Why
Civil
Resistance
Works


Erica
Chenoweth,
Ph.D.

Wesleyan
University

April
8,
2010

 Some
ConvenBonal
Wisdoms?

•  Insurgents
use
violence
because

–  It
is
effecBve

–  It
is
a
last
resort

•  Nonviolent
resistance


–  Is
ineffecBve
against
brutal
regimes

–  Is
ineffecBve
for
achieving
“tough”
demands

–  Only
emerges
in
contexts
where
it
is
likely
to

succeed
in
the
first
place

 Project
Scope

•  The
Project
Does
Not:

–  Explain
the
emergence
of
different
campaigns


–  Examine
cases
outside
of
the
three
issue
areas
(i.e.,
civil
rights,

anB‐war,
etc.)

–  Argue
that
nonviolent
campaigns
are
morally
superior
to
violent

campaigns

–  Establish
a
formula
for
campaign
success

–  Focus
on
the
human
experience
of
conflict


•  Goals
of
the
Project:

–  Assess
the
empirical
validity
of
the
convenBonal
wisdom

–  Compare
trends
in
the
outcomes
of
nonviolent
and
violent

campaigns

–  Explore
the
condiBons
under
which
campaigns
succeed
and
fail

–  Make
some
claims
about
the
strategic
uBlity
of
different

approaches
to
poliBcal
contestaBon

 Introducing
NAVCO

•  Nonviolent
and
Violent
Campaign
Outcomes
Dataset

–  323
campaigns
from
1900‐2006

–  Ideal
types:
nonviolent
and
violent

–  Campaign
goals:
regime
change,
anB‐occupaBon,

secession

–  Unit
of
analysis:
campaign
end
year

–  Examples
of
typical
variables

•  Campaign
peak
membership

•  Security
force
defecBons

•  Violent
government
repression

•  Material
support
received
from
a
foreign
state

•  Regime
type,
regime
capabiliBes,
country
populaBon,
etc.

Figure
1.
Success
Rates
of
Nonviolent
and
Violent
Campaigns,
1900‐2006


70%


60%


50%


40%

Nonviolent

30%

Violent

20%


10%


0%

Success
 ParBal
Success
 Failure


p=.000

Figure
2.
Success
Rates
by
Decade,
1940‐2006


70


60


50


Nonviolent

40


30
 Violent


20


10


0

1940‐1949
 1950‐1959
 1960‐1969
 1970‐1979
 1980‐1989
 1990‐1999
 2000‐2006


p=.000

 The
Puzzle



Why
has
nonviolent
resistance
been
more

effecBve
than
violent
insurgency
in
the
20th

century?

 The
Argument:


The
Primacy
of
ParBcipaBon


•  The
superior
mobilizaBon
capacity
of

nonviolent
campaigns
advantages
them

relaBve
to
violent
campaigns.


•  Mass,
nonviolent
acBon
is
more
likely
to
divide

the
regime,
whereas
violent
acBon
is
more

likely
to
unite
the
regime.

 Explaining
ParBcipaBon
in
Nonviolent

Resistance


•  Lower
physical
barriers

•  Lower
informaBonal
barriers

•  Lower
moral
barriers

•  Fewer
commitment
problems

Figure
1.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Type
on
Campaign
ParBcipaBon

12
11.5
11
10.5
10
9.5
Logged
Violent
Nonviolent
Campaigns
Membership,
Campaignsfitted values

12 11.5
Logged Membership, fitted values
10 10.5 11
9.5

Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns

p=.00

Figure
2.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Membership
on
the
Probability
of

Success


p=.02

Figure
3.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Membership
on
the
Probability
of

Security
Force
DefecBons,
by
Campaign
Type

.20 members
Pr(defect)
log
Violent
Nonviolent
0
.8
.6
.4
.2
1
5
10
15 Campaigns
Campaigns

Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns

.8
.6
Pr(defect)
.4
.2
0

5 10 15 5 10 15
log members

p=.07

 The
Effects
of
Repression

•  Though
repression
is
quite
common
against

nonviolent
and
violent
campaigns,
its
effects

vary

–  Violent
campaigns
facing
government
repression

are
less
than
20%
likely
to
succeed

–  Nonviolent
campaigns
facing
repression
are
over


46%
likely
to
succeed

•  Backfire
ohen
results
from
government
repression

•  The
state
cannot
repress
all
of
the
people
all
of
the

Bme.

Figure
4.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Type
on
the
Probability
of

Receiving
External
State
Support

.2
0
.6
.4
.2
Pr(Campaign
Violent
Nonviolent
Campaigns
Campaigns
Receives Foreign State Support)
.6
Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support)
.2 0 .4

Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns

 The
Consequences
of
Insurgency

•  Violent
campaigns
create
“structural
violence”

long
aher
the
insurgency
ends


•  Nonviolent
campaigns
are
more
likely
to

improve
governance
and
stability

–  Democracy

–  Civil
peace

 Post‐Conflict
Regime
Type


Violent

 Nonviolent

Campaigns
 Campaigns

Probability
of
Being

a
Democracy
Five

Years
a;er
the
 4%
 41%

Conflict
Has
Ended


P=.000

 Post‐Conflict
Regime
Type,
Extant

Democracies
Only

Violent

 Nonviolent

Campaigns
 Campaigns

Probability
of
Being

a
Democracy
Five

Years
a;er
the
 15%
 84%

Conflict
Has
Ended


P=.000

 Post‐Conflict
Civil
War
Onset


Violent

 Nonviolent

Campaigns
 Campaigns

Probability
of

Experiencing
a
Civil

War
within
Ten
 43%
 28%

Years
of
the
End
of

the
Conflict

P=.07

 Study
LimitaBons

•  Considers
only
ideal
types

–  Nonviolent
and
violent
campaigns

–  Two
broad
categories
of
goals

•  Over‐aggregated
unit
of
analysis

–  Campaign
as
the
unit
of
analysis,
rather
than
different

tacBcal
choices
(or
non‐events)

–  Fails
to
capture
the
iteraBve
nature
of
the
conflict

(inter‐group
and
campaign
vs.
state
interacBons)
over

Bme.

•  StaBsBcs
show
only
correlaBon,
not
causaBon.

 Study
Extensions

•  CollecBng
panel
data
from
1900‐2008.

•  CollecBng
daily
events
data
from
1989‐2009.

–  Textual
Analysis
by
Augmented
Replacement

InstrucBons
(TABARI)

•  Including
many
other
variables,
especially

intra‐organizaBonal
variables.

 QuesBons


echenoweth@wesleyan.edu