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or,
failing this, to refund to her the sum of P38,949.87 plus interest
from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. Damages were also
awarded.

ISSUE: W/N RTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY SAID
CASE.

HELD: NO. While we [SC] are disturbed by the findings of fact of
the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of
the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the
jurisdictional issue.

RATIO:
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344,
entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue
Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 967

The language SECTION 1, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private
respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the
National Housing Authority

The private respondent contends that the applicable law BP No.
129, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19. It stresses,
additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later
enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after PD No.
957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of

conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment.

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD
No. 1344 the special law.

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies
to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in
the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the
reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth
department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must
be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned
duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a
total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal
before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising
the issue is barred by estoppel, which does not appear in the case
before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the
motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which
continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the
respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding
the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the proceedings in the
trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING: the challenged decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and the decision of the RTC is SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., vs. SPS. AVELINO C.

IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 164789. August 27, 2009
BRION, J

FACTS:
A case filed by CGA against the Spouses Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio
(respondents) for rescission of their Contract to Sell before the RTC
Malolos, Bulacan.

CGA entered into a Contract to Sell subdivision lot in Pulilan, Bulacan
with respondents [registered owners and developers of Villa Priscilla
Subdv.] for P 2.373 M on installment basis. According to CGA, it
religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative
pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered
from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property
was actually part of two consolidated lots which was placed under PD
27s Operation Land Transfer.

CGA claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that
the subject property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the
Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil
Code. CGA asked the trial court to rescind the contract; order the
respondents to return the amounts already paid; and award actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Citing PD No.
957 and PD No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a
subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the
action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not
among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as
specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344.

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss and held that the action for rescission of
contract and damages due to the respondents' fraudulent
misrepresentation that they are the rightful owners of the subject
property, free from all liens and encumbrances, is outside the HLURB's
jurisdiction.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.CA ruled that
the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint since it involved a contract to sell a subdivision lot based on
the provisions of PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344.

ISSUE: main issue we are asked to resolve is which of the two the
regular court or the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGA's
action for rescission and damages.

HELD: HLURB

RATIO:
The determination of whether the CGA's cause of action falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB necessitates a closer examination of the laws
defining the HLURB's jurisdiction and authority.

PD No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, was intended to closely supervise
and regulate the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses in
order to curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators. Section 3 of PD No. 957 granted the
National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business". Thereafter, PD No. 1344 was issued
on April 2, 1978 to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA.

Executive Order No. 648 (EO 648), dated February 7, 1981, transferred
the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the HSRC was renamed as the
HLURB.

The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions
regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at
providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which
all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the
enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real
estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and
corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any
question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought
to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the
exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by the regular courts

As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada: The argument
that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the
provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This
quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident
of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities
falling under their particular expertise.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such
powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts, One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private
rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable
only by our regular courts.

The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean,
however, that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall
under its jurisdiction. HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by
subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this
can be found in the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly
qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by
subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project
developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy of the law,
which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and
business.

The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a case filed by the
developer is when said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim
to a pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision
lot or condominium unit.

In the present case, CGA is unquestionably the buyer of a subdivision lot
from the respondents, who sold the property in their capacities as
owner and developer.

We view CGA's contention that the CA erred in applying Article
1191 of the Civil Code as basis for the contract's rescission to be a
negligible point. Regardless of whether the rescission of contract is
based on Article 1191 or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that
what CGA principally wants is a refund of all payments it already
made to the respondents. This intent, amply articulated in its
complaint, places its action within the ambit of the HLURB's exclusive
jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts. Accordingly,
CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the
proper jurisdiction.

LOLITA DADUBO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and the

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 106498. June 28, 1993
CRUZ, J

SYLLABUS:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; FINDINGS
OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; CONTROLLING ON THE
REVIEWING AUTHORITY IF BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if
based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to
substitute it own judgment for that of the administrative agency on
the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse
of discretion, fraud or error of law.

