G.R.

No.

Case Title

107852

Aruelo vs. CA

160465

Estrella vs.
COMELEC

Issue/Doctrine/Princi
ple
Whether laws
governing election
protests be construed
strictly against any of
the candidates for an
elective post.

Whether 3 is the
majority number of
COMELEC sitting en
banc to reach a
decision.

SC Ruling
No. Laws governing election
protests should be liberally construed
to the end that the popular will, ex
pressed in the election of public
officers, will not, by purely technical
reasons, be defeated. An election
protest does not merely concern the
personal interests of rival candidates
for an office. Over and above the
desire of the candidates to win, is the
deep public interest to determine the
true choice of the people.
No. Section 5. Quorum; Votes
Required. (a) When sitting en banc,
four (4) Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum for the
purpose of transacting business. The
concurrence of a majority of the
Members of the Commission shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure was lifted from Section
7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
which provides: SECTION 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or
resolution. The provision of the
Constitution is clear that it should be
the majority vote of all its members
and not only those who participated
and took part in the deliberations.
Under the rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. Since
the above-quoted constitutional
provision states all of its members,
without any qualification, it should

be interpreted as such.
113219
101428
90780
L-8051921
L-31455

Mateo vs. CA
Vital-Gozon vs.
CA
Acena vs. Civil
Service
Commission
Cua vs.
COMELEC
Filipinas
Engineering and
Machine Shop
vs. Ferrer

104639

Province of
Camarines Sur
vs. CA

49677

Trade Union of
the Philippines
and Allied
Services vs.

Whether or not
Filipinas, the losing
bidder, has a cause of
action under the
premises against the
COMELEC and
ACME, the winning
bidder, to enjoin them
from complying with
their contract.

The COMELEC resolution awarding

the contract in favor of Acme was
not issued pursuant to its quasijudicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court. Being nonjudicial in character, no contempt
may be imposed by the COMELEC
from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this
Tribunal lie from such order. Any
question arising from said order may
be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.
Whether Titi Dato was The S.C Agrees with Petitioners
a permanent employee contentions. Dato, being merely a
of petitioner Province temporary employee, is not entitled
of Camarines Sur at
to his claim for back wages for the
the time he was
entire period of his suspension. The
suspended on March
fact that private respondent obtained
16,1976
civil service eligibility later on is of
no moment as his having passed the
supervising security guard
examination, did not ipso facto
convert his temporary appointment
into a permanent one. What is
required is a new appointment since
a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary
appointment these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority

L-69137
85279
L-44061
L-23721
L-3881
83896

104732
L-8321
93867
100113
95061
199082
118861
112060
104848
95346

National
Housing
Corporation
Luego vs. Civil
Service
Commission
SSS Employees
Association vs.
CA
Salazar vs.
Mathay
Corpus vs.
Cuaderno
Delos Santos vs.
Mallare
Civil Liberties
Union vs.
Executive
Secretary
Flores vs.
Drilon
Quimson vs.
Ozaeta
Brillantes vs.
Yorac
Cayetano vs.
Monsod
Lindo vs.
COMELEC
Arroyo vs. DOJ
Relampagos vs.
Cumba
Edding vs.
COMELEC
Gallardo vs.
Tabamo
Galido vs.
COMELEC

Whether or not a
COMELEC decision
may, if it sets aside the
trial courts decision
involving marked
ballots, be brought to
the Supreme Court by
a petition for certiorari
by the aggrieved
party.

The fact that decisions, final orders

or rulings of the COMELEC in
contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices are final,
executory and not appealable, does
not preclude recourse to this Court
by way of a special civil action of
certiorari. Under Article IX (A),
Section 7 of the Constitution, which
petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless
otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on

certiorari by the aggrieved party

within thirty days from receipt
thereof. We resolve this

88919

People vs.
Inting

Whether the
preliminary
investigation
conducted by a
Provincial Election
Supervisor involving
election offenses have
to be coursed through
the Provincial
Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court
may take cognizance
of the investigation
and determine
whether or not
probable cause exists?

issue in favor of the petitioner. We

do not, however, believe that the
respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the questioned decision.
The COMELEC has the inherent
power to decide an election contest
on physical evidence, equity, law and
justice, and apply established
jurisprudence, in support of its
findings and conclusions; and that
the extent to which such precedents
apply rests on its discretion
The 1987 Constitution empowers the
COMELEC to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable
cause and for filing an information in
court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC. The evident
constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free,
orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would
result in the frustration of the true
will of the people and make a mere
idle ceremony of the sacred right and
duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the
authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office
would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these
principles in mind, it is apparent that
the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional
provision when it quashed the

information filed by the Provincial

Election Supervisor.
93419-32
83938-40
129417
105628
108886

132922

People vs.
Delgado
People vs.
Basilia
COMELEC vs.
Silva
Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC
Reyes vs. RTC
of Oriental
Mindoro

Telecommunicat
ions &
Broadcast
Attorneys of the
Phils. vs. GMA
Network, Inc.

