ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL vs . PILAR GIL VDA.

DE MURCIANO

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3362. March 1, 1951.]
Testate estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS
VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee, vs. PILAR GIL VDA. DE
MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant.

Eligio C. Lagman, for appellant.

Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; OBVIOUS CLERICAL OMISSION MAY
BE SUPPLIED; RECONSTITUTION OF BURNED DOCUMENTS; AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES AS TO CORRECTNESS OF COPY OF DOCUMENT RECONSTITUTED, IS
BINDING, EXCEPT WHEN THERE IS A CLEAR MISTAKE. The attestation clause
of the will in question reads: Nosotros los que sucribimos, todos mayores de edad,
certicamos: que el tesmtamento que procede escrito en la lengua castellena que
conoce el testador, compuesto de los paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuesta presencia y
que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y rmado dicho documento y todas
las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en cada uno nosotros." Held: The
phrase "han sido rmados por el testador" or equivalent expression between the
words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if
the attestation clause is to be complete and have sense. The rule that a party is
bound by a stipulation of facts isnot absolute. The binding eect of a stipulation
on the parties does not go the extent of barring either of them from impeaching
it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. When it appears from the context
of an attestation clause that certain words have been inadvertently omitted, the
court may supply the omission.
2.
ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION THAT TESTATOR SIGNED THE WILL.
When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instrument,
besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial
compliance with the law even through the said attestation clause appears to
have been made by the testator himself. (Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378.)
3.
ID.; ID.; SUPPLYING OMITTED WORDS THEREIN; EVIDENCE
"ALIUNDE" NOT ALLOWED IN SUPPLYING SUCH OMISSIONS. In adopting
liberal construction of a will, evidence aluinde is not allowed to ll the void or
supply missing details. What is permitted is a probe into the will, an exploration
within its connes, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or

absence of the requisite formalities of the law.

DECISION
JUGO, J :
p

The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will
and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de
Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only questions of law.
Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors:
"Primer Error. EI Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el
alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otorgado de acuerdo con la ley.
"Segundo Error. Erro finalmente al legalizar el referido testamento."

The alleged will read as follows:

"Primera Pagina (1)
"EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN.
"Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 aos de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I.
F., hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y
expontaneamente, em violencia, coaccion, dolo o inuencia ilegal de persona
extraa, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en
castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:
"1.
Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel
Herreros no tuvimos hijos;
"2.
Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la
Provincia de Pampanga;
"3.
Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herreros todos mis
bienes ya qua muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo
la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes
heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a
Don Carlos Worrel.
"4.
Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despus de mi
fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta conanza, con
relevacion de fianza;
"En testimonio de todo lo cual, rmo este mi testamento y en el
margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez rmaron
cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia
cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia
27 de Mayo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve.
"CARLOS GIL
"Testificacion:
"Segunda Pagina (2)

"Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certicamos:

que el testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que
conoce la testadora, compusto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra
presencia y qua cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y rmado dicho
documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del tastador y en la de
cada uno de nosotros.
"(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA
"(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA
"(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAA"

Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will,

the court below said:
". . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal
in case G. R. No. L-254, entitled 'Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros
Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and
appellee.' Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the
will." (P. 10, Record on Appeal).

The appeal being only on questions of law the above nding of the court
below cannot be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based
on it. Moreover, the nding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The
parties agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would
not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is
fatal to the validity of the attestation clause.
It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that
the alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the
witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause
is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential
element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the
court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it
aects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or
corrected only in matters of form which do not aect the substance of the
statement.
It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a
deciency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences
to supply fatal deciencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following
that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implications,
and even by internal circumstantial evidence. This would be done in the face of
the clear, unequivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause
should be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the
clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged
deciencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No.
190, before it was amended, contained the following provision:
". . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will

invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this
section provided."

