People V. Lol-lo, et. al.

43 Phil. 19
Defendant - Appellant: Lol-lo and Saraw
Plaintiff Appellee: People of the Philippines
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Facts:
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta, both Dutch possessions. In one of the
boats was one individual, a Dutch subject and in the other boat eleven men, women and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After days of navigation, the second boat arrived between the islands of Buang and
Bukid and was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch
boat, with exception of the two young women, were placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it
would submerge, but after 11 days these people were succored. Taking the two women with them, and
repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able
to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and
that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of
copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part
of the costs.
Issue:
1.

Whether or not the elements of piracy exist.

2.

Whether or not the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor

of any court of the Philippine Islands.

3.

Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy are still in force. Article 153 to

156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at
war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II,
Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to
the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

Decision:
1.

SC held that elements of piracy exist.

2.

SC held that the offense charged was within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, and of any
court of the Philippine Islands.

3.

SC held that the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy are still in force.

Ratio Decidendi:
1-2.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is

robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi (intention
to steal), and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is again done in this
court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani
generis (enemy of mankind). Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It

may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

3.

SC Decided that there was no doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy

were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to
article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable
not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of
United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public
officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and
(2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as
amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into
consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital
punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death

penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not
unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice
Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results,
therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is
affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the
crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be
fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants
together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
cost of both instances.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.