THE CHARGE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE; THE ALLEGATION
OF THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS CONTROLLING, NOT THE
DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE. It is true that the petitioner
was formally charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the bank and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless,
the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her
guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which is unquestionably
prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. The charge against the
respondent in an administrative case need not de drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is
sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge
against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts
complained of, not the designation of the offense.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst and Rosario
B. Cidro, Cash Supervisor, of the Development Bank of the
Philippines, Borongan Branch were administratively charged with
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charges
were based on reports on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00
from Savings Account No. 87-692 in the name of Eric Tiu, Edgar
Tiu, and/or Pilar Tiu.

The formal investigations revealed that in the morning of August 13,
1987, Erlinda Veloso, authorized representative of the Tius,
presented an undated withdrawal slip for P60K. Dadubo, as acting
teller, prepared the corresponding ticket and voucher in the name of
the cash supervisor, Rosario Cidro. Dadubo initialed the withdrawal
slip, ticket and voucher, all dated August 13, 1987, and passed on to
Cidro all the documents on the said transaction. These were then
forwarded to the accountant, Dorado, who signed the ledger card
and passbook, Babaylon initialed the withdrawal slip and returned
the documents to Dorado, who approved the withdrawal and
thereafter disbursed the P60,000.00 to Veloso. The Received
payment portion of the withdrawal slip was signed by Veloso but
Cidro, who disbursed the amount, failed to initial the passbook.

After banking hours, another withdrawal slip was presented by
Feliciano Bugtas, Jr., also an employee of the Tius. This was the
second P60K withdrawal. Veloso did not know about it. The
withdrawal slip was processed and approved on the same day,
August 13, 1987. The space Posted by was initialed by Babaylon but
no posting was actually made because the passbook was not
presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated August 13, 1987, all
other supporting documents were dated August 14, 1987, this being
a withdrawal ABH.

The following day, prior to the payment of the ABH withdrawal,
Veloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for P60K. This

was the third withdrawal. The withdrawal slip was received by

Dorado, who handed it to Dadubo. At that time, Cidro was encashing
the check to satisfy the ABH withdrawal. When she returned from
the bank, she paid this withdrawal to Veloso, who thought that what
she was collecting was the P60K corresponding to the withdrawal
slip she presented that morning.

When Dadubo informed Cidro about the third withdrawal, till
money of P100K was made to service it. Prior to the payment of the
third P60K withdrawal, Veloso came back and presented another
withdrawal slip for P40K. The petitioner claimed she disbursed
P100K to Veloso, covering the third P60K and the P40K
withdrawals. On the other hand, Veloso testified that she received
only P40K from the petitioner. She acknowledged receipt of the
amount by signing the withdrawal slip and indicating opposite her
signature the amount of P40K. That left the balance of P60,000.00
unaccounted for and directly imputable to Dadubo.

On the basis of these findings, DBP found Dadubo guilty of
dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds. She was penalized with
dismissal from the service. Cidro was adjudged guilty of gross
neglect of duty and fined in an amount equivalent to one month
basic salary, payable through salary deductions in not more than 12
installments.

Dadubo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), 7
which affirmed the decision of the DBP. was a necessary
consequence of the evidence.

However, DBP was reversed by the Civil Service Commission which
reduced Dadubo's penalty to suspension for six months on the
ground that: Although Dadubo made alterations on the dates in the
Ledger Card from August 13 to August 14, the fact remains that the
bank was defrauded on account of said ABH withdrawal (for) which
Cidro is held responsible and accordingly found guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Inefficiency and Incompetence in the
Performance of Official Duty. It was also Dadubo who reported on
the irreconcilable P60,000.00. The most that Dadubo could be
charged with is willful violation of office regulation when she
undertook reconciliation for under the Bank Manual the tellers are
not allowed access to the savings account ledger cards.

Respondent DBP moved for reconsideration. On July 16, 1992, the
Commissionpromulgated Resolution affirming the earlier findings of
the DBP as to Dadubo's guilt.

Dadubo has brought her case to this Court in this petitioner

for certiorari. She claims that CSC Resolution No. 92-878
failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
the decision is based

ISSUE: W/N SC CAN REVIEW FACTS OF ADMIN BODIES

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is
that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based
on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to
substitute it own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters
within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can

only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,

fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown
in this case.

Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was,
to repeat, the prerogative of the administrative body,
subject to reversal only upon a clear showing of
arbitrariness. The rejection of the affidavit of Ballicud, for
example, was not improper because there was nothing in
that document showing that the petitioner did not
embezzle the P60,000.00.

