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People vs Macoyjr., G. R. No. 126253, August

16, 2000, Pardo, J.
Facts: Accused Victor MacoyJr.was charged by the
crime of parricide and illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition. In an information filed by the
prosecution, Victor Macoy Jr. shoot his son
JoglynMacoy by an unlicensed firearm (.38 caliber
paltik) which eventually lead to the death of the
victim. Victor Macoy Jr. pleaded not guilty. Victor
claimed that the gun used does not belong to him.
Also he pointed out that he was not afforded of his
constitutional right. The trial court rendered a
decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide and illegal possession of firearm.
Accused then now file an appeal still contending that
he had not done the said crime. The Solicitor General
also submit to the court modification, that RA 8294
amending PD 1866 that there be no separate
conviction of murder/homicide and illegal possession
of firearm if said firearm is used.
Issue: WON accused is guilty of parricide and illegal
possession of firearm
Held: The court ruled that accused is guilty of
parricide sentencing him of reclusion perpetua and
the illegal possession of firearm is dismissed. RA
8294 even though it will spare the accused of the
separate crime of illegal possession it should not be
given retroactive effect in this case as it aggravate
the crime of parricide increasing the penalty from
reclusion perpetua to death. Therefore it should be
given prospective application by dissolving the crime
of illegal possession of firearm.
People vs Tuson, G.R. no. 106345-46, Sept. 16,
1996, Romero, J.
Facts: Tusons and Villarins are neighbors and
cousins. On Oct 10 1990 Romeo Tuson and Loreto
Villarin had a fight over a gambling matter but
eventually settled their differences. On Oct 11 1990
Loreto and CeferinoVillarin were drunk and tipsy after
the celebration of theirs brother birthday. Ceferino

while seated on the wooden window of their house

saw Loreto make his way to the common lavatory but
he did not reach it, for Romeo Tuson shot him who
was standing by the door of his own. Ceferino rushed
to aid his brother but he was also shot by Romeo
Tuson. CeferinoVillarins life was saved due to timely
medicaction but Loreto Villarin died. Accused
eventually went hiding for 9 days until he
surrendered to the police. Romeo Tuson was charged
in the RTC for murder and frustrated murder for the
death of Loreto and the shooting of Ceferino and
eventually the RTC found him guilty. Romeo Tuson, in
his appeal stated that it was a self-defense, but the
court did not honor it for the requisite of self-defese
are not present.
Issue: WON accused is guilty of murder and
frustrated murder
Held: The court found accused guilty of the said
crime and suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
murder and prisioncorreccional to reclusion temporal
for frustrated muder. The court also found treachery
because the means employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or to retaliate
w/out danger to the accused. The suddenness of
attack clearly indicates treachery. Murder as one of
the instances when man descends to a level lower
than that of the beast, for it is non-instinctive killing,
a deliberate destruction of a member of same
species for reasons other than survival. Its
senselessness is heightened when it is committed
between kindred.
People vs Pugay and Samson, G.R. no. L-74324,
Nov. 17, 1988, Medialdea, J.
Facts: Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson were
charged for the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, a retardate, that thru conspiracy,
and helping and assisting one another with
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage
of their superior strength, kill Miranda by pouring
gasoline and use fire to burn Miranda. Accused both
pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court find accused

guilty of murder. Accused appeal stating that its true

that they poured the can of gasoline believing it is
only water and that they did not set fire. They also
claimed that their written statements were extracted
by force which the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also assailed
the credibility of the statement of the witness
because he was just made to testify by the mother of
deceased in exchange for his absolution from liability.
Issue: WON accused should be held guilty of murder
with intent to kill by the use of fire
Held: There is nothing to show that the two
conspired or unity of purpose and intention between
the two accused to commit the crime. It is clear that
the accused only wanted to make fun of the victim.
Also Pugay failed to exercise due diligence for the
smell of gasoline cannot escape his notice and
avoided the undesirable consequences of the act.
The court only finds accused guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence. Also Samson showed
no reason to kill the deceased and the act are only
fun making. Even though Samson knew well that the
liquid poured is gasoline. Giving the benefit of doubt,
the accused only wanted to set fire the clothes of the
deceased still it will amount to physical injury a
penalty punishable in the RPC. Therefore, Samson is
found guilty of homicide.
People vs Araquel, G.R. no. L-12629, Dec. 9,
1959, Gutierrez David, J.
Facts: On Jan. 30 1955, the acting chief of police of
Naruacan, Ilocos Sur filed a complaint for homicide in
justice of peace court of said municipality against
Alfredo Araquelfor hacking and killing Alberto
Pagadian with a bolo. While complaint is pending the
chief of police field for the amendment of the
complaint on the ground that the crime charged is
not homicide but homicide under exceptional
circumstances defined and punished under Art. 247
of RPC which he was arraigned under the amended
complaint sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
destierro. During service of sentence provinvial fiscal
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filed a complaint at Court of First Instance for

homicide under Art. 249 of RPC for the killing of
Alberto Pagadian. Accused moved to quash said
information on the ground of double jeopardy
invoking the first and second sentence. The plea of
double jeopardy is sustained by the lower court and
information is dismissed.
Issue: WON accused is place on a double jeopardy
Held: The requisite for double jeopardy is that he is
placed under court of competent jurisdiction and
tried. Hence in this case the justice of peace even
though has the jurisdiction over cases in which the
penalty is destierro the said case does not fall within
its jurisdiction. Art. 247 is not a crime separate and
distinct from homicide, parricide or murder or any
other crimes similar to it. Art. 247 saved as a grant of
privilege or benefit exempting from adequate
punishment. The penalty is mere banishment and
since such crime involves intent to killing such case
must have been tried at the CFI. Therefore case is
remanded to the proper courts.
People vs Caritativo, G.R. no. 92271-72, April
1, 1996, Panganiban, J.
Facts: On April 13, 1996 RTC, Iloilo City, convicted
accused Salvador Caritativo and Victor Solas of the
crime of murder and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua. The victims were Wilfredo (Fred) Pama and
his 11 years old son, Joey, both have multiple
wounds and a gunshot wound. Jeffrey, anotherson of
Fred who lived to recount the tale of horror.
Caritativo, Solas and Solomon are the identified
perpetrators but Solomon fled and remained at large.
Jeffrey testified that the 3 perpetrators suddenly
attacked them. Fely Gonzales, elder sister of Fred
Pama, also testified that she saw the killing but failed
to aid for fear that her own life would be in peril. The
defense contends that it is all done by Solomon who
disappeared to defeat the ends of justice.
Issue: WON the defense of the accused is tenable

Held: The court ruled that the alibi of the defense

cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the eyewitness at the scene of the crim. Also the
contention that It is only Solomon who perpetrated
the act is absurd as it is shown that the wounds
showed that there were more than one assailant and
numerous wounds in the body indicates plurality of
assailants. The court also ruled that the conspiracy
exist because of the common purpose or design as
well as concerted action on their part and there is a
trail of vendetta involving families of accused and
the suddenness of attack, completely without
warning, caught them by surprise and gave them no
chance to put up any defense. Also the abuse of
superior strength is deemed absorb by the treachery.
Therefore accused are guilty of two separate crimes
of murder and sentenced to two penalties of
reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735, G.R. No. 74433, September 14,
1987
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under
Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the

accused found his wife, Jenny, and KhingsleyKoh in
the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour
who got his revolver. The accused who was then
peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a
firearm. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo
and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back
to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh
there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it
was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused
found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at KingsleyKoh
three times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and

LinaAmparado who were occupying a room adjacent

to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were
also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley
Koh died instantaneously as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen.
Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on
in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife,
LinaAmparado, was also treated in the hospital as
she was hit by bullet fragments. The trial court then
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.

The accused then contended that the trial court erred

in convicting him for the crime charged instead of
entering a judgment of conviction under Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:

1)
2)

Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in

the case
Whether or not the accused is liable for the
injuries suffered by third persons

HELD:

1)

Yes. Though quite a length of time, about

one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim
and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by
the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall
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2)

kill any of them or both of them . . .

immediately" after surprising his spouse in
the act of intercourse, does not say that he
should
commit
the
killing
instantly
thereafter. It only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act
of infidelity. But the killing should have been
actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced
by external factors. The killing must be the
direct by-product of the accused's rage.
No. The accused-appellant did not have the
intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although
as a rule, one committing an offense is
liable for all the consequences of his act,
that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. But the case at bar
requires distinctions. Here, the accusedappellant was not committing murder when
he discharged his rifle upon the deceased.
Inflicting
death
under
exceptional
circumstances is not murder. The court
cannot therefore hold the appellant liable
for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.

RATIO: There is no question that the accused

surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim
in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a
result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder,
therefore erred.

US v. ALANO
32Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021,
December 1, 1915
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under
Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed,

while his wife remained at the window looking out
and a little while afterward told her husband that she
would go down for a moment to the Chinese store
nearby, which she did.

As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick

child was crying, EufrasioAlano left the house to look
for her in the Chinese store situated on the corner of
Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her
there, went to look for her in another Chinese store
nearby, with the same result. He therefore started to
return home through an alley where he tripped on a
wire lying across the way. He then observed as he
stopped that among some grass near a clump of
thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a
position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they
both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the
noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at
once recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he
was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who
immediately started to run. He was wearing an
undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower
garment he held and pulled up as he ran. Enraged by
what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he
had in his pocket and pursued Martin Gonzalez,
although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and,
not knowing where he had filed, returned to the
house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of
climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her
disgraceful conduct and immediately stabbed her
several times, although she finally succeeded in
entering the house, pursued by her husband and fell
face downwards on the floor near the place where a
sick woman RicardaGarces was lying. The latter on
seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started

to run, as did also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen and

gone down the stairs out of the house; but her
infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she
reached the ground she fell on one of the posts
beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall,
he entered the house, took some clothes and started
out in the direction of Fort McKinley.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused killed her wife

immediately thereafter the act of sexual
intercourseto entitle him to the exceptional privilege
under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: Yes.The unfaithful wife was not killed in the

very place where she was caught, for the reason that
the wronged husband preferred first to attack the
despoiler of his honor and afterwards the adulterous
wife who succeeded in getting away from the place
where she was caught with her paramour. The
assault upon the woman must be understood to be a
continuation of the act of the wronged husband's
pursuit of her paramour, who had the good fortune to
escape and immediately get away from the place of
the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did
not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but
in another place nearby, logically it must be
understood that the case at bar comes within the
provisions of the said article.

The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing

must all form part of one continuous act.

RATIO: For a husband to be justified, it is not

necessary that he sees the carnal act being
committed by his wife with his own eyes. It is
enough that he surprises them under such
circumstances as to show reasonably that the
carnal act is being committed or has just been
committed.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

ROGER or ROGELIO PUEDAN, appellant.

Whether the Trial Court erred in finding the accused

guilty of the crime of murder instead of Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code.

[G.R. No. 139576. September 2, 2002]

Held:

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 8, Malaybalay City, finding the
accused guilty of murder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the
sum of P50,000. According to the Prosecution, in the
morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar,
accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the
house of Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was
fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his
house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio
told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet from him.
Accused suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five
times, with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as
plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno
fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young
Reymark ran back to his parents house and told his
mother, Erlinda, what transpired. Erlinda ran swiftly
to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead,
bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the
rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen
until the arrival of the police later that day. On the
part of the Defense, the wife of the accused, Leah
testified, admitted having an illicit relationship with
the deceased. Their relationship had been going on
for two years and was known in their barangay,
except her Roger. In the morning of February 21,
1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was
breastfeeding her child, and was looking for her
husband.

The Decision of the Trial Court was affirmed. By

raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his
defense, accused admitted that he killed the victim.
By invoking this defense, he waived his right to the
constitutional presumption of innocence and bears
the burden of proving [1] That a legally married
person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his
daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him),
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; [2] That he or she kills any or both of
them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious
physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter;
[3] That he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she
has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse; To satisfy this burden, accused must prove
that he actually surprised his wife and Florencio
in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during
or immediately thereafter. What is important is that
his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically
opposed to the convincing accounts of Prosecution
Witnesses. Further eroding the defense of the
accused is the fact that he immediately fled right
after the stabbing incident. He hid for about three
years until he was arrested.

The appellant contends that, having surprised his

wife, in the afternoon of the date in question, under
circumstances indicative that she had carnal
intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the
privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail himself

of Article 247
PEOPLE v. GONZALES
69 Phil. 66, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under
Exceptional Circumstances

Issue:

FACTS: At the trial, the appellant testified that, on

June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the
woods, he surprised his wife, SixtaQuilason, and
IsabeloEvangelio in the act, told her that the man
was the very one who used to ask rice and food from
them, and counseled her not to repeat the same
faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the
act again. Thereafter - the accused continued
testifying - he left the house and went towards the
South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his
house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and not
finding his wife there, he looked for her and found
her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place
covered with underbush, who was standing and
buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels.
The accused went after him, but unable to overtake
him, he returned to where his wife was and,
completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife
without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity
on her and took her dead body to his house. The
Court of First Instance of Tayabas found him guilty of
parricide.

HELD: No. The accused cannot avail himself of the

aforesaid article, because the privilege there granted
is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse
surprise the husband or the wife in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person;
the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act
or carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such
there was, because from the fact that she was rising
up and the man was buttoning his drawers, it does
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not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had

committed the carnal act.

The court cannot entirely accept the defense sought

to be established by the accused, first, because his
testimony is improbable. It is not conceivable that
the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to
repeat committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of
taking harsher measures as is natural in such
circumstances, if it were true that he had surprised
the two offender in the act of adultery on returning to
his house on the date in question. Secondly, because
even assuming that the accused caught his wife
rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did
not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of
committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective
positions of the woman and the man were sufficient
to warrant the conclusion that they had committed
the carnal act.

chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a

very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and
Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded
her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him;
they even threatened to kill him.
On September 1995, Manolito went to the room of
Tita to inform the latter of the meeting they were
invited upon due to their sons failing grade. Upon
reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of
romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried
open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught
his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse.Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in
the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Tita
came in defense of Jesus and stabbed Manolito. This
angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita. Tita fell near
the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point
that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was
renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired
about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not
to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Manolito surrendered himself to the authority upon
the call for him to surrender.

RATIO: Article 247 is not applicable when the

accused did not see his spouse in the act of
sexual intercourse with another person.

He was later convicted by the court guilty of

homicide and parricide. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MANOLITO

OYANIB
G.R. Nos. 130634-35
March 12, 2001
Facts:
Manolito Oyanib is the husband of Tita T. Oyanib.
They were married sometime in 1979. However, due
to marital indifferences, they separated in 1994, with
Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children.
Tita rented a room not far from the place where her
family lived.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita
back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for
the sake of the children. However, Tita was very
reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was
very open about her relationship with other men and
would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he

Whether or not the actions of Manolito should fall

under the exceptional circumstances provided under
Article 247
Held:
Yes. At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife
and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an
exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present
'where the act committed is a crime but for reasons
of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed."'
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon
accused to prove the exempting circumstances to
the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of

any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal

Code prescribes the following essential elements for
such a defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse. Accused must prove these
elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The
death caused must be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put,
the killing by the husband of his wife must concur
with her flagrant adultery."
There is no question that the first element is present
in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must
convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence
presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we
find accused to have acted within the circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his
wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was
that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his
wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having
sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage,
accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the
accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of
Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several
times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
surrendered to the police when a call for him to
surrender was made.

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Issue:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDELCIANO
AMACA EDDIE

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code

G.R. No. 110129. August 12, 1997

Facts:
On October 1, 1990 at around 7 in the evening,
Edelciano Amaca and a certain John Doe, members
of Civilian Volunteer Organization, willfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot Wilson Vergara
with unknown reason. The victim was immediately
brought to the hospital with the company of Bernardo
Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police.
Upon reaching the clinic, the police officer inquired
from the victim about the incident, and the former
answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang.
Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did
not know the reason why he was shot. Mangubat was
able to reduce into writing the declaration of victim
Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his
thumbmark with the use of his own blood in the
presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City
Mayor.
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused
corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, Felix
Ponting, and Alfredo Gabucero, portrayed the
following scenario: Felix Ponting and Alfredo
Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Unit) and accused as
member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)
with station at Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On
October 1, 1990, the accused together with his
companion Felix Ponting were on duty at the said
station from 6:00 oclock in the evening to 8:00
oclock that same evening. After their duty at 8:00
oclock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and
were relieved by Alfredo Gabutero, whose duty
covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening.
Accused Edelciano Amaca was convicted of murder
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Hence this
appeal.

