Professional Documents
Culture Documents
168913
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No.
N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not
issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of
xxxx
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs
over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate,[16]
which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Significantly, in this case, the original petition docketed before the trial
court contains only the following averments:
xxxx
1. That Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at 2237 P.
Burgos St., Pasay City who is named devisee in the Last Will and
Testament of MOISES BANAYAD, deceased who died in Pasay City
General Hospital on March 27, 1991 xerox copy of his death certificate is
herewith attached as Annex A to form integral part hereof;
2. That the said Last Will and Testament is herewith (sic) attached as
Annex B and made an integral part of this Petition, the original thereof will
be presented to this Honorable Court at the time of probate;
3. That the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines and residing at
2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City at the time of his death;
4. That the properties left by the decedent consist of real and personal
properties particularly described herein below, which decedent all
bequeathed to petitioner;
A. A parcel of land described under TCT No. 9741 xerox copy of which is
herewith (sic) attached as Annex C.
B. Imahen ng Oracion del Huerto at Pieta, kasama and korona.
C. All personal belongings.
5. That the testator at the time of the execution of the said Will was of
sound and disposing mind.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:
a. Upon proper notice and hearing, the above mentioned Will be admitted
to probate;
b. That letters testamentary or administration be issued to herein petitioner
without bond;
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in (sic) the
premises.
x x x x[17]
not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of
First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to
set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16,
1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to
dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year,
the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us.
x x x x[24]
Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised
during the execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts
denial of the suretys motion to quash the writ of execution has been
brought to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial courts assumption
of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been
discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not
during the execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the
exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings
therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.[25] With the
above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve
the other issues raised in the petition.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on
its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged
grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and
authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain
Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that
the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the
parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she
convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan,
our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented
proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is
the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules
of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which
would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically
evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan,
Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that
they personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none
of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan
to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They
were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth.
These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or
heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents
witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to
be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the
son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly
not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the
relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima
Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa
Gabatan Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according probative weight to
their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination
that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31]
In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband.
They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the
case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and
the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32]
(Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by
the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document
involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan
as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the
vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or
recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA
considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the
part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its
contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was
vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35] After a close
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court
cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions
made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
(subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In
their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died
intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to
the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1wphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in
an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court
of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the
case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate
child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding
for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted
the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,
appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining
whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25
Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
NACHURA, J.:
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his
mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for
mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce
the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle
and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason.[3]
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a
condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in
custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were
given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent
was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No.
224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended
that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle
the controversy with her before he filed the suit.[4]
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed
to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will.
Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to
the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to
issue the writ of mandamus.[5]
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.[6] In its February 4,
2005 Order,[7] however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied on September 20, 2005.[8] Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26,
2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the
writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy
would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an
action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent
could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the
proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.[9]
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the
assailed August 23, 2006 Amended Decision,[10] granted the motion, set
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the
will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent
was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the further
assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.[11]
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court,
contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as
basis for its ruling is inadmissible.[12]
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause
of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED.
PERALTA, J.:
It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of the
Court was arrived at only after extensive consideration of every legal facet
available on the question of validity of the Will.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed
separately by petitioner Republic and oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are both
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the
aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution
referring the petition to the CA, to wit:
xxxx
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed
herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate,
the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and
this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to
take cognizance of said case in the first instance.[10] (Emphasis and
Underscoring Supplied)
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for
partial reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate portion
of which reads:
Under the Rules, a decedents testamentary privilege must be accorded
utmost respect. Guided by this legal precept, therefore, in resolving the
two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained to DENY both.
Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that
these are but a mere rehash of issues already raised and passed upon by
the Court.
SO ORDERED.
One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case,
e.g., the orders dated September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as well as
October 3, 1995, to see that even as far back then, the Court has
considered the matter of competency of the oppositors and of
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having been settled.
Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said
resolution gave the CA discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it
may deem proper. The resolution is clear that the petition was referred to
the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action
as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA
when the action it deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition for
having availed of an improper remedy. More importantly, the action of the
CA was sanctioned under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which
provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[26] in which this Court made the following pronouncements:
In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to resort to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari for when it learned of the case and
the judgment against it on July 25, 1986, due to its receipt of a copy of the
decision by default; no execution had as yet been ordered by the trial
court. As aforementioned, Oriental had still the time and the opportunity to
file a motion for reconsideration, as was actually done. Upon the denial of
its motion for reconsideration in the first case, or at the latest upon the
denial of its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental should have
appealed. Oriental should have followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court for
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to purpose that substantive law and adjective
law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other,
in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due
process whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.[27]
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to
serve as executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.
