The Problem of War in Hegel's Thought

Author(s): Shlomo Avineri

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1961), pp. 463-474
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708025
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THE PROBLEM OF WAR IN HEGEL'S THOUGHT

BY SHLOMOAVINERI
Oneoftenencounters
thatHegel'spoliticalthought
theassumption
of a theoryof statebothnapaved the way forthe crystallization
tionalistand totalitarian.
This view has been presentedin a particularly
forceful
mannersincetheriseto poweroftheNazis in Germany,when many efforts
were made on the part of enemiesof
Nazism to findsimilarities
betweenthe philosophicalpremisesof
Hegel'sthoughtand theinstitutional
state
imageofthenationalistic
in its extreme
manifestations.1
This opinionneedsre-examination,
as is oftenthe case witha
hypothesis
whichhas takenroot,gainedacceptance,
and becomefixed
to such a degreethat it seemsto requireno proofor confirmation.
One can,withoutmuchdifficulty,
associations
indicatethehistorical
whichcontributed
in a
to the understanding
of Hegel's philosophy
nationalist
spirit,justas one can showthatthisis nottheonlyinterpretationapplicableto Hegel's thought.RudolfHaym'sHegel und
seineZeit (Berlin,1857) is a bitterinvectiveagainstHegel,accusing
himofbeingblindto thenationalaspirations
of Germanunity;and
Haym'sbookis onlyoneexample.
We shall not undertakeherean exhaustiveattemptto examine
afreshHegel'sconnection
withGermannationalism.
The aim of this
paperis to tracethe meaningof war in Hegel'sthoughtand tryto
findout,whetherthismeaningcan be assumedto have contributed
towardsa nationalistic-militaristic
ideologyculminating
in Nazism
and Fascism.
It wouldnotbe difficult
to findpassagesin Hegel whichseemto
justifyprimafacietheopinionofthosescholarswhohave foundthat
theHegelianconceptofwarresembles,
in a waythatleavesno room
fordoubt,the "newtotalitarian-etatistic"
or fascistideas.2In one of
his earlyworks,called"The SystemofEthics" (SystemderSittlichkeit),writtenabout 1801-1802,Hegel says: "Moralitymustdisplay
'See e.g. H. Heller,Hegel und der nationaleMachtstaatsgedanke
in Deutschland (Leipzig & Berlin,1921), 118; W. M. McGovern,From Lutherto Hitler
(N. Y., 1941); K. R. Popper,The OpenSocietyand Its Enemies(Princeton,
1950),
259. This opinion,uncritically
accepted,foundits way intogeneraltextbooksof
politicalphilosophy,
e.g. J. Bowle,Politicsand Opinionin the19thCentury(London, 1951), 43. The oppositeopinionis no less widespread;see F. Rosenzweig,
Hegel und der Staat,2 vols. (Munich& Berlin,1920); H. Marcuse,Reasonand
Revolution,
2nded. (London,1955); E. Weil,Hegelet l'1tat (Paris,1950).Cf.also
GeorgLukacs'"Der deutscheFaschismus
undHegel,"in hisSchicksalswende
(Berlin,1948),37-67.
I wishto expressmygratitude
to Prof.J. L. Talmonforthe help and advice
I was privileged
to receivefromhimwhiledoingresearch
on thissubjectunderhis
supervision.
2D. A. Routh,"The Philosophyof International
Relations,"Politica (Sept.
1938),223-35.
463
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464

SHLOMO

AVINERI

its vitalityin somethingdifferent

fromitself.. . . This somethingdif-

ferent
is theenemy,and thedissociation
fromhim,whichtakesshape

in relationto one's fellowman as the opposite of survival . . . is the

3 In another
fearoffighting."
workdatingfromthesameperiod,"On
theMethodsofScientific
Treatment
ofNaturalLaw" (Uberdie wissenschaftlichen
these criteriaare
Behandlungendes Naturrechts),
fromthe inter-personal
transferred
to the inter-state
level: "War is
themoralhealthofpeoplesin theirstruggle
againstpetrifaction....
Justas thebreezesaves thesea fromfoulness,
whichis theresultof
continued
complacency,
so doeswarforpeoples."4
But the mostextremeformulation
is that whichappearsin the
"Phenomenology
ofMind" (Phdnomenologie
des Geistes),whichwas
completedin 1806-preciselyon the eve of the Battleof Jena-and
whoseoutlookis strongly
influenced
by thecharismatic
experience
of
theNapoleonicpersonality
and itshistorical
operation:"In ordernot
to let [thecitizens]getrootedand settledin thisisolationand thus
breakup thewholeintofragments
and let thecommonspiritevaporate,Government
has fromtimeto timeto shakethemto the very
centreby War. By thismeansit confounds
the orderthathas been
establishedand arranged,
and violatestheirrightto independence,
whilethe individuals(who,beingabsorbedtherein,get adriftfrom
the whole,strivingafterinviolableself-existence
(Fiirsichsein)and
personalsecurity)aremade,by thetaskthusimposeduponthemby
to feelthepoweroftheirlordand master,death...." 5
Government,
Theseformulations,
in all theirintensity,
can be takenas theunmitigated
consecration
oftheforceof war,and it mightappearfrom
themthatthereis no distinction
betweenHegeland theformulations
6 or even thoseof the Fascists.7
of Treitschke
But thosequotations
shouldbe studiedwithinthe contextof Hegel's generaltheoryof
in hisPhilosophy
state,mostmaturely
expressed
ofRight.
Here we encounter
Hegel acceptingthe challengeof one of the
mostdifficult,
and perhapsmostthankless,
theoretical
tasks:namely,
the painstaking
in a generalphiloeffort
to tryand givea meaning,
to thephenomenon
ofwar.He was nottheonlyone
sophicalcontext,

3Hegels Schriften
zur Politikund Rechtsphilosophie,
ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig,
1913),470.
4 Ibid.,432.
5 G. W. F. Hegel,The Phenomenology
of Mind,trans.by J. B. Baillie,2nd ed.
(London,1949),474.
6 H. v. Treitschke,
Politik,ed. M. Cornicelius,
5thed. (Leipzig,1922),I, 24, 39,
60; II, 362,371,519.
7 Cf. Mussolini's
article"Fascismo"in theEnciclopediaItaliana (Rome,1932),
XIV, 847-850,forthe strongemphasison 'positive'values of war. See also W.
ModernPoliticalThought(New York,1958),330-337.
Ebenstein,

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PROBLEM

OF WAR IN

HEGEL

465

a contemporary
ofhis,AdamMuller,tried
to do so in hisgeneration;
delivered
to tacklethesameproblemin a seriesoflectures,
in 1808/9
and laterpublishedunderthe generaltitleof ElementederStaatskunst.But Mullerreachedquite different
conclusions
on the moral
plane: he recognized
the expansionist
urgeof the state and distinguishedbetween"just" and "unjust"wars-a distinction
whichis
aliento Hegel'sthought,
completely
as willbe shownlater.8
Hegel,on the otherhand,attemptsto understand
warin its hu9
man setting,"to recognizethe rose in the crossof the present."
Hegelrealizesthatwe customarily
evaluatewaras a deviationfrom
thenormalcondition
ofpeace; undertheinfluence
ofvariousschools
ofNaturalLaw,waris conceivedas a reversion,
a regression
to somethingpriorto therationalsocio-political
order,a reversion
to an elemental,barbaricstate.'0
This explanation
seemsto Hegel insufficient:
themoralnegation
ofwardoesnotexplainit away.Warseemsto be theproductofsome
humaningredient,
specific
and seeingit as a mereaccident,
a product
ofsheerarbitrariness,
onlybegsthequestionas to themotivesofthis
outrageous
eruption.
Seeingfighting
as a departure
fromthenormof
peacemeansslidingintowishful
thinking.
Thismightbe laudedfrom
thepointofviewofpersonalsubjectivemorality,
butit cannotbe an
adequatephilosophical
explanation,
whenphilosophy
meanscomprehendingthatwhichis. Here,as withothersocialphenomena,
Hegel
holdsthatmoralindignation
cannotsuffice.
He doesexplicitly
condemn
war: "Hencein war,waritselfis characterizedas somethingwhichought to pass away . . . implying. . .

" He doesnotreston this

thatthepossibility
of peace be retained."
but goesfurther
in orderto explaintheinnernecessity
of thecauses
whichbringaboutwaras partof theculturalworldshapedby man.
8 A.

Muller,Elementeder Staatskunst,
ed. J. Baxa (Jena,1922),I, 5, 7, 85ff.
Meinecke,in his Weltbiirgertum
und Nationalstaat,
146,sees in Miillerthe forerunnerof Ranke'sthoughts
on war,whileHegel'sthought,
whichis freefromthe
romantic
obsession
withthevitalistic
and organicgrowth
of thestate,is of a completelydifferent
mold.This seemsto be truein spiteof Hegel'sremarkthatliterature,and mainlyepic literature,
is nourishedby wars of conquest(Werke,ed.
Glockner[Stuttgart,
1928],XIV, 354,recently
quotedand discussedby W. Kaufmann,From Shakespeareto Existentialism,
122-124). It seemsthat here,once
more,a merestatement
of whatseemedto Hegelto be a historical
factwas construedas if it meantmoralapproval.
9Hegel'sPhilosophy
ofRight,trans.by T. M. Knox (Oxford,1945),12. On the
specificLutheranconnotations
of thisexpression,
whichoccursalso in Goethe,cf.
K. Lowith,VonHegelbisNietzsche(Zurich,1941),24.
10 Montesquieu
is perhapsthefirstamongthemoderns
whoseesin wara result
of the social condition
of man,and not a relapseinto sometraumaticpre-social
state.L'Espritdes Lois,I, ch. ii-iii.
11Philosophy
of Right,? 338; see also additionto ? 339.

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466

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AVINERI

That our ideas about how this worldshould have been are different
fromhistoricalreality,is in itselfa proofof the human capacity for
workingout the ideal out of the actual.
First of all, Hegel goes on to explain that war cannot be justified
by the utilitarianmotive of the defenseof life and property.This
idea, which Hegel recognizesas one of the commonplaceanswersto
the questionof the moraljustificationof war,would lead to an absurd
situation: forit is impossibleto demandthat men sacrifice,in the act
of war, those very things towards the preservationof which it is
waged.12Every attemptto justifywar by referenceto needs will necessarilyculminatein a dubious code of ethics accordingto which A
will have to pay withhis life to preserveB's life or merelyproperty.
This amounts,in otherwords,to an absoluteviolationof Kant's categorical imperative,which is also the basis of Hegel's personal morality: "Be a personand respectothersas persons."13 Where war is
defendedfromthe point of view of Civil Society (i.e., the realm of
needs), therenecessarilyemergesthis violation of the basic imperative of morality,since man thus servesas a mere tool and means at
the hands of his fellowman.'4
Howeverstrangethismay seem primafacie,Hegel's theoryof war
triesto avoid this difficulty
and findan explanation,and justification,
forwar withoutinfringing
on the Kantian imperative.Accordingto
Hegel, therelies in war an ethical (sittlich) elementinasmuchas it
exposesthe accidental,the arbitrary,
and finitein life.It preventsthe
particularinterestfrombecomingthe masterof the universe.By demanding everythingfromall, it places the concreteworld of phenomena in its true transitoryplace, it serves as an ethical memento

morz:

"The ethical momentin war is impliedin this.... War is not to

be regardedas an absolute evil and as a purely external accident,
whichitselfthereforehas some accidentalcause, be it injustices,the
passionsof nationsor the holdersof power,&c., or in short,something
or otherwhichoughtnot to be. It is to what is by nature accidental
that accidentshappen, and the fate wherebythey happen is thus a
necessity.Here as elsewhere,the point of view fromwhich things
seem pure accidentsvanishes if we look at them in the light of the
12 Ibid., ? 324. Withoutdirectly
drawingon this paragraph,this utilitarianliberalargument
was criticized
on themoregenerallevelof politicalobligation
by
Hegel'sEnglishdisciple,
B. Bosanquet,The Philosophical
Theoryof theState,new
edition(London,1958),76, n. 1.
13 Philosophy
ofRight,? 36; Hegel'sEnzyklopddie,
? 49. Comparethiswiththe
Nazi maxim:"The individual
as suchhas neither
a rightnora dutyto exist,as all
the rightsand dutiesderiveexclusively
fromthe community,"
statedby the Nazi
juristOtto Dietrichin his articlein the Volkischer
Beobachter(November11,
1937).
14Philosophy
ofRight,? 324.

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PROBLEM

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467

concept and philosophy,because philosophyknows accident for a

showand sees in it its essence,necessity.It is necessarythat the finite
-property and life should be definitelyestablishedas accidental,
because accidentalityis the conceptof the finite."`5
Hegel himselfsees the affinityof his train of thoughtwith religion,and commentsthat one oftenhears sermonsof this sort from
the pulpit. But, he goes on to remark,everyone hearingin church
that all the goods of this worldare ephemeral,still thinksthat on the
day of judgmenthis life and propertywill be spared. But when the
day of wrathdoes come and showsup here,in this world,and not in
some remoteother-worldly
existence,"if this insecuritynow comes
on the scene in the formof hussarswith shiningsabres and they actualize in real earnestwhat the preachershave said, thenthe moving
and edifyingdiscourseswhich foretoldall these events turn into
cursesagainst the invader."'6
Accordingto these paragraphs,war is only the permanentwriting
on the wall, the embodimentof "unto dust thou shalt return."Thus
it is not an outcomeof a real will of any concretehuman being,nor
is it waged withan eye towardsthe aggrandizement
of any particular
personor group.It is, in a way, a rod of anger,to use the biblical expression,unrelatedby itselfto any goal, just as the wars of Nebuchadnezzarwere unrelatedto any ethicalpurpose,thoughin the eyes
of the pious they always had, behind the scene,the hidden meaning
of providentialscorn.
This metaphysicalexplanation will not receive much approval
nowadays and may certainlyseem dated if not obscurantist.On the
otherhand, it would not be welcomeby any ideologywhichmightbe
termedmilitaristic,as it is completelydevoid of the ethos of war itself. It is, however,related only to the conceptof war, and does not
yet referto any concrete,historicalwar. Hegel distinguishes,on anotherlevel, betweenthe conceptof the state and the concretestate;
the latter belongs ultimatelyto the realm of the accidental and the
arbitrary,and so this distinctionservesHegel here also: "This [concept of war], however,is said to be only a philosophicidea, or, to use
anothercommonexpression,a 'justificationof Providence,'and it is
17
maintainedthat actual wars requiresome otherjustification."
Obviouslythis impliesthat the philosophicalsignificance
of the concept
of war cannotserveas a justificationforwagingany concretewar. In
this regardtherewas a markeddevelopmentin Hegel's thoughtafter
the Phenomenologyof Mind had been written;thereHegel had not
yet arrivedat a clear distinctionbetween the conceptualizationof
war and its concreteincidence.
'5

Ibid.

16Ibid.,additionto ? 324.

17 Ibid., ? 324. It is interestingto note that Popper,

op. cit.,262, 269, did not

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468

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AVINERI

warsforHegel?
What,then,is theessenceofconcrete
as a unity,an
Hegelassertsthattheessenceofa state'sexistence
This personality
liesin its relationswithotherstates.18
individuality,
of thestate,this"fictitious
man,"to use Hobbes'language,mustbe
fromotherpersonalities
in orderto findits identity:
distinguished
in
mind
its substantive
and im"The nationas a stateis
rationality
theabsolutepoweron earth.It folmediateactualityandis therefore
and autonomous
lowsthateverystateis sovereign
againstits neighbors."19

This absolutepowerof the statederivesfromthe empiricalfact

thatnationshave no praetorto presideoverthem,as Spinozaonce
beforewhichnationscan
put it, forthereis no judicialinstitution
litigate0; but it shouldbe emphasizedthat thisabsolutepoweris
sub specieaeternitatis.
on earth,andnotto be viewedas eternal,
This
statement
aboutthe non-existence
of an inis a factual,descriptive
law. That we may want thingsto be
stitutionalized
supranational
different,
Hegel wouldargue,belongsto the realmof hope,and not
to theprovinceofreality.
WhatmakesHegel'sstatements
soundas if theymeantthatwar
couldneverbe avoided(and hencetheywereviewedas obnoxious)is
eventhepossibility
thefactthathe criticizes
ofeverachieving
lasting
thereasonforhisposition,
it is necessary
peace.To understand
to exthelanguageHegelusesto explainit: "But thestate
aminecarefully
is an individual,
and individuality
essentially
impliesnegation.Hence
evenif a numberofstatesmakethemselves
intoa family,
thisgroup
21
an oppositeand createan enemy."
as an individualmustengender
A properunderstanding
of this sentenceis possibleonlyin the
whereasmostofthosewhohave relied
lightofHegel'sepistemology,
the connection.
As the stateis seenby
uponit have not understood
Hegel as a person,an 'individualwritlarge,'we shouldturnto
Hegel'snotionofhowa personidentifies
himself.
Put intoa nutshell,
Hegel's answeris that the individualis a personby virtueof his
being recognizedby othersand thus distinguishing
himselffrom
them22 and thisholdstruealso forthestatewhichhas theattribute
of a person.Its existenceis possibleonlythrough
the objectification
ofits desiresas theycomeintocontactwiththeworldexternalto it.
This contactis possibleonlyby meansof oppositionand strugglewhodistinguishes
-just as withtheindividual,
himself
fromhis fellowman,setshimself
in opposition
to him,and in doingso attainsto
make the distinction,
into the pitfallof identifying
fallingtherefore
Hegel with
Treitschke
and Moellervan denBruck.
18 Philosophy
of Right,? 323.
19Ibid., ? 331. Hegel writes: "Das Volk als Staat . . ."; since Knox translated

thisas "thenation-state,"
whichonlybegsthe question,I have had to rendermy
owntranslation
of thisphrase.
20Ibid.,additionto ? 324.
21 Ibid. The Koreanand Congolese
experiences
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PROBLEM

OF WAR IN

HEGEL

469

self-identification.
To makethepointclearer,one mayparadoxically
saythatifstates,in theplural,ceaseto exist,therecannot,by definition,remaina statein thesingular.
in whichHegel becameenmeshedbecause
But thiscomplication,
ofthedialecticalnatureofhis epistemology,
is apt to lead to yetanothersurprising
conclusion:ifthestateexistsbecauseit is recognized
as suchbyotherstates,23it followsthatthestateis notindependent,
"sovereign,"
a monadenclosedwithinitself.It seemsto be limitedin
its omnipotence,
its sovereignty,
as it needsforits veryexistence
the
co-existence
ofitsfellow-states.
Thisis thestartling
pointfromwhich
Hegelderivesdialectically
theneedfortheexistence
ofinternational
law as ofvitalimportance
fortheveryexistenceof the statesthemselves.The negationof the possibility
of a comprehensive
and perpetualinternational
orderdoesnottherefore,
according
to Hegel,constitutethedenialoftheexistence
ofinternational
law itself.24
The dialecticalparadoxis thatHegel'sstateis sovereign
onlyin
so faras theotherstatesrecognize
it as such,and the essentialneed
fortheexistence
ofa comitasgentium
arisesfromjusttheapparently
unlimited
sovereignty
ofthestate.To theuninitiated,
thismaysound
a bit overstrained;
to Hegel,thiswouldonlyprovethattheinfinite
mustnecessarily
be limitedand restricted
by its owndialecticalreason. And so Hegel comesto the treatment
of International
Law in
thatsectionof thePhilosophyof Rightentitled"Sovereignty
vis-avis foreign
States."Here clearlyit is incorrect
to assumethatHegel
deniedtheexistence
ofinternational
law.He onlydeniestheexistence
of an aprioristic
international
law, whichwouldbe based only on
abstractions
of things-as-they-ought-to-be.
Hegel stresses,however,
the difference
betweeninternational
and intranational
positivelaw.
As international
law derivesits authority
not fromits essencebut
ratherfromtheparticular
willsofthepartiesinvolved,
it is morelike
a contract
thanlaw.25But itsveryexistence(and Hegelhereemploys
a conceptwiththe intenseconcretesignificance
of Wirklichkeit)
is
neverdeniedbyhim.26
Hegel evengoesfurther
to provethatthe normof international
behavioris inherent
in whatseemsprimafacieitsverynegation:
trationsto Hegel's contention
how the existenceof an international
organization
mightenmeshthisveryorganization
in whatis to all practicalpurposesan act of
war.Assertions
thatthoseexperiences
tendto strengthen
the authority
of the UN
onlycorroborate
Hegel'sinsight,
as the samemightbe said of an individualstate
confronted
by thechallenge
of war.
22Ibid.,? 71.
23Ibid.,? 323.
24 Cf. the interesting
studyon this subjectby Dr. Adam von Trottzu Solz,
uinddas Internationale
Recht,Abhandlungen
des Seminars
HegelsStaatsphilosophie
fuirV6lkerrecht
und Diplomatie,
Heft6 (Gottingen,
1932),87-91.
25For the difference,
accordingto Hegel,betweenlaw and contract,see his
Enzyklopddie,
?? 493-495.
26Philosophy
of Right,? 333.

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Even in war-the state of affairswhenrightsdisappearand forceand

chancehold sway-a bondwhereineach countsto the restas something
as someabsolutealwaysremains.Hencein war,waritselfis characterized
theprovisoofthejus
thingwhichoughtto pass away.It impliestherefore
ofpeace be retained(and so, forexample,that
thatthepossibility
gentium
envoysmustbe respected),
and,in general,thatwar be notwagedagainst
domestic
institutions,
againstthepeace offamilyand privatelife,oragainst
personsin theirprivatecapacity.27
Here the non-totalitarianaspect of Hegelian war is emphatically
stressed,and this stands miles apart fromthe prevailingoutlook of
that period as characterizedby the German Romantics,e.g. Adam
Muller,who complainsthat war was still consideredin Germanythe
exclusivebusinessof the standingarmy; accordingto him,"the fireof
war should penetrateall the families,all the laws and institutionsof
peacetimelife."28 It is in Muller's expressionsthat we encounterthe
roots of the ideologyof total war. Hegel's distinction,on the other
hand, between State and Civil Society enables him to safeguardan
autonomousregion,eminentlypersonal and particular,which should
be respectedeven in war-as war is waged betweenstates,neverbetween individuals.Hegel even comes to the conclusionthat modern
warfarecharacterizedby the anonymityofbattlemade possibleby the
discoveryof gunpowderexpels personalenmityfromthe act of fighting itself.29
This mightseem a rathernaive appreciationof the horrible possibiltiesof modernwarfare,and it mightbe that Hegel became himselfa victimof that wishfulthinkingso much obnoxiousto
him.But thisatteststo the factthat Hegel wantedto see war humanized or minimizedin spite of his convictionthat it could not be
abolishedaltogether.In any case, the individualmust be safeguarded
fromthe emotionalhorrorof warfare.
This cannot be interpretedas the modernconcept of a people's
nationalistwar,whichneeds the concentrationof everyhuman effort
in the community.As a consequenceHegel stresseshis point that the
termof patriotismshouldnot mean the irrationalenthusiasticbattlecry,but ratherthe day-to-dayidentificationwith the laws, institutions,and values of the state in peace time.30
Moreover,accordingto Hegel war and victoryin war can never
sufficeto indicate which party was right.A concretewar can never
decide mattersof justice; the victorsare nevernecessarilythe righteous, northe vanquishedthe villainsin the piece: Might is not Right.
Hegel firsttook this positionas to the ethicallyneutral outcome of
27Ibid., ? 338 (my italics).Cf. also the additionto thisparagraph,
as wellas
? 339. This is strikingly
similarto clause6 of Kant's "Preliminary
Articlesof PerpetualPeace" in hisPerpetualPeace,trans.by M. Smith(London,1903),114.
28 Elemente der Staatskunst, 9.
29 Philosophyof Right,addition
to ? 338.
L,
30 Ibid.,? 268.

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PROBLEM

OF WAR IN

471

HEGEL

war in his essay "On the Constitutionof Germany"(Die Verfassung

Deutschlands) in 1802,saying:
The variouspossibilities
of conflict
are so numerous
thatit is impossible
to
expressthemat theoutseton thebasisofhumanreason.The moretheyare
explicitly
statedand formulated,
i.e.,themorerightsthatare set down,the
morereadilywill conflict
springup betweentheserights.. . . Each side
bases its positionon the rightwhichit claimsas its ownand chargesthe
otherpartywithviolatingthisor thatright.... The publictakessidesand
eachpartyarguesthatjusticeis his,and bothsidesare right:thedifficulty
is thatthesejust rightsthemselves
have causedtheconflict.... Law is the
utilityofthestateas assertedand confirmed
in contracts
and treatises.
But
sincein thesecontracts
the different
interests
of the state are statedin a
generalway,whileas rightstheyare exceptionally
many-sided,
theseinmustcometo conflict.
terests,and withthemthe rightsthemselves,
It dependsonlyon the combination
of forces,i.e. on the judgmentof politics,
whether
theinterests
and rights
whichare thusendangered
willbe defended
by all availablemeansand force,or not.In sucha case it is obviousthat
thisrightis also reserved
by theotherparty,as it has theinterest
opposite
to it, as wellas therightto thisinterest.
And war,oranyother
means,
is
whatwilldecidethematter:notwhichof thetworightsis themorejustforbothsides have just rights-butwhichof therightswill yieldto the
other.War mustdecidethis,forjust thereasonthatthetwomutuallycontradictory
rightsare equallytrueand just.3'
The same principles,but in less cumbersomeand more mature
philosophicalgarb, Hegel expressedtwentyyears later in his Philosophyof Right: "A state throughits subjects has widespreadconnectionsand many-sidedinterests,and these may be readilyand constantlyinjured: but it remains inherentlyindeterminablewhich of
these injuriesis to be regardedas a specificbreachof treatyor an injury to the honor and autonomyof the state. The reason forthis is
that a state may regardits infinityand honoras at stake in each of
its concerns,howeverminute,and it is all the more inclinedto susceptibiltiesto injurythe moreits strongindividualityis impelledas a
resultof long domesticpeace to seek and create a sphereof activity
abroad." 32

This is a rareinsightinto the self-righteous

attitudeeverystate is
apt to adopt towardsa real or imaginedinfringement
on what it considers its rights.33
Thus everywar creates the unfortunatesituation
whereinboth sides may have a claim to a certainportionof justice,
and as a result war cannot be "justified"fromthe point of view of
one partyalone. This assumptionprecludedany possibilityof relating
the Hegelian conceptof war to the idea of a national war, since the
nationalmovement,even in its humanitarianphase, e.g. Mazzini, has
had recourse to the concept of a 'just' war: otherwiseit cannot
31 HegelsSchriften
zurPolitikundRechtsphilosophie,
99-101 (myitalics).

ofRight,? 334.
32Philosophy

33Ibid., ? 335.

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472

SHLOMO

AVINERI

justifya nationallevee en masse, or a people'swar againstthe 'nationalenemy,'not to mentionwarswagedon pretextsof rectifying

historical
injustices
orpreventive
wars.
According
to Hegel,no warcan be inherently
just,fora concrete
wardoesnottakeplacein a realmwhichis at all relevantto theconceptof justice.Thus the circlehas beenclosed:firstthe conceptof
war has been understoodin the ethicalsphereof generalphilosophicalspeculation,
and thenconcretewarretreatsto the realmof
the accidental.The philosophical
solution,in spiteof its dialectical
brilliance,
mayseemunsatisfactory,
butifso,thefailurederivesfrom
Hegel'sunwillingness
to consecrate
thephenomenon
ofconcrete
war.
The solutionadoptedbyTreitschke,
whosawa positivemoralingredient in nationalwarsor warsof conquest,or Carl Schmitt'sradical
of war as the essenceof a humanand politicalcreature
treatment
mightbe moreconsistent,
thoughmorallyabhorrent.
For Hegelconcretewar is alwaysa conflict
betweenaccidental-particular
desires
whichcontainnothingnecessary,34
and thusno philosophical
justification
can be givento thator anyotherwar.35
From this Hegel drawssome institutional
conclusions:as war
shouldnotbe partand parcelofthelifeofthecommunity
at large,it
shouldbe conducted
bya standing
professional
army,andnotthrough
a levee en masse.36 Universalconscription
shouldbe avoided,as the
courageand skillneededin warare themselves
individualcharacteristicsand notcollectivemass-psychology
In harmony
virtues.37
with
undercivilianauthority,
this,themilitary
powershouldbe absolutely
and a militarystatelikethe late Romanpraetorian
Empireis cited
by Hegelas theinversion
of thenormalorderofthings.38
This is unquestionably
a radicallydifferent
conclusionfromthe
primafacieimpression
one getsfromthepassagesquotedat the beginningof thisessay,but the distinction,
occurring
overand again,
betweentheconceptand theconcrete
is essentialto the
phenomenon
of Hegel'sposition.Thus Hegel can exalttheconcept
understanding
of war,withoutidentifying
himself
withanyconcrete
war.This ambivalencemightperhapsbe compared(on a rathersuperficial
level,
of course)to the Christianattitudeto sin.The conceptof sin is the
cornerstone
ofChristian
andis sine qua nonto theconceptof
theology,
grace.Yet everyconcretesinis a subjectfornegativemoralevaluation.
Thus Hegel concludesthe passageson war in a vein whichcorrectlyexpresses
hisfeeling
ofcrucifixion
in faceofthefactthatwaris
so muchwithus; yetin spiteofhis assertion
notto turnto wishful
he sees in Europeof thepost-Napoleonic
thinking,
periodthepossibilityof minimizing
the incidenceof war: "The Europeanpeoples
34 Ibid.,
37 Ibid.,

? 334.
? 327.

35 Ibid., ? 337.

36
38

Ibid., ?? 325, 328.

Ibid., additionto ? 271.

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PROBLEM

OF WAR IN

HEGEL

473

forma familyin accordancewiththe universalprincipleunderlying

theirlegalcodes,theircustoms,
and theircivilization.
This principle
has accordingly
modified
theirinternational
conductin the stateof
affairs[i.e. war] otherwisedominatedby the mutualinflicting
of

evil."31

This universalistic
attitudetowardsthe unifying
conceptof the
modernworld,of contemporary
Europe,Hegel also uses in orderto
stressthefactthatthepolitico-national
boundaries
dividingtheEuropeanstatesareofsecondary
importance,
sincetheculturalpartnershipis dominant.
Politicalunityis secondary
to culturalunity,as the
realmof the stateitselfis philosophically
subordinated
to the realm
of the absolutespirit.Thus Hegel puts it in his Philosophyof History:"Statesin theModernWorldseekindependence
ofoneanother,
and thisis theirhonor.This obstinatetendency
towardan absolute
positionof autonomytheyhave in commonwiththe Greekcitystates. . . . But despite all the differences
between the individual
states . .. , therealso obtains a unityamong them,and thereforewe

shouldviewevenpoliticalindependence
as a merelyformalprinciple.
Today thereis not the same absolutechasmbetweenthe statesof
EuropewhichprevailedbetweenGreeceand Persia.Whenone state
is annexedto theterritory
oftheother,it loses,to be sure,its formal
independence:
butitsreligion,
itslaws,theconcrete
in itsliferemain
intact.The trendof the states is, therefore,
towardsuniformity.
Thereprevailsamongthemoneaim,onetendency,
whichis thecause
of wars,friendships,
and theneedsof dynasties.
But therealso prevails amongthemanotheruniformity,
whichparallelsthe idea of
in Greece,exceptthatnowit is thehegemony
hegemony
ofSpirit."40
Although
Hegeldoesnotaccept,on whatseemsto himsolidphilosophicalconsiderations,
the vision of an aprioristiceternalpeace
schemesuchas Kant'sor thatoftheHolyAlliance,his empirical
de3I9bid.,additionto ? 339. Hegel uses a similarexpression
in his lectureson
aesthetics
whenhe remarks:"In contemporary
Europeeverynationis limitedby
anotherone, and cannot,therefore,
embarkon a courseof war againstanother
Europeannation"(Werke,ed. Glockner,
XIV, 355).
40 G. W. F. Hegel,Vorlesungen
ilberdie Philosophie
der Weltgeschichte,
ed. G.
Lasson,(Leipzig,1920), 761 (my italics).I have had to rendermy own translation,as thispassage,likeso manyothers,doesnotappearin Sibree'sEnglishtranslation,whichwas based on the veryfragmentary
earlyGermaneditionof Hegel's
lectureson the Philosophy
of History.Onlyat the beginning
of thiscenturydid
LassoncomparethiseditionwithHegel'sownnotesand publishthe fulleredition.
It is a pitythattheEnglish-reading
publichas to relyon suchan incomplete
version.Cf. also Hegel'sopposition
to the claimfor'natural'frontiers,
mostvociferouslyclaimedin Germanyby Arndt.Hegel contendsin his Philosophy
of Right,
? 247,thatsucha claimonlycausesendlessdangersand provokesfurther
wars,as
thereexistsno objectivecriterion
forthe 'naturalness'
of the frontiers.
It is fascinatinghowdeeplyan earlyXIX-century
couldforeseethe hollowness
philosopher
of thisnationalistic
so muchstillen voguein ourowncentury.
catchword,
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474

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ofcontemporary
Europeis muchin thesamevein.If there
scription
mightbe raisedobjectionsto it, theyare on the groundthathe has
notrightly
sensedthepulseofhis time.
For it seemsdoubtfulthat Hegel'spositionabout war could,or
to explain
should,be defended.It mightseemhardlypraiseworthy
to
its
of
war
in
human
reference
beinga
the immanence
historyby
thatbythis
memento
continuous
mori;still,it shouldbe remembered
notionHegeldid nottryto defendanyactualwar,onlyto explainit
it maybe questioned
whether
therereallyare
conceptually.
Similarly,
no 'just' warsin thesensethatin any warbothsideshave an equal
historycertainlycould supplyus
portionof justice.Contemporary
with ample cases in whichHegel's notionwould not stand when
testedbyhisownstandards.
Hegelhas suppliedus with
Yet, apartfromthequestionwhether
ofwar,it mustbe maintained
an adequatephilosophical
explanation
fromwhichthe
that,on theotherhand,he didnotsupplyarguments
nationalistcase for war could be sustained.The last paragraphs
quotedamplysuggestthatHegel did not speakthe languageof natranHis dreamof a relatively
militarism.
tionalismor expansionist
likeall theotherdreamsof theRestoraquil Europewas shattered,
in 1848.At thattime
tionperiod,in 1830andlater,withgreater
force,
whichenabledmento praisewaras morally
a newchordwas struck,
whichsuitedthemideologically.
justifiedunderthosecircumstances
Thus Mazzini, the humanitarian
nationalist,encouragedhis folin 1844,to be concerned
thatthe
lowersin hisDutiesofMan, written
blood spilt by them should be ad magnampatriae gloriam; Wilhelm

memberof the GermanConstituent

Assemblyin Frankfort,
Jordan,
justifiedthe continuedoccupationof Polish areas by a unifiednationalGermanywiththe following
words:"Our rightin Poland is
the rightof conquest,the rightof the stronger. . ., and I am proud
ofit" 41; and theStudentFraternities
(Burschenschaf
ten) whichde-

clared"webelievethatwarputsan endto conditions

ofdegeneration
and thatit is thefirstand irrepressible
way to the finalgoal of nationalunity"42 all thosevarioustrendsofthoughtdo notspeakthe
lineageof thoseattitudes
languageof Hegel,and the philosophical
cannotbe ascribedto him.
The HebrewUniversity,
Jerusalem.
41Cited in T. Klein, 1848-Der VorkampfdeutscherEinheitund Freiheit
(Munich,1914),294-295.On thisproblemin thehistory
of modern,
and especially
cf.J. L. Talmon,PoliticalMessianism:The RomanticPhase
German,nationalism,
(London,1960),479-486.
42H. Haupt, Quellenund Darstellungen
zur Geschichteder Burschendschaft
und der deutschen
(Heidelberg,
1911), II, 37. For Hegel'sattiEinheitsbewegung
tude to the extremenationalism
of the Fraternities,
see my "The HegelianPosition on the Emancipation
of the Jews,"Zion,Quarterly
forResearchin Jewish
History(Jerusalem,
1960),XXX, 134-136(in Hebrew).
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