Held:
No. The Court held that the appellant may be held
liable only for homicide since treachery was not
alleged in the Information, while evident
premeditation and nighttime, although duly alleged,
were not satisfactorily proven. The Information
readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by
evident premeditation. The trial court however found
that the killing was qualified by treachery. Even
assuming that this conclusion is supported by the
evidence on record, we cannot appreciate treachery
to qualify the crime to murder for the simple reason
that this was not alleged in the Information.
Treachery is an element of the crime. The
Constitution requires that the accused must be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Obviously, this failure to allege
treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the
prosecution. Since every doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused, we cannot convict him of
murder through treachery under an Information that
charged him with murder qualified by evident
premeditation.
Moreover, in this case, treachery and nighttime may
not be considered even as generic aggravating
circumstances, because there is nothing in the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses to
convincingly show that the accused-appellant
consciously and purposely adopted (1) such means
of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the
darkness of night to facilitate the commission of the
crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade
capture. This conclusion is further bolstered by the
simple fact that not one of the prosecution witnesses
saw the commencement of the assault or even the
actual assault itself. Hence, they are not competent
to testify on whether the aggravating circumstances
of treachery and nighttime attended the commission

thereof. These circumstances cannot be appreciated

on the basis of mere presumptions or suppositions;
they must be proven as clearly as the crime itself.
Appellant may therefore be held liable only for the
crime of homicide defined under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since there are no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
temporal provided under said article shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should suffer
imprisonment of prision mayor in its medium period
to reclusion temporal, also in its medium period.
(Just in case na matanong ni Judge)
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is
highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his
impending death to accuse falsely or even carelessly
anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable
demise. Indeed, when a person is at the point of
death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak the truth. This is the rationale for this
exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such
exception are: (1) the deceased made the
declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the
declarant would have been a competent witness had
he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
where the declarants death is the subject of inquiry;
and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these
concur in the present case.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS,vs.FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES
(alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, alias FRANCISCO
ADMONES, alias BUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY),
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-38511
October 6, 1933
Facts:
On the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee,
father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the
corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the
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District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the

outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the
street. While they were talking, a man passed back
and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu
Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man
that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon
approached him from behind and suddenly and
without warning struck him with his fist on the back
part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards.
His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part
of his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants
immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through
San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and
then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam
and Yee Fung, who were walking along Calle
Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him in the
pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The wounded man was
taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he
died about midnight.
The accused contend that they should only be
convicted of slight physical injuries under art 266
than murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should only be charged
with slight physical injuries rather than murder
Held:
No. Since the accused struck the deceased from
behind and without warning, he acted with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make." (Article 14, No. 16,
of the Revised Penal Code.)
We have seen that under the circumstances of this
case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon,
because his death was the direct consequence of
defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head.
If the defendant had not committed the assault in a
treacherous manner. he would nevertheless have
been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend

to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did

commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of
murder, because of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no
incompatibility, moral or legal, between alevosia and
the mitigating circumstance of not having intended
to cause so great an injury:
Considering that there is no moral or legal
incompatibility between treachery and the
mitigating circumstance No. 3 of article 9 of
the Penal Code, because the former
depends upon the manner of execution of
the crime and the latter upon the tendency
of the will towards a definite purpose, and
therefore there is no obstacle, in case
treacherous means, modes or forms are
employed, to the appreciation of the first of
said circumstances and simultaneously of
the second if the injury produced exceeds
the limits intended by the accused; and for
that reason it cannot be held in the instant
case that this mitigating circumstances
excludes treachery, or that the accused,
being chargeable with the death of the
offended party, should not be liable due to
the voluntary presence of treachery in the
act perpetrated, although with mitigation
corresponding to the disparity between the
act intended and the act consummated, etc.
(Decision of May 10, 1905, Gazette of April
20, 906; Viada: 5th edition, Vol. 2, p. 156.)
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be
criminally liable for a felony different from that which
he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the
two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a
felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done
to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of

the crime committed by the offender. U.S. vs. Brobst,

14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 U.S. vs.
Diana, 32 Phil., 344.)
The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, and there being present in this case
one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the
prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to
seventeen years, four months, and one day of
reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER DELA
CRUZ y DOE
G.R. No. 152176. October 1, 2003
Facts:
In the evening of August 29, 1998 at Bgy.
Cabanbanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, Roger Dela
Cruz stabbed Mark Lester Suarez, with the use of ice
pick.
Joseph Sanchez testified that he saw Mark Lester
Suarez and Edgar delos Santos, on their way towards
Barangay Cagsao, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. He
stopped at a store to buy a cigarette. Suddenly, he
heard Mark shout that he was stabbed. When he
looked over his shoulder, he saw appellant, running
away. Mark told him that it was appellant who
stabbed him. Sanchez ran to the house of Marks
mother, Milagros Suarez, to tell her that Mark had
been stabbed by Roger dela Cruz. Together, he and
Milagros rushed Mark to the Bicol Medical Center but
he died on the way.
The appellant however said that he went to away to
look for a job and when he learned that there was
case filed against him so he went home and was
later arrested and convicted of murder. Hence, this
appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of
murder
Held:
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No. the court held that the crime committed was not
murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim.
The prosecution witness did not see the actual
stabbing of the victim. Therefore, there is no way of
determining on how the attack was initiated. In the
same way that no testimony would prove that the
appellant contemplated upon the mode to insure the
killing.
Therefore, the crime committed by appellant is
homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal.
There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Appellant is entitled to the benefits
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and may
thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum term of which shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision mayor.
Thus, appellant may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The declaration of the victim is admissible as part of
the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the
res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites are present in this
case. The principal act, i.e., the stabbing, was a
startling occurrence. The declaration was made right

after the stabbing while the victim was still under the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without
any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating
the appellant. The declaration concerns the one who
stabbed the victim. Thus, the trial court correctly
appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Sanchez and Delos Santos on what the victim told
them as part of the res gestae.

saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a

plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police
a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut
lumber and a carpenters saw. The appellant even
told Romualdo Campos, a security guard, that he had
killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance
to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump
where he could burn it. Campos then called for the
police. He was later question regarding the crime
without the presence of a counsel.

Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on

the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, in the absence of any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would have affected the result
of the case. None of the aforesaid exceptions obtains
in the case at bar.

Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant

Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV
reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABSCBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both
interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide.
Appellant admitted to David that he committed the
crime and never gave it second thought. He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including
how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his
body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and
cartons. When asked why he killed his employer,
Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for
years, did not feed him properly, and treated him
like an animal. Both Abelgas and David said that
Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his
alleged misdeed during the course of their respective
interviews with him.

We cannot sustain appellants defenses of denial and

alibi. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense. It must be
supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in
order to be credible. Correspondingly, courts view the
defense of alibi with suspicion and caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it can be fabricated easily.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC

GUILLERMO y GARCIA
G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004
Facts:
This is case wherein the appellant was convicted
guilty of the crime of murder for killing one Victor
Keyser.

However, during the trial, the accused denied all the

accusations against him and said that he was framed
up. That the information was extracted without the
officers explain his rights and absence of a counsel.
Hence, this appeal. The appellant also contends that
he should only be convicted of homicide because
there is no witness that can prove that the element
of treachery is present and it should be presumed
that all things should be favorable to the accused.
Issue:

The herein appellant is an employee of Victor Keyser,

who was and manager of Keyser Plastic
Manufacturing Corp.

Whether or not the appellant should be convicted of

homicide.

On March 22, 1998, Eric Guillermo bashed the victim

on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser
fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters

Held:
No. The appellant is guilty of murder.
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Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove

either treachery or evident premeditation to qualify
the killing as murder. He points out that there was
not a single eyewitness to show how the crime was
committed and hence, absent an eyewitness to show
the manner in which the crime was committed, he
cannot be held liable for murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted
by the appellant himself, he repeatedly struck the
victim, with a piece of coco lumber (dos por dos), at
the back of his head, while the victims back was
turned towards him. The suddenness of the attack,
coupled with the manner in which it was executed
clearly indicates treachery. The OSG agrees with
appellant, however, that evident premeditation was
not adequately established. Hence, we shall now deal
only with the disputed circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender
commits any crime against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to the offender arising from
any defense which the offended party might make.
Two essential requisites must concur for treachery to
be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b)
the said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the
nature of the crime and increases the imposable
penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself,
it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the
instant case, we find insufficient the prosecutions
evidence to prove that the attack on the victim came
without warning and that he had absolutely no
opportunity to defend himself, or to escape. None of
the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack
was initiated or carried out, simply because there
was no eyewitness to the offense.
The gap in the prosecutions evidence cannot be
filled with mere speculation. Treachery cannot be
appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner
in which the aggression commenced or how the act
unfolded and resulted in the victims demise. Any

doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved

in favor of appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply
proved by the prosecutions evidence which shows
that the victims corpse was sawn by appellant into
seven (7) pieces. Under Art. 248 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code, outraging or scoffing at the corpse is a
qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead
body is one manner of outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the victim. In the instant case, the corpse
of Victor F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant
who sawed off the head, limbs, and torso. The
Information categorically alleges this qualifying
circumstance, when it stated that the appellant
thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor
F. Keyser. This being the case, as proved by the
prosecution, appellant is guilty not just of homicide
but of murder.

their way. They saw Mercedes being dragged toward

the sitio of Sawahon. Hardly had they walked one
kilometer when they heard gun reports. The following
day Mercedes Tobias was found dead in Sawahon
with two gunshot wounds, the points of entry being
at the back and of exit at the left breast and
shoulder.
NestorioRemalante was charged with complex crime
of kidnapping with murder. His companions have not
been apprehended. After trial the Court of First
Instance of Leyte found him guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the
costs. He has appealed.

Issue: Won the accused is guilty of murder

Held: No. the elements of crime of murder are:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE VS. NESTORIO
REMALANTE

Facts:At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 18

March 1948, while Mercedes Tobias accompanied by
EusebioGerilla and Lucia Pelo was on the way to her
home in the Barrio of Guinarona, Municipality of
Dagami, Province of Leyte, coming from her farm in
Maanghon, she met a group of more than ten men all
armed with rifles, some of them with beard reaching
the breast. NestorioRemalante, one of the bearded
men, approached, took hold of and dragged
Mercedes Tobias. She remonstrated and entreated
him not to take her because she had done him no
wrong. Remalante continued to drag and struck her
with the butt of his rifle on different parts of her body.
The companions of Mercedes were told to continue

1.

That a person was killed

2.

That the accused killed him

3.

That the killing was attended by any of the

qualifying circumstances

4.

The killing is not parricide or infanticide

There is no sufficient evidence of intention to

kidnap because from the moment Mercedes
Tobias was held and drag to the time when the
gun reports were heard nothing was done or said
by the appellant or his confederates to show or
indicate that the captors intended to deprive her
of her liberty for sometime and for some
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purpose and thereafter set her free or kill her.

The interval was so short as to negative the idea
implied in kidnapping. Her short detention and
ill-treatment are included or formed part of the
perpetration of the crime of murder. It is murder
because of the concurrence of at least one
qualifying circumstance, either of treachery or of
abused of superior strength or with the aid of
armed men, the first shown by the entry of the
shots at the back and the second and the third
by the number of armed captors, the appellant
and his companions, some or one of whom killed
Mercedes Tobias. For lack of sufficient number of
votes as required by law, the death penalty
recommended by the Solicitor General cannot be
imposed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NICANOR
SESPENE

Facts:In the afternoon of June 23,1953, Leonardo

Enerio left his home located in barrio Tagbaya, Ibajay,
Capiz, and went to the field to tend his carabao. Left
in the house were his wife Gloria Enerio, three minor
children the oldest of whom being 9 years of age,
and a houseboy. Before departing, Leonardo Enerio
left behind his bolo and instructed the houseboy to
split some firewood.
Between 6:00 and 6:30 o'clock that evening, Mrs.
PriscilaEnerio Andrade, a sister of Leonardo, arrived
at the house for the express purpose of fetching the
latter because their mother, MarencianaBitong, was
then seriously ill. Not finding her brother at home,
Priscila waited, and while she was conversing with
Gloria
and
one
Eliang
from
Buracay,
BienvenidoSajera and Domingo Sajona arrived at the
place. Sajona sat himself on a chair inside the sala,
while Sajera hid behind the shutters in the balcony.
Inside the sala were Gloria, Priscila and Eliang, aside
from Sajona, and the place was then well lighted with

a "Coleman" lamp hanging in the center. Sajona

inquired for the deceased and scarcely had Gloria
replied when the sound of chopping of banana stalks
in the backyard and the dropping of stones atop the
roof, were heard. Gloria then asked Sajona as to who
were with him, and the latter replied that there was
no one. Thereupon Gloria invited Priscila and Sajona
to the balcony, and as they looked outside Gloria and
Priscila saw three individuals hiding behind Gloria's
store, which is about half meter from the house.
While they were watching the movements of said
individuals, Leonardo Enerio arrived, and just as he
was about to step on the first rung of the
ladder Jesus Mangilog suddenly appeared and
rushing towards him, attacked the latter from the
rear with a bolo, locally known as "talibong". Taken
completely by surprise, the deceased was struck on
both shoulders, after which, he faced his assailant.
Mangilog then stepped backward, a little to the left
side, and at this instance NicanorSespee, Apolinario
Leonardo and Pedro Calizo, each armed with a
firearm, arrived and fired four shots at Leonardo
Enerio. Upon seeing the latter fall, Gloria and Priscila
shouted for help. At this juncture, Sajera and Sajona
went down of the house, after which Sajona removed
the ladder, while NicanorSespee, Apolinario
Leonardo and Pedro Calizo stood around. After Sajona
had laid the ladder on the ground, and upon seeing
the victim stand up and make an effort to escape, he
fired his revolver at his victim. Immediately
thereafter Sajera, who was behind, knifed the
deceased once on the nape. Still with life, Leonardo
Enerio made an attempt to flee from his assailants,
but the latter surrounded him and so he was forced
to lean against the fence fronting the house. The
fence broke due to weak condition and Leonardo
Enerio fell with it, his head touching the canal while
his feet rested at the base of the fence. While in this
position, Sespee shouted "kill him" and one of them
fired a shot at Leonardo Enerio. Immediately
afterwards, the assailants fled from the scene.
After the assailants had left, Gloria and Priscila
jumped out of the house and went to succor

Leonardo Enerio. With the help of CamiloCalizo,

Gloria's brother, they carried Leonardo Enerio to the
house, while Gloria's mother called for a doctor.
Leonardo Enerio told his wife that his assailants were
NicanorSespee, Apolinario Leonardo, Pedro Calizo,
BienvenidoSajera, Domingo Sajona, and Jesus
Mangilog.

Issue: WON the accused are guilty of murder

Held: Yes. Because all the elements of murder are

present:
1.

That a person was killed

2.

That the accused killed him

3.

That the killing was attended by any of the

qualifying circumstances

4.

The killing is not parricide or infanticide

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE VS. JULIO GUILLEN

FACTS:The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to
assassinate the Presidentof the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.During the 1946
Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing
candidateof Manuel Roxas. According to the accused,
he was disappointed with the latter for failing
toredeem and fulfill promises made by President
Roxas
during
the
elections.
Consequently,
theaccused determined to assassinate the President
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and found the oppoturnity to do so on thenight of

March 10, 1947 when the President attended a
popular meeting by the Liberal Partyat Plaza de
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first intended to use
a revolver to accomplish hisgoal but he had
previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of
using two handgrenades which were given to him by
an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of
whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been
sitting on and hurled the grenade at thePresident
when the latter had just closed his speech. A general
who was on the platform sawthe smoking grenade
and kicked it away from the platform towards an
open space where hethought the grenade was likely
to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the
middle of agroup of persons standing close to the
platform
and
grenade
fragments
seriously
injuredSimeon Varela, who died the next day due to
the mortal wounds caused, and several other
persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily
admitted his responsibility.
ISSUE:WON the accused was guilty only of homicide
HELD: No. the elements of homicide are not present
specially no. 4 because the accused used an
explosive device to commit the crime. Thus it
qualifies him as murder.
1.

That a person was killed

2.

Thqt the accused killed him without any

justifying circumstances

3.

That the accused had the intention to kill,

which is presumed

4.

That the killing was not attended by any of

the qualifying circumstances of murder or
by that of parricide or infanticide

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALIDE

Facts: The accused, Manalinde, who pleaded guilty

confessed that his wife died about one hundred days
before; that he was directed by DattoMupuck to go
huramentado and to kill the two persons he would
meet in the town; that if he was successful in the
matter, Mupuck would give him a pretty woman on
his return; that in order to carry out his intention to
kill two persons in the town of Cotobato, he provided
himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana
leaves; that he traveled for a day and a night from
his home; that upon reaching the town, he attacked
from behind a Spaniard named Igual, and
immediately after, he attacked a Chinaman named
Choa, who was close by; and that he had no quarrel
with the assaulted persons. Both victims died as a
result.
Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation is established by the facts.
Held: YES. Those facts establish the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.

The three requisites of evident premeditation are

illustrated by the facts:
First requisite: On a certain date, Manalinde accepted
the proposition that he would turn hurmentado and
kill the first two persons he would meet in the market
place. On said date, the offender is said to have
determined the crime.
Second requisite: He undertook the journey to
comply therewith and provided himself with a
weapon. The journey and the carrying of the weapon

are acts manifestly indicating that the offender clung

to his determination to commit the crime.
Third requisite: After the journey for a day and a
night, he killed the victims. One day and one night
constitute a sufficient lapse of time for the offender
to realize the consequences of his contemplated act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BALUYOT

Facts:The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses

Miguel Baluyot y Dulay Pablo Pinca y Narca and
Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot of the
crime of robbery with homicide, penalized under the
provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, Committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August 1970, in the
Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Miguel Baluyot y
Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari y
Naval,
alias
Tony
Baluyot,
conspiring
and
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, take and rob money
from Gerry Sureta alias MarcelinoCarceles y Abasola,
then driving a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate No.
14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9340 s/69), to the damage and
prejudice
of
the
said
Gerry
Sureta
alias
MarcelinoCarceles y Abasola; that simultaneously, on
the occasion of or during the commission of robbery,
to enable them to take, steal and carry away the said
money, the said accused, in furtherance of their
conspiracy, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and armed with a deadly
weapon (dagger) fan-nife did attack, assault and stab
the said Gerry Sureta alias MarcelinoCarceles y
Abasola, hitting him in the neck, thereby inflicting
serious wounds (stab wounds which directly caused
the
death
of
said
Gerry
Sureta
alias
MarcelinoCarceles y Abasola.

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Issue: WON the acts of the accused constitute

homicide only

Held: Yes.Because the act of the accused does not

enunciated under article 248 to qualify him in
murder.
As pointed out by both the counsel for the appellant
and the Solicitor General, the trial judge limited
himself to asking two brief questions from the
appellant: whether the appellant was aware of tile
consequences of his change of plea from not guilty to
that of guilty, and whether the appellant knew that
notwithstanding such plea of guilty the only possible
penalty was that of death. The record is completely
bereft of any indication that the Court diligently
ascertained for itself whether the appellant
completely understood the full meaning, significance
and implications of his plea of guilty. The court
likewise failed to inform the appellant of the
aggravating circumstances alleged in the amended
information and their effect on his plea. Again, the
court failed to ask the appellant whether he was
invoking mitigating circumstances in his favor.
Finally, the court did not m ake any inquiry, which
inquiry was obviously called for, why the appellant
had a sudden change of plea after he had previously
pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. In sum,
the trial court failed to take the necessary
precautions to forestall the entry by the appellant of
an improvident plea of guilty before passing
judgment upon him.
PEOPLE

OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JOHN JENN PORRAS and
SERGIO EMELO, accused-appellants.