No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
xxxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis Supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters
testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1)
want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of
cases[30] and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or
at the least, with questionable integrity.[31]
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following
findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on
the part of Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez
Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament, so as to render
them incompetent to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no
evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the
said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is
disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the
matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or
gross abuse of discretion is shown.[32] The Rules of Court gives the lower
In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed
by law, or makes willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x
x. (Emphasis Supplied)
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III
filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the
allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred
his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and
banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by
involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which
was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the
significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his
curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and
Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x."10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence
on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a
decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and
the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and
Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately
from their father and paternal grandparents.
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.11
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an
estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross value of
P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving
heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving
spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita CojuangcoSuntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and
(4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a
resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no
debts or obligation at the time of her death.8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent
Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
among others, that:
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of
a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he
appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER
WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE
INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES
SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated,
thus:
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for
the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against
the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home
in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of
the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator.
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with
that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 99216 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is
barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over
respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the
decedent; and
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents
estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA
glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give
preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid
and effective will;
in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation
from her late husband Leonardo.
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a
Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006,[15]
praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a true
inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an
accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the
income of the estate.
Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15,
2007,[16] claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an
inventory and render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate
inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the
June 15, 2006 Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with
Renato.
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of
Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC
took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of
Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the
estate.
On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents appointment as
joint special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and
to Render Account of the Estate,[17] reiterating their stance that
respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a
true inventory of the income and assets of the estate.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators
Bond[18] on May 22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their
duties as special administrators without the need to file an administrators
bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged
that, since petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object
to the appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it would
be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from
incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They
also assured the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as
special administrators under pain of contempt should they violate any
undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office.
In an Order dated June 29, 2007,[19] the RTC directed the parties to
submit their respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents,
i.e., petitioners Motion for Inventory and to Render Account, and
respondents Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond.
Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition,[20] stating that they
have already filed a comment on petitioners Motion for Inventory and to
Render Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime,
hold in abeyance the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of
their Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond.
On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007
Order appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners
filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to
Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.[21]
Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as
the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being
identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating
the representation of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise,
contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special
administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was
due them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a
real property for P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners
to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents alleged
misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to
cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.
Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment[22] on March 10, 2008,
to which, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment[23]
on March 17, 2008.
In its Order dated March 13, 2008,[24] the RTC granted petitioners Motion,
revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint
special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order,
particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts,
legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed by the court;
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court;
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.[31]
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before
entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the
court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come
to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as
are received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same
to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person
as may be authorized to receive them.[32]
Is a minor;
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
xxxx
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
(a)
(b)
The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names
and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c)
(d)
prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice
thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. Any interested person
may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the
incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the
ground of the contestants own right to the administration, and may pray
that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named
in the opposition.
Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition,
it must first be shown that notice has been given as herein-above required,
and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of
their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or
that there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance
of letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto.
estoppel
to
justify
its
denial
reconsideration;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of
the
motion
for
It should be stressed that when the complaint was filed, defendant Manuel
S. Toledo was already dead. The complaint should have impleaded the
estate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only the wife, considering
that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable party, which stands
to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case. x x x
xxxx
[Respondents] motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted
by public respondent judge as the same was in order. Considering that the
obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is solidary with another debtor, x x x, the
claim x x x should be filed against the estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in
conformity with the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, x
x x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial courts
jurisdiction;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable party as the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party
not warranting the dismissal of the case before the lower court; and
Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not
necessary that petitioner file its claim against the estate of Manuel.
In essence, what is at issue here is the correctness of the trial courts
orders denying respondents motion to dismiss.
