PERSPECTIVES

Social Science and Democracy

An Elective Affinity
Dipankar Gupta

Social sciences need democracy,

not wealth, to prosper. It is only
in those societies that centralise
citizenship have disciplines such
as economics, sociology, political
science, as well as the humanities,
made significant advances. This
is because democracies alone
robustly satisfy the foundational
principles of social sciences,
namely, allowing for human
errors and the recognition of
others in making choices
for oneself.

ver wonder why social sciences,

including philosophy, flourish
today only in democratic societies? There are many rich countries in the
world; Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia,
for example, but their social sciences are
in a miserable condition. Interestingly,
there has been a resurgence of social
sciences with the return of democracy in
many Latin American nations, such as
Mexico, Chile, and even Colombia. Now
that Cuba is opening up somewhat, let
us see, if in the years to come, it becomes
a significant contributor to this sphere
of knowledge.
What makes this issue even more interesting is that many of these rich and
powerful, but non-democratic states, have
indeed made great strides in the exact
sciences. China and Russia can match
the advances in electronics, physics,
medicine, transportation, and in a whole
lot of other associated areas, with the
best worldwide. Bring in sociology, political science, economics, even history,
and these countries falter and fail to
make the grade. This is not an overt
defence of these disciplines; maybe
some societies are happier without them
and do not even notice their absence.
Nevertheless, it is hard to evade the
conclusion that it is only in democracies that social sciences are pursued
actively. The question then is: Why is
there such an elective affinity between the two?
Neither Western Nor Eurocentric

I am grateful to Andre Beteille and to Deepak

Mehta for their comments on this paper.
Dipankar Gupta (dipankargupta@hotmail.
com) teaches at the Shiv Nadar University,
Greater Noida.
Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

JANUARY 23, 2016

Alongside, we must also consider the

charge that social sciences are Westernoriented and, therefore, their categories
make little sense in Asian and African
societies. The concepts they employ, the
questions they raise, are of little meaning
to places like India, for instance. If this
were true, then to argue, as we just did,
vol lI no 4

that democracies alone have developed

social sciences could be masking a more
superficial prejudice. Democracy now
becomes just a cover for modern social
sciences to appear cultureneutral. In
actual fact, however, they are only addressing purely European or American cultural and historical concerns. It is this
line of thinking that has prompted
many non-Western critics of social sciences to delve into, and promote instead,
indigenous categories. In their view, a
corrective of this sort would not only be
more authentic but would also expose
the universalistic pretensions of the
social sciences.
Before we give in to this conclusion, we must remember that the social
sciences are a recent development even
in Europe and America. The themes,
theories and terminologies they work
with are very removed from their
earlier indigenous, or traditional, forms
of thought. When these knowledge
systems first came about, they were
novel in those parts of the world as
well. They drew none of their analytical powers from the intellectual conditions of medieval, or even, late
medieval, Europe.
Take, for example, the concept of secularism. Secularism is not a term that
can be found, in its current form, in traditional Europe. The secularism of
today came to life well after absolutism
was dead and buried in that continent. This term does not simply mean
the separation of church from state, as
is popularly understood, but actually
stands for a system where an individual
is free to decide what is true. Even after
the church was spectacularly undermined by Henry VIII of England, secularism did not come to Britain. The Pope
had been humiliated by the state, surely
that should have been the beginning of
secularism?
But, no!
Secularism had to wait for a few
more centuries before it could really
make its entry on the world stage. If at
one time, knowledge came from
the church and nobody dared challenge that source, now it was the state
31

