1.

CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS (ARTS 19-21)

a. ABUSE OF RIGHT (ART 19)

G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY
OF
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

THE

EAST, petitioner,

FACTS:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade

He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos
Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee.
He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade

In the meantime, the plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988)

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. At
the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however the following
annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his
Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.

He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives
who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination.

He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar
review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review
class and was not able to take the bar examination

respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights
when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's
negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

TC decided in favor of Jader and CA affirmed the decision with modification awarding the
latter moral damages

ISSUE: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?

HELD:

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education

is entered into between said institution and the student.
The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein
the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot
be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established
for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article
19 of the Civil Code.
The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by
not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an
act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is
engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law
Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for
without the latter, the former are useless
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will
not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after
graduation of an LL.B. graduate.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered

shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations.
At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed
all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically
those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not
being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements
including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as
a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and
reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY

one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him
by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced
leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias
was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of
his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to
determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose
G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This
report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending

Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

another investigation was made reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias
also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact
that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).lwph1

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners
that his employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

HELD

Art 19 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does
not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because of Article 21 of the Civil Code
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes

the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case.

And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.

But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to
uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.

The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of
the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners
clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter
the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 147076

June 17, 2004

METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS
vs.
ACT THEATER, INC., respondent.

AND

SEWERAGE

SYSTEM, petitioner,

FACT

On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely,
Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by
members of the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation

of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.

subsequently criminally charged (Criminal Case
account of the incident, the respondents
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint
Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.

876. The respondents employees were

No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On
water service connection was cut off.
for injunction with damages (Civil Case No.

In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the
petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondents
water service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and
sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons but in the surrounding premises as well,
were adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay
damages.

After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision. in the criminal case, the accused were
acquitted for failure of of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. However, In the civil case, MWSS was ordered to pay the plaintiff actual
and compensatory damages.

Petitioner appealed to CA but it was dismissed. . According to the CA, the court a
quo correctly found that the petitioners act of cutting off the respondents water service
connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying
the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: whether or not the honorable court of appeal[s] correctly applied the provision of article 19
of the new civil code without considering the applicable provision of article 429 of the same code

HELD

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or

decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, 6 constitutive of a legally enforceable
claim of one person against the other.7

Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain
consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be
exercised.8

Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of ones rights

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. 9 In this case,
the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the
petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water service connection. As correctly
found by the appellate court:

While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the
disconnection of the latters water services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its
assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated badly on the
flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Acts water services were cut at
midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiffappellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a
consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number of
days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for
the restoration of their water services.

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO

R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS,
JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM,
CESAR
T.
LIBI,
RAMONTITO* E.
GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA,
Petitioners,
-versusRICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 160273

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 18, 2008

FACTS:

Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI,
designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations
Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The
designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of Directors.

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership

Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3
million.Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate
No. 1446 to respondent

on August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCIs corporate
secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary
membership.

Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration for several
times but the latter remained silent.

on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners

RTC decided in its favor ordering CCCI to pay the former actual, moral, compensatory
damages including attorneys fees and litigation expenses

On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003,
affirmed the trial courts Decision with modification

ISSUE: whether in disapproving respondents application for proprietary membership with CCCI,
petitioners are liable to respondent for damages,

HELD:

In rejecting respondents application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners

violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad
faith in disapproving respondents applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or
public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring
the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not
printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed
thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of
votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to
economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside
from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20)
years before respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and
exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have
enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application
was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members
was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an
objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did
not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a
special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with
courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have informed him why his application
was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the
proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible

Heirs
of
PURISIMA
NALA,
represented by their attorney-in-fact
EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 161188

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

-versus-

CHICO-NAZARIO,
REYES, and
BRION,* JJ.

ARTEMIO CABANSAG,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 13, 2008

FACTS

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October
1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from
spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part
of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he
received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf
of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will
be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such
demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.[3]
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely
acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of
ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by
her late husband, EulogioDuyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400square meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property
is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses
Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies. [4]

After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in
favor of respondent.

The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19, 2002 affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification

ISSUE: WON Art 19 applies in this case

HELD

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel,
Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In
the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was
owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the
same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them
by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only
after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such

sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to
the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent
any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to
petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the
sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters;
however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
[14]
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.[15]
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable
rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right
does no injury.[16] Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne
solely by him.

b. ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES (ART 21)

G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

TANJANCO, petitioner,

FACTS

from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959,
through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having
carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign
her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that
thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a
decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to
pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

RTC dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action.

in its appeal to CA, it held that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child
as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action
for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
origin to proceed with the case.

ISSUE: WON no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code

HELD

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted
by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil
Code.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM
SHOOKAT
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS

BAKSH, petitioner,

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the
latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime
in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her;
as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable.

petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged
as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to
or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him
by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00
as moral damages.

ISSUE: whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal

remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable
acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

c. SEDUCTION AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

G.R. No. L-17396

May 30, 1962

CECILIO
PE,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

ET

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

FACTS

Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay
in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was
staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman
named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity
in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also
in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each
other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the
extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs
reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence
at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said
house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside
Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size,
was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have
a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

ISSUE: WON Art 21 applies in the case at bar

HELD

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any
other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was

allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of
her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When
the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

7. TORT AND INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

DEFAMATION, FRAUD AND PHYSICAL INJURIES
G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989
ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br.
XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN and ROLANDO
GATMAITAN, respondents.
FACTS:

This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the now
defunct Anti-Smuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila,
pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of Customs of
Manila on April 20, 1976. 1 The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly
smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong.
These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of
Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and
other charges thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official
receipts. Only a few items "of no commercial value" were ordered confiscated. 2

While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the
seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976, to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he
complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible
therefore be investigated.