FRANCISCO, J.:
The separate indictments are for MURDER and
for FRUSTRATED MURDER respectively.
Appellants
committed by

impute fourteen alleged errors

the trial court which can be

substantially reduced as follows: (1) misappreciation

of facts; (2) giving credence to the inconsistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Jose
Malumay and Maribel German; (3) ignoring the
defense of alibi; (4) not considering as fatal the
prosecutions inability to present as witness Cpl.
Crisanto de la Cruz; (5) admitting in evidence Sgt.
Alvarezs hearsay testimony; and (6) in convicting
appellants who were not positively identified in open
court.[3]
FACTS:Piecing together the testimonial and
material evidence submitted in these cases, the
Court cannot but conceive the following resume: that
on the night of June 20, 1990, (sic) accused John
JennPorras and Sergio Emelo went to the Police
Station looking for Pfc. RoldanEmelo of the Cavite
City PNP, a cousin of the latter and was directed by
Sgt. Pilapil to where he was; that they had some food
and drinks at the Banaue Restaurant and Emelo
asked for his black ammo pouch and some .38
caliber ammunition; that thereafter, perhaps in
connivance with Marcelo Real of the Philippine Coast
Guard who was then moonlighting in his tricycle,
flagged him down along M. Gregorio St. and in which
Marcos Luciano was a passenger at the time and was
told to alight as they were already overloaded and
whereat Luciano identified John JennPorras, who was
then wearing a maong jacket and maong pants when
he was focused by the headlights of the incoming
vehicle; that they proceeded to the Aroma Beer
House where the victim RosendoMortel was tabled
(sic) and wherein some misunderstanding happened
and Ronnie Mortel went out and was shot at close
range by either Porras or Emelo as seen by a
waitress, Maribel Herman who pointed to Porras as
the assailant and who after seeing RosendoMortel
sprawled on the ground and bloodied, fled into an
alley and thereafter returned and shot the prostrate
victim twice and sped away and who hailed Sgt.
CatalinoBermas (sic) was then monitoring the
situation as an Intelligence Operative on his
motorcycle to give chase; that during the shooting
Jose Malumay who was on a bicycle on his way home

after going to a house near Sangley Point also heard

a gun shot which he mistook for a blow-out and when
he offered to assist, he saw two men, one in dark
attire and the other in white T-shirt who from the
information of the witnesses fixed their identities as
the two accused John JennPorras and Sergio Emelo
who fired the initial shot and ran away and later on
returned to finish the job with Porras allegedly having
fired the last two shots killing the victim
instantaneously as he was brought to the hospital
dead on arrival.
During the chase given by CatalinoBermas he was
shot by Emelo along the way after having told them
(Emelo and Real) to go to the Police Station and
Bermas, feeling the effects of his wounds chanced
upon Cpl. Dela Cruz in front of the 501 Beer House
and asked for his assistance and they rode in tandem
and pursued the tricycle at the Saulog Terminal
Compound where only the tricycle was left together
with the driver Marcelo Real who pointed to the two
accused as the assailants.
Sgt. Amorico Alvarez who was then following
up unsolved cases in the Station was apprised of the
shooting and went to the place and was informed
about the identity (sic) of the tricycle which they
traced to the house of Real whereat they found the
black ammo pouch and the camouflage holster with
the name of Emelo inscribed and with live and spent
bullets on the back seat and putting together the
evidence thus far gathered, he was able to
apprehend the three, namely: Porras, Emelo and
Real. [4]
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in (1)
misappreciation of facts; (2) giving credence to the
inconsistent
testimonies
of
the
prosecution
witnesses, i.e., Jose Malumay and Maribel German;
(3) ignoring the defense of alibi; (4) not considering
as fatal the prosecutions inability to present as
witness Cpl. Crisanto de la Cruz; (5) admitting in
evidence Sgt. Alvarezs hearsay testimony; and (6) in
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convicting appellants who

identified in open court

were

not

positively

HELD:We find that the purported inconsistency is

more fancied than real. A closer scrutiny of Maribel
Germans testimony reveals that she merely saw an
assailant shot the victim (Mortel) while sprawled on
the ground, but nowhere in her testimony did she
state that there is only one assailant. In fact, Maribel
German never testified witnessing the crime from its
inception which Jose Malumay witnessed to have
been authored by two assailants. This explains the
apparent inconsistency between the witnesses
testimonies.
Appellants
defense
of
alibi
must
likewise
fail. Against their positive identification, alibi cannot
prevail.[12] Prosecution witness, Marcos Luciano
positively identified appellant John JennPorras as one
of the persons who were on board the tricycle which
was used as get away vehicle by Mortels assailants
just before midnight on June 19, 1990; [13] SPO3
Rolando Villegas identified Sergio Emelo and John
JennPorras as the persons who arrived at the PNP
station looking for Pfc. RoldanEmelo at around 9:00
oclock on that evening of June 19, 1990; [14]Maribel
German described one of the assailants as wearing a
T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes, and was
riding in a tricycle; [15] and Sgt. CatalinoBermas
confirmed the person described by Maribel German
to be Sergio Emelo,[16] the same person he identified
as his assailant on that same night.[17]
The alibi set up by the two accused that they were
in their barracks sleeping, all the time up to early
morning, is of no moment, as alibi is the weakest of
all defenses, specially (sic) so when the place where
they alleged to have been at the time of the
commission of the offense and the situs where the
incident happened is (sic) not so far (sic) distant from
each other and maybe (sic) reached within a
reasonable time which, in the instant cases are no
more than 100 or 200 meters apart.[19]

Appellants also contend that the non-presentation of

Cpl. Crisanto de la Cruz, one of the police officers
who first investigated the crime, and Pfc.
RoldanEmelo, the police officer who gave appellant
Sergio Emelo the black ammo pouch bag and .38
caliber bullets, is fatal to the prosecutions case. We
find this contention devoid of merit. The matter of
deciding whom to present as witness for the
prosecution is not for the accused or, for the trial
court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the
prosecutor.[20] Moreover, if the appellants believed
that the testimony of the said police officers would
bolster their theory, then they could have availed of
the compulsory process to have the latter produced
as their witnesses,[21] which they failed to do so.
Appellants likewise characterize as hearsay the
testimony of Sgt. Amorico Alvarez on Pfc.
RoldanEmelos statements to the police investigator
implicating them to the crime. This contention is
bereft of legal basis for it is a settled rule that when a
testimony is presented to establish not the truth but
the tenor of a statement or the fact that such
statement was made, as in this case, the same is not
hearsay.[22] Furthermore, appellants conviction did
not hinge solely on the assailed testimony as there
were other evidence extant in the records
establishing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, appellants argue that they were not positively
identified in open court by the two prosecutions
witnesses (German and Malumay) to be the culprits,
hence they may not be convicted of the crime
charged. The argument is specious and erroneously
assumes
that
there
was
no
identification
made. While witnesses German and Malumay did
not point out the appellants in open court they,
nonetheless, described the perpetrators attire at the
time of the commission of the crime, with one
assailant wearing a T-shirt, maong pants and rubber
shoes, and the other assailant wearing a dark
attire. These descriptions conform with the other
witnesses testimony identifying the appellants to be
wearing the same attire during the commission of

the crimes. In any event, it is a settled rule that

there can be a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime, [23] as in
this case. In order that circumstantial evidence may
be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with
these essential requisites, viz: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[24]
The record reveals that there were at least eleven
circumstances correctly considered by the trial court
in arriving at its judgment of conviction, viz: (1)
moments before the incident of June 20, 1990,
appellants were seen inside the Cavite City PNP
Station looking for Pfc. RoldanEmelo;[25] (2) appellant
Sergio Emelo was then wearing a white T-shirt,
maong pants and rubber shoes while appellant John
JennPorras was wearing a sleeveless cream T-shirt,
maong pants and was carrying a maong jacket;[26] (3)
on the same evening just before the incident,
appellant John JennPorras, then wearing a maong
jacket, was seen on board the tricycle of Marcelo
Real, together with a man wearing a white T-shirt;
[27]
(4) the two assailants were described by Jose
Malumay as respectively wearing a dark attire and
white T-shirt;[28] (5)one of the persons who shot
RosendoMortel was described by Maribel German as
wearing a T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes;
[29]
(6) the assailants of RosendoMortel boarded a
tricycle to flee from the scene of the crime; [30] (7)
Sergio Emelo was identified by Sgt. CatalinoBermas
as the person on board the tricycle that fled from the
scene of the crime;[31] (8) Sergio Emelo was identified
by Sgt. CatalinoBermas as the person who shot him
during the chase;[32] (9) a magazine pouch,
camouflaged holster with the name Emelo, .38
caliber empty shells and live bullets were found
immediately after the shooting on the floor of the
tricycle
used
by
the
appellants; [33] (10)
RosendoMortel and Sgt. CatalinoBermas both
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sustained gunshot wounds from a .38 caliber

handgun;[34] and (11) the plight of the appellants
which was not sufficiently explained. There is no
reason for us to disagree with the trial court on these
matters. These findings are fully supported by the
evidence on record and constitute an unbroken chain
of events which by their concordant combination and
cumulative
effect,
more
than
satisfy
the
requirements for the conviction of the appellants.[35]
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of treachery in Criminal
Case No. 245-91. Treachery must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the
killing itself.[36] And to appreciate it, two conditions
must concur, viz: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
that said means of execution be deliberately and
consciously
adopted.[37] In
this
regard,
the
prosecution failed to definitively establish the
manner in which the initial assault against the
deceased victim was committed to justify the
appreciation of treachery. This hiatus in the
prosecutions evidence cannot be substituted by
mere suppositions as what the trial court apparently
did. It is a well settled rule that in order to
appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in
a continuous aggression, as in this case, the same
must be shown present at the inception of the attack.
[38]
Absent any showing therefor, treachery as a
qualifying circumstance may not be considered.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 246-91, we
find that the trial court properly discarded the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and correctly
ruled that the crime committed is Frustrated
Homicide and not Frustrated Murder as alleged in the
information. The shooting of Sgt. CatalinoBermas
who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing
appellants was, at best, done in a spur of the
moment, an act which can hardly be characterized as
treacherous for it was nowhere proved that the same

was deliberately adopted to deny Sgt. Bermas the

opportunity to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No.
245-91, finding the appellants .JOHN JENN PORRAS
and SERGIO EMELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized
under
Article
249
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code. Considering the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating
circumstance
and
applying
the
Indeterminate Law.appellants are hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months
and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum,
respectively, and to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the deceased RosendoMortel the amount
of P50,000.00, plus actual damages and funeral
expenses in the amount of P67,000.00. The award
for moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00
which we find to be excessive is hereby reduced to
P50,000.00. However, in Criminal Case No. 246-91,
the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto.
C.A. No. 227

February 1, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
LEON CASTILLO, ET AL., accused. NENA
TANALEGA RAYMUNDO, appellant.
DE JOYA, J.:
FACTS:Defendant-appellant NenaTanalegaRaymundo
was accused of the crime of frustrated murder by
poisoning through reckless imprudence, in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, under the
That on or about the 18th day of February, 1941, in
San Pablo City, Commonwealth of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,

Mr. SilvinoBelarmino presented for dispensation at

the Escudero Drug Store and bought one-third
formula of the following prescription of Dr. Antonio G.
Sison
Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. NenaTanalegaRaymundo
mutually helped each other prepare and dispense the
said prescription, but instead of mixing the required
proportion of SparteinSulphate, through carelessness
and reckless imprudence, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, they mixed and compounded in the
formula a toxic dose of Strychnine Sulphate, which is
a poisonous substance, and as a result of such
carelessness and imprudence, Mr. Belarmino, upon
taking one capsule of the medicine on the very same
day, was poisoned and would have died, had it not
been for causes independent of the will of the
accused; that had the act committed by the accused
been intentional it would constitute the crime of
frustrated murder.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna, on October 12,
1942, rendered judgment, finding said accused guilty
of the crime of frustrated homicide through reckless
imprudence, and sentenced her to suffer four (4)
months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs of the
proceedings, at the same time acquitting her coaccused Dr. Leon Castillo.
The accused, NenaTanalegaRaymundo, appealed
from said decision to the Court of Appeals of
Southern Luzon, claiming that the trial court had
erred.
The evidence, testimonial and documentary,
presented by the parties in the trial court, has
satisfactorily established the following facts:
Belarmino presented the prescription to the Universal
Drug Store, in the City of Manila, where he secured
the medicine described therein contained in a bottle
(Exhibit C) on which the prescription was written, and
after taking said medicine his health was somewhat
improved. When the symptoms of the said disease
recurred, following the instructions given him by
Doctor Sison to continue taking said medicine, he
copied said prescription (Exhibit 2), and, in the
morning of February 18, 1941, presented it to the
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Escudero Drug Store, in the City of San Pablo,

Laguna, and asked Dr. Leon Castillo, the manager of
the said drug store, and a friend of the complainant,
whether they could prepare said medicine, after
having failed to secure the same in other drug stores
in the locality; and having been answered in the
affirmative, the complaining witness requested
Doctor Castillo to have prepared for him 1/3 of the
formula and Doctor Castillo himself wrote "1/3 f." on
Exhibit 2, for P1, as the whole formula cost P3; as
there was some doubt as to the figure appearing
after the word "carbromal" on Exhibit 2, Belarmino
requested Doctor Castillo to check it up, and the
latter corrected the said figure by writing the figure
"5" in ink in the figure "6" appearing after the word
"carbromal." As Belarmino himself wanted to be sure
about the said figure, he proposed to return to said
drug store in the afternoon with the bottle marked
Exhibit C, on which the prescription was written; and
in fact he returned at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day. The pharmacist,
SaturninoGesmundo Cortes, of said drug store, was
then in the house, and Doctor Castillo sent for
defendant-appellant NenaTanalegaRaymundo, who
was employed in said drug store as pharmacy clerk.
Mrs. Raymundo was already a pharmacy graduate,
but she had not yet taken and passed the
government examination conducted by the Board of
Pharmaceutical Examiners; and she had worked as a
pharmacy clerk in different drug stores in the City of
Manila, before her employment in the same capacity
in the Escudero Drug Store in the City of San Pablo.
Before the arrival of the defendant and appellant,
Doctor Castillo, took two bottles from the shelves and
a cardboard box and placed them on the
dispensation table. Mrs. Raymundo then prepared
the balance and began computing the formula
contained in Exhibit 2 to reduce it to 1/3 after which
she proceeded to compound the medicine, using,
among others, the substances contained in said two
bottles. The medicine compounded by defendant and
appellant was placed in five (5) capsules and was
delivered by Doctor Castillo to herein complainant
contained in a cardboard box (Exhibit B), for which he
paid P1, as previously agreed upon with Dr. Leon
Castillo, manager of the Escudero Drug Store; that at
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
February 18, 1941, the complainant took one of the
capsules with a glass of water, and left his house for
a walk; and about 20 minutes after he had taken said
medicine, he became ill. He felt dizzy and had

difficulty in breathing, and he could hardly stand as

his knees became shaky, and for that reason, he
immediately consulted with physicians, namely, Dr.
FelisaCelestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes, and the latter
advised him to go home and rest. About two hours
afterwards, complainant's legs began to stiffen, his
stomach to harden, his lips to draw back, and his
tongue to shrink to his throat, and he could not talk
and thought that he was in a serious condition; and
so complainant's family sent for Dr. Ricardo Reyes,
who advised complainant's wife to rub his body with
hot water which produced some relief, after he had
urinated; and the following day when Doctor Reyes
returned, complainant explained to him all that had
happened and showed him the remaining four
capsules contained in the cardboard box, marked as
Exhibit B, on which the prescription had not been
written, and Doctor Reyes advised the complainant
not to take any more of said remaining four capsules.
As already stated, the Court of First Instance of
Laguna acquitted Dr. Leon Castillo, manager of the
Escudero Drug Store, of the crime charged in the
information, on the ground of reasonable doubt, but
found herein defendant and appellant,
NenaTanalegaRaymundo, guilty of the crime of
frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD:In view of the facts stated above, said
judgment of conviction is untenable, on the ground
that the offense of frustrated homicide requires the
concurrence of the essential requisite of intent to kill,
which is incompatible with the charge of reckless
imprudence; although a charge for physical injuries,
serious or less serious, through reckless imprudence,
is legally proper under the law; as in that case the
act sought to be punished is the material damage or
injury actually done.
The legal question raised by counsel for defendant
and appellant appears to be quite plausible, and
defendant and appellant would appear to be entitled
to a judgment of acquittal, under the Revised Penal
Code.
The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill;
and druggists must exercise care of a specially high
degree, the highest degree of care known to practical
men. In other words, druggist must exercise the

highest practical degree of prudence and vigilance,

and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the
business, so that human life may not constantly be
exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution
of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
A druggist that sells to a purchaser or sends to a
patient one drug for another or even one innocent
drug, calculated to produce a certain effect, in place
of another sent for and designed to produce a
different effect, cannot escape responsibility, upon
the alleged pretext that it was an accidental or an
innocent mistake. His mistake, under the most
favorable aspect for himself, is negligence. And such
mistake cannot be countenanced or tolerated, as it is
a mistake of the gravest kind and of the most
disastrous effect.
One holding himself out as competent to handle such
drugs, and having rightful access to them, and relied
upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high
degree of caution and care called for by the
peculiarly dangerous nature of the business, cannot
be heard to say that his mistake by which he
furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for
those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross
negligence.
In reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and
care is no defense. And in Criminal Law, run the
same rigorous rules. Apothecaries, or apothecary
clerks, who are guilty of negligence in the sale of
medicine when death ensues in consequence, have
been held guilty of manslaughter.
The delivery of one drug for another has been
declared punishable in this jurisdiction. In a case in
which the complainant asked for potassium chlorate,
but received from the druggist barium chlorate, this
Court declared that such act was tantamount to
giving or dispensing medicine under a fraudulent
name; and notwithstanding the fact that the
potassium chlorate demanded and paid for was
much cheaper than the barium chlorate which was
actually delivered by the druggist, the latter was held
criminally responsible, and punished, in accordance
with the provisions contained in said section 751 of
the Revised Administrative Code, in connection with
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the provisions of section 2676 thereof, declaring that

defendant had sold a drug under a fraudulent name.
In the Pineda case, the potassium chlorate
demanded by the complainant had been intended for
his race horses; and when the complainant mixed
with water what he thought and believed was
potassium chlorate, but which turned out to be
barium chlorate, which is poisonous, his race horses
died from poisoning a few hours after having drunk
water in which barium chlorate had been dissolved
and mixed.
The wisdom of such a decision is unquestionable. If
the victims had been human beings instead of
horses, the damage and loss would have been
irreparable.
It is true that in the instant case, the complainant,
SilvinoBelarmino, did not die and that there was a
great difficulty in determining the injury, if any,
sustained by him, because of the impossibility of
examining his stomach and other internal organs. In
the Pineda case, this Court declared, with reason and
justified by experience, that the profession of
pharmacy demands great care and skill, and that
druggists must exercise and use the highest degree
of care known to practical men; and that the care
required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspond
with the superior knowledge of the business which
the law demands.
But it may be stated that the instant case is different
from the Pineda case, in which the accused was a
licensed pharmacist and druggist; whereas in the
instant case, the defendant and appellant
NenaTanalegaRaymundo, was only a pharmacy clerk.
But it must be borne in mind that, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, defendant and
appellant was already a pharmacy graduate, and that
she had worked as a pharmacy clerk in several drug
stores in the City of Manila, although she had not yet
taken and passed the examinations prescribed by the
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners.
But the offenses penalized under the provisions of
section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code, in

connection with the provisions of section 2676

thereof, may be committed not only by licensed
druggists and pharmacists, but also by any other
person preparing any drug, chemical, medicine or
poison, under any fraudulent name.
The claim of defendant and appellant that, in
prosecuting this case, the complainant had been
impelled by improper motives, in the sense that he
intended to make money out of it, as the Escudero
Drug Store was known to be the property of a
wealthy family, in the opinion of the Court, is
completely unfounded, considering the wellestablished facts that herein complainant has always
been a friend of Dr. Leon Castillo, manager of said
drug store, and former classmate of the complainant;
and there is no evidence that herein complainant had
not been on friendly terms with ArsenioEscudero,
owner of said drug store.
The Court declares that the preparation of one
medicine for another, by a pharmacy clerk, under a
false name, whether it be through negligence,
accident or mistake, is punishable under the law.
Defendant and appellant NenaTanalegaRaymundo is
found guilty of having prepared one medicine for
another, under a false name, in violation of the
provisions of section 751 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and, in accordance with the
provisions of section 2676 thereof, she is hereby
sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred pesos (P200),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs of this instance; and with this
modification the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
Southern Luzon is upheld, and the petition for
reconsideration is consequently denied. So ordered.
G.R. No. 172608