Whether the
petitioner's failure to
file a motion for
reconsideration of the
decision can be
dispensed with.

COMELEC can
supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or
utilization of all
franchises or permits
for the operation of
transportation and
other public utilities,
media of
communication or
information.

No. A motion for reconsideration

before the COMELEC en banc is
required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari is clear from the
provisions of the Constitution
regarding the powers and functions
COMELEC. Conformably to these
provisions of the Constitution all
election cases, including preproclamation controversies, must be
decided by the COMELEC in
division. Should a party be
dissatisfied with the decision, he may
file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc.
Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.
It is argued that the power to
supervise or regulate given to the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution does not include the
power to prohibit. In the first place,
what the COMELEC is authorized to
supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4
of the Constitution, among other
things, is the use by media of
information of their franchises or
permits, while what Congress (not
the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale
or donation of print space or air time
for political ads. In other words, the
object of supervision or regulation is
different from the object of the
prohibition. It is another fallacy for
petitioners to contend that the power
to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit. This may have

force if the object of the power were

the same. Petition is dismissed
103956

Adiong vs.
COMELEC

Whether or not the

Commission on
Elections (COMELEC)
may prohibit the
posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile"
places, public or
private, and limit
their location or
publication to the
authorized posting
areas that it fixes

The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of

decals and stickers on "mobile" places
whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The prohibition
unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Sec. 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It is
difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free
elections may be guaranteed if the freedom
to speak and to convince or persuade is
denied and taken away. We have also ruled
that the preferred freedom of expression
calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage. There is another problem involved.
Considering that the period of legitimate
campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the
opinion of some, too short, it becomes
obvious that unduly restrictive regulations
may prove unfair to affected parties and the
electorate. The posting of decals and stickers
in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. In sum, the prohibition
on posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places
whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on
Elections providing that "decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL
and VOID.

102653

National Press
Club vs.
COMELEC

Whether Section 11
(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646 is
constitutional.

The Comelec has been expressly

authorized by the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of the franchises or

permits for the operation of media of

communication and information. The
fundamental purpose of such
"supervision or regulation" has been
spelled out in the Constitution as the
ensuring of "equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply," as
well as uniform and reasonable rates
of charges for the use of such media
facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums
among candidates." Finally, the
nature and characteristics of modern
mass media, especially electronic
media, cannot be totally disregarded.
Realistically, the only limitation upon
the free
speech of candidates imposed is on
the right of candidates to bombard
the helpless electorate with paid
advertisements commonly repeated
in the mass media ad nauseam.
Frequently, such repetitive political
commercials when fed into the
electronic media themselves
constitute invasions of the privacy of
the general electorate. It might be
supposed that it is easy enough for a
person at home simply to flick off his
radio of television set. But it is rarely
that simple. For the candidates with
deep pockets may purchase radio or
television time in many, if not all, the
major stations or channels. Or they
may directly or indirectly own or
control the stations or channels
themselves. The contemporary
reality in the Philippines is that, in a
very real sense, listeners and viewers
constitute a "captive audience." The
paid political advertisement
introjected into the electronic media
and repeated with mind-deadening
frequency, are commonly intended
and crafted, not so much to inform

and educate as to condition and

manipulate, not so much to provoke
rational and objective appraisal of
candidates' qualifications or
programs as to appeal to the nonintellective faculties of the captive
and passive audience. The right of
the general listening and viewing
public

90878

Sanidad vs.
COMELEC

to be free from such intrusions and

their subliminal effects is at least as
important as the right of candidates
to advertise themselves through
modern electronic media and the
right of media enterprises to
maximize their revenues from the
marketing of "packaged" candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should
be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
2167 violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined
in the Constitution even with the
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio
time which provides a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee
full dissemination of information to
the public concerned because they
are limited to either specific portions
in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times. Since plebiscite
issues are matters of public concern
and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the
issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not
be unduly burdened by restrictions
on the forum where the right to

expression may be exercised.