However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916,
besides increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the
above-quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act
was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities.
Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deciencies by
inferences, implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary
cases the law requires certain requisites for the conclusiveness of circumstantial
evidence.
It is contended that the deciency in the attestation clause is cured by the
last paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At
rst glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation
clause, which is the function of the witnesses. But the important point is that he
attests or certies his own signature, or, to be more accurate, his signature
certies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does
not increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by
his own bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in
any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding a zero
to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.
It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to
documents and wills. This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will,
containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which
must be so clear that it should not require any construction.
The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court,
some of which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation
of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645.
In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the
following to say:
"1.
WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND
634 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. The right to
dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is here
found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. The law not
alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and
makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention.
"2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. The Philippine authorities relating
to the attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Sao vs. Quintana
([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil.,
152), particularly comparad. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, suppra,
adopted and rearmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra,
modified.
"3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The portion of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is

written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other" applied and enforced.
"4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An attestation clause which does not recite
that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the
left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect
annuls the will. (Sao vs. Quintana, supra.)"

In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge
Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made
the following pronouncement:
". . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se
hace constar que los testadores rmaron el testamento en presencia de los
tres testigos instrumentales y que estos rmaron el testamento los unos en
presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos
rmaron el testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y
aquellos rmaron todas y cada una de las paginas del testamsnto los
primeros en presencia de los segundos y vice-versa.
"En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del
alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se
declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado."

The Supreme Court fully armed the decision, laying down the following
doctrine:
"1.
WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY
DEFECTS OF. The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity
with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where
said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those
requirements, the defect constitutes sucient ground for the disallowance
of the will. (Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil.,
30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not
appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been
admitted it should not be given the eect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.)
"2.
ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT No. 190,
AS AMENDED. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given
a strict interpretation in order to give eect to the intention of the
Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution
of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defective
execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.)

It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the
doctrine of the Gumban vs. Gorecho case, supra, but not to the extent of
validating an attestation clause similar to that involved herein.
In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the
attestation clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two
attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court said:

"In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration
about the points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as
the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration,
we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the
testament constitute a sucient compliance with the requirements of
section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that: . . ." (p. 381, supra.)

The attestation clause involved herein is very different.

In the case of Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held
that:
"An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading:
'We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated
opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the testratix, whose
name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will
consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the
same in our presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the
same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in the
presence of each other,' held not to be fatally defective and to conform to
the law."

This is very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.
In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 O. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3,
May 23, 1939), the will was objected to on the ground that, although the
attestation clause stated that "each of the pages of which the said will is
composed" was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the
fth page, it did not state that the signature was made in the presence of the
witnesses. It was held, however, that said deciency was cured by the phrase "as
well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as"
indicate that the testatrix signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the
phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to "also." The language is clear and,
unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any
correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the
presence of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a
corroboration, but it was unnecessary.
In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 O. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No.
7, October 18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:
"Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynes, como su ultima
voluntad y testamento en pressncia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a
ruego de dicho testador, rmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los
otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador, Valerio Leynez. El
testamento consta de dos (2) paginas solamente."

The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and
the witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact, however, appears
in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in that case the will complied with all
the requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were
omitted.
In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa 1 (40 O. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131,
134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:

"Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionados

otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de
cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clausula de atestiguamiento. Que estabamos
presentes en el momento de leer y raticar el que el testamento arriba
mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuetro
paginas en papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes
cuando el rmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo
de cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno de
nosotros en cada pagina y en el mergen izquierdo de esta escritura o
testamento. En su testimonio rmamos abajo en presencia del testedor y de
cada uno de nosotros."

The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error
is that it says "testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del
testador." The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the verb
"firmamos."
In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil 2 (40 O. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27,
1941), the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will.
However, it was held that this deciency was cured by the will itself, which
stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages.
In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 O. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October
23, 1947), decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in
Spanish) reads as follows:
"Nosotros, los testigos, certicamos que este que hemos rmado es
el testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de
Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y de leerle el mencionado
testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, rmo y marco con
su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de
nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los testigos, rmamos en
presencia da la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros."

