Matrix

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES
CASE TITLE
1.PEOPLE VS EDUARTE
ESTOPPELLegal rule of evidence (and

not a cause of action) which
(1) prevents a party from
making an allegation or denial
that contradicts what it had
previously stated, or what has
been legally established, as
the truth, (2) supports a claim
for damages of the party that
had a good-faith reliance on a
misleading representation of
another party.
LACHES laches is
"failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable
and
unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by
exercising due diligence,
could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
2.LACSON
VS
SECRETARY
EXEC
FACTS
Assailed in this petition is the order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela,
Branch 22, dismissing the criminal information for concubinage filed against
private respondents, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The antecedent facts
are as follows:
Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Cabagan, Isabela filed on July 25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan,
Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and
Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage [Annex "A" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.]
allegedly committed in September 1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents
entered a plea of not guilty [Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 19]. The
complainant was represented before the trial court by a private prosecutor.
During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the
Regional Trial Court.
The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro,
the imposable penalty on the concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court
sustained private respondent's position and granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner first contends that private respondents are estopped from raising the
issue of jurisdiction after the prosecution has rested its case and the defense has
started to present its evidence. Furthermore, petitioner complains that "it took
two (2) years and six (6) months before anyone to take (sic) notice of the
jurisdictional infirmity [Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12]. Hence, according to
petitioner, private respondents are barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction,
estoppel having already set in.
ISSUE
1) WON the respondent are
estopped in questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC?
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,

an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitionerintervenors.
Issues:
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and
not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the
said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
2)Whether or not the Regional

Trial Court has original
jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage.
RULING
No. The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No judgment has
yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Court holds that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People and
People v. Munar does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply. Private respondents are
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
No jurisdiction. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four (4) years and two (2) months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction" in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec.
20]. Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B. P. Blg. 129 would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro, such as concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months.
More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the husband and another
for the concubine. The penalty for the husband, prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, is unquestionably
within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.
In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the jurisprudence on the
matter, holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over the said crime. Hence, the court a quo
committed no reversible error in dismissing the criminal information against private respondents. At any rate,
considering that the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure] and
considering further that the crime has not yet prescribed [See Art. 90, RPC], the offended wife is not precluded
from initiating the filing of another criminal information against private respondents before the proper court.
(1) Whether or not Sections 4

and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners right to due process
and the equal protection clause
of the Constitution as the
provisions seemed to have been
introduced
for
the
Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the
Held: Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection
of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Page | 1
However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including
herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors,
charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as
an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary
Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of
their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused
in
Section
2
of
R.A.
7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, (ACT
FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN)
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending
in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Kuratong
Baleleng
case.
(2) Whether or not said statute

