G.R. No.

L-45674

May 30, 1983

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25,
1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of the crime
of simple slander instead of grave oral defamation as the former Court of First Instance has
held, and imposed on him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and ordered them to pay complainant the amount of P1,000.00 as moral
damages.

On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the
Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on
December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in
the former Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of
grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court, was
amended by adding the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly
constituting the crime of slander to wit:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the
crime of Grave Oral Defamation, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the municipality of Tanay, province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed
accused conspiring and confederating together, with the deliberate intent of bringing one Dr.
Patrocinio Angeles into public discredit, disrepute and contempt, after having knowledge
that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was a former patient of the Morong Emergency
Hospital was operated thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak and utter the following insulting and
defamatory words and expressions, to wit:

Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz):

Your wife should not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all that I should have done
was to do a curretage raspa on her.

Atty. Bernardino:

Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They are just bold.

Dr. Francisco:

The operation was unusual.

Atty. Bernardino:

The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for murder thru reckless
imprudence. The doctors there are no good. They are not surgeons.

thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the attending physician of
the wife of Romulo Cruz and one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital,
professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence thus casting public contempt and
ridicule upon the reputation of the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles.

Contrary to law.

Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966,

(Sgd.) ZENAIDA S. BALTAZAR

Special Counsel

On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused Harry
Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced each of
them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and
one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and each of the accused was directed to pay
complainant t the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court as already stated was
modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander.

As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows:

The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been
suffering from a vaginal bleeding since November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr.
Custodio about her ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days; that
thereafter her bleeding recurred that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her

that if her bleeding continued she should go to a hospital; that her bleeding continued so on
December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital that she was
attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her ailment was tentatively
diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an x-ray examination
conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs.
Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of fresh blood on December
11, 1965; that as the bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complaint Dr.
Patrocinio ; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed that
the operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested, that on December 26, 1965 at
about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry
Bernardino together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs.
Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband
Romulo Cruz about her operation; that the couple informed the two that they are satisfied
with the operation; that in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco
said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated
on and that if he were the one he would not conduct an operation but only curretage
(raspahin); that on the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino that the physicians
in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons
and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless
imprudence; that the accused Dr. Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical
Staff on the Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private patients
who needed the facility of the hospital for proper management; that, however, on December
15, 1965 his membership in the said staff was cancelled by the Credential Committee of said
hospital at a meeting called for that purpose by the complainant Dr. Angeles who was then
the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the accused Harry Bernardino, as
counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the ouster of Dr. Angeles as Director of the
Morong Emergency Hospital; that the case was bitterly contested that it even reached the
Office of the President; that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the accused Atty.
Bernardino as Mayor of Morong, Rizal he caused the passage of a resolution wherein he was
given authority to recommend all charity cases for admission to the Morong Emergency
Hospital and that this resolution, however, was ignored by the complaint Dr. Angeles in
accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services.

The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Eastern
District of Rizal Medical Society, the accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be
done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles
which resulted in the removal of triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the
other accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take; that upon the advice of accused
Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr. Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a
Committee member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went on December 26, 1965 to
Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz; that they interviewed the spouses Romulo
Cruz and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13,
1965; that in that interview the two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to
the Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding investigation; and that after the
interview with the Cruz spouses Dr. Golla and the accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza,
in coming president of the Rizal Medical Society on December 27, 1965, to take up the
matter with him but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal Medical
Society, which they did.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while it is true that the
statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact finding interview pursuant to
the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of bounds by imputing to the
complainant acts which are not only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be
prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that the defamation committed by the
accused cannot be considered as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was
said of the complainant was that he should not have performed the operation, and that he
could be prosecuted for murder through reckless imprudence.

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was instituted. While
the case was pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died, hence in the
resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned.

Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal raises several questions. In
synthesis, they are:

1.
Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals to be the
offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed;

2.
Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be considered
libelous;

3.

Whether or not there was conspiracy;

4.
Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that petitioners acted with
"malice" is fatal; and

5.
Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the witnesses
for the prosecution.

As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already been dismissed, We shall discuss
only those matters as may be pertinent to petitioner Francisco.

Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found that the offense committed was
the lesser offense of simple slander, which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, the said court should have dismissed the case, and sustained the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that said crime had already prescribed. He pointed
out the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, and the
information charging the accused of the greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed
with the court more than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966.

Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that for the purpose of determining
the proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense
charged in the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the
accused, as said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander. Hence, the
period of prescription here should be six (6) months.

Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the complaint was filed by the offended party
before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine (39) days after the incident
in question which is still within the prescriptive period. He cited the case of People v. Olarte 1
which overruled the case of People v. del Rosario 2 and held that the filing of the complaint
in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. It makes no difference whether the case was filed in the Fiscal's Office and not in the
Municipal Court as in the Olarte case, since Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not
require that the complaint be one filed in court in order to toll the running of the period.

Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the
offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To
hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the
simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. The principle has the
support of overwhelming authorities in American jurisprudence:

The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is "as a general rule, one
indicted for an offense not barred by limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense
which is so barred, is entitled to discharge", and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 343; "It
frequently happens that a change of felony includes an offense of a lower grade with a
different period of limitation so that, while the felony is not barred, the statute has ran as to
the lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is that if the statute has not run against the
felony, while the lesser offense is barred. the bar cannot be evaded by the defendant for the
felony and convicting him of the lesser offense." 3

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities. or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him."

Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco 4 held that the complaint
or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the
denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so,
according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall
commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or
information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the
accused.

The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in the
Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte case
there was diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. One view declares that the
filing of the complaint with the justice of the (or municipal judge) does in the course of
prescriptive term. This view is found in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases
cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588,
590. The other pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the complainant or
information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on
its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People
v. Coquia, L- 15456, June 29, 1963.

The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the
Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar
reads:

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar,
this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without

distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall
commence to run again when such p terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed
must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or
acquittal if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been
shown.

As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a p investigation, a

proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.

As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:

To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling
also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or
denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to
conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In
chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or
denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals,
besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they
may even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of
First Instance. ... 5

Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the
offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the
Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or
discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for his statements

Your wife would not have been operated, If I were the doctor, all that I should have done was
to do a curretage raspa on her.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The operation was unusual.

are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he committed a
mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco were
but a harmless expression of his opinion on what should have been done in treating her, if

he were the doctor managing her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that
complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient. An
impartial observer would readily note that such remarks do not degrade the competency of
a doctor, for the latter, because of human limitations cannot be expected to be accurate at
all times in the diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs. Hearst Publications,
93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his
profession, and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by
those reasonably skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's wrong
management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be considered libelous. In the
same American case, it was held:

It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the mismanagement of the making of a
wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not of itself actionable. Such a charge implies nothing
more, at most, than ignorance or unskillfulness in that case, and does not materially affect
his reputation as respects his general competency to practice his profession.

To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the management or

treatment of an individual case is not more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors
incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skillfull physician or surgeon may
make mistake on the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general
professional skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in that case
would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the community in his general
professional competency.

We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements could be branded as
libelous. To stigmatize them as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere
criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal liability for slander. His alleged
defamatory remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous
handling of the case.

It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the statements quoted
and stigmatized as defamatory are those only of accused Bernardino. 6 That latter's
statements are what the Solicitor General considered as "strong words that are evidently
serious and damaging." Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the
statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General would like to hold
Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy. Assuming that
Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the
lower court nor the Court of Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit
the alleged crane. This is so because no evidence was offered to show that there was prior
consultation on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those
words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly, each
accused spoke spontaneously and individually.

Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required for establishing it
must be the same as that required to support a finding of guilt for the crime itself 7 which
must be upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 8

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were made on the occasion of the
so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision" is obviously
incompatible with the notion that petitioners had gone to the residence of the Cruz pursuant
to a conspiracy to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to Tanay,
Rizal, having been accepted as a fact by the Court of Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as
respondents now do, that Atty. Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had conspired to slander Dr.
Angeles.

From what has been said, there is no further need to discuss the other issues raised in this
case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano Francisco is hereby acquitted, with
cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17905

January 27, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN MORAN, FRUCTUOSO CANSINO, and HILARIO ODA, defendants-appellants.

Pedro Ma. Sison for appellants.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ARAULLO, C. J.:

On March 31, 1922, the decision of this court in the present case, affirming the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was published, but the term of imprisonment by
the said court upon the accused, for a violation of the Election Law, defined and punished in
section 2639 of the Administrative Code, was increased to six months from which judgment
the present appeal was taken by the accused. The accused, after asking for a
reconsideration of the said decision and a rehearing and pending the resolution on the said
petition, filed a special motion on May 2d of this year, alleging that the crime complained of
had prescribed under the provision of section 71 of Act No. 3030, enacted by the Legislature
on March 9, 1922, and praying that they be absolved from the complaint. Upon this motion
the Attorney-General was heard, having filed an answer and a supplemental answer, with
the corresponding arguments, opposing the same, as well as the accused who filed their
reply thereto and supplementary replies, both parties stating at length the reasons and legal
grounds for their respective contentions.

While it is a rule of general application that unless the defense of prescription is pleaded in
the trial court, it will be deemed to have been waived and cannot later be raised, yet this
rule is not of absolute application in criminal cases, for if the prescription of the crime, as
well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the case
here with regard to the former, be provided by statute after the termination of all the
proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the case has
already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if the
prescription of the crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the State to prosecute and
punish the culprit, it is beyond question that, once the State has lost or waived such right,
the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that the same be dismissed
and that he be absolved from the complaint. And not only that, the right to prosecute and
punish the criminal having been lost by the prescription of the crime expressly provided by
the statute, the State itself, the Government through the proper court, is in duty bound to
make a pronouncement to that effect. Therefore, as on March 9th of this year, 1922, when
Act No. 3030 went into effect, providing in its section 71 that offense resulting from the
violations thereof shall prescribe one year after their commission, the accused and the
Attorney-General had already filed their respective briefs in this court for the prosecution of
the appeal taken from the judgment of the court below, and the hearing of the case had
already been held, this court itself, without the necessity of any motion of the accused, or of

the Attorney-General, should have declared the crime in question to have prescribed, in view
of the provision of said section. Consequently, as this court had not up to that time made
such pronouncement, the accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they have done in
their motion of May 2d of this year, that the offense having prescribed, they be absolved
from the complaint. This duty is imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that
the offense appears to have prescribed under the provision of the law. With particular
reference to the present case, this conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well
as the spirit of the provisions of the Penal Code relative to prescription, and from that of
section 71 of the aforesaid Act No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed,
the State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to punish him, and if he has already
been punished, it has no right to continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition
of the penalty. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or
misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence, would be useless and nugatory if the
courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not
the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of
the crime and the penalty.