PERSPECTIVES

that took over and did just about the

same. Those who asked questions, just
questions, nowhere near offering alternative points of view, were severely
persecuted and prosecuted by absolutist rulers. The famous astronomer,
Tycho Brahe, advised fellow scientists
to keep their instruments light as
they may have to flee at a moments
notice (Koestler 1990: 29097). There
was no telling when their patron, the
monarch, would be upset by them.
Interestingly, some of the medieval
astronomers actually masqueraded as
astrologers to win the favours of the
rulers under whom they served.
Therefore, when some Indian scholars
argue that secularism is a Western term
what they forget is that it appeared very
late even in Europe. It truly came into its
own when beliefs, knowledge, information and viewpoints were freed from a
superior agencys reach and did not need
its sanction. It was not enough for truth
to shift headquarters from the priests pulpit to the princes chamber. The transition from: this is true because the church
or the king says so to this is true for me
because I believe it to be true took a
long time to surface. It is only after this
became, more or less, standard practice,
that we might begin to accept the arrival
of secularism and, with that, of modernity too.
As long as knowledge was a lump of
beliefs that was handed down from
above, whether church or state, secularism was out of the question. It had to
wait in the wings till the conditions were
right for the individual to ask the all
important question: Before I believe
what you say, prove it to me (Mannheim 1936: 31). While all sciences
need secularism to thrive, the need is
the greatest in the social sciences because here we are studying people in
action. Their lives do not remain static
primarily because the contexts they live
in differ vastly across the globe and in
history. Regardless of time and place,
water always quenches thirst, rainbow
always arcs the sky and burning
fire always brings both smoke and light.
None of these require democracy to appear, nor have they changed in any way
after its arrival.
32

Other and Error Seeking

In the social sciences the situation is vastly
different. Before democracy, the context
for the pursuit of social sciences just did
not exist. Nor were certain kinds of data,
that are the staple items in modern sociology, political science, economics, and
so on, even available, or considered to be
valid. Social sciences were born when a
new context came to the surface and
when a new set of facts became relevant
for the first time. It is this twin thrust
that together propelled the growth and
advance of the social sciences.
In terms of context, it is now relevant,
no, essential, to frame observations with
the understanding that what others
do impacts on the self, even defines
it. This aspect, which is so central today,
did not actually exist with the same kind
of valency and weight in the past. In earlier times you had communities, groups,
solidarities, tribes, castes, affines and
blood relatives, living, for the most part,
within their confines, but we had no
society. For that to emerge, it was necessary that wide-ranging interactions happen across these primordial frontiers, on
a regular and institutionalised basis. As
this took a long time coming, it stands to
reason that social sciences, that expressly
studies such societies, too arrived only
recently in human history.
When there is society people need to
connect outside their immediate sphere
of influence where familiarity reigns on
the basis of rules that are inward-looking.
As Burckhardt, the 19th century Swiss
scholar of the Renaissance noted, the
adage: Parma rejoices because Cassius
sleeps within its walls (Burckhardt
1990: 107) rang true in medieval Europe
as well. With the coming of society, it is
no longer possible to remain tightly
bound within pre-existing groups and
categories. From now on, the awareness
of the other becomes pivotal to the
constitution of even ones self.
In a democracy, the salience of this
context becomes all the more significant
in everyday, routine behaviour. No policy
or economic initiative can now take
place without considering a multiplicity
of interests, even those originating from
less privileged quarters. This is why it
makes eminent sense to characterise

Britains 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act

as a major step in the establishment of
democracy. From now on labour was no
longer confined to parish-run poor houses,
but could move freely in search of jobs.
In days when there was no society,
the past and the present mingled unproblematically, only to be disturbed in
times of war. This explains why historians often argue that though India saw
many invasions, the basic structure of
society remained the same. Let us not
forget, not just wars, there were revolts
too; but even these revolts did not make a
substantial difference to routine lives,
and the past soon re-established itself. If
there was any awareness of the other it
was one of hostility and distancenot
one where it was necessary to make
common ground and realise freshly
negotiated relations. If truth be told, this
practice does not come easy and must be
ingrained by a democracy that is ever
vigilant and constantly on guard, lest
we fail.
So much for context, let us now turn
to how democracy brought to surface a
new, grand fact. From now on we must
accept human beings as rational goal
seeking actors, who are liable to
make errors (Parsons 1959: 46). This
became possible only when democracy
set in place universal laws which compelled everybody to accept the general
rules of interaction, leaving actual choices
open. Therefore, an error which does
not violate the universal law, is acceptable, even encouraged, for that is what
allows for innovation and enterprise in
all fields.
Innovations outside the context of
universal rules are more like adventurism and cannot be properly integrated
within modern societies. Those who are
intrepid enough to break the norms and
bonds that conventions impose are the
only people capable of such daring performances. It is only when adventurism
is normalised does innovation come into
being and for this to happen it is essential to have universal rules in place. It
is only after this universality sets the
outer limits of what cannot be done that
a new world opens up. Now we are faced
with a number of choices but we are
liable to make a number of errors too. This

