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Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).

Facts
Mitchell brought suit against Neff to recover unpaid legal fees. Mitchell published notice of
the lawsuit in an Oregon newspaper but did not serve Neff personally. Neff failed to appear
and a default judgment was entered against him. To satisfy the judgment Mitchell seized
land owned by Neff so that it could be sold at a Sheriffs auction. When the auction was
held Mitchell purchased it and later assigned it to Pennoyer.
Neff sued Pennoyer in federal district court in Oregon to recover possession of the
property, claiming that the original judgment against him was invalid for lack of personal
jurisdiction over both him and the land. The court found that the judgment in the lawsuit
between Mitchell and Pennoyer was invalid and that Neff still owned the land. Pennoyer
lost on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue

Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not
been personally served while within the state and whose property within the state
was not attached before the onset of litigation?
Holding and Rule (Field)

No. A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party 1) is
personally served with process while within the state, or 2) has property within the
state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi in rem
jurisdiction).
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the validity of judgments may be directly
questioned on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute
due process of law. Due process demands that legal proceedings be conducted according
to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the protection and enforcement of private rights.
To give legal proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal with legal authority to pass
judgment, and a defendant must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process
within the state, or by his voluntary appearance.
The substituted service of process by publication in actions brought against non-residents
is valid only where property in the state is brought under the control of the court, and
subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that purpose, or where the judgment is
sought as a means of reaching such property or affecting some interest therein; in other
words, where the action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
The Oregon court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was not served
in Oregon. The courts judgment would have been valid if Mitchell had attached Neffs land
at the beginning of the suit. Mitchell could not have done this because Neff did not own the
land at the time Mitchell initiated the suit. The default judgment was declared invalid.
Therefore, the sheriff had no power to auction the real estate and title never passed to
Mitchell. Neff was the legal owner.
Disposition
Judgment for Neff affirmed.

Summary of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94
L. Ed. 865 (1950).

Facts
Central Hanover Bank (P) was the trustee of a common trust fund formed by pooling the
assets of a number of smaller trusts. Central Hanover Bank petitioned to the New York
Surrogates Court for a judicial settlement of the trust. The only notice provided to
beneficiaries was via publication in a newspaper. Mullane (D) was appointed attorney and
special guardian for a number of beneficiaries who either were unknown or did not appear.
Procedural History
Mullane objected to the statutory provision for notice by publication, arguing that it was
unconstitutional for lack of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Surrogates
Court overruled Mullanes objection and the ruling was affirmed on appeal to the New York
Supreme Court Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. The United States
Supreme Court granted cert.
Issue

Is notice given to out of state parties by publication in a newspaper, when the


parties addresses were known, constitutional in light of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Rule

No. Notice given to out of state parties by publication in a newspaper, when the
parties addresses were known, is unconstitutional in light of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notice must be reasonably calculated to inform known parties affected by the proceedings.
However, constructive notice by publication was acceptable with regard to missing or
unknown parties or for those whose whereabouts could not be ascertained by due
diligence or for whom future interests were too conjectural to be known with certainty.
Disposition
Judgment reversed.
Facts
Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, lost a large antitrust judgment and Heitner (P)
initiated a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware against 28 officers and directors of the
corporation (i.e. Shaffer, D). Heitner owned one share of Greyhound stock and was a
nonresident of Delaware. Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of stock owned by 21 of
the defendants in order to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The legal situs of the stock was
deemed to be in Delaware.
The Delaware sequestration statute allowed property within the state to be seized to allow
the Delaware court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the owner. Shaffer et al. made a
special appearance to challenge the courts jurisdiction on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutional. Shaffer also asserted that there were insufficient contacts to confer
jurisdiction. The District Court found that the statute was valid, and did not address the
minimum contacts argument due to the finding that the legal presence of the stock in
Delaware conferred quasi-in rem jurisdiction.
Issues
1
Can a state obtain personal jurisdiction over a party based on that partys
ownership of property in the state?
2
Is quasi in rem jurisdiction subject to the constitutional requirements of minimum
contacts?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1
No. A state cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a party based merely on that
partys ownership of property in the state.
2
Yes. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is subject to the constitutional requirements of
minimum contacts.

