Section 5

Freedom of Religion; Non-Establishment

Clause (1988)
No. 7: - Tawi-Tawi is a predominantly Moslem
province. The Governor, the Vice-Governor,
and members of its Sang-guniang Panlalawigan
are all Moslems. Its budget provides the
Governor with a certain amount as his
discretionary funds. Recently, however, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed a resolution
appropriating P100,000 as a special
discretionary fund of the Governor to be spent
by him in leading a pilgrimage of his
provincemates to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islam's
holiest city.
Philconsa, on constitutional grounds, has filed
suit to nullify the resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan giving the special discretionary
fund to the Governor for the stated purpose.
How would you decide the case? Give your
reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The resolution is unconstitutional First, it
violates art. VI, sec. 29(2) of the Constitution
which prohibits the appropriation of public
money or property, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit or support of any system of
religion, and, second, it contravenes art. VI,
sec, 25(6) which limits the appropriation of
discretionary funds only for public purposes.
The use of discretionary funds for purely
religious purpose is thus unconstitutional, and
the fact that the disbursement is made by
resolution of a local legislative body and not by
Congress does not make it any less offensive to
the Constitution. Above all, the resolution
constitutes a clear violation of the Nonestablishment
Clause (art. III, sec. 5) of the
Constitution.
Freedom of Religion; Convicted Prisoners
(1989)
No. 5: "X" is serving his prison sentence in
Muntinlupa. He belongs to a religious sect that
prohibits the eating of meat. He asked the
Director of Prisons that he be served with
meatless diet. The Director refused and "X"
sued the Director for damages for violating his
religious freedom. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Director of Prison is liable under Article
32 of the Civil Code for violating the religious
freedom of "X". According to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of
O'Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400,
convicted prisoners retain their right to free
exercise of religion. At the same time, lawful
incarceration brings about necessary limitations
of many privileges and rights justified by the
considerations underlying the penal system. In
considering the appropriate balance between
these two factors, reasonableness should be
the test. Accommodation to religious freedom
can be made if it will not involve sacrificing the
interests of security and it will have no impact
on the allocation of the resources of the
penitentiary. In this case, providing "X" with a
meatless diet will not create a security problem
or unduly increase the cost of food being

served to the prisoners. In fact, in the case of O'

Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, it was noted that
the Moslem prisoners were being given a
different meal whenever pork would be served.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The suit should be dismissed. The Free
Exercise Clause of the Constitution is
essentially a restraint on governmental
interference with the right of individuals to
worship as they please. It is not a mandate to
the state to take positive, affirmative action to
enable the individual to enjoy his freedom. It
would have been different had the Director of
Prisons prohibited meatless diets in the penal
institution.
Freedom of Religion; Non-Establishment
Clause (1997)
No. 4: Upon request of a group of overseas
contract workers in Brunei, Rev. Father Juan de
la Cruz, a Roman Catholic priest, was sent to
that country by the President of the Philippines
to minister to their spiritual needs. The travel
expenses, per diems, clothing allowance and
monthly stipend of P5,000 were ordered
charged against the President's discretionary
fund. Upon post audit of the vouchers therefor,
the Commission on Audit refused approval
thereof claiming that the expenditures were in
violation of the Constitution.
Was the Commission on Audit correct in
disallowing the vouchers in question?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Commission on Audit was correct in
disallowing the expenditures. Section 29(2),
Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the
expenditure of public funds for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest. The only exception is
when the priest is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution or government
orphanage or leprosarium. The sending of a
priest to minister to the spiritual needs of
overseas contract workers does not fall within
the scope of any of the exceptions.
Freedom of Religion; Flag Salute (1997)
No. 12: Section 28. Title VI, Chapter 9, of the
Administrative Code of 1987 requires all
educational institutions to observe a simple and
dignified flag ceremony, including the playing or
singing of the Philippine National Anthem,
pursuant to rules to be promulgated by the
Secretary of Education. Culture and Sports,
The refusal of a teacher, student or pupil to
attend or participate in the flag ceremony is a
ground for dismissal after due investigation.
The Secretary of Education Culture and Sports
issued a memorandum implementing said
provision of law. As ordered, the flag ceremony
would be held on Mondays at 7:30 a.m. during
class days. A group of teachers, students and
pupils requested the Secretary that they be
exempted from attending the flag ceremony on
the ground that attendance thereto was against
their religious belief. The Secretary denied the
request. The teachers, students and pupils
concerned went to Court to have the
memorandum circular declared null and void.
Decide the case.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The teachers and the students should be
exempted from the flag ceremony. As held in
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, 251 SCRA 569. to compel
them to participate in the flag ceremony will
violate their freedom of religion. Freedom of
religion cannot be impaired except upon the
showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil which the State has a right to
prevent. The refusal of the teachers and the
students to participate in the flag ceremony
does not pose a clear and present danger.
Freedom of Religion; Limitations (1998)
No XV. - A religious organization has a weekly
television program. The program presents and
propagates its religious, doctrines, and
compares their practices with those of other
religions.
As the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) found as
offensive several episodes of the program
which attacked other religions, the MTRCB
required the organization to submit its tapes for
review prior to airing.
The religious organization brought the case to
court on the ground that the action of the
MTRCB suppresses its freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. Decide. [5%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The religious organization cannot invoke
freedom of speech and freedom of religion as
grounds for refusing to submit the tapes to the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board for review prior to airing. When the
religious organization started presenting its
program over television, it went into the realm
of action. The right to act on one's religious
belief is not absolute and is subject to police
power for the protection of the general welfare.
Hence the tapes may be required to be
reviewed prior to airing.
In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 529, 544, the Supreme Court held:
"We thus reject petitioner's postulate that Its
religious program is per se beyond review by
the respondent Board. Its public broadcast
on TV of its religious program brings it out of
the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears
of children. The Court reiterates the rule that
the exercise of religions freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring
about the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
of some substantive evil which the State is
duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the mere overriding Interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare."
However, the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board cannot ban the tapes on
the ground that they attacked other religions. In
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals,. 259
SCRA 529, 547, the Supreme Court held:
"Even a side glance at Section 3 of PD No.
1986 will reveal that it is not among the
grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
broadcast of petitioner's television program."
Moreover, the broadcasts do not give rise to

a clear and present danger of a substantive

evil. In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court
of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, 549:
"Prior restraint on speech, including the
religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of
a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the reality already on the ground."
Eminent Domain; Non-observance of the
policy of "all or none" (2000)
No VIII. Madlangbayan is the owner of a 500
square meter lot which was the birthplace of the
founder of a religious sect who admittedly
played an important role in Philippine history
and culture. The National Historical
Commission (NHC) passed a resolution
declaring it a national landmark and on its
recommendation the lot was subjected to
expropriation proceedings. This was opposed
by Madlangbayan on the following grounds: a)
that the lot is not a vast tract; b) that those to be
benefited by the expropriation would only be the
members of the religious sect of its founder,
and c) that the NHC has not initiated the
expropriation of birthplaces of other more
deserving historical personalities. Resolve the
opposition raised by Madlangbayan. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The arguments of Madlangbayan are not
meritorious. According to Manosca v. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996), the power of
eminent domain is not confined to expropriation
of vast tracts of the land. The expropriation of
the lot to preserve it as the birthplace of the
founder of the religious sect because of his role
in Philippine history and culture is for a public
purpose, because public use is no longer
restricted to the traditional concept. The fact
that the expropriation will benefit the members
of the religious sect is merely incidental. The
fact that other birthplaces have not been
expropriated is likewise not a valid basis for
opposing the expropriation. As held in J.M.
Tuason and Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970), the
expropriating authority is not required to adhere
to the policy of "all or none".
Freedom of Religion; Flag Salute (2003)
No III - Children who are members of a religious
sect have been expelled from their respective
public schools for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing by a band or
singing the national anthem, saluting the
Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
The students and their parents assail the
expulsion on the ground that the school
authorities have acted in violation of their right
to free public education, freedom of speech,
and religious freedom and worship. Decide the
case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The students cannot be expelled from school.
As held in Ebralinag v. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. 219 SCRA
256 [1993], to compel students to take part in
the flag ceremony when it is against their

religious beliefs will violate their religious

freedom. Their expulsion also violates the duty
of the State under Article XIV, Section 1 of the
Constitution to protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education and make such
education accessible to all.

