Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083,
July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined
the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance
the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom
of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs

Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its
best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be
necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to
contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of
his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged
against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes
as
continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not
be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the
rules of procedure for environmental cases.
20 days Temporary restraining order

Carino v. Insular Government

7 Phil 132 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Ancestral Domain Ancestral Land Claim
FACTS:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because
the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held
the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding
cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him
but process only established possessory title
Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
operation
ISSUE:

W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD:
YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For
cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or
his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property
as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary
proof.

CRUZ V. NCIP
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

DENR et al VS. YAP et al

FACTS:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section
3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondentsclaimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to
judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that,
PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to
the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought
reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this
Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE:

The main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.
HELD:
Petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may
be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act
or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa
were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do
so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or

disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or
implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is
a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled
by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into
its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does
not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into
other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent,
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected

Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Secretary Angelo Reyes

Summary:
The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines ruled that a service contract for oil
exploration, development, and production issued by the government of the Philippines in the
protected area of the Tanon Strait was unconstitutional.
FACTS:
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX
to conduct oil exploration in the Tanon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and
drilled one exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine
mammals in the Tanon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the
marine mammals.
The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization
representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing
communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007,
shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the
Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The
Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the
case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that
mootness is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public
interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated,
the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular service
contract had been terminated. Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down
to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the
case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic
laws. Id., p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and
juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence
moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. Id., p. 16-17.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction,
the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the
1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by
the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the
Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources
in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be
performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that
JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was
unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and
utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine
Congress. Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tanon Strait, the Court
declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken
as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Loney vs. PeopleG.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres.and CEO,
Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been
storing tailings (mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of
the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed
out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged
petitioners in the MTC of Boac ,Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of
P.D. No. 1067 or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution
Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property. In the Consolidated Order of MTC,
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order quashing the information for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of

the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing that the
portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Information for violation of RA 7942 and the
petition was raffled to Br. 94while public respondents appeal assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was
consolidated with petitioners petition. MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondents appeal but
denied petitioners petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
that Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the Information for violation of PD
1067, PD 984, RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC proceeded from are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art
365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate
protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them, 2. The
duplicitous nature of the Information contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.
Issue:
1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand
2. whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As early as the start of the last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In
People vs. Doriquez, the court held that two or more offenses arising form the same act are not
the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not all its elements are present. On
petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb malap rohibita crimes
(such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes the former felony is
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them. Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling
in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the courts statement in Relova that the law
seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an
issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for
an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national
statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits
multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the
same incident.

LLDA v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.

FACTS:

The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002 by the
Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected from respondents SM
City Manila branch.
Sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for
inland water imposed in accordance with law.
On March 12, 2002, LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation:
-directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution
caused by the said company; and
-ordering the latter to pay P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be
computed from February 4, 2002 (date of inspection), until full cessation of discharging
pollutive wastewater
March 23, 2002: In a letter, respondents Pollution Control Officer requested the LLDA to
conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming that they already took the measures to
enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLDA.
In an Order to Pay dated October 2, 2002, petitioner required respondent to pay a fine of
P50,000 which represents the accumulated daily penalty computed from February 4
March 25, 2002.
The respondent issued follow up letters which the petitioner treated as Motion for
Reconsideration, where respondent asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the LLDA in
its March 12, 2002 Notice of Violation and Order of October 2, 2002
Requests for reconsideration were denied.
On May 27, 2003, the LLDA issued another Order to Pay, requiring payment of the fine
within 10 days from respondents receipt of a copy of the said order.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying for the nullification
of the Orders of the LLDA.
CA rendered its Decision, granting and setting aside the assailed Orders of the LLDA
Ruling that an administrative agencys power to impose fines may not be implied The CA
found that under its charter RA 4850, the LLDA is not expressly granted any power or
authority to impose fines for violations of effluent standards set by law. The assailed
Orders of the petitioner are issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines
HELD:

Yes, The LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory
and quasi- judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. (Pacific
Steam Laundry, Inc. v. LLDA)
Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, the LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting
from failure to meet established and effluent standards.
In addition, Section 4 (d) of EO No. 927, which further defines certain functions and powers
of the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the power to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within
which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
Section 4 (i) of the same EO states that the LLDA is given authority to exercise such
powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities.
Also, Section 4 (c) authorizes the LLDA to issue orders or decisions to compel compliance
with the provisions the EO and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
The intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section (i) of EO No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or

incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full proper implementation
of its purposes and functions. Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the LLDA are reinstated
and affirmed.

Pacific Steam Laundry v. LLDA

FACTS:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of
laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from
petitioners plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA
conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioners
laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River.
Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioners plant was operating without LLDA
clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental
Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent.
The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly
Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and
Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted its
application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake
the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was reported
that petitioners wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently, another
wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed. A Pollution Control and
Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner requested another test.
This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30
October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable penalty be
reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. It is respondents
position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual
basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water
pollution. This Public Hearing Committee finds respondents arguments devoid of merit.
Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found
in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for
every day during which such violation continues. The mere discharge of wastewater not
conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA
has the power to impose fines.
ISSUE:
WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal
sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now
assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC
disagree. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the
Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication
Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the
NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),

LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its
prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may
"exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its
duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court
upheld the power of LLDA to issue an
ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding
that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of
its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its
charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner,
we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.

