REYES VS BELISARIO & MALICDEM

FACTS: deputy administrators belisario and malicdem,

officers of the local water utilities administration, filed with
the office of the ombudsman a criminal complaint for the
violation of anti-corrupt and graft practices act against LWUA
administrator reyes. 13 days after filing belisario, et al were
reassigned to the office of the administrator. The following
day, oic administrator issued a directive to bar the
respondents from using the rooms and facilities the occupied
earlier. Reyes issued an office order directing belisario et al to
vacate offices and remove their belongings and transfer to
their new office. Espinas, LWUA corporate legal counsel
sought the opinion of CSC regarding regularity of the
reassignments. In its legal opinion, it ruled that the
reassignments were not in order, tainted with bad faith and
constituted constructive dismissal. Belisario et al, filed an
administrative complaint with the ombudsman for oppression
and harassment against reyes and OICs. Ombudsman ruled
in favor of reyes ruling that csc legal opinion is not final and
for lack of evidence of force and intimidation. Meanwhile, the
earlier legal opinion was affirmed in its CSC en banc
resolution. Belisario filed motion for recon attaching a copy of
the csc resolution but was denied. Appeal to ca for grave
abuse of discretion which reversed ombudsman decision.
Reyes filed review on certiorari .
Issue:
Held: CSC had the authority to declare the reassignments
invalid but had no authority to penalize the petitioner for his
acts. CSC has primary jurisdiction over the issue of the
reassignments validity, declaring that it can hardly arrogate
unto itself the task of resolving the said issue. This is a
correct reading of the law as the CSC is the central personnel
agency of the government whose powers extend to all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
An alternative course of action for the Ombudsman to
ensure that his decision would have legal and factual bases
and would not be tainted with arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion, would have been to undertake its own
examination of these reassignments from the perspective of
harassment and oppression, and to make its own findings on

the validity of the petitioners actions. It should have

explained in clear terms and on the basis of substantial
evidence on record why no harassment or oppression
attended the reassigments and their implementation.
Unfortunately,
no
such
determination
was
ever
made. Instead, the Office of the Ombudsman simply relied
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
that it claimed the petitioner enjoyed, and from this premise,
ruled that no harassment or oppression transpired in the
absence of force or intimidation that attended the
implementation of the reassignments.
An administrative decision, in order to be valid, should have,
among others, "something to support itself." It must
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence adequate and acceptable enough for a
reasonable mind to justify a conclusion or support a decision,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
[ G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989 ]
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governorelect and assume office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the
allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the
Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was
Philippines at the time of his election.

citizen

of

the

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides

that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the

Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for

public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officers entire
tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but was disqualified by the Court twice
due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his
lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee
was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the
votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void;
that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the
most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor
should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy
due to Frivaldos ineligibility.
Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure
his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and
to hold the Office?

2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to

his eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition
considering that said petition is not a pre-proclamation case,
an election protest or a quo warranto case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1)
direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by
repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state
a particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year
residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least 35 years old on election day).Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on
the very day the term of his
office began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a
VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. In
other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is
to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in
the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else. In
fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime
issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of
filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the
petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his
application.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently

reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of

the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power
to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a
proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the
Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Lee is just a second placer. The rule is: the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic
and has no merit.
Bautista vs. Salonga
Facts:
- August 27, 1987: President Cory Aquino appointed
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as permanent Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
- December 22, 1988: Bautista took her oath of office to Chief
Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.
- January 9, 1989: The Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for
her presence along with several documents at the office of
CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's
review.
- Bautista filed a petition with the Supreme Court.
- While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino
appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in
his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to
surrender her post.
- Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of
the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be
at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista
shall be subsequently removed as well.
Issues:

WON
the
President's
appointment
is
considered
constitutional.
WON or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
WON or not President should extend her appointment on
January 14, 1989.
Held:Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or
boards. The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President,
vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint
Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision
Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is
authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA,
several government officials. The position of Chairman of
CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment
of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and
finalized even without the review or participation of CoA.
Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore,
was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as

the appointment was finalized

expressly stated in her oath.