It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and not
specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the
allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved
her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which is
unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the bank.
The charge against the respondent in an administrative
case need not de drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that
he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him;
what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained
of, not the designation of the offense.

We must also dismiss the petitioner's complaint that CSC
Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the
constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which a decision is based. We have
held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and
not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service
Commission.

We find no justification to nullify or modify the questioned
resolution. It would perhaps have been more thorough if
certain other officers of the bank had been also investigated
for their part in the anomalous transaction. But that matter is
not before this Court and cannot be resolved by us at this
time.
RULING: the petition is DISMISSED for lack of a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civil
Service Commission in issuing the questioned resolutions.

LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., vs. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ

ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the
Court of First Instance of Agusan and AGO TIMBER
CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-30637. July 16, 1987

TEEHANKEE, C.J;

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE;

BUREAU OF FORESTRY; VESTED WITH THE JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY OVER DEMARCATION OF ALL PUBLIC
FOREST AND FOREST RESERVES. Respondent Judge erred
in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent
Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct
boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue
had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office
of the President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry,
the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation,
protection, management, reproduction, reforestation,
occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves
and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for
the taking of forest products, including stone and earth
therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the
decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the
public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the
Office of the President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS OF JUSTICE DEVOID OF
JURISDICTION
TO
TAKE
COGNIZANCE
PURELY
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. In giving due course to the
complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily
have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented
in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to
consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and
passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to
substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a
better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of
the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a
posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine
that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with
purely administrative matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise
unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they
have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that
their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose

licensed areas are adjacent to each other. Since the
concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to
each other, they have a common boundary the Agusan-
Surigao Provincial boundary whereby the eastern
boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner
Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports of
encroachment by both parties on each other's concession
areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to

establish on the ground the common boundary of their

respective concession areas.

Respondent Ago appealed in the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then
Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose
Y. Feliciano, set aside the appealed decision of the Director
of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of
the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the
green line on the same sketch which had been made an
integral part of the appealed decision."

Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President
where the ruling of the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources was affirmed. On motion for
reconsideration, the Office of the President issued another
decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant
Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and
overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in
toto and reinstating the decision, dated March 20, 1961, of
the Director of Forestry.

On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago
Timber Corporation, as plaintiff, in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan for "Determination of Correct Boundary
Line of License Timber Areas and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same
question raised and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268
and insisting that "a judicial review of such divergent
administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine
the correct boundary line of the licensed areas in question.

On November 10, 1968, defendant Lianga (herein
petitioner) moved for dismissal of the complaint and for
dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds
that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent
public officials and respondent corporation.

ISSUE; W/N CFI OF AGUSAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
CASE

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the
complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the
determination anew of the correct boundary line of its
licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of
the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of
Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction,
reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and
forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game

and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including

stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or
modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when
advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn
appealable to the Office of the President.

In giving due course to the complaint below, the
respondent court would necessarily have to assess and
evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the
administrative proceedings, which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to
consider and weigh again the evidence already presented
and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to
substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a
better position to consider and weigh the same in the light
of the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a
posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled
doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not
interfere with purely administrative matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess or
lack of jurisdiction.

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines
in an administrative office the power to determine
particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be
presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over
the courts.

The general rule, under the principles of administrative law
in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts,
except when the former have acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect
but at times even finality of such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the Court, "in
this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable."

The Court went on to say that, "(I)n the case of Espinosa, et
al. v. Makalintal, et al. (79 Phil. 134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we
held that the powers granted to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law
regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting
of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts or approving,
rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling applications or deciding
conflicting applications, are all executive and
administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized principle

that purely administrative and discretionary functions may

not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have
no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of
the administrative departments of the government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of
judgment or discretion, and findings of act. Findings of fact
by an administrative board, agency or official, following a
hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be
disturbed except where the board, agency or official has
gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised
unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion. And we have repeatedly held that there is grave
abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of
certiorari only when there is capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
(Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Tan vs.
People, 88 Phil. 609)"

RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. The restraining order heretofore
issued by the Court against enforcement of the preliminary
injunction and related orders issued by respondent judge is
the case below is made permanent and the respondent
judge or whoever has taken his place is hereby ordered to
dismiss Civil Case No. 1253