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is a welcome price to pay; it is only when

one is unafraid of making errors, do innovative things happen.
The best example of this is in sport. It
is hardly a coincidence that sports came
into our world only with democracy. In
tradition, people played games, frolicked, had fun, but did not engage in
sports. The transition from games to
sports came with the establishment of
universal rules. These were known to
everybody in advance, including the
spectators, and applied equally, to all
players, regardless of birth and social
station. This, in a microcosm, is what
democracy does across social fields on a
much wider scale. The referee blows the
whistle not when a player commits an
error and, say, fails to kick the ball into
an open net, but when the striker fouls
and trips the goalkeeper.
What does this imply? The answer is
clear but not always appreciated. As
individual errors are not penalised as
deviant behaviour, there is always scope
both for improvement and for innovation. As long as the universal law is not
violated, all errors that respect its
boundaries are actually welcome. Who
knows how many errors Michael Jordan made before he perfected his art of
leaping in stages? Or, take Mohammed
Ali: his famous rope-a dope tactic came
out of his admission of the errors he
committed against younger and stronger
boxers in the past.
It can well be the case that actors
make an error, in their own estimate, in
the selection of ends too. It is only when
errors find structural acceptance that
they can often evolve to bigger things
that the world had hitherto no inkling
of. This, in turn, forces us to accept that
there are many ways towards attaining
certain ends, provided they are allowed
for by the universal rules in place. Think
of sports again and any confusion on
this question should disappear.
With democracy, therefore, it is not as
if there is just one ordained way to doing
things and that everybody must take just
that one route. Obviously, some of the
ends and routes chosen to attain them
will be in error, and that is the name of
the game. Now there are different ways
of raising children, leading a married

life, choosing jobs and professions, making friends, and the list goes on. In the
past, these choices did not exist; in fact,
one did not even have friendsonly
relations. Notice closely the intimate
connection between allowing for errors,
even error seeking, and the awareness
of others as aspects of the self.
Errors do not affect the pure sciences
the way they do the social sciences. In a
laboratory, an error can be sequestered
and even hushed up, but this phenomenon would fall in the realm of the sociology of science. The facts as seen in a
test tube or petri-dish, or particle accelerator, or whatever, are not in error; it is
another matter that an analyst might
make mistakes in reading them. In the
social sciences, however, errors constitute the empirical material itself, and
that makes all the difference. It is, therefore, in this thicket of trial and error
that human beings commit that social
scientists find their facts. Making a mistake may be unfortunate from a personal point of view, but from a disciplinary
perspective of the social sciences mistakes are absolutely fundamental raw
material. It is because these errors and
their fallouts happen often enough that
social scientists get both their database
and their concepts.
Democracy then is the necessary condition for the emergence of social sciences,
for it is only now that acceptance of
errors within universal rules becomes
unexceptional. Even when some find it
difficult to break with traditional prejudices, they are constrained in public life
to keep their primordial instincts on
hold. This begins, first and foremost, from
the admission that if we can make errors
ourselves and choose another route, then
such opportunities should be available
to others as well. Differences do not
just lie with other people; they often lie
within us too. This immediately reveals
the distance the present has moved
from the past; we can now, for the first
time, understand the gravitas behind the
term tradition.

Economic & Political Weekly

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JANUARY 23, 2016

Economics
Imagine yourself as an economist in a
pre-democratic society. You would hardly
know what to study and what concepts

