Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Flinders University
Reflecting
on Seminal
Administrative
Theorists
1148
stability
control systems
complexity
Liaison devices
diversity
Decentralization
hostility
Power
Charismatic
Visionary
vertical
horizontal
ownership
power needs
culture
Structural configuration
Manifestation of
policy
Policy mode
Professional
Training
Operating core
Expert judgment
Expert
Missionary
Indoctrination
Ideology
Ideological stance
Ideological
Machine
Standardization of behavior
Technostructure
Procedural
Diversified
Standardization of outputs
Middle line
Planning
Network
Support staff
Consensus
Collaborative
Political
Politics
Compromise, agreement
Political
Autocratic
Direct supervision
Strategic apex
Command or directive
Autocratic
Charismatic
Leadership
Strategic apex
Political leadership
Leaders vision
Visionary
STABLE
Expertise/
Ideology
Delegation
COMPLEX
SIMPLE
Control
Administration
Figure 1
DYNAMIC
Rationality/
Ideology
Politics/
Pragmatism
Decentralized bureaucratic
Decentralized organic
Professional: training
Policy type: an expert judgment
EXPERT MODE
Network: collaboration
Policy type: a consensus
COLLABORATIVE MODE
Missionary: indoctrination
Policy type: an ideological stance
IDEOLOGICAL MODE
Political: politics
Policy type: an agreement
POLITICAL MODE
Centralized bureaucratic
Centralized organic
Bureaucratic
Authority
Personal
Authority
Politics
Negotiation
Imposition
Authority
organizations that employ experts and professionals typically permit them a high level of autonomy.
Levels of standardization and centralization are shaped by a variety
of contingency factors in addition to environmental complexity and
stability. In the case of standardization, they include organizational
ownership, age, and size. In the case of centralization, they include
the distribution of power resources among organizational members,
the extent of their legal rights, the organizations culture, its ownership, and the level of environmental hostility. Given that organizational structures reect both environmental and power contingency
factors, organizations may choose structures that are not called for
by their environments. In such cases, structures reect power and
cultural factors such as the presence of outside control of the organization, the personal needs of its members, the fashion of the day,
and the national culture.
Centralization is an attribute not only of organizations but also
of political systems. For example, the degree to which power is
concentrated as opposed to shared is a key dimension in studying
policy network structures (Adam and Kriesi 2007). The dimension
of centralization underlies such contrasts in the policy literature as
those between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy, the
elitist and pluralist models, unitary and federal states, the topdown and bottom-up models of implementation, and the notion
of strong versus weak states (see table 3). The dimension of
standardization underlies such contrasts as those between rationality
and incrementalism, policy and administration, and anticipative and
reactive policy styles.
Levels of standardization and centralization combine to yield different types of organizations. These are depicted in the four cells
Understanding the Policy Process 1151
Nonstandardized
Centralized
Decentralized
Planned
Emergent
Vertical
Horizontal
Structure
Agency
Hierarchies
Networks
Administration
Policy
Top down
Bottom up
Rational
Incremental
Unitary
Federal
Anticipative
Reactive
Elitist
Pluralist
Programmed
Nonprogrammed
Authoritarian
Democratic
Prescribed
Discretionary
Strong state
Weak state
widely shared, as they are when a nation unites to confront a common enemy or to solve an intractable problem.
In the lower-right cell, power is centralized but nonstandardized.
This combination yields what Mintzberg calls the simple structure. This structure typies small organizations that are located
in dynamic environments. The autocratic and charismatic
organizations are variants of the simple structure. The former arises
when a chief executive hoards power, whereas the latter arises when
leaders have power lavished on them by their followers. We may
accordingly contrast imposition and negotiation as alternative sources of policy (see the right-hand vertical polarity). Politics
as a form of coordination (located in the upper-right cell) may
therefore be contrasted with a variety of alternative coordinating
mechanisms. These include expertise or analysis and ideology or
the closed society (the dual horizontal polarity from top right to
top left), rules and plans or administration (the diagonal polarity
from the upper right to the lower left), and authority or coercion
(the right-hand vertical polarity). These four polarities underlie the
depictions of politics that are provided by Charles Lindblom, Karl
Popper, Woodrow Wilson, and Bernard Crick, respectively. Politics or partisan mutual adjustment can also be contrasted with
collaboration as the two alternative forms of mutual adjustment
(both located in the upper-right cell). The nal polarity is between
expertise and authority (the diagonal polarity from the upper left to
the lower right). This polarity arises in relations between civil servants and politicians and was explored by Weber. The coordinating
mechanisms that Mintzberg identies correspond to the universal
and fundamental features of all political systems that are identied
by Lindblom (1980). These include analysis, mutual adjustment,
rules, persuasion, exchange, and authority. Hood (1983) similarly
identies persuasion, authority, organization, and treasure as tools
of government. The rst three of these tools correspond to the
coordinating mechanisms of indoctrination, direct supervision, and
standardization, respectively. Treasure is an organizational resource
rather than a coordinating mechanism. It nonetheless facilitates the
use of exchange, which is a species of mutual adjustment.
