MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS

Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM

G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is
meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers
by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19),treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section
20), budgetary power(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account

known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fasttracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid
being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.)

Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo
presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a
government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the
1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo
government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the
former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada)
truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is
legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted
statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all
these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for
the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality
test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his
alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to
hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another).

Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar

167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit
Must Be Invoked by the President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which
provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow
the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct
the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue
squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to
officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited
citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the
guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be
lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with
respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and
available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to
have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and

Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned
according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2,
2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and
filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC
2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of
Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private
respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.
II. THE ISSUE

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for any re-election?

III. THE RULING

[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.]

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010
elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be

premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because

the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has
been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who
has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or
practical purpose.

G. R. No. 85468, September 07,

1989
DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAY
AN,Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor
FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),
Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million
worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and
Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and
a preliminary investigation was conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of
the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under
the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a
business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of
which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council,
which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since
there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against
him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is
unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same
subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary
investigation.

HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the
Supreme Court.

RATIO:

(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President,
the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their)
tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.

(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial
over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time
shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be
conducted.

(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if
there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite
the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation.

Civil Liberties Union vs

Executive Secretary
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such
law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly

practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called
Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for
all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions thatCabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on
May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments,
they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures,
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment
of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the
JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so
once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another
part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the
short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article
VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from
the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor
of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to

appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in

Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for
prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments
to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said
petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard
in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2)
great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in
the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief
Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must
be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of
prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing

laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express
their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W.,
769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides thatSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or
Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister,
members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies,
Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective
offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that
the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973
Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of
Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When
the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a
feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over
presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
ThusMr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that
I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on
but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed
and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7,
Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval
captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to
put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same

page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et

cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The
first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on
line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what
would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by
deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely
staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude
of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who
only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn
of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz?
The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not
the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer
of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the
Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this
matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.

MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.

MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will
first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such
that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by
the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and
bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment
on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on
line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED
IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.

FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16

is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words
I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the
Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those
officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and
the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification
made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed
amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the
Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can
be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-

He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in
the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of
the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in
addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which
meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the
President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentenceRather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the
first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to
each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with
Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so,
because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly
justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if
such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art.
VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and
deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the
first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need
of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to
presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they
were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on
or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
Presidentalone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this
is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the
President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word
"alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study
of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip
or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision
appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes
practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
thus3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment
of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,

because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint
is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of
par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22
June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and
one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter
known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall
each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by
existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the
proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No.
34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now
reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner
of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis
supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be
read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment
he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.