February 6, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNARD MAPALO, Accused-Appellant.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:That on or about the 13th day of February,

1994, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and being then armed with lead pipes
and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, did then and there
by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on one Manuel
Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipes
and stabbing him several times with the said bladed
weapons, and thereby inflicting on the aforenamed
victim fatal injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
The RTC ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest
for the apprehension of the appellant. No bail was
recommended.4 When the case was called, appellant
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and Bail, which was
granted.
That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in
the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with
intent to kill and being then armed with lead pipe
and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, did then and there
by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on one Manuel
Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipe
and stabbing him several times with the said bladed
weapons, and thereby inflicting on the aforenamed
victim fatal injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.7

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The prosecution presented Calixto Garcia (Garcia) as

its lone eyewitness.
Garcia testified that on 12 February 1994, a preValentine dance was held in SitioBaracbac, Brgy. Sta.
Cecilia in Aringay, La Union. He watched the dance,
along with the appellant and Jimmy Frigillana.10 In the
early morning of 13 February 1994, at around 3:00
a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte
(Piamonte) and the group of Lando Mapalo,11 Jimmy
Frigillana, and the appellant.12
Garcia further testified that he witnessed the fight
from a distance of more or less five (5) meters. He
claimed that he could see the incident very clearly
because of the light at the dancing hall.13 He saw the
appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe from
behind, hitting him on the right side of the
head.14 The pipe was one and a half (1 and ) feet in
length, and one and a half (1 and ) inches in
diameter.15 At that time when the appellant struck
Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy Frigillana
and LandoMapalo standing in front of Piamonte.
Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had
suffered multiple stab wounds.16 He saw stab wounds
on the left and right parts of the abdomen, and below
the left breast, as well as small wounds on the front
part of his left hip.17Garcia disclosed that he neither
witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he see
the act of stabbing Piamonte.18 He does not know
who stabbed the latter.19 It was only when Piamontes
shirt was removed when he saw stab wounds on the
formers dead body.20
Appellant testified that in the evening of 13 February
1994,21 at around 9:00 p.m., he, along with his wife,
CaridadMapalo, entertained several guests at their
residence, namely, Crispin Calderon, Noel Cordero,
Ruel Mercado, and Rolando Mapalo.22 They drank
wine.23 Appellant knew that there was a Valentines
Day dance celebration at the dance hall, located
northeast of his house at a distance of about 20-30
meters.24 At 12:30 a.m., after his guests had left the

house, he went to sleep.25 At 3:00 a.m., his wife woke

him up and was informed that somebody had been
stabbed. He said he came to know that Piamonte was
the person who was stabbed.26 He added that he
planned to go out of the house, but his wife
prevented him from doing so.27 He, thereafter,
returned to his room, and went back to sleep.28
Corroborating the appellants defense of denial and
alibi, his wife, CaridadMapalo, narrated that on 13
February 199429 at 8:00 p.m., she served brandy to
her husband and their guests at their residence. The
celebration finished at around 12:00
midnight.30 Thereafter, she and her husband went to
sleep, while their guests proceeded to the dance hall.
At 3:00 a.m., she awoke because of a commotion
from the dance hall.31 She described that the dance
hall is around 60 to 70 meters, southwest of their
residence.32 She went outside of their house, and
along with her sister-in-law, Marissa Dapit, proceeded
to the edge of the dancing hall.33 She claimed that
her husband did not go out and just stayed at their
house.34 She explained that she and Marissa Dapit
went out to see or to know the name of the person
who died at the commotion.35 At the dancing hall, she
saw the body of Piamonte, lying face down.36
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, dated 27
October 2004, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
It ruled that appellants defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the lone
eyewitness. As emphasized by the RTC, per
admission of appellant, the distance between his
house and the dancing hall is only 20 to 30 meters,
more or less. There was no physical impossibility for
the appellant to be present at the scene of the crime.
Moreover, it found Garcias testimony to be
consistent and uncontradicted. On the other hand,
the RTC considered the testimony of CaridadMapalo

as defying the natural course of human reaction and

experience. The RTC found it strange that it was only
CaridadMapalo who was awakened by the
commotion, while the appellant remained asleep.
Learning of the same, CaridadMapalo exposed
herself to danger by proceeding to the dance hall to
see what the commotion was all about without even
informing her husband. The RTC conjectured that
CaridadMapalo proceeded to the dance hall not to
see what the commotion was all about, but because
she was informed that her husband was involved in a
fight.37
Further, the RTC ruled that conspiracy was
established by the prosecution. According to the RTC,
the appellant was clearly identified by Garcia as the
one who struck Piamonte on the head with a lead
pipe, which alone is "sufficient manifestation of a
concerted, common and united design with the other
accused to commit an unlawful and felonious act."
The fact that the medical certificate shows the cause
of death as stab wounds was deemed by the RTC as
immaterial, in view of the presence of conspiracy.
The RTC also appreciated the attendance of abuse of
superior strength as a qualifying circumstance, on
the rationalization that the perpetrators were armed
with bladed weapons and a lead pipe that were out
of proportion to the unarmed Piamonte.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, appellant challenged the
credibility of the prosecutions lone eyewitness.
Appellant similarly assailed the ruling of the RTC on
the ground that it erred in convicting him despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.39
The Court of Appeals found no adequate reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC in weighing the
testimony of Garcia. It did not find significant the
alleged inconsistencies in Garcias affidavits as
executed before the investigating police and the
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prosecutor.40 The appellate court did not accept the

appellants defense of alibi. The positive
identification of the prosecution witness which was
consistent and categorical, and shown to be without
ill-motive, has discredited appellants defense.
The Court of Appeals, however, found reason to
modify the findings of the RTC. It convicted the
appellant of frustrated murder only. It was not
convinced that the evidence on record established
conspiracy among the appellant and his co-accused.
The appellate court rationalized that while the
evidence shows that Piamonte sustained stab
wounds which caused his death,41 the appellant was
never identified as the one who inflicted the stab
wounds on the deceased. According to the appellate
court, the prosecutions evidence only established
that the appellant clubbed Piamonte with a lead pipe.
However, the prosecutions witness did not see the
stabbing. He was not able to describe the particular
acts which caused Piamontes death. Hence, it
cannot be inferred from the account of the witness
that the appellant and his co-accused came to an
agreement to commit a felony, or that they decided
to commit the same, by concerted acts.42 The Court
of Appeals made the following observations:
In the first place, the killing was the result of a fight
that erupted suddenly during the Valentine dance,
which discourages the conclusion that the killing was
planned. Also, the witness did not see any stabbing.
He did not see anyone else perform any act of
stabbing or hitting, other than the appellant
delivering blows with a lead pipe on the victim. There
is no proof, therefore, of any concerted action or
common design to kill the victim that could be the
basis for a finding of conspiracy among several
malefactors. Because of this, it could not be said that
conspiracy was proven attendant beyond reasonable
doubt.43
In the absence of a conspiracy, the Court of Appeals
said that the appellant could only be held liable for

the consequences of his own criminal act. It ruled

that when the appellant hit Piamonte in the head
with the lead pipe, he performed all the acts that
would have brought about the death of the
victim.44 Piamontes death however was due to some
other supervening cause, independent of the
appellants will.45
ISSUES:
1.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN OPEN
COURT; and

2.

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

IS GUILTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF FRUSTRATED
MURDER INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE.47

HELD:In support of the first assignment of error,

appellant raises, for the first time, the defense that
the witness for the prosecution failed to positively
identify him during the trial proceedings. Citing
People v. Galera48 and People v. Hatton,49 appellant
submits that the prosecution failed to discharge its
first duty, which is the identification of the accused
as the author of the crime charged.50 Witness Garcia
did not identify the appellant in open court.
Appellant further posits that Garcia did not deny
drinking gin at around 9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994
until 3:00 a.m. of the following day. Garcia was then
intoxicated if he had been drinking hard liquor
continuously for six hours. At such point, he can no
longer positively determine a persons identity. It is
argued that the foregoing circumstances create
doubts as to the identity of the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime.

We first tackle the issue on the lack of in-court

identification.
True that on the matter of identification, the Court in
Hatton said:
More importantly, the accused-appellant was not
positively identified in court. True, his name was
referred to by both Basierto and Ongue in their
respective direct testimonies. However, he was not
identified in Court. The failure of the prosecution
witness to positively identify the assailant in court is
fatal to the prosecutions cause. Pre-trial
identification is not sufficient.51
It appears that the accused Bernard Mapalo was
being notified for (sic) todays hearing and his wife
came to Court and informed the Honorable Court that
her husband could not come to Court because he is
sick.52
The same testimony, however, conspicuously reveals
that there was no identification in open court of the
appellant because said appellant was not present at
the time, despite notice, as according to his wife, he
was sick.
In a later case, this Court clarified that a physical
courtroom identification is essential only when there
is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to
have committed the crime is the same person who is
charged in the information and subject of the trial. In
People v. Quezada,53 this Court expounded, thus:
We do not see the absolute need for complainant to
point to appellant in open court as her attacker.
While positive identification by a witness is required
by the law to convict an accused, it need not always
be by means of a physical courtroom identification.
As the court held in People v. Paglinawan:

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"x xx. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses

to point out the accused in open court by way of
identification, the fact that the witness x xx did not
do so in this case was because the public prosecutor
failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence such
omission does not in any way affect or diminish the
truth or weight of her testimony."
In-court identification of the offender is essential only
when there is a question or doubt on whether the
one alleged to have committed the crime is the same
person who is charged in the information and subject
of the trial. This is especially true in cases wherein
the identity of the accused, who is a stranger to the
prosecution witnesses, is dubitable. In the present
case, however, there is no doubt at all that the rapist
is the same individual mentioned in the Informations
and described by the victim during the trial.
(Emphasis supplied.)54
We do not find herein a case where there is a
question or doubt as to whether the one alleged to
have committed the crime is the same person
charged in the information and subject of the trial. In
fact, appellant never denied that he is the person
indicted in the Information, and subject of the
proceedings. His denial is that he did not participate
in the commission of the crime. Hence, in-court
identification is not indispensable in the case at bar.
We are convinced that the identity of the appellant
was sufficiently established by the evidence on
record.
"Identification testimony has at least three
components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a
victim or a bystander, involves perception of an
event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize details of the event. Third, the witness
must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise
at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information

accurately, they are limited by normal human

fallibilities and suggestive influences."59
There is no question that the witness Garcia was at a
close range of merely five meters more or less from
the scene of the incident.60 Neither can it be said that
the illumination was poor. The dancing hall was
lighted.61 No improper motive was attributed to the
witness Garcia for testifying against the appellant.
Moreover, witness Garcia is familiar not only to
appellant. Garcia was also familiar with the
deceased, Piamonte. Witness Garcia, in his
testimony, referred to Piamonte as his third cousin.62
On appellants submission that it is doubtful if
witness Garcia can still have positively identified him
as one of the perpetrators of the crime considering
that the former admitted to drinking hard liquor from
9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994 until 3:00 a.m. of the
following day, we are not convinced that the same
can overthrow the trial courts evaluation of Garcias
testimony. Beyond appellants bare allegations, no
evidence whatsoever was produced to show that
Garcia suffered from such a level of intoxication as to
impair his facility and disable him to identify
appellant. In the case of People v. Dee,63 the
credibility of the surviving victim therein as witness
was disputed because he was under the influence of
liquor at the time of the incident. In Dee, the witness
was even found positive for alcoholic breath, but the
Court ruled that such fact does not necessarily
prevent him from making a positive identification of
his attackers, especially since his level of intoxication
was not shown to impair his faculties. The credibility
of the witness therein was not made to suffer on that
score alone.64
The foregoing material considerations, taken
together with the fact that witness Garcia and the
appellant are not strangers to each other, satisfy us
that the danger of Garcia misidentifying the
appellant does not exist. Where the prosecution
eyewitness was familiar with both victim and

accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good

visibility, and where no improper motive can be
attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused, his version of the story deserves much
weight.65
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown
with clear and convincing evidence that at the time
of the commission of the crime charged, the accused
is in a place other than the situs of the crime such
that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the situscriminis when the crime was
committed.69
In the case at bar, appellant was not successful in
invoking the defense of alibi. Appellant insists that he
was sleeping at his residence at the time when the
incident occurred. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
consistently found that the distance between
appellants residence and the dance hall, or the
situscriminis, is 20 to 30 meters, more or less.70 Such
a distance is negligible. In fact, appellants wife
testified that from their residence, she could see the
people dancing at the hall.71 It was not highly
impossible for the appellant to be physically present
at the dancing hall at the time of the occurrence of
the incident. We, therefore, reject appellants
defense of alibi.
We shall now determine the criminal liability of the
appellant.
To reiterate, the RTC, in convicting the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, proceeded from a rationalization that there
was conspiracy among appellant and his co-accused.
It also appreciated the attendance of abuse of
superior strength to qualify the crime to Murder.
The Court of Appeals was unable to agree with the
RTC. It found that the conspiracy was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that the witness
Garcia admitted to not being able to see the
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stabbing. He could only attest to the clubbing of the

victim by appellant with a lead pipe. No proof was
shown as to the concerted action of the malefactors
of their common design to kill. It, thus, modified the
RTCs conviction, and, instead, found appellant guilty
of frustrated murder.
There is a want of evidence to show the concerted
acts of the appellant and his co-accused in pursuing
a common design - to kill the deceased, Piamonte.
The sole eyewitness for the prosecution, Garcia, was
categorical and precise in declaring that he did not
see the act of stabbing Piamonte, nor the manner in
which Piamonte was stabbed. He later learned that
Piamonte died from stab wounds when he saw the
latters dead body covered with stab wounds. The
cause of death of Piamonte, as found by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals,78 and as borne by the records,
is multiple stab wounds.79 It was, thus, incumbent on
the part of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant and his coaccused acted in concert with a unity of purpose to
kill Piamonte. They must show to the satisfaction of
this Court the appellants overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.80 They must show that
appellants act of striking Piamonte with a pipe was
an intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.81
The prosecution was unable to show, either by direct
or indirect evidence, proof of the agreement among
the appellant and his co-accused to warrant
conspiracy as a basis for appellants conviction. No
evidence was even adduced to show implied
conspiracy. Nothing has been shown that the
appellant and his co-accused were "aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of
each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment." 82

This complete absence of evidence on the part of the

prosecution to show the conduct of the appellant and
his co-accused, disclosing a common understanding
among them relative to the commission of the
offense,83 is fatal to the prosecution. The
prosecutions witness could not testify on the manner
by which the deceased Piamonte was stabbed,
precisely because by his own admission, he did not
see the stabbing. No account of the stabbing which
caused the death of the deceased Piamonte was ever
given nor shown. Unfortunately, no account of how
Piamonte died was ever given, except for the
established fact that he died due to stabbing. The
appellants act of holding a lead pipe and hitting the
deceased in the head was not shown to be in
furtherance of the common design of killing the
deceased. What transpired during the stabbing of the
victim, which is material to proving the fact of
conspiracy, is, regrettably, left merely to speculation.
This Court must neither conjecture nor surmise that a
conspiracy existed. The rule is clear that the guilt of
the accused must be proved with moral
certainty.84 All doubts should be resolved in favor of
the accused. Thus, the time honored principle in
criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are capable
of two or more explanations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt,
the Court should adopt that which is more favorable
to the accused for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty.85
Liability of the Accused Bernard Mapalo
There being no conspiracy, the liability of the
appellant will revolve around his individual
participation in the event.86
In the case of Li v. People,87 a street fight ensued
resulting in the death of the victim therein. No
conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The liability of the accused Li who was shown to have
struck the victims right arm with a baseball bat,

resulting in a contusion was, thus, determined by the

Court in the following manner:
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on
the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking
[the victim] Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the
victims supervening death from injuries which
cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt,
the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not
mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the
required medical attendance, the offense is only
slight physical injuries, penalized as follows:
In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be
attributable to the appellant. The only medical
evidence that appears on records is the deceased
Piamontes death certificate,89 which indicates that
the cause of death is massive
hypovolemia90 secondary to multiple stab wounds.
The factual findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of
Piamonte is multiple stab wounds. Nothing has been
shown otherwise. Other than the presence of
multiple stab wounds, no other type of injury on the
deceased was established. No contusions or injury on
the head of the victim or anywhere else in his body
caused by a lead pipe was shown. The witness
Garcia, in his testimony, merely pointed to stab
wounds on the different parts of the body of the
deceased.91 No proof on the injury that was sustained
by the deceased that can be attributable to
appellants act was demonstrated. No other physical
evidence was proffered.92
We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or
Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal and
essential element of attempted or frustrated
homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take
the life of the person attacked.93Such intent must be
proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude
reasonable doubt thereof.94 Intent to kill may be
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proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or

number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at
the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim.95
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that,
at the time of their execution, are unmistakably
calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means.97 We cannot infer intent to kill from
the appellants act of hitting Piamonte in the head
with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not
shown to have been inflicted because of the act.
Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to show the
intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
cannot declare that the same was attendant.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated 21 November 2005, in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00408 is MODIFIED. Appellant Bernard Mapalo is
ACQUITTED of the charge of MURDER for lack of
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. He is found
GUILTY of the crime of MALTREATMENT, as defined
and punished by Article 266, par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code. He is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of arrestomenor of 10 days.
Considering that appellant has been incarcerated
since 2004, which is well-beyond the period of the
penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons is ordered to cause appellants IMMEDIATE
RELEASE, unless appellant is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform this Court, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the
compliance therewith. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-32246-48 June 30, 1988

When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed

without causing any injury, and without causing
dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article
266,98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte,
appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any
injury. As we have earlier stated, no proof of injury
was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in
Murder, which is the offense charged in the
Information. Thus:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.
The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
x xxx
3. By arrestomenor in its minimum period or a fine
not exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall illtreat another by deed without causing any injury.
The duration of the penalty of arrestomenor in its
minimum period is 1 day to 10 days.

