RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL

DETAINER
1. REYES V. STA. MARIA
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action to quiet title on residential lot in
Bulacan and to recover the possession thereof from
respondents
They averred that through their tolerance and goodwill, thru the
intervention and entreaty of one Maximo Santos, father of the
defendants, the latter used and occupied the land free of
charge, under the following conditions, to wit: (a) that instead of
paying rentals on the premises defendants undertook to pay the
corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b) that said
defendants will leave and vacate the premises anytime the
plaintiffs so demand
Plaintiffs verbally notified defendants that they needed the land,
hence, said defendants should vacate, but said defendants
unreasonably refused at the same time claiming ownership of
the property, and alleging further that they bought the same
from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo
Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for judgment
declaring them as owners of the property and ordering the
defendants to vacate the premises and return the possession of
the same to them
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that "the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or suit" and that the action embodied in petitioners'
complaint "is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer.
Consequently, the case falls within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the inferior court or municipal court"
The lower court issued granted the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the case was proper.

RULING: NO.

Such action was clearly an accion publiciana for the recovery of

the right to possess (possesion de jure) (if not an accion
reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction and
not a mere action for detainer to recover physical possession

(possession de facto) which would fall within the jurisdiction of

the municipal court (if filed within one year after unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession) as erroneously held by
the lower court in its dismissal order.
The complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to
deliver the possession of the property was due to their adverse
claim of ownership of the property and their counter-allegation
that they had bought it from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and,
therefore, petitioners' action was clearly one for recovery of
their right to possess the property (possession de jure) as well
as to be declared the owners
There are 3 kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of
real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry
or detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession
only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace
court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the
right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding in a CFI; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which
seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the
jus utendi and the jus fruendi also brought in the CFI
The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the
physical possession of real property possession de facto
and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior
possession in himself, he may recover such possession even
from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has
the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action
was not merely for recovery of possession de facto.
Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana for
recovery of possession de jure if not one of accion
reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the
land.
Accion publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess
(independently of title) clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the
CFI and not of the Municipal Courts.
Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana
before the lower court. Having been fully apprised of
respondents' refusal to surrender possession and their contrary
claim of ownership of the same property, petitioners properly
filed their accion publiciana with the CFI to avoid getting
enmeshed in what would certainly have been another
jurisdictional dispute, since they could reasonably foresee that if

indeed they had filed a summary action for illegal detainer

instead in the municipal court, respondents would then have
contended, contrary to their present claim, that the municipal
court is without jurisdiction over the detainer case by virtue of
their contrary claim of ownership of the property
2. HILARIO V. CA
Facts: The spouses Hilario purchased a house and lot from the
spouses Palileo under a deed of sale dated March 5, 1986. Another
document was executed on the same day granting spouses Palileo
the right to repurchase within one year.
The Hilarios further allowed the spouses Palileo to remain in
possession of the property on the verbal understanding that the
Palileos would vacate the same after two years from the date of
sale. The period passed without the Palileos complying, even after
demands by the Hilarios so a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed by the Hilarios with the MTC.
The Palileos alleged that the deed of sale was in fact a deed of
mortgage and that the obligation secured by such mortgage had
already been extinguished. Thus, they remained owners and their
continued physical possession of the property bolsters the assertion
it was only a mortgage contract. The Palileos also questioned the
MTCs jurisdiction.
The MTC affirmed its jurisdiction over the case and ruled that the
deed of conveyance was a deed of sale which vested in the Hilarios
the right of ownership and consequently, of possession. RTC
affirmed this ruling. The Palileos appealed to the CA.
On the reasoning that the issue raised by the Palileos ultimately
rested upon and involved the question of ownership, particularly on
the assumption that the deed of conveyance was actually a
mortgage contract, the CA reversed and set aside the judgments of
the RTC and MTC.
Issue: W/N the case involved an issue of ownership which would
deprive the MTC of jurisdiction over the case
Holding/Ratio Decidendi: No, the MTC was not deprived of
jurisdiction. Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, provides
that the MTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of

forcible entry and unlawful detainer and in such cases where the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Therefore, as the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction
over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is
subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to ownership
could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining
the issue of possession. An adjudication made therein regarding the
issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.
The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to
be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
3. WILMON V. CA
FACTS: Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation, et al were lessees of a
commercial building and bodegas standing on registered land in
Iloilo City owned in common by Solinap et al.
The leases were embodied in uniformly worded deeds.The lease
contracts, among others
1) stipulated fixed terms or periods (September 1, 1987 to August
30, 1989);
2) provided for a deposit of an amount equal to two months' rents;
3) provided that the lessee should give the lessor 30 days prior
notice of the intention to terminate or renew the contract, and that
if no such written notice were given, the lessor would consider the
contract terminated on the expiration of the term; and
4) contained a "reservation of lights" reading as follows: 3
Reservation of rights. LESSOR reserves the rights to sell,
mortgage, hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it
requires the purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the terms
of this lease contract; provided further that LESSEE shall be duly
informed about LESSOR's plan to sell the property.
After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the
lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute

Sale," in virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star

Group. The deed provided that the "Vendee shall henceforth deal
with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold
without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the
Vendors."
Star Group filed an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC against
the Wilmon, et al. Wilmon, et al refused to concede and impugned
STARs right to eject them claiming that their leasehold rights were
violated: their right of preemption, the buyer was not required to
honor their leases and denied the option to renew.
Wilmon, et al filed a petition to annul the sale, to exercise their
right of preemption and recover two mos. deposit, conveyance of
the property and damages.
The RTC issued a restraining order to enjoin the MTC proceedings of
the unlawful detainer. However, the writ was later dissolved as the
RTC judge held that the MTC case involved issue of physical
possession while the RTC case involved is one of ownership. Thus
the suspension of unlawful detainer is not warranted.. The MR was
denied. The RTC and CA did not rule in favor of Wilmon, et al to
issue an injunction to the unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the
MTC against a lessee grounded on the expiration of the latter's
lease should be abated or suspended by an action filed in the
RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled to a
right of preemption (or prior purchase) of the premises in question
and wishes to have said right judicially enforced?
RULING: Based on current jurisprudence, an ejectment case is not
abated by the ff:
Injunction suits, Accion publiciana, Writ of
possession where ownership is the principal issue, Action for
quieting of title to property, Suits for specific performance with
damages,
Action for reformation of instrument, Action for
reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria, Suits for
annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property.
The underlying reasons is because actions in the Regional Trial
Court did not involve physical or de facto possession and, on not a
few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely
a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the
issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. This is
specially true in the cases at bar, where the petitioners-lessees'

claims that the lessors (and the buyer of the leased premises)
had violated their leasehold rights because (a) they (the lessees)
were not accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not
required to respect their leases, and (c) the lessees were denied
the option to renew their leases upon the expiration thereof
constituted their causes of action in the suits commenced by them
in the Regional Court.
The precedents invoked by the petitioners do not represent current
and prevailing doctrine; they might at most be deemed exceptions
justifying the general rule. Moreover, the facts in the rulings
invoked by them are quite readily distinguishable from the
numerous precedents upholding said general rule.
In this case, we follow the general rule that an action to annul a
sale or reconveyance in the RTC shall not abate the ejectment case
pending in the MTC.
It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even
when, in forcible entry and lawful detainer cases, "the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding that issue of
ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and
Municipal Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . . only to
determine the issue of possession."
4. MUNOZ v. CA
FACTS: Complainant NICOLAS GARCIA filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer with MTC of Pampanga, alleging the following:

that he is an owner of an agricultural land;

He and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from
their father PEDRO;
That the lot is tenanted by LORETO GARCIA;
Defendants Spouses Munoz constructed their houses on the
portion of the lot without knowledge and consent of the
owners;
That NICOLAS sent letters to demand to asking Spouses
Munoz to remove their houses;
Spouses Munoz refused to vacate their houses.

Spouses Munoz denied assertions of NICOLAS alleging that LORETO

GARCIA (tenant) is deemed owner of land by virtue of PD 27. They

also asserted that MTC lacks jurisdiction since the case is an accion
publiciana recognizable by RTC.
MTC: in favor of NICOLAS, since he is a co-owner of lot.
RTC: reversed; NICOLAS failed to establish proof of prior possession
over land since case at bar only deals with possession de facto (not
de jure)
CA: set aside RTC decision. HENCE.
ISSUE: W/N complaint filed by NCOLAS was for summary
proceeding of forcible entry (MTC has jurisdiction)or an accion
publiciana (RTC has jurisdiction)?
HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICITION. Reversed.
1) There was no mention in the complaint of NICOLAS that he is in
PRIOR POSSESSION of property with co-owners. It did not state
when the tenant LORETO started to posses the property. It also
failed to state that PEDRO was in prior possession of the property at
the time of the entry by SPOUSES MUNOZ. Finally, it also failed to
aver that when the entry was accomplished or when NICOLAS
found out of such entry.
The failure to allege the TIME when unlawful deprivation
took place is fatal because this will determine the start of
the counting of the 1 year pd for the filing of the summary
action of forcible entry. In effect, the action should either be an
accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria with the RTC.
FORCIBLE ENTRY1

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Possession illegal; it is an open

challenge to the right of
possessor

Possession legal until demand is

made to recover possession or
until possession fails to do an
act (i.e. pay rent) which makes
continued
possession
of
premises illegal

Thus after lapse of 1 year, the suit must be started with RTC
as accion publiciana.

SC RULED THAT CA ERRED IN HOLDING THIS IS A CASE OF UNLAWFUL

DETAINED. The fact that demand was made by NICOLAS for the SPOUSES
MUNOZ to vacate premises doesnt change the nature of the latters
possession of property and convert action from forcible entry to unlawful
detainer.

5. SUMULONG C. CA
Facts: Esperanza Sumulong entered into a contract of lease with
Jopson Corp covering two adjoining lots along Earnshaw St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. Lease contract provided that if lessee abandons
the property lease contract shall become automatically
terminated and cancelled, and premises vacated peacefully by
lessee for lessor to hold.
Upon her return from the USA, Sumulong discovered that Joson had
vacated the leased premises and tolerated the illegal entry of
Inland. Pursuant to the abovementioned provision, the lease
contract was rendered automatically terminated and cancelled.
Sumulong then took possession of the subject properties. To regain
possession, Inland did the following:
1. misrepresented to plaintiff that Jopson is also the owner of
Inland- Sumulong accepts
2. Dec 1989- Sumulong discovers misrepresentation, notified
Jopson of termination of lease contract, took possession of
properties
3. Inland pusuaded Sumulong to grant it temporary use of the
properties pending negotiations for a lease- Sumulong
perceives good faith, allows Inland to occupy
4. Inland insists on an unreasonably low amount of the lease
rental- Sumulong decided not to lease premises to Inland;
formally notifies termination of lease contract to Joson
(March 1990)
5. April 1990- without Sumulongs knowledge, Inland acquired
sub-lease from Jopson; Sumulong then took over physical
possession of the premises to secure its interest; Inland
asked Sumulong if it could enter again and promised to
finalize the lease contract; upon entry, Inland refused to
enter into a lease contract and pay.
Sumulong filed a case for forcible entry. MTC ruled in favor of
Sumulong because Inland entered the premises by stealth and
strategy, since it had no sublease when it entered the premises.
RTC reversed the MTC decision and said that the right to possession
can be ventilated by way of another action. CA affirmed RTC
decision.
Issue: Whether the Civil Case should be dismissed?
Held and Ratio: NOT DISMISSED. Although there is no cause
of action for forcible entry, the allegations in the body
sufficiently establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
The MTCs decision is consistent with that of unlawful detainer,
except that the fixed reasonable compensation for the use of the

premises should only commence to run from December 1989 and

not from June 1989.
Why not forcible entry? No strategy and stealth.
1. "Strategy" could only mean machination or artifice and
considering that the parties tangled for weeks to reach an
agreement on the terms and conditions of a contract of
lease, no such machination or artifice could be said to have
been employed by Inland.
2. "Stealth," is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to
avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within
residence of another without permission.
Why unlawful detainer? Inland refused to vacate.
6. ONG V. PAREL
Facts: Petitioners spouses Ong are the registered owners of Lot No
18 of Rizal Park subdivision having purchased the property from the
spouses Magbag in 1994. Adjacent to this is Lot No.17 registered
under the name of Visitacion Beltran, grandmother of respondent
Parel. Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against defendant
alleging among other things that defendant through strategy and
stealth constructed an overhang and hollow block wall along the
common boundary of the parties adjoining lot, thereby illegally
depriving petitioners of possession of the said portion of their lot;
that they discovered the same in August 1994 when they had the
boundaries of their lot resurveyed; that they made various
demands on the defendant to remove the constructions and vacate
the same. The defendant alleged that such constructions had
already been in existence since 1956 and that these are within the
boundary of lot 17 owned by her. Upon ocular inspection, the
Commissioner and Geodetic Engineer reported that defendants
house (wall, window, eaves of main building) encroached
petitioners property. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners.
Defendant filed an appeal with the RTC which reversed the MTCs
decision and dismissed the case for failure of the petitioners to
prove prior physical possession of the subject lot. The case was
appealed to the CA but it denied the petition because it found that
the alleged encroachments were made by the late Visitacion at a
time when she still owned both lots thus the introduction of the said
construction could not be equated with strategy and stealth giving
rise to forcible entry. It was admitted by the petitioners in their
petition that this case involves a boundary dispute and the
encroachment was discovered only upon a relocation survey of the

property; such controversy could not be threshed out in an

ejectment suit in view of the summary nature of the action, and the
MTC, accordingly, is without jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is a petition for forcible entry proper in this case?
Held: No. This is not a proper case for forcible entry, it is a
boundary dispute wherein the adobe wall, overhang and window
grill on the respondents side of the property encroach upon the
petitioners side of the property.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that in actions for
forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth and that the action is filed any time within one year from
the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This
requirement implies that in such cases, the possession of the land
by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires
possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege
and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property
in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. The
one year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except
that when entry was made through stealth, the one year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. If the alleged
dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in section
1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover
possession with the RTC. Stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or
clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or
remain within residence of another without permission.
Petitioners failed to establish that respondents encroached upon
their property through stealth as it was not shown when and how
the alleged entry was made on the portion of their lot. The alleged
encroachments were made by the late Visitacion at a time when
she still owned both lots. Respondent in her affidavit had affirmed
that her grandmother Visitacion was the registered owner of Lot No.
17 with improvements which include the window sill overhang and
the old adobe wall which were constructed as early as 1956 and
these improvements are adjacent to the private alley from Elias
Street which has to be opened and maintained as long as there
exists building thereon; that the maintenance of such alley was
made as an encumbrance in petitioners title when they bought the
adjacent Lot no. 18. Petitioners failed to present evidence to the
contrary.

For failure of the petitioners to circumstantiate prior physical

possession and the fact of entry by the defendant by force,
intimidation, violence or stealth, the present action for forcible
entry must exigently fail. Where the complaint fails to specifically
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the action should either be ACCION
PUBLICIANA or ACCION REINVINDICATORIA for which the lower
court has no jurisdiction.
Furthermore, neither does the instant case fall under a case for
unlawful detainer. The complaint does not allege that the
possession of respondent ever changed from illegal to legal
anytime from their alleged illegal entry before petitioners made the
demand to vacate. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
7. CO TIAMCO vs. POMPEYO DIAZ
FACTS: Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action against Yao Boom Sim
(alias Co Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam
(alias Go Si Pio) for unlawful detainer in a building in Manila. At trial,
plaintiff offered as evidence, a notice to quit alleged to have been
served upon defendants prior to the action. This was objected to on
the ground that the fact sought to be proved thereby was not
alleged in the complaint. Objection was sustained. An action for
mandamus was brought by plaintiff before the CFI compel
admission of evidence and was granted. When the trial was
resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was admitted.
Judgment was rendered against defendants who appealed to the
CFI. The notice, was a part of the record elevated on appeal. In the
CFI, the complaint filed in the municipal court was reproduced.
Defendants filed a MTD upon the ground that there was no
allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the
premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the
municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action and, as a consequence, the CFI had no appellate
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The motion was sustained
and the case dismissed. Hence, this action for mandamus against
the CFI to reinstate the petitioner's case.
ISSUE: Was unlawful detainer case validly dismissed? NO.

HELD: The order of dismissal is erroneous on the following

grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong construction of the Rules of Court;
(2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case; and (3)
the complaint filed is sufficient in itself.
It is apparent from that a demand is a pre-requisite to an action for
unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or
to comply with the conditions of his lease," and where the action is
to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term. A lease
ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any
notice to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant
withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied," In other words, upon the expiration
of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and
occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an
action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against
him even before the expiration of the five days.
Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit
renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the
acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing
leased for fifteen days, and the lessor's acquiescence may be
inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. But tacit renewal
in such case, being a new contract is a matter of defense which
may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being
necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense.
There has been in this case a notice to quit, though not specifically
pleaded in the complaint. That notice has been offered and
admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even supposing,
without conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard,
the deficiency was cured by evidence. This evidence was admitted
upon objection of the defendant.
When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings,
the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse
party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense
upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to
enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of
course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of
formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading and the
municipal court did not do so in the case. Since, however, the
municipal court is not one record, the rule on amendments should
not therein be rigidly applied. Furthermore, where the failure to

order an amendment does not appear to have caused surprise or

prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless
error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may
be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the
substantial rights of the parties.

It is true that according to Rule 4 section 3, the complaint in an

inferior court shall state "the grounds of action" but no other facts
are required in the form to be stated aside from those that are
already therein stated which are thus deemed sufficient grounds for
action.

It is true that the case was dismissed by the respondent court, it

was there on appeal and for trial de novo, independently of any
evidence that had been presented in the municipal court. But the
admissibility of the notice to quit as evidence, should have been
considered by the respondent court as a closed question in so far
its jurisdiction was concerned, for it was one of the branches of that
court which, in an action for mandamus, issued a writ compelling
the municipal court to admit the evidence. When the writ has been
issued and has become final and has been obeyed, it is perfectly
valid and should be respected. Specially is this so in the instant
case where the complaint filed was sufficient and under its
allegations the municipal court was bound to admit the evidence.

The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of

pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible
entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as
possible and accordingly technicalities or details of procedure which
may cause unnecessary delay should carefully be avoided.

We, therefore, believe and so hold that the respondent court having
judicial knowledge of the mandamus proceedings was duty bound
to give due regard and full weight to the final and executed
judgment therein rendered and, had it done so, it would have found
that the supposed deficiency of the complaint pointed out in the
motion to dismiss had already been supplied by evidence admitted
by order of one of its branches; that the curative evidence was
already before it as a part of the record elevated on appeal by the
municipal court; and that to throw away the whole case only
because the complaint was silent on a fact well known to all the
parties and to the court was certainly to defeat the paramount
interests of justice for the sake of a useless technicality.
In an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is
made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply
possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the
beginning having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, possession which has legal in the beginning having no
other source than a contract, express or implied possession which
has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief and concise and
though apparently too general it is so worded as clearly to apprise
the defendant of the substance of the claim. Other details like the
one-year period within which the action should be brought, and the
demand when required to be made by the Rules must be proved
but need not be alleged in the complaint.

8. PENAS V. CA
FACTS: Subject of this controversy were 2 apartments in QC, which
were leased by Penas Sr. to private respondent Lupo Calaycay at a
rental fee of P110/month. The written lease contract was on a
month to month basis. Penas, Sr. died in 1976 so an extra-judicial
settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of
whom is his son, Penas, Jr. In 1990, the petitioners notified Calaycay
that effective March 1990, they were terminating the written month
to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew
the same and demanded that the latter vacate the premises on or
before February 28, 1990. The petitioners stated in the letter
thatthey would allow the lease to continue provided a new lease
contract would be executed for a period of (1) year at an increased
monthly rental of P2,500 (later reduced to P2K).
Calaycay continued staying on the leased premises and effective
March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals with PNB in his name
ITF (in trust for) Penas, Jr. On August 10, 1992, Penas sent another
letter to the defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay
back rentals amounting to P60K. On September 25, 1992, Penas
filed an unlawful detainer suit on the ground of termination of the
month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to
execute a new lease agreement with increased rentals.
MTC QC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the
complaint was allegedly filed more than 1 year after private
respondent began unlawfully occupying the premises. The CA
affirmed the TC decision reinforcing that since herein petitioners
were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private
respondent to PNB, there no longer was any lease contract between
the parties for 2 years since the first letter of the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the

petitioners was to file an action for recovery of possession in the

RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the petitioners

complaint?
RULING: YES.
The 1 year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed
should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate, the
reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.
In the present case, the first demand letter gave Calaycay the
option to either vacate the premises or agree to execute a new
lease contract on an annual basis. The notice giving the lessee the
alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate
the land is NOT the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in
unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects
to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is
first made.
The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled
doctrine. It should be noted that even if the private respondent was
depositing rentals in trust for the petitioners, what was being
deposited were rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were not
bound to accept or withdraw. When Calaycay elected to remain in
the premises after petitioners had sent him the first letter, he
assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the
premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the
petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by
the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. Private
respondent was thus ordered by the SC to vacate the premises and
pay back rentals.
9. CANIZA V. CA
FACTS:
Carmen Caiza was declared an incompetent by RTC of
Quezon City because of senile dementia. Her legal guardian
is her niece Amparo Evangelista. Caiza was owner of a
house and lot in QC which was being occupied by the
spouses Estrada out of kindness and tolerance.

Evangelista, in behalf of Caiza, filed a complaint of unlawful

detainer against the Estradas because despite repeated
demands, they refused to vacate said lots. The complaint
alleged that the Estradas are depriving Caiza of needed
income since they are occupying the property rent-free.
Estradas said that the lot was already bequeathed to them
by virtue of a holographic will made by Caiza before she
was declared an incompetent.
MTC ruled in Caizas favor but the RTC reversed saying the
action is supposed to be accion publiciana. CA affirmed the
RTC rationating that the Estradas were not occupants by
mere tolerance but they were sort of adopted family as the
holographic will, although of no force and effect until
probated, evinces the intent that the Estradas are to remain
in possession.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the action of Caiza

must be for acion publiciana and not accion interdictal.
RULING: YES

The SC held that the complaint clearly sets out a case for
unlawful detainer and says: It is settled that in an action for
unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.
The Estradas defense, relying on the literal interpretation of
Sec.1 of Rule 70 is pure sophistry. "the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied."
Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house,
rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. More than once has the
SC adjudged that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission
without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him.

It is also important to note that the 1 year period to file the

complaint for desahucio is reckoned from the date of
last demand to vacate. The reason being that the lessor
has the option to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
premises.
Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had
executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the
Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to
stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory
that they might in future become owners thereof, that right
of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly
probated.
Also, since there has been a valid substitution of parties
after the death of Caiza in this case, Evangelista, being a
legal heir of the original plaintiff, may still continue to
prosecute the case against the Estradas.

10. CETUS V. CA
FACTS: Private respondents are lessees of the premises originally
owned by Susana Realty. These individual verbal leases were on a
month-to-month basis. Rental payments were made to a collector
of Susana Realty who went to the premises monthly. Susana realty
sold the premises to Cetus Devt. Private collector continued to pay
to a collector by Cetus. For the months of July, August and
September, respondents failed to pay their rentals as no collector
came. Cetus sent a letter to each private respondent demanding
that they vacate the premises and to pay back rentals. Private
respondents paid. But for failure of the private respondents to
vacate, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment. Trial court ruled that
theres no cause of action because at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the rentals had all been paid (no rentals in arrears). The
CA held that the right to bring an action of ejectment must be
counted from the time the defendants failed to pay rent after the
demand therefore.
ISSUE: Whether this demand is merely a demand to pay rent or
comply with the conditions of the lease or also to vacate right after.
HELD:
Two requisites in an ejectment suit: 1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, ans 2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within

15 days in case of lands, and 5 days in case of buildings. In this

case, theres no cause of action for ejectment.

11. CURSINO V. BAUTISTA

FACTS:
- Maria James is the owner and lessor a premises in Paranaque
leased by Cursino at a monthly rental of P100.00.
- Cursino defaulted in the payment of his monthly rentals (Oct.
Dec. 1977). He sent postal money orders as payment, which
were refused by Maria James.
- Prior to the sending of said postal money orders, Maria James
demanded that Cursino pay the back rental and vacate the
premises 'within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this
letter'.
- Despite the formal demand, Cursino failed and refused to
vacate the subject premises without justifiable cause. Hence,
Maria James was constrained to secure the services of counsel
and incurred expenses in this litigation.
- Cursino contends that he has not defaulted in the payment of
rents and that it was Maria James who refused to accept the
same.
- Cursino did not vacate the premises as demanded and so a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent.
- RTC: Maria James for the win. Cursino was ordered to pay back
rentals and vacate the premises. CA: affirmed. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the possession of the lessee legitimized by the lessor's
acceptance of the payment of back rentals.
HELD/RATIO: NO. CA decision affirmed.
The failure of the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the
rentals are not valid defenses. Article 1256 of the Civil Code
provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum
due.
Petitioner further argues that in spite of his payment of back rentals
with five days from receipt of the demand letter, private

respondent filed the complaint for ejectment which allegedly is

contrary to the provision of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Such argument is untenable.
It will be recalled that private respondent formally demanded from
the petitioner, the following: (a) to pay the back rentals, and (b) to
vacate the premises.
Petitioner was able to pay the back rentals but refused to vacate
the premises. Undoubtedly, petitioner's belated payments of his
back rentals do not automatically restore the contract of lease
without private respondent's consent. The terms of the contract of
lease have been violated and the lessor-owner has the
unquestionable right to withdraw from said contract or agreement
whether oral or written. In the case at bar, respondent-lessor did
not consent to petitioner's possession of the leased premises after
the latters default in the payment of the monthly rents. On the
contrary, respondent demanded that petitioner pay the back rental
and vacate the premises. The refusal of the petitioner to vacate the
premises after demand, makes his withholding of possession
unlawful.
12. HEIRS OF SUICO V. CA
FACTS: The 2-storey residential building subject of the instant
petition was originally owned by the late Emilia Suico, grandmother
of the petitioners. (This building was actually constructed by the
parents of the defendants, who were the original lessees, with
grandma Emilia then being the original lessor. Originally, what was
being rented was the land with a nipa house. But, the nipa house
was destroyed by the typhoon; so, the defendants parents
constructed a building made of permanent materials). The said
bldg. was being rented by the respondents for P360/month. Finding
this amount to be inadequate, in 1991, petitioners proposed to
increase this amount to P1200/month. Respondents refused.
Instead, they proposed a lease contract for 25 yrs. at a monthly
rental of P600. Of course, petitioners turned this down. They also
refused to receive the tendered rentals. The respondents then
deposited these rentals to a bank. When the parties still failed to
conciliate at the barangay level, the petitioners filed an unlawful
detainer case at the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners,
and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises and pay the
petitioners rentals starting April 1991 up to the last month of
occupancy. On appeal to the RTC, the decision was modified. The
RTC judge fixed the lease for another 5 yrs (until 1998), and

ordered the defendants to continue paying until the end of the fixed
lease period. When the case was brought to the CA, the appellate
court ruled that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
the award of ownership over the disputed bldg. is not an issue in
unlawful detainer case, rather, a possession de facto only.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in holding that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case because the issue of
ownership of the building was raised.
HELD: Yes. The SC annulled the decision of the CA and
affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA failed to fully
appreciate the subject matter of the lease and the purpose of the
respondents claim of ownership over the building. It was not
disputed that the respondents constructed the building because the
original one (the nipa house) was previously destroyed by a storm.
This allegation of ownership was raised merely to underscore
respondents claim that petitioners demand for rental increase for
several times was harsh and oppressive disregarding the close
relationship between the petitioners grandma and the
respondents parents. Notably, respondents never asked for the
value of their bldg., but only sought that the complaint be
dismissed, or in the alternative, that the lease period be fixed, with
moral damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses in either
case. Also, the respondents in fact did not set up the defense of
MTCs lack of jurisdiction on the basis of issue of ownership.
The parties to the oral lease in question (grandma Emilia and
respondents parents) did not fix a specified period therefor.
However, since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if
verbal, may be deemed to be on monthly basis, expiring at every
month. In such case, a demand to vacate was not even necessary
for judicial action after the expiration of every month.
As to the issue of RTCs extension lease period for 5 years from
1993-1998, the Court reversed this. Instead, the SC found MTCs
ruling more in accord with justice and equity. The respondents and
their parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 yrs. At
first, respondents were paying relatively meager price at P30 a
month, then P360, before a demand to increase it at P1200 was
made. This meager rent was due to the fact that the original lessor,
grandma Emilia, and defendants parents were close. Obviously,
the respondents had already benefitted from this fact. Also, the
extension of 5 yrs was almost obtained (since this case was
resolved already in 1997).

The RTC also erred when it ruled that after the expiration of the 5-yr
lease period, the property vacated shall become the property of the
petitioners. The Civil Code provides that the lessors would only
become the owners if they choose to reimburse the respondents, as
of the termination of term, of the value of the house constructed.
If they refuse to reimburse, the respondents remedy is to remove
the house.
13. MARA V. ESTRELLA
Facts : Mara, Inc. filed a complaint for forcible entry agains Jose de
Leon. It was alleged that on or about April 5, 1973, de Leon through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth occupied 4 lots
registered in the name of Mara, Inc. It was also alleged that Mara,
Inc. had prior possession of the said lots.
Four days after the filing of complaint, Mara, Inc. asked the City
Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restore to it the
possession of the said lots.
The writ was granted as the validity and incontestability of the TCT
from which Maras titles were derived had been upheld in previous
decisions, on the condition that Mara post a bond (P10,000).
De Leon filed an MR which was denied. Mara posted its bond and
the writ was issued. De Leon filed a motion to dissolve the writ and
offered a counterbond of the same amount, which was granted.
Issue: W/N Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to recover possession of the lots during the
pendency of the ejectment suit.
Held: Yes. The 2nd paragraph of Art. 539 of the Civil Code provides
that A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry
may within 10 days from the filing of a complaint present a motion
to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry,
a writ of preliminary injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within 30 days from the filing
thereof. This has been incorporated in Sec. 3, Rule 70.
It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the
principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing
shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most
urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is
necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons
effective.

The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to the

general rule that the writ of injunction is not proper where its
purpose is to take property out of the possession or control of one
person and place it in the hands of another whose title has not
clearly been established by law.
In this case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots appear to
be unassailable. De Leon in his answer merely pretended lack of
knowledge of said titles. He has also not shown any indubitable
right to possess the said lots. The judge should not have dissolved
the bond.
14. BALAGTAS V. ROMILLO
FACTS: Balagtas Realty Corporation(petitioner, owner of a row of
residential apartments located at Balagtas Street in Pasay City,
filed nineteen (19) separate Identical complaints for illegal detainer
against private respondents for refusal and failure to vacate their
respective premises and to pay their rentals in arrears, as well as
an increased monthly rental of P2,000.00 from May 1, 1976,
notwithstanding valid and formal demand. The dispositive portion
of the decision ordered the defendants to immediately vacate said
premises and to forthwith surrender its peaceful possession the
plaintiff; to each pay to the plaintiff their respective rental arrears
up to April 30, 1976, as well as (P2,000.00) monthly rentals from
May 1, 1976 until each of them finally and respectively vacates
his/her respective apartment-premises subject matter of these
summary complaints.The first motions for immediate execution of
the said Judgment under the provisions of the first paragraph of
Sec. 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. was filed January 26, 1977.
Immediate execution was stayed as private respondents filed with
the Pasay City Court a common notice of appeal dated February 10,
1977 and posted
respective supersedeas bond covering (a)
adjudged rental arears prior to May 1, 1976, (b) adjudged
liquidated damages, and (c) the P2,000.00 monthly rentals as
found by the Judgment of the Pasay City Court to exist from May 1,
1976 and accruing down to the time of the Judgment However, on
October 11, 1977, petitioner filed for the second"Motions for
Immediate
Ejectment
Execution"
against
the
private
respondents on the ground that respondents failed to deposit to the
Court of First Instance their monthly rentals for the period from
February 1, 1977, in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly "as found by
the judgment" of the City Court of Pasay City, on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month under Section 8 of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. Respondent judge denied such motion.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted without and/or in

excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's Motions for Immediate Ejectment Execution.
Held: Yes. Under Rule 702 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment
in favor of the plaintiff must be executed immediately in order to
prevent further damages to him arising from continued loss of
possession. However, the defendant may stay execution (a) by
perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond, and (b) by
paying promptly from time to time either to the plaintiff or
depositing with the Court of First Instance the adjudged reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the property. This rule is
mandatory, the exception being when the delay is due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 3 In the case at bar, it is
uncontradicted that private respondents posted their respective
supereas bonds to answer for rentals and damages accruing down
to the time of the perfection of their appeals in January, 1977. What
is controverted is whether or not there is complnce with the second
requisite which is the payment of the monthly rentals as they fell
due. Private respondents insist that they correctly paid 1000P as
rentals as provided in the Letter-Contract3 dated April 21, 1976
(Exhibit A), which was sustained and upheld by the Pasay City Court
as the new lease contract governing the relations between the
petitioner and private respondents,
The Court held that since the dispositive part of the decision of the
Pasay City Court adjudged and ordered the respondents "to each
2

Section 8. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an
appeal has been perfected, and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the
municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance
and to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due
from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to
exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment,
on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance to which the action is appealed. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the
plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its
merits.
3

Rental. P2,000.00 per month period payable by you to us, through our collector,
within the first three days of each corresponding month period; provided,
however, that you shall be granted by us an initial discount of Pl,000.00 for each
monthly rental paid on time, but this discount shall not in anywise amend the
aforesaid rental,

pay to the petitioner Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) monthly

rentals from May 1, 1976 until each of them finally and respectively
vacates his/her respective apartment-premises subject matter of
these summary complaints," anything said in the body of the
opinion about the P1,000.00 discount if a lessee pays his/her rental
within the first three days of the month, is merely an obiter.
Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion
of a decision, the former must prevail over the latter. When
respondents effected monthly deposits of less than P2,000.00, they
violated the condition imposed by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The law providing that in case the defendant appeals, he
must pay to the plaintiff or into the CFI the amount fixed as
rent on or before the 10th day of each calendar month, and
that failure to do so shall cause the judgment to be
executed, is mandatory and cannot be evaded. The court has
no discretion to give or not to give effect to such failure to pay.
Failure of the defendant to deposit on time the monthly reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the property or the rents fixed in
the judgment is a ground for execution of such judgment as a
matter of right the duty of the court to order such execution being
ministerial and imperative.
15. CHUA V. CA
FACTS: The Batangas MTC rendered judgment for the spouses
Chua with respect to four lots in Galicano St., Batangas City,
ordering the ejectment of spouses Moreno and for them to pay
monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall
have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to the Chua
spouses plus attorney's fees. A copy of the decision was received
by the Chua spouses' counsel on March 10, 1993; on March 11,
1993 they filed a notice of appeal; The Moreno spouses however,
moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that
although Chua spouses had filed a notice of appeal, they had not
filed a supersedeas bond nor make a deposit every month of the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as
required by Rule 70, sec. 8.
Chua spouses opposed, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots
from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant
immediate execution of the decision would render their appeal
moot and academic. They later claimed that while they were after
all willing to file a supersedeas bond, they had been kept busy
attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure a bond.

RTC denied the Moreno spouses motion for execution, on the

ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the
ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the
period of appeal, prevented private respondents from filing a
supersedeas bond on time. RTC then issued another order giving
petitioners an extension of five days within which to file a
supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond of
P550,000, the RTC also granted petitioners' motion for the
substitution of the cash bond with a surety bond.
CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N despite the expiration of the period for perfecting the
appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept
a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of a decision
in an ejectment suit pending appeal.
HELD&RATIO: RTC had no authority to do so. As a general rule
that, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him
arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To
stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending, the Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires
that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant
perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he
periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the
pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply
with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendantappellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond
will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not
perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed
within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In this case, the bond was filed out of time. The motion for
execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners
received a copy of the MTC's decision, after the appeal had already
been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed
within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been
issued as a matter of right.
How the Amount of Supersedeas Bond Is Determined: Petitioners
need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas

bond. They could have computed this themselves - it is equivalent

to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the
judgment or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the
premises, at the rate determined by the judgment, damages and
costs down to the time of the final judgment in the action. The
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises is that
fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the rental stipulated in
the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer
be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises
as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. But the
bond together with the appeal is only to prevent the immediate
execution of a judgment rendered against the defendant in forcible
entry and detainer cases. It does not answer for amounts accruing
during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject
of the periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.
Where Is the Supersedeas Bond Filed? The bond should be filed
before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the
RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during
the period of appeal. In this case, petitioner failed to file the bond
on time not because they did not know where to file it, but because
they believed that they should not do so. Hence, their opposition to
the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-ownership
of the property. It was only before the CA that they claimed
confusion on where the bond should be filed.
The pendency of an action for partition (filed by the spouses Chua)
does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay execution
of the judgment, since such action is entirely independent of the
ejectment suit. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of
material possession or possession de facto of the property under
litigation, not on the issue of ownership (as in an action for
partition). The only issue in this case is whether or not a writ of
execution should be issued pending appeal of the ejectment suit.
The Chua spouses perceived injuries to their business located in the
land in question are irrelevant since an action for ejectment is not
conclusive on the right of possession of the land and any case such
could have been avoided if they had filed the supersedeas bond,
which they did not do so. Moreover, in an action for ejectment or
for recovery of possession of real property, defendant's claims for
the value of the improvements on the property or necessary
expenses for its preservation should be interposed as compulsory
counterclaims.
16. DE LAUREANO V. ADIL

FACTS:
Petitoner de Laureano was owner of a lot in Iloilo City. She
leased said lot to respondent Ong Cu for a period of 15 years.
The term expired but respondent refused to vacate and remove
the improvements thereon forcing petitioner to file an
ejectment case in the city court of Iloilo City where she won.
Respondent filed an appeal but instead of filing a supersedeas
bond based on the findings of the city court, he asked that the
city court ex parte to approve the bond in the amount of 22k. it
was granted.
Petitioner prayed in the CFI of Iloilo for execution pending
appeal on the ground that the bond was inadequate and for
preliminary mandatory injunction in order to restore her in
possession of the lots alleging that the appeal was frivolous and
dilatory. Both motions of petitioner were denied by the CFI. The
bond was upheld and it would be absurd to grant the mandatory
injunction because the very purpose of the bond is to stay the
execution and leave possession with the respondent. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI acted with GAD in denying petitioners
motion for execution and mandatory injunction.
RULING: YES
As explicitly provided in section 8, the judgment of tile inferior
court in plaintiff's favor in an ejectment case is immediately
executory. Thus, where the city court on the day it rendered the
judgment ordered the execution thereof and the defendant did
not perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it
was held that certiorari would not lie to set aside the execution.
Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the general rule as to the
execution of the judgment of an inferior court which is found in
section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.
The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises
is that fixed by the inferior court in its judgment because the
rental stipulated in the lease contract that had expired might no
longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of
the premises by the reason of the change or rise in value.
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure
payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the
appealed judgment. Hence, the bond is not necessary if the
defendant deposits in court the amount of back rentals as fixed
in the judgment. In other words, the supersedeas bond answers
only for rentals was in the judgment and not for those that may

accrue during the pendency of the appeal which are guaranteed

by the periodical deposits to be made by the defendant.
The bond should have been in the amount of 161k. The city
court should not have allowed respondent to dictate the
amount. The reasonable value for the use and occupation was
also fixed in the judgment, hence there was another error by
the city court.
If this were a case where the respondent did not file any
supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, then
petitioner would be entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate execution of the city court's judgment. Execution in
that case would be mandatory but since respondent only filed
an inadequate bond based on the error of the city court, he
should be allowed to file the correct amount 30 days from
notice.