EXPERT
IDEOLOGICAL
POLITICAL
COLLABORATIVE
Size of moves
Relation between decisions
Degree of flexibility
Basis of decisions
Character of decisions
Criterion of valid policy
Manifestation of policy
Policy style
Incremental
Disjointed
Moderate
Expertise
Theoretical
Proficiency
Expert judgment
Deliberate and emergent
Varied
Integrated
Low
Ideology
Doctrinaire
Orthodoxy
Ideological stance
Deliberate
Incremental
Disjointed
High
Bargaining
Pragmatic
Agreement
A compromise
Emergent
Incremental
Disjointed
High
Collaboration
Accommodative
Consensus
A consensus
Emergent
Attributes of Modes
PROCEDURAL
PLANNING
AUTOCRATIC
VISIONARY
Size of moves
Relation between decisions
Degree of flexibility
Basis of decisions
Character of decisions
Criterion of valid policy
Manifestation of policy
Policy style
Incremental
Integrated
Low
Rules and precedents
Consistent
Rule conformity
Rules and laws
Deliberate
Varied
Integrated
Low
Goals and plans
Predictable
Goal attainment
Goals and plans
Deliberate
Bold
Loosely coupled
High
Authority
Capricious
Compliance
A command
Deliberate and emergent
Bold
Integrated
High
Leaders vision
Visionary
Commitment
A vision
Deliberate and emergent
When this is allied with a preference for bold, risky decisions that
are based on intuition rather than analysis, radical policy change
can result. For example, former President George W. Bush reportedly preferred to take instinctive decisions rather than to engage
in protracted deliberation (Brookhiser 2003). His decision to invade
Iraq in 2003 was a bold one that overturned previous U.S. policy.
Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Howard also displayed boldness in deciding to invade Iraq alongside Bush, as they both faced
considerable domestic opposition.
(Sabatier and Weible 2007). To understand policy making in dierent types of political systems, dierent theories are required.
Kershaw (2007), in a comparative study of foreign and defense
policy decisions made during World War II by the governments
of Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany, Italy, and
Japan, notes that stark contrasts separated the processes of decision making in the democratic and nondemocratic states. Only in
the United States was public opinion a factor of rst importance
in the making of decisions. In the four authoritarian states, public
opinion was shaped by propaganda and indoctrination and did not
act as an independent inuence on decision making. In Germany,
Hitler exercised unrestrained power and often took decisions alone.
In the United States, by contrast, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
had to negotiate and compromise with Congress, while in Britain,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill was constrained by the collective
nature of cabinet government. He notes that, notwithstanding such
dierences, in all six states, decisions were shaped by such factors as
bureaucratic planning, ideology, and the personalities of leaders. The
relative importance of dierent policy modes, then, varies according
to institutional context. Dierent modes, however, typically coexist
within government because it relies on a variety of coordinating
mechanisms.
Incremental models
Advocacy Coalition Theory
Network Theory
Multiple Streams Theory
Pluralist Theory
Policy Learning Theory
STANDARDIZED
NONSTANDARDIZED
Theories of Bureaucracy
Institutionalism
Policy Analysis
Public Management
Public Administration
Policy Cycle Theories
CENTRALIZED
on rules. Other than in its reliance on rules, the fatalist way does not
correspond to any of Mintzbergs coordinating mechanisms, because
it is characterized by an absence of coordination.