ARCADIO CORTEZ y VENGZON, PAULINO

SAMPANG y BUNGUE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock on the
night of October 21, 1961 while Santiago Baltazar,
his wife EscolasticaPingol and his four sons Ruben,
Pablo, Orlando and Luis, all of tender ages, were
sleeping in their house at Barrio Mitla, Porac
Pampanga, the said Santiago Baltazar was awakened
by the barking of the dogs ). Then he heard a voice
which he recognized as that of Arcadio Cortez for he
knew him long before the incident, asking "Are the
owners of the house in?". He peeped through a hole
and there on the ground he saw and recognized, for
the moon was very bright, another man,
PaulinoSampang, whom he knew very well before
the. Being the owner of the house, Santiago Baltazar
had no alternative but to go downstairs, however,

before he did that, he told his wife who was also

awaken [sic] by the barking of the dogs that there
were three persons in all near their .
Upon reaching the ground, Santiago Baltazar
approached PaulinoSampang who was armed with a .
22 cal. gun and asked him: "What is it you want,
Abe?," to this question, Sampang replied: "If you
want to know, you come and see our Commander."
When he said "Commander he was referring to
Arcadio Cortez who was under a bullcart.
When Santiago Baltazar approached Arcadio Cortez,
the latter moved away from him and holding a
(G)arand with his two hands over his head, told
Baltazar: "Go back to your wife." Baltazar started
moving towards the house and upon reaching the
foot of the stairs, he faced them (Arcadio Cortez and
PaulinoSampang). At this instance, Cortez and
Sampang began shooting at the house and also at
him. Baltazar was hit in the right thigh. He fell and
lost consciousness.
When he regained consciousness, he saw nobody on
the ground but he heard a voice inside the house
saying, "Go on, Go on." At the same time he also
heard a thud as if someone was hacking somebody
with a bolo. He tried to rise but he was shot again in
the right ear and consequently fell unconscious a
second time
When he regained consciousness again he felt that
his son Pablo was embracing him, saying "Father you
have been wounded." And while he heard the
screaming of his other children, he managed to go
under the house and with a piece of rag he bound his
wound. Then he crawled upstairs. There he saw his
wife and youngest son already dead. He examined
her body and found her having a bolo wound on her
left shoulder and a bullet wound on the breast
People began coming to the premises. Among them
was Vice-Mayor GenaroDimalanta to whom Santiago
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Baltazar gave two unfired bullets which he found on

the ground. They fell when the Garand held by
Arcadio Cortez jammed twice.
The vice-mayor in turn brought Santiago Baltazar to
the Pampanga Provincial Hospital where he was
hospitalized for two weeks. While there he was
visited by two P.C. men, one of them was Major
Lim.They asked him whom he suspected and he said
he didn't know, ... After having been discharged from
the provincial hospital, Baltazar was treated for more
than two months in the clinic of Dr. Benita Ayson in
ManibaugPorac, Pampanga
Death certificate of EscolasticaPingol (Exhibit E)
stated that the cause of death as certified by Dra.
Benita Ayson, was hemorrhage due to total wounds
(gunshot).
And the death certificate of Luis Baltazar (Exhibit F)
disclosed that the cause of death as found by the
same physician wall internal hemorrhage caused by
trauma on the chest. (pp. 26-29, Rollo; Italics
supplied.)
Thus, in one case where the witnesses for the
prosecution failed to divulge immediately the identity
of the criminals, This Court said:
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to report the
malefactors to police officers who investigated the
crime immediately after the occurrence is
understandable, considering that the witnesses
feared for their lives as the killers were still at large
and armed, and with the shock of the ambush still
fresh in their minds, perhaps they considered the
protection of the police inadequate. [People v.
Sampang, March 31, 1966, G.R. No.L-15843, 16 SCRA
516.]
Moreover, the delay complained of is partly
attributable to the acts of petitioners and their

counsel. The records show that the criminal

complaint was filed on October 27, 1961. Petitioners'
counsel moved for the postponement of the second
stage of the preliminary investigation three times,
filed a motion to quash, postponed its hearing,
changed his mind and withdrew the motion to quash
and with the conformity of petitioners, asked that
trial on the merits ensue. A period of four months
had elapsed by them. Petitioners cannot now
complain of the belated identification considering
that they are partly to blame for it.
Notwithstanding Baltazar's credible explanation for
the delay, still, this Court examined the record to
ascertain the positiveness of Baltazar's testimony.
After careful scrutiny, the Court finds that Baltazar's
narration of the facts is straightforward, direct and
full of details which could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought. As such it deserves full faith
and credence. He stated that he saw Sampang twice;
first, when he peeped through a hole, and second,
when he went down the house. He even saw
Sampang point the gun at him before the latter fired.
He also identified Cortez whom he saw sitting under
the bullcart and with who he conversed.
There is no law requiring that a testimony be
corroborated in order to be believed. It has been held
that the testimony of a single witness if credible and
positive, is sufficient to produce conviction [People v.
Lao Wan Sing,supra, People v. Canada, No. 63728,
September 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121; People v. Tan,
Jr., G.R. No. L-53834, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA
614.1 Secondly, the contradictions and
inconsistencies in Baltazar's testimony refer merely
to minor details which do not impair nor destroy its
probative value and which in fact even strengthen its
reliability.
Above all, it is well settled in jurisprudence that the
conclusions of the lower court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect.
Unless there are substantial facts and circumstances

that have been overlooked, which if considered might

affect the result of the case, such findings are
generally not disturbed on appeal [People v. Lao Wan
Sing, supra; People v. Baluarte, G.R. No. L-31180-81,
October 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 356, People v. Brioso,
G.R. Nos. 72028-31, November 9,1987; People v.
Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1986, 144
SCRA 429; People v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-48606, July
11, 1986,142 SCRA 649; and People v. Patola G.R.
No.L-41265, February 27, 1986, 141 SCRA 397.] The
reason for the above stated rule is that the trial court
is in a better position to observe the deportment and
demeanor of witnesses to determine the veracity of
their answers. No compelling reasons exist here to
justify a deviation from that rule.
This contention is untenable.
The evidence for the defense shows that six .30
caliber cartridges (Exhibit 1) recovered from the
scene of the crime and a .22 caliber slug (Exhibit 2)
extracted from Santiago Baltazar's thigh were
examined to determine whether they came from
eleven (11) Garand rifles and from one .22 caliber
rifle rounded up the day after the crime was
committed.
The Solicitor General contends that the paraffin test
should not be considered in determining the
innocence of the accused as during the period of five
days the gunpowder residue may already have
disappeared. The contention is well taken.
As the confessions here were made before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which
incorporated the Miranda rule, they are presumed
voluntary until the contrary is proved by the
petitioners.
To rebut the presumption, the defense introduced as
evidence the medical certificates executed by Dr.
MarcelinoBenosa and his testimony that he examined
the accused a day after they were apprehended.
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When he took the stand, he averred that he found

contusions and swellings on the bodies of the
accused for which he prescribed certain medicines.
He also stated that it was Atty. Clemente Soriano,
counsel for the accused, who recommended him to
relatives of the accused to examine the latter and
that he had personally known Atty. Soriano since
1945 as they were townmates, being both from
Macabebe, Pampanga. In addition, he also said that
his practice was in Angeles, Pampanga, and that he
went to Porac and left his clinic just to examine the
condition of the petitioners. The defense did not
attempt to explain why they did not avail of the
services of a physician from Porac nor did they show
that there was none available.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented as
witness the Clerk of Court, Mr. Marcelo Mendoza, who
testified that when the accused were brought before
him, they never complained to him of any
maltreatment; that he translated and explained to
them each of the questions propounded and the
answers they had given in their statements and that
afterwards, the accused swore to the truth of the
contents. of their confessions, and signed them in his
presence. This testimony was corroborated by those
of the investigators who took the statements of the
accused and who vehemently denied maltreating
them.
In view of the Clerk of Court's credible testimony and
the admission of Dr. Benosa during the trial that the
contusions he found may not have been caused by
the alleged maltreatment of the accused, this Court
finds that the presumption of voluntariness; has not
been satisfactorily overcome.
More importantly, the statements are replete with
details which only the accused could have known and
which the investigators could not have supplied, as
follows: that EscolasticaPingol or "Tecang" was a
witch; that although they knew that such could not
be believed by courts of law, they knew for a fact,

that she was victimizing certain members of the

community; that Cortez was in fact a victim of her
witchery, as was Sampang's mother; and that they
went to Tecang's house only to scare her but when
they heard her and her family shouting for help, they
started firing. The confessions also reveal that they
utilized Benjamin Villanueva to guide them to
Tecang's house as well as the direction they took in
getting there. All these details are earmarks of
voluntariness.

PEOPLE V. AVECILLA
GR117033; Feb.15, 2001
Accused was charged of qualified illegal possession
of a firearm; accused willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously with intent to kill, and actually killing a
victim as a consequence, possess and carry an
unlicensed firearm.
ISSUE:

Alibi is easily fabricated such that courts must accept

it only with great caution. For such defense to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused were
somewhere else but that it must be clearly shown
that it was physically impossible for them to have
been at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission [People v.
Perante Jr., G.R. Nos. L-63709-10, July 16, 1986, 143
SCRA 56; People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. L-52017,
October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 178; and People v.
Santillan, G.R. No. 68331, January 29, 1988.] In this
case, the places where petitioners were at the time
of the incident and the place where the crime was
committed are within walking distance.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi must fail in view of
the clear and positive Identification made by
Baltazar. He had known Cortez and Sampang for a
considerable period of time. There was no showing
that he had any grudge or improper motive to foist
such a serious accusation upon them and fabricate
his testimony.
On the totality of the evidence therefore, the Court
finds the guilt of the petitioners to have been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE the petition is denied, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirmed, except the
indemnity in the two homicide cases which is hereby
raised in each case to P30,000.00. SO ORDERED.

Conviction and Retroactivity of RA8294 (An act

Amending the Provisions of PD 1866)
HELD:
SC dismissed the case. Originally he could have been
convicted of illegally possessing a firearm separately
from his conviction on the killing that occurred as a
consequence thereof, which happened in 1991. With
the passage of RA 8294 in 1997 amending PD1866,
the possession of an unlicensed firearm has become
merely an aggravating circumstance to a murder or
homicide charge. As a general rule, penal laws have
prospective effect EXCEPT where the new law will be
advantageous to the accused, as in this case, sparing
him of two separate convictions.

SISON v. PEOPLE
250 SCRA 58, November 6, 1995

Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986

EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at
the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being
denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at
the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and
delivered speeches in between. When the authorities
arrived and no permit could be produced, they were
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told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver

Lozano,
turned
to
his
group
and
said
Gulpihinninyoanglahatngmga Cory infiltrators, and
a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and
later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden
of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the
loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, the
color of the Coryistas, one of which was Salcedo.
He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled. One
RanulfoSumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from
them, but several accused came forward and
resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for
mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General
Hospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.

Issue: Were the photographs of the incident

presented properly given evidentiary weight despite
lack of proper identification by their respective
photographers?

Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence,

must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The value of this
kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime.

The photographer, however, is not the only witness

who can identify the pictures he has taken. The
correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved
prima facie, either by the testimony of the person
who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment
as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be
identified by the photographer or by any other
competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness
and accuracy.

In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used

the same photographs to prove that his clients were
not in any of the pictures and therefore could not
have participated in the mauling of the victim. When
the prosecution used the photographs to crossexamine all the accused, no objection was made by
the defense, not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the
third hearing a continuing objection to their
admissibility. The use of these photographs by some
of the accused to show their alleged nonparticipation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness
and
accuracy
thereof.
That
the
photographs are faithful representation of the
mauling incident was affirmed when some of the
accused identified themselves therein and gave
reasons for their presence thereat. The absence of
two of the accused in the photographs, meanwhile,
does not exculpate them. The photographs did not
capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo
but only segments thereof. However, the accused
were unequivocally identified by two witnesses.

Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence,

must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. They can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witnesses
who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with

Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a
public
dance at Rizal St.,
Mag-asawangTaytay,
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or
around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo asked
Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to
their personal necessities outside the dance
hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and
bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby
store.

Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left

to look for a place to relieve him. According to
Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from
Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark
bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo
and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by
striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of
beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men
numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and
hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles,
stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was
petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was
being
mauled
and
overpowered
by
his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before
he could be given any medical assistance.
Issues:
Whether the testimony of prosecution witness was
credible; and
Whether the lower court is right in convicting the
accused of murder qualified by treachery and not
death in a tumultuous affray.

PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA

Facts:
ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias Lapad" was
charged and subsequently convicted by the court a
quo and
sentenced
to reclusion
perpetua and
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as
moral damages,P50,000.00 as temperate damages,
and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.In

Held:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault
each other in a confused and tumultuous manner,
and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and
it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
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deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted

serious physical injuries can be identified, such
person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified by
treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully
unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly
the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda,
approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accusedappellant; the attack was completely without
warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and
given no chance to put up any defense. The penalty
for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period which, as correctly imposed by the
court a quo, is reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 1272, January 11, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs. BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendantsappellants.

FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of the crime
of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of
the Penal Code. They were sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private
person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any
way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with
the
penalty
of
prision
mayor.
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that
one who illegally detains another and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished
with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life
imprisonment.
The punishment for the crime mentioned in article
483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of cadena
temporal in its maximum degree to cadenaperpetua,
or in other words one convicted of simply depriving a
person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of

from six to twelve years and one convicted of

depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not
state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said
person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment
for a term of seventeen years four months and one
day, to life, as in this case. In other words, for failure
on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the
whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or
to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment
may be increased from imprisonment for a term of
six
years
to
life
imprisonment.
On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that
the provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a
defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or
to take a much severer punishment. The burden is
put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to
lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of
incriminating himself, for the very statement of the
whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the
defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession
that the defendant unlawfully detained the person.
So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant,
under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the
effect of convincing him under article 481. It is
claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5
of the Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness
against
himself."
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights against
self-incrimination
were
violated.
HELD: Yes.
The right against self-incrimination was established
on the grounds of public policy and humanity - of
policy, because if the party were required to testify, it
would place the witness under the strongest
temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions
by
duress.
Under the present system, the information must
charge the accused with acts committed by him prior
to the filing of the information and which of
themselves constitute an offense against the law.
The Government can not charge a man with one of
the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his
making out the rest by availing himself of his right to
leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the
prosecution
from
beginning
to
end.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of

being used against him as a confession of crime, or
an admission of facts tending to prove the
commission of an offense, such disclosure would be
an
accusation
against
himself.
In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the
whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he
was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to
obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal
Code.
It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict
one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not
be called upon either by express words or acts to
assist in the production of such evidence; nor should
his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a
right to rely on the presumption of innocence until
the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of
the crime with which he is charged.

PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANIA

Facts:
Before the court is information, dated 7 May 1976,
FilomenoSalufrania y Aleman was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I,
with the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, committed that on or about the 3rd day of
December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court the accused FilomenoSalufrania y
Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the lawfully
wedded wife of the accused, by then and there
boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries
which resulted in her instantaneous death; the
accused likewise did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the
child while still in its maternalwomb, thereby
committing
both
crimes
of PARRICIDE
and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as to the damage and
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prejudice of the heirs of said woman and child in the

amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.

G. R. L- 5597
March 5, 1910
15 PHIL 394

Issue:
Should FilomenoSalufrania be held liable for for the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion?
Held:
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
accused
FilomenoSalufrania committed and should be held
liable for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case,
was caused by the same violence that caused the
death of MarcianaAbuyo, such violence being
voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his
victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that
MarcianaAbuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was
voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence,
MarcianaAbuyo died together with the foetus in her
womb.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to
the heirs of the deceased MarcianaAbuyo is
increased to P30, 000.00 in line with the recent
decisions of the Court.

Facts:
Teodorica Saguinsin was in a shop when a man
named D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and without
apparent reason whatever, struck her three times on
the hip which caused her to fall to the ground, and
being three months pregnant, she had a miscarriage
the following day. D.B. Jeffrey did not know that she
is pregnant and the complaint against him is only for
lesiones menos graves. In the information read to
him, it was however stated that miscarriage occured
due to his maltreatment of her.

The trial court imposed the penalty prescribed in

paragraph 2 of article 503 of the Penal Code, but we
are of opinion that the penalty which should have
been imposed is that prescribed in paragraph 3 of
said article.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 503 are as follows:
One guilty of robbery with violence or
intimidation to the person will be punished:
xxx

Issue:
WON Jeffrey may be found guilty of abortion even if
the complaint does not charge him of the same.
Held:
Yes. In fact what was committed is abortion, not
lesiones. Even though the criminal intent is not
abortion, the fact that without any apparent reason
whatever, he maltreated Teodorica, presumably not
knowing that she is pregnant, as author of the abuse
which caused the miscarriage, he is liable not only
for such maltreatment but also for the consequences
thereof, to wit, for the abortion.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
JUAN BOGEL, (alias CATALIN) ET AL., defendantsappellants.

With costs against the appellant.

CARSON, J.:

U.S. V Jeffrey

result of the wound thus inflicted she lost the use of

the eye.

The guilt of the accused of the crime of robbery with

which they were charged was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It was further proven that one of
the accused, on the occasion of the robbery, stabbed
a woman named Fabiana in one eye, and that as a

xxx

xxx

2. With cadena temporal in its medium

degree to cadena perpetua when the
robbery was accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or when for the
purpose of or on occasion of the robbery
any wounds are inflicted which are
penalized in paragraph 1 of article 416 of
the Penal Code, or when the person who
was robbed was held prisoner for ransom or
period longer than one day.
3. With cadena temporal when the purpose
of or on occasion of the robbery any of the
wounds are inflicted which are penalized in
paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal
Code.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code
provide that he wounds, strikes, or maltreats another
will be punished for the crime of grave injuries.
1. With prision mayor if as a result of the
wounds the offended person became an
imbecile, impotent, or blind.