to use. For all practical purposes, the market was known and buyers and sellers of
commodities and services were prefixed and tagged from the start. Medieval karkhanas produced for a defined
category of buyers and for this, skills
were certainly needed, but not enterprise.
It is only after we acknowledge that
others contribute to the economy that
we can even conceive of something like
the gross domestic product (GDP). In
fact, it took a while for this fact to toil its
way to prominence. Though it was being
talked about from the early decades of
the last century, it was only after World
War II that economists agreed on how to
standardise and measure it. GDP is not
out there in the real world, it is an abstract idea whose worth became noticeable only with the awareness of others
in the economy (Coyle 2014: 47).
Nor was there really an option earlier
to make an economic error within the
system. It is for this reason the phenomenon of risk taking did not arise
either, because buying and selling was
either an outcome of custom or of patronage. There was no hidden hand, no
market disequilibrium, no errors of judgment that led to economic swings and
bankruptcy. If people managed to fall on
bad times from a position of wealth and
privilege there were just about two routes
open: finance a losing war or get bested
in a game of dice. Conversely, win a war
and win a fortune and win yourself a
position at the top of the hierarchical
pecking order.
As an economist again, where is the
room to look at matters like entrepreneurial skill for that implies taking calculated risks? In the past, neither was
land easily alienable, nor labour free to
move around (recall the 1834 Poor Law
Amendment Act), and status was defined from the start. If we take them
together, it is easy to realise why economics as a scholarly discipline, with its
challenges and puzzles, had no place
in pre-democratic times.
The term hidden hand is now used
freely, but Adam Smith employed it only
thrice. Though he had coined the term
he did not run riot with it for the time
was not yet right for its robust application. By the early decades of the 20th
33

PERSPECTIVES

century, however, this phrase was hard

to miss. It was used all the time because
it sat well with an entrenched democracy
and, its cognate, a risk taking economy. Not just that; when we think of
the hidden hand today we find that
these words have gained a symbolic
aura that spills well outside the disciplinary margins of economics.
As errors take place in a context where
multiple interests interact, as they should
in any true society, a democracy must
eventually conduct its economy with this
sensitivity. Therefore, while the market
tells us how the hidden hand operates,
occasionally the exposed hand of the
state is necessary to keep social equilibrium in place. If the economy rights
itself again, it is simply because the basic
principles that govern economic transactions still remain firm. If the government were to break this code and give in
to the interests of one class or the other,
then it will take that much longer for a
hurt economy to heal. In essence, this is
also what Goran Therborn argues, but
from a Marxist perspective (1978: 242
43). This again reveals, in bold, the salience of the two all important features of
democracy, viz, awareness of others, the
cross cutting of interests, and the admissibility of errors.
Even while calculating the marginal
utility of any factor of production, there
is scope for errors because every constituent of the phenomena in question is
not homogeneous. Change the composition of the factors and new numbers come
up, but who makes that all important
decision on the mix of land, labour, capital
and enterprise? The error-prone business
person! That sometimes this individual
succeeds is because the system allows
for errors in its governing principle.
Economics, as a discipline, would not
have a leg to stand on if it were not for
the basic principle that people make
mistakes in judging how others will behave. Flip the coin and we can also find
several instances when entrepreneurs
made the right call and won. Sometimes
there will be miscalculations, sometimes,
spot-on decisions, but at every turn there
is a risk of making an error at the individual level. This feature is present at
even the highest echelon of the economic
34

establishment in a democracy. Is this the

right time for quantitative easing? Should
the exchange rate be pegged at a certain
level? Should that be against all major
currencies, or just a few? Course corrections occur on all such decisions and sometimes things may go completely wrong.
In a totalitarian economy, unlike a
democratic one, the scope for such instances is severely restricted because
most things are administered. That being the case, decisions are taken from
above and we have a replay of the dominance of objective knowledge. Once
again, this leaves the individual with
little chance of contemplating an economic option with the assertion: prove
it to me. When was the last time you
have ever heard of a good economist
coming out of dictatorial and nondemocratic society? There are a few you
could name, but all of them tried hard to
figure out if there was any scope of reconciling a free market within a totalitarian economy.
Political Science
The situation with Political Science is all
too obvious. Democracy demands that
there be universal franchise where
everybody votes. That this took some
time to evolve does not take away from
the fact that authority comes only with
popular mandate, freely exercised.
Political Science, as we understand it,
would lose its entire raison dtre if
the first categorical distinction between
power and authority were not to be
made. Look closely, for it is here that the