The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged
were all exonerated in a decision dated August 25, 1976. 4 Not satisfied with what he later
described as a "home town decision," the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a
complaint for robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.
This was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest fiscal who said that the case

might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 5 The petitioner says he then went
to Camp Aguinaldo but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when lie was told
that it would take about a year to complete the preliminary investigation alone.6 The owners
of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which the petitioner filed
for them in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 7,1976. 7

Three days later, there appeared in the June 10, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the
following report: 8

TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL

Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong, have filed a case for damages
against a customs official and 11 agents of the government's anti-smuggling action center ASAC
in connection with a raid conducted in their hotel rooms, more than a month ago.

Esteban Manuel filed the case in behalf of the plaintiffs composed of Manila resident Ng
Tee, and Hong Kong visitors Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying and Lee Kee Ming who came to
the Philippines to visit their relatives and friends.

The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace,
bracelet and wrist watch. They allegedly seized many articles valued at P27,000 which
have remained unaccounted for in the list submitted by the defendants as the inventory
of the items confiscated.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the
petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 9 A
reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the
charge; all it said was that they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner
himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter of
April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item
in the Bulletin Today.

ISSUE: WON the abovequoted article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made
in good faith and without comments or remarks
HELD

the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in
court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision
promulgated should be covered by the privilege. (Emphasis provided)

It may also be argued that the complaint, standing by itself, is a public record and may
be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court unless the court
directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.

It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are
not absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is presumed is not
malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption
by proof that the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the
charge must fail.

When in the information itself it appears that the communication alleged to be libelous is
contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at
once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence before
he can raise the question of privilege. And if, added to this, the questioned imputations
appear to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based
on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a
right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's
court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not
constitute an offense of libel.

As has already been said by this Court: As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency
necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be
liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in
relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety. Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court
committed a reversible error in this case of finding that the allegations in the information
itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication justifying the dismissal of
the case.

The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on the wider guarantee of
freedom of expression as an institution of all republican societies. This in turn is
predicated on the proposition that the ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to involve
himself in matters that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform himself
of such matters.

It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not only a right but a responsibility
of the highest order that should not be shirked for fear of official reprisal or because of
mere civic lethargy. Whenever the citizen discovers official anomaly, it is his duty to
expose and denounce it, that the culprits may be punished and the public service
cleansed even as the rights violated are vindicated or redressed. It can never be
overstressed that indifference to ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration
of corruption will breed more corruption. The sins of the public service are imputable not
only to those who actually commit them but also to those who by their silence or inaction
permit and encourage their commission.

The responsibility to review the conduct of the government functionaries is especially

addressed to the lawyer because his training enables him, better than most citizens, to
determine if the law has been violated or irregularities have been committed, and to take
the needed steps to remedy the wrong and punish the guilty.

It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice, that even after the seizure
proceedings had been concluded in favor of the petitioner's clients, he pursued their
complaint against the ASAC agents in the fiscal's office in Manila and then with the
military authorities in Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing of the civil case for
damages in the court of first instance of Manila.

It would be a sad day indeed if for denouncing venality in government, the citizen could
be called to task and be himself punished on the ground of malicious defamation. If
every accuser were himself to be accused for discharging his duty as he sees it, then will
the wrong-doer have been granted in effect, and by this Court no less, an undeserved

immunity for his misdeeds or omissions. The private individual would be barred from
complaining about public misconduct. Every criticism he makes would be tainted with
malice and pronounced as criminal. The next step may well be a conspiracy among those
in the government to cover up each other's faults and to insulate themselves from the
legitimate efforts of the people to question their conduct.

The second exception is justified under the right of every citizen to be informed on
matters of public interest, which, significantly, was first recognized in the 1973
Constitution. Even if it were not, the right would still be embraced in the broader
safeguard of freedom of expression, for the simple reason that the right to speak
intelligently on "matters that touch the existing order" necessarily imports the
availability of adequate official information on such matters. Surely, the exercise of such
right cannot inspire belief if based only on conjectures and rumors and half-truths
because direct access to the facts is not allowed to the ordinary citizen.

This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass media, which have
fortunately resumed their roles as an independent conduit of information between the
government and the people. It is the recognized duty of the media to report to the public
what is going on in the government, including the proceedings in any of its departments
or agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or confidentiality when
disclosure may be prohibited.To protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law
says that as long as the account is a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made
without any remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not presumed.
Its publication is encouraged rather than suppressed or punished.

This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on censorship in general as an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression, Censorship presumes malice at
the outset, It prevents inquiry into public affairs and curtails their disclosure and
discussion, leaving the people in the dark as to what is happening in the public service.
By locking the public portals to the citizen, who can only guess at the goings on in the
forbidden precints, censorship separates the people from their government. This
certainly should not be permitted. "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people," declared Justice Sutherland of the U.S.
Supreme Court. "To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."

There is here a manifest effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity
in accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed special privileges and perhaps
also immunities during those oppressive times. The non-inclusion of the periodicals
was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of
respect for freedom of expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties
during the past despotism.