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2. With prision correccional in its medium

and maximum degrees if as a result of the
wounds the offended person lost an eye or
some principal member, or has been
incapacitated or unfitted for the work in
which prior thereto he was habitually
engaged.
Unless the putting out of an eye by stabbing is a
mutilation in the sense in which this word is used in
the above set out paragraph 2 of article 503, it is
manifest that the penalty to be imposed in this case
is that prescribed in paragraph 3 and not paragraph
2 of said article. Viada, in his commentary on article
415, which penalizes intentional mutilations, points
out that by mutilation (mutilacion) is understood,
according to the Diccionario de la lengua, the lopping
or clipping off (cercenamiento) of some part of the
body, and it is evident that the putting out of an eye
does not fall under this definition.
The commission of the offense was marked with the
aggravating circumstances mentioned in paragraphs
15, 20, and 8 of article 10 of the Penal Code, the
robbery having taken place at night and in the house
of the offended party, and the robbers having
disguised themselves for the purpose of committing
the crime with greater security to themselves. The
penalty which should be imposed in accordance with
the provisions of the above-cited paragraph 3 of
article 503 of the Penal Code is that of cadena
temporal in its maximum degree, which was the
penalty imposed by the trial judge, he not having
taken into consideration the above-cited aggravating
circumstances and imposed the penalty prescribed in
paragraph 2 of article 503 in its medium degree.
The sentence of the trial court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants. After expiration of ten days
let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and
in due time thereafter the record remanded to the

court from whence it came for proper action. So

ordered.
People vs Baygar
Facts:
The complainant minor after she was qualified as a c
ompetent witness testified that at the time of the inci
dent she was only with the accused at their home. T
he accused asked her to let him see her pipe(vagin
a) which she complied. After she showed to him her
pipe the accused removed his pants and showed h
er his titi (penis). The accused then asked her to h
old his penis which she again complied. After that, th
e accused put on his pants. When asked if the penis
of the accused touched her pipe, the latter answer
ed in the negative. But on the question whether the
accused tried to put his penis insideher vagina, she a
nswered in the affirmative. The complainant said tha
t the accused put his penis twice inside her vagina d
uring the night time while her panties was on. Althou
gh she felt pain, she did notcry. Instead, she let him
do it. She saw urine came out of his penis the color o
f which she does not know but she described it as sti
cky. What happened to her was left to herself. Howe
ver, the incident wasdiscovered by her Mama Coring
(grandmother) when she undressed the complainant
who was about to sleep.
On cross-examination, it was further adduced that w
hen the incident happened her parents were away fro
m their home. The persons left in their house were h
er Ate Maricel and Mama Coring (CorneliaFormentina,
complainants grandmother). It happened in the latt
ers room beside the room of her parents. The room
has no lock. She confirmed that she was still wearing
her panties when accused insertedhis penis into her
vagina. The sticky fluid which came out from accuse
ds penis was placed outside her panty. After that inc
ident, the accused just picked up his shorts and went
to the sala which she also did.
Mrs. Nable testified that the accused became her hou
seboy on August of 1993 but until December only be
cause he was caught by her mother doing bad acts t

o her daughter. Her mother complained to her onDe

cember 8, 1993 that she saw the accused and the co
mplainant inside the room. She saw her daughter lyi
ng on bed who immediately dressed up. Lito Baygar
was on top of her who was covered by a thinblanket
and immediately zippered his pants. When she learn
ed this from her mother she hurriedly went back hom
e and brought her daughter to the house of her broth
er whom she asked to follow them. Ataround 3:00 p.
m. when her husband arrived she informed him of th
e incident and they brought their daughter to Lourde
s Hospital and had her examined there. Afterwhich, t
hey went home first and thenproceeded to the baran
gay chairman of Cupang, Antipolo to file a complaint.
What happened next was the arrest of the accused a
nd the taking of statements of the complainant and h
er mother at the policestation.
Dra. Nieves Vergara testified that she examined the
person of Joanna Kristin Nable on December 9, 1993
upon a letter request from officer on case of Antipolo
Municipal Police Station and submitted aMedico-Legal
Report No. M-1753-93. Her report on the genital of t
he complainant stated that:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full
, convex and coaptated with the congested labia min
ora presenting in between. On separating the same
disclosed an elastic fleshy-type, congested andintact
hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the ti
p of the examining index finger.
The congestion or redness on the said area could hav
e been caused by application of pressure by any hard
object such as fully erected penis.
Dr. Cabailo testified that she also examined the perso
n of the complainant minor in coordination with the
Bacteriologist and OB-Gyne of Lourdes Hospital on D
ecember 10, 1993. On said examination, theyobtain
ed pus on the vaginal discharge of the complainant,
meaning that there was an infection on the genital ar
ea of the complainant where the smear was taken.[3]
LITO denied having raped JOANNA. He testified
he was the houseboy of the Nables and that the case
was filed against him because he tried to collect his u
npaid salary in the amount of P5,000 to buynew cloth
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es. Instead of paying him his salary, the parents of J

OANNA threatened him and told him that he can be a
rrested at any time. He was subsequently arrested o
n 7 December 1993. Prior to the arresthe was left al
one in their house as the couple and their children w
ent out to work for money. He was told to guard the
house while they were away. They left the house at 1
:00 oclock in the afternoon andreturned at 8:00 oclo
ck in the evening. When they returned they were acc
ompanied by a barangay tanod who arrested him. H
e was brought to the police headquarters and was su
bsequently detained.[4]

e settled that appellate courts will generally not distu

rb thefactual findings of the trial court since the latte
r is in a better position to weigh conflicting testimoni
es, having heard the witnesses themselves and obser
ved their deportment and manner of testifying unless
itis found that the trial court has plainly overlooked c
ertain facts of substance and value that, if considere
d, might affect the result of the case.

The trial court found it hard to believe LITOS te

stimony that the complaint for rape was fabricated b
y his employers to evade payment of his salary. It no
ted that the amount of P5,000 was nothingcompared
to the trouble of having their daughter medically exa
mined twice as well as going to court and advertising
to the whole world that their daughter had been rape
d. It observed that the victim was onlyfive years old
when the incident occurred and it would be preposter
ous to assume that JOANNA could have concocted th
e grave charge of rape. Although it recognized that v
ictims testimony wascharacterized by inconsistencie
s, it decided that the categorical statement of the vic
tim that LITO inserted his penis into her vagina preva
ils.

Held:
The victim has been consistent and positive in her te
stimony that LITO inserted his penis in her vagina an
d felt pain in the process. LITO has not successfully c
ontroverted this testimony. JOANNAstestimony that
she had her panty on was not inconsistent with her t
estimony that LITO inserted his penis into her vagina.
The fact that the victim was wearing a panty when t
he sexual assault was committeddid not negate pene
tration.

The trial court was convinced beyond reasonabl

e doubt that LITO ravished JOANA, a five year old girl,
and carnal knowledge of a girl below 12 years old is a
lways rape under the law. Thus, in itsdecision of 17 S
eptember 199
These three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusa
tion for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult forthe person accused, thoug
h innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nat
ure of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant m
ust be scrutinized withextreme caution; and (3) the e
vidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its o
wn merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength fro
m the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Ti
me and again theCourt has held that conclusions as t
o the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily
on the sound judgment of the trial court. It is likewis

Issue: Whether or not Lito si Guilty of rape

Further, the fact of penetration, though incompl

ete, was collaborated by the testimony of the examin
ing physician that there was a congestion or redness
on the vaginal area of the victim which could havebe
en caused by a fully erected penis.[10]
As for the intact hymen, such finding has no be
aring on the fact of carnal knowledge. We have held
that to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration
of the female genital organ is not required sincemere
entry by the penis into the lips of the said organ -- ev
en without rupture or laceration of the hymen -- is su
fficient. Thus, a finding that the victims hymen is int
act does not negate a finding that rape wascommitte
d.[11]
LITOs bare denial and self-serving assertions th
at the case stemmed from the desire of the victims f
amily to evade paying him his wages is unbelievable.
No parent would expose his or her owndaughter, spe
cially a child of such tender age as JOANNA, to the sh

ame and scandal of having undergone such a debasi

ng defilement of her chastity if the charge filed were
not true.[12] Moreover, it is hard tobelieve that a child
would invent such a story as the rape perpetrated by
accused-appellant on her unless it were true. A girl o
f such age as the victim would not concoct a tale of d
efloration, allow theexamination of her private parts,
and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, no
t to mention the trauma, of a public trial, unless she
was raped.[13] In fact, from a reading of JOANNAs test
imony, itwould appear that she, because of her tende
r age, did not quite grasp the enormity or gravity of t
he bestiality heaped upon her by LITO.
There is no doubt in our minds that the prosecu
tion had established beyond reasonable doubt the fa
ct that LITO had carnal knowledge of JOANNA. Consi
dering JOANNAs age at the time of the crime,LITO co
mmitted statutory rape, and carnal knowledge alone
of JOANNA is rape. It is not required that LITO use for
ce or intimidation, or that JOANNA be deprived of rea
son or be otherwise unconscious.[14]
Finally, JOANNA is entitled to an award for moral
damages which is hereby set at P50,000. The grant
of moral damages is automatically made in rape case
s without need of proof for it is assumed thatthe com
plainant has sustained mental, physical and psycholo
gical sufferings, thus entitling her to such award.
People v. Celis
October 20, 1999
Complainant Racquel arrived from Manila at
Magundanao and boarded the passenger jeep driven
by accused appellants Roque and Carlos. Upon
reaching the terminal, Racquel discovered that there
was no more tricycle trip going to San Antonio.
Accused invited Racquel to sleep in their house, who
agreed after the initial hesitation because she is not
familiar with the area. She was raped in several
occasions, once in a makeshift hut and twice in a
school building.
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Issue: W/N there was a rape?

Held: Yes.
For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation employed be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted. It is only
necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the appellant had
in mind. When Racquel was dragged to the makeshift
hut by Carlos, he told her to cooperate with him or
she would be shot. These threats were enough to
implant fear in the mind of the complainant, who was
alone and helpless. Roque, in turn, managed to have
sexual intercourse with complainant by flashing a
knife in her face. Threatening the victim with a knife,
a deadly weapon, is sufficient to cow the victim. It
constitutes an element of rape.
PEOPLE V. CESAR MELENDRES
G.R. NO. 133999-4001
Facts: Accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape
committed against the 11 year old daughter of his
common law wife. He contends that accused and
complainant were actually lovers.
Issue: WON rape is committed
HELD:
In rape cases falling under Art 335 (3) when the
woman is under 12 years of age or is demented, 2
elements must be established to hold the accused
guilty of rape: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) that the woman is below
12 years of age. Proof of consent of the woman is
immaterial. Sexual intercourse with a woman below
12 years old is statutory rape. Her consent to the
intercourse is involuntary because she is considered
to have no will of her own.
People vs Puertollano
FACTS:

On July 19, 1994, at about one oclock in the

afternoon in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, Mary Joy
Puertollano, who was then ten years of age, was
ordered
by
her
father,
appellant
Ildefonso
Puertollano, who was drunk at the time, to stay at
home and forego her afternoon classes. Obediently,
she went upstairs to put her brother and sisters to
sleep.
Later, appellant instructed Mary Joy to come
down and wash the dishes.appellant ordered her to
close the doors and the windows of their
house. Thereupon, appellant told Mary Joy to remove
her skirt. Mary Joy refused and instead left to go to
the house of her uncle, Jose Fernandez, which was
located nearby. When asked by her uncle why she
was crying, Mary Joy replied that her father did not
allow her to go to school. Shortly thereafter, she
heard her father calling for her, Mary Joy, halikana,
pumasokkana. Meekly, she obeyed and went back
to their house. Once inside, she was not allowed to
leave.
Appellant
removed
his
pants
and
underwear. Then he forced Mary Joy to take off her
clothes. When Mary Joy refused, appellant took them
off. He then lifted Mary Joy and touched her
body. Attempting to insert his penis into her vagina,
he encountered extreme difficulty so he placed the
girl on a bench, laid himself on top of her and held
her thighs. Five times, he attempted to have sexual
intercourse with vigorous motions, all of which
inflicted excruciating pain on Mary Joy. As she could
not take it any more, she moved her buttocks aside.
[1]

Jose Fernandez, Mary Joys uncle, witnessed

through a hole in the wall of appellants house how
the latter sexually assaulted his daughter. While
appellant was performing his dastardly act, he
shouted, Walanghiyaka, patianak mo, kinakain mo,
dugo mo iyan, kinakain mo pa. Upon hearing this,
appellant arose and let go of Mary Joy. Forthwith,

Jose Fernandez summoned his neighbors and

instructed his wife to call the barangay tanods. The
tanods came, took appellant with them and called
the police.
Dr.Danilo Ramirez examined Mary Joy and found
the presence of abrasion and hyperemia at the
vulva. He explained that these could have been
caused by constant friction on a blunt object. While
her hymen was still intact, its edges were
blunted. He opined that the edges could have been
damaged by insertion of a finger or penis of a
man. The other parts of her body had no signs of
physical injury like contusions and others.[2]
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving
undue weight and credence to the unreliable and
unworthy testimony of Mary Joy and of her
supporting witnesses. Further, appellant claims that
even supposing that he was guilty, the trial court
erred in convicting him of consummated rape for the
crime committed is only attempted rape.The
complainant testified that because of such awkward
position of complainant and that of appellant as
described to by the former, it is highly impossible for
appellant to have consummated the crime imputed
against him. This is made more glaring by
complainants own admission during trial that
appellant was not able to insert his penis into her
private part (TSN, December 12, 1994, p.
36). Worse, complainant did not feel the penis of
appellant during the sexual attack which belies
penetration even the slightest one (Ibid, p.
52). Withal, complainant admitted that she was
lifted by appellant while the latter was in
a standingposition thereby making it even more
difficult to consummate the alleged sexual assault.

ISSUE: W/N the crime committed Consumated Rape.

HELD:
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thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to

death.
he mere touching by the males organ or
instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the
womans private parts is sufficient to consummate
rape. As we have said in unnumbered cases, full or
deep penetration of the victims vagina is not
necessary to consummate sexual intercourse; it is
enough that there be even the slightest penetration
of the male organ into the female sex organ. [5]
Under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, rape is
defined as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a

homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police
or military authorities.

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or

otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the rape is committed in full view of the

husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or

is demented.

4. When the victim is a religious or a child below

seven (7) years old.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion

perpetua.

5. When the offender knows that he is inflicted with

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the

use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion

provision for cases where the death penalty is

imposable, i.e. the victim is under eighteen years of
age and the offender is a parent . . . of the victim.
In order to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty, the special qualifying circumstances of the
victims minority and her relationship to the offender
should be both alleged[6] and proved.[7]
A close scrutiny of the information filed in this
case shows that all that is stated therein is that Mary
Joy is a minor. No mention was made of her exact
age.
We reiterate that due process requires that the
acts or omission constitutive of the offense be stated
in the Information to fully apprise the accused of the
charge against him.[8] The nature and the cause of
the accusation must be reasonably stated therein.[9]
Consequently, the death penalty imposed by
the trial court should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua as provided for in the second paragraph of
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial
court convicting appellant of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that his sentence
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua and that moral
damages of P50,000.00 be imposed on him.

6. When committed by any member of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
The Court, however, believes that the trial court
erred in applying paragraph 1 of the foregoing

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ROBERTO BANIGUID y PASSION, accusedappellant. [G.R. No. 137714. September 8, 2000]
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the
lower court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Baniguid guilty of rape against his minor daughter,
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JosibelleBaniguid. According to the complaint filed by

the offended party, on January 4, 1995, in Pasay City,
Roberto Baniguid, by means of force and
intimidation, unlawfully had carnal knowledge of her
minor daughter against her will and consent.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court
blindly believed the testimony of complainant
despite its falsehood and that his warrantless arrest
by the police officers was illegal considering that it
was not one of the cases falling under Rule 113, Sec.
5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when
warrantless arrest is lawful.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting Roberto Baniguid guilty of the crime of
rape.
HELD: The Court found that accused-appellant is
indeed guilty of rape of his daughter. Complainants
inability to recall the names of some people did not
affect the consistency of her testimony concerning
the circumstances under which she was raped. Also,
as long as the victims testimony measures up to the
standard of credibility, the fact that she had sexual
relations with other men would not destroy or affect
her credibility. The moral character of the victim is
immaterial in rape cases. Regarding accusedappellants contention that his warrantless arrest was
illegal, for his objection to prosper, he should have
interposed it before he entered his plea during
arraignment, otherwise, the same is already waived.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision convicting
accused-appellant of rape, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that his sentence is REDUCED from
death to reclusion perpetua, the award of indemnity
to complainant is reduced from P75,000 to
P50,000.00, and accused-appellant is ordered to pay
complainant the additional amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

People vs Bidoc

This is a case were Bidoc raped his daughter in a

series of events 2 times and frightened her daughter
not to tell anyone or else Bidoc will kill her. In the
early part of January 2000, AAA took chances in
going to the PNP Station located in Kabugao, Apayao,
and reported that she was raped twice by the
appellant. She was alone when she reported the
incidents to SPO1 Agculao, an investigator of
Kabugao Municipal Police.11
The result of the said investigation was reduced into
writing. As part of the investigation, he asked AAA to
undergo a medical examination. He brought her to
the Rural Health Office for the medical examination
and even made a request to Dr. Dangao for the
issuance of a medical certificate.12
At the Rural Health Office, Dr. Dangao, who was then
the Rural Health Officer of Kabugao, Apayao,
conducted a medical examination on AAA. She
declared in court that her examination indicated that
AAA's genital area reveals healed hymenal
lacerations at 3, 7, and 10 o'clock positions, and the
vaginal opening admits one finger with ease. She
further avowed that the said lacerations could have
been caused by any penetration, by any hard object
or a man's penis. She also mentioned in court that
those lacerations could have occurred during the
months of November or December 1999.Bidoc
denied all allegations and sent forth witnesses
claiming that he was innocent . The Trial Court held
that Bidoc was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Sentenced to death penalty,the case was transmitted
for automatic review

ISSUE:
The trial court gravely erred in not considering the
Information in Criminal Case No. 11-2000 as
insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for
failure of the prosecution to state the precise date of

commission of the alleged rape, it being an essential

element of the crime charged.
HELD:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by these
principles: First, the prosecution has to show the guilt
of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or
that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind,
produces conviction. Second, unless there are special
reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially
regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. Third, the disposition of rape cases are
governed by the following guidelines: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution, and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.24In the case at bar, appellant contends that
the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him for
two counts of rape based not on the strength of
prosecution's evidence but on the weakness of his
defense. This Court finds such contention untenable.
Given the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the
trial court correctly convicted the accused for two
counts of rape and such conviction was not based on
the weakness of defense evidence as the appellant
claimed it to be, but on the strength of the evidence
of the prosecution. The straightforward testimony
given by AAA, corroborated with the testimonies of
SPO1 Agculao and Dr. Dangao, were sufficient to
convict the appellant. Besides, appellant's defense
was not able to destroy the truthfulness and the
credibility of AAA's testimony and the testimonies of
her witnesses.

