RULING:

As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was composed of Justice B.S.
de la Fuente, as Chairman, Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and Flores Bartolome, as
Members. In view, however, of the voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia and Bartolome
from taking part in the case, Justices Bidin and Camilon were reassigned to the Third Civil
Cases Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division.
Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division, not being one of the
ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with jurisdiction, had no adjudicatory powers. It is
also alleged that the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is violative of the injunction
against appointment of an appellate Justice to a class of divisions other than that to which
he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129
prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class. For instance, a Justice
appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was
reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the same
class of divisions to which they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third Civil Cases
Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal
bounds. Otherwise, a situation would have arisen where a regular division could not decide a
particular case because some members thereof inhibited themselves from participating in
said case.
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the correctness of the ruling of the
IAC that the CA Decision of December 29, 1982 could not have gained the nature of a proper
and valid judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy) and that the
Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or cancelled the validity of said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively an acknowledgment by the
Division that promulgated it that the earlier Decision dated December 29, 1983 rendered in
a Special Civil Action case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530, was not appropriate and
beyond the authority of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals to promulgate. The said
Resolution was actually a statement that the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had overstepped its bounds by reviewing in certiorari proceedings a decision in a purely civil case
that should have passed through the processes of an ordinary appeal. We are not aware of
any legal doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a petition for review on certiorari
upon purely questions of law, such as that filed by petitioners herein, as an ordinary appeal.
Neither can we find any legal basis or justification for the election by the appellate court of
the essential requisites then prescribed for the validity of an appeal, such as the submission
of a formal notice of appeal, an appeal bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of
these mandatory requisites, the appeal could not have been deemed perfected and ought to
have been dismissed outright.
The Court does not agree.
There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in their
original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or
to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter

category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these
modes have different procedural requirements.
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as
G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to
appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. However, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as an appeal, and
not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a
form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure outlined in Rule 45 which,
unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on
appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be passed
upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way
of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal.
Those cases are not in point. They refer to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,
and not to appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the Resolution dated July
25, 1983 of the Second Special Cases Division (to which the case was assigned after the
reorganization under BP 129) as having "erased or cancellation" the validity of the Decision
of the Ninth Division. A perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely made clarification
about the nature of the case and why it should be reassigned to the Civil Cases Division of
the IAC. There was not the slightest implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of
the Decision of the Ninth Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the validity of the Decision
of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for reconsideration. It would have been
incongruous to grant a motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and set it aside, if in the first
place it did not have any validity. It would have been necessary only to decide its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the IAC Special
Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the title in the name of Carpo
and declaring null and void the titles in the names of Realty and of QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same basis for the of the Vera
Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no authority to issue the
order of May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of Mayuga,
predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land registration court and also
because the original records of LRC Case No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or
destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347 (1914),
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to and was conferred upon the Courts
of First Instance of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in
court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The
issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and
as such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga,
predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration
proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan
Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty and
QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO
Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721
filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved Identical parcels of land, and
Identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a consolidated
decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:
En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del plans PSU47035 a nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desist oposicion de Florentino Baltazar y Eduardo
Guico con respects a dichos lotes....
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of which reads:
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas confirmamos la decision apelada en cuanto
adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano y que equivalent a lost lotes,
4, 5 y 6 del plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the petition was
dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed (See Guico v. San Pedro, 72 Phil.
415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with the Reyes Court
docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao
Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration over the property
adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be overemphasized that the
petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but a
continuation of, the original land registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga,
Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the
case, which jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original applications.
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of Dominador
Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a decree of
registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered owner
Dominador Mayuga in liue of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC Case No. 657 were not
properly reconstituted, then there was no pending land registration case. And since the
Reyes Court was acting without a pending case, it was acting without jurisdiction.
(Respondent Carpo's Memorandum, pp, 2-8.)

