EN BANC

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held
on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were
elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:

NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members
of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting,
all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato
Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with,
and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June
17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10,
1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta
C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing
Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by
her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was
rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello
Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others
by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and
subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their
election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed
the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and
Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend,
for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and
strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is
that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in

the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates
and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the
other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine
whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before
and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the
Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called
to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the
election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the
relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the
same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall
be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate
for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or
indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement
of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing
an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice
to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vicepresident, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President,
Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio
City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113;
t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and
distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the
membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination
forms which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo
C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr.,
Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas,
Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel
Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR)
borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of
the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by
Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria
is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane
to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the
IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and
Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group.
He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region
in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the
Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu)
could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty.
Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon),
Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C.
Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas),
Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern

'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera
(Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao)
(Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan
City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written
commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo
nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be
committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and
Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila
4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the
IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the
Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro,
Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla,
Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano
James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime

Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and
Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were
made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to
Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for
that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the
IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could
attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted,
however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao,
Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores,
Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera,
Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula
Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda
Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for
the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of
the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the
members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to
whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for
a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager,
credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill
amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo
P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan,
Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP ByLaws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the
Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta
Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which
included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno.
They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the
other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110
during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were
recorded as emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila).
These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the
Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot
their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues
of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it

was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the
name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election
year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce
similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his
own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor.
Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this
year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate,
but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of
the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met
Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala
Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a
room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter
presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed
his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is
admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also
withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became
Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon
(t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in
La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed
his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to
another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant
regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the
offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a
room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates
had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine
Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of
the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses
for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of
airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food,

and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them
to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national
officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the
other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates;
the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets
and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket
to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP
but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's
esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during
the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than
candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president
has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously
perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the nonpolitical character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by
this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer,
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation
basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be
held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court
of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three
(3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer
the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to
its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6408

August 31, 2004

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEORO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for
deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra
only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank
Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia,
totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient
funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the
criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said
promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for
a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants;
the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client;
complainants checked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen
Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a
transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over the phone
but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.1
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2 of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting
to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were issued in payment of a preexisting obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with new checks; Isidra
signed a document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists; 3 she
also issued in favor of Olivia several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation; the checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the
City Prosecutors Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the
criminal case filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3
was already dismissed; the Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-03 4 were
never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not send text
messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present
any title in exchange for her bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings

were made with Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated by Isidra only because she had a
misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from respondent. 5
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines
docketed as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was
brought about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the
account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my cocomplainant Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the
corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra
Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some
mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and
submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere
Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I
have also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that
I have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.6
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear before
it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their
misunderstanding.7
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent
acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered basis. Another
hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in said hearing despite due
notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear,
the case shall already be submitted for resolution.8
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant who was
unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that
should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve the case. On said date,
respondent did not appear despite due notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the July 31
order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already paid

complainant the amount ofP64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondents father was admitted to the
Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her
remaining balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fully
settle the balance of her debt up to this date. Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days
from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.10
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondents motion and setting aside the
order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that she already paid
complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing payment amount
only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent was
directed to present proof of her payments to the complainant. The hearing was however reset
several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent
somebody to ask for a postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave
respondent a last opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for
October 7, 2003 which the commission said was "intransferrable."12
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent was duly
notified and even personally received the notice for that days hearing. The case was thereafter
submitted for resolution.13
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his report
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More
particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein
complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement
has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral
characters. In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the
respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her
indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more
disconcerting is that while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office
respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not
offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainants charge
that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title (TCT) which had
been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a transaction which the
former had with the Quedancor where respondent was formerly employed. Based on all the
foregoing findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her
accountabilities, inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to
attend the scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza
Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also
the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must
constantly be of good moral character and unsullied honesty.14
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of law
for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos. 15
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was not
able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to pressing
personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25, 2003 and it was only then that
she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent never intended to
ignore the Commissions hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial

crisis which hit her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the
expenses incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by
her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank;
respondents husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent herself
had sought medical help on several occasions due to her inability to conceive despite being married
for more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could have already paid the complainant
despite respondents knowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely
the interest of her debt since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and
she already paid for those that she was not able to return. Respondent prays that the resolution of
the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said date or until January 19, 2003
to settle whatever balance remains after proper accounting and presentation of receipts. 16
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondents glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer
but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A.
Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution ofP84,000.00 to complainant.17
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of
respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the bounced checks
that were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured.19 They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves
in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra
Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her
indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered basis.

Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every
member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.21
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment
thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of the hearings
and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBP-CBD
Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick days
before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her
promise and did not appear before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice.
After the case was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed another
motion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending to personal
matters. Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt. This repeated failure on
her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and moral character. Her failure to attend
most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated pleas for reconsideration also
manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to make full use of the mechanisms
of administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutors office in Cabanatuan City. Her only excuse
is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her debt,
which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.
It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence.22 The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.23 It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem.24
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were issued
in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we explained
in Co vs. Bernardino:25
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyers professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondents propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt26 (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also
had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She however did not present any
proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear personally before the complainant and
the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the payment

of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited until the case
was submitted for resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for, nor
has she controverted the complainants charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer
certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should be held liable therefor. Basic
is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove her exception or defense. 27 Simply put, the burden is not on the
respondent to prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt. In this case,
complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together with their
letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sisterin-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the bounced checks in their possession. 28 No other
evidence or sworn statement was submitted in support of such allegation. Respondent in her
answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion
was made on the matter, not even in the hearings before the commission. 29 For this reason, we hold
that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to complainants for
lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the issuance of worthless
checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.30
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
In Lao vs. Medel,31 which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, the
Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in
the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts
amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and
the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and
is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to
the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as well
as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4256

February 13, 2004

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO, complainant

vs.
ATTYS. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS A. VILLARIN, respondents.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro charging respondents
Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and concubinage.
Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that they
were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract; 1 that she
bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971, 1973, and 1978, respectively,
as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth;2 that respondent abandoned her and their
children in 1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin, 3 at 27-C
Masbate St., Quezon City; that respondents have since then been publicly representing themselves
as husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birth to Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January
17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and scandalous relationship with complainants husband whom
she named as the father of her son in the latters Certificate of Live Birth; 4 and, that in said Certificate
of Live Birth, respondent Atty. Villarin identified herself as "Ma. Cristina V. Alejandro" having been
married to Atty. Alejandro on May 1, 1990 at Isabela Province. Complainant alleged that she filed this
administrative complaint when she learned that her husband has been nominated as a regional trial
court judge. She insists that he is not fit to be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty.
Villarin, do not even possess the basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.
We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution dated July 4,
1994. When copies of our resolution and of the complaint and its annexes addressed to respondent
Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned unserved with notation "moved," we
required complainant to submit the correct and present address of her husband. 5 No similar return of
service with respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on the record.
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that her
husbands correct address remains to be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him who told
the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service by mail will result in the
same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a change of address again.
Complainant therefore asked that copies of the complaint and Court resolution requiring comment be
served personally upon her husband by the Courts process servers. We noted and granted the
prayer.6 However, when the Courts process server attempted to effect personal service on February
16, 1995, respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of the house and his house helper refused to
accept service. Consequently we considered the copies as having been served upon respondent
Atty. Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 and required him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for his continued failure to file comment, and to file
such comment, considering the considerable length of time that has lapsed since he has been first
required to do so. Respondent Atty. Alejandro failed to comply. Hence, we fined him P1,000.00 and
directed that he file the required explanation and comment on the administrative complaint. 8
When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal notations "moved," we
required complainant anew to submit the correct and present address of respondents, within ten (10)
days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. 9 In a handwritten letter

dated September 10, 1998, complainant disclosed respondents present address as "12403 Dunlop
Drive, Houston, Texas."10
We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation, within ninety (90) days from notice, in our Resolution of March 17, 2003.
In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended that
both respondents be disbarred on the following rationalization:
In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme Court (Second Division) ruled that respondent
Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a copy of the instant administrative complaint and of the Courts
Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by substituted service pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court.
In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty. Alejandro and
Atty. Villarin were directed to file their Comment on the instant Complaint within ten (10) days from
notice of said Resolution. To date, no Comment has been filed by either respondent Atty. Alejandro
or Atty. Villarin. x x x
Complainant submitted a photocopy of the Marriage Contract (Annex A of the letter-complaint)
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro executed on 3 March 1971. Complainant also
submitted photocopies of the Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the letter-complaint) of the
children born out of her marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro. These documentary evidence
submitted by complainant clearly show that there was and is a valid and subsisting marriage
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro at the time she filed the instant administrative
complaint against said respondent, her husband.
In support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against respondents Alejandro and Villarin,
complainant submitted a photocopy of the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the letter-complaint) of one
Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The said Birth Certificates states that the mother of said Paolo Villarin
Alejandro is "Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin", while his father is one "Warfredo Tomas Alejandro". Said
Birth Certificate also states that the parents of Paolo Villarin Alejandro were married on May 1, 1990
in Isabela Province.
Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and
considering the failure of respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges of
complainant, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record which establishes the
immoral/illicit relationship between respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin. However, there is
no evidence on record which would establish beyond doubt that respondent Atty. Alejandro indeed
contracted a second marriage with Atty. Villarin while his marriage to herein complainant was
subsisting. Thus, it is recommended that as prayed for by complainant, respondents Atty. Alejandro
and Atty. Villarin be disbarred for willful violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the above report and
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-169 dated September 27, 2003.

We agree with the IBP recommendation with respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.
Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a
condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership
therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so
as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.12 He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.
Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations.13 The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role
being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his
part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him. 14
In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty. Alejandro, while
being lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another woman, corespondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that he
contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact remains that respondent Atty.
Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. We have already held that disbarment proceedings is warranted against a
lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman 15 who
had borne him a child.16 We can do no less in the instant case where respondent Atty. Alejandro
made himself unavailable to this Court and even fled to another country to escape the
consequences of his misconduct.
The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that our
Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment on the administrative complaint was never
"deemed served" upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it does not
appear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution requiring
comment were even sent to her. Although sent at the address she allegedly shared with corespondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was addressed to the latter only.17 That
was why when both service by registered mail and personal service failed, the copies were deemed
served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18
The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive for her
to file answer. It is noted however that the same was sent to respondents old address at 27-C
Masbate St., Quezon City, not "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas," which was respondents new
address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of service therefore showed the postal
notation "moved." Considering the serious consequences of disbarment proceedings, full opportunity
upon reasonable notice must have been given respondent to answer the charge and present

evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear cases of waiver that an administrative case be resolved
sans respondents answer.
WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is DISBARRED
from the practice of law, to take effect immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copy of this
Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandros personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4762. June 28, 2004]