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HELD:
People vs Barcena
FACTS:
Estrella testified that at 10:00 oclock in the morning
of April 10, 1997, she was alone in their house when
appellant suddenly embraced her from behind and
dragged her towards the bedroom despite her
vigorous attempts to free herself from his clutches.
Appellant repeatedly slapped Estrella, forcibly
stripped her of her clothing, mounted her and then
inserted his penis into her vagina. Estrella could not
tell how long the appellant stayed on top of her but
after a while, he put on his clothes and ordered her
to do the same. He warned her not to tell anybody
about the assault or he would kill her. Four days later,
she revealed the harrowing experience to her cousin
who accompanied her to the barangay captainDr.
Estela Cabigas-Cabatu, resident physician of the
Central Ilocos Sur District Hospital, testified that she
found healed lacerations at 2 oclock, 4 oclock, and
8 oclock positions of the hymen of the victim. She
opined that for a 15-year old girl with no history of
delivery, the presence of healed lacerations is
abnormal and could have been caused by the
introduction of a foreign object into her genitalia,
such as a penis during sexual intercourse Accused
denied the allegations
The trial Court held that Barcena is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, The CA affirmed the allegation and
sentenced Barcena to the maximum penalty of
death.

NO. The fact that Estrella did not shout or make an

outcry when her relatives were just nearby does not
mean that she was not raped by the appellant. It
would be demanding too much from an ordinary
mortal placed under such a stressful psychological
and emotional situation to require that she shout or
ward off the impending evil. We have said before that
workings of a human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable and people react
differently. In such a given situation, some may
shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked
into insensibility; while others may openly welcome
the intrusion.11
Estrella demonstrated her repulsion to appellants
lewd advances. Even so, physical resistance need not
be established in rape when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim who submits against her will to the
rapist's lust because of fear for her life or personal
safety. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a
relative term, depending not only on the age, size,
and strength of the parties but also on their
relationship with each other. A woman of such young
age like Estrella can only cower in fear and yield into
submission. Rape is nothing more than a conscious
process of intimidation by which a man keeps a
woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is
not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make
an outcry against an unarmed assailant.

ISSUE:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

The sexual assault on AAA began sometime in 1991,

when the child was nine (9) years old and a Grade 2
pupil at Damortis Elementary School in Nagtagaan,
Rosario, La Union.11 She was living with her
grandmother CCC in Nagtagaan, about 25 meters
away from the house of appellant. She lived there
and not with her mother because Nagtagaan was
nearer her school.12
Around after lunch on the day she was raped, the
appellant summoned AAA from her home to remove
his earwax.13 He brought her to a nipa hut, about
only six (6) meters away from his house.14 After
removing the earwax of appellant, he brought her to
the room of his house. The appellant locked the door,
lay the victim on the bed and undressed her.
Thereafter, he removed her panties and forcibly
inserted his finger and penis in her vagina. The
victim cried in pain, but every time she would cry out
"Mama," the appellant would spank or pinch or slap
her.15
When the appellant had finished ravishing the victim,
he dragged her to the bathroom to perform fellatio
on him. AAA refused. She was later allowed to go
home, but not before the accused threatened her to
keep silent about what had happened.16 When AAA
went home, she did not report the incident to her
grandmother or to anyone else. The abuse continued
until 1993 3 years repeatedly raped by the appellant
The defense alleged that the evidence lacks
truthfulness , that the testimony must be
clear,convincing
and
free
from
material
contradictions He likewise capitalizes on the failure of
the prosecution to putJulieta Flores on the witness
stand.

People vs Carpio
HELD:
FACTS:
Having reviewed the testimonies adduced by the
prosecution and the recounting of events by the
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victim herself, the Court finds that indeed the crimes

as charged have been committed against AAA. AAA
withstood the difficulties of not only her direct
examination, but the rigors of cross-examination by
the defense as well. Although at times having broken
down and cried, AAA nonetheless managed to give
an
unambiguous,
categorical
and
forthright
testimony. Her apparent vulnerability from the recent
traumatic events in her life only serve to reinforce
the strength and plausibility of her allegations.

We have no reason to believe that AAA was

motivated by any other reason than to seek justice
and vindication for the wrong done against her. As
the Court of Appeals aptly pointed out, the
revelation of an eleven year-old child whose chastity
was abused deserves full credit as her willingness to
face police investigation and to undergo the trouble
of humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony
of the truthfulness of her complaint.[52]

Moreover,
the
medical
certificate
and
testimony of Dr. Bautista corroborate AAAs
allegations of rape. Dr. Bautista found two
old hymenal lacerations
at 9
oclock and 3
oclock positions in her examination of AAA. The
rupture of AAAs hymen, she explained, was caused
by the insertion of a hard object, possibly an erect
human penis.
The inconsistencies, if any, in AAAs testimony are
minor details. They are too inconsequential and
immaterial to affect the heart of the issue. These
lapses do not detract from the overwhelming
testimony of the prosecution witnesses who
positively identified the malefactor.[58] What is
material is that all the elements of statutory rape
have been properly alleged and adequately proved in
this case. In statutory rape, only two elements need
to be established: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the offended party; and (2) that the
offended party was below twelve (12) years of age at
the time of the sexual assault. Force or intimidation,

not being an essential element of the crime, need

not be proven.[59]
PEOPLE VS MORENO
FACTS: Before us for automatic review1 is the
Decision2 of 9 August 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case
No.99-026 finding accused-appellant Rogelio Moreno
y Reg (hereafter ROGELIO) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay the amounts of P200,000 as moral
damages and P1,000 representing the value of the
personal property taken from the victim Marites Felix
(hereafter MARITES). The victim, 20-year-old
MARITES, testified that at about 12:45 A.M. of 8
January 1999, as she was walking along ABC
Commercial Complex, Makati, after her duty as
service crew of the Burger Machine outlet located at
Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, she noticed a man behind
her. Suddenly, the man put his arms around her and
pointed a fan-knife at her neck. Since the place was
illuminated by streetlights and lights coming from the
ABC Commercial Complex, MARITES noticed the
tattoos in his arms and recognized him to be
accused-appellant ROGELIO. Prior to 8 January 1999,
ROGELIO would pass by their Burger Machine outlet
twice a week, but there was never an occasion that
he bought something from Burger Machine.4

replied "Huwagkangmaingay, kundipapatayinkita."

ROGELIO then removed his pants and again uttered
"Huwagkangmaingaykundisasaksakinkita." Still, she
told him that he could get her bag if he needed
money, but he replied, "I do not need money."8
ROGELIO ordered MARITES to open her legs apart or
else he would kill her. MARITES was forced to obey
him. ROGELIO then went on top of her with his right
hand holding her throat, inserted his sexual organ
into hers, and kept on pumping. After he was
through, ROGELIO went again on top of MARITES and
ordered her to put his organ inside her vagina.
MARITES said, "Ayoko." At this point, she heard
someone nearby running. ROGELIO forthwith put on
his shorts and snatched the shoulder bag of
MARITES, which contained her ATM card, P200 cash,
a small Bible, coupons of Burger Machine and T-shirt
with Burger Machine markings. He then ran away
towards the direction of the other side of EDSA.9

ROGELIO dragged MARITES and at the same time

ordered her to follow him to the side of ABC Complex,
which is about five arms-length away from EDSA.
MARITES removed her ring from her bag and gave it
to ROGELIO.5The latter told her, "Mamayana
iyan."6 "[T]hat will come later on because I will give
it back to you but you have to follow me first."7

The vendors who saw MARITES crying as she was

walking inquired about what happened to her. They
brought her back to the Burger Machine outlet and
called the police. MARITES joined the police in the
search for ROGELIO around the vicinity and to the
place where the incident happened. One of the two
policemen saw her ring in said place. They continued
to search the vicinity until they reached Laperal
Compound. As they were approaching Guadalupe
Bridge, several persons who were talking to each
other scampered away upon seeing MARITES and the
police officers. One of them was ROGELIO, who
immediately went inside a house and turned off its
lights. With the assistance of the barangay tanod, the
police went to the back portion of the house and saw
ROGELIO, who at the time was wearing a hat and a
blue jacket with his head bowed down.10

ROGELIO grabbed MARITESs long-sleeved shirt,

unbuttoned it, and pushed her to the vacant space
behind the car then parked on the side of ABC
Complex. He again pointed his knife at her throat and
pulled down her pants. To her plea for mercy, he

Upon seeing ROGELIO, MARITES exclaimed: "He is

the one." ROGELIO refused to remove his hat when
she tried to remove it. After finally succeeding in
removing his hat, MARITES confirmed: "He [was] the
one who raped me." She then removed his jacket and
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saw under it her T-shirt with Burger Machine prints at

the left sleeve and catsup stains in the front and
upper parts of the shirt. This was the shirt she used
in working at their Burger Machine outlet.11
The police brought ROGELIO and MARITES to the
police station where MARITES was investigated. At
9:00 A.M. of the following day, MARITES was
examined by Dr. Aurea P. Villena, a medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).12
Dr. Aurea P. Villena testified that she conducted an
examination on MARITES and found that MARITES
sustained contusions on her breasts. She also noted
the following:
2) Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide
(2.5 cm in diameter) as to allow complete
penetration of an average-sized adult Filipino male
organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury;
3) Semenology - positive for human spermatozoa
which is highly indicative of recent sexual intercourse
with [a] man.13
SPO3 QuillanoMolmisa of the Makati Police Station
corroborated the testimony of MARITES that upon
receiving her complaint for rape, he, together with
the latter and SPO4 Alejandro Alisangco, proceeded
to the Laperal Compound in Guadalupe, which was
known to the police officers as a hiding place of
criminals in that area. ROGELIO ran away upon
seeing MARITES and the police officers. ROGELIO was
later found hiding in a kneeling position in Laperal
Compound. MARITES was hysterical as she positively
identified ROGELIO. SPO3 Molmisa brought ROGELIO
to the Ospital ng Makati for medical examination
before bringing him to the police station.14
Accused-appellant ROGELIO, 19 years old and a
resident of Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo,
Makati City, put up the defense of alibi. He testified
that on or about 12:45 A.M. of 8 January 1999, he

was sleeping in a folding bed located outside the

house owned by his uncle, with whom he had been
living. ROGELIO was roused from sleep by the police.
MARITES approached him, took off his hat and was
hysterical when she pointed to him saying,
"Iyanngapoiyon, iyanngapoiyon."
"Ikawangnangholdapsa akin at nang rape." Then the
policemen tied his hands and brought him to
the Ospital ng Makati, together with MARITES.15
ROGELIO did not deny the fact that he was wearing a
T-shirt with Burger Machine prints at the time of his
arrest. According to him it had been with him for
almost a year prior to the incident. It was given to
him as a souvenir by a friend who worked at the
Burger Machine.16
ZaldyCarino, a 17-year-old neighbor and friend of
ROGELIO for three years prior to the incident,
testified that between 5:00 and 8:00 P.M. of 7 January
1999 he was playing basketball with ROGELIO and
the latters friends. ROGELIO was wearing a Burger
Machine T-shirt the whole time that they were
playing basketball. After winning the game, ROGELIO
bought some merienda for his playmates, since he
was the one who placed the bet. They stayed in
ROGELIOs house until about 10:00 P.M. when
ROGELIO told them that he was going to sleep. After
Zaldy and his friends left, ROGELIO slept in a folding
bed located outside the house of his uncle.17
Between 2:00 and 3:00 A.M. of the following day,
Zaldy was awakened when he heard noises. He went
out of the house and went to the place where the
noise was coming from. He found out that it came
from the place where ROGELIO was sleeping, and he
saw ROGELIO being beaten up by four persons,
including a barangay tanod.Zaldy also saw MARITES
shouting, crying and claiming that the T-shirt worn by
ROGELIO was hers. ROGELIO and another person by
the name of Inteng were taken away.18
After evaluating the evidence offered by the parties,
the trial court gave full faith and credit to the version
of the prosecution, convicted ROGELIO of robbery

with rape and appreciated against him the

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. It
disregarded ROGELIOs defenses of denial and alibi in
view of his positive identification by MARITES as her
assailant. Accordingly, in its Decision of 9 August
1999, the trial court decreed as follows:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court finds accused
Rogelio Moreno y Reg, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of having committed the special complex
crime of robbery with rape, defined and penalized
under Articles 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Applying
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, considering the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity and absent any mitigating circumstance,
the Court imposes the penalty of death upon said
accused. Accused is ordered to pay the
complainant P200,000.00 as and for moral damages
plus P1,000.00 representing the value of the personal
properties taken but not recovered.19
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed a
separate crime of rape and theft, or special complex
crime of robbery with rape.
HELD: We cannot, however, sustain ROGELIOs
conviction of robbery with rape.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape
defined in Article 293 in relation to paragraph 2 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
employs the clause "when the robbery shall have
been accompanied with rape." In other words, to be
liable for such crime, the offender must have the
intent to take the personal property of another under
circumstances that makes the taking one of robbery,
and such intent must precede the rape.23If the
original plan was to commit rape, but the accused
after committing the rape also committed robbery
when the opportunity presented itself, the robbery
should be viewed as a separate and distinct crime.24
A painstaking assessment of the evidence in this
case convinces us that ROGELIO committed two
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separate offenses of rape and theft, and not the

special complex crime of robbery with rape.
Immediately after ROGELIO put his arms around
MARITES and directed the knife at her neck, he
dragged MARITES to the vacant space in ABC
Commercial Complex and removed her clothes.
These acts clearly showed that ROGELIO had in mind
sexual gratification. This intent was further
established by the fact that when MARITES offered to
give her ring to ROGELIO, the latter did not take it
and instead replied, "Mamayana iyan"25; "That will
come later on because I will give it back to you but
you have to follow me first."26 Again, when ROGELIO
removed his pants, MARITES told him to get her bag
if he needed money; but ROGELIO replied "I do not
need money."27 After giving vent to his lustful desire,
he snatched the victims shoulder bag, which was
then on her right foot, and then he ran
away.28 Clearly then, the taking of personal property
was not the original evil plan of ROGELIO. It was an
afterthought following the rape.
Significantly, the constitutive element of violence or
intimidation against persons in robbery was not
present at the time of the snatching of the shoulder
bag of MARITES. The force or intimidation exerted by
ROGELIO against the victim was for a reason foreign
to the fact of the taking of the bag.29 It was for the
purpose of accomplishing his lustful desire. Hence, it
cannot be considered for the purpose of classifying
the crime as robbery. Accused-appellant may thus be
held liable for simple theft only, in addition to the
crime of rape

Thomas was in front of her employers house in

Moonwalk, Paraaque when Richard Gacer and a
certain Ricky approached and invited her to attend a
party later that night. They agreed to meet at a
nearby vulcanizing shop. Agnes knew Richard as he
used to deliver bread in the neighborhood.
At about 9:00 p.m. that evening, Agnes and her
friend Pogi (the brother of Ricky) met with Richard
and Ricky at the designated place. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the house of JoselitoSugalan in Sto.Nio
St., San Agustin Village, Paraaque. Upon reaching
the place, Agnes asked where the party was but no
one answered her. She asked to go home but
Richard and Joselito prevented her from leaving. Only
brothers Ricky and Pogi were allowed to leave.
Agnes was then led to the sala (the
victim referred to this portion of the house as the
terrace), after which Richard, Joselito and
Darwin David, whom she saw for the first time,
conferred with one another. A few minutes later,
Joselito entered the sala and offered Agnes a bottle
of beer. When she refused to drink, Joselito poked a
fan knife at her and forced her to consume most of
its contents. After Joselito left, Richard came in and
started to undress her. She tried to resist but by
then she was starting to feel dizzy. Before losing
consciousness, she felt that Richard was already on
top of her. When she regained consciousness, she
found herself naked and Richard was gone. Instead,
she was alone with Darwin who poked a knife at her
and forced her to sit down. Then he took his turn
raping her. She saw blood oozing from her private
part even before Darwin could insert his penis.

PEOPLE VS DAVID
FACTS: Before us is an appeal from the decision,
[1]
dated February 6, 1995, of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, in
Criminal Case Nos. 91-4009 to 11, convicting herein
appellant Darwin David and his co-accused Joselito V.
Sugalan of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.On February 5, 1991, 14-year-old Agnes

Agnes could only cry in pain after having been

ravished twice. After Darwin left, Joselito came in and
asked her masarapba? Then, he raped her too.
While the whole incident was taking place, Joselitos
mother, grandmother, brother and cousin were in a
room inside the house.
Subsequently, Agnes heard Joselito arguing
with Darwin as to who would take responsibility for

their acts. The following day, Joselito told his mother

that Agnes would be staying with them. Joselitos
mother asked her if she wanted to marry her son but
Agnes refused. Nevertheless, she stayed with the
Sugalan family for about two months during which
Joselito made her a sex slave. She complained about
Joselitos physical abuses but Joselitos mother who
was herself afraid of her son, advised her to endure
her suffering. She was never allowed to go out
alone. In one instance, she attempted to escape
when she attended mass with the Sugalan family but
Joselitos mother prevented her from doing so.
On April 5, 1991, Agnes succeeded in fleeing from
the Sugalan residence after Joselito physically
maltreated and threatened to kill her. From
Paraaque, she proceeded to her Auntie Fe in
Malibay, PasayCity. She told her aunt that she came
from work and that she met an accident in Baclaran.
It took her more than a month before she could
muster the courage to reveal what really happened,
because of fear of the Sugalans. Accompanied by her
aunt, she reported the incident to the police
authorities and subjected herself to a medical
examination.
The examination report on Agnes Thomas, prepared
by Dr. Roberto Simbalon, Jr., NBI medico-legal officer,
showed the following: (1) there were no extra-genital
injuries at the time of the examination; (2) a healed
laceration was found compatible with the date of the
first alleged rape and (3) there were signs of
probable pregnancy. Dr. Simbalon concluded that,
under normal circumstances, the healed laceration of
the hymen was caused by sexual intercourse.
Darwin and Joselito denied the charges against
them. Joselito, 20 years old and single, claimed that
he met Agnes on January 22, 1991 in
a peryahan. She became his girlfriend and live-in
partner fromJanuary 29, 1991 up to the first week of
April 1991. They stayed in Paraaque with Joselitos
mother, grandmother, brother and sister. He
considered her as his wife and the rest of the family
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treated her very well. To prove his claim, he

presented three pictures of Agnes with handwritten
notes indicating her birthday and a list of some of the
clothes she left in their house.
Joselito alleged that in the evening of February 5,
1991, he and Agnes slept in their room. Sometime in
March, they had an argument because of her
jealousy. He slapped her, prompting the latter to
leave the house and file the present charge against
him.
Joselito further said that he and his childhood friend,
Darwin David, were members of a fraternity called
NAKAJEDU or NK but denied having known their coaccused Richard Gacer.
Julieta Valdez, Joselitos mother, testified that her son
and Agnes lived together as husband and wife in
her house since January 29, 1991 up to the first week
of April 1991. She met Agnes for the first time in the
early morning of January 30, 1991. Upon learning
that Agnes wanted to live with Joselito, she asked her
if she wanted to marry him but the former replied
that she was too young and that she was afraid of
her aunt.
Darwin testified, in essence, that on February 5,
1991, he was with his girlfriend (now his wife)
from 6:00 p.m. up to about 12:30 midnight. He came
to know Agnes only through his friend Joselito.
After a thorough evaluation of the evidence, the trial
court convicted Darwin and Joselito of rape and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of its decision read:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of all the
foregoing, the
Court finds both accused, Joselito Sugalan and
Darwin David, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua, and to jointly and severally indemnify the

offended party of the (sic) sum of P50,000.00 as

moral damages.
The lower court ruled against the 3 accused , Darwin
and joselito were convicted while Richard gracer
remains at large.
ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court erred and the
contention of respondent herein to some
contradictory statement of the victim regarding the
allege rape and timeline when the victim decided to
go to the proper authorities.
RULING:
In the case of People vs. Arafiles,[8] we ruled that
protracted examination of a young girl, not
accustomed to a public trial, can produce
contradictions which are insufficient to destroy her
credibility. On the contrary, they may in fact serve as
badges of truth, indicating that the witness was
unrehearsed.
Appellant contends that the absence of extra-genital
injuries on the victim was contrary to her testimony
that she had been constantly subjected to physical
brutality from February 5, 1991 until her escape
onApril 5, 1991.
We do not agree. The absence of any extra-genital
injuries on Agnes Thomas was explained by the fact
that Dr. Simbalon physically examined her only
on June 14, 1991 or more than four months after she
was raped. Moreover, while there were no extragenital injuries on the victim, Dr. Simbalon
nonetheless found a healed laceration in her vagina
and signs of probable pregnancy.[9] These
circumstances were consistent with her allegation
that she was raped on February 5, 1991.
Appellant likewise disputes the presence of drugs in
the beer that was given to the victim, arguing that
the record did not support this fact. Our ruling
in People vs. Del Rosario[10] squarely applies:

