A.M. No.

07-6-5-SC Dated July 10, 2007 :

RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are two communications, 1) a letter,[1] dated 23 August 2007, of
Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, Associate Justice of this Court; and 2)
a Memorandum,[2] dated 29 August 2007 of Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief of Office, Fiscal Management and Budget Office
(FMBO), also of this Court. Both communications, addressed to Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, embody a request for clarification whether or not to tack
earned leave credits in the computation of Longevity Pay upon compulsory
retirement of Justices and Judges. Justice Garcias letter reads in part
I am ending my more than 45 years of government service by midnight
of 19 October 2007, 30 years, 10 months and 26 days of which were with the
judiciary x x x.
I am presently receiving monthly longevity pay computed at thirty
percent (30%) of my basic salary, conformably with Sec. 42 of BP 129 which
pertinently provides:
Sec. 42. Longevity Pay. A monthly longevity pay
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the
Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five
years continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in
the judiciary x x x.
As of 19 October 2007, my earned leave credits would have reached a
total of 1,499.5 days which would be equivalent to 5 years, 8 months, and 3.5
days x x x.
xxxx
Under Administrative Circular No. 58-2003, my retirement pay, and
God-willing, my monthly pension five (5) years later, shall have to be computed
by tacking my leave credits of 5 years, 8 months and 3.5 days to my total years
of service in the judiciary (30 years, 10 months and 26 days), making a total of
36 years, 6 months 29.5 days or 36.58 years, thus, increasing my monthly
longevity pay to thirty six percent (36%). It will be noted that the Circular makes
no distinction as to what branch of the government the leave credits were earned
for purposes of increasing the longevity pay of Justices and Judges who reach
the age of compulsory retirement.[3]

In connection thereto, the FMBO Chief, in her Memorandum, relates that

Upon the request of Justice Gutierrez and Justice Garcia, we have
computed their estimated retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 910 (RA
910), as amended. The computation of their retirement benefits did not consider
the tacking of earned leave credits in the computation of longevity pay provided
under Administrative Circular No. 58-2003. [Citation omitted.]
Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, who retired from the Court of
Appeals on June 19, 2007, likewise requests, in his letter dated August 6, 2007
[citation omitted], that his earned leave credits be tacked for the purpose of
computing his longevity pay in accordance with Administrative Circular No.
58-2003.[4]

To recall, a similar situation arose sometime in 2003, prior to the

compulsory retirement of then Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, also
of this Court. In a letter-request[5] dated 25 September 2003, docketed as A.M.
No.
03-9-20-SC
entitled Re:
Request
of
Senior
Associate
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo for Computation of His Longevity Pay upon
Compulsory Retirement, then Senior Associate Justice Bellosillo asked this Court
that his earned leave credits be tacked to his judicial service to increase his
longevity pay. In a Resolution[6] dated 7 October 2003, this Court resolved to
grant said request. Consequently, on 11 November 2003, this Court approved and
adopted Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 58-2003 entitled ALLOWING THE
TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF
LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND
JUDGES, which, in whole, provides that:
WHEREAS, The Court has studied proposals to allow the tacking of
earned leave credits to the length of judicial service for computation of the
longevity pay.
WHEREAS, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129 provides for a
monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for every five
years of service rendered in the judiciary;
WHEREAS, it is true that vacation and sick leave credits earned during
the period of employment are, by their nature and purpose, generally enjoyed
during employment; however, the law does not preclude the accumulation of

these leave credits, not to be paid while one is working, but to be reserved for
senior age;
WHEREAS, retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood and the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes
of the law in order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government
personnel may be enhanced;
WHEREAS, laws pertaining to retiring government personnel should be
liberally construed to benefit retiring personnel, following an interpretation that
rightly expresses the nations gratitude towards the women and men who have
tirelessly and faithfully served the government;
WHEREAS, earned leave credits, computed in accordance with Section
40, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, should accordingly be allowed
to increase the longevity pay of Justices and Judges reaching the age of
compulsory retirement;
NOW, THEREFORE, the COURT RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, that earned leave credits shall be allowed to be tacked to the length
of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of Justices
and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation
should also include the additional percentage of longevity pay that corresponds
to any fraction of a five-year period in the total number of years of continuous,
efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that the retiree would no
longer be able to complete the period because of his compulsory retirement.[7]

With the foregoing issuances, it is manifestly directed that earned leave

credits ought to be included in the computation of the longevity pay of Justices
and Judges upon their compulsory retirement.
At present, however, as the FMBO explains, the non-inclusion of earned
leave credits in the computation of the longevity pay of Supreme Court Associate
Justices Gutierrez and Garcia, as well as Retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Dacudao, upon their compulsory retirement, even in the face of A.C. No.
58-2003, and the edicts by this Court in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, i.e., 1)
Resolution[8] dated 7 October 2003, granting the request of Senior
Justice Bellosillo to tack his earned leave credits; and 2) Resolution[9] dated 11
November 2003, approving and adopting A.C. No. 58-2003, is the consequence
of its apprehension as to the non-sustainability of charging payments of longevity