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in
favor of respondent. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a
motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss
is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is
finally decided on the merits.21 Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a
case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered."22
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on
Higher Education:23
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion
or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its
function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no
power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous
findings and conclusions made by the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to
dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as
respondents motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS
AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone
already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed
in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be
filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim.24
over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if
not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent
cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being
subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the
party who can thereby waive it by silence."39
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid
service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never
acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him
when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is
notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person."40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him,
precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against
him and his wife was filed in the trial court. The issues presented in this
case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te.41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio Sereno
was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering the payment of his
monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the possession of Serenos
employer was levied upon by a sheriff of the NLRC, accompanied by
Sereno and his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A
complaint for recovery of motor vehicle and damages, with prayer for the
delivery of the truck pendente lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba,
Sereno, the NLRC sheriff and the NLRC by the registered owner of the
truck. After his motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, petitioner
Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on, however, he filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of jurisdiction over one of the
principal defendants, in view of the fact that Sereno was already dead
when the complaint for recovery of possession was filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that
of Sarsaba, one of the issues submitted for resolution in both cases is
similar: whether or not a case, where one of the named defendants was
already dead at the time of its filing, should be dismissed so that the claim
may be pursued instead in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed,
as did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died before
summons was served on him, the trial court should have dismissed the
complaint against all the defendants and the claim should be filed against
the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore,
prayed that the complaint be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to
all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno.42 This is exactly the same prayer made by
respondent herein in her motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba
wise:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Case,
resolved
the
issue
in
this
Supreme Court, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v.
Villarama, et. al.,49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence
[Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that where two persons are
bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole
indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter, the decedents
liability being absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing
that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the creditor desire
to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said
provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent
before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the
creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to
the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors.
Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditors filing
of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of
instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of
Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion51 where the Supreme Court
pronounced:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against
the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure
in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set
forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file
or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. x x x
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable
provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to
"proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of
one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to
have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the
creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for
any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would
deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
GO vs. DIMAGIBA
June 21, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1)
imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a
fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that
shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment,
at the discretion of the court.[37]
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a
rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.[39] When the
circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be
considered as the preferred penalty.[40] The determination of the
circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial
judge only.[41] Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate,
such penalty may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment.
The competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this
Court.[43]
Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy
enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a first time offender.
[44] This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining
whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be
imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.[45] It is the
trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law.
SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:
x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference
in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of
a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant
the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.
that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction.
Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he
was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably
considered in determining his appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is punished
in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of
checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or
lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of
worthless checks is criminalized:
The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on
public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend
the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation
multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.[66]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders
NULLIFIED.
REYES, J.:
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17,
in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001.1wphi1 Since his detention was by
virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with
six (6) others, on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a convict may
be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum
period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is
a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on
parole.20 Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel
case was pending before the RTC Branch 14.21 In fact, even when the
instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending.
The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore,
proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate
release at that time.
Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular
No. 08-2008, citing Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the
imposition of the fine rather than imprisonment under the circumstances of
the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January 25,
2008 and provides the "guidelines in the observance of a rule of
preference in the imposition of penalties in libel cases." The pertinent
portions read as follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the
foregoing rule of preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following
principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fame alone would best serve the
interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)
A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering
the attendant circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative
circular can not be given retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 486792001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument considering
that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become final and
executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence.
Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
1.
Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008
re Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden
Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.
2.
This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied
in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against
him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against
such police personnel.
3.
In this connection, you are hereby directed to place
PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and
Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive
custody.
4.
Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court
cannot simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the
Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody
pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process
done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of
the subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of
PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic,
the same could not be accepted by this Court. It must be stressed that the
resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of
the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is
still in the active status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED.[13]
Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC
Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.[15]
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be
followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment.[17]
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals
liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.[18] Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[19]
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.[20]
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.
Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.[21]
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any
time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member
thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First
Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable
before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course
or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.[22]
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the
custody of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative
case filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor
Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was
still no administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues
that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan
was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial
authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment[23] filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject
petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from
custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal
action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned
and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held
under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing
administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of
Manalo v. Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a petition for habeas
corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
Sec. 52 x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred
eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have
the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the
filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police
personnel. [Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has
held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not
a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[26]
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call
for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody
since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should
have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of
a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is
six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend
the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from
arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that
the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may
order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the
charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day:
Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than
ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to
the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That
such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the
exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.
CARPIO, J.:
In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy
from Bagtas and Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the
matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition[6] for habeas
corpus.
In its Order[7] dated 10 July 2002, the RTC issued a writ of habeas[8]
corpus directing the deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to
summon Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they were withholding the
custody of Maryl Joy.
