Solid Homes, Inc. vs.

Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989)

FACTS:
Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure
to deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid
Homes contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA)
pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to
NHA.
ISSUE:
W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages
HELD:
SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction.
In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this
case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the
exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become
necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation
of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they
can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally
construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with
the legislative purpose.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission

14 SCRA 620 (1965)
FACTS:
The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to
operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board,
securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.
Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the
Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory
and unjust. The Commissions order or resolution would make impossible, for all
practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
permission amounted to prohibition.
Issue:
Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?
Held:
None.
1.

Test for determining the existence of authority

The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against
double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department
Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities
Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition
but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.
2.

Commission without power to impose prohibition

The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which
results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that
an administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by
statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the
license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against
double listing.

TAULE vs. SANTOS August 12, 1991 G. R. No. 90336

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent
Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Facts:
An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council
(FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the
said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.
Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its
nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted.
Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing
respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan
affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in
Catanduanes.
Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election
and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by
the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent
Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.
Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the FABC.
2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election
protest.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is
SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election

on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted
immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision
over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the
Administrative Code.
It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the
COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.
2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of
the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan
consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said
sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers
of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If
said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the
sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore,
respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of
the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not
complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the VicePresident shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum."
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President
presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman
of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear
violation of the said mandatory provision.
Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that
public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June
7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election.
The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does
not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of
barangay councils.

CARIO V. CHR 204 SCRA 546

Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest
the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass
actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education
served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee,
said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of
Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the
meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of
the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to
SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-towork orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-

judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.

Investigate vs. Adjudicate

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve

or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their

classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or
not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the
Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.