Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts: This appeal was instituted for the purpose of reversing a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, finding the accused, Manuel
Tambunting, guilty of stealing a quantity of gas belonging to the Manila Gas
Corporation, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for two months
and one day, of arresto mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law; to
indemnify the said corporation in the sum of P2, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The evidence submitted in behalf of the prosecution shows that in January of
the year 1918, the accused and his wife became occupants of the upper floor
of the house situated at No. 443, Calle Evangelista, in the city of Manila. In
this house the Manila Gas Corporation had previously installed apparatus for
the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors, consisting of the
necessary piping and a gas meter, which last mentioned apparatus was
installed below. When the occupants at whose request this installation had
been made vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the gas
pipe and removed the meter, thus cutting off the supply of gas from said
premises.
Upon June 2, 1919, one of the inspectors of the gas company visited the
house in question and found that gas was being used, without the knowledge
and consent of the gas company, for cooking in the quarters occupied by the
defendant and his wife: to effect which a short piece of iron pipe had been
inserted in the gap where the gas meter had formerly been placed, and piece
of rubber tubing had been used to connect the gas pipe of rubber tubing had
been used to connect the gas pipe in kitchen with the gas stove, or plate,
used for cooking.
At the time this discovery was made, the accused, Manuel Tambunting, was
not at home, but he presently arrived and admitted to the agent to the gas
company that he had made the connection with the rubber tubing between
the gas pipe and the stove, though he denied making the connection below.
He also admitted that he knew he was using gas without the knowledge of
the company and that he had been so using it for probably two or three
months.
Issue: WON gas can be considered in larceny?
Held: Yes. Gas can be considered in larceny, for the very reason that it is
considered as property being able to be capable of appropriation. Thus
having monetary value. There was evidence before the court showing that
the general average of the monthly bills paid by consumers throughout the
city for the use of gas in a kitchen equipped like that used by the accused is
from P18 to 20, while the average minimum is about P8 per month. We think
that the facts above stated are competent evidence; and the conclusion is
inevitable that the accused is at least liable to the extent of the minimum
charge of P2 per month. The market value of the property at the time and
place of the theft is of court the proper value to be proven (17 R.C.L., p. 66);
and when it is found that the least amount that a consumer can take costs P2
per months, this affords proof that the amount which the accused took was
certainly worth that much. Absolute certainty as to the full amount taken is of
course impossible, because no meter wad used; but absolute certainty upon
this point is not necessary, when it is certain that the minimum that could
have been taken was worth a determinable amount.
Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng
Facts: that on April 26, 1926, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the
sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the
defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage
constituted on two parcels and land "with all its buildings, improvements,
sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and
whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill,
steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist is
said lots."
On October 5, 1926, shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the capacity of its sugar
central by buying additional machinery and equipment. The estimated cost of
said additional machinery and equipment was approximately P100,000. In
order to carry out this plan, B.A. Green, president of said corporation,
proposed to the plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary
amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment, promising to
reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the
mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Having agreed to
said proposition made in a letter dated October 5, 1926 (Exhibit E), B.H.
Berkenkotter, on October 9th of the same year, delivered the sum of P1,710
to B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., the total amount
supplied by him to said B.A. Green having been P25,750. Furthermore, B.H.
Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against said corporation for unpaid
salary. With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of P22,000, the Mabalacat
Sugar Co., Inc., purchased the additional machinery and equipment now in
litigation.
On June 10, 1927, B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc.,
applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75,000 offering as
security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A.
Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original
The Court of Tax Appeals having sustained the respondent city assessor's
ruling, and having denied a motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought the
case to this Court
Issue: WON that said tools, equipments or machineries are immovable
taxable real properties?
Held: No. So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of
the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or
works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or
carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." We may here
distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry
for those which may not be so considered immobilized because they
are merely incidental, not essential and principal.
Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by
their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's
business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are
merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to
facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments,
its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such
equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on
without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.
Sergs Product vs PCI
Facts: On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
(PCI Leasing for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of
money (Annex E), with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-98-33500.
On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent
judge issued a writ of replevin (Annex B) directing its sheriff to seize and
deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon
the payment of the necessary expenses.
On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would]
return for the other machineries.
On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order
(Annex C), invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its
officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the
sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex F), on the ground that the
properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ
of replevin.
the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property
Issue: WON the subject machiniries are personal property?