It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the
signing of the testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but
the omission is cured by the fact that their signatures appear on every page. This
attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case.
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying
substantially with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to
supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural
but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.
"The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is
purely of statutory creation, and is available only upon a compliance with the
requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has
prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot
be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of
the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a
compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether a will
has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is
entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only the intention of the
Legislature, as expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered

by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with
the statute." Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30 L.R.A., 460,
52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700, 701.)
"In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed
any exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlyihg the law, the
chief purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are observed. It is
possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had
made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his
intention, but of what he actually did, or . . . failed to do . . . It may happen . .
. that . . . wills . . . truly expressing the intentions the testators are made
without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens,
the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The legislature . . . has thought of it
best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that
intention, . . . in preference to the risk of giving eect to or facilitating the
formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . . . The evil of
defeating the intention . . . is less than the evil probably to arise by giving
validity to wills made without any form, . . .' or, in derogation of testator's
wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his estate. Churchill's Estate,
260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.
"It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally
possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers
protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be
presented apparently meritorious." (In Re: Maginn, 30 A.L.R., pp. 419, 420.)

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying

the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased
Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was
copied in the stipulation of facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes
the correctness of the copy an issue thereby raising the question of not whether
the burnt will possessed the statutory requirements but whether the copy is
erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appellee's case is built; since,
in fact, the objection to the form of the attestation clause, with which the
decision wholly deals, would disappear if the appellee's contention were well
founded, it is proper that in this dissenting opinion we should accord the matter
at least a passing notice.
It may be stated as background that the original of the will was led in the
Court of First Instance of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up
for probate, it was destroyed by re or looters; that in the probate proceeding
after liberation, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts in which the

will was reproduced as copied in the record on appeal in another case docketed in
this court on appeal as G. R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further
appears from the record of that case and from the decision of this court that the
controversy there concerned the right of a nephew of the testator to impugn the
will, it being alleged that he was not a legal heir and had no interest in the
probate.
As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation
clause is truncated and meaningless. The last of the compound sentence is
incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase. Counsel for appellee contends that the
phrase "ha sido rmado por el tertador" or equivalent expression between the
words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if
the sentence is to be complete and have sense. The attestation clause with the
inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize should read thus:
"Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certicamos
que el testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la
testadora, compuesto de las paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo (Ha sido rmado
por el testador) en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos
atestiguado y rmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros."

It seems obvious that the missing phrase was inadvertently left out. The
probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the
will was not in controversy. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily
conceivable that little or no care was employed in the copying thereof in the
pleading or record on appeal above mentioned. The absence of the signature of
the testator on the rst page of the copy is an additional proof that little or no
pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la
testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is another.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as
the decision says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaa, who drafted the whole
instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law and, by the
context of the whole instrument, has shown familiarity with the rules of
grammar and ability to express his idea properly.
Read in the light of these circumstances without mentioning the
evidence on record, not objected to, that the testator signed the will in the
presence of the attesting witnesses so important an omission as to make the
sentence senseless granting such omission existed in the original document
could not have been intentional or due to ignorance. The most that can be said is
that the flaw was due to a clerical mistake, inadvertence, or oversight.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it
was "reproduced in the Record on Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the
agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The binding eect of a stipulation on the
parties does not go to the extent of barring them or either of them from
impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. That there was such
mistake, is indubitable. It is noteworthy that the opponent and appellant herself

