REGINO VS.

PANGASINAN COLLEGE
G.R No. 156109 November 18, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Kristine Regino was a poor student enrolled at the Pangasinan
College of Science and Technology. Thus, a fund raising project pertaining to a dance
party was
organized by PCST, requiring all its students to purchase two tickets in consideration as
a prerequisite for the final exam.
Regino, an underprivileged, failed to purchase the tickets because of her status as well
as that project was against her religious belief, thus, she was not allowed to take the
final examination by her two professors.
Issue: Was the refusal of the university to allow Regino to take the final examination
valid?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court declared that the act of PCST was not valid, though, it
can impose its administrative policies, necessarily, the amount of tickets or payment
shall be included or expressed in the student handbooks given to every student before
the start of the regular classes of the semester. In this case, the fund raising project was
not included in the activities to be undertaken by the university during the semester. The
petitioner is entitled for damages due to her traumatic experience on the acts of the
university causing her to stop studying sand later transfer to another school.
Regino v Pangasinan College of Science and Technology
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
financial support of her relatives.
2nd sem, enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A.
Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis
and volleyball courts.
EACH=two tickets at the price of P100 each.

The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased

tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied
the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Refused scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad allegedly
disallowed her from taking the tests.
Sit out and ejected
RTC > lack of cause of action
CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy
Liability for Tort
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation,
mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of
Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action
against respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless
to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will
have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate
speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs

KHRISTINE REA REGINO VS. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she
demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in
another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence
on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to
award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue
is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA [205 SCRA 729 GR No.

84698. February 4, 1942]
Post
under case
digests, Civil
Law at Tuesday,
March
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2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools
by assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This
prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages
against PSBA and its corporate officers.
The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the ground
of no cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an
academic institution. The trial court overruled the petitioners contention and its decision
was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on the law of
quasi-delicts is valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of Appeals to
deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of
the appellate courts ruling.
Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of in loco
parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which were not
students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship.
The school and the students, upon registration established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its premises.
The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to
determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the contractual
relation of them and the students.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. CA Case Digest

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA,
February 4, 1992
FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community,
while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his
parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of
action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic
institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration
was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was
forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in
loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos
were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it
does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while
in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.

Petition denied.
BRICKTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORP vs MOR
TIERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Case
Digest
BRICKTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORP. and
MARIANO Z. VERALDE VS. AMOR TIERRA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and the HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112182
December 12, 1994
239 SCRA 127

FACTS: Bricktown Development Corporation,

represented by its President and co-petitioner
Mariano Z. Velarde, executed two Contracts to Sell
in favor of Amor Tierra Development Corporation,
represented in these acts by its Vice-President,
Moises G. Petilla, covering a total of 96 residential
lots at the Multinational Village Subdivision, La
Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
The total price of P21,639,875.00 was stipulated to
be paid by private respondent in such amounts and
maturity dates, as follows: P2,200,000.00 on 31
March 1981; P3,209,968.75 on 30 June 1981;
P4,729,906.25 on 31 December 1981; and the
balance of P11,500,000.00 to be paid by means of

an assumption by private respondent of petitioner

corporation's mortgage liability to the Philippine
Savings Bank or, alternately, to be made payable in
cash. On date, March 31, 1981, the parties executed
a Supplemental Agreement, providing that private
respondent would additionally pay to petitioner
corporation the amounts of P55,364.68, or 21%
interest on the balance of down payment for the
period from 31 March to 30 June 1981, and of
P390,369.37 representing interest paid by petitioner
corporation to the Philippine Savings Bank in
updating the bank loan for the period from 01
February to 31 March 1981.
Private respondent was only able to pay petitioner
corporation the sum of P1,334,443.21. However, the
parties continued to negotiate for a possible
modification of their agreement, but nothing
conclusive happened. And on October 12, 1981,
petitioners counsel sent private respondent a
Notice of Cancellation of Contract because of the
latters failure to pay the agreed amount.
Several months later, private respondents counsel,
demanded the refund of private respondent's various
payments to petitioner corporation, allegedly
"amounting to P2,455,497.71," with interest within
fifteen days from receipt of said letter, or, in lieu of a
cash payment, to assign to private respondent an
equivalent number of unencumbered lots at the