Douglass grid dimension can be seen as comprising two separate
dimensions when interpreted in terms of Mintzbergs theoretical framework. One is a contrast between direct supervision (the
hierarchist way) and the two major species of mutual adjustment:
the collaborative (the egalitarian way) and the partisan in the form
of markets and bargaining (the individualist way). The other is a
contrast between behavior formalization (the fatalist and hierarchist ways) and mutual adjustment (the individualist and egalitarian ways). Rather than view the grid dimension as referring to the
extent of behavior formalization, Collins (1988) interprets it as
referring to the extent of asymmetry in power relations. High grid
therefore equates to deference relations, while low grid equates
to egalitarian relations. If we adopt Collinss interpretation, we
can resolve certain anomalies in Douglass scheme. Hood notes,
for example, that the fatalist way is the most problematic and the
least explored of the four generic types of control. Douglas (1996)
also used the term atomised subordination to describe the low
grouphigh grid fatalist cell. If we interpret grid as the extent of
asymmetry in power relations, then the low grouphigh grid cell
represents low solidarity deference. We can contrast such gesellschaft-like authority, involving low trust relationships and mutual
antagonism or indierence (what Thomas Carlyle called the cash
nexus), with gemeinschaft-like paternalistic authority, involving
high trust relationships and mutual aection (the high grouphigh
grid hierarchist cell). Dened as gesellschaft-like authority rather
than as rule-governed individualism, the low grouphigh grid cell
corresponds to bossism as a control method rather than to contrived randomness. This explains why the fatalist way is the most
problematic and least researched of the four ways of life, because
fatalism is an invalid category. The low grouphigh grid fatalist
cell actually comprises gesellschaft-like authority.
If we adopt Collinss interpretation of the grid dimension, Douglass gridgroup matrix comprises two dimensions of social life:
power relations and social solidarity. The rst of these dimensions
contrasts two of Mintzbergs coordinating mechanisms, namely,
direct supervision (high grid) with mutual adjustment (low grid),
whereas the second contrasts gemeinschaft (high group) with
gesellschaft (low group). In contrast to Douglass matrix, which
comprises two dimensions of social relations, Mintzbergs matrix
comprises two dimensions of organizational structure. His matrix
accordingly identies the full gamut of coordinating mechanisms,
whereas Douglass matrix identies only two: direct supervision
and mutual adjustment. Her four cells comprise the high and low
group variations of each, and they fall within the two right-hand
cells of Mintzbergs matrix in gure 1. Mintzbergs matrix is not,
therefore, superior to that of Douglas, because their explanatory
purposes dier. Mintzbergs matrix seeks to explain variations in
organizational structure, whereas Douglass matrix seeks to explain
variations in group cultures. We can derive a greater variety of
modes of governance from Mintzbergs matrix than from that
of Douglas, though. Douglass grid dimension can be dened to
incorporate behavior formalization as an additional coordinating mechanism, but this gives rise to the problematic category of
fatalism.
consultative and reactive rather than one where it involves imposition and planning.
Given that the dominant theories of public policy focus on the
political mode, their applicability is accordingly limited to those
situations where the combination of low standardization and low
centralization that underlies the political mode arises. Within any
single political system, however, we will encounter dierent such
combinations and, accordingly, dierent structural congurations
and policy modes. For example, democratic states centralize power
in chief executives and accordingly display an autocratic mode,
while within authoritarian states, dierences in interests and values
arise that are resolved through bureaucratic politics. Thus, we
require multiple theories to understand the policy process, because
this is usually not mono-modal. Even a single mode may display
multiple variations. Mintzberg (1983), for example, identies no
fewer than 13 political games that are played within organizations. Advocacy coalition theory, policy networks theory, and
multiple streams theory likewise identify dierent variations of the
political mode. Such variation is not surprising, given that political
actors possess diverse interests, ideas, values, power, and resources
are governed by varied institutions and encounter dierent environments. The preoccupation of public policy theorists with the
political mode, however, has led them to overlook alternative modes
that predominate within nondemocratic states, such as the ideological, planning, and autocratic. A nal virtue of Mintzbergs theory is
that it can encompass not only the formulation of policy but also its
implementation. The same types of contingency factors, coordinating mechanisms, structural congurations, and policy modes are
present in each instance.
To conclude, Mintzbergs work provides us with both a framework
and a theory for understanding the public policy process. It meets
the criteria that Greenaway et al. (cited in Parsons 1995) have
proposed for evaluating the worth of theories in politics, namely,
coherence, consistency, comprehensiveness, and parsimony. It can
incorporate a diverse array of theoretical perspectives within a single
framework. It can also accommodate the dominant frameworks in
the public policy literature. It links the study of organizations with
that of public policy and the study of the formulation of policy with
that of its implementation. By adopting a contingency approach, it
acknowledges that policy processes vary as a result of dierences in
structural congurations, coordinating mechanisms, and contingency factors. It therefore suggests that theories should be used
selectively, because their applicability tends to be conned to those
policy modes and structural congurations to which they correspond, but also in combination, because the policy process typically
displays a variety of such policy modes and structural congurations
rather than just one alone.
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