That such is the duty of the courts of justice and has been so recognized by this court, is
shown by the decision in the case of United States vs. Rama, R. G. No. 16247,1 for the crime
of murder of four persons, committed in the month of July, 1902, in the province of Cebu, in
which one of the accused was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of the said province
to death and the other two to life imprisonment. That case was brought to this court on
appeal and, after the filing of the respective briefs of the accused and the Attorney-General
a hearing was had. No allegations was made as to the prescription of the crime, yet this
court rendered a decision (not yet published in the Official Gazette) wherein, after finding
that two crimes of murder and two of homicide had been committed and that seventeen
years had already elapsed from the commission of the latter to the institution of the judicial
proceeding for the investigation and punishment thereof, that is, more than the fifteen years
fixed by lay for the prescription of the crime of homicide, this court held that the said two
crimes of homicide had prescribed and the criminal responsibility of the three accused for
the said crimes extinguished, convicting the accused only of the two crimes of murder. There
is, therefore, on reason whatsoever why the allegation of prescription made by the accused
in their motion of the 2d of May of this year cannot legally be considered; on the contrary,
said motion must be decided before the petition for the reconsideration of the decision
published on the 31st of March of last year, and for a rehearing of the case, or, to be more
exact, the said petition must be ignored, for the resolution of the aforesaid motion, if
favorable to the accused, would put an end to the proceeding right at its present stage.

The first question to be decided, in connection with the contention of the accused, is
whether or not the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that Act
and not to any other, for said section 71 says: "Offenses resulting from violations of this Act
shall prescribe one year after their commission," and section 72 adds: "This Act shall take
effect on its approval."

It is enough to take into consideration the fact that Act No. 3030, is, as its title indicates,
amendatory to several sections and parts of sections of chapter 18 of the Administrative
Code, known as the Election Law, and of chapter 65 on penalties for the violation of various
administrative laws, among them, those of the Election Law itself, included in said chapter
18 of the Administrative Code, in order to understand that when the Legislature used the
words "This Act," that is, Act No. 3030, it referred, necessarily, to the Election Law included
in various sections and provisions of the aforesaid two chapters of the above-mentioned
Code, that is, the Election Law prior to Act No. 3030, under which the herein accused were
convicted. One needs but examine one by one all the sections of said Act No. 3030, each of
which declares the sense in which each of the sections included in said chapters in
amended, in order to convince himself that said Act No. 3030 is similar to the law that
preceded it, with the amendments and some additions thereto. If the Legislature had passed
and enacted a new Election Law different from that contained in the above-mentioned
chapters of the Administrative Code, then it may be said that the phrase "This Act" can in no
way refer to the prior Election Law. Furthermore, if the offenses resulting from the violations

of the Election Law, the provisions of which are contained in the aforesaid chapters of the
Administrative Code, are the same offenses provided for in Act No. 3030, though with some
modifications in the details as to some of them and with increase in the penalty, it cannot be
denied that when the Legislature used the words "This Act" in section 71 of Act No. 3030,
wherein it is provided that said offenses shall prescribe one year after their commission, it
necessarily referred to offenses resulting from the violations of the former Election Law, as
amended by said Act No. 3030. Besides, one of the objects of this Act, as its title indicates, is
to make more effective the provisions and the purposes of the former Law contained in the
Administrative Code; so that Act No. 3030 rather than being an integral part of the former
election law is in conjunction with the latter the only Election Law in force; and any other
interpretation to the contrary of the phrase "This Act" cannot, in our opinion, be accepted as
good logic and in accordance with the principles of sound reasoning.

It is true that in the next section, 72, it is provided that said Act No. 3030 shall take effect on
the date of its approval, which took place on March 9, 1922, but the meaning of such an
expression in connection with prescription is that prescription can be invoked from that date,
as was done by the accused, and not that such provision may have a retroactive effect from
that same date.

In this connection, there arises the second question as to whether or not the provision of
article 22 of the Penal Code above cited, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to the defendant in a criminal action for a felony or misdemeanor, is
applicable to crimes penalized by special laws, as does Act No. 3030, account being taken of
the fact that, under article 7 of the Penal Code, offenses punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of the said code.

Several decisions have been rendered by this court on this question in which the
distinguished members of this court hold opposite views. Among those may be cited the
case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), which is cited in a later case, United States vs.
Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86), in which case this court did not lay down a definite rule, but
expressly reserved its opinion as to whether or not article 22 of the Penal Code above
referred to was applicable. And it was so recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in an appeal taken by writ of error by the accused, Ong Chang Wing (40 Phil., 1046),
said high court having limited itself to declaring that the accused, not having been convicted
by this court of an offense which was not punishable when committed, and this court having
held only that the right to impose the penalty prescribed by the Penal Code of the
Philippines had not been lost by the subsequent statute, Act No. 1757, of the Philippine
Commission, the accused had not been denied due process of law, for as the Supreme Court
of the United States says in its decision, the duty of that court in that case was to determine
whether or not the judgment of this court amounted to a denial of due process of law.
Therefore, the decision rendered in those two cases cannot be invoked in the one now
before us.

In the case of United States vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86) and United States vs. Calaguas
(14 Phil., 739), cited also in support of the contrary opinion, as the offenses therein involved
were penalized by special laws, that is, by the Opium Law, in the former, and by the Law of
Police and Railroad Preservation, in the latter, this court held, as it could not have done
otherwise, that, under article 7 of the Penal Code, the provisions of the said Code were not
applicable to those offenses, inasmuch as said offenses were penalized by the said law
which prescribed a special and definite penalty for said offenses, but in those cases said
article 7 of the Penal Code was not interpreted in connection with the application of article
22 of the same Code, providing for the retroactivity of penal laws favorable to persons
accused of a felony or misdemeanor. Wherefore neither can the holding of this court in those
cases have any application to the one before us.

The case in which this court plainly and definitely decided the question under consideration
is that of United States vs. Parrone (24 Phil., 29). There the said accused was charged with

the crime of falsification of a cedula certificate, definite and punished in section 55 of Act
No. 1189 of the Philippine Commission, but before the conviction of the accused, said Act
was amended by Act No. 2126 of the Philippine Legislature, which prescribed a lesser
penalty than the previous Act, and this court, after a careful perusal of all its decisions
dealing with that question, as above indicated, and a luminous and exhaustive discussion on
the interpretation of article 7 of the same Code in connection with the retroactivity of the
penalty, in so far as it is favorable to the accused, held, upon the appeal taken by the said
accused from the judgment of the court below, that, under the provisions of article 22 of the
Penal Code, the penalty provided in Act No. 2126, which was later than Act No. 1189, was
the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused in that case. In the course of that
decision, the court said:

Considering the provision of article 7 of the Penal Code, are the provisions of article 22 of the
same Code applicable to the penal laws of the Philippine Islands other than the provisions of
the Penal Code? Article 22 is found in chapter 1 of title 3 of the Penal Code. Said chapter is
entitled "Penalties in General". Article 21 of said title and chapter provides that "no felony or
misdemeanor shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission." This article is general in its provisions and in effect prohibits the Government
from punishing any person for any felony or misdemeanor with any penalty which has not
been prescribed by the law. It (art. 21), therefore, can have no application to any of the
provisions of the Penal Code for the reason that for every felony or misdemeanor defined in
the Penal Code a penalty has been prescribed.

The provisions of article 21 can only be invoked, therefore, when a person is being tried for a
felony or a misdemeanor for which no penalty has been prescribed by law. Article 21 is not a
penal provision. It neither defines a crime nor provides a punishment for one. It has simply
announced the policy of the Government with reference to the punishment of alleged
criminal acts. It is a guaranty to the citizen of the State that no act of his will be considered
criminal until after the Government has made it so by law and has provided a penalty. It (art.
21) is a declaration that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution for any act of his
until after the State has defined the misdemeanor or crime and has fixed a penalty therefor.
The doctrine announcement by this section has been considered of so much importance to
the citizen of a State that many of the States of the Union have been pleased to include its
precepts in their constitutions or have so declared by express provision of law.

Article 22 provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same." This provision
clearly has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal Code. Its (art. 22) application
to the Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or subsequent law is under
consideration. It must necessary relate (1) to penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code; or
(2) to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code, in which the penalty was more favorable
to the accused. Rule 80, Ley Provisional para la aplicacion de las disposiciones del Codigo
Penal. Under the provisions of said article 22, if a crime had been committed prior to the
date of the Penal Code the punishment for which was more favorable to the accused than
the provisions of the Penal Code, it is believed that the accused might invoke the provisions
of said article (22) even though he was not placed upon trial until after the Penal Code went
into effect. (U. S. vs. Cuna 2). So also if by an amendment to the Penal Code or by a later
special law the punishment for an act was made less severe than by the provisions of the
Penal Code, then the accused person might invoke the provisions of said article. It appears
to be clear, then, that article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the provisions
of some other penal law than the provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In
other words, the provisions of article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other
penal law. It has no application to the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with
some other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting article 7 of the
Penal Code intended to provide that article 22 should not be applicable to special laws.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that such was the intention of the legislature, in view of
the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain, whose authority as regards the
application and interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code of the Philippines is
unquestionable, because said Code is the same as that of Spain. In two cases (decisions of
July 13, 1889 and April 26, 1892), among others decided by that court, in which article 22 of
the Penal Code was alleged to have been violated by the imposition of the penalty of prison
correccional prescribed by the said Code, instead of prison menor, prescribed by article 168
of the Election Law of August 30, 1870, upon the accused therein, who were found guilty of a
violation of the said Election Law, which, was therefore, a special law in force prior to the
said Penal Code of that same year, the said Code having substitute the penalty of prision
correccional for that of prision menor, said court held that the appeal was not well taken on
the ground that the penalty of prision correccional had taken the place of that of prision
menor prescribed by the Election Law, and while the duration of both penalties was the
same, the correctional penalty was lighter and more advantageous and favorable to the
accused than prision menor, as it was of a less grave nature; so that in those two cases, the
supreme court of Spain not only applied the provisions of the Penal Code to a special law,
but also gave retroactive effect to said provisions on account of being more favorable to the
therein accused, in accordance with the precept of article 22 of the Penal Code. And here we
have a most complete, clear and satisfactory solution of whatever doubt might have arisen
as to the interpretation of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code aforesaid.