same price fixed in the contracts. When the demand

was not heeded, Amor Tierra filed an action with the
court a quo which rendered a decion in its favor. The
decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the contract was properly
rescinded.
2. Whether or not Bricktown properly forfeited
the payments of Amor Tierra.
RULING: The contract between Bricktown and Amor
Tierra was validly rescinded because of the failure of
the latter to pay the agreed amounts stipulated in the
contract on the proper date even after the sixty-days
grace period. Furthermore, the records showed that
private respondent corporation paid less than the
amount agreed upon. The Supreme Court also
added that such cancellation must be respected. It
may also be noteworthy to add that in a contract to
sell, the non-payment of the purchase price can
prevent the obligation to convey title from acquiring
any obligatory force.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
since the private respondent did not actually
possessed the property under the contract, the
petitioner is then ordered to return to private
respondent the amount remitted. However, to
adjudge any interest payment by petitioners on the

amount to be thus refunded, private respondent

should not be allowed to totally free itself from its
own breach.

CONTRACT

AS

SOURCE

OF

OBLIGATION

COSMO

ENTERTAINMENT

MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, VS. LA VILLE COMMERCIAL CORPORATION,

Respondent G.R. No. 152801 20 August 2004 FACTS: The respondent, La Ville
Commercial Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 174250 of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City together with the commercial building thereon situated at the
corner of Kalayaan and Neptune Streets in Makati City. On March 17, 1993, it
entered into a Contract of Lease with petitioner Cosmo Entertainment
Management, Inc. over the subject property for a period of seven years with
a monthly rental of P250 per square meter of the floor area of the building
and a security deposit equivalent to three monthly rentals in the amount of
P447,000 to guarantee the faithful compliance of the terms and conditions of
the lease agreement. Upon execution of the contract, the petitioner took
possession of the subject property. The petitioner, however, suffered
business reverses and was constrained to stop operations in September
1996.

Thereafter,

the

petitioner

defaulted

in

its

rental

payments.

Consequently, on February 1, 1997, the respondent made a demand on the

petitioner to vacate the premises as well as to pay the accrued rentals plus
interests which, as of January 31, 1997, amounted to P740,478.91. In reply to
the demand, the petitioner averred that its unpaid rentals amounted to
P698,500 only and since it made a security deposit of P419,100 with the
respondent, the said amount should be applied to the unpaid rentals; hence,
the outstanding accounts payable would only be P279,400. The respondent
requested that the interest charges be waived and it be given time to find a
solution to its financial problems. After negotiations between the parties
failed, the respondent, on May 27, 1997, reiterated its demand on the

petitioner to pay the unpaid rentals as well as to vacate and surrender the
premises to the respondent. When the petitioner refused to comply with its
demand, the respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City. The petitioner, in its answer to the complaint, raised the defense
that, under the contract, it had the right to sublease the premises upon prior
written consent by the respondent and payment of transfer fees. However,
the respondent, without any justifiable reason, refused to allow the petitioner
to sublease the premises. After due proceedings, the MeTC rendered
judgment in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable.
RULING: While petitioner pleads that a liberal, not literal, interpretation of
the rules should be our policy guidance, nevertheless procedural rules are
not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement
of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation.
But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be
heard in the correct form and manner, at the prescribed time ina peaceful
though adversarial confrontation before a judge whose authority litigants
acknowledge. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a
conscientious observance of the rules of procedure. In any case, the Court is
convinced that the findings and conclusions of the court a quo and the RTC
are in order. These courts uniformly found that, under the terms of the
contract of lease, the respondent, as the owner-lessor of the premises, had
reserved its right to approve the sublease of the same. The petitioner, having
voluntarily given its consent thereto, was bound by this stipulation. And,
having failed to pay the monthly rentals, the petitioner is deemed to have
violated the terms of the contract, warranting its ejectment from the leased
premises. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this factual
disquisition of the courts below in view of the rule that findings of facts of the

trial courts are, as a general rule, binding on this Court. The petition is
DENIED.