The Alexandra Condominium Corp. V. LLDA

FACTS:
Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (Phil Realty), which constructed and developed The
Alexandra Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation
(TACC) such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5
years),Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not
meet government effluent standards, and informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage
Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Since
constructing an STP would be expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of
cleaning its wastewater. However, the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For
this violation, LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater discharge complies
with the government standard. TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing
for the construction of theSTP for P7.5M. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine
(~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was constructed. TACC requested LLDA to
condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000 per day in recognition of the remedial and
corrective measures it undertook to comply with government standards. TACC further argues
that the non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of Phil
Realty. This was denied by LLDA.TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA denied
TACCs petition.
ISSUE:
1.W/N TACC complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. NO.
2.W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. YES.
HELD:
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with
the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation
of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. In this
case, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first
pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. This is because under
Executive order No. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy
and program coordination and/or administrative supervision. And although under the same order,
DENR only has administrative power over LLDA, a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to
"promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution" and to

"promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable
levels of other pollutants and radiations."
Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled
to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent
quality standards. It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with
TACC, because Phil Realty turned over the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC
that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. If, as claimed by TACC, the noncompliance was due to the omission and fault of Phil Realty, TACCs recourse is to file an action,
if warranted, against Phil Realty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA by
shifting the blame to Phil Realty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4
September 2003 Order.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MINING CORPORATION

vs.

MARCOPPER

FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the
meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192dated
June 10, 1987, and its powers and functions were integrated into the Environmental Management
Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in
his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to "cease and desist from
discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the MMC with the Office of
the President (OP).In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project
(CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13,
1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped
discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits to the
ETF. The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP, however, the CA acted on
Marcoppers petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid Order.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to the power
and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the
discharge of the mine tailings.
HELD:
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the Order from the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of authority to act on pollutionrelated matters in mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA 7942(Philippine Mining
Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate
pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the term "pollution" as referring to
any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or land
resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as
will or is likely to create a harmful environment. On the other hand, the authority of the mines
regional director is complementary to that of the PAB. While the mines regional director has
express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no

adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines
Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was such authority
conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by
the said law. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board
conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained
the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill
effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.
But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of
cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective
offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance,
our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these
agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high
national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude
towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on
bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities,
but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of
people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
Facts:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners
in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila
Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
Issues:
a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled
by mandamus.
Held:
Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in
the complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean
up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within
six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration
of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but
also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the
bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine
life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning
up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free
flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually
end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is
ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other
non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies
and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila
Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and
agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and
discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence,
there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them
as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its
former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But
the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and
take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the
absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay,
they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to
do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for
lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos],
through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications.
The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under
the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the
dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President
Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.
A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question
that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take
it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..
Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section
27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government
authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr.
v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should
apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the
particular community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the
Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence

of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made
by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal
mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the
MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes,
or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other
similar forest development projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing
for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for
the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity
and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the
coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water
supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping
station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province
of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus,
on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing
Governor Carlito Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority

(PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province
deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64
hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources. After PRAs
approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesEnvironmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province
Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the
Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the
existing jetty port. On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which
stated that the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial,
recreational and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province
deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public consultation meetings. On the other hand, the
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and
petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some 160 businessmen
and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on
environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds. Despite the opposition, the Province merely
noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence
with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the
instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus.
Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments to the petition. The Petition was premised on the
following grounds, among others: a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of
the LGU concerned; b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as
required by the Local Government Code (LGC). The Province responded by claiming that its
compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the approval of the
reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the
Barangay Council of Caticlan and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had
categorically addressed all the issues raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the
Petition to be premature for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the
available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.
ISSUES:
WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case? WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project?
RULING:
On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies
The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies
and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents. The Court reiterated their
ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where, among others,
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant
case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy or where the protestant has no other recourse. Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of
continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be
availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides
for the
issuance of a TEPO as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The writ of
continuing mandamus
allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper court when any government
agency or instrumentality or officer thereofunlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an

environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Such proper court may be the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred,
the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique
national and local importance raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection.
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may compel the submission of compliance
reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.
On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project
The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project. The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government
agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public
consultations and approval of local government units. In
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local Government
Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
The absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation
as illegal. Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted
that such national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause
pollution and bring about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this
case. Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should initiate public
consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are
taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to reclaim land in this
case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination
conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the
requirements under the LGC. Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is
not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang
Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly
achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.

Dolot v. Paje
FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of
the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners),
filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338. 4 The petition contained the following pertinent
allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in
Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and
maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and
landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground

settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that
the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul
Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which
they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not
do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; 5 and (7) the respondents violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. 6 Thus, they prayed for the
following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the
mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment
protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among
others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the
designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 10 dated
October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the
RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. 12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue
is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order
or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
HELD:
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011,
apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the
Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 232008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws
x x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." 14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities
of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain,
hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court." 15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin.
Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had
jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.

None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the
court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. 16 It may either be over the nature of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in
the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in
the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129,
which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall
exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely
provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in
Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. 19 Section
18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Matas20 that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the
National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se
confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the
administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical
location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the
place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. 22Consequently, the RTCs motu
proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently
incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was
that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with
the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission
occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred
in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of
Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as
venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature
where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. 26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on
Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have done under the
circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it
would serve the higher interest of justice 28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011

8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its
disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008
constituting the different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines
in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were
made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible
on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy
of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. 29 The respondents, and even the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the
RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. 30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules,
the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions
for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil
Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition
filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that
the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of
discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law
and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served. 31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section
1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such
right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.1wphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well
as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be

one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition
must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an
agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be
performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law
as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4)
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. 32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." 33 The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of
the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
(Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to
the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for
continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7
and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to
ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to
monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final
judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
courts decision."35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a
case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A.
No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. 36 But
the petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the
alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by
Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the
Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in
favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials
over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise

of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines
and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, 37 the Court stated
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between
the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation
and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that
Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such
contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the
contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the
execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. 38(Emphasis supplied in the former and ours
in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach
judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified,
contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not
prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that
it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer
form) must be attached to the petition/complaint. 39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that
the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy
of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by
technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even
the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an
end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard." 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.