It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers only to penalties and is
not applicable to appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of the crime is
intimately connected with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed by the law for the
prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of Book I
of the Penal Code, containing, as its heading indicates, "General Provisions Regarding
Felonies and Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties," without distinguishing
between the penalties and the extinguishing of the criminal responsibility dealt with in said
Title VI of said Book, which title comes next to Title V, treating of the penalties incurred by
those who evade service of sentence and those who, while serving sentence, or after having
been convicted by a final judgment not yet served, commit some other crime. And aside
from this intimate connection between the prescription of the crime and that of the penalty,
a statute declaring the prescription of the crime has no other object and purpose than to
prevent or annul the prosecution of the offender and, in the last analysis, the imposition of
the penalty. Moreover, if the provisions relative to the prescription of ownership and to the
prescription of actions in civil matters are part of the civil law, it cannot be denied that the
provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part
thereof.

With regard to the question whether prescription must be considered as a matter of

procedural or formal law, or as a substantive law for the purpose of the retroactivity of laws,
we must state, with reference to the present case, that the prescription provided in section
71 of Act No. 3030 is of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far as it gives a person
accused of any of the crimes therein referred to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished
after the lapse of the period of one year from the commission of said crimes, within which
the criminal action must be commenced, and of a procedural or adjective law in so far as it
fixes the time within which such action must necessarily be commenced in order that the
prosecution may be legal and the proper penalty may lawfully be imposed. but however said
provision may be considered, the same must have a retroactive effect, as will be seen later
on.

Therefore, as the instant case involves two special laws of the Philippine Legislature, to wit,
the Election Law contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the Administrative Code, and
Act No. 3030 which amended and modified the former, it is evident that the provision
declaring that offenses resulting from the violations of said Act shall prescribe one year after
their commission must have retroactive effect, the same being favorable to the accused.

This, however, is objected to, although it is based on a general principle frequently applied
by many courts of the American Union, and in support of the objection, several decisions of
the said courts and a doctrine concerning the matter found in Corpus Juris (volume 16, p.
222) and in Ruling Case Law are cited, wherein it is established that laws fixing a period of
prescription are not applicable to crimes previously committed, unless by their terms they
are clearly retroactive or contain an express provisions to that effect.

We need not discuss each and every one of the said cases, it being sufficient for our purpose
to take up one of them, namely, that of Martin vs. State ([1859], 24 Tex., 62). There the
Supreme Court of Texas held that as regards crimes and misdemeanors, prescription had no
retroactive effect and that the Statute of Limitations enacted in 1854 could not have the
effect of barring a criminal action instituted within two years after the enactment of said Act,
provided that no period of prescription was fixed in a former law for the crime in question,
that is to say, that prescription cannot be invoked as a bar to a criminal action for an offense
like that of falsification involved in that case, where said action was commenced under a
statute authorizing it and in the old law penalizing that crime no period was fixed for the
prescription thereof. As can be seen from a reading of the context of the decision in the
aforesaid case and the opinion of the writer thereof, said doctrine was announced without
taking into account the difference between the rule governing prescription in criminal
procedure and that applicable to civil actions, but on the contrary, application was made
only of the latter; hence the holding that a special provisions as to prescription was
necessary in the later statute to give it a retroactive effect.

It should be noted, however, that the Chief Justice of that Supreme Court voted vigorously
against the said decision, stating in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion the following:

I . . . am of opinion, that the limitation prescribe to prosecution applies as well to

prosecutions for offenses, committed before the passage of the statute, as afterwards; and
that, as the words of the statute plainly import, the limitation commences to run from the
time of the "commission of the offense," whether that was before or after its passage. The
statute makes no distinction, as respects the limitation; it makes no exception, from its
provision, of offenses previously committed; and I know of no principle, or rule of
construction, which will authorize the court to engraft an exception upon the statute. It is a
statute relating to the remedy, and being enacted for the benefit of persons accused, is not
an ex post facto law. The constitutional inhibition of the enactment of retroactive laws, and
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, has no application to penal statutes. Retroactive
criminal laws, which are forbidden, are those which come under the denomination of ex post
facto laws. There is nothing to prevent statutes, respecting crimes, from being
restrospective, provided they do not come under that denomination.

It is an acknowledged general rule, in the construction of statutes, that they will not be
construed to have a restrospective operation so as to destroy or impair rights of property, or
of action, unless the legislature have plainly expressed such to be their intention. But laws
which affect the remedy merely are not held to be within the rule or the inhibition against
retrospective laws, unless the remedy be entirely taken away, or so restricted, as to impair
the right. Nor, as I conceive, do statutes relating to the punishment of offenses come within
the rule of construction, or the constitutional inhibition, though their effect should be wholly
to defeat a prosecution. On the contrary, laws respecting crimes, whether they relate to the
remedy merely, or to the offense, are, I think, always construed to relate to past, as well as
future offenses, where their operation is in any wise beneficial to the accused; unless the
legislature have plainly declared that they are not to receive such a construction. To give
such effect to laws respecting crimes and punishments, is not to render them retrospective,
or retroactive laws, in the sense of the constitutional inhibition. These terms have no
application to such laws, but relate exclusively to laws affecting civil rights. (De Cordova vs.
City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 470.)

I do not think the reservation contained in the 81st section of the act was intended to have,
or should be construed to have, any effect upon the limitation contained in the 75th section.
That section was intended only to prevent repeals by implication, and to enforce the
observance of the rule, which would have applied on general principles, without its
enactment, that where the act mitigates the punishment, the milder penalty should be
imposed. To hold it to apply to the limitation prescribed for prosecution by the act, would be
to except all offenses committed before the passage of the act, from the operation of the
periods of limitation therein contained, and to hold that those offenses would never become
barred under its provisions. I cannot think that such was the intention of the legislature.

There may be differences of opinion, respecting the policy of prescribing so short periods of
limitation, to prosecution for high crimes. But that was a question for the law-making power;
and I can see no reason why the legislature should have intended the limitation to apply to
future, and not to pas, offense. The same reasons, and the same policy, which dictated that
the prosecution should be commenced within a prescribed period, after the offense was
committed, would seem to apply equally to offenses committed before, as to those
committed after the passage of the statute.

Entertaining these views, I could not give my assent to the imposition of the pains and
penalties of the law, where the prosecution had not been commenced until after the
expiration of the time within which the legislature have positively enacted that the offense
"shall be prosecuted," or be forever barred.

Furthermore, Mr. Wharton, cited in one paragraph of the said dissenting opinion, in his work
entitled Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th edition, 1889, says that, as a general rule, the
laws of prescription of actions apply as well to crimes committed before the enactment, as
afterwards, and speaking of the rule to be applied to the prescription of actions and the
interpretation of the laws on that subject, he says in section 316, page 215, of said book the
following:

We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statute of

limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in
civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the
statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, the is no intendment to be made in
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor
against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is otherwise
when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no
longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast
over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his
immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are
to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the
statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that
delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to
public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of
testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes
enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its
subaltern, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained.

But even if the rule generally and frequently applied by many courts of the American Union
and the doctrine laid down by them were those announced in the above-mentioned
paragraphs of the Corpus Juris and the Ruling Case Law, the precept of article 22 of the
Penal Code being clear and unmistakable, according to which, penal laws have retroactive
effect in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, the
courts of justice of these Islands cannot, and must not, make any application of the said rule
and doctrine, but must, on the contrary, abide by the said precept and comply with it and
carry it into effect, as hereinbefore stated, although no petition to that effect is made by the
accused that may be favored by those laws. And a provision for the retroactivity of penal
laws having, as it has, been made in the said article in the terms already mentioned, it is
evidently that when the Philippine Legislature, the majority of whose members are also
members of the Philippine Bar, and, therefore, were aware of this legal provision, drew
section 71 of the Election Law, Act No. 3030, to the effect that the offenses resulting from
the violations of the said law prescribe one year after their commission, it ought to have
known that it was not necessary for it to say that said provision was to have retroactive
effect in so far as it was favorable to the accused, inasmuch as such provision had already
expressly been made in article 22 of the Penal Code, which was applicable not only to the
prescription therein provided when the same might be favorable to persons accused of those
crimes, but also to every penal law the retroactivity of which might be favorable to persons
accused of a felony or misdemeanor. And, this is the best and most conclusive proof that in
making the provision in section 71 aforecited, the Legislature intended that same be given a
retroactive effect, because the members thereof could not ignore the law. From all of which
it also necessarily follows that, if that doctrine established by many courts of the metropolis
is to be applied in the instant case, it must be by saying that the same is useless or that it
was complied with in so far as the giving of a retroactive effect to the said prescription was
concerned, because that provision regarding retroactivity has already been expressly made
in article 22 of the Penal Code, and, therefore, it is of no importance that in the former
Election Law, that in, the amended law, no provisions was made regarding prescription to
give immediate and full effect to the retroactivity provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030. The
provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of laws favorable to
persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, is to be deemed as if also expressly made in
any new law at the time of its enactment, when said law is a penal law, or one of a penal
character, such as the prescription contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 here in question,
which is of that nature, as above stated, and there is no necessity of making in that law any
provisions to that same effect. And this is the reason why in the case of Pardo de Tavera vs.
Garcia Valdez, one of the first cases in the Philippine Jurisprudence (1 Phil., 468) in which,
the question, among others, was raised whether the defendant, who was accused of grave
insult defined and punished in paragraph 1, article 458, of the Penal Code, should be
punished under said article, or under the provisions of Act No. 277, which is the Libel Law
and went into effect after the publication of the libelous article and the institution of the
criminal action, the court held, as stated in the syllabus, that:

"The general rule that penal laws shall be retroactive in so far as they favor the accused has
no application where the later law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or
existing cause of action," which clearly means that in order for a penal statute favorable to
the accused to have a retroactive effect, it is not necessary that it be so expressly provided
in the statues, or, to put it in another way, that the provision declaring the retroactivity be
repeated therein, but that if the Legislature intends it not to have a retroactive effect, it
should expressly so state in the same statute. And the reason for it is obvious. For it being
the general rule, according to article 22 of the Penal Code, that penal laws have retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the accused, said general rule applies to all laws that may be
enacted in the future, and if the Legislature intends to make an exception to the said rule, it
should expressly say so.

Now, the eminent professor of International Law, Mr. Fiore, in his work on the Irretroactivity
and Interpretation of Statutes, which is termed by various eminent jurists "a work full of
juridical science," after recognizing as a rule universally accepted by the courts and
expressly sanctioned by most of modern legislation that no penal law can have any
retroactive effect, that is, that no action or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its
author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed,
advocates the retroactivity of a penal law favorable to the offender, not as a right of the

latter, but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
combination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
consideration, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.

The same author, on studying the question that may arise in case the new land should have
changed the rules regarding prescription, that is to say, the retroactivity of the law as to
prescription, says:

The modifications as to prescription introduced by the new law may affect the penal action
or the penalty itself. With respect to the former, it can be imagined that the new law has
modified the rules as to the applicability or inapplicability of the prescription to a given
crime, or the necessary conditions for its effectiveness, or, finally, the time and period when
it will have effect.