may be considered as an expost
facto
statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple
murder of the alleged members
of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP
officers which is essential to
the determination whether the
case
falls
within
the
Sandiganbayans or Regional
Trial Courts jurisdiction.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does
not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws.
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode
of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent
requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the
accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those
arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again,
while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection
between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential
element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
3.MONTILLA
HILARIO
VS
In Montilla v. Judge Hilario, 90 Phil. 49 (1951), we held: The fact that, as alleged,
the accused public officers made use of firearms which they were authorized to
carry or possess by reason of their positions, could not supply the required
Page | 2
4.PEOPLE VS MONTEJO
connection between the office and the crime charged (murder). Firearms however
and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of murder or homicide.
Section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code and Republic Act No. 1799,
Section 19 (g) of Commonwealth Act 39, the City Charter of Zamboanga, and
Section 3, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. A perusal of each of the above legal
prescriptions yields no support for petitioners theory.
Section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No.
1799,6 which was approved and took effect on June 21, 1957, speaks of the
authority of a Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Fiscal and Special Counsel to conduct
investigation in criminal matters. All that the City Charter of Zamboanga7 provides
is that its Fiscal may conduct investigations in respect to crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of ordinances by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for
this purpose may, by subpoena, summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him, and the attendance of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced
by application to the Municipal Court or the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Zamboanga. The particular rule cited provides process issued from a superior
court in which a case is pending to bring in a defendant, or for the arrest of any
accused person, or to execute any order or judgment of the court, may be enforced
in any part of the Philippines.8 It is obvious then that the argument of counsel for
the City of Zamboanga based on the above legal provision is, to put it at its mildest,
far from persuasive.
Counsel for respondent, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, did, in his thorough and exhaustive
memorandum, stress anew that the first and decisive question is whether a Court of
First Instance possesses authority in a criminal case to compel by subpoena the
attendance of the witness who, as in this case, resides hundreds of miles away from
the place of trial. According to him, an examination of the placement on Section 9
of Rule 23 discloses to us that it is found under the topic Procedure in Courts of
First Instance which unquestionably would include both criminal and civil cases. It
will be noted further that the provision of Section 9, Rule 23 above quoted makes no
distinction between a criminal or civil case and it is a fundamental rule or statutory
construction that where the law makes no distinction it is not proper for the
interpreter to make any such distinction. After which counsel invoked the
Constitution as well as the Rules of Court,9 particularly the provisions contained
therein granting to the accused in a criminal case the right to have compulsory
process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, which right was
not conferred on the prosecution. Thus, he would sustain the actuations of
respondent Judge not only as free from error but as correct and proper.
While not lacking in plausibility, this contention of respondents failed to enlist the
assent of a majority of the Court. It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the inherent
power of the Court to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending
therein.10 Section 9 of Rule 23 is thus interpreted to apply solely to civil cases. A
recognition of such power in a court of first instance conducting the trial of an
accused may be gleaned from principle that justifies it when satisfied by proof or
oath, that there is reason to believe that a material witness for the prosecution will
not appear and testify when required, to order that he give bail in sum as [it] may
deem proper for such appearance. Upon refusal to give bail, the court must commit
him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged.11
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent
requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Page | 3
Under the circumstances, in view of the serious handicap to which the prosecution
would thus be subjected in proving its case, the order of respondent judge denying
the motion for an order of arrest or a citation for contempt in the alternative, based
on a clear misapprehension of the Rules of Court, could be viewed as amounting to
grave abuse of discretion. It would follow then that respondent Judge should decide
said motion without taking into consideration Section 9 of Rule 23.
WHEREFORE, the preliminary injunction is lifted, the orders of February 3, 1961
set aside, and respondent Judge ordered to pass upon the aforesaid motion of
petitioner. Without costs.
5.CUDIA VS CA
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez,
Mabalacat,i[2] Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for
possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo,
Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter
conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as
follows:
Won Branch 60 , Angeles City

is the proper place for the
hearing/
Won there
jeopardy?
Is
double
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had
no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat,
which is beyond his jurisdiction.
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under
his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6)
live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the
necessary authority and permit to carry the same.
6.PEOPLE VS GARFIN
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise
raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information,
stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into
hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the
accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of
FACTS:
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of the "Social
Security Act,". That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while
being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit
the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of (P6,533.00),
representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December
1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently,
notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had
jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for
offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a
public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. ii[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting
attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction
As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.iii[13]
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must
fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
ISSUE: Whether the approval

of the city or provincial
prosecutor is no longer
required.
HELD:
No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of
administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial
prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said
directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not
required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is
Page | 4
ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100

(P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in
violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and
prejudice
of
the
SSS
and
the
public
in
general.
mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive
word "may" should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph
immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112.
x x x Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within
ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis
supplied)
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City.
Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for
pre-trial.5 Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the
ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval
of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of

Justice
designating
State
Prosecutor
Tolentino
as
Special
Prosecutor
for
SSS
cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city
prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file
the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the
respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the
petition
is
DENIED.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit: After
considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so
resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3
of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal ProcedureRule 112, Section 4 x x x x x
x No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Expresio
unius
est
exclusio
alterius.
7. DE JESUS VS PEOPLE
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it
has
not
been
approved
by
the
City
Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a
motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express
provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of
want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of
Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner
Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978
Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of
Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following
information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the
Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and
try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans
exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.
Whether or not the Tanodbayan