over whelming sense of the other manifests itself. Power can be exercised without a true society coming into being;
alien rulers and invaders can issue diktats that force people to do their bidding.
There have been countless studies to
suggest that in medieval and premodern
times, the source of power was a distant
monarch whose rule was exercised by
local satraps. For this arrangement to be
realised it was not required for rulers to
be aware of other people, just keeping
track of hostile potentates was enough.
Once we make the transition from
studying power, or even influence, to
examining the roots of authority, we are
face to face with society where other
people count (Weber 1946). For power to
become authority, it is necessary that it
be acknowledged as legitimate even by
those who may not have voted for the
party, or parties, that head the current
government. Democracy not only accepts the multiplicity of interests in society, it also considers this fact to constitute
its necessary condition. Yet, on all occasions, conflicting views and ends must
be expressed within the framework of
free and fair elections. This is important, for no matter which party wields
authority, it does so, not in the name of
God, or King, but People. In order to succeed, any authority seeker must balance
the conflicting interests of the agriculturists, industrial labourers, the white
collar class, and so on.
The list is actually very long, for almost all of these fractions have subfractions, which, in their totality, compel

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PERSPECTIVES

those in politics to pay attention to others. Botch that up, make mistakes with
these numbers, then you are done for
now and can, at best, live to fight another
day. This brings us directly to the issue
of error admissibility in democracies.
This feature is writ large in the very nature of popular elections. Regardless of
how charismatic a leader may have appeared in the past rounds at the polls,
the future of such people is never certain.
In a democracy those in authority can
never take their elevation for granted.
As voters can change their minds, and
are even encouraged to do so (error correction), you can be on the saddle one
day, and unseated the next. Once again,
for political science, it is imperative
that errors be admissible within the system so that people can make and unmake mistakes, but within a bounded set
of rules. Without democracy, no choices,
no elections, no recanting and no anti-incumbency factor, either. In fact, if one is
not allowed to make mistakes and then
correct them subsequently, elections
would be a total farcesomething of
the kind that happens in North Korea, or
in monarchies and theocratic societies.
Let us take a further step. Why is it
that only in democracies the study of
the constitution is so absorbing and that
there are so many experts who devote
their lifes work to this subject? The
answer, very simply, is because these
documents are, at the very least, open
to amendments. This is a clear admission that even hallowed founding figures can make mistakes, and big ones at
that. They too can commit errors,
hence the amendments. These changes
too are not final and can be subjected to
further rethinking. If the constitution
were written in stone, like the tablet of
Moses, then there would be only worship and no political science. This is
why constitutions make it a point to
leave enough room, and procedural
directions, for amendments. Obviously,
the authors of these texts realise that
they too are prone to committing errors, and these might well be spotted by
later generations.
While all democratic constitutions allow for amendments, in no case will they
tolerate a dilution of their foundational

principles. Democracies often present

these binding constraints under different rubrics. If in the United States (US)
they are called inalienable rights, in
India they are clubbed as basic structure of the constitution. But, no matter
what the term, it is almost certain that
such restrictions will always be there. It
is, therefore, within these constraints
that amendments are allowed, but in
every case, after considerable discussions at a number of levels. As the constitution lays down the basis of universal
laws, care must be taken that any
amendment to it does not affect the
sanctity of its being.

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Sociology
Let us now turn to sociology. This disciplines primary objective is to refract
phenomena through classes, categories,
genders, occupational groups, and so
on. If we are discussing marriage, then
we must look at it in terms of its actual
practice by refracting it through categories, such as those mentioned above.
Depending upon the theoretical point
that is being pursued, different layers
will become important: sometimes caste,
at other times class, or even religion,
occupation, and so on. This demands an
awareness of others in the first place,
or else such an exercise in refraction could never be conducted.
It is on account of refraction, of the
kind just mentioned, that sociology is
able to resist popular conceptions of
reality, more specifically, the aura of
essentialism (Berger and Luckmann
1967). If sociology were not to conduct
such exercises, fixity in form and presentation would have characterised all
social phenomena, rendering them unworkable as scientific variables. Further,
essentialisms allow biases of all sorts to
thrive unchecked, which is why the first
enemy of sociology is everyday, lay theorising. Consequently, sociology is a science that self-consciously digs deep
into the comparative method (Beteille
2002: 102). In doing so, it is not just variations in space, but those over time, too,
that become relevant for examination. This forces the scholar to be dispassionate and critical, especially towards
what is closest to ones heart.