The authors who had studied this question have reached different conclusions, because
some have considered prescription as a law of procedure or of form, while others have
regarded it as a substantive law, thereby admitting, therefore, the principle of vested right
on the part of the offender.

Those who have considered the statutes of limitations as of a formal or remedial nature have
maintained the opinion that the new law must always be applied in all cases of prescription
where the period was already running at the time of the enactment of the new law on the
ground that all procedural laws must be deemed retroactive by nature. Against this theory,
however, it has been said that even admitting the principle enunciated, the truth is that the
culprit cannot be placed in a worse situation, as would be the case if that theory is adopted,
for although the prescription begun under the former law, fixing a shorter period, might have
been completed, he would be subject to criminal action under the new law prescribing a
longer term, even if the provisions of the latter, concerning the substance of the penal
action, were not in force at the time of the commission of the crime. Again, setting aside the
theory of vested right on the part of the accused, as we have already done (for we cannot
admit any vested right on the part of a private individual as against that which is considered
by the sovereign power as indispensable for maintaining the juridical order), it can, however,
be maintained that the application of the new law about the prescription of the criminal
action, when said law has extended the time of the prescription, is tantamount to giving that
penal law a retroactive effect, as regards the very substance of punishment, thus prejudicing
the offender and admitting, as to him, a right to punish, which, on account of the longer
period fixed in the new law, cannot be considered as based on any law in force and already
promulgated at the time of the commission of the crime.

On the other hand, those who have considered prescription as a substantive law hold that
the old law should always be applied, the principal reason adduced by them in support of
this opinion being that the accused must at all events suffer the consequences of the
situation created by himself by committing the crime. Against this opinion, it has been held,
however, that the consideration of public policy, which naturally prevails in matters of
prescription, constitutes an obstacle to the invariable application of the old law, for if the
new law is less severe as regards prescription, the result would be that the culprit would be
subject to the more severe law, which has been modified in harmony with the more modern
criteria sanctioned by the new law as more in consonance with justice.

xxx

xxx

xxx

To our mind, in accordance with the principles underlying all the foregoing theories regarding
the retroactivity of a less severe penal law, it must be admitted that also when the question
is one of prescription must the new law be considered retroactive if it is more favorable to

the accused than the former law, and that contrariwise it should not be so considered, if it is
found to be more prejudicial. Although we are maintaining this opinion, we do not thereby
accept the unjustified theory above set forth of those who believe that there must be
admitted here the supposed vested right on the part of the offender, for we have already
stated the reason why no such vested right can be recognized as against the penalty
provided by law. On the contrary, we admit this theory, but founded on the principles of
justice itself upon which the right to punish, considered as a supreme right of sovereignty,
rests.

In fact, where the new law has shortened the time of prescription or established easier
conditions for its effectiveness with respect to a given crime, it is clear that the reduction of
the period made in the new law implies an acknowledgment on the part of the sovereign
power that the greater severity of the provision of the former statute relative to the
substance of the criminal action is unjust.

Consequently, if the sovereign power should enforce its right under the former law it would
be guilty of an inconsistency in view of its implied admission that the old law was too severe
and consequently unjust. The necessity therefore of applying the less severe new law rests
upon the principle that the sovereign power cannot exercise its right to punish except only
within those limits of justice which that sovereign power has established as being just and
equitable at the time of exercising that right.

On the other hand, when the latter statute of limitations of criminal actions is more severe
than the former, either as to the applicability of the prescription itself, or as to the
requirements and duration of the action, the application of the said law to crime committed
before its enactment must be avoided not because the culprit has acquired any right to
prevent said application, but for the reasons above set out. Indeed, on what ground can the
culprit pretend to prevent the sovereign power from doing what it has the right to do for the
purpose of maintaining the juridical order? There exists, therefore, no reason in support of
the theory of vested right on the part of the culprit, but what must inevitably be admitted is
that the sovereign power cannot, without doing an injustice, apply the more severe legal
provision in the matter of prescription; and that that provision cannot justly be applied
unless it was previously promulgated, as even the right itself to punish cannot come into
existence except by virtue of a law duly promulgated and in force at the time that it was
violated and the crime committed. The more severe law in matter of prescription extends
the field of criminal action and affects the substance of the same, because it determines the
basis and the sphere of the right to punish. Now, can the sovereign power do all this without
any law? Can it, without committing an injustice, extend the effect of the new law to acts
committed before its enactment? As the sovereign power cannot punish any act not
expressly penalized by a former law, nor punish with a more severe penalty any act
performed before said penalty was prescribed and the law fixing it promulgated, so it cannot
extend the criminal action (that is, its right to punish) by virtue of a later law by applying to
acts completed before its promulgation the less favorable provisions therein made regarding
prescription. In fact, in any case where reduction of the time of prescription formerly fixed is
to be made under a new law, or where harder conditions are required by said law for
effectively taking advantage of the prescription, the sovereign power is exercising the right
to punish acts committed prior to the promulgation of the new law, and it is evident that no
such right can be recognized in the sovereign power.

From all of the foregoing, we conclude that upon the very principles of justice, under which
the less severe provisions of the new law must regulate all the elements of the criminal
action, said less severe new law must also control the matter of prescription, provided that
there is no final and irrevocable judgment, and this rule holds good even if the modifications
of the statute have reference to the prescription of the penalty, because in substance the
prescription of the penalty is equivalent to the prescription of the criminal action. (Fiore,
pages 423-428.)

Wharton gives a clear explanation of the distinction to be made between the construction of
prescription in criminal actions and that of prescription in civil case in the paragraph above
quoted from his book, and the grounds for the distinction are also clear and are not unknown
to anybody, for, as Wharton says, they are inherent in the origin and nature itself of the law
of prescription, which must be liberally construed in favor of the accused for if prescription in
criminal matters is, as said author says, a benefit, a grace granted by the State, and a
waiver of its right to prosecute and an announcement that the crime is no longer the subject
of prosecution, from the moment that the granting of that grace or benefit, or the making of
such waiver, is known, the prosecution for the said crime and the punishment of the
offender would be a juridical contradiction.

But the opinions discussed by Fiore in his book abovementioned are more in point, for he
refers precisely to the prescription provided in a later statute the subject of which is the
criminal action or the penalty, that is, the prescription of the crime, as is the case now
before us, or the prescription of the penalty, whether prescription be regarded as a law of
procedure or of form, or as substantive law.

After examining the different opinions of the writers on the matter, Fiore has come, as seen
from the above quotation, to the conclusion that, whether the statute relative to prescription
be considered as of a procedural or formal, or substantive, nature, the new statute must be
applied if it is less severe or more favorable to the accused, but not if it is more prejudicial,
notwithstanding the general rule that all procedural laws are retroactive in regard to
prescription. In view of the special motion filed by the accused on May 2, 1922, it does not
matter and it is of no importance, so far as the question herein raised is concerned, whether
the provision contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 be considered as of a substantive,
procedural, or adjective character, because applying the principles above enunciated, the
result is the same, and the more severe law in the matter of prescription extends, as Fiore
says, the field of the criminal action and affects the very substance thereof, because it
determines the basis and the sphere of the rights to punish.

It may, perhaps, be argued that no term having been fixed in the Election Law prior to Act
No. 3030 for the prescription of the offenses resulting from the violations thereof, and said
Act No. 3030 having fixed at one year the period for the prescription, the former law is more
lenient, less severe, and more favorable to the persons accused of those offenses than the
latter. Such an argument, however, is absolutely erroneous and untenable, if it is borne in
mind that no period of prescription having been fixed in the former law, those offense were
imprescriptible, and the offender could be prosecuted and punished at any time and
indefinitely, even ten, twenty, or more years after the commission thereof, whereas the new
law, that is, Act No. 3030 in providing the period of one year for the prescription, has, in
effect, shortened the time of prescription fixed in the old law by virtue of the silence thereof,
reducing it to one year and has established less difficult conditions for the application of the
same as regards those offenses, which is evidently more favorable and lenient to the
violators of the said former law, and, as Fiore says in one of the paragraph above quoted
from his book, the reduction made by the new law implies a recognition on the part of the
sovereign power that the greater severity of the former law, as regards the substance of the
criminal action, is unjust, and it would contradict itself if it would attempt to enforce its right
under the conditions of the former law which has already been regarded by the
conscientious public opinion as juridically burdensome, and, therefore, unjust, and the
sovereign power cannot exercise the right to punish except within the limits regarded by it
as just at the time of exercising it.

If, therefore, in reviewing the former Election Law contained in the two chapters of the
Administrative Code hereinbefore mentioned, for the purpose of amending and reforming it
in accordance with the dictates of reason, justice and experience, the Legislature did amend
and reform it by the enactment of Act No. 3030, which supplied the deficiency found in the
old law with regard to the prescription of the crimes penalized therein, by providing in
section 71 of Act No. 3030 that those crimes, which year after their commission, because
their imprescriptibility was considered by the conscientious public opinion as juridically

burdensome, and, therefore, unjust, it is evident that the State, the Government and the
courts of justice representing it, cannot, without committing a gross injustice, exercise the
right to prosecute and punish the violator of the old law under the conditions required by the
law and outside of the limits now regarded by the sovereign power, that is to say, the
Legislature, as just by the enactment of said Act No. 3030, which took effect on March 9,
1922. And such injustice would be more apparent still, if the violators of the old Election
Law, which was amended by Act No. 3030, would be prosecuted and convicted five, ten,
twenty, or more years after the said violations when the proof of their innocence may not
have been kept by them, while violators of Act No. 3030, who may not have been
prosecuted within the one year fixed by section 71 aforesaid, would be free from being
prosecuted and punished for the crimes committed by them. And this injustice, which is so
contrary to conscientious public opinion and repugnant to humane sentiments, would
necessarily result, if the provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which is now in force, are
not immediately applied right at this stage of the case in favor of the herein accused, by
taking up first the special motion of the accused filed on May 2d of this year, before the
petition for reconsideration and re-hearing hereinbefore mentioned, or, better, by ignoring
the said petition and disposing of the case by deciding the motion of May 2d, wherein the
accused invoked the prescription provided in the said section, for the reason that this action
was commenced on December 20, 1920, one year and a half after the commission of the
offense resulting from the violation of the Election Law with which they are charged.

In view of the foregoing, we find the said crime to have prescribed, and setting aside the
decision of this court published on the 31st of March of this year, the present action is
dismissed with all the costs de oficio, and the bond given by the accused for their provisional
release is cancelled, which release is hereby declared final. So ordered.