Held: Yes by stipulation. In the present case, the machines that were the
subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built
on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of
their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable
or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.
[16]
In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are
real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the
petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal.[18] After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a
contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any
material fact found therein.
Held: No. Exception to Art. 415. United States Supreme Court, it was
held that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
Facts: This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed
by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land.
The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank,
elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water
pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators.
The said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station
operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in
the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary wear
and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the
owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the
ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station
equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The realty tax on said equipment
amounts to P4,541.10 annually (p. 52, Rollo). The city board of tax appeals
ruled that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
This petition for certiorari now seeks to reverse the above ruling.
Issue: WON tailing dams are subject to realty tax?
Issue: WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery already
enumerated are subject to realty tax?
Held: Yes. We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to
which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas
station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil 709).
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some
purposes they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40
and 41). "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property
for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630,
633).
Held: The petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may be
considered realty within the meaning of Article 415.
The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of "real property" and
simply says that the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as lands,
buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real
property." In the absence of such a definition, we apply Article 415 of the Civil
Code
From the definitions and the cases cited above, it would appear that whether
a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty
would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction
and use. The expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement does
not imply that the improvement must be used perpetually but only until the
purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. It is
sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the land to
which it is annexed is still used for the said purpose.
The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an
"improvement" because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the
value and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the
dam defines its character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code
and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
Facts: It appears on the records that on 1 September 1955 defendantsappellants executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over
their house of strong materials located at No. 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, over Lot Nos. 6-B and 7-B, Block No. 2554, which were
being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Manila on 2 September 1955. The herein mortgage
was executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffsappellees, payable within one year at 12% per annum. The mode of payment
was P150.00 monthly, starting September, 1955, up to July 1956, and the
lump sum of P3,150 was payable on or before August, 1956. It was also
agreed that default in the payment of any of the amortizations, would cause
the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately due and Payable
When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at
public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, plaintiffsappellees were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. 3 Thereafter, on
18 April 1956, plaintiffs-appellant commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in the
municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house be
vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for defendantsappellants to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time
the possession is surrendered. 4 On 21 September 1956, the municipal court
rendered
Defendants-appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court and
court a quo impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage,
Issue: WON the subject matter of the mortgage is a house of strong
materials, and, being an immovable, it can only be the subject of a real
estate mortgage and not a chattel mortgage?
Held: No. Certain deviations, however, have been allowed for various
reasons. In the case of Manarang and Manarang vs. Ofilada, 17 this Court
stated that "it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property",
citing Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Jaramillo. 18 In the latter case,
the mortgagor conveyed and transferred to the mortgagee by way of
mortgage "the following described personal property." 19The "personal
property" consisted of leasehold rights and a building. Again, in the case
of Luna vs. Encarnacion, 20 the subject of the contract designated as Chattel
Mortgage was a house of mixed materials, and this Court hold therein that it
was a valid Chattel mortgage because it was so expressly designated and
specifically that the property given as security "is a house of mixed materials,
which by its very nature is considered personal property."
In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only expressly
designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the
mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel
Mortgage 23 the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on
which it is constructed and participation ..." 24Although there is no specific
statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding,
selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendantsappellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed
to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject
house stood on a rented lot to which defendats-appellants merely had a
temporary right as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone determine
the status of the property, it does so when combined with other factors to
sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the mortgagors,
intended to treat the house as personalty. Finally unlike in the Iya
cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. 25 and Leung Yee vs. F.
that the sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive motor of
said machinery. The appellate court rejected petitioner's argument that
private respondent is estopped from claiming that the machine is real
property by constituting a chattel mortgage thereon.
A motion for reconsideration of this decision of the Court of Appeals having
been denied, petitioner has brought the case to this Court for review by writ
of certiorari.
Issue: WON the machinery in suit is real or personal property?
Held: Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract
so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise
treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped
from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as
chattel by the private respondent is indicative of intention and impresses
upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated
inStandard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that
the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that
which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third parties
would be prejudiced thereby.