CONTRACT AS A SOURCE OF OBLIGATION AYALA CORPORATION VS. ROSA

DIANA REALTY 346 SCRA 633
FACTS: In April 1976, appellant-petitioner entered into atransaction with Manuel Sy and
Sy Ka Kieng where former sold a lot in Salcedo Village in Makati. The deed of sale had
some encumbrances contained in the Special Conditions of Sale (SCS) and Deed of
Restrictions (DR), which should be followed by the vendees. The stipulations in the SCS
are: a building proposal must be submitted to Ayala which must be in accordance with
the DR, the construction of the building must be completed on or before 1979, and that
there will be no resale of the lot. The DR specified the limits in height and floor area of
the building to be constructed. However, Sy and Kieng, failed to build a building but
nonetheless with the permission of Ayala, the vendees sold the said lot to the
respondent, Rosa Diana Realty. Respondent Company agreed to abode by the SCS
and theDR stipulations. Prior to the construction, Rosa Diana submitted a building plan
to Ayala complying with the DR but it also passed a different building plan to the building
administrator of Makati, which did not comply with the stipulations in the DR. While the
building, The Peak, was being constructed, Ayala filed a case praying that: 1) Rosa
Diana, be compelled to comply with the DR and build the building in accordance with
the building plan submitted to Ayala; or 2) on the alternative, the rescission of the deed
of sale. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and thus, Rosa Diana was able to
complete the construction of The Peak. Undeterred, Ayala filed before the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Makati a cause of annotation lis pendens. RD refused to grant Ayala
such registration for in the lower court; the case is of personal action for a specific
performance and/or rescission. However, the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
reversed RDs ruling. The appellate court upheld the RDs ruling stating that the case
before the trial court is a personal action for the cause of action arises from the alleged
violation of the DR. The trial court sustained the respondents point saying that Ayala
was guilty of abandonment and/or estoppels due to its failure to enforce the terms of the

DR and SCS against Sy and Kieng. Ayala discriminately chose which obligor would be
made to follow certain conditions, which is not fair and legal. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the lower courts ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosa Diana committed a breach of contract.
RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Rosa Diana committed a breach of
contract by submitting a building plan to Ayala complying with the DR and submitting a
different building plan to the building administrator of Makati, which did not comply with
the stipulations in the DR. Contractual Obligations between parties have the force of law
between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, they must complied with in good faith. Thus,
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

CONTRACT AS A SOURCE OF OBLIGATION PILIPINAS HINO, INC. VS.

COURT of APPEALS G. R. No. 126570 August 18, 2000 338 SCRA 355
FACTS: On or about August 14, 1989, a contract of lease was entered into
between Pilipinas Hino, Inc. and herein respondents, under which the
respondents, as lessors, leased real property located at Bulacan to Pilipinas
Hino, Inc. for a term of two years from August 16, 1989 to August 15, 1991.
Pursuant to the contract of lease, petitioner deposited with the respondents the
amount of P400,000.00 to answer repairs and damages that may be caused by
the lessee on the leased premises during the period of lease. After the expiration
of the contract, the petitioner and respondents made a joint inspection of the
premises to determine the extent of damages thereon. Both agreed that the cost
or repairs would amount to P60,000.00 and that the amount of P340,000.00 shall
be returned to petitioner. However, respondents returned only the amount of
P200,000.00 leaving a balance of P140,000.00. Notwithstanding repeated
demands, respondents averred that the true and actual damage amounted to
P298,738.90. On August 10, 1990, petitioner and respondents entered into a
contract to sell denominated as Memorandum of Agreement to sell whereby the
latter agreed to sell to the former the leased property in the amount of

P45,611,000.00. The said Memorandum of Agreement to sell granted the owner

they shall return to the buyer any amount paid by the buyer in excess of the
down payment with no obligation to pay interest thereon. The private
respondents withholding of the amount corresponding to the interest violated the
specific and clear stipulation in paragraph 9 of the said memorandum. The
parties are bound by their agreement. Hence, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified in that private respondent is ordered to return to the
petitioner the amount of P924,000.00 representing the accrued interest for the
unpaid installments and the decision appealed is affirmed in all other respects.
respondent had allegedly constructed almost one third of the project as weel as
selling some units to third persons unknown to the petitioner. Integrated Inc. took
over the project, thus the petitioner is demanding for the return of its advanced
payment in the amount of P2, 000,000.00 as weel as the keys of the unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to damages.
RULING: No, because in a contract necessarily that there is a meeting of the
minds of the parties in which this will be the binding law upon them. Thus, in a
reciprocal obligation. Both parties are obliged to perform their obligation
simultaneously and in good faith. In this case, petitioner, TitanIkeda can not
recover damages because it was found out there was no solutio indebiti or
mistake in payment in this case since the latter is just entitled to the actual
services it rendered to the respondent and thus it is ordered to return the
condominium units to the respondent.