Street, Avancea, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J., with whom concur JOHNSON and JOHNS, JJ., dissenting:

The high respect which I entertain for the authors of the majority opinions in the cases of
People vs. Moran and People vs. Parel,1 should not, of course, keep me silent when I am
strongly of the opinion that judgments grounded in a mistaken view of the law are being
handed down. My desire to state clearly and bluntly my dissent from the majority opinions is
only bounded by the paucity of the English language in which to express myself. According
to my view, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the majority decisions discuss questions
which need no discussion, do violence to plain provisions of the law, take stands sup-ported
by no authority which can be discovered, and attain the result of effectuating a general jait
delivery of crim-inals who had thwarted the people's will during the elec-tions in 1919.

An introductory and pertinent inquiry can well be, what is the effect of the majority
decisions?

Juan Moran, Fructuoso Cansino, and Hilario Oda, election inspectors of the first precinct of
the municipality of Bina-lonan, Pangasinan, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance
Nepomuceno and again on appeal by the Supreme Court, with the sole modification that the
penalty was increased, of having falsified election returns.-But Moran, Cansino, and Oda will
now never enter the portals of prison.

Raymundo, Verceles, election inspector of the fifth pre-cinct of the municipality of Binalonan,
Pangasinan, was found guilty by Judge of First Instance Nepomuceno, and again on appeal

by the Supreme Court, with the sole modifi-cation that the penalty was increased, of having
falsified election returns, and is now serving his sentence.-Verceles will now be liberated.

Norberto Parel and Daniel Paz, election inspectors of the second precinct of the municipality
of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance Jaranilla, of having
unlawfully written the ballots of illiterate persons, with the result that following the trial in an
election contest, the protestant was declared elected.-But though the two cases are on the
calendar, the motion to dismiss being granted, the question of the guilt or innocence of Parel
and Paz will never be determined by the appellate court.

Andres Imzon, chief of police of the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, with having unlawfully intervened in the elec-tions of 1919,
by soliciting votes in the election booths and exchanging ballots previously prepared by him
with those received by the electors from the election board; Claudio de Leon and Alejandro
Cailao, election inspectors of the second precinct of the municipality of Bay, Laguna, were
charged with having seized and destroyed fifty official ballots already filled in by different
persons; and Alejandro Cailao, election inspector of the second precinct of the municipality
of Bay, Laguna, was charged with having abstracted four official ballots duly filled in from
the ballot box and having delivered them to Julian Carrillo, a can-didate for municipal
president.-But Imzon, De Leon, Cai-lao, and Carrillo will never have these serious charges
resolved by the courts of justice.

Francisco Hutalla, Jacinto Alfajora, and Hermogenes Orijuela, election inspectors in the first
precinct of Maca-lelon, Tayabas, and Francisco Catarroja, election inspector in the second
precinct of the same municipality, were charged with various unlawful acts intended to
secure a victory for.Demetrio Pandeno, their candidate for munic-ipal president.-But Hutalla,
Alfajora, Orijuela, and Cata-rroja, will now have this record stand without any judicial
decision as to their guilt or innocence.

Mariano Quilona, Bartolome Severe, and Matias Operario, election inspectors of the
municipality of San Julian, Samar, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance Capistrano of
having falsified the election returns.-But though the guilt of Quiloiia, Severe, and Operario is
clearly apparent, the appeal in this court cannot go forward and they are absolved from the
criminal charges.

Liberate Exaltacion, municipal president of Meycawayan, Bulacan, was convicted of having

extracted ballots from the urn used in Meycawayan, and was sentenced by Judge of First
Instance Jocson to three months' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of f*125.-But Exaltacion,
although thus found guilty by a judge of long experience, of a most serious crime, will now
be exonerated.

Cesareo Navarrete, Ambrosio Diapo, Luciano Nabaira, Eugenio Nabor, Apolonio Castro,
Mamerto Navarra, Esta-nislao Nabor, Tolomeo Segovia, Aproniano Navarrete, Hipolito
Nalangan, Ricardo Nahil, and Severino Nalangan, residents of the municipality of Libacao,
Capiz, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance Salas of having provoked such tumult and
confusion in and about the second election precinct of the municipality of Libacao, that the
election inspectors and policemen were prevented from performing their respective duties,
and of having seized the ballot boxes and other election effects, thus frustrating th'e election
in that precinct.-But all these twelve persons found guilty by the trial court, and guilty, also,
as we read the record, will escape the penalties of the law.

Twelve (12) cases pending in this court relating to thirty (30) defendants are thus seen to
involve the retroactivity of section 71 of Act No. 3030. According to the revised figures
reported by the Attorney-General, the outcome of at least twenty (20) cases in courts of first

instance relating to sixty-one (61) defendants likewise depend on our deci-sion on this
question. All told, thirty-two (82) cases and ninety-one (91) defendants. Quite a respectable
jail de-livery.

The point next in logical order, to which I would address attention, is whether the question of
the retroactivity of Act No. 3030 is properly and legally before the court.

The status of the Moran case is of particular interest. Recall-Appeal perfected and four errors
assigned, but naturally not including the point of prescription under Act No. 3030, for the
very good reason that the Act was not yet on the statute books. Act No. 3030 enacted and
effective on March 9, 1922. Case submitted, and judgment of Supreme Court rendered on
March 31, 1922. Motion of reconsideration filed by the attorney for the appellants, within the
regular fifteen-day period, based on two counts, but again not including the point of
prescription, although Act No. 3030 was then in force. Not until May 2, 1922, that is, not until
two months after judgment was rendered, when a third motion, which the Chief Justice is
pleased to call a "special motion," was presented, was the contention made that the alleged
crime had prescribed in accordance with section 71 of Act No. 3030.

The Chief Justice finds no difficulty in surmounting these obstacles, although the constant
practice of the court has been not to allow new and original questions to be presented for
the first time on a motion for rehearing; although the court has consistently required that all
arguments be ad-vanced in one motion of reconsideration, and although the Rules of the
Court are explicit and mandatory, when they provide that "judgment shall not be entered
until ten days after * * * publication," that "five days after entry of judgment the clerk shall
remand the case to the lower court," and that "applications for a rehearing shall be filed
within fifteen days after the publication of the decision of the court." (Note U. S. vs. Serapio
[1912], 3 Phil., 584; Lucido and Lucido vs. Vita [1911], 20 Phil., 449; Espidol vs. Espidol and
Espidol [1913], 25 Phil., 4; Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 33, 34, 35; 4 C. J.,
pp. 629, 642.)

Conceding, however, that as to all these preliminary mat-ters the majority are right, and I
am wrong, I am yet ready to meet them on their own ground and am prepared to prove that
the provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030 approved March 9, 1922, providing that
"Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their
commission," should not, and cannot be given retro-active effect, if the law is to be followed
and justice is to be done. The importance of the subject will serve as an apol-ogy for a
lengthy and serious consideration of the question above stated.

Act No. 3030 of the Philippine Legislature is entitled, "An Act to amend certain sections and
parts of sections of chapter eighteen, known as the Election Law, and chapter sixty-five, on
penalties for violations of certain administra-tive laws, of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, entitled 'An Act amending the Administrative Code/ to make more
effective the provisions and purposes of said Election Law, and for other purposes." The first
seventy sections of Act No. 3030 amend specifically named sections of the Administrative
Code "to read as follows." Then follows section 71 above quoted. The Act concludes with
section 72 reading: "This Act shall take effect on its approval." The Act was approved on
March 9, 1922.

The first duty of the courts is to apply the law. The last duty of the courts is to interpret or
construe the law. When, therefore, the Philippine Legislature said that "Offenses resulting
from violations of this Act shall pre-scribe one year after their commission," it meant exactly
what it said, and the only duty of the court is to make effective the legislative language.
"This Act" could mean only Act No. 3030. Judicial interpretation or construction are
consequently impertinent and offensive in the face of the plain words used by the
Legislature.

It has, however, been suggested, that "this Act" means "the Election Law as amended." Even
if this proposition be conceded, yet it remains true that the amendatory Act will not be given
a retrospective construction; the new provisions are to be understood as enacted at the time
the amended act takes effect. (36 Cyc., 1223.) In this instance section 72 says that "This Act
(No. 3030) shall take effect on its approval"-on March 9, 1922.

It should be observed in relation to what has just been said with regard to the
appropriateness of merely applying the law, that there is nothing in section 71, or in any
other section of Act No. 3030, which would authorize a retrospec-tive construction. Not one
word which even squints at a retroactive effect can be found in Act No. 3030. If the
Philippine Legislature had intended that Act No. 3030 should apply to pending cases, it could
easily have used language to this effect; as for example, "Offenses heretofore committed,"
etc. Not having done so, the courts cannot write such words into the law without usurping
legislative prerogatives.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction, so elemen-tary that I hesitate to repeat it, that
if the courts find it impossible to apply the law, then their duty is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the law-making body. Here, the intention of the Philippine Legislature is
self--evident. The various sections of Act No. 3030 were care-fully drafted to close up the
loopholes in the old Election Law and to provide more severe penalties. The purpose of the
Legislature, as announced in the title of the law, is, in part, "to make more effective the
provisions and purposes of said Election Law." It would be a, strange interpretation indeed,
which would attain the result, in a law of this character, of liberating criminals convicted at
the time the law went into effect, when the Legislature intended to provide more effectively
for cleaner elections.

With strong reluctance, therefore, am I led away from the firm ground on which my feet are
planted, when we simply apply the law and effectuate legislative intention, to follow strange
and treacherous.bypaths. That I do so is because of the energy with which these arguments
have been pressed by counsel and out of respect to the point of -view of colleagues in the
Court.

The majority say that "Both consistency and sound legal principle^, * * * demand that we, in
this case, seek our precedents in Latin rather than in American jurispru-dence." I had
thought that the Philippines was under American sovereignty and that the Election Law was
an American importation. But apparently I have been mis-taken. As, however, the majority
with "consistency" cite Wharton, an American authority, possibly, also, I may be pardoned if
I use the same authority and give some promi-nence to the American precedents.

Mr. Wharton, in his treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice (9th ed., 1889) announces the
following doctrine: "As a rule, statutes of limitation apply to offences perpe-trated before the
passage of the-statute as well as to sub-sequent offences."' (P. 219.) The. cases cited in
support of the text are found on examination to be early Federal cases relating to the 32d
section of the Act of Congress of April 30, 1790. The contention there denied was "that an
act of limitations to criminal prosecutions can only be used as a bar in cases declared by law
to be criminal at the time the act of limitations was passed, unless there be express words
extending it to crimes to be created in fu-ture." (See Adams vs. Woods [1805], 2 Cranch,
336.)

Corpus Juris (published in 1918), which the majority decisions avoid mentioning, is authority
for a different statement of the rule, under the subject "Limitation of Prosecutions in Criminal
Cases," namely: "Such statutes are to be given a reasonably strict construction in favor of
accused and against the prosecution. By the weight of authority, however, they do not apply
to crimes previously committed, unless clearly retrospective in their terms." (16 C. J., 222.)