Private respondent contends that estoppel cannot apply against it because it
had never represented nor agreed that the machinery in suit be considered
as personal property but was merely required and dictated on by herein
petitioner to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank
form at the time of signing. This contention lacks persuasiveness. As aptly
pointed out by petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the status of the
subject machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue
before the lower court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental
memorandum in support of the petition filed in the appellate court. Moreover,
even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a
contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract
voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a
proper action in court. There is nothing on record to show that the mortgage
has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the
same. On the other hand, as pointed out by petitioner and again not refuted
by respondent, the latter has indubitably benefited from said contract. Equity
dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another. Private
respondent could not now therefore, be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the
chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom,
the Tumalad case bears more nearly perfect parity with the instant case to be
the more controlling jurisprudential authority.
Santos Evangelista vs Alto Surety and Insurance Company
Facts: Briefly, the facts are: On June 4, 1949, petitioner herein, Santos
Evangelista, instituted Civil Case for a sum of money. On the same date, he
obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house, built by Rivera on
a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the
corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Manila, on June 8, 1949. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of
Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951, bought the house at public auction
held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. The
corresponding definite deed of sale was issued to him on October 22, 1952,
upon expiration of the period of redemption. When Evangelista sought to
take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the
ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. respondent herein and that the latter is now the true owner of said
property. Hence, on June 13, 1953, Evangelista instituted the present action
against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his
(Evangelista) title over said house, securing possession thereof, apart from
recovering damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment for
Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and respondent to deliver the house in
question to petitioner herein and to pay him, jointly and severally, forty pesos
(P40.00) a month from October, 1952, until said delivery, plus costs.
On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, which absolved said respondent from the complaint, upon the
ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been
filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of
respondent, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the
attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable
property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is "ostensibly a
personal property."
Evangelista now seeks a review, by certiorari, of this decision of the Court of
Appeals. In this connection, it is not disputed that although the sale to the
respondent preceded that made to Evangelists, the latter would have a better
right if the writ of attachment, issued in his favor before the sale to the
respondent, had been properly executed or enforced.
sale. The RTC agreed with Evertex and ruled that the lease and sale of said
personal properties were irregular and illegal. Dissatisfied, both PBCom
and Tsai appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the judgment
appealed from and denied the motion for reconsideration. PBCom
and Tsai filed their separate petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
DID
THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY
DECREE
THE
MACHINERIES LISTED UNDER PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE COMPLAINT
BELOW AS PERSONAL PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF THE 1975 DEED OF
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AND EXCLUDED THEM FROM THE REAL
PROPERTY EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSED BY PBCOM DESPITE THE
PROVISION IN THE 1975 DEED THAT ALL AFTER-ACQUIRED
PROPERTIES DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE MORTGAGE SHALL
FORM PART THEREOF, AND DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
SAID MACHINERIES ARE BIG AND HEAVY, BOLTED OR CEMENTED ON
THE REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGED BY EVER TEXTILE MILLS TO
PBCOM, AND WERE ASSESSED FOR REAL ESTATE TAX PURPOSES?
(WoN the properties are to be considered as personal property?)
Held: Yes. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be
immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed
by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both
the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels.
Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by
nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an
obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9
SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be considered a personal property if
there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an
obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as "Real
Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage," instead of just "Real Estate
Mortgage" if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as
immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate "LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT." These facts, taken together, evince the
conclusion that the parties' intention is to treat these units of machinery as
chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired properties, which are of the
same description as the units enumerated under the title "LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT," must also be treated as chattels.
Burgos vs Chief of Staff
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publishereditor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security
Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or
successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case.
theatre business. It was intimated that Orosa, his family and close friends
were organizing a corporation to be known as Plaza Theatre, Inc., that
would engage in such venture. Pursuant to said verbal
agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the
construction of the Plaza Theatre on May 17, 1946, up to December 4 of
the same year. But of the total cost of the materials amounting to
P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only P20,848.50, thus leaving a balance of
P41,771.35.
We may state at this juncture that the Plaza Theatre was erected
on a piece of land with an area of 679.17 square meters formerly owned
by Vicente Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on
September 25, 1946, for P6,000. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for
payment of the remaining unpaid obligation, the latter and Belarmino
Rustia, the president of the corporation, promised to obtain a bank loan
by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., out of which said
amount of P41,771.35 would be satisfied, to which assuranceLopez had
to accede. Unknown to him, however, as early as November, 1946, the
corporation already got a loan for P30,000 from the Philippine National
Bank with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in
turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of said
company as counter-security.