and the Sandiganbayan have
the power to investigate,
prosecute, and try election
offenses committed by a public
officer in relation to his office.
Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving
this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of
the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of
1978.
Page | 5
8. BROCKA VS ENRILE
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal
Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were
released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered
only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7,
1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et
al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention
Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo).
Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was
ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to
Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p.
349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel. The original informations filed
recommended no bail. The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second
offense are cited by Brocka, et al.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment
are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact
that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on
one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney
strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act
(Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses
and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double
jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case,
since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the
sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the
second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions,
among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused "b.
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions
ISSUE: WON criminal

prosecution of a case may be
enjoined YES
RATIO:
GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final
EXCEPTIONS:
1.
To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused
2.
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions
3.
When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
4.
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
5.
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
6.
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
7.
When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
8.
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
9.
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
10.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had
been denied
11.
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners
HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials in bad
faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT
This PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85 upon receipt of TCs order of release violates
guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48 hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile)
Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it violates
Page | 6
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice
Court pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the
original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the
PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs.
Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information [instead of a petition
for HC]
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing:
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance
1. spurious and inoperational PDA
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground has been denied
2. sham and hasty PI, clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the
second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew
IF-THEN RULE:
Brocka, et al contend:
1.
bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution
2.
second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on

one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where
petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and
where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result
should lawfully be enjoined.
xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the
petition.
matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is
9. CRESPO VS MOGUL
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City
(petitioner prays that respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his
threat to proceed with the arraignment and trail of petitioner, ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely
civil.)
FACTS
- Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an information for estafa against Mario
Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that
there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The
presiding judge (leodegario Mogul) denied the motion through his order.
- The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction. In an order (Aug 17 1977), the CA restrained Judge
Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders
from the Court
ISSUE
WON the trial court acting on a
motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom
the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the
merits
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and
insist
on
the
arraignment
and
trial
on
the
merits?
RULING:
YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
Page | 7
- On May 15 1978, a decision was made by the CA granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Dept of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition
for review.
- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino Macaraig Jr,
resolving the petition for review, reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge
denied the motion and set the arraignment
- The accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with petition
for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the CA. On January 23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision of
October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a
resolution.
10 REODICA VS CA
Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87

Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him
physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after
the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner.
She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati
rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence,
resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6
months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before
the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner now assails that
the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight
physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction
and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.
Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other
hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is
necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information
has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
It is a cardinal principle that a criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow
that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them
by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced
that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
Issues:
Whether or not the penalty
imposed is correct.
Whether or not reckless
imprudence
resulting
to
damage to property and
reckless imprudence resulting
to slight physical injuries are
light felonies.
Whether or not there is a
complex crime applying Article
48 of the RPC.
Whether or not the duplicity of
the information may be
questioned for the first time on
appeal.
Whether or not the RTC of
Makati has jurisdiction over the
case.
Whether the quasi offenses
already prescribed.
Held:
1. On penalty imposed
The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty
next lower in degree to arresto menor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).
The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be
arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods.
2. Classification of each felony involved
Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article
25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower
to arresto menor.
Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and
thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
3. Rule on complex crime
Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime
because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony.
Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.
4. Right to assail duplicity of information
Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many
offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the
trial therefore the right to object has been waived.
Page | 8
three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or
for an action on the merits.iv[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appealsv[34] and
People v. Cuaresma,vi[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with
the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
5. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to
the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.
Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:
1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC.
2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running
of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e.
ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes
punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.
We cannot apply Section 9vii[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which

provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without
need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.
Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.viii[37] Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure
promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was
involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law
was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended,
entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended
only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly,
this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the
Page | 9
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a
judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only
the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the
prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of
the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the
Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
11 PILAPIL VS IBAY
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,

and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila
where they had a daughter.
After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling
initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed
that there was failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since
1982.While petitioner filed an action for Legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court in Manila.
On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that during the marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia
and another man named Jesus Chua.
After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the
respondent City fiscal a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two
branches of the RTC of Manila.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that
the cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not, to move to defer further
Whether or not the divorce