Section 6
Right to Travel; Order of Arrest (1991)
No. 6: Mr. Esteban Krony, a Filipino citizen, is
arrested for the crime of smuggling. He posts
bail for his release. Subsequently, he jumps bail
and is about to leave the country when the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) cancels
his passport. He sues the DFA, claiming
violation of his freedom to travel, citing the new
provision in the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: "Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law. Decide the case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The case should be dismissed. Any person
under an order of arrest is under restraint and
therefore he can not claim the right to travel. If
he is admitted to bail his freedom of movement
is confined within the country. Therefore, if he
subsequently jumps bail, he cannot demand
passport which in effect will facilitate his escape
from the country; he is in fact liable to be
arrested anytime. Indeed, the right to travel
under the Constitution presupposes that the
individual is under no restraint such as that
which would follow from the fact that one has a
pending criminal case and has been placed
under arrest.
Liberty of Abode; Temporary (1996)
No 2: The military commander-in charge of the
operation against rebel groups directed the
inhabitants of the island which would be the
target of attack by government forces to
evacuate the area and offered the residents
temporary military hamlet.
Can the military commander force the residents
to transfer their places of abode without a court
order? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the military commander cannot compel the
residents to transfer their places of abode
without a court order. Under Section 6, Article
III of the Constitution, a lawful order of the court
is required before the liberty of abode and of
changing the same can be impaired.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
Yes, the military commander can compel the
residents to transfer their places of abode
without a court order. If there is no reasonable
time to get a court order and the change of
abode is merely temporary, because of the
exigency, this exercise of police power may be
justified.
Liberty of Abode; Limitations (1998)
No VIII - Juan Casanova contracted Hansen's
disease (leprosy) with open lesions. A law
requires that lepers be isolated upon petition of

the City Health Officer. The wife of Juan

Casanova wrote a letter to the City Health
Officer to have her formerly philandering
husband confined in some isolated leprosarium.
Juan Casanova challenged the constitutionality
of the law as violating his liberty of abode. Will
the suit prosper? [5%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. Section 6, Article III
of the Constitution provides:
"The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court."
The liberty of abode is subject to the police
power of the State. Requiring the segregation of
lepers is a valid exercise of police power. In
Lorenzo us. Director of Health. 50 Phil 595,
598, the Supreme Court held:
"Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
leprosy is commonly believed to be an
infectious disease tending to cause one
afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded
from society, and that compulsory
segregation of lepers as a means of
preventing the spread of the disease is
supported by high scientific authority."

Section 8
Right to Assembly; Public Teachers (2000)
No XII - Public school teachers staged for days
mass actions at the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports to press for the immediate
grant of their demand for additional pay. The
DECS Secretary issued to them a notice of the
illegality of their unauthorized action, ordered
them to immediately return to work, and warned
them of imposable sanctions. They ignored this
and continued with their mass action. The
DECS Secretary issued orders for their
preventive suspension without pay and charged
the teachers with gross misconduct and gross
neglect of duty for unauthorized abandonment
of teaching posts and absences without leave.
a) Are employees in the public sector allowed
to form unions? To strike? Why? (3%)
b) The teachers claim that their right to
peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances has
been curtailed. Are they correct? Why?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Section 8, Article III of the Constitution allows
employees in the public sector to form unions.
However, they cannot go on strike. As
explained in Social Security System Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals. 175 SCRA 686
[1989], the terms and conditions of their
employment are fixed by law. Employees in
the public sector cannot strike to secure
concessions from their employer.
b. The teachers cannot claim that their right to
peaceably assemble and petition for the
redress of grievances has been curtailed.
According to Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.
276 SCRA 619 (1997), they can exercise this
right without stoppage of classes.