Persistent demand from Lopez for the payment of the amount due him
caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to execute on March 17, 1947, an alleged
"deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of stock of the Plaza Theater,
Inc., at P100 per share or with a total value of P42,000 in favor of the
creditor, and as the obligation still remained unsettled, Lopez filed on
November 12, 1947, a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Batangas (Civil Case No. 4501 which later became R-57) against
Vicente Orosa Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc., praying that defendants be
sentenced to pay him jointly and severally the sum of P41,771.35 with
legal interest from the filing of the action; that in case defendants fail to
pay the same, that the building and the land covered by OCT No. O-391
owned by the corporation be sold at public auction and the proceeds
thereof be applied to said indebtedness; or that the 420 shares of the
capital stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr.,
to said plaintiff be sold at public auction for the same purpose; and for
such other remedies as may be warranted by the circumstances. Plaintiff
also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on said properties
with the Register of Deeds.
The surety company, in the meantime, upon discovery that the land was
already registered under the Torrens System and that there was a notice
of lis pendens thereon, filed on August 17, 1948, or within the 1-year period
after the issuance of the certificate of title, a petition for review of the decree
of the land registration court dated October 18, 1947, which was made the
basis of OCT No. 0-319, in order to annotate the lights and interests of the
surety company over said properties (Land Registration Case No. 17 GLRO
Rec. No. 296). Opposition thereto was offered by Enrique Lopez, asserting
that the amount demanded by him constituted a preferred lien over the
properties of the obligors; that the surety company was guilty of negligence
when it failed to present an opposition to the application for registration of the
property; and that if any annotation of the rights and interest of said surety
would ever be made, same must be subject to the lien in his favor.
On October 15, 1969 Judge Taada issued an Order granting Goulds' Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated October 14, 1969, declaring the
reasons therein alleged to be meritorious.
2) "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the
New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of
real property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because
attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code).
Held: No. the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from
the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real
properties 1 could mean only one thing that a building is by itself an
immovable property, a doctrine already pronounced by this Court in the
case of Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644. Moreover,
and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the
contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner.
A close examination of the provision of the Civil Code invoked by
appellant reveals that the law gives preference to unregistered
refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the
refection or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion
must be that the lien so created attaches merely to the immovable
property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred. Evidently, therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid
value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only
to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
Yap vs Tanada
Facts: The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing by Goulds
Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. of a complaint 2 against Yap and his
wife 3 seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price
and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises.
Yap appealed to the Court of First Instance.
Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered
the following day by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds (1)
Pl,459.30 representing the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him;
(2) interest. On September 16, 1969 Yap filed a motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime the Sheriff levied on the water pump in question, 19 and by
notice dated November 4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof on
November 14, 1969. 20 But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for
reconsideration of October 29, 1969, suspension of the sale was directed by
Judge Taada in an order dated November 6, 1969.
Judge Taada thereafter promulgated another Order dated September 21,
1970 granting a motion of Goulds for completion of execution of the judgment
of August 29, 1969. Once more, Yap sought reconsideration. He submitted a
"Motion for Reconsideration of Two Orders"
On December 3, 1970, Yap filed a "Notice of Appeal"
Issue: WoN the property has been converted into a real property?
Held: No. Yap's next argument that the water pump had become immovable
property by its being installed in his residence is also untenable. The Civil
Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." 42 The
pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from
Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the
separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than
the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
Machineries and Engineering Supplies Inc. vs CA
Facts: On March 13, 1953, the herein
petitioner filed a complaint for replevin for the
recovery of the machineries and equipments sold
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from
the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which
are patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the
valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March
26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Salas vs Jarencio
Facts: On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment, declaring the
City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1,
Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, containing an area of
9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to said judgment the Register
of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of Manila
As a consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title No. 4329
was cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura
Villanueva for the portions purchased by her.
Vice-Mayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of
declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska
Streets
The said resolution of the Municipil Board of the City of Manila was officially
transmitted to the President of the Philippines
on the same date, transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines.
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill
No. 191 was filed in the House of Representatives by then Congressman
Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as
patrimonial property of the City of Manila,
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives
with the following explanatory note:
The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel of
land in the district of Malate, which is reserved as communal
Accordingly, withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registerable title over the lot in question.
Chavez vs PEA
Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. [1] On the
same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay[2] under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in
MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA.
January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares
of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration
in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation ProjectMCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding.
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very
clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain to private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no
longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban
does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such
sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations
remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
including government reclaimed lands.