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,

PRESQUITO, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

PEPITO

C.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint with the

then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito
C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis
Oriental Chapter, for having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in
refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still
alive, the sum of P763,060.00. According to complainant, respondents
unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband,
who died disillusioned and embittered. The letter-complaint and affidavit also
alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino and
complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the
amounts represented by the eight checks which had all been dishonored.
Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquitos refusal to pay may be due to his
reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the
RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).
[1]

[2]

The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was

introduced to complainants late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a
resident of Davao City, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of
Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his piece of land with an area of
11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion between Mr.
Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to respondent.
Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, the
purchase price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis
and by installments. Pursuant to the terms of payment in the agreement,
respondent issued eight post-dated checks, totalingP736,060.00.
Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with
Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its
development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own
use. The land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares,
and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all

dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment from
respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His
widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of the
eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained unheeded, she
filed the complaint in June 1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any
wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed fraud, trickery
and dishonest means with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless.
The complaint, according to respondent, stemmed from complainants lack of
knowledge as to the real story of the transaction between complainants
husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the
imputation that he was banking on the influence of his father-in-law and unclein-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What
respondent claims, however, is that the nonpayment was justified by the
unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of
the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances that the land had a
right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that

such road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the
expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According
to respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed that the latter would not encash
the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until the right-of-way
problem of the land had been resolved. Respondents position is that until the
problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has
yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be very unfair
and unjust for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed
and sold.
[8]

[9]

Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount
he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances
he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr.
Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he has fully paid
the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same
advances and incurred expenses.
[10]

In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD).
[11]

In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002, Investigating

Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found that the facts and credible evidence
made available in this case indubitably establish respondents failure to live up
to the demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. For having failed to act with candor and
fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and
ordered to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the
piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent and his
business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed a Resolution adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Dulay, finding that respondents lack of fairness and candor and
honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
[12]

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree

that respondent was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty demanded of
him by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended penalty of six (6)
months suspension too light considering respondents gross misconduct.
Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1)
there was an agreement between respondent and complainants late husband
for the sale of the latters land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in
connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and
remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-ofway.Complainants exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6, 1999,
and were admitted without objection from respondent.
[13]

[14]

In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon

respondent to prove a legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight
checks.
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainants presentation of evidence on
December 1998 until Commissioner Dulays report on November 12, 2002, the
records show that respondent was unable to present evidence - either
testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal cause to refuse
payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondents
own statements - which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere selfserving allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to crossexamination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions by the IBPCBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but
only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between
him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement
between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than
his own allegations.
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, especially in the light of the numerous
postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the
[15]

ground that he needed more time to prepare his evidence. We note that
respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14,
1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for
resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary
evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his
financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his
witnesses. We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial
constraints could have prevented respondent from presenting the originals of
the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged
advances and costs on Mr. Espinos behalf. The originals of these documents
are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of
testimony, respondent could have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses the taking of which he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro to keep
down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option. But he
did neither.
[16]

[17]

All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion

that respondent could not present evidence because there really was
none to justify his nonpayment.
[18]

Even if we were to excuse respondents procedural lapse and consider his

written pleadings as testimony, we agree with Commissioner Dulay that
respondents problems with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with
Mrs. Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of
respondent.We note that respondent has already taken title over the property together
with Guadalupe Ares by making complainants late husband, sign over the property by
way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondents position vis--vis the widowed
complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed
responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of the
problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem only as
an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of
what is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of
complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare

allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the
business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannot be
blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents actuations in the whole transaction
is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the
bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he
has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time and
the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable and
censurable behavior for a member of the bar. [citations omitted]
[19]

Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored

checks, respondents indifference to complainants entreaties for payment was
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court.
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by his unlawful,
dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband,
first by allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring
the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this
complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with
dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of complainant and her late
husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares name, the injustice of
respondents different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due
and unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
[20]

It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks,

seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public
order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel, that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the
erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his
professional duties as a member of the bar. He not only sets himself liable
for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to
obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.
[21]

[22]

It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or

disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members

of the bar. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
[23]

[24]

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who
issued worthless checks - Lao v. Medel, Co v. Bernardino, and Ducat v.
Villalon, Jr., - we find respondents reprehensible conduct warrants
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
[25]

[26]

[27]

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty

of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year, and ORDERED to immediately account with complainant
regarding the sale of the piece of land, which has been subdivided in the
name of respondent and his business partner.
Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar
Confidant and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7136

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,

versus

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,
Respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline
(CBD)
against
Atty.
Jose
Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you
at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from

work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the
aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of
us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your
single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us
to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS
IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at
No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French
wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala.A photocopy of the report
is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership
in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter
to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.
[6]
(Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15
of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship
with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as
his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
ofRespondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to

the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a
mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article
XV, Sec. 2).[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades
the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarmentpursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene

gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as

the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a

Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having
personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a
civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants ComplaintAffidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.[16]Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [18] dated October 26,
2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed

pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit:

Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous

relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile
and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him
and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex
H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth
of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is
the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the

pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
[27]
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge

of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And
the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they were
affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in
his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other [32] which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,

proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress

in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation [41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,
which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal,
the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though
no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage
was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her

marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing
the
City
Prosecutors
Resolution,
DOJ
Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all
the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and
text
messages
to
her. Complainant
also
personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having
a
rendezvous
on
two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to
be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was
a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance
that
it
was
in
that
said
address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both

respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were
to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge
is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case [47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06

passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of
the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
thePhilippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales
was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by
this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges
more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an
amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro

Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter
referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court
fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said
case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in
Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados,
which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a
contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection
with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who
was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without
legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while
respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the
long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings
filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor
General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required
the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent
committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency
of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on
November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing
additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the

determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under
Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent
claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly
by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated
even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that
the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent
submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the
Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for
more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of
the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven
(11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant
who appeared as a witness against him.

II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2)
of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to
the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex
"B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2)
of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue
of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of
any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship
with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it

cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the
nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other
hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the
matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in
relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics
for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is
untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of
the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development
agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do
transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs,
successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D
of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to
be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement
was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time
the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had
already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31,
1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the
request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved
in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice
to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated
at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of
the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so
doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which
place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a

former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the
land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the
land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the
project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against
him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to
be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed
by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to
the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T.
Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the
original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their
names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original
and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado,
never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox
copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox
copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply,
pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the
addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of
the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum
was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of
his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed
by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and
Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed

]
Editha
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
Nestor
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
CONFO
RME
Ramon
A.
Gonzal
es
[signed
]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid
by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements
are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See
Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts
violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the
same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows
that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the
Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados,

dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for
libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17;
Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and
perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering
that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that
it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is
no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to
harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law
and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29,
1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature
of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective
from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts
of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ROSARIO T. MECARAL,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. DANILO S.
VELASQUEZ,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 8392 [ Formerly CBD

Case No. 08-2175]
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 29, 2010

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DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD)[1] with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in
her Position Paper[2] as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and
common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous
Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group
known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the

leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to
December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious,
respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers
tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on
December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed.
Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24
hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received
information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the
mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her.
The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of
respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1
Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally,
complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to
Leny H. Azur onAugust 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first
wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the

following: Affidavit[3] of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and
PO1 Robedillo[4] dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of
Marriage[5] between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage
Contract[6] between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office
Certification[7] dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal
to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur
to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine
copy of the Resolution[8] of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval,
Biliran and the Information[9] lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval,

Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on
complaint of herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order[10] of the
Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days from
receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to properly make [his] defense in a
verified pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which
the parties were duly notified, only complainants counsel was present. Respondent
and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and
Recommendation[12] dated September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two
marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society
in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do.
Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed
severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the
celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court]
ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations
with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only
did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal
in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary
(complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All
these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave]
the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.[13] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution [14] dated December
11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED
the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners
evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the

charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body
and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[16]
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings
before the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him, suggesting that they are
true.[17]Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he would come up
with his defense in a verified pleading, he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in
the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18] of the Provincial Prosecutor on

complainants charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal
Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the
complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo
Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint
employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he
claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and
police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the place and
thus, could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary
that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of
locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would wander,
that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness
and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran
where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the
express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to
keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned
from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being
reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had
untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.[19] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal

complaint against respondent, his therein co-respondent corroborated the
testimonies of complainants witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain
unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant
evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.[20]

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts
which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer.[21]

WHEREFORE,
respondent,
Atty.
Danilo
S.
Velasquez,
is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

WILSON CHAM,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7494

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus -

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA,

June 27, 2008

Respondent.

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RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant

Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he
alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit
and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals
due.

According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998, respondent

entered into a Contract of Lease[2] with Greenville Realty and
Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its
President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment
unit owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue,
Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a
term of one year.

Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent

informed the complainant that she would no longer renew the
same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment
unit until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she would be
paying
the
monthly
rental
during
the
extension
period. Complainant approved such request but increased the
rental rate to P8,650.00 per month for the period beginning 1
October 1999 until 30 June 2000.

Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October

2000 without paying her rentals from July to October 2000. She
also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September
and October 2000. The Statement of Account as of 15 October
2004[3] shows that respondents total accountability is P71,007.88.

Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainants

office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit,
bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not
heed complainants repeated written demands for payment of her
obligations despite due receipt of the same, compelling
complainant to file the present Complaint.
In her Answer,[4] respondent alleged that she had religiously
paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated the apartment unit
surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another

place because she was given notice by the complainant to vacate

the premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the
same, but which never happened until presently. Respondent
actually wanted to ask that complainant to account for her
deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she
did not know complainants address or contact number. For the
same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door
keys to the vacated apartment unit.

After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by

the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, the
parties were given time to submit their respective Position Papers
per Order[5] dated 17 February 2006. On 29 March 2006,
complainant filed his Position Paper.[6] Respondent, despite the
extension given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C.