upon

her

acceptance,

Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A

is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin.
The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of
the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they
must have a term of office.
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the
lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by
the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance
thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office
before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She
certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause
and with her right to due process properly safeguarded.
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the
rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case to
this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting
Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights (pending
decision in this case) instead of appointing another
permanent Chairman. The latter course would have added
only more legal difficulties to an already difficult situation.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly
appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and
the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or
terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is
made permanent.
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Reynaldo
Tuanda,
etc.,
vs
The
Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan
Estrellanes
Facts:

Honorable
and Delia

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying
petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan
were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative
and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG
Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on
February 16 and 17, 1989.
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the
President for review and recall of said designations. This was
denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral
representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a
petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for
recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed.
The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City
accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their
official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to
Estrellanes and Binaohan.
Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension
of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question
exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void
ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the
provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a
determination first of the number of sectors in the
city/municipality to warrant representation.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution
saying that the private respondents have rendered such
services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of
regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were
entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC
later declare the appointments null and void, they would still
be given salaries because of the period they acted as
representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution

in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it
was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their
arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and
the others to submit a written show cause why they should
not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear
in court today for the arraignment.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the
following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension
of the proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would
entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two
alternative theories that private respondents are de jure
and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due
process.
Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as
sectoral representatives.
Held:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential
elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we
find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769,
constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension
of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal
case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the

facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and
the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of
the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged
partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents'
salaries
and
per
diems
as
sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely
to resolve whether or not the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in
accordance with law.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are
nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual
services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court
and as borne out by the records, from the start, private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have
been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition
filed with the Office of the President copies of which were
received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely
eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence,
private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered
services as sectoral representatives has not been
established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's
thesis that even in the event that private respondents'
designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be
considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation
for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the
following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by
the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in
good faith.
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.
FLORES V DRILON

FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at
Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of
its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (RichardGordon)
shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription
against appointment or
designation
of
elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to
the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an
electiveofficial to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art.
IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed
to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems,allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No
electiveofficial shall
be
eligible
for appointment or

designation in any capacity to any public office or position

during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned
or
controlled corporations or
their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This
is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government, and
thus
neglect
his
constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need ofappointment. The phrase shall be
appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor
of
Olongapo
City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example,
an electiveofficial who may be appointed to a cabinet post,
may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet
position
if
specifically
authorized
by
law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President
the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power
of
choice
is
the
heart
of
the
power
to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at
the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it
may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications

of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e.,

he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an
abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may
however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit forappointment. Consequently, as long as he is
an
incumbent,
an
elective official remains
ineligible
for appointment to
another
public
office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible
forappointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance
with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said
provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its
operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as
chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also

contend
that
Congress
encroaches
upon
the
discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the
constitutional
prescription
against
appointment
or
designation of elective officialsto other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public
officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with
a public office that is a full time job to let them function
without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority
which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the
first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall
assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the
appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no
power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise
discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI) vs Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive
Secretary) et al.
Facts:

The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of

1960 (RA No. 3019)

Every public officer within 30 days after its approval

or after his assumption of office and within the month of
January of every year thereafter, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the
head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year.

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical

submission within the month of January of every other year
thereafter of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities
(SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable

search and seizure construed together with the prohibition

against self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:

Acceptance of public position = voluntary

assumption of obligation

Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of

insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and clean
public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to
the due process clause

Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1.
An oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process
and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with
the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
Ruling: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
1.
Presumption of validity

Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a

reasonable requirement for employment so a public officer can
make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of
office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the
presumption of validity.

If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the

person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider. (Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila)
1.
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the
Due Process Clause

inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to

prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society (Justice Malcolm)

The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and

things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going
beyond curtailment of rights)

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension

of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public
or private life can invoke the protection of due process.

It has been held that due process may be relied upon by

public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited
sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due
process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of
his liberty.

Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable

as long as due process is observed.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS.

Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to

ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with
its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and
avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement
as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years
after having done so upon assuming officeThere was
therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.
1.
Right to privacy

Right to be let alone

It cannot be said that the challenged statutory

provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not
to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is
bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that
in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his
assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of
personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a
private sphere.
1.
Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search

and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion.
1.
Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to

protect a mans conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in
fleeing from justice.

1.

Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom
of the action taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute
invalid.