appears not to have noticed any defect in the attestation clause as copied in the
stipulation. It would seem that in the court below she conned her attack on the
will to the alleged failure of the testator to sign the rst page. We say this
because it was only the alleged unsigning of the rst page of the document
which the trial court in the appealed decision discussed and ruled upon. There is
not the slightest reference in the decision, direct or implied, to any aw in the
attestation clause which is by far more important than the alleged absence of
the testator's signature on the first page.
As stated, the problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not
by the law of wills which requires certain formalities to be observed in the
execution, but by the rules of construction applicable to statutes and documents
in general. And this rule would obtain even if the omission had occurred in the
original document and not in the copy alone. In either case, the court may and
should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del nado Emilio Alcala, a similar situation arose and the
Court said:
"Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple
vista que en su redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el
sentido comun pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto
del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervinieron en el
otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraseologia de la segunda
parte de la clausula se observara que las omisiones, aunque son
substanciales, consisten en meros errores gramaticales que los tribunales,
en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de
interpretacion de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la
intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de
atestacion surtan sus efectos.
"La interpretacion que se acaba de dar a la clausula de atestacion y la
correccion de los errores gramaticales de que la misma adolece, incluyendo
la insercion del verbo 'rmamos' que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de
acuerdo con las reglas fundamentales de interpretacion de documentos
segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya
redactado el instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; Pecson contra
Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R.C.L., sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.)"
"La solucion que se acaba de dar al asunto es la que se halla mas
conforme con la justificia en vista de que no se ha presentado prueba alguna
que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido
dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a cualquiera. (Testamentaria de
Emiano Alcala, 40 G. O., 14. Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)"

From 69 C. J., 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be
supplied by the court whenever necessary to eectuate the testator's intention
as expressed in the will; but not where the eect of inserting the words in the
will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the meaning of words that
are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50, 51, the same work says: "To aid the
court in ascertaining and giving eect to the testator's intention in the case of an
ambiguous will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the
construction or interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will

should be construed according to these established rules of construction."

Speaking of construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable to
construction of documents, the same work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says: "Where it
appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently omitted
from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete
the sense, and to express the legislative intent.
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is
in accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.) Let us
assume, for the purpose of this decision only, that the attestation clause was
drawn as the draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in said clause
was not inadvertent, and consider the case on the premise from which the court
has approached it; is the decision well grounded, at least in the light of this
court's previous decisions?
At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as 1922 a similar case,
in which the validity of the will was sustained, found its way into this court.
(Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378). That case was more than four-square behind
the case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more
radical, in that the testator took charge of writing the entire attestation clause in
the body of the will, the witnesses limiting their role to signing the document
below the testator's signature. Here, at most, the testator took away from the
witness only a small part of their assigned task, leaving them to perform the rest.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a
unanimous decision in banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus): "When
the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments besides the
testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial compliance
with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in
said attestation appear to have been made by the testator himself."
That was good doctrine when it was announced. We think it is good law
still. That ruling should set the present case at rest unless the court wants to
discard it. On the possibility that this is the intention, we will dwell on the subject
further.
This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil.,
437, "that there have been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent
tendencies in the law of wills the one being planted on strict construction and
the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be
found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a
literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other direction, predicated
on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in
later decisions." In the Abangan case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Avancea, later Chief Justice, observed: "The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the

exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given

assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
"Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle
were numerous: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922),
43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923),
45 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal
(1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs.
Cartagena (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437;
Testamentaria de M. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F, 1007; Sebastian vs. Paganiban
(1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs. Yap (1939) 1 , 40 O. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3,
p. 194; Grey vs. Fabie (1939) 2, 40 O. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs.
Leynez (1939) 3 , 40 O. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940) 4 ,
40 O. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941) 5 , 40 O.
Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941) 6 40 O. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa
(1941) 7 40 O. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948) 8 ,
46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.
The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure a deciency by
means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply
fatal deciences in wills? Where are we to draw the line?" These same questions
might well have been asked in the cases above cited by the opponents of the
new trends. But the so- called liberal rule does not oer any puzzle or diculty,
nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The decisions we have cited to
tell us when and where to stop; the dividing line is drawn with precision. They
say "Halt" when and where evidence aliunde to ll a void in any part of the
document is attempted. They only permit a probe, an exploration within the
connes of the will, to ascertain its meaning and to determine the existence or
absence of the formalities of law. They do not allow the courts to go outside the
will or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply missing details that should appear in
the will itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to
banish any fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus dened. If the witnesses
here purposely omitted or forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their
presence, the testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in
the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was
introduced or taken into consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind
it was the thing that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of
the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the
antiquated, outworn worship of form in preference to substance. It has been said,
and experience has shown, that the mechanical system of construction has
operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must
be conceded, is the eect in this case of this court's rejection of the will under
consideration. For the adverse party concedes the genuineness of the document.
At least, the genuineness is superobvious, and there is not the slightest

insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator or fraud.