He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA 1119) where this
Court said that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law, "the parties are deemed to have
waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file
an action anew for the registration in their names of the lots in question," citing the case of
Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases. The basis of said ruling is
Section 29 of Act No. 3110, an Act to provide an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of
the records of pending judicial proceedings and books, documents, and files of the office of
the register of deeds, destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to reconstitute records
on the status of the case in its entirety, was modified in the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93)
Phil. 595 [1953]). where this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the sense that Section 29 of Act
No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the Court of First Instance as well as in
the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not reconstituted, but not where the
records of the Court of First Instance are intact and complete, and only the records in the
appellate court were lost or destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason for this view
is that section 29 of Act 3110 is found among the sections and provisions dealing with the
reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in pending civil cases, special
proceedings, cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act (No.) 3110 ... who show that
there are separate procedures for the reconstitution of records in the Justice of the Peace
Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now
including the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in
the office of the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of
destroyed records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under which
sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so
that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or
stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. The law contemplates
different stages for purposes of reconstitution. . . .
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was pending trial in the Court of First
Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers to the stage
where the case had been tried and decided but was still pending in the Court of First
Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the stage where the
case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) at the time the record was
destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the
parties and the court should go back to the next preceding age where records are available,
but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be
voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to
the great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which
must again perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it
anew,-all of these, when the records up to said point or stage
. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and (suffer) the
annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings,
aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction,
and also to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then
decide the case, when an along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the
trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be

not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court
which has not committed any negligence or fault at all.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the reconstitution law.
As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or
invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit
litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings,
instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the
records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can
happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g.
having the case at the stage when the records were destroyed).
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not
have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage where
records are available. The land registration case itself re. mained pending and the Court of
First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that remained to be done was
the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which
would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a
judgment which had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002;
Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De
Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the
decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035
to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of this Court
affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for
the issuance of a decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a land
registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration,
"substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in hue of the original
adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the
provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with the
ruling of this Court in the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated
August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said order
and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and QCDFC, the Special Division
also relied on Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an issue in the
trial court. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis exists to support
such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent
purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of
the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on the
certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare,
117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)

Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by
virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October
9, 1970. However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in
favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and
that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970,
that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the
Registry of Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied
upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for
value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an
oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the
CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035
"desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such
successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration
proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom
Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in
the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates
of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA, Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA
380.)
TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT No. 303961 derived from
OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC)
alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as thirty-party defendant inasmuch as
Realty's alleged cause of action against it is neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief in respect of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that Realty
had no cause of action against it since the third party complaint did not allege that QCDFC
violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC also assails the Vera Court decision in that it
declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo and not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera Court, nor from the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor from the resolution of the
IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 all of which voided QCDFCs title
to the disputed property. Hence, said decisions/resolution have become final and executory
as regards QCDFC.
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed against
it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the

former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances
of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.
** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these
conflicting claims over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and
exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as
testimonial evidence. It was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however,
was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original registered owners.
Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. was
issued on July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years after the issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier than OCT No. 8931
from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of QCDFC.
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging that the case
at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of
Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved for
consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same property. By Resolution of
August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against Realty is in
the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title
to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead,
and by filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court
to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to
481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and
Similar Remedies, Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in
such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421
[1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final determination of
G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court and the
Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and the Decision of
December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
RULING:
Lucasan posits that he has sufficient cause of action against PDIC; thus, he chides the
RTC for dismissing his complaint, and the CA for affirming the dismissal. In support of his
thesis, he cites Section 75 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree18 and Cometa v. Court of Appeals.19
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, Lucasans action was one for quieting of
title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Essentially, he sought the cancellation of the notice
of embargo and the certificate of sale annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 claiming
that the said annotations beclouded the validity and efficacy of his title. The RTC, however,
dismissed his complaint for lack of cause of action which was affirmed by the CA in its

assailed Decision. Thus, the key issue for our consideration is whether the dismissal of
Lucasans complaint was proper.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of doubt or
uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the
following language:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20 Stated differently, the
plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in
dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of
land was held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in
favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or
redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from
the registration of the certificate of sale.21 With the expiration of the twelve-month period of
redemption and no redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or
the redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in question.22
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period, on
account of his then limited financial situation.23 It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15)
years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had
lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997 cannot, in any way, operate
to restore whatever rights he had over the subject properties. Such payment only
extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan
claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo and
certificate of sale.
Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBCs failure to file a petition for consolidation of
ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. As we explained in Calacala v.
Republic:24