98355
92279
75959
103309

Osmea vs.
Commissioner
on Audit
Sambeli vs.
Province of
Isabela
Orocio vs.
Commission on
Audit
Bustamante vs.
Commissioner
on Audit

L-61676

Saligumba vs.
COA

L-171115

Guevarra vs.
Gimenez
Philippine
Airlines vs.
COA

91890

Whether the COA

committed grave
abuse of discretion in
denying the
petitioners claim for
transportation
allowance
Whether the Supreme
Court can review the
decision of the COA
in its decision in this
case.

Whether Pedro M.
Gimenez, as Auditor
General of the
Philippines, and
Ismael Mathay, as
Auditor of the Central
Bank of the
Philippines can
approve and pass in
audit two (2) bills of
petitioner Guillermo
B. Guevara for
professional services
rendered by him to
said Bank.

The disallowance of the petitioners

claim for transportation allowance is
within the power of the Commission
on Audit as it is provided in Const.
Sec. 2., Article XII-D, 1973
Constitution. The use of government
motor vehicle and the claim for
transportation allowance are
mutually exclusive.
Supreme Courts power to review
COA decisions refers to money
matters and not to administrative
cases involving the discipline of its
personnel. Even if the SC have
jurisdiction to review decisions on
administrative matters, they cannot
do so on factual issues. Their power
to review is limited to legal issues.
This duty implies a negation of the
power to refuse and disapprove
payment of such expenditures, for its
disapproval, if he had authority
therefor, would bring to the attention
of the aforementioned administrative
officer the reasons for the adverse
action thus taken by the General
Auditing office, and, hence, render
the imposition of said duty
unnecessary. The writ prayed for is
granted and respondents herein are
hereby ordered to pass in audit and
approve the payment of the amounts
claimed by petitioner herein, after
deducting therefrom the sum of
P6,000 already collected by him. It is
so ordered.

112399
201716
133495
R.A. no.
8249

R.A. no.
1379

R.A. no.
6770

Bagatsing vs.
Committee on
Privatization
Abundo vs.
COMELEC
Borja, Jr. vs.
COMELEC
Republic Act
No. 8249
Jurisdiction of
the
Sandiganbayan
Forfeiture in
Favor of the
State Any
Property Found
to have been
Unlawfully
Acquired by any
Public Officer
or Employee
Ombudsman
Act of 1989

Appointive Power of
the President

AN ACT
PROVIDING
FOR THE
FUNCTIONAL
AND
STRUCTURAL
ORGANIZATI
ON OF THE
OFFICE OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN
, AND FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES

139 SCRA
252

Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan

Issue: whether the

Tanodbayan has
power to conduct
preliminary
investigations, file
informations and
prosecute criminal

Section 4. Appointment. The

Ombudsman and his Deputies,
including the Special Prosecutor,
shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least twenty-one (21)
nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council, and from a list of
three (3) nominees for each vacancy
thereafter, which shall be filled
within three (3) months after it
occurs, each of which list shall be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation. In the organization of the
Office of the Ombudsman for filling
up of positions therein, regional,
cultural or ethnic considerations shall
be taken into account to the end that
the Office shall be as much as
possible representative of the
regional, ethnic and cultural make-up
of the Filipino nation.
The Tanodbayan functions not only
as an ombudsman but also as a
prosecutor as well.
As an ombudsman, his investigatory
power is limited to those complaints
initiated against officers and
personnel of administrative agencies,

cases against judges

and their appurtenant
judicial staff.

193459

Gutierrez vs.
The House of
Representatives
Committee on
Justice

164316

Office of the
Ombudsman vs.
Madriaga
Khan vs. Office
of the
Ombudsman
Francisco vs.
House of
Representatives
Villavert vs.
Desierto

125296
160261
133715

One-Year Bar Rule

as defined in Section 9(a) of PD no.

1607 which puts the courts, judges
and their appurtenant judicial staff
outside the Tanod bayan's
investigatory power.
But as a prosecutor where the
tanodbayans power as defined in
section 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607
confers upon him through the chief
special prosecutor and the special
prosecutors, the exclusive authority
to conduct preliminary investigation
of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations
therefor, and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein.
What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that
is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle
the candle. The Supreme Court held
that the whole import of the
constitutional safeguard of one-year
bar rule in consideration of the
impeachable officers is that when the
impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should
be made to traverse it just once.
Similarly, if Congress is called upon
to operate itself as a vehicle, it
should do so just once. There is no
repeat ride for one full year.