It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the
witnesses' presence "would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The
simile, we say with due respect, does not look to us quite well placed. Under
physical law a man cannot raise his body from the ground by his own bare hands
without the aid of some mechanical appliance, at least not for more than a
itting moment. But there is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to
his own act unless forbidden by rules of positive law. The rationale of our dissent
is that he is not. If we were to make a metaphorical comparison, it would be
more appropriate to say that a man can and generally does himself pull the
bootstraps to put the boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate practical reason for
objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the
will in the presence of the latter. The will is the testator's, and the intervention
of attesting witnesses is designed merely to protect the testator's and not
anybody else's interest.
If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has
denite and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as
possible, any chance of substituting one instrument for another (1 Page on Wills,
481), what better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a
certication by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the
testator's signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by
muddling it or the attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making
a valid will, to do so would be a contradiction. If the formalities are only a means
to an end and not the end themselves, and that end is achieved by another
method slightly dierent from the prescribed manner, what has been done by
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should satisfy
both law and conscience. The chief requirements of statute are writing, signature
by the testator, and attestation and signature of three witnesses. Whether the
courts profess to follow the harsher rule, or whether to follow the milder rule,
they agree on one thing that as long as the testator performs each of those
acts the courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, 483, 484.)

Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION
March 20, 1953
TUASON, J .:
This appeal is before us on a motion for reconsideration of this court's
decision. Whereas formerly six Justices voted for reversal and ve for armance
of the probate court's order admitting the will to probate, the vote upon
reconsideration was six for armance and ve for reversal, thereby making the
dissenting opinion, which had been led, the prevailing rule of the case. Under
the circumstances, this resolution will largely be conned to a restatement of
that dissenting opinion.
The will in question was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance
of Manila in 1943 with Roberto Toledo y Gil, decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil

Vda. de Murciano, decedent's sister opposing the application. Toledo's legal right
to intervene was questioned by the proponent of the will, and the objection was
sustained in an order which was armed by this court in G. R. No. L-254. As a
result of the latter decision, Toledo was eliminated from the case and did not
appear when the trial was resumed.
The proceeding seems to have been held in abeyance pending nal
disposition of Toledo's appeal, and early in 1945, before the application was
heard on the merit, the record, along with the will, was destroyed, necessitating
its reconstitution after liberation. In the reconstitution, a stipulation of facts was
submitted in which, according to the appealed order, "both parties . . . agreed
that the will as transcribed in the record on appeal in Case G.R. No. L-254 is true
and a correct copy."
The will consisted of only two pages, and the attestation clause as thus
copied reads:
"NOSOTROS los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad,
certicamos: que el testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana
que conoce la testador, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra
presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y rmado dicho
documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de
cada uno de nosotros.
"(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA.
"(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA.
"(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAA"

It will be noted from the above copy that the last of the compound
sentence is truncated and meaningless. This defect is the main basis of the
appellant's sole assignment of error.
Counsel for appellee contend that the phrase "han sido rmadas por el
testador" or equivalent expression between the words "del mismo" and the
words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if the attestation clause is to be
complete and have sense. With this insertion the attestation clause would read ".
. ., asi como todas las hojas del mismo han sido rmadas por el testador en
nuestra presencia . . ." The point is well taken.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The
probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the' fact that the form of the
will was not in controversy in Toledo's appeal. The form of the will being
immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or no care was employed in
transcribing the document in the agreement or record on appeal. The absence of
the signature of the testator on the rst page of the copy is an additional proof
that little or no pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The
appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is another
indication of haste and carelessness in the transcription.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as