Pacheco
submitted
his
Report
and
Recommendation,
[7]
recommending the imposition of the penalty of three-month
suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that

herein respondent be held guilty of having violated the
aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three
(3) months suspension from the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII2006-585[8] dated 15 December 2006, amending the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for
lack of merit.

We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP

Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be dismissed and
respondent must face the consequences of her actions.

It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she

executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy the
apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October 1998to 30
September 1999, paying a monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon the
expiration of the lease contract[9] on 30 September 1999, the
same was renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an
increased rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement,
respondent was able to stay at the leased premises until October
2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills during the said period.

A review of the records would reveal that respondent is,

indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is
able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations
that she failed to settle.

Annex D[10] of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September

2000 signed
by
complainant and
addressed
to
respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid rentals for the
period of three months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September
2000. The letter appears to have been received by one
Purificacion D. Flores. Annex H of the same Complaint is another
letter dated 30 August 2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier
demand for respondent to settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her
unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was sent
through registered mail and received by one Nonie
Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of both
letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having failed to
rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have
admitted them. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied

deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint,
other than those as to the amount of unliquidated
damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied.

Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who

pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where it is the
plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant
(respondent herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff
to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with
legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment.[11]

Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that

a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment.
[12]
In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,[13] the receipts of payment, although
not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence. A receipt is
a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have
been delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to
discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to
produce receipts or any other proof of payment of the rentals due
for the period of 1 July to 20 September 2000.

It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed

to pay her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and electric bills
constitute just debts, which could be any of the following: (1)
claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence
and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. [14]

Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty

and legal responsibility to settle them when they became due.
Respondent should have complied with just contractual
obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards
to preserve the courts integrity, since she is an employee
thereof. Indeed, when respondentbacktracked on her duty to pay
her debts, such act already constituted a ground for
administrative sanction.

Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her

unpaid obligations, and without the complainants knowledge and
consent. Respondents abandonment of the leased premises to
avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes
deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which
explicitly state:

CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondents defense that she does not know where to find

the complainant or his office is specious and does not inspire
belief considering that she had been occupying the apartment
unit and paying the rents due (except for the period complained
of) for almost two years. How she could have dealt with
complainant and GRDC for two years without at all knowing their
office address and contact numbers totally escapes this
Court. This is only a desperate attempt to justify what is clearly an
unjustifiable act.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As

vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[15] In so doing, the peoples
faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured.

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their

duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As
part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of

Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court

may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.[16]

The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is

a privilege.[17] It demands a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. [18] In this case,
respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as
a guardian of law and justice.[19]

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional

or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty
of suspension or disbarment because good character is an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
for the continuance of such privilege. [20] The Court has held that
the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, [21] for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the
practice of law,[22] or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation.[23]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by

respondents gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves
the respondents deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without
her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more
serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for
three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross

misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the
practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of

respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the court
administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ALFREDO B. ROA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 8382

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 21, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O LUTIO N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This complaint, filed by Alfredo B. Roa (complainant) against Atty. Juan R.
Moreno (respondent), stemmed from a transaction involving the sale of a parcel of
land. Complainant asks that respondent be disciplined and ordered to return the
amount of money paid for the sale.
The Antecedent Facts
Sometime in September 1998, respondent sold to complainant a parcel of land
located along Starlite Street in Cupang, Antipolo. Complainant paid
respondent P70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Respondent did not issue a
deed of sale. Instead, he issued a temporary receipt [1] and a Certificate of Land
Occupancy[2] purportedly issued by the general overseer of the estate in which the
lot was located. Respondent assured complainant that he could use the lot from
then on.
Complainant learned, not long after, that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could
not be registered in the Register of Deeds. When complainant went to see
respondent, the latter admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio.
Respondent also said there was a pending legal controversy over the lot. On 25
February 2001, complainant sent a letter[3] to respondent demanding the return of
the P70,000 paid for the lot.

Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent in the Municipal Trial
Court (Branch 2) of Antipolo City. On 26 September 2003, the trial court rendered
a decision[4]convicting respondent of the crime of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTC sentenced
respondent to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for one month and one day and
ordered him to return the amount of P70,000 to complainant.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Antipolo City set aside the
lower courts ruling. For lack of evidence establishing respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC acquitted respondent in a decision [5] dated 20 December
2005. The decision further stated that the remedy of complainant was to institute a
civil action for the recovery of the amount he paid to respondent.
On 23 February 2006, complainant filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint[6] against respondent.
In his Answer,[7] respondent explained that what he sold to complainant was merely
the right over the use of the lot, not the lot itself. Respondent maintained he never
met the complainant during the negotiations for the sale of said right. Respondent
claimed it was a certain Benjamin Hermida who received the purchase price.
Respondent further alleged that it was one Edwin Tan, and not the complainant,
who paid the purchase price.
At the hearing set on 14 October 2008, complainant narrated that respondent
personally sold to him the lot in question. Complainant stated respondent assured
him that the papers would be processed as soon as payment was made.
Complainant claimed he duly paid respondent P70,000, but when he followed up
the sales documents, respondent just dismissed him and denied any transaction
between them. For his part, respondent did not appear at the hearing despite receipt
of notice.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[8] dated 17 October 2008, the IBP Commissioner

on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for three months and ordered to immediately deliver the amount of P70,000 to
complainant, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY
of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS
SUSPENSION.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the amount of
Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) to herein complainant.[9]