Take away this method from sociology and we will immediately be grounded by such stark relativism that it
would be impossible to converse across
contexts. It is through comparative studies
we get to the understanding of the general features of a social phenomenon,
whether religion, marriage or social preference. Alongside a new standard has
also come in place and that is the awareness of how context makes for the difference in the manifestation of social facts.
This is why it is not difficult either to
demonstrate sociologys link with democracy. As can be easily surmised, it is in
the awareness of others, the context,
that this discipline most ostensibly defines itself. In this case, it is not the realm
of authority, or wealth creation, that is uppermost, but how people interact within
and across cultural borders and economic boundaries. It is this attribute of
deliberate refraction that allowed sociology to be a pacesetter in a number of
areas, most notably, the study of social
mobility. Briefly put, sociology is a subject
where relations between people matter
because the whole is, very explicitly,
greater than the sum total of its parts.
However, if we are not living in a
democracy, where is the freedom to
refract and ask those questions most relevant to the discipline? In a monarchical, dictatorial or theocratic dispensation, those in power would wonder why
such an exercise was being carried
out in the first place. Without the freedom that democracy allows, any enquiry
along these lines runs the risk of being
labelled as subversive. A democracy, on
the other hand, finds nourishment from
such investigations. This is because all
aspirants to authority must compete
against one another in trying to gauge
how best to represent multiple interest
groups. A misreading can happen here.
Sociology might create the impression
that it is activist in orientation, or that
it is prompted by policymakers and their
immediate interests. Nothing could be
more incorrect. At the same time, it is
also true that those in democratic political circles can profit from sociology.
They can learn about the tensions inherent in a social setting and also apply the
results of refraction that sociologists
35

PERSPECTIVES

areso adept at performing.Ifpolicymakerswant a complete pictureof the

nature of the problem they are dealing
with, they can turn to sociology.If, on
the other hand,sociologists are tempted
to work at the behest of activists,they
would taint the refracted datato suit
non-academic interests.
Whether or not activists are attra
cted to sociology, this discipline is
bestequippedtohandlethe all-important questionregardingthe direction of
change.Thisissue alwayssucceeds
ingeneratingred-hotcontestationson
all sides and that,more often than not,
obscures the view. It is here thatsocio
logy can help in plotting out the options
available such thatwemove steadily
towards being a more inclusivesociety.
In operational terms, this translates into
greater participation, and greater tolerance of differences and errors.
At the very heart of sociology, it may
be recalled, nests theproposition that
peoplemake errors,but alsotry to correct them, in seeking goals through
means not predetermined, as best seen
in a democracy.This is especially significant when we examine the phenomenon

of social change which, paradoxical as it

may sound, is a perpetual condition of
modern times. Consequently, choosing
between, or adjusting to, or even resisting alternatives is now a quotidian, commonplace sociological reality. This is why
sociology is replete with examinations of
trial, error and correction when studying
social change which, as we have just
mentioned, is a pre-eminent aspect of
modern life, especially in a democracy.

tothedemocratic context.It is this

thatmakes it possible for us to accept
flaws of the past and how earlier epochs
have influenced social relations in the
present.Without this, history would be
a colourlesschronicle, or acolourful
hagio
graphyin both cases academically useless.
Philosophy, likewise, went through a
tremendous transition with the coming
of democracy. Even till the late 19th century, the major problem thatconcerned
History and Philosophy
thinkerslike Immanuel Kant was to figThe point, by now, has been made and ure out what makes the self a self.
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JANUARY 23, 2016 vol lI no 4 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