[P]etitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over [the] land in
question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of
redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any
way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the
same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and
we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to
secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and
obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose
property has been previously foreclosed and sold.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the
obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the
title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al.:
Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year
period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The
issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely
confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of
that fact. (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the
subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.
Furthermore, Lucasan failed to demonstrate that the notice of embargo and the certificate of
sale are invalid or inoperative. In fact, he never put in issue the validity of the levy on
execution and of the certificate of sale duly registered on June 5, 1981. It is clear, therefore,
that the second requisite for an action to quiet title is, likewise, absent.
Concededly, Lucasan can pursue all the legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul
the execution sale prior to the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of PBC.
Unfortunately, the remedy he had chosen cannot prosper because he failed to satisfy the
requisites provided for by law for an action to quiet title. Hence, the RTC rightfully dismissed
Lucasans complaint.

Lucasan tries to find solace in our ruling in Cometa v. Court of Appeals. Sadly for him, that
case is not on all fours with his case, for it was not for quieting of title but a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession and cancellation of lis pendens. Likewise, in Cometa the
registered owner assailed the validity of the levy and sale, which Lucasan failed to do.
Undoubtedly, Lucasans right to redeem the subject properties had elapsed on June 5, 1982.
His offer to redeem the same in 1997 or long after the expiration of the redemption period is
not really one for redemption but for repurchase. Thus, PBC and PDIC, its receiver and
liquidator, are no longer bound by the bid price. It is entirely within their discretion to set a
higher price. As we explained in De Robles v. Court of Appeals:25
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise after
the period is not really one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made
because redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept
redemption. Repurchase however of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes

no such obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no
law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his
discretion to set a higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.
Accordingly, the condition imposed by the PDIC for the re-acquisition of the property cannot
be considered unjust or unreasonable.
Verily, in several cases,26 this Court allowed redemption even after the lapse of the
redemption period. But in those cases a valid tender was made by the original owners within
the redemption period. Even in Cometa, the redemption was allowed beyond the redemption
period because a valid tender of payment was made within the redemption period. The
same is not true in the case before us.
In fine, we find that the RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans complaint for quieting of title.
Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 81518, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

RULING:

The appeal lacks merit.

Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the
death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of
the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of
Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence,
any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and
Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their
property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.16 The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. (399)

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas

share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.18
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.19
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.20
This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract
must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio
who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the
sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already
received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito
sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not present any
public document on the allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares
in Martas estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already been
liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the
efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the
interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate
recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in
Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the coowner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as
if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].1avvphi1
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court. xxx24
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors
in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of
Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:

xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the
share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really

would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and
void.1wphi1 But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs
to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of
the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the
other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it
follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it
has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse
without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse
(except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said
portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall
not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764,
Jan.31, 1959.)25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

RULING:
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of the
outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this Court.26
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, to
declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its reconveyance to
him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540;
(b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the
property and deliver possession thereof to him; and (c) damages and attorneys fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by Lagata to his
father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate,
they were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo,
Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with
his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and
enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an
accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to
be instituted for the benefit of all.27 Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will
benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of
the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims
to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper
unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the
subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof
that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the
same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial
court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and
entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision
of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his
siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with
the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an
indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No.
P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded
as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held