The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise
agreement. In its Order[9] dated 13 September 2002, the RTC stated:
In todays hearing, both parties appeared with their respective counsels
and have agreed on the following:
1.
that the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday,
Saturday and Sunday;
2. that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners
on Sunday at 8:00 oclock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the
petitioners anytime of the day; and
3.
that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but
should be returned to the petitioners on Friday morning.
The above agreement shall take effect today and parties are ordered to
comply strictly with the said agreement under pain of contempt in case of
violation thereof.
On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S.
Gallardo brought Maryl Joy to Samar. In their motion[10] dated 30
September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardo be
directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to
explain why they violated the RTCs 13 September 2002 Order, and that
they be cited in contempt. In their motion[11] to dismiss dated 11 October
2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardos action be
dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. Section 3
states that If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to comply with x
x x any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the courts own motion. Bagtas and Sioson claimed
that the Spouses Gallardo failed to comply with the RTCs 13 September
2002 Order.
In its Order[12] dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited the Spouses
Gallardo in contempt, fined them P500, and ordered them to produce
Maryl Joy before the trial court.
5.
Thus, the Honorable Court very clearly issued a conflicting Order
because It has cited the [Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of court for
violating the previous September 13, 2002 Order that the child should be
returned to the respondents in the evening of September 29, 2002
(Sunday), and yet the Honorable Court has dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic. This is in effect giving premium to the act of the
petitioners of not turning over the child to respondents on September 29,
2002. Likewise, this is tantamount to rewarding them for not producing the
child in court in violation of the aforesaid September 13, 2002 Order;
6. Moreover, the Honorable Court has issued an unreasonable Order by
stating that the dismissal of the instant case is without prejudice to the
filing of the proper action for custody of the minor by the petitioners. Why
would the petitioners still file the proper action for custody if they now have
the custody of the minor?
P R AY E R
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the
December 9, 2002 Order of the Honorable Court be partially reconsidered
so that the dismissal of the case will not be based on the ground of being
moot and academic but based on failure to comply with the September 13,
2002 pursuant [sic] to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and that petitioners be consequently directed to return the
person subject of the petition to the respondents to preserve the status
quo ante.
In its Order[15] dated 21 April 2003, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. The RTC held that the sole purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy and that the Spouses
Gallardo exercised substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy. The RTC
stated that:
The allegations in the Petition show that the sole purpose for the filing of
the Petition is to cause the production before the Court of the person of
minor Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo, not a determination of the legality or
illegality of respondents custody of the child, petitioners being aware of the
fact that the child was left by their (petitioners) daughter to [sic] the custody
of the respondents, as stated in par. no. 10 of the Petition.
The instant Petition is therefore, essentially not a petition for Habeas
Corpus as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court which is
resorted to in all cases of illegal confinement by which any person is
deprived of his liberty (Cruz vs. CA, 322 SCRA 518), but is resorted to also
where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court. In
order that the special remedy of Habeas Corpus maybe [sic] invoked, it is
necessary that there should be an actual and effective restraint or
The Issues
In his petition dated 1 February 2005, Bagtas raised as issues that:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The Courts Ruling
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTCs 9 December 2002
and 21 April 2003 Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole
purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy
before the trial court, the action became moot when Maryl Joy was
produced. The Court disagrees.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the
purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the production of
the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. In Tijing
v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court held that:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his
own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors,
the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become
moot after Maryl Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have
conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy.
In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for habeas
corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis. In Laxamana v. Laxamana,[19] the Court held that:
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have
conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit
the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of
Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence
of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the courts
primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify
the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect
the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in
resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability
of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. Article 216 states that in default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child. Accordingly, in its 21 April 2003
Order, the RTC held that:
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the legal custody
of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or
enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.[20]
In its 11 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that:
While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial
custody of the minor in violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless
sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition and validating such
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are
the grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her parents.[21]
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare
is the most important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal
BRION, J.:
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present
petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three
remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present
factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal
reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the
private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition bases
as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge
shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute].
They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants.
Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were
burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence
put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the
armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their
intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y
GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo,
fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them
to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were
reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant
violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and
children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons
have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police
authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in
dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into
the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are
persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested
witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel
Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of
Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to
atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the
defendants.[13]
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing
Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact
involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding
P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC.
Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC
decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on
appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the
petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has
been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a
pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review
of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the
petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact
status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with
against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before
the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through
different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the
summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the
fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule
7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That
a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and
possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation
where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory
orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs.[22]
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on
the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents complaint,
which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners
may have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to or
possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over
these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed
to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed
value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on
the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of
the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for
the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones
the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with
Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be
with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the
assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at
the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was
or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the
factual allegations heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in
paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the
following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting
the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession,
private respondents intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private
respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal
acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors
descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemias affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson
Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards
of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident
involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating
that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge
Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and
unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or
to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence
of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand,
is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from
the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and
firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the
statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically
identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod,
on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny
Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential
houses was accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its
decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual
claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they
were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments
and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the
backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence
or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC;
subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still
much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and
then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the
issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate,
may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of
a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing
threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear
to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus,
if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings,
as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the
MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place,
but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at
this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present
recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to
negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify
before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial
measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed
out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse
itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo
based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To
be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures,
neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they
may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the
appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these
processes the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides for rules on the institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of
earlier-filed criminal actions,[25] and for the consolidation of petitions for
the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil
action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for
dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the
parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through
a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the
right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended
to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or
threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on
appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the coexistence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the
act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges
that:
1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so
that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the
petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private
respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the
same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the
Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to
the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and
likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the
PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security.
The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need
for information under the control of police authorities other than those it
has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for
the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts
made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is
not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its
body and attachments.
G. R. No. 182161
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege
on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner
together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await
inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco,
Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest
proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to
Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales
issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent
Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49
others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national
security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and
36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S.
No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon
Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence
indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the
Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made
personally by a judge.
Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998[2]
and No. 18 Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by
the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case
against herein petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of
HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondents pending Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the
Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No.
07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45
before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18
can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of
the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners
counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in
Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for
several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a
motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would
be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue
HDO.
For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained
that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute
offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its tenyear existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been
challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge
for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.
The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel
of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other
accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in
taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other accusedcivilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite
the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and
submit themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the
scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on electoral and
political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence
that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accusedsoldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law
penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was
or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for
the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the
protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is
a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called
upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court
explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the
right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by
a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of
his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades
the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a
broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of
life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to
the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[16]
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et
al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm
to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. x x
x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly
expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates
that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars
postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the right to security
of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless
to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to
security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the
threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in
the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for
human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) [19]
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20]
As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to
travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the courts sound discretion. [22]
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in
the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available
legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23]
this Court ruled that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person,
which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare
any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this
nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort
on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the
provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The
reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed
with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 073126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the
DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner
argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said
HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the
HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the
LEONEN, J.:
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In
the body of its decision, the RTC stated:
Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order
dated 2 March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said
rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof
on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to
file their Answer ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the
Court has devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
falling within their jurisdiction:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations
in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual
order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the
entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return
and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or
security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed.1wphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and
grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege
of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances.
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as
"granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of
the plaintiffs claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the
proper procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the
parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to
a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure,
delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory
order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for
Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the
present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved.
It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo were promulgated.
(2)
ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on
the aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to
personally appear thereat;
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Petitioners Arguments
(3)
COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and
Andrew Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72)
hours from service of the writ, a verified written return with supporting
affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party, through any act or omission;
b)
The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
c)
All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners]
pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4)
GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order
prohibiting the [petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf,
under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm
to [respondent], his immediate family and any [member] of his household.
Our Ruling
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated
to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in
the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. [40]
Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce
be dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties
do not dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned
at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such
uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and
constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6[41] of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[42] recognizes
every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9[43] thereof ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be
protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired
except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.[44]
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance
as alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the summary
proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does
not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This
omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be
promulgated by Congress.[45] Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo
blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46] when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted
principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of
enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to
issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are
not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that
the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal
to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a
menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic
blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of
Navia at that time, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala
kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It
unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is
nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they
released Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath.
Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her
signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far,
the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged
complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in court
and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of
State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented
tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.[51] Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or
its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of
amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person
sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are
mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam,
Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do
not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by
some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a
missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.
SERENO, J.:
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile,
respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.)