decree is valid in the
Philippines and if the private
respondet can file a complaint
of adultery against the
petitioner.
Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that the private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in view of the nationality principle on our civil law
on the matter of the status of persons.
Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed the suit.
The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case befor the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other.
Page | 10
proceedings and to elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review.
Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the
date of arraignment of the other was merely reset.
During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty
while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in
contempt and was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later
entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the
ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case.
On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner.
12.PEOPLE VS DIGORO
An information charging Counterfeiting of Treasury and Bank Notes under Article
166 of the Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First Instance of Lanao on
June 3, 1959 against Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan, Hadji Solaiman Digoro
and Macasasab Dalomangcob. Amended informations charging the same offense
were filed on June 5, 1959 and August 13, 1959. On August 14, 1959, upon
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, on March 20, 1961, the case was provisionally dismissed, upon the
Provincial Fiscals motion, in regard to the accused Hadji Solaiman Digoro and
Macasasab Dalomangcob. On that date, however, an amended information was filed
against Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan. It was captioned For: Illegal
Possession of Counterfeit Treasury and Bank Notes.
As follows is the body of said amended information:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CAMOLO DIGORO alias
PANONDIONGAN of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT
TREASURY AND BANK NOTES, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959 and for sometime prior thereto, in the
Municipal District of Taraka, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to possess, have in his possession, custody
and control, 100-peso bill, 20-peso bill, 10-peso bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1Peso bill denominations in resemblance or similitude to a genuine treasury or bank
notes issued by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
WON guilty plea to an

information does not charge
an offense.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.

A plea of not guilty was entered thereto by the accused, with the assistance of counsel, on the same day. A
decision was thereupon rendered sentencing the accused to suffer imprisonment of not more than ten (10) years
and one (1) day and not less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and to pay the costs.
From said judgment the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the amended information to
which he pleaded guilty, does not charge an offense. Said appeal was thereafter certified to this Court, by
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 11, 1963, as involving questions purely of law.
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to
constitute an offense under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the possession must be with intent to use said
false treasury or bank notes. From the provision of the law the foregoing is clear:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit.-Unless the act
be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use
or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section,
shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging possession of false treasury and bank notes without alleging
intent to use the same but only intent to possess them, charges no offense. A plea of guilty to such an
information, therefore, does not warrant conviction of the accused. It is well recognized that a plea of guilty is an
admission only of the material allegations of the information but not that the facts thus alleged constitute an
offense (People vs. Fortuno, 73 Phil. 407).
From the allegations in the information to which the accused pleaded guilty, intent to use cannot be clearly
inferred. It is true it was stated that the accused possessed the false treasury and bank notes unlawfully and
feloniously Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Such statements, however,
are not allegations of facts but mere conclusions that the facts alleged constitute the offense sought to be charged.
Page | 11
Furthermore, the information alleged intent to possess instead of intent to use. Such allegation precludes clear
inference of intent to use, in the absence of express allegation of the latter, since intent to use entails intent to part
with the possession.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed is hereby set aside and the case is remanded for new prosecution under an
appropriate and valid information. Costs de oficio. So ordered.
13.PEOPLE VS TEVES
This case is before us on automatic reviewix[1] of the decisionx[2] of 14 March 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in four (4) criminal cases,
finding accused-appellant Godofredo Teves y Lemen (hereafter GODOFREDO)
guilty of the crime of multiple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages.
On the basis of a sworn statement xi[3] executed by Cherry Rose Teves (hereafter
CHERRY), daughter of GODOFREDO, a criminal complaint xii[4] for multiple rape
committed since the year 1993 up to the 1st, 8th and 3rd day of January 1995, was
filed against GODOFREDO before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Kawit,
Cavite. Although not clear from the record, GODOFREDO was somehow arrested
and detained.
Despite due notice, GODOFREDO did not file his counter-affidavit with the MTC.
After due proceedings, the MTC found a prima facie case against GODOFREDO
and thus forwarded the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite.xiii[5]
On 4 July 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed four (4)
separate informations for rape against GODOFREDO with the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 20, in Imus. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 3872-95,xiv[6] 3873-95,xv[7] 3874-95xvi[8] and 3875-95,xvii[9] respectively.
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 3872-95,
denominated as one for multiple rape, reads as follows:
That sometimes [sic] in the year 1993, in the Municipality of Kawit,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter,
by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have repeated carnal
knowledge of Cherry Rose Q. Teves, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
WON there is defective motion