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-632[10] passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board

of Governors adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors suspended respondent
from the practice of law for three months and ordered him to return the amount
of P70,000 to complainant within 30 days from receipt of notice. Thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Juan R. Moreno is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months andOrdered
to Return the Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) to complainant
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.
Complainant and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to
complainant, respondent claimed to be the owner of the lot and even offered to be
his lawyer in case of any legal problem that might crop up from the sale of the lot.
On the other hand, respondent denied ever meeting complainant, much less selling
the lot he insisted he did not even own. In his answer, he presented the affidavits of
Benjamin and Cepriano Hermida who claimed that upon receipt of the payment for
the right to use the lot, they immediately removed the improvements on the lot.
The Hermidas also claimed they received the payment from one Mr. Edwin Tan,
not from complainant.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court gives credence to
complainants version of the facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. Records show that respondent even
issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to complainant whose only fault was
that he did not know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges
of intent to defraud. It purports to be issued by the Office of the General Overseer.
It contains a verification by the Lead, Record Department that the lot plan
conforms with the record on file. It is even printed on parchment paper strikingly
similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, it can easily pass off as a
document evidencing title. True enough, complainant actually tried, but failed, to
register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Complainant
readily parted with P70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the sham
certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of respondent are not
without recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving

moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to

take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether
it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[12]

In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that
he owned the lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by
complainant. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant.
It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We cannot, and we
should not, let respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct go unpunished.
Time and again we have said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.
It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. Thus,
lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their
dealings with their clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and even disbarment.[13]
Respondents refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is
unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct,
respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents acts violated the trust and
respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
court.

However, we cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation ordering respondent to

return the money paid by complainant. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondents
administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other.[14]
That said, we deem that the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by
the IBP is insufficient to atone for respondents misconduct in this case. We
consider a penalty of two-year suspension more appropriate considering the
circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Juan R. Moreno GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
CourtSUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
effective upon finality of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of
this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
MARJORIE
SAMANIEGO,
Complainant,

F. A.C. No. 7022

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

TINGA,

- versus -

REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

ATTY.
ANDREW
FERRER,
Respondent.

V. Promulgated:

June 18, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against
respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment
and willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD
Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a
potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her cases [1] and
soon their lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms.
Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love with
him.[2] He said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her
temptations.[3] Thereafter, they lived together as husband and
wife from 1996 to 1997,[4] and on March 12, 1997, their daughter

was born.[5] The affair ended in 2000[6] and since then he failed to
give support to their daughter.[7]
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego
presented their daughters birth and baptismal certificates, and
the photographs taken during the baptism. She testified that she
knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he
was already married. She also testified that she was willing to
compromise, but he failed to pay for their daughters education as
agreed upon.[8] Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing
since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego. [9]
In his position paper,[10] Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to
support their daughter. He also admitted his indiscretion; however,
he prayed that the IBP consider Ms.Samaniegos complicity as she
was acquainted with his wife and children. He further reasoned
that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10
children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-138[11] dated November 12, 2005, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the
penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law for
his refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP
also admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar
and to keep in mind his duties as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[12] with prayer for us to reduce the penalty, to
wit:
Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the
disposition of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline, herein
respondent most humbly and respectfully begs the compassion of the
Honorable Court and states that the gravity of the penalty imposed
and meted out, depriving herein respondent to earn a modest living for
a period of six (6) months, will further cause extreme hardship to his
family of ten (10) children.[13]

We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for

evaluation. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of
morality required of a member of the bar for his illicit affair with
Ms. Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he was lawfully
married and with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that we affirm Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and
deny the prayer for reduced penalty.[14]
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrers failure to give support to his
daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also agree with the Office of
the
Bar
Confidant
that
Atty.
Ferrers
affair
with
Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of good moral character as a
member of the bar. We dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniegos charge
of abandonment since Atty. Ferrer did not abandon them. He
returned to his family.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his
indiscretion which ended in 2000. We have considered such illicit
relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to
disciplinary action.[15] The penalty for such immoral conduct is
disbarment,[16] or
indefinite[17] or
definite[18] suspension,
depending on the circumstances of the case. Recently,
in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,[19] we ruled that suspension from
the practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty
imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross
immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of
aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship
coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit
relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of
his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with
other women.[20]
In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus
we find the penalty recommended by the IBP and Office of the Bar
Confidant as adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct
of respondent.
On another point, we may agree with respondents contention that
complainant was not entirely blameless. She knew about his wife

but blindly believed him to be unmarried.However, that one

complicit in the affair complained of immorality against her coprincipal does not make this case less serious since it is
immaterial whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari delicto.[21] We must
emphasize that this Courts investigation is not about Ms.
Samaniegos acts but Atty. Ferrers conduct as one of its officers
and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. [22]
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of
the bar of the following norms under the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
xxxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
xxxx

Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the

responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a
resultant hardship on them because of this case, let it be
impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his
own misconduct.
WHEREFORE,
we
find
respondent
Atty.
Andrew
V.
Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6)

months effective upon notice hereof, with WARNING that the

same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the
respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to this
Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of
this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 9608