The cases in support of the last sentence are the following: People vs. Lord ([1877], 12 Hun.
[N. Y.L 282), and Martinis. State ([1859], 24 Tex., 62).. Contra, Commonwealth vs. Hutchinson
([1850], 2 Pars. Eq. Gas. [Pa.], 453, 1 Phila., 77).

The New York case cited is not available in our library. In a standard treatise, Wood on
Limitations, special refer-ence is, however, made to it. It is said: "In New York such statutes
are held not to apply to crimes committed before the statute was changed, unless expressly
included therein, adopting the rule in that respect applicable In civil cases." (Wood on
Limitations, 3d ed., p. 45.)

In the second case cited in the note to Corpus Juris, Martin vs. State, the Supreme Court of
Texas held: "Stat-utes of limitations for the prosecution of crimes and mis-demeanors, do not
have a retrospective operation. * * * The statute of limitations passed in 1854 could not
operate as a bar to a prosecution commenced within two years from the time that statute
went into operation, there being no previous limitation to the prosecution of the offense in
question." The Chief Justice rendered a dissenting opinion, which is now made one of the
props of the opinion of our Chief Justice.

The same result was obtained in decisions coming from Massachusetts. (Commonwealth vs.
Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation [1853], XI Gush. [Mass.], 512; and
Commonwealth vs. Homer [1891], 153 Mass., 343.) In the first Massachusetts case it was
held that an indictment against a railroad company under St. 1840, c. 80, for negli-gently
causing the death of a passenger, is not within Rev. Sts. c 120, sec. 21, limiting actions and
suits for any penalty, or forfeiture, to one year after the offense is committed, for the reason
that St. 1853, c. 414, sec. 3, does not apply Jo indictments pending at the time of its
passage. In the second Massachusetts case, it was held that the Statute of 389, c. 100,
providing that in a criminal prosecution on the Pub. Sts. c. 207, sec. 9, for attempting to
procure a mis-carriage, the dying declaration of the woman shall be ad-missible in evidence,
if her death is alleged to have been the result thereof, is prospective only in its operation,
and does not apply to an indictment found after its passage for' such an offense theretofore
committed. The court followed the language of another case, namely:

"'The statute is equivocal and ambiguous in its terms, and might without doing violence to
the words in which it is expressed be construed as retroactive. But such is by no means its
necessary interpretation. On the contrary, it willhave full meaning and effect, consistent with
the fair import of its language, if it is held to be prospective only. The true rule of
interpretation applicable to such enactments is well settled, and has been often recognized
and affirmed by this court. It is, that all statutes are to be considered as prospective, and are
not to be held to prejudice or affect the past transactions of the subject, unless such
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. (Whitman vs. Hapgood, 10 Mass., 439; King
vs.'Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331; Gerry vs. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319, 323; Garfteld vs. Bemis, 2 Allen,
446.) No good reason can be given for excepting the statute under consideration from the
operation of this wise and salutary rule.' There is no express intention to make the St. of
1889, c. 100, retroactive in its operation, and none can be implied from the subject-matter;
it will have full effect if construed as prospective only, and, in the opin-ion of a majority of
the court, it must be so construed."

The following was the holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of
Commonwealth vs. Duffy [1880], 96 Pa. St., 506):

"An act of limitation is an act of grace purely on th& part of the legislature, and especially is
this the case in the matter of criminal prosecutions. The state makes no con-tract with
criminals, at the time of the passage of an act of limitations, that they shall have immunity
from punishment if not prosecuted within the statutory period. Such enact-ments are
measures of public policy only. They are entirely subject to the mere will of the legislative

power, and may be changed or repealed altogether as that power may sec fit to declare.
When a right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the period
of limita-tion, that period is subject to enlargement or repeal without bemg obnoxious to the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws." (See also Thompson vs. State [1877],
74 Miss., 740, and Moore vs. State [1881], 43 N. J. L., 203.)

With the exception of the Philadelphia city case, which cannot be found in the Philippines, all
other courts which have given consideration to the subject have refused to give retroactive
effect to statutes establishing limitations of actions in criminal cases, and have, we think,
with all propriety, adopted the rule in civil cases pertaining to limitations of actions.

A rule as old as law itself is that statutes ought to be construed to be prospective, and not
retrospective, in opera-tion. Laws look forward and not backward. Nova cons-titutio futuris
formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. This rule is applicable to statutes of limitation,
unless by express command, or by necessary and unavoidable impli-cation, a different
construction is required. It has been held that the rule for the construction of statutes of
limita-tions, with respect to their operation as being retroactive or not, requires such
statutes (whether new, reenacted or amended), to be given a wholly prospective effect, that
is, to commence running with respect to a particular cause of action from the time when the
cause is subjected to the operation of the act, so that the party may have the full period
prescribed thereby, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the act to operate
on existing causes, so as to commence running from the time any such cause accrued.
(Thomas vs. Higgs & Calderwood [1910], 68 W. Va., 152, Ann. Cas.,.1912A, 1039; Hathaway
vs. Mer-chants' Loan and Trust Co. [1905], 218 III., 580; 4 Ann. oGas., 164; Moore vs. State
[1881], 43 N. J. L., 203; Herrick vs. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. [1906], 200 U. S., 96, 102; U.
S. Fidelity etc. Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co., [1907], 209 U. S., 806.)

Ruling Case Law summarizes the principles governing the construction of limitation laws as
follows:

"One rule for the construction of laws is that statutes of limitation are presumed to be
prospective and not retro-spective in their operation, in the absence of a clear legis-lative
intent to the contrary, and the presumption is against any intent on the part of the
legislature to make such statute retroactive. It has been said that words of a statute ought
not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative that
no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot
be otherwise satisfied. *. * * Some courts take the view that since limitation laws apply only
to the remedy, they are not within the principle that statutes should be given a prospective
rather than a retrospective construction, and therefore that they should be construed as
retrospective unless they contain no language clearly limiting their appli-cation to causes of
action arising in the future. But it has also been pointed out that even statutes as to
procedure are not necessarily retrospective in their operation and the courts are not
compelled to construe as retrospective a limitation law dealing with procedure only." (17 R.
C. L., 682-684.)

"While it is undoubtedly within the power of the legis-lature to pass a statute of limitations or
to change the period of limitation previously fixed and to make such statute or changes
applicable to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is given by the new law
for the commence-ment of suit before the bar takes effect, yet such a statute is not to be
readily construed as having a retroactive effect, but is generally deemed to apply merely to
causes of action arising subsequent to its enactment, and the presumption is against any
intent on the part of the legislature to make the statute retroactive. The statute will only be
given a retroactive effect when it was clearly the intention of the legislature that it should so
operate." (25 R. C. L., 792, 793.)

One of the cases cited in support of the general rule, and oft followed by other courts, is
United States Fidelity etc. Company vs. Struthers Wells Co., supra. In the course of the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, it was said:

"There are certain principles which have been adhered to with great strictness by the courts
in relation to the construction of statutes, as to whether they are or are not retroactive in
their effect. The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act
retrospectively, and it ought never to receive such a construction if it is suscep-tible of any
other. It ought not to receive such a construc-tion unless the words used are so clear, strong,
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them or unless the intention^ of
the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. (Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns., 477, 499; Jackson ex dem Hicks vs. Van Zandt, 12 Johns, 169; United States vs. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399, 414;
Southwestern Coal & Improv. Co. vs. McBride, 185 U. S., 499, 503; United States vs.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U. S., 563, 577.)

"The language of the amended act is prospective, as it provides 'that hereafter any person
or persons entering into a formal contract with the United States/ etc. That language
standing alone would leave little doubt as to the intention of Congress in the matter of the
taking effect of the amendment.

"It is urged, however, that as the amendment in this respect but reiterates the language of
the original act, the use of the word 'hereafter' in the commencement of the amendment
ought not to have the significance which would >therwise attach to it, because it is simply in
this particular reenacting the law as it already stood.

"There is considerable force in the suggestion that the word 'hereafter' is not to receive the
weight which in other circumstances it ought to have. The question is, however, one as to
the intention of Congress, and when we come to took at the provisions of the statute, as
amended, we are convinced that Congress did not intend that the amendment should apply
to cases where the bond had already been executed, the work done, the respective rights of
the parties settled, and the cause of action already in existence. If Congress had intended
otherwise, we think it would have still further amended the original act by providing in plain
language that the amendment should apply to all cases, and not be confined to the future. *
**

"Viewing the whole section, we think Congress meant that only in future cases should the
provisions of the amend-ment apply, although some trifling portion of those provi-sions
might be regarded, technically, as in the nature of procedure. It is therefore wiser to hold the
entire section governed by the usual rule and as applying only to the future."lvvph1n+

It is, however, insisted with marked earnestness, that notwithstanding the simple and plain
provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030, and the almost universal rule adopted by the
American courts, we are in duty bound to apply the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.

Article 7 of the Penal Code reads: "Offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code." In the decision of the Supreme Court of the Phil-ippines, in
which most elaborate consideration was given to article 7 of the Penal Code, the rule
adopted was: "That, when a crime is made punishable by a law other than by the provisions
of the Penal Code, the provisions of said code do not apply." Following Viada in his
commentaries on the Penal Code (1 Viada, 84), it was also pointed out that among the
special laws are election laws. (U. S. vs. Se-rapio [1912], 23 Phil., 584, 592, 593.) The
majority de-cisions are strangely silent as to the decision last cited.

Paraphrasing article 7 of the Penal Code as construed by this court: As offenses are made
punishable by Act No. 3030, a special lawt the provisions of the Penal Code do not apply. But
it is said that article 7 should be interpreted with reference to other articles of the Penal
Code, and I concede that this is a fair argument.

Article 22 of the Penal Code is found in Title III, which is headed, "Penalties." Chapter I of
Title III is entitled "Penalties in General." Only passing reference is made to the epigraphy, in
order to concede everything possible to the argument of the petitioner in this case. Coming
then to a consideration of the substance of article 22 of the Penal Code, its effect can best
be judged by setting it side by side with article 3 of the Civil Code, since both articles have
been given indiscriminate application to criminal laws. These two provisions of Philippine law
read as follows:

"ART. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the per-son guilty
of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same."

"ART. 3. Laws shall not have a retroactive effect un-less therein otherwise provided,"lvvph1n+

Article 3 of the Civil Code, given express application to criminal laws in the case of United
States vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil, 241), bears out the general doctrine previously announced.
Article 22, on the other hand, is of an opposite tenor, and if given controlling effect, might
lead to a contrary result. The first two words of article 22 are "Penal laws." What is meant by
the term "Penal laws?" Is section 71 of Act No. 3030 a "penal law?"