pays, computed in accordance with A.C. No. 58-2003, to the savings of the court
concerned. According to the FMBO, the longevity pay of retired Senior Associate
Justice Bellosillo was charged to the savings of this Court in view of the prior
refusal of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to pay the amount
due him, computed in accordance with the subject circular, notwithstanding this
Courts Resolution[10] dated 26 July 2005 in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, enjoining said
department to disburse payment thereof, to wit:
SC Administrative Circular No. 58-2003 allows earned leave credits of
Justices and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement to be tacked to
the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing their longevity pay,
on the basis of a liberal interpretation of retirement legislation in line with
previous jurisprudence for the benefit of deserving retirees. The observations
of the Secretary of Budget and Management are, therefore, noted but she is
enjoined to pay the amount due to retired Senior Associate
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in the implementation of said Circular.
WHEREFORE, the payment of longevity pay in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 58-2003 to retired Justice Josue N. Bellosillo is
hereby DIRECTED. (Emphasis supplied.)[11]

The negative response to the implementation of A.C. No. 58-2003 by

the DBM, was conveyed to this Court by way of a letter[12] dated 6 May 2004. In
said letter, then Secretary of the DBM, Emilia T. Boncodin observed that:
First, Section 42 clearly states as a condition to grant longevity pay, the
rendition of five years continuous service. It expressly grants longevity pay for
each five years of continuous service. Thus, longevity pay may only be granted
if the condition has been complied with, i.e., at the end of every five-year period.
It cannot be granted before expiration of the five-year period.
Second, the use of the words continuous, efficient and meritorious service
clearly refers to the actual service. Therefore, earned leave credits, not being
actual service, cannot be considered as part of continuous, efficient and
meritorious service. Tacking-in of leave credits will therefore run counter to the
expressed intent of the law.
Third, we are fully aware that laws pertaining to retiring government personnel
should be liberally construed in favor of the retiring personnel, if the law is
vague and capable of more than one construction. Section 42 of B.P. 129,
however, is quite clear on its intent.

Besides, retirees are already given due recognition and award for their services
to the nation under Section 42 of B.P. 129 which entitles retirees to longevity
pay. Furthermore, retirees who did not avail of their leave privileges are allowed
to accumulate and commute unused leave credits as terminal leave upon their
retirement. The intent of the law, which is to award retirees for their untiring
service to the nation, continues to be served.
For these reasons, we believe we have complied with the provisions of R.A. 910
(sic) as amended in the computation and release of funds for the retirement and
terminal leave benefits of Justice Bellosillo.

Hence, the twin prayers for clarification by Supreme Court Associate

Justice Garcia and FMBO Chief Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores.
The seeming necessity for clarification founded on the preceding factual
milieu is declared, thus, by Supreme Court Associate Justice Garcia:
The undersigned seeks a clarificatory resolution from the Court on this
matter for the future guidance of all persons, agencies, and offices concerned.[13]

Likewise, the FMBO implores, to wit:

IN VIEW THEREOF, may we respectfully request clarification if the
tacking of leave credits to the length of judicial service for the purpose of
computing the longevity pay as prescribed in Administrative Circular No. 582003 should be made applicable to all justices and judges retiring under RA
910, as amended. In the affirmative, may we respectfully recommend that the
DBM be directed to comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No.
58-2003. In case of non-compliance by the DBM, may we further respectfully
recommend that the payment of the retirement benefit corresponding to the
longevity pay based on tacked leave credits to be sourced from savings of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals and the lower courts, as the case may be, be made subject to availability
of savings.[14]

In fine, illumination is allegedly needed respecting the issue of whether or

not longevity pay of Justices and Judges upon compulsory retirement shall be
computed in accordance with A.C. No. 58-2003, which provides for the tacking
of earned leave credits.

The foregoing letter of the DBM notwithstanding, this Court is of the view
that the uncertainty is more ostensible than real. There is nothing that needs to be
clarified as A.C. No. 58-2003, as well as all the other Resolutions issued by this
Court in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, explicitly dictates the tacking or inclusion of
earned leave credits to the computation of longevity pay of Justices and Judges
upon their compulsory retirement. This Court agrees with Associate Justice
Garcia that A.C. No. 58-2003, just like all Court issuances which are made
pursuant to its constitutional power to interpret laws, has the force and effect of
law, and that, all concerned government agencies like the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and our very own Budget Division, included, are
thereby duty-bound to comply x x x[15] therewith exclusive of any written appeal,
demand or request of its prospective beneficiaries.
Anent the recommendations of the FMBO, to quote again:
In the affirmative, may we respectfully recommend that the DBM be directed
to comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 58-2003. In case
of non-compliance by the DBM, may we further respectfully recommend that
the payment of the retirement benefit corresponding to the longevity pay based
on tacked leave credits to be sourced from savings of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and the lower
courts, as the case may be, be made subject to availability of
savings.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court approves the recommendation insofar as the FMBO proposes that the
DBM be directed to comply with the provisions of A.C. No. 58-2003.
The suggestion, however, that, in the event the DBM refuses to comply
with a prospective directive from this Court, payment of subject retirement
benefit be made subject to availability of the savings of the court concerned, is
without merit. To conform thereto would make payment of such retirement
benefit conditional, defeating its compulsory nature, not to mention the very
wisdom behind the issuance of A.C. No. 58-2003, which is to ensure the comfort
and security of retired Justices and Judges who have tirelessly and faithfully
served the government. In other words, compliance by the DBM with the
directive contained herein is the only option available to it, bearing in mind that