that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.28 The absence of the
respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof,
including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.29
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that he failed to
prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and that he is not
entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the requisite quantum of
evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under a contract of sale, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness or absence of the evidence of that of his opponent.30 He who
claims a better right to real estate property must prove not only his ownership of the same
but also the identity thereof.31 In Huy v. Huy,32 we held that where a property subject of
controversy is duly registered under the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens Certificate is
evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name appears
therein.33 Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was coconut, and not
residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of absolute sale, Victoriana
Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular, she sold the residential
portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed his house on a portion of Lot No.
3353 which Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina, now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The
petitioners assert that along with their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy,
they constructed their houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father
Iluminado; hence, they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit
that, whether the house of Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the
property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered by OCT
No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject property, which turned
out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In contrast, the RTC declared in
its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale executed by Irene Griarte in favor of
Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666 square meters, Griarte actually owned only
4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot was actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence,
Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to Iluminado34 because he was aware that he
owned only 4,651 square meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion
of Lot No. 3347 was declared as part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed.
The trial court concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute sale
executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot No.
3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with an area of
6,666 square meters, more or less.35 When she sold the property to Martiniano Balbedina
on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property of Lino Estopin. There was
no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the south and of Lino Estopin on the north. In
the meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was established between the

property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a
cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The property
of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square
meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the construction of the road, the property
of Balbedina, which was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters.
Balbedina declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651
square meters and was coconut land36 and that his property was bounded on the south by a
trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for taxation purposes, in
which he stated that his property was bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran.37
Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary the trail (road) going
to Biriran.
Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,651
square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951.38 Under the deed of absolute sale, the
property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by Lino Estopin.39 The English
translation of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the RTC Records, which both the trial
court and the appellate court relied upon, is incorrect.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the boundary of the
property on the south is "con camino, Lino Estopin," while the English version of the deed,
indicates that the property is bounded "on the south by Lino Estopin." Being an earlier
document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties therefore should prevail. Conformably
to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax Declaration No. 5359 under his name that
the property is bounded on the south by a trail,40 and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino
Estopin.
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the Spouses
Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondents reliance on the testimonies of
Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio Guamos as well as the
May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed of sale executed by Victoriana
Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular to corroborate his claim over the
lot in question, is misplaced.
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even an authentic
copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure to adduce the same
in evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim that his father acquired the property
from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must prevail.42
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declarations over the
disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino Estopin, or realty tax payment
receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961. The documents are circumstantial
evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed ownership over the disputed property and that
Lino Estopin acquired the same from her. After all, such tax declarations and tax receipts can
be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period
sufficient for acquisitive prescription.43
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790 covering
the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim that Lot No. 3347
consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the petitioners appended a
certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot
No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was
described as coconut land; this is contrary to the respondents claim that the said lot was
then residential, and that the boundary of the property on the north was the road to Biriran

which, in turn, is consistent with the petitioners claim.44 Unfortunately, the trial court
denied the said motion on the ground that it was mooted by its decision.
Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of Balbedina,
inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a total area of 9,302
square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347
with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy applied for a free patent over Lot
No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his name. The respondent failed to adduce
any evidence that the Spouses Estopin and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or
Iluminados claim of ownership of Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the
application. A propos is our ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals:45
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing the totality of the
evidence
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and possessors of the
subject lot just because it "is adjacent to their titled property." Precisely, the boundaries of
defendants titled property were determined, delineated and surveyed during the cadastral
survey of Dipolog and thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in order that the extent
of their property will be known and fixed. Since the subject lot was already found to be
outside their titled property, defendants have no basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots
for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of the cadastral survey as a process of
determining the exact boundaries of adjoining properties will be defeated.
Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and Cristina Gonzales),
in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession over the adjacent subject lot.
Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral survey of Dipolog was conducted from
January, 1923 to November 1925; (2) defendants titled property was one of those lots
surveyed and this was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3) during the survey, it was already
determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast, southeast, southwest
and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our narration of facts, the subject lot is a
subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog
Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0357 was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered on July 31
(sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case No.
6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the cadastral survey
was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were already determined and
delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part of Lot No. 4443, it means that
during that time defendants predecessors-in-interest never claimed ownership or
possession over the subject lot. Otherwise, they would have complained so that the subject
lot could be excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent
lots. It is obvious then that defendants predecessors only claimed Lot No. 2623 and they
pursued their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0357 was issued to them. The contention of defendants that they and their predecessors-ininterest occupied and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is not
true.46
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold to Astrologo
Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals,47 we ruled that:

Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and enforceable and that it was
perfected at the very moment that the parties agreed upon the thing which was the object
of the sale and upon the price. The parties herein had agreed on the parcel of land that
petitioner would purchase from respondent PNR, and the same was described therein; thus,
petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set aside the technical description in this agreement and
insist that it is the legal owner of the property erroneously described in the certificate of
title. Petitioner can only claim right of ownership over the parcel of land that was the object
of the deed of sale and nothing else.48
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana Lagata sold Lot No.
3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 4790.
The deed does not state that what was sold was only a portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding
therefrom the disputed property. This is understandable, since the subject property is a
portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino
Estopin and/or Victoriana Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which
she does not own. As the Latin adage goes: "NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET."
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the respondent to prove the
contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners. Balbedina did not
testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their right to cross-examine him. The said
affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative weight. The affidavit varies the contents of
the deed of absolute sale which he (Balbedina) executed in favor of Iluminado more than
forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it was made to appear that Balbedina sold to
Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters,
when under the said deed of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of 4,651
square meters. The affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in favor of Baloloy
was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio Notary Public; hence,
entitled to full probative weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo P.
Cunanan49 cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even buttressed the case
for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353,
and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado Baloloy,
the deceased father of the petitioners.
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347 under the
deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the property was a part of Lot
No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of Alejandro
Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition to his own. As
such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free patent, as well as
OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
respondent is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED

RULING:
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that
the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an
action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It

may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon
the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by
the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage
may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of
the real estate in question. x x x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on
the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is
a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably,
therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the
complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,32 but
that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.34 Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean
that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36 In fact,
mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.37
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best
evidence thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an
admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence
of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to
the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.38
Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is
not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement
after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have
any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that
respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and
engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself
who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly,
respondents act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a
deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife.
Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful
act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to
any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as
attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED.

RULING:
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:

Propriety of Certiorari

Before the Court of Appeals

Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the
reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private
respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They contend that private
respondents' invocation of certiorari was "procedurally defective." 14 They further argue
that private respondents, in their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the
trial court which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were not
correctable by certiorari. 15 This Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the
appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al.,
78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding
which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860
and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or
without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento,
et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or
public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. 16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein);
(4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in
case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5)
where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982);
and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the
remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court
patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, 17 as in the present case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable
when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are
convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed
resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this
case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title
only provisionally. 19 It is hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of
a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate
proceeding as in the case at bar." 20 In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision
declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963
and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their
daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S.
Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the
said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower
court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership of the properties

subject thereof . In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court.
Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so. 21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its
decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the
ground that the compromise agreement "was nor approved by the court," 23 is tantamount
to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court's decision but
also the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion, not merely errors of judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a
petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n act
done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here under Rule
109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does
not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy
and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the
respondent court has disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed
as early as October, 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality, which,
as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate.
Considering further the [trial court's] granting of [herein petitioners') motion for execution of
the assailed decision, 27 [herein private respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition
[for review on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be
challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At
the very least, this case is a clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal because the trial court's decision and resolutions were issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time.
"A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
Second Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod to
deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. They
further contend that said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged

deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned
deeds of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one hearing
conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S. Lugod to
install her as administratrix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was no other evidence,
whether testimonial or otherwise, "received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted
by the probate court below"; nor was there "a trial on the merits of the parries' conflicting
claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the compromise agreement
on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties NOT because of any
deficiency in the land conveyed to them under the agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard
evidence on record to back up petitioners' claims.
In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to reimburse any
deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who
prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in question, and who could have provided
evidence for the petitioners, "to bring records of his relocation survey." 66 However,
Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum. Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even
after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence to support
petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private Respondent Rosalia.
Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale
are bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The
legal presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized
public documents, has not been overcome. 68 On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or
speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future
inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime.
69 Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable because, essentially,
collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed
inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided
in the compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in
nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70
Petitioners have failed to convince us that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All
in all, we find that the Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them.
Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible error to
warrant a grant of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.