November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public
eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private
fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 1
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement
dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that
the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on
19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent ATTY.
DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino
and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that

sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the
charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on
04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26
August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of
Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department
of Justice.
xxxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein
Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney
by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that sometime in December 2001, at around
midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when respondent entered and
went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another
incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her
not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered
her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria
Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutors Office
with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has
no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years.
xxxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint
to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
xxxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of
respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge against
the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a
well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as
a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law
Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from
respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00;
otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent
did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor
dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for
the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so
that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of
Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can
afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent
herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case
No. 5414.

xxxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits
that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral
conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends
when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had
sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go
out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave
her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they
could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is
a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She
casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging
house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his
farm worker and asked him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not
notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual
intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and
walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell
anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things
but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between
them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is
no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del
Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor
and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was
dismissed.9

In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for
immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victims
guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by
the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a
young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant considering that she was then staying at respondents residence. Moreover, there was a
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists
that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege
which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts
that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter,
complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants mother even testified that
her daughter stayed at respondents house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the
practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part
of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.16 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted
he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he
procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards
of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-yearold minor,19who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with

conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can
be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers.20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in
Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23
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Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondents gross misbehavior and
unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. 25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 26 However, in
the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz
Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his
post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The
GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied
for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly
listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already
resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of
LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be
taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the
BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It
would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly
thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served
to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5
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She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she
sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on
Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on
November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys Certificates
dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers
of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et
al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27,
2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory

findings.11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the
complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12
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Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment
and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of the CPR and
thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on
the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to
be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere
signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue. 15
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Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors
or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite
knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins signature
Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of
bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin
moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
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Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated [t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with
his oath.21
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Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of theRules
of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office
and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in
the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained
therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he
never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation
that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de
los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of
the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.
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WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.

Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

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EN BANC
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with
the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty.
Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960s when
they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2
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Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by
a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that
he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal
out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.4
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Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve
his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5
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Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. 6

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Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree
that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize
their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7
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Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition
to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez
to the said petition.8
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Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail informing her of
Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love

letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11
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On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen. 12
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In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14
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Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however,
that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four
children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16
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Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute
a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was
ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
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Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew
that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry
her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18
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Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid
of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19
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Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20
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He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September
1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He
likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21
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For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too
old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.22
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On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23
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On June 2, 2003, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on

October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindigs act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct
was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
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There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. Respondents bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital
adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head
up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perezs
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the
status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent
with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindigs motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
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Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the

activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36
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Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their
paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed
that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a
semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense
of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that
he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a
faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled
that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was
then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot
be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on
Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. 37 In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.38
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Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated
and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in
1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample
basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove
the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr.
Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were
indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.39
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The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig
wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan

A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator
to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
JUANITA MANAOIS, ADM. CASE No. 5364
Complainant,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 20, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment

filed by Juanita Manaois (complainant) against Atty. Victor
V. Deciembre (respondent) for willful and deliberate falsification
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Complainant gave the following account of the facts that spawned

the present administrative Complaint.[1]
Complainant is a government employee working as a mail sorter
at the Manila Central Post Office. Sometime in 1998, she applied
for
a
loan
of P20,000 from Rodella Loans,
Inc.,
through
respondent. As security for the loan, respondent required her to
issue and deliver to him blank checks that he would fill out
according to their agreed monthly installments. Notwithstanding
the full payment of the loan, respondent allegedly failed to return
the remaining blank checks. Respondent told complainant that
the loan had not yet been paid and that the payments had been
credited to the interest on the loan. Respondent threatened
complainant with a lawsuit in the event of nonpayment.
Respondent allegedly filled out the blank checks with different
amounts and made it appear that complainant had them
exchanged them for cash in the total amount of P287,500.00 for
use in her business venture. Using these checks as basis,

respondent filed several cases against complainant for estafa and

for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the City
Prosecutors Office of Quezon City and Pasig City.[2]

Complainant contended that no man of respondents stature would

be too foolish to extend a P287,500.00 loan to a mere mail sorter
earning barely P6,000.00 a month on the bare assurance that her
postdated checks would be encashed on their due dates.[3]

In his Comment[4] dated 20 March 2001, respondent countered

that complainants allegations are devoid of any truth and
merit. He maintained that it was in fact complainant who
deceived him by not honoring her commitment under the
transactions. Those transactions had allegedly been covered by
the postdated checks which were subsequently dishonored due to
ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed the criminal cases against her.
He also claimed that the checks had already been fully filled out
when complainant affixed her signature thereon in his presence.
Respondent further asserted that he had given complainant the
amount of money indicated in the checks because he was
convinced, based on their previous transactions, that complainant
had capacity to pay.

In a Resolution[5] dated 17 October 2001, the Court referred the

case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision within 90
days from notice.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes conducted hearings on the

matter. In his Report and Recommendation [6] dated 7 August
2007, he found complainants version of the facts more credible
than that of respondent and, accordingly, found respondent guilty
of tampering with the checks of complainant. He likewise noted
that this is not just an isolated case as several of complainants
officemates had also fallen prey to respondents cunning scheme.
Thus, he recommended respondents suspension from the practice
of law for five (5) years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Commissioners report and recommendation in
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-133 dated 28 September 2007.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

except as to the recommended penalty.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

The Code of Professional Responsibility likewise mandates that a

lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.[7] To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession.[8]

Evidently, respondent failed to comply with the foregoing canons.