for rape.
Concretely then, GODOFREDO might only be convicted of the crimes of rape charged in the informations in
Criminal Case No. 3873-95 and in Criminal Case No. 3875-95. It was then error for the trial court to find him
guilty of rape in the four (4) cases and, worse, impose upon him one penalty of death for multiple rape. In view of
its findings, the court a quo should have imposed the death penalty in each of the four (4) cases.
At this point, however, we are compelled to inquire into the propriety of the imposition of capital punishment. To
repeat, the trial court so imposed the death penalty, reasoning that under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, the same was warranted in rape cases committed by a parent when the victim was
under 18 years of age.
Initially, we note that the trial court found that R.A. No. 7659 took effect in January 1994. However, in People
v. Simon,xviii[29] as reiterated in a multitude of cases since, we categorically held that said statute took effect on 31
December 1993.
Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the last
paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.
When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.
When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consaguinity.
4.
When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.
When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.
When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, Ra 7659.)
These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus increase the
degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added
by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. So
we held in People v. Ramos,xix[30] to the effect that a qualifying circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the
information, thus:
While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of
the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred
to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this
Page | 12
kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a
different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty
upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death.
Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a
special qualifying circumstance.
As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against
appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is
being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. xx[31] This right
finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. xxi[32]
Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information.
Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against
him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 9 of Rule 110
provides:
Section 9. Cause of accusation. -- The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment.
Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: a person of common understanding,
which had its origins in this jurisdiction in the phrase: a person of ordinary intelligence. xxii[33]
In this light, we hold that the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95 do not sufficiently allege
the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victims age and the relationship between the culprit and the
victim. The informations in these two cases provide, respectively:
[A]nd taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only
thirteen years old...
[T]aking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter...
What strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. xxiii[34] Be it in terms of syntax or composition, the
wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or
ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that
the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the
attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in
the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special
circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time
the crime of rape was committed.
14. PEOPLE VS NUEVO
FACTS:
Whether or not appellant was
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 oclock in the evening of December 4, 1994, sufficiently identified by the
Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband for the drinking spree at offended party based only on
Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with her 10 month old daughter and her recognition of the sound of
her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm, appellant returned and entered their his voice;
room. She was awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and
Whether or not the prosecutions
took off her clothing. She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail.
evidence suffices for the
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have sexual conviction of rape and the
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy talk even
from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an
acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years.
In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of the circumstances under the provisions
of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659, mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the
absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty.
While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use of a deadly weapon aggravated the
Page | 13
intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present, witnessed what was being done
to her. Appellant threatened her and her niece. Roberta testified that she did not see
him because it was very dark that night, she identified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wifes story. He saw Sanico left his
fathers place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at around 1:00 pm. Dr.
Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found on the victim, that
only old lacerations were present.
Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since they were
schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor. He denied, he invited
Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances. The accused was sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of death.
15.US VS YAO SIM

There is and can be no question as to the fact that the accused in this case was found
with some 3 grams of opium in his possession. It is claimed by counsel on appeal
that the conviction of the accused by the trial court should not be sustained, because
the prosecution failed to negative by affirmative evidence that the accused was
lawfully entitled to have this opium in his possession for use as a medicine upon the
prescription of a practicing physician.
imposition of the death penalty

on him.
crime committed, court find that these were not averted in the information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravating circumstances with specifity. This requirement has retroactive effect.
The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished
only with Reclusion Perpetua.
ALLEGATIONS
EXCEPTIONS
We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused. The judgment convicting
and sentencing him should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against him. So ordered.
OF
No evidence was offered by the accused in the court below in support of a claim that
the accused was lawfully entitled to have the contraband drug in his possession, and
the prosecution having established the fact of possession by competent testimony,
the trial court properly held such possession tending to show that the accused was
lawfully entitled to have the drug in his possession for use as a medicine upon a
prescription of a practicing physician. (U.S. vs. Chan Toco, 12 Phil. Rep., 262.)
16.TEEHANKEE
MADAYAG
VS
FACTS: Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of
frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the
course of the trial, Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the information
from frustrated murder to consummated murder. Teehankee Jr. questioned the new
charge for lack of preliminary investigation thereon .
T
here are three (3) questions to