Rules
Whether or not a State can assert jurisdiction over a nonresident must be evaluated
according to the minimum-contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
In rem jurisdiction: due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the basis
for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in the thing. The presence of property in a State may allow jurisdiction by
providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation; for example,
when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy.
Where, as in this case, the property serving as the basis for jurisdiction is completely
unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action, the presence of the property alone, i.e., absent
other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, would not support the States
jurisdiction.
Delawares assertion of jurisdiction over appellants, based solely as it is on the statutory
presence of appellants property in Delaware, violates the Due Process Clause, which
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Appellants
holdings in the corporation do not provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support
jurisdiction of that States courts over appellants.
Delaware state-court jurisdiction is not supported by that States interest in supervising the
management of a Delaware corporation and defining the obligations of its officers and
directors, since Delaware bases jurisdiction, not on appellants status as corporate
fiduciaries, but on the presence of their property in the State.
Though it may be appropriate for Delaware law to govern the obligations of appellants to
the corporation and stockholders, this does not mean that appellants have purposefully
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State. See
Hanson v. Denckla. Appellants, who were not required to acquire interests in the
corporation in order to hold their positions, did not by acquiring those interests surrender
their right to be brought to judgment in the States in which they had minimum contacts.
Discussion
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust we held certain Fourteenth Amendment
rights attach once an adverse judgment in rem directly affects the property owner by
divesting him of his rights in the property. If jurisdiction over property involves jurisdiction
over a persons interests, the proper standard is the minimum contacts standard of
International Shoe. This makes the assertion of jurisdiction over the property an assertion
of jurisdiction over the person. Thus, all assertions of jurisdiction must be determined
according to the standards of International Shoe and its progeny.
Delaware has a strong interest in supervising the management of corporations created
within its borders. The legislature must assert that interest, however. Delaware is not a fair
forum for this litigation because the officers and directors have never set foot in the state
and have not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of the state.
Disposition
Reversed.
Concurring (Powell)
I reserve judgment as to whether ownership of real property in a jurisdiction may provide
the contacts necessary for jurisdiction. Quasi in rem jurisdiction should remain valid when
real property is involved.
Concurring (Stevens)
This holding should not be read to invalidate in rem jurisdiction.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part (Brennan)
The use of minimum contacts is more than justified and it represents a sensible approach
to the exercise of state court jurisdiction, however the majoritys approach to minimum

contacts is wrong. To be proper, State court jurisdiction must have both notice and a long
arm statute. Under this case there is no such statute.
As a general rule, a state forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative
action centering on the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation
incorporated in that State. I therefore would not foreclose Delaware from asserting
jurisdiction over appellants were it persuaded to do so on the basis of minimum contacts.
Heitner however never pleaded or demonstrated that the defendants had minimum
contacts with the state.
Greyhounds choice of incorporation in Delaware is a prima facie showing of submission to
its jurisdiction. There was a voluntary association with the State of Delaware invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws. The majority opinion is purely advisory once it finds
that the state statute is invalid

G.R. No. L-48754


November 26, 1941
EMILIO V. REYES, protestant-appellant,
vs.
APOLONIO R. DIAZ, protestee-appellee.
MORAN, J.:
This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the
jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first,
whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of
candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the
validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the
protestee in his counter-protest.
Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue." Section
138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos.
3 and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all
cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue." It has been held that the
word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to
the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a
broader sense." (15 C. J. 735; Johnson vs. Wells, 91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626;
Vinal vs. Continental Constr., etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102
Ga. 597; 29 SE 452.) There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which
may lend the word "jurisdiction" therein used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over the
subject matter. On the contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law,
which is to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this court to cases of vital importance
involving questions of fundamental character, such, for instance, as the question of validity
of statute, treaty or ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which may
effect the very existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or
death penalty is imposed, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction
which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is
dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the
pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter as determined by law.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers (Banco

Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup.
p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45674). The question, therefore, of whether a court
has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of
jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the
Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting,
as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to
place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land.
In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both
parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the
trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question
between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either
case. The real question between them is one of fact whether or not the protestant's
certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not the until this fact is proved can the
question of jurisdiction be determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions
above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the
pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be true that the court by
an erroneous ruling on such question my encroach upon issues completely foreign to
those defined in the pleadings, but in such case the question of jurisdiction that may arise
would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In
order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties. (Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs.
Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216.) But in some instances it is said that the court
should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15 C. J. 734; Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587,
33 N. E. 676), meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be
within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be
distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and
the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. (Rule 17,
sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and
decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an
expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties.
Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot
be said to have been served with process as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs.
Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a
specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings,
and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.
Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the
institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the
ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which
are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.
(Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781; Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689; Cosculluela vs.
Gaston, 63 Phil. 41).
Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Avacea, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz, Horilleno, and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.
-

LUCIA BERNABE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,


vs.
DOMINGO L. VERGARA, defendant-appellant.
Dantis, Rivera & Vergara for appellant.
Harmogenes Concepcion for appellees.
MORAN, J.:
This case has been certified to this Court by a resolution of the Court of Appeals which
reads as follows:
En la demanda entablada en este asunto se pide la anulacion de la subasta publica que
realizo el sheriff de Nueva Ecija para dar cumplimiento a una parte de la sentencia dictada
por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de aquella provincia en el asunto civil No. 5714, parte
relativa al pago de la cantidad de P350 con sus intereses legales desde el 22 de febrero
de 1917, montando todo ello a la suma de P747 por la que se remataron los bienes
embargados y vendidos. Despues de enjuciar el presente pleito, el Juzgado dicto
sentencia anulando la subasta, conforme a lo pelido en la demanda, por causa de varias
irregularidades cometidas por el sheriff en la tramitacion de las diligencia concernientes a
dicha subasta. Contra el fallo asi dictado, la parte demandada, es decir, la parte a quien
beneficio la subasta, ha interpuesto la presente apelacion.
Al revisar los autos de este asunto hemos notado que los demandantes y apelados, al
arguir a favor de la sentencia del Tribunal inferior, no solamente invocan las
irregularidades de la subasta, sino que suscitan una cuestion de jurisdiccion o
comptencia, la del Juzgado que dicto la sentencia en el pleito anterior, o sea, el referido
asunto civil No. 5714. Segun los apelados, en aquel asunto la unica cuestion planteada
era la particion de ciertos bienes inmuebles, la parte demandada entonces, que lo es
tambien en este asunto, no reclamaba ninguna cantidad de dinero en su escrito de
alegaciones. Sin embargo, el Juzgado, al dictar su sentencia, condeno a los demandantes
a pagar a los demandados la cantidad de P350, mas los intereses legales. Al hacer esto
sostienen los apelados el Juzgado obro sin jurisdiccion ni competencia (alegato de
los apelados, pags. 22 y siguientes). Y esta cuestion de jurisdiccion aaden puede
suscitarse en cualquier estado del juicio, sea en este o en el primer asunto.
Por lo expuestos y en obediencia a la ley que rige nuestras actuaciones, ordenamos que
este expediente se eleve al Tribunal Supremo por ser de su incumbencia el enjuiciarlo y
resolverlo.
Civil case No. 5714, as we have examined it, was an action for partition of an inheritance
left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra. He was survived by three children: Benito Apolonia
and Dominga, all surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died, the first leaving a daughter
named Irinea, and the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. The
plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the
defendants were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she sad sold her share in the
common property; namely, Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho.
Dominga Zafra, in her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain
debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and
Barbara. These debts constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said deceased
Apolonia Zafra. (Suiliong & co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13; Lopez vs. Enriquez , 16 Phil.,
336; Montinola vs. Villanueva, 49 Phil., 528.) At the trial, evidence was presented as to
such debts, and the trial court in its decision awarded the plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and

Barbara one-third of the common property and, at the same time, ordered them to pay the
debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350. Appeal was
interposed by them from this judgment, and in this Court no question was raised as to the
jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said amount of P350. This Court
accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment.
The question now raised by the plaintiffs-appellees as to whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money above mentioned is unsubstantial.
There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial had such jurisdiction not only because there
was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but
because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance
wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the
creditors are parties, as was the case. Plaintiffs-appellees knew that the trial court had
such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise any question with respect thereto in
their appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have been passed upon
impliedly by this Court when it acted on the case and decided the same on the merits.
And, furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the
kind of question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not
one over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case involving P200 or more, and therefore
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the
amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was a proper issue raised in the
pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but
jurisdiction over the issue. In this regard we reiterate what we have said in Reyes vs. Diaz,
G.R. No. 48754, November 26, 1941:
There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which may lend the word
"jurisdiction" therein used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over the subject-matter. On
the contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to confine the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court to cases of vital importance involving questions of
fundamental character, such, for instance, as the question validity of statute, treaty or
ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which may affect the very
existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death penalty
is imposed, we are of the opinion and so hold., that the issue of jurisdiction which confers
appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is dependent
exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but
that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter as determined by law.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. J. S. p. 36) and is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines the court and defines its
powers (Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off Gaz.,
No. 7, 3rd Sup., p., 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G. R. No. 45674). The question, therefore of
whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and
application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different
courts in the Philippines and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching
consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the
law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court
of the land.
xxx

xxx

xxx

... Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is
merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be true that the court by an erroneous
ruling on such question may enrcroach upon issues completely foreign to those defined in
the pleadings, but in such case the question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court
may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties (Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil.,
921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3d Sup., p., 216.) But in some instances it is
said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15 C. J., 734; Hutts vs.
Martin, 134 Ind., 587; 33 N. E., 676), meaning thereby that the issue being tried and
decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of
jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject matter, the latter
being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied
of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an issue is not duly pleaded it
may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This
cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction
over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint,
the defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to that issue. (Cf.
Atkins, Kroll & Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil., 680.) At any rate, whether or not the court has
jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination
of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as to call for the intervention
of this court.
We hold therefore, that the question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only
unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of
its appellate jurisdiction over the case. It is hereby ordered that this case be returned to the
Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on the merits.
Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta, Bocobo and Generoso, JJ., concur.
Davao Light & Power Co. Inc. v CA (204 SCRA 343)
Facts:
Davao Light and Power Inc, Co. filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and
damages against Queensland Hotel and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Judge Nartatez granted the writ and fixed the attachment bond at around P4Million. The
summons, copy of complaint, writ of attachment, copy of attachment bond were served
upon Queensland and Adarna. Pursuant to the writ, the Sheriff seized the properties of the
latter.
Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction
to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3,
1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over cause and person of defendants.

Trial Court denied the motion to discharge.


CA annulled the Trial Courts Order. Davao seeks to reverse CAs order.
Issue:
Whether or not preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before
acquiring jurisdiction over his person.
Held:
Yes. Rule 57 speaks of the grant of the remedy at the commencement of the action or at
any time thereafter What the rule is saying is that after an action is properly commenced
(by filing of the complaint and payment of all requisite docket and other fees), the plaintiff
may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment. This he may do so, before or
after, the summons to the defendant.
The CA decision is reversed and the writ of attachment issued by Judge Nartatez is
reinstated.
**
Preliminary Attachment provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party
may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the
adverse party taken into custody of court as security for satisfaction of judgment to be
recovered.
Nature of Attachment: a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law
requires a strict of construction of the provisions granting it. No principle, whether statutory
or through jurisprudence, prohibits its issuance by any court before the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the pers

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