PERSPECTIVES

It is time now to tie in the various

strands. If we accept that a democracy
signifies a concern for others and allows for errors being committed, then we
are really talking of citizenship. Citizenship is really ethics writ large and it
is this aspect that forms the cornerstone
of the basic statutes of democratic law and
governance. Our constitution and our
penal codes are premised on the acceptance of others as being ethical agents,
ontologically similar to ourselves and
complements of our being.
By the same token, if a citizen commits an error that does not impinge on
the citizenship freedoms of others, then
there is room for self-correction. Law
swings in only when freedom of others is
trampled upon by the wilful activity of
those who seek goals with means that
are contrary to the tenets of citizenship.
Social scientists, however, go further.
They try to strengthen citizenship for
they realise that in doing this they
would also consolidate their respective
disciplines. This is why one reads with
appreciation Jurgen Habermas because

we find in his writings ways of advancing the cause of the public via a congregation of citizens. Or, when John Rawls
advises policymakers to hypothetically
go behind a veil of ignorance and try
to imagine how the worst off could be
best served (1971: 105556; 14245).
Can we say, in fairness, that these are
concerns that are Western? It is true
that scholars in Europe and America may
have first raised such issues; perhaps,
they also worked on them with great
vigour. Yet, when we read their contributions why is it that they make sense
to us? India may be backward, may be
poor, but because we are democratic we
can see the first glimmers of citizenship
and, without consciously willing it, we
want to acquire it in full.
We satisfy this urge by enquiring into
issues such as that of urban and rural
existence, of life in factories and fields,
and how diverse linguistic groups and
castes interact. These investigations are
based on an indefinite range of actions
that are error-prone because they strive
to integrate the self with the other. An
ambitious exercise of this sort would be
impossible if fallibility, at every step,
were not allowed for. It would then be
fair to suggest that our social sciences
are not West-oriented, or Eurocentric,
but are designed to enquire into social
conditions that only democracy can
create. By the same token, it is democracy that allows economics, political
science and sociology to coexist happily and with profit. All of them depend on
the same context, namely, society; and
all of them must accept the grand fact of
errors across all relevant social actions.
It is not surprising then that we, in
India, have several world class sociologists, economists, historians and political scientists in our ranks. This is because we function under conditions, and
with concerns, similar to our counterparts in the west; why, we ask very similar questions too. Now, what is wrong
about that? And why should that be
Eurocentric at all? When the other
becomes so central, and when the
acceptance of errors is routine, then
we are actually talking about citizenship. In other words, the strength and
depth of a democracy can be judged

Economic & Political Weekly

vol lI no 4

we have not been properly introduced.

Regardless of a persons origin or circumstance, the other is always an aspect of the self. Nor can a man any longer look at his wife and children as property; he must now consider them as free
citizens. After Hegel, the self was no
longer alone because the other became
its constant complement. This then set
the framework for debates about what
was correct practice as far as citizenship was concerned. This concern dominates contemporary philosophy even
today. Habermas, for example, believes
that the only real context for todays lifeworld is the public space (1987). Or,
think of Levinas (1998) for whom ethics
was always about the other people.
The self which, in isolation, ruled
Western philosophy from Descartes to
Kant, now has had to make room for the
other. This transformation should not
be read as accommodative, but rather as
constitutive, because philosophy today
clearly admits that there really is no self
without the other.
Not Eurocentric
but Citizen-centric

EPW

JANUARY 23, 2016

from the strength and depth of its social

sciences. Take away democracy and
watch sociology, economics and political
science get wasted as if on barren soil.
Without going into detail on this subject, it is indubitable that democracy and
citizenship are of a piece and you cannot
have one without the other. Perhaps,
autocratic societies can boast of a higher
standard of living for those over whom
they rule. Let us also grant that on some
fronts such societies are richer, stronger
and the health status of their population
is enviable. However, if we are thinking
of freedom of choice, the openness towards errors and the ground level realisation that others impact the self, then
these conditions are available only to
citizens in a democracy. Consequently,
it would be incorrect to characterise
the social sciences as either Western or
Eurocentric. If anything, they should be
seen as citizen-centric, perhaps even
citizentric, disciplines.
[This article was earlier published on the internet in the Global Dialogue, the internet journal
of the International Sociological Association.]

References
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Burckhardt, Jacob (1990): The Civilization of the
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Coyle, Diane (2014): GDP: A Brief but Affectionate
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Habermas, Jurgen (1987): The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, Reason and Rationalization
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Hegel, G W F (1945): The Philosophy of Right,
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Koestler, Arthur (1990): The Sleepwalkers: A History
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Levinas, Emmanuel (1998): Entre-Nous: Thinkingof-the-Other, New York: Columbia University
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