I feel that I can, with all propriety, turn to the definition of "penal law" given by the American
authorities, not only because there are numerous judicial definitions of the phrase available,
but because the Election Law, establishing the Australian Ballot System, is primarily an
American innovation, which was unknown in Spain when the Penal Code of 1870 was
promulgated.

"PenaUaws," all of the English and American decisions state, strictly and properly are those
imposing punishment an offense committed against the state, and which, by the English and
American constitutions, the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a
penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense
against its law. It would be palpably incongruous to call a statute penal which did not contain
a definite and certain provision for punishment. On the other hand, a statute which gives a
remedy for an injury belongs to the class of remedial statutes, and not to that of penal
statutes. (Huntington vs. Attrill [1892], 146 U. S., 657; Whitman vs. National Bank of Oxford
[1900], 176 U. S., 559; Shick vs. United States [1904], 195 U. S., 65; The Antelope [1825], 10
Wheat., 66, 123; United States vs. Reisinger [1888], 128 U. S., 398, 402; Davis vs. Mills
[1903], 121 Fed., 703, 704; United States vs. Illinois Cent. R. Co. [1907], 156 Fed., 182, 185;
United States vs. Four Hundred and Twenty Dollars [1908], 162 Fed., 803, 805; Ross vs. New
England Mortg. Security Co. [1893], 101 Ala., 362; Nebraska Nat. Bank vs. Walsh [1900], 68
Ark., 433; Levy vs. Superior Court [1895], 105 CaL, 600; Plumb vs. Griffin [1901], 74 Conn.,
132; Mitchell vs. Hotchkiss [1880], 48 Conn., 9, 19; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Melton [1909], 133
Ga., 277; Woolverton vs. Taylor [1890], 132 111,, 197; Diversey vs. Smith [1882], 103 III.,
378, 390; American Credit-Indemnity Co. vs. Ellis [1901], 156 Ind., 212; State vs. Hardman
[1896], 16 Ind. App., 357; Lagler vs. Bye [1896], 42 Ind. App., 592; Sackett vs. Sackett
[1829], 25 Mass., 309, 320; Cary vs. Schmeltz [1909], 141 Mo. App., 570; Casey vs. St. Louis
Transit Co. [1905], 116 Mo. App., 235; State ex rel Rodes vs. Warner [1906], 197 Mo., 650;
Manhattan Trust Co. vs. Davis [1899], 23 Mont., 273; Globe Pub. Co. vs. State Bank [1894],
41 Neb., 175; Boice vs. Gibbons [1826], 8 N. J. Law, 324, 330; Hutchinson vs. Young [1903],
80 N. Y. S., 259; People vs. Wells [1900], 65 N. Y. S., 319; Smith vs. Colson [1912], 31 Okl.,

703; Kiltoh vs. Providence Tool Co. [1905], 22 R. I., 605; Ayls-worth vs. Curtis [1896], 19 R. I.,
517; Whitlow vs. Nash-ville, C. & St. L. R. Co. [1904], 114 Tenn., 344; Drew vs. Russel [1875],
47 Vt, 250, 253; Norfolk & W. R. Co. vs. Hall [1897], 44 W. Va, 36.)

Escriche, Diccionario Razonado de Legislacidn y Juris-prudencia (vol. Ill, p. 898), defines "ley
penal," the Spanish equivalent of "penal law," as follows: "Ley penal es la que tiene por
objeto algun delito y la pena con que ha de cas-tigarse." Diccionario Encidopedico de la
Lengua Caste-liana defines "penal" thus: "Perteneciente o relativo a la pena o que la
incluye;"-and "pena" thus: "Castigo im-puesto por superior legitimo al que ha cometido un
delito o falta."

The first instance in which our Supreme Court gave con-sideration to article 22 of the Penal
Code, was in the case Jof Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1 Phil, 468), The Chief
Justice, in his decision, relies on the syllabus which, of course, is the statement of the
reporter and not of the court. I prefer to go to the opinion, wherein it was said:

"Section 13 of the same act provides as follows: 'All laws and parts of laws now in force, so
far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall operate as a repeal of exist-ing laws in so far as they are applicable to
pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of action or pending
actions existing laws shall remain in full force and effect/ This act went into effect October
24, 1901, subsequent to the publication of the article in question, and during the pendency
of the prosecution. By article 22 of the Penal Code 'Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime or mis-demeanor/ etc. The court below in
fixing the punishment proceeded upon the theory that by the operation of this general rule
the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code for the offense in question was necessarily
modified and could not be inflicted in its full extension. In so doing we think the court
overlooked or improperly construed the proviso in the section of Act No. 277, above cited, by
virtue of which the previously existing law on the subject covered by the act is left intact in
all its parts as respects pending actions or existing causes of action. The language is gpueral and embraces, we think, all actions, whether civil, criminal, or of a mixed character. In
this view of the case we have no occasion to consider the question argued by coun-sel for
the private prosecutor as to whether the provisions of Act No. 277 respecting the penalty are
more favorable to the accused than those of the former law or otherwise. The punishment
must be determined exclusively by the provisions of the former law."

The case of United States vs. Hocbo ([1908], 12 Phil, 304) oft mentioned by Mr. Justice
Ostrand, merely holds that (I now quote from the body of the decision), "All amendments of
the law (meaning the Penal Code) which are beneficial to the defendant, shall be given a
retroactive effect, in so far as they favor the person charged with the crime or misdemeanor.
* * * We find nothing in Act No. 1773 which is more favorable to the defendant than the
provisions of the Penal Code."

The case of United States vs. Parrone ([1913], 24 Phil, 29), gave special attention to the
relative effect of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code. It was said that "Article 22 must
necessarily relate (1) to penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code, in which the penalty was
less severe than those of the Penal Code; or (2) to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal
Code, in which the penalty was more favorable to the accused. Rule 80, Ley Provisional para
la aplica-cion de las disposiciones del Codigo Penal. Under the pro-. visions of said article 22,
if a crime had been committed prior to the date of the Penal Code the punishment for which
was more favorable to the accused than the provisions of the Penal Code, it is believed that
the accused might invoke the provisions of said article (22) even though he was not placed
upon trial until after the Penal Code went into effect. (U. S. vs. Cuna [1908], 12 Phil., 241.)
So also if by an amendment to the Penal Code or by a later special law the punishment for
an act was made less severe than by the provisions of the Penal Code, then the accused
person might invoke the provisions of said article." We gather from this language that the
phrase "penal laws" used in article 22 relates to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code,

in which the penalty is more favorable to the accused or the punishment for the act is made
less severe.

Statutes of limitation, it is well settled, relate to the remedy and not to the right; relate to
procedure and not to the crime. (Moore vs. State, supra; Commonwealth vs. Duffy, supra; 17
R. C. L., 703, citing Mulvey vs. Boston [1908], 197 Mass., 178; U. S. vs. Serapio, supra.)
Viada, in his commentaries on the Penal Code (vol. I, p. 570, 4th ed.), makes the following
observations: "Prescription of the crime only means the termination of the right or power to
prosecute or punish the offender, after the lapse of a definite period from the commission of
the offense, or if this is not known, from the day of its discovery and the beginning of the
judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment." The supreme court of Spain, in a
decision of January 22, 1872, held that when the law speaks of the prescription of an
offense, it cannot be understood to mean other than that of the action to prosecute the
same.

This construction is the more apparent, when it is re-membered that the Penal Code,
although it does contain some provisions concerning procedure, is, generally speak-ing,
substantive law. As such substantive law, it is but reasonable to suppose that it would only
reach special laws of a similar nature. It must also be recalled that the crim-inal actions in
the case before us and in all other cases on appeal to tbe court, were instituted before the
time Act No. 3030 took effect, and that these courts of first instance had jurisdiction of the
cases at that time.

What, therefore, is the condition of the much vaunted Latin law and jurisprudence on the
question under discus-sion? First, article 7 of the Penal Code and our decisions make Act No.
3030 not subject to the provisions of the Penal Code; second, article 22 is found in a title and
a chapter of the Code relating to "Penalties," and the article itself specifies "Penal laws;"
third, section 71 of Act No. 3030 does not concern "penalties," and is not a "penal law," but
is a procedural law.

Not a single authority, Latin or American, supports the position of the majority.lvvph1n+

So much for our opinion on the principal question. I note, however, that the majority decision
of Mr. Justice Ostrand argues the facts. I had been told that a legal ques-tion was to be
resolved. But somehow or other, although none of us have read the record or the briefs in
that partic-ular case, it may be a matter which strengthens his position. And if this is true,
and if the argument at least serves as a smokescreen to obscure the real question, who can
object?

The majority decisions also essay to sanctify and deify prescription laws. What this has to do
with the question in issue I do not know. I had thought that the Supreme Court was a judicial
body, but apparently I have miscon-ceived our functions.

The majority further say that "a strong appeal has been made to our emotions by describing
in rather vivid colors, the disastrous consequences which will result from the dis-missal of
actions," etc., etc. I can find no such plea in any of the briefs. But the statement brings to
mind a point on which I would gladly comment. What then are the consequences which
would result from holding that section 71 of Act No. 3030 has retrospective effect?

One consequence I have already noted. At least thirty-two cases dismissed, and the crimes
of ninety-one accused condoned. "A clear legislative intent, by a repeal of the act imposing
it, or some other expressed purpose, is re-quired to take away a penalty or condone a crime

by a retroactive law. This is especially to be guarded against in legislation designed to favor

individuals at the expense of the public." (State vs. Startup [1877], 39 N. J. Law, 423.)

In the next place, such a holding would mean that we would make of Act No. 3030 an ex
post facto law, something which is not claimed for it by petitioner, and a pitfall which the
courts invariably avoid. And, lastly, I would recall another well-known principle of statutory
construction: "If the language is clear, and the intent manifest, there is, of course, no room
for presumptions. But if, on the other hand, the language is not clear, and it is obvious that
by a particular construction in a doubtful case great public in-terests would be endangered
or sacrificed, the court ought not to presume that such construction was intended by the
makers of the law. A statute will not be so construed as to work public mischief, unless
required by clear, unequivocal words, especially if the statute be chiefly to subserve individual interests." (25 R. C. L., 1027.)