the trial court says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaa, who drew the
instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law and, by the
context thereof, has shown familiarity with the rules of grammar and ability to
express his idea properly. In the light of these circumstances and of the further
fact that the clause was brief and, by its importance, must have been written
with utmost concern, so important an omission as to make the clause or
sentence senseless could not have been made, intentionally or otherwise, in the
original.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it
was "reproduced in the Record on Appeal" is bound by the agreement. This is not
an absolute rule. The binding eect of a stipulation on the parties does not go to
the extent of barring either of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical
error or clear mistake. The mistake just pointed out clearly brings the case within
the exceptions to the rule. The able counsel for the proponent of the will could
not possibly have subscribed to the agreement if they had noticed the incomplete
sentence in the copy without making an objection or reservation.
The problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law
of wills which requires certain formalities to be fullled in the execution, but by
the rules of construction applicable to statutes and documents in general. And
this rule would obtain whether the omission occurred in the original document or
in the copy alone. In either case, the court may and should correct the error by
supplying the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del nado Emiliano Alcala, a similar situation arose and
the court said:
"Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple
vista que en su redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el
sentido comun pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto
del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervenieron en el
otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraseologia de la segunda
parte de la clausula se observara que las omisiones, aunque son
substanciales, consisten en meros errores gramaticales que los tribunales,
en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de
interpretacion de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la
intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de
atestacion surtan sus efectos."
"La interpretacion que se acaba de dar a la clausula de atestacion y la
correccion de los errores gramaticales de que la misma adolece, incluyendo
la insercion del verbo 'rmamos' que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de
acuerdo con las reglas fundamentales de interpretacion de documentos
segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya
redactado el instrumento (art. 286, Cod. de Proc. Civil; Pecson contra
Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R. C. L., sec. 187, pags. 225, 226)."
"La solucion que se acaba de dar al asunto es la que se halla mas
conforme con la justicia en vista de que no se ha presentado prueba alguna
que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido
dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a cualquiera. Testamentaria de
Emiliano Alcala, 40 Gac. Of., 14.o Supplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)"

From 69 C. J. 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be

supplied by the court whenever necessary to eectuate the testator's intention
as expressed in the will; but not where the eect of inserting the words in the
will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the meaning of words that
are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50 and 51, the same work says: "To aid the
court in ascertaining and giving eect to the testator's intention in the case of an
ambiguous will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the
construction or interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will
should be construed according to these established rules of construction." And
referring to construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable to
construction of documents, C. J. S., in Vol. 59, p. 992, tells us that "Where it
appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently omitted
from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete
the sense, and to express the legislative intent."
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is
in accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
But let it be assumed, for the sake of this decision only, that the attestation
clause was drawn exactly as it was copied in Toledo's record on appeal, was the
mistake fatal? Was it, or was it not, cured by the testator's own declaration? to
wit: "En testimonio de lo cual, rmo este mi testamento y en el margen
izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez rmaron cada una
de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de
ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de marzo de mil
novecientos treinta y nueve." The answer is in the negative.
As early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will was
sustained, found its way into this court. See Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378. That
case was more than foursquare behind the case at bar. There the departure from
the statutory formality was more radical, in that the testator took charge of
writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the witnesses
limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature. Here,
at the most, the testator took away from the witnesses only a small part of their
assigned task, leaving to them the rest.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a
unanimous decision in banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said in the AldabaRoque case (syllabus):
"When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments,
besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial
compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the
facts recited in said attestation clause appear to have been made by the testator
himself."
That ruling should set the present case at rest unless we want to revert to
the old, expressly abandoned doctrine, in a long line of what we believe to be
better-considered decisions.
This court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (1922), 57 Phil., 437,