William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10
May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9
Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report
entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission
Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission,13
thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items
reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the
status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special
Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and
counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the
PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19,
2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates
their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups
are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the
Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to
wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in
Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also
asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen
(117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been
dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than
eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed
the Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of
Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly
reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the
Commissions recommendation that they revise their validation system to
include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent
briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven
(7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been
violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security
enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG
could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition,
she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers
of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her
reputation and to transgress her right to life.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The
Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases
supplied)
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him
the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right
to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference
was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system
had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and
(b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication
as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection,
recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The following
statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is
true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for
the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of
the people to access information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of
the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information
is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public
who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right
to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on
which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins
from the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided
by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free
from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect
its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish
citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the
Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security
zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control
resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the
secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a
margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the
nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the
interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent
State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the
seriousness of the interference with the applicants right to respect for his
private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in
registers not accessible to the public information on persons and,
secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of
candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of
access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other
hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the
Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series
A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the
interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his
own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation
available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in
the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx
xxx
xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that
the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security", as it is the very absence of such communication
which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control
procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the
issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise
the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the
wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was
entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of national
security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see
paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate
state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place
of marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect
of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any
change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding.[13]
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents
date of marriage and the name of respondents father from the entries in
respondents birth certificate,[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction,
such order not being in accord with respondents prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner
from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the
Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant
government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.[15]
(underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was
adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its
annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General,
and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four
public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the
OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the
Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors
appeared on the scheduled hearing.[16]
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.[17] Respondents reason
for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order
to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely
sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since
childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled
to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy
to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents
supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . .
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order
of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial
courts order directing the change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation
of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include
not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be
adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from legitimate to
illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she
will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that
such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule
108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier
mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise
which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is
not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for
the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory
the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of ones name or
the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious
grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be
made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in
Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as
the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the
RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother
were made parties thereto.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-inintervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded
in Nadinas petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary
Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively
identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice
cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court
explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether
Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be
affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of
his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3,
Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
REPUBLIC vs. UY
August 12, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
PERALTA, J.:
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in
any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that
she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition
which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other
evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The
court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in
the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 0211-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she
was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs
and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP
Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. ReysioCruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner.
Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [reassignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny
the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the
State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in
the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to
FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor
of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16
form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26
The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;
(c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx
xxx
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30
is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to
the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected
if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex,
it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when
a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of
the subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed
a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and
removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer
for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice
of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of
Court applying the fresh rule period enunciated by this Court in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.[16]
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting
the petition of private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED
and GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the
writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate, dated
April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo
is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. SilverioDee.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
-AThe Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the
Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not
subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31,
2005 on June 8, 2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 15, 2005[5] of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the
RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private
respondent on December 22, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005[6] also recalled its
previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration
over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated
October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of
various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due
thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located
at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.[7]
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal
dated January 5, 2006[8] from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while
the Record on Appeal dated January 20, 2006[9] was filed on January 23,
2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution[10] against the
appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was
filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[11] denying the appeal on
the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The
RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order
dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of
the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of
execution was later issued on April 17, 2007[12] and a Notice to
The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case
was proper saying that the appeal pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order
dated May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v. Haldeman,[18] argued that
an order denying a motion for reconsideration may be appealed as such
order is the final order which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated:
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005
against Nelia Silverio-Dee requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3
Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.
SO ORDERED.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999
Order denying his Omnibus MotionMotion for Reconsideration should thus
be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared him
non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds:
(1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion
for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec.
3 of Rule 41.
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31,
2005 is an interlocutory order.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005
was a final order, to wit:
We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the
Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a
quo ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had
no right to use and occupy the property in question despite authority given
to her by Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in
Intsia, Forbes Park, admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and
subject to their proceedings without authority of the Court. Based on the
pretenses of Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum, it is clear that she
would use and maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee. Under
her perception, Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is
violated. x x x
xxxx
For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated
by, nor distributed to Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be
allowed until the payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated
Rule is made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the taxes
pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every coowner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the
pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the
subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings
before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate
to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after
the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the
estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court,
the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court.
And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is
part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she
allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,
the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of
appeal, the case should have been dismissed.[23]
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not
toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private
respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005
Order of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised
in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus,
the Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC denying due course to the
appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007;
and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.