Having, then, in view the disastrous consequences of one holding, as contrasted with the
reasonable consequences of another, I can properly recall that in every instance in which
this court has considered the subject, it has avoided the condonation of crime. For example,
when the United States Supreme Court in its decision in the Weems case ([1910], 217 U. S.,
349), held article 300 of the Penal Code void, it was incumbent upon the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands to apply and construe the 'decision of the higher tribunal. In the case
of United States vs. Pico ([1911], 18 Phil., 386), in which this court discussed the subject, it
was found that according to the official report of the Director of Prisons there were serving
sentences of analogous crimes four hundred and eighty-five accused, and that should this
court be bound thereby to liberate them, "it * * * would result in a general jail delivery of all
those heretofore convicted of many of the gravest and most heinous offenses defined and
penalized by law; and would be substantially equivalent to a proclamation of amnesty in
favor of all those who have heretofore committed such crimes and have not yet been
brought to trial, or who may commit them hereafter until such time as the Legislature niay
be able to reform the Penal Code." The court con-tinued: "Confronted as we are with the
knowledge that consequences so far-reaching and disastrous must result from a holding
favorable to the contention of counsel on this motion, it is manifestly our duty rigidly to
restrict the application of the doctrine laid down in the Weems case to cases wherein the
ratio decidendi in that case is clearly applicable and to decline to be bound by inferences
drawn from observations and comments contained in the opinion in that case which appear
to be based upon a mis-apprehension of facts, or upon assumed facts which do not accord
with the facts in the cases brought before us." (Note also Ong Chang Wing vs. U. S. [1910],
218 U. S., 272.)

Before closing, I would like to disencumber myself of the miscellaneous authorities which I
have discussed, and would again prefer to get back to the fundamentals of ascertaining and
giving effect to legislative intent. On the one hand, by applying the simple phraseology of
section 71, it appears to me that we effectuate legislative intention and avoid indescribable
harm. On the other hand, if we give to the language of the Legislature an unusual meaning,
we nullify legislative intention and turn away from prison persons who are guilty of violations
of the Election Law.

Not many years ago, the public was edified by executive pardons of criminals who had
violated the Election Law during the elections of 1913 and 1916. A judicial veto of legislative
intent, and judicial legislation now effects a blanket pardon of persons who audaciously
thwarted the people's will during the elections of 1919.

It is incomprehensible that members of the Philippine Legislature convened for the avowed
purpose of enacting "a more effective Election Law," to use their own language, and
cognizant as many of the members must have been, of pending cases in the Courts of First
Instance and in the Supreme Court,:-that these same members of the Legisla-ture would
insert provisions tantamount to a legislative pardon of persons who had committed crimes
during the elections in 1919, but whose causes had tardily been brought before the courts. It

would, indeed, be a serious charge against the integrity of the members of the Philippine
Legislature to ascribe to them the purpose of inserting in the new Election Law a section to
effectuate a general jail delivery of convicted criminals, and the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands is indeed assuming a grave re-sponsibility when it distorts legislative
language with the result which I have described. Believing, however, that the Philippine
Legislature acted in a patriotic manner to advance the general public interests, and that no
lurking design hides behind the meaning of its legislative product to advance private
interests, we should enforce the law of an independent branch of the Government as we find
it-as it is our duty to do. Motion granted and case dismissed.
G.R. No. L-22366

October 7, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO JOSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Pedro Sorreta for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is a criminal action. The complaint charges that the defendants violated the
Election Law. The complaint was dismissed upon motion of the defendants. The AttorneyGeneral appealed for the Government.

The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not the action is barred by
prescription.

The complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay on
the 28th day of April, 1923. It charged that the defendants had violated the provisions of
section 60 of Act No. 3030. The complaint alleged:

That during the period between the first to the sixth of June, 1922, but specially on the
6th of June aforesaid, early in the morning and during said 6th day of June, and on the
occasion of the general elections which were being held on said day in the municipalities of
Virac and Bato, Province of Albay, Philippine Islands, the above-named accused, conspiring
for the purpose, did wilfully and intentionally write, prepare and cause to be written,
distributed, published, divulged and posted in different public places within the
municipalities of Virac and Bato several posters and bills reading as follows: "Seores
Electores: Guiromdoma nindo an magna casaquitan na tinitios ta. Barato an bandala huli
que Vera: mahal an bagas huli qui Pedro Martinez," which in English means: (Voters, bear in
mind our sufferings, hemp is cheap, due to Vera, and rice is dear, due to Martinez), and is
calculated to belittle and defeat Jose O. Vera, Provincial Governor and candidate for
reelection, and Pedro Martinez, Representative for the Second District and also candidate of
reelection, with reference to Administrative Order No. 13 of the Bureau of Agriculture, which
the defendants have persistently and publicly been attributing to Governor Vera, as author
of the measure, and to the raising of the price of rice by the Fifth Philippine Legislature in its
last period of sessions which the same defendants have been attributing publicly to

Representative Martinez, without in one or the other case stating their names or that of any
other person, with their domicile or residence, at the bottom of said bills. And all the above
criminal acts were committed by the accused, within their conspiracy and in pursuance and
furtherance of a general plan of election campaign in all the municipalities of the
subprovince of Catanduanes.

Contrary to law.

On the date of the presentation of the complaint (April 28, 1923), the Honorable M.
Rosauro, judge, issued the following order:

The attached information having been presented, the same is hereby admitted and it
is ordered that the clerk issue the proper warrant of arrest against the defendants Eustaquio
Joson, Florencio Tacorda, Vicente Bagadiong, and Pedro Tapar, and for their provincial release
they will be admitted to bail by giving a bond of P500 each.

In accordance with the foregoing order on the same date (April 28, 1923), an "order of
arrest" was issued, signed by said judge. On the same date (April 28, 1923), and without
having been actually arrested under said order of arrest, all of the defendants appeared in
court and gave "bail bonds" for their liberty, which bonds were duly approved by the
Honorable M. Rosauro. Each of said bonds obligated each of said defendants "to appear and
answer the charge above-mentioned (the complaint) in whatever court it may be tried, and
will at all times hold themselves amenable to the orders and processes of the court and, if
convicted, will appear for judgment and render themselves to the execution thereof."

Nothing further seems to have occurred in the prosecution of said action until the 22d
day of January, 1924, when the cause was set down for trial on the 6th day of March, 1924,
at 8 o'clock a. m. Notices of the assignment of said cause for trial were duly served upon the
defendants by the sheriff, some of them on the 10th day of February, 1924, and the others
on the 5th day of March, 1924.

On the 5th day of March, 1924, the cause was transferred from the 6th day of March,
upon petition of the provincial fiscal, to a later date to be fixed by the court. On the 11th day
of March, 1924, the cause was reassigned for trial on the 20th day of March, 1924. On the
20th day of March, 1924, and at the time set for the trial of said cause, the defendants
appeared and presented a motion to dismiss the action. Said motion was based upon the
following grounds:

1. That the information presented in this case was filed on or about April 28, 1923.

2. That the defendants were never arrested nor arraigned as to said information up to this
time.

3. That while a warrant of arrest appears in the record, yet on no date of occasion were the
defendants notified of said order, and it appears that up to this time no action was taken
thereof and it was not enforced. 1awph!l.net

4. That since the aforesaid information was presented and up to this date, no step was taken
by the prosecution to notify or inform the accused thereof, nor to have the proper

preliminary investigation held, and it appears that up to this time no preliminary

investigation of the case has in fact been made, notwithstanding the lapse of the
considerable period of almost exactly eleven months.

5. That it appears from the foregoing facts that this court has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused nor to try them.

6. That the acts imputed to the accused, according to the information itself, are alleged to
have been committed on or about June 6, 1922, and yet and without any explanation
therefor being given, more than 10 months were let elapse without filing said information.

7. That in view of the facts and irregularities above set forth, the filing of the aforesaid
information does not constitute the commencement of any valid or legal criminal action, nor
interrupt the period for the prescription of the offense with which the accused are charged,
and said offense has in fact prescribed.

Notwithstanding the opposition of the provincial fiscal to said motion to dismiss, the
Honorable Pablo Borbon, judge, after a consideration of the arguments pro and con upon
said motion, granted the same upon the specific grounds that the defendants had not been
arrested; that the action had not been prosecuted, and that the same was then barred by
prescription. From the judgment the Attorney-General appealed to this court, and now
alleges that the lower court committed the following errors: (a) In holding that the running of
the statute of limitation was not interrupted; (b) in holding that the offense with which the
defendants were charged had prescribed; and (c) in dismissing the information.

Section 71 of Act No. 3030 (the Election Law) provides that "Offenses resulting from
violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission." The complaint charges
that the crime with the 1st to the 6th day of June, 1922. The complaint was presented,
therefore, within the year following the commission of the crime. If the presentation of a
complaint has the effect of interrupting the period of prescription, then the present action
was not barred at the time the complaint was presented.

The lower court argued, however, that inasmuch as the defendants had not been
arrested, that the action had not been prosecuted within the period prescribed by the law
and that the action was barred. No rule of law relating to the prescription of actions is better
settled than that the commencement of an action interrupts the running of the prescriptive
period. But, was the action commenced by the presentation of the complaint? By reference
to said Act No. 3030, with special reference to section 71, it will be noted that the Act does
not define what shall amount to the commencement of a criminal action. The lower court
relied upon the provisions of the Penal Code. We are of the opinion, however, that Act No.
3030 being a special law, that the provisions of the Penal Code do not apply. We are left
therefore, so far as the law is concerned, without a definition of what constitutes the
commencement of an action in criminal cases.

By reference, however, to section 46 of Act No. 190, we may find something which will
assist us in solving that question by analogy. While section 389 of Act No. 190 provides that
the commencement of an action shall date from the filing of the complaint and the service of
the same, yet for the purpose of interrupting the statute of prescription or limitations,
section 46 of said Act provides that "An action shall be deemed commenced within the
meaning of this chapter (prescription), as to each defendant, at the date of the filing of the
complaint in court. . . ."

In the absence of a definition in Act No. 3030 or any other acts of the Legislature,
defining what shall constitute the commencement of a criminal action, we are inclined to
follow the provisions of section 46 of Act No. 190, and to hold that the word "action" as used
in section 46 applies to both criminal and civil actions. In accordance therefore with that
section, we are forced to decide that the filing of the complaint in the present action on the
28th day of April, 1923, had the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period
mentioned in section 71 of Act No. 3030, and that the actual arrest of the defendants was
not necessary to interrupt the running of the period of prescription or limitation. Moreover, it
may be added that when the defendants voluntarily appeared after the complaint was
presented against them and gave bonds for their appearance at any time they may be
called, no arrest is necessary. Voluntary appearance relieves the necessity of an actual
arrest.

The record contains no explanation why the prosecution of the present case was
delayed from the 28th of April, 1923, to the 20th of March, 1924. Such delay should not be
permitted.

In view of all of the foregoing, our conclusions are: That the presentation of the
complaint within the year of prescription interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
and the action was not barred by prescription; that the lower court committed the errors
complained of by the Attorney-General; that the cause was improperly dismissed, and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the record should be returned to the court whence it came,
with direction that the prosecution proceeds as speedily as possible. And without any finding
as to costs, it is so ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.