"that there have been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in
the law of wills the one being planted on strict construction and the other on
liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the
decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a literal
enforcement of the law. The basic rule in the other direction, predicated on
reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in
later decisions."
In the Abangan case, a unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Avencea, later Chief Justice, observed:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on
the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded."
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle
were: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil.,
378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil.,
216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924),
47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartagena
(1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria
de N. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Paganiban (1934), 59 Phil.,
653; Rodriguez vs. Yap (1939), 40 O. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs.
Fabia (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl., No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939), 40
O. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940), 40 O. Gaz., 7th Suppl.
No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941), 40 O. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs.
Pilapil (1941), 40 O. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941), 40 O. Gaz., 14th
Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948), 46 O. Gaz., Suppl., No. 1, p
211.
It is objected that "If we cure a deciency by means of inferences, when are
we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deciencies in wills? Where
are we to draw the line?" These same questions might well have been asked by
the opponents of the new trends in the cases above cited. But the so-called
liberal rule does not oer any puzzle or diculty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they
draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to ll a
void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in
the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the
requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty
and ought to banish any fear of dire results.

The case at hand comes within the bounds thus dened. If the witnesses
here purposely omitted or forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their
presence, the testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in
the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was
introduced or taken into consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind
it was the thing that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of
the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the
antiquated, outworn worship of form in preference to substance. It has been said,
and experience has shown, that the mechanical system of construction has
operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must
be conceded, would be the eect in this case if the will under consideration were
rejected. For the adverse party now concedes the genuineness of the document.
At any rate, the genuineness is superobvious, and there is not the slightest
insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator, or fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the
witnesses' presence "would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The
simile does not look to us quite well placed. There is no impossibility or
impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless forbidden by rules of positive
law. The rationale of this decision is that he is not. If we were to make a
metaphorical comparison, it would be more correct to say that a man can and
generally does himself pull the bootstraps when he puts his boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate, practical reason for
objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the
will in the presence of the latter. The will is of the testator's own making, the
intervention of attesting witnesses being designed merely to protect his interest.
If the sole purpose of the statute in requiring the intervention of witnesses is to
make it certain that the testator has denite and complete intention to pass his
property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one
instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), what better guaranty of the
genuineness of the will can there be than a certication by the testator himself
in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is duly authenticated?
Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling and bungling it or the attestation
clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be
a contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the end
themselves, and that end is achieved by another method slightly dierent from
the prescribed manner, what has been done by the testator and the witnesses in
the execution of the instant will should satisfy both law and conscience.
A second ground of attack on the questioned will is that the rst page or
sheet thereof does not bear the testator's signature. The discussion on the
correctness of the copy of the attestation clause amply answers this objection. In
fact, the appellee's case is much stronger on this point for the reason that there
is not only speculative but also positive basis for the conclusion that the
testator's signature was axed to the rst page of the original. Both the testator
and the attesting witnesses stated in the will and in the attestation clause,
respectively, that the former signed both pages or sheets of the testament.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the order of the probate court is

affirmed with costs.
A motion dated February 17, 1953, was led after the motion for
reconsideration was deliberated and voted upon, in behalf of the minor children
of Carlos Worrel, who was a residuary legatee under the will and who is alleged
to have died on February 6, 1949. The motion prays that a guardian ad litem be
appointed for the said children, and allowed to intervene and le "A
Supplementary Memorandum in Support of Appellant's (Appellee's?) Motion for
reconsideration." Counsel for the appellant objects to the motion on the ground
that the movants having only a contingent interest under the will are not of right
entitled to intervene.
As this case has already been considerably delayed and thoroughly
considered and discussed from all angles, it is the sense of the court that the
children's intervention with the consequent further delay of the decision would
not serve the best interest of the parties. For this reason, the motion is denied.

Paras, Feria, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Reyes, JJ., dissent.

Separate Opinions
JUGO, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the ground set forth in my opinion rendered in this case.

Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
1.
2

68 Phil., 128.
71 Phil., 561.
72 Phil., 546.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

1.

68 Phil., 126.

2.

68 Phil., 128.

3.

68 Phil., 745.

4.

70 Phil., 89.

5.

72 Phil., 531.

6.

72 Phil., 546.

7.

71 Phil., 561.

8.

81 Phil., 429.