this Court, after due and painstaking consideration, has sufficiently made clear its
position on the matter.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby Resolved,
that, in accordance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 58-2003 and
Supreme CourtEn Banc Resolutions dated 7 October 2003, 11 November 2003,
and 26 July 2005, in Administrative Matter No. 03-9-20-SC, henceforth, the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Office is DIRECTED to include
in the computation of the longevity pay of Justices and Judges, upon compulsory
retirement, their total earned leave credits. The Department of Budget and
Management is, likewise, heretofore ENJOINED to release such payment to
Justices and Judges, upon compulsory retirement, representing their longevity
pay computed on the basis of Administrative Circular No. 58-2003.
SO ORDERED.

3. Certification Against Forum Shopping

REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 February 8, 1994

TO: THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ALL OTHER BAR ASSOCIATIONS, THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR
PETITIONS FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS TO PREVENT FORUM
SHOPPING OR APPEALS TO PREVENT FORUM
SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE FILING OF PETITIONS AND
COMPLAINTS
The attention of the Court has been called to the filing of multiple petitions
and the complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals other tribunals or agencies, with the result that said
courts, tribunals or agencies have to resolve the same issues.

1. To avoid the foregoing, in every petition filed with the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals, the petitioner, aside from complying with pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, must certify under
oath all of the following facts or undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agencies;
(b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is such other action or proceeding
pending, he must state the status of the same; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and such other tribunal or agency of
that fact within five (5) days therefrom.
2. Any violation of this revised Circular will entail the following sanctions: (a)
it shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petitions or
complaints; (b) any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and
his counsel through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure
favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court; and (c) the
submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party and
the institution of disciplinary proceedings against the counsel.
This revised Circular shall take effect on April 1, 1994.
February 8, 1994.

A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY
(RE: OFFICE HOURS)
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar,
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said
city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:
1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;

2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day)
during the entire calendar year.
Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office
from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he
expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00
a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year.
In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2911 as
amended by P.D. No. 3222 enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed
purpose of P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and
making them part of our national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 322,
provides that the following are recognized Muslim holidays:
a. Eid-ul-Fitr (Hariraya Puasa) - which falls on the 1st day of the lunar month of Shawwal
commemorating the end of the fasting season;
b. Eid-ul-Adha (Hariraya Haj) - which falls on the 10th day of the 12th Lunar month of Zul Hajj;
c. Mauledan Nabi - Birthday of Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H), which falls on the 12th day of the
3rd Lunar month of Rabbiol-Awwal;
d. Lailatul Isra Wal Miraj - (Ascension) which falls on the 27th day of the 8th Lunar month of
Rajjab;
e. Muharram (Ashura) - which falls on the 10th Lunar month of Muharram; and
f. Amon Jaded (New Year) - which falls on the 1st day of the 1st Lunar month of Muharram.
Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays
in order that they may be able to properly observe them.
Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that:
Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the
national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the
morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee
breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee
who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this provision.
(b) Regulations for the implementation of this section shall be issued together with the
implementing directives on Muslim holidays.
Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277
dated November 13, 1981 which states in part:
2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of
8 oclock to 12 oclock and 1 oclock to 5 oclock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.
without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime;
3. During Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10 oclock in the
morning to 2 oclock in the afternoon.

Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January 26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term
"Friday" in the above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but
refers to "all Fridays of the
calendar year." However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5,3 Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2924 which enjoins civil servants to render
public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week, the CSC prescribes the
adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims Friday Prayer Day subject
to certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end
not later than 7:00 p.m.5
In the Resolution dated October 1, 2002, the Court required the Court Administrator to study the
matter. In compliance therewith, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that
the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to
3:30 p.m. without break during the month ofRamadan. Further, that they be excused from work
from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day.
However, to compensate for the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working
schedule which should start from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every
Friday. In that way, the working hours mandated by the civil service rules is complied with.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim
employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break
during the month of Ramadanis well taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D.
No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, which categorically states that "[d]uring the fasting
season in the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to threethirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no
diminution of salary or wages ..."
The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim
employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to
attend the Muslim Prayer Day. As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Dio, Chief, Office of the
Court Attorney, in her Report dated May 13, 2005, the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it
declared in Resolution No. 81-1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly issued
pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two
decrees mention "Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day" as one of the recognized holidays.
The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
and political rights.
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise
clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free
exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine
that:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.6

Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to
his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they
be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after
all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be,
religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious
freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this
is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for
the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.7
The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is
integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim
employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any
break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended
by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year.
On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to
enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded.
Underlying Section 5,8 Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is
the interest of the general public to be assured of continuous government service during office
hours every Monday through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious
denomination, to render public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a
week.
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00
p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution
of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve
(12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would
encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to
other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the
exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable
requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative,
which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with
the prescribed government working hours.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours from
7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; and
2. DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the
entire calendar year.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: