Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 210836, September 01, 2015
Taxation, Tax Refund, Tax Credit
The phrase which are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes describes the entities
to whom the petroleum products must be sold in order to render the exemption operative. Section
135(c) should thus be construed as an exemption in favor of the petroleum products on which the
excise tax was levied in the first place. The exemption cannot be granted to the buyers - that is,
the entities that are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes - because they are not under any
legal duty to pay the excise tax.
It is noteworthy that excise taxes are considered as a kind of indirect tax, the liability for
the payment of which may fall on a person other than whoever actually bears the burden of the
tax.23 Simply put, the statutory taxpayer may shift the economic burden of the excise tax
payment to another - usually the buyer.
In cases involving excise tax exemptions on petroleum products under Section 135 of the
NIRC, the Court has consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer, not the party who only
bears the economic burden, who is entitled to claim the tax refund or tax credit. But the Court
has also made clear that this rule does not apply where the law grants the party to whom the
economic burden of the tax is shifted by virtue of an exemption from both direct and indirect
taxes. In which case, such party must be allowed to claim the tax refund or tax credit even if it is
not considered as the statutory taxpayer under the law.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Del Castillo, Leonen
More important, the prospect of declining sales of aviation jet fuel sold to international
carriers on account of the unwillingness of major domestic oil companies to shoulder the burden
of excise tax, which in a way encourages "tankering," hinges on speculation. Neither is it a legal
justification to grant manufacturers a refund or credit of the excise taxes paid on petroleum
products sold to international carriers.
It bears stressing that tax refunds, just like tax exemptions must not rest on vague,
uncertain or indefinite inference but should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision
of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken, as taxes are the lifeblood of the
government.52 Thus, unless there is a clear grant of tax exemption or refund in the law, the Court
cannot grant petitioner's claim for tax refund or credit as this would constitute judicial
legislation, which is not allowed.
Notably, Section 135 of the NIRC is not a refund provision as it does not provide for a
tax refund in favor of the buyers, i.e., international carriers and tax-exempt entities, and the
sellers of petroleum products. Thus, there is no legal basis to grant petitioner's claim for tax
refund
or
credit.
In the discharge of his powers and duties, the notary public's certification is one
impressed with public interest, accuracy and fidelity18 such that he owes it to the public to
notarize only when the person who signs the document is the same person who executed it and
personally appeared before him to attest to his knowledge of the contents stated therein. Thus,
the Court has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of an affiant's personal appearance and makes
the failure to observe such rule punishable.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It is impressed with
substantial public interest, and only those who are qualified or authorized may act as such. It is
not a purposeless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are
willing to pay fees for notarization. Moreover, notarization of a private document, such as an
SPA in this case, converts the document into a public one which, on its face, is given full faith
and credit.
The Court has ruled that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted
out the following penalties: (7) revocation of notarial commission; (2) disqualification from
being commissioned as notary public; and (3) suspension from the practice of law - the terms of
which vary based on the circumstances of each case. In this case, while the IBP Commissioner
found the absence of bad faith and considered Atty. Gasmen as a first time offender, the Court
finds that the penalties of disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period
of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year are proper.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED
ADMINISTRATOR WILSONUY v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III
A.C. NO. 10525
September 01, 2015
BY
ITS
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means
for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration. In
certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there is ground to
support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence,
credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this
court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this
requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus,
faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is
as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's
cause.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number,
and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended
to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who
have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys
number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been
admitted to the Philippine bar.45 With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the
same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally
discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same
person remains in good standing as a lawyer.
Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise
compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government
units.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the
practice of law.
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate the
dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service of court processes, enhance
compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better representation of a client's
cause.
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece of
paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to
facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to betray apathy for the
ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the standards for
admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but
to feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter
lack of respect for the profession that one brandishes.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of the very
same badgeshis place in the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his
recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing training and competencethat are
emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such contempt for these badges,
we find that there is every reason for preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the
profession these badges signify.
FELICIANO P. LEGASPI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO GERMAR,
AND ROGELIO P. SANTOS, JR.
G.R. No. 216572, September 01, 2015
that restricts such phrase to include only those actions or proceedings that are originally filed
with the COMELEC en banc itself (e.g., petition to declare failure of elections) has no basis and
only obscures the otherwise clear import of the phrase's language.
Verily, when an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first decided by a
division, the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision before the en
banc does not signify the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an
existing process. The motion for reconsiderationnot being an appeal from the decision of the
division to the en banconly thus serves as a means of having the election case decided by the
COMELEC en banc. Under this view, therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before
the division remains the same even after it is forwarded to the en banc through a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide a motion for
reconsideration from the decision of a division in anoriginal election case would unquestionably
bring to the fore the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.
The words "action" and "proceeding" and even the entire phrase 'action or proceeding are
not exclusive to Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. Such words and phrase, in fact,
appear in other parts of the COMELEC Rules, most notably in Part V thereof. To our minds, an
examination of how the words "action" and "proceeding" and the phrase "actions or
proceedings" were used in Part V of the COMELEC Rules is telling of how the COMELEC
Rules actually intended such terms and phrase to be understood, which is, in the context of its
other provisions.
Evidently, what Part V actually discloses are the particular cases or matters that may be
considered as "actions or proceedings" for purposes of the COMELEC Rules. Notably, all the
actions or proceedings identified thereunder, save for the provisional remedy of injunction, are
all main cases cognizable by the COMELEC. Notable too is that a motion for reconsideration
from a decision of a division which is but a part of a main case - is not among those included
n
Part
V.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Velasco, Jr.
As can be gleaned, both the adverted constitutional and COMELEC rule provisions, as
couched, require not a simple majority of the participating members constituting a quorum, but
an absolute majority.
This rule in statutory construction is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
"speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." As the statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
Clearly then, the Constitution no less bestows on the COMELEC divisions the authority
to decide election cases. Their decisions arrived are capable of attaining finality, without need of
any affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. For instance, if no
motion for reconsideration is filed by the aggrieved party within five (5) days from the
promulgation of the decision, the ruling becomes final and executory.36 In this sense, the process
before the division should be deemed complete, although it can also be considered, in the bigger
picture, as part of the integrated process of resolving an election case from start to finish, as
when the case was originally initiated before the trial court.
The fact that the COMELEC division's decision may be referred to the en banc via a
motion for reconsideration should in no way be considered as a diminution of its adjudicatory
powers. Worth maintaining is this doctrine in Mendoza: a motion for reconsideration is a
constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or
resolution, but not an appeal.
In distinguishing an action originally commenced with the COMELEC from an appealed
case, reference should be made to Article IX-C, Sec. 2(2) of the Constitution. According to the
provision, the COMELEC is a constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests, involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well
as appellate jurisdiction
over
election
protests
involving
elective
municipal
and barangay officials.41 Thus, in the case at bar, the petition for disqualification filed by Legaspi
was correctly categorized by the ponencia as an election case originally commenced in the
Commission because (1) private respondents were candidates for posts in the city government,
(2) there is no trial court ruling elevated to the Commission to speak of, and (3) the motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondents with the COMELEC en banc, as earlier stated, does
not amount to an appeal.
It is beyond cavil that for cases originally filed before it, the failure of the COMELEC to
muster the required majority vote after rehearing would lead to the dismissal of
the action or proceedingpending before it. The conjunctive word "or" clearly indicates that there
is an intended distinction between the words "action" and "proceeding," such that in not all
instances would the "action" originally commenced before the COMELEC will be dismissed in
their entirety. Otherwise, to treat them similarly would mean that the words are superfluous,
which is not the case.
It is the considered view that the "action" to be dismissed in cases originally commenced
before the COMELEC under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure pertains to
those originally and directly filed with the COMELEC division or en banc.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith, still it.
be
said
that
it
is
an
innocent
purchaser
for
value.
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a property without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, the property and pays full and fair price at the time of
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of other persons in the property.
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not
go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances
which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being
sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course, expected from the
purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the
occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueo, in the
concept of the owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection
of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he
find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as
in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify
the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from
claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
There is x x x no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third
person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property to be
solidarily bound with the principal obligor. x x x. The signatory to the principal contract- loan remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon the default of the latter that the creditor may have
recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the
recovery of the amount of the loan. And the liability of the third-party mortgagors extends only
to the property mortgaged. Should there be any deficiency, the creditor has recourse on the
principal debtor.
COMMERCIAL LAW; Corporation Law; Piercing of the Veil
It is a basic rule that a corporation is a juridical entity which is vested with a legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and from the people
comprising it, who, in general, are not personally liable for obligations incurred by the
corporation unless the veil of corporate fiction is pierced to justify that it is used as a means to
perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.
REY TORRECAMPO, JOVITA V. CALMA, WINTHROP MARK N. BARBA AND LEA
TAPNIOv. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MATSUSHITA
ELECTRONIC PHILS. CORP., SEIICHI FUKAMI, IROKAZU UMEDA, BARTOLOME
SARANGGAYA, JAIME TIONGSON AND SINICHI JOSONE
G.R. No. 199617
September 02, 2015
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to
be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Rules of procedure must
be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded
as mandatory.
The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration
A second motion for reconsideration, as a rule, is a prohibited
pleading which shall not be allowed except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after
an express leave shall have first been obtained.
evidence is necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. 46 Following this
doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband
must be upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.
Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can
be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement
other
than
the
contents
of
the
writing.
Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or
vary a written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the
terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and
(d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution
of
the
written
agreement.
Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility
as to overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the
documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.
TOMASA J. SABELLINA, - versus -DOLORESBURAY,LEDENIA
VILLAMOR, ARLENE MAGSAYO, LUDIMA ROMULO, RAMON
CANADELLA, ROBERTO ACIDO, MARIO ESPARGUERA, RODRIGO
ACIDO, RONNIE UBANGAN CONCEPCION REBUSTO
G.R. No. 187727, September 02, 2015
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is not our function to analyze and weigh the
evidence that the lower courts have passed upon. However, jurisprudence has carved out
recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse ofdiscretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion
Nonetheless, in the spirit of liberality that pervades the Rules of Court 4 and in the interest
of substantial justice, this Court has, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for certiorari as
a petition for review on certiorari, particularly when: (1) the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari;6 (2) the petition avers
errors of judgment;7 and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.8 Considering that the present petition was filed within the extension period granted by this
Court and avers errors of law and judgment, this Court deems it proper to treat the present
petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari in order to serve the higher ends of
justice.
As our last word, this decision should not be construed as imposing unnecessary burden
on the lawyer in collecting his just fees. But, as in the exercise of any other right conferred by
law, the lawyer - and the courts -must avail of the proper legal remedies and observe the
procedural rules to prevent the possibility, or even just the perception, of abuse or prejudice
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Political law; Constitutional law; Waiver of the right to question the legality of the search
warrant
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and
the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in
the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based
thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered
by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause
to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
Generally, a judge's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. "Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched."
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite
examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the
search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional
requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void.
Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights;their noncompliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of
the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined
after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of
the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical
rules
of
procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. In People v. Decierdo, the Court declared that "[wjhenever a protection
given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out
convincingly.
Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs to be proved by the
accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be proven first in order
The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the person
invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack used by the
aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an accused is to defend
himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character,
the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes
self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault." Moreover, the nature and
location of wounds are considered important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of selfdefense
Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would normally
grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. It has been held,
however, that non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence either. There is no
law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the
cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee.
To the Assignee, these "control" mechanisms are indicative of the interest of Legacy in
the enforcement of the trust fund because the agreement gives it the power to dictate on
LBP the fulfillment of the trust, such as the delivery of monies to it to facilitate the
payment to the planholders.
Iit must be stressed that a person is considered as a beneficiary of a trust if there is a
manifest intention to give such a person the beneficial interest over the trust properties.
It is clear from Section 16 that the underlying congressional intent is to make the
planholders the exclusive beneficiaries. It has been said that what is within the spirit is within the
law even if it is not within the letter of the law because the spirit prevails over the letter.
The Congress, because of the chaos confounding the industry at the time, considered it
necessary to provide a stronger legal framework so that no entity could claim that the mandate
and delegated authority of the SEC under the SRC was nebulous. The Pre-Need Code cemented
the regulatory framework governing the pre-need industry with precise specifics to ensure that
the rights of the pre-need planholders would be categorically defined and protected
"Under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment, the re-enactment of a statute, substantially unchanged (as in this case), is persuasive
indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction." Accordingly, where a
statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency
charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter reenacts the provisions without
substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory that the ruling carries out the
legislative purpose.
The Court cannot go against that legislative intent for it is the duty of this institution to
read what the law intends. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice
The Pre-Need Code is clear on this. It recognizes the distinction between claims against
the pre-need company and those against the trust fund. Section 52 (b) states that liquidation
"proceedings in court shall proceed independently of proceedings in the Commission for the
liquidation of claims, andcreditors of the pre-need company shall have no personality
whatsoever in the Commission proceedings to litigate their claims against the trust
funds." The reason why claims against the trust funds can proceed independently of the
proceedings in the courts is the fact that the latter is directed against a different person or entity.
The Pre-Need Code recognizes that the jurisdiction over pending claims against the trust
funds prior to its effectivity is vested with the SEC. Such authority can be easily discerned even
from the provisions of the SRC. Section 4 thereof provides that despite the transfer of
jurisdiction to the RTC of those matters enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC
remains authorized to "exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those
which may be implied from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the
express powers granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws."
Finally, it must be stressed that the primary protection accorded by the Pre-Need Code to
the planholders is curative and remedial and, therefore, can be applied retroactively. The rule is
that where the provisions of a statute clarify an existing law and do not contemplate a change in
that law, the statute may be given curative, remedial and retroactive effect. To review, curative
statutes are those enacted to cure defects, abridge superfluities, and curb certain evils.
A reading of the Pre-Need Code immediately shows that its provisions operate merely in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of the right of the planholders to exclusively claim
against the trust funds as intended by the legislature. No new substantive right was created or
bestowed upon the planholders. Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code only echoes and clarifies the
SRC's intent to exclude from the insolvency proceeding trust fund assets that have been
established "exclusively for the benefit of planholders." It was precisely enacted to foil the
tactic of taking undue advantage of any ambiguities in the New Rules.
Any doubt or reservation in this regard has been dispelled by the Pre-Need Code. Section
57 thereof provides that "[a]ny pre-need company who, at the time of the effectivitv of this
Code has been registered and licensed to sell pre-need plans and similar contracts, shall be
considered registered and licensed under the provision of this Code and its implementing
rules and regulations and shall be subject to and governed by the provisions hereof xxx."
Thus, Legacy and all other existing pre-need companies cannot claim that the provisions of the
Pre-Need Code are not applicable to them and to the claims which accrued prior to the enactment
of
the
said
law.
"[I]t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions,
as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms
so direct:46 With the Pre-Need Code having the attribute of a remedial statute, Legacy and all
pre-need providers or their creditors cannot argue that it cannot be retroactively applied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION
MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INC.,
G.R. No. 198426
September 02, 2015
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction
BY THE PHILIPPINE
(POEA) v. PRINCIPALIA
While "[w]ell-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency," 34 it is
not entirely correct to say that an action by an administrative agency, such as in the case at bar,
cannot be questioned in an injunction suit. It has been held that "[c]ourts cannot enjoin an agency
from performing an act within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it
gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction." 35 Indeed, administrative decisions on matters within
the executive jurisdiction can be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of
law, and in such cases, injunction may be granted.
Significantly, this likewise goes true with respect to the main relief for injunction. As the
elements for its issuance, i.e., (1) there must be a right to be protected; and (2) the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right, 39 are matters that must be proved
during trial, the RTC merely acted in its judicial sphere when it proceeded to try the case.