be answered here:
ISSUE #1: Was there an amend ment of the information or substitut ion when the information was changed from
frustrated murder to consummated murder?
HELD: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but
only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being
the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of
the amended information for murder is proper.
ISSUE #2: What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial?
HELD: Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner
will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in
determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the
Page | 14
victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may
adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for
murder. So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: You shot Hultman who almost died. Teehankee Jr.:W ala man
ako dun ba! I was at home asleep! Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now, namatay si Hultman. Ano man ang depensa
mo? Mao man gihapon: Wala man ako dun! The accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still
available to him.
SSUE #3: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge?
HELD: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when there is substitution,
kailangan ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal amendment, preliminary investigation is not
necessary. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple
and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information.
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that
an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new
preliminary investigation is not necessary.
Nota Bene: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been
held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his
right to invoke prescription.
17.GABIONZA VS CA
GABIONZA V. CA
30 March 2001
Facts:
Dennis t. Gabionza was charged of violating RA 1161 (SSS Law). He
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. About 4 years after he was arraigned, the
public prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the information in order
to change the dates therein. The TC granted the motion.
On 9 November 1993 an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of

violating Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to Sec. 28, par. (e), of RA 1161. It
alleged that in and about or during the period from January 1991 to May 1993
petitioner, President of the Manila City Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered
employer under RA 1161, willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to
remit to the Social Security System (SSS) contributions for SSS, Medicare and
Employee Compensation (EC) amounting to P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty
imposed thereon in the amount of P541,417.87.xxiv[3]
Issue:Was the grant proper?
May an Information be
amended to change the material
dates of the commission of the
offense after the accused had
been arraigned?
Held:
Yes. After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the information may be allowed as to matters of
form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused
are prejudiced by the amendment is when a defense under the complaint or information would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information as amended.
Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:
a.
it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription
b. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged
c.
it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to
undergo any material charge or modification in his defense
d. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty
e.
it does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.
In this case, the questioned amendment is one of form only. The allegation of time when an offense is
committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
49098-SP affirming that of the trial court which allowed the amendment of the Information charging petitioner
with violation of RA No. 1161, as amended, is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10 February 1998 or about four
Page | 15
(4) years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information
from January 1991 to May 1993 to January 1991 to May 1992. Petitioner
opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in
nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of
the cause and nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice
defenses that were otherwise available to him.
On 31 March 1998 the trial court granted the motion and allowed amendment of the
Information, ruling that the amendment pertained only to matters of form. It further
ruled that the amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused as the theory
of the prosecution remained the same. xxv[4] On 2 September 1998 petitioners
motion to reconsider the order was denied.
Petitioner elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the order of the trial court. On 9 June 1999 respondent
Court of Appeals upheld the amendment and dismissed the petition.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or
Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as amended.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and
not of substance.
Page | 16
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv

Matrix

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Matrix

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

ESTOPPELLegal rule of evidence (and

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,

2)Whether or not the Regional

(1) Whether or not Sections 4

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

(2) Whether or not said statute

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

Won Branch 60 , Angeles City

ISSUE: Whether the approval

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100

In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of

Whether or not the Tanodbayan

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

ISSUE: WON criminal

To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused

When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice

When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation

When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice

"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

1. spurious and inoperational PDA

second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on

matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87

Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

We cannot apply Section 9vii[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,

Whether or not the divorce

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

WON guilty plea to an

Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

WON there is defective motion

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

14. PEOPLE VS NUEVO

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

15.US VS YAO SIM

imposition of the death penalty

here are three (3) questions to

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

On 9 November 1993 an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of

Issue:Was the grant proper?

Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10 February 1998 or about four

CASE DIGEST RULE 110 PROSECUTIO N OF OFFENSES

You might also like