True, there was no test conducted to determine the

presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given
to the victims which caused them to lose momentary
control of their faculties. But this is of little
consequence as the same is not an indispensable
element in a prosecution of rape. Under the
circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found
to have been unconscious at the time the offender
had carnal knowledge of her. (underlining ours)
Appellant insists that he cannot be held guilty of rape
because there was no real struggle or determined
effort on the part of the victim to resist. She did not
even shout for help or create any disturbance which
could have roused the other occupants of the house.
We are not persuaded. Rape is perpetrated when the
accused has carnal knowledge of the victim through
the use of force or intimidation.[11] Agnes testified
that before she was sexually abused, the three
accused brandished a knife at her and threatened to
kill her if she did not give in to their lustful desires.
The act of holding a knife, by itself, is strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and
threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to
bring her to submission.[12] As stated in the case
of People vs. Paranzo:[13]
The Court has repeatedly held that rape is committed
when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter
submitted against her will because of fear for her life
or personal safety. It is not necessary that the force
or intimidation employed be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted because all that is
required is that it be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind.
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the
sexual advances of the rapists was not tantamount to
consent. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when threats and intimidation are employed,
and the victim submits herself to her attackers
because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not
the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.
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[14]

Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may

offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all.[15] Here, the
victim categorically testified that she was cowed into
submission because appellant pointed a knife at her
and threatened to kill her. Moreover, she was too
helpless to resist the molestation as she was dizzy
and weak because of the beer she was forced to
drink.
Finally, appellant questions Agnes credibility for
reporting the incident only after more than a month
from the time she arrived at her aunts place, when
she could no longer hide her pregnancy.
The Court has consistently held that delay in
reporting rape because of threats of physical
violence should not be taken against the victim. A
rape victim is oftentimes controlled by fear rather
than reason. It is through fear, springing from the
initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build up a
feeling of extreme psychological terror which will, he
hopes, numb his victim to silence and submission.
[16]
The present case of Agnes is no exception. She
was physically abused and constantly threatened
with death by Joselito. A girl merely 14 years old
when she was sexually assaulted could not be
expected to act like an adult with the courage and
intelligence to disregard a threat to her life. We note
that the only reason for the victims prolonged stay
in the Sugalan residence was the continued presence
of Joselitos relatives who were watching her and
preventing her from leaving.
Appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over
Agnes unwavering positive identification of him as
one of her abusers and tormentors. He failed to
establish the impossibility of his presence at the
scene of the crime. He merely claimed that, at the
time of the alleged rape, he was with his girlfriend
(Glenda Mendoza, now his wife) in her house
until midnight. While Glenda executed an affidavit,
nothing was mentioned therein to corroborate
appellants declaration that they were together at

the time the rape of Agnes took place. For his alibi to
prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was
not at the scene of the crime but that it was
physically impossible for him to be there.[17] It was
not physically impossible for the appellant to be at
the crime scene considering that his house was
within walking distance from that of Joselito.
Likewise, the defense failed to show any ill motive on
the part of the victim to falsely implicate appellant in
a very serious case. As we have said in a number of
cases, no woman will concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private part and expose
herself to the stigma and humiliation of a public trial
if she is not motivated by an earnest desire to seek
justice against the one who defiled her.
PEOPLE VS CABALQUINTO
FACTS:

between the door and the wall, she peeped through

the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making
pumping motions on their daughter, AAA, who was
lying underneath him with her panties pulled down.
When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her
legs ("ibuka mo"), she kicked and pounded the door.
Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood
up and opened the door. ABC entered the room and
confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her
accusation. She then asked AAA what her father did
to her. AAA did not say anything but looked pale. 17
After regaining her composure, she went to her
sister-in-law EEE, who lived on the second floor of the
house, and confided to the latter. At around 10:00
o'clock that night, she went to her sister's house in
xxx to seek advice. Her sister told her to report the
matter to the barangay officials. The barangay
officials, in turn, told her to go to the police which
she did the following day, November 14, 1998.18

Because of the paramount interest of a victim of

rape ( 8yrs. Old) it is decided that the full text will not
be published .This case presents an opportunity for
the Court not only to once again dispense due
requital for the sufferings of a child who has been
defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610),
otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its
implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence
Against Women and their Children.1

AAA's Salaysay was taken by the police and they

were referred to the CPU of PGH. Because there was
no doctor on duty, she and AAA returned to the CPU
on November 16, 1998. AAA was examined by a
doctor and a medical certificate was issued. They
returned to the police station where she executed
her Salaysay. They then proceeded to the fiscal's
office to lodge a complaint.19

ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of

Cabalquinto and that they have four children,
namely: BBB, CCC, the child-victim AAA, and DDD. At
around 8:45 p.m. of November 13, 1998, she was on
her way home to xxx, and saw her sons BBB and CCC
outside the house, and her youngest daughter DDD
playing with a cousin. As she was approaching the
house, she noticed that the door was closed although
the lights were on. Since there is a half-inch gap

AAA testified that at around 8:45 p.m. on November

13, 1998, she was inside their house in xxx, with her
father, Cabalquinto, when the latter instructed her to
close the door and windows and turn off the light.
She obeyed but did not turn off the light. Her father
then told her to lie down and immediately placed
himself on top of her. He then undressed her, brought
out his penis, asked her to masturbate him and to
suck his penis, inserted his penis in her private parts

ABC further testified that during the police

investigation on November 14, 1998, AAA revealed
to the police that a similar incident happened to her
on November 8, 1998, the day of her friend's
birthday celebration.20

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and licked her private parts. He told her not to tell

her ninang DDD or her mother; otherwise, he would
kill them all. She felt pain in her stomach and pelvis
after the incident.21
Corroborating her mother's testimony, AAA stated
that while they were at the police station, she
disclosed that she was also raped by her father on
November 8, 1998. She remembered the incident
because it was the day her friend, FFF, celebrated
her birthday. According to AAA, her father had been
drinking that night. When she went home to drink
water, she was called by her father, told to close the
door and windows and to turn off the lights. She
obeyed but did not turn off the lights. Her father then
placed himself on top of her and told her to
masturbate him.22
AAA further testified that she was not enrolled in
school because her mother had been abroad. 23

Cabakquinto denied all the allegations Cabalquinto's

claim that there are material inconsistencies
between the testimonies of AAA and ABC with regard
to whether AAA cried out as she was being raped
because while AAA testified that she shouted twice,
ABC stated that she did not see AAA struggle nor
hear her call out, is unconvincing.
ISSUE:Whether or not the contention of Cabalquinto
will raise sufficient ground for him to be aquitted
from conviction of rape.
RULING:AAA was firm and unwavering in her
narration of her traumatic experience. During cross
examination, she remained steadfast in her assertion
that her father inserted his penis inside her genitals
and raped her, even demonstrating what she
understood of the word rape by forming a circle with
her fingers and moving her middle finger inside and
out indicating sexual intercourse.29

It should be mentioned that in

her SinumpaangSalaysay dated November 14, 1998,
AAA stated that her father had raped her seven (7)
times since her mother left for abroad. She said that
she distinctly remembered having been raped by her
father on November 8, 1998, her friend's birthday;
August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on November
13, 1998, the day before her statement was taken.
However, she said no longer remembered the exact
dates of the other incidents.24

Thus, the trial court gave full credence to AAA's

testimony and ruled:

Dr. Manalo, who conducted the physical examination

of AAA, testified that AAA had no injury on her
genitalia; that her hymen is quite large and
distensible possibly because of penile penetration;
and that she recovered a strand of pubic hair inside
AAA's vaginal vault which could only have reached
the area as a consequence of penile penetration
because AAA did not have pubic hair yet.25

The testimony of [AAA] was even more bolstered by

the consistency of her declaration under cross by the
defense counsel, Atty. Torralba of the Public
Attorney's Office, whose attempt to discredit [AAA]'s
accusation by making it appear that she would not
have known how to testify that she was raped by her
own father, had she not been coached by someone
else to say so, miserably failed. In the following
portions of [AAA]'s cross-examination by the
Defense, instead of destroying [AAA]'s credibility the
more that it was established that accused indeed
raped her (sic) daughter.

On cross-examination, Dr. Manalo stated that she did

not find any traces of bleeding in AAA's vagina but
that injury is uncommon in incestuous rape

From the testimony of the principal witness, [AAA]

alone, viz, the testimony of the accused, there is no
reason to doubt that accused has [sic] molested his
daughter, and had carnal knowledge of her, on two
occasions, nighttime on November 8 and 13, 1998,
when [AAA] was then only 8 years old, inside their
dwelling.

x xxx
[AAA]'s declaration that she was raped corroborates
the testimony of the doctor who testified that a
strand of hair was found inside [AAA]'s vaginal vault.
The doctor's testimony that the presence of a strand
of hair inside the vaginal vault would not be possible
without sexual intercourse, bolsters the accusation of
[AAA] that she had been raped. Of course, there is no
test to determine whose hair was it, but considering
[AAA]'s testimony that accused had carnal
knowledge of her twice prior to examination, a
conclusion that the hair is accused's is plausible. The
idea that that hair was purposely placed inside
[AAA]'s vagina would be absurdity. Thus, when [AAA]
pointed to her father as the person who molested
her, this Court can only believe because no daughter
in [AAA]'s age would accuse her own father of any
wrongdoing, if it is not for the fact that he had
wronged her, and that hair (pubic or not) is
accused's.30
ABC's testimony of what she witnessed regarding the
act of rape corroborates AAA's account. The
inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her
mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is of
little consequence to the question of whether rape
was actually committed. Whether AAA cried out or
not does not discount rape.
It should be emphasized that AAA was but eight (8)
years old when the rapes happened. A child of her
tender years cannot be expected to be able to
recount the details of her torment with exactitude.
In People v. Villar,31 the accused questioned the
inconsistency between the victim's declaration in her
sworn statement and her direct testimony in court as
to the exact time when she was first raped by the
accused in 1993.32 The Court held that it cannot
impose the burden of exactness in the victim's
recollection of her harrowing experience more so
because the victim was an innocent and tender nine
(9)-year old lass when she was first
raped.33 Citing People v. Sagucio,34 we also held that
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errorless testimony cannot be expected especially

when a witness is recounting the details of a
harrowing experience.
On the other hand, ABC must have also been so
devastated by what she witnessed her husband
doing to their daughter that she might have
perceived things differently from AAA.
Persons who witness an event may perceive it from
different points of reference, hence they may have
different accounts of how the incident took place.
What is important is that their testimonies reinforce
each other on the essential facts and that their
versions corroborate and substantially coincide with
each other to make a consistent and coherent
whole.35 The fact therefore that the statements of
AAA and ABC differ on some minor details does not in
any way affect their credibility or detract from the
integrity and truthfulness of their declarations. The
variations in their testimonies present a believable
narration of what actually happened, made more so
precisely because of their imperfections
It is improbable that a victim of tender years,
especially one unexposed to the ways of the world as
AAA must have been, would impute a crime as
serious as rape to her own father if it were not true.
There is no doubt in our minds that AAA was impelled
solely by a desire to let justice find its way.37
As regards ABC, we are convinced that she did not
expose AAA to the ignominy that rape victims must
face only to get back at Cabalquinto's brother. Had
that been her motive, she would have accused
Cabalquinto's brother and not Cabalquinto himself.
No mother would possibly wish to stamp her child
falsely with the stigma that follows a rape only for
the purpose of punishing someone against whom she
has no grudge whatsoever.38 ABC's zeal in
prosecuting this case demonstrates to us her
yearning that the law may do her daughter justice
even as her own father had so depravedly wronged
her.

Further, the contemporaneous and subsequent

conduct of mother and child are revealing of the
veracity of the rape charge. It should be emphasized
that upon witnessing the outrage done to her
daughter, ABC immediately confronted Cabalquinto.
Shortly afterwards, she confided to her sister-in-law
and traveled all the way to xxx to seek her own
sister's advice. The following day, mother and child
went to the police to report the incident and to
execute their sworn statements. ABC also took her
daughter to the CPU of PGH for the latter's medical
examination.
These significant circumstances cannot be ignored.
We are compelled to believe, especially in the face of
Cabalquinto's plain denial, that AAA was indeed
sexually abused and raped by her own father.
Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age
is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a
parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty
shall be imposed as provided under the Death
Penalty Law.39 In this case, the qualifying
circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter
were properly alleged in the Informations, proven
during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However,
in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
should instead be imposed.
PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN
FACTS:
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found
guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a
quo to the extreme penalty of death,[5] hence this
case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.[6]
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25
April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the afternoon, Ma.

Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old

CrysthelPamintuan, went down from the second floor
of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met
Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small
plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the
freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a
helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As
Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard
one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!"[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis
into Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anakkoiyan!" and boxed
him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled
up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she
tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin
and an uncle who were living within their compound,
to chase the accused.[8] Seconds later, Primo was
apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call
for help. They held the accused at the back of their
compound until they were advised by their neighbors
to call thebarangay officials instead of detaining him
for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim
yielded negative results. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal
officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact
and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his
defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed
the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother
who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his
refusal to run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in
truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to
ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was
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in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon

them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him
and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but
restrained himself from hitting back when he realized
she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her
brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second
floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her
call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched
him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the
threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of
Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo
pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out
that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked
him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece
of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his
back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives
and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take
Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul
or possibly kill him
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the
credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that
her narration should not be given any weight or
credence since it was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with
human nature and experience. He claims that it was
truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape
considering that Crysthels younger sister was also in
the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs
preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their
presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact
that the episode happened within the family
compound where a call for assistance could easily be
heard and responded to, would have been enough to
deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the
door of the room was wide open for anybody to see
what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that
it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give
such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact
when from where she stood she could not have
possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual
organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that

the absence of any external signs of physical injuries

or of penetration of Crysthels private parts more
than bolsters his innocence.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a consummated rape
RULING:In People v. De la Pea[11] we clarified that
the decisions finding a case for rape even if the
attackers penis merely touched the external portions
of the female genitalia were made in the context of
the presence or existence of an erect penis capable
of full penetration. Where the accused failed to
achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an
oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's
vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony
that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to
insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood
reached the labia of herpudendum as the victim felt
his organ on the lips of her vulva,[12] or that the penis
of the accused touched the middle part of her
vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape cases
does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that
the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape.[14] As the labias, which are
required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their
natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or
the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is
to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching
the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the
female genital organs that are visible in the perineal
area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora,
the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc.
Themons pubis is the rounded eminence that

becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible

within the surface. The next layer is the labia
majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner
surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is
covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while
the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have
any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly
beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
[15]
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated,[16] and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the
female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been
confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ,"[17] but has also progressed into being
described as "the introduction of the male organ into
thelabia of the pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment
of the drawbridge."[19] But, to our mind, the case at
bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of
orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of
the citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses that the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of
proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate
Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we
grant arguendothat Corazon witnessed Primo in the
act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously
doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the
inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel.
When asked what she saw upon entering her
childrens room Corazon plunged into saying that she
saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel
without explaining her relative position to them as to
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enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in

automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be
recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and
Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling
position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that
the chest of the accused is pinning down the victim,
while his right hand is holding his penis and his left
hand is spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing
narration that Primos kneeling position rendered an
unbridled observation impossible. Not even a
vantage point from the side of the accused and the
victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed
view of Primos penis supposedly reaching Crysthels
external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora,
hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazons
sight, not to discount the fact that Primos right hand
was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it
from Corazons view. It is the burden of the
prosecution to establishhow Corazon could have seen
the sexual contact and to shove her account into the
permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that
she claims that she saw what was done to her
daughter. It is required that her claim be properly
demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed
in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any
taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was
at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve
the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run
roughshod over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent.Corazon insists
that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his
wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus
giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly
act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans
instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is
and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows

fully well that his dastardly acts have already been

discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother
of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of
Primo upon learning of Corazons presence would
have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught
literally with his pants down. The interval, although
relatively short, provided more than enough
opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but
even to conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the
accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the
court Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated
her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of
confusion that enshrouds the question of whether
rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed
the possibility of Primos penis penetrating her
vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical
statement denying penetration,[21] obviously induced
by a question propounded to her who could not have
been aware of the finer distinctions
between touching andpenetration. Consequently, it is
improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four
(4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is
bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult
interpretation that because the penis of the
accused touched her organ there was sexual entry.
Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the
victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the
middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of
her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish
sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate

Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint

that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded
with an erection.[23] On the contrary, Corazon even
narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his
right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having
breached Crysthels vagina is belied by the child's
own assertion that she resisted Primos advances by
putting her legs close together;[24] consequently, she
did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy"
about what Primo did to her.[25] Thus, she only
shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Arayko, arayko!" In
cases where penetration was not fully established,
the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape
nevertheless was consummated on the victim's
testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal
finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina,
or the labia minora was already gaping with redness,
or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.[26] None
was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony
must be received with due consideration on account
of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same
time to harness only what in her story appears to be
true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights
of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even
on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the
accused cannot be held liable for consummated
rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal
officer's finding in this case that there were no
external signs of physical injuries on complaining
witness body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr.
Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of
complete penetration of the hymen does not negate
the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual
contact between the accused and the victim

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