As shown by the records and as found by the Commissioner,
complainant had supplied respondent with blank personal checks
as security for the P20,000 loan she had contracted and
which respondent subsequently deceitfully filled out with various
amounts they had not agreed upon and with full knowledge that
the loan had already been paid. After the filled-out checks had
been
dishonored
upon
presentment,
respondent
even
imprudently filed multiple lawsuits against complainant. Verily,
respondent is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity
not expected from and highly unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.[9] The fact that the conduct pertained to respondents private
dealings with complainant is of no moment. A lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to

his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in

moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession
of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to
the practice of law, but also a continuing qualification for all
members of the Bar.[10]

For the record, respondent has already been indefinitely

suspended from the practice of law in A.C. No. 5365
entitled Olbes v. Deciembre,[11] a case involving an offense and a
set of facts similar to the case at bar. In the said case, the Court
notes that complainants therein averred that many of their
officematesamong them, Juanita Manaois, HonorataAcosta and
Eugenia Mendozahad suffered the same fate in their dealings with
respondent
(Deciembre).[12] This
demonstrates
respondents
propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. As such,
following our ruling in Olbes, the Court hereby imposes the same
penalty upon respondent in the present case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross

misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED indefinitely from
the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts, as well

as the Office of the Bar Confidant which is directed to append a
copy hereof to respondents personal record. Let another copy be
furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

MARILI C. RONQUILLO,

A.C. No. 6288

ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and

Present:

JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact

PUNO,

SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL,
Complainants,

QUISUMBING,
*YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,

-versus-

AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR,

June 16, 2006

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of

respondent from the practice of law for unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold
them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest,
and that he refuses to return to them the amount they have paid
him for it.
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently
residing in Cannes, France, together with her minor children,
Alexander and Jon Alexander.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a
Deed of Assignment.[1] For the price of P1.5M, respondent
transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests
over a townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas
Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent also obligated himself
to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April
19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent
further undertook to have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.
Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon
execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid
by
complainants
in
four
equal
quarterly
installments
of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of
respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check
dated August 17, 1999.[2]

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown

Asia that respondent has not paid in full the price of the
townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a
copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the
bank to stop payment on the second check she issued to
respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.
On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel,
wrote respondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse on the
condition that respondent work on Crown Asias execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the alternative,
complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00,
plus legal interest, within ten days. [3] The amount of P937,500.00
represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly
installment ofP187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.
In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants,
respondent claimed that he was working now on a private
project which hopefully will be realized not long from now, and
requested for a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within
which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at
your (complainants) option.The period lapsed but respondent did
not make good his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return the
amount paid by complainants.
[4]

On February 21, 2002, complainants counsel sent

respondent a second letter[5] demanding the return of the amount
of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for failing to comply with
his promise. The demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint [6] that respondent
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he ought to

be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant
disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report datedOctober 9,
2003, she recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of
Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated October
25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner San
Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not
engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively
to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. This Court
has made clear in a long line of cases [7] that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private

capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his
undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be
gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property
over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was
likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform
the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to
sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the
purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he
was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.
Respondents adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili
Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor
as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally
reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to
the strict standard of morality required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the
court.
Respondents culpability is therefore clear. He received a
letter from complainants counsel demanding the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the
alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In
reply to said letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, and
promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:
xxx

I am working now on a private project which

hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a
little time to fix some things over. May I please request for
a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to
either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money
at your option. (Emphasis supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full

ownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet
to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to
produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia over the subject unit, which would show the extent of his
right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in
question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to
fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two years had
passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to
complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent
respondent a second letter[8] demanding solely the return of the
amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it
was indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform his
end of their agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted
only to those of good moral character. [9] The Bar must maintain a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. [10] Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they
are dealing with their clients or the public at large, [11] and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.[12]

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants prayer that

respondent be directed to return the money he received from
them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings
is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. [13] Thus, this Court cannot rule on the
issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the
complainants.
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T.
Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Ecraela v. atty. Pangalangan PDF
EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994.]
JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent.
JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent.
Enrique S. Chua for complainants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant dated June 8, 1992, docketed as
Adm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala
entitled "People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest partiality,
oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may result or has resulted in

falsification of public documents or in the commission of falsehood."

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In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the charges against him. He
averred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident between them. Judge
Abastillas pointed out that on September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he made statements which were
highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March
2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and
recommended for suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued an
order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the
amount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that Atty. Chua be suspended from
the practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge
Renato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua."
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The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6,
1993.
After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report recommending the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of
appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815.
Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.
Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas,
through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of P20,000.00 to Judge
Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases
against his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit:
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"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal witness declared in his
Affidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided
by the respondent, he was heartened because the respondent was among the few judges he was
comfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his chambers and
apprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance
because of the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the respondent accordingly
instructed the docket clerk not to release the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent
allegedly said, Ike, dont worry toe much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases of
your clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorneys fees. Why, how much is your fee
there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there and I will take care of everything
(Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.H).
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Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to worry but at the same
time informed him that the judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy
advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sad
experience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the objections of Atty.
Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn
give to respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the check in his
account.
Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent informed Atty.
Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ax paste
motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for
not giving the money yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the respondent
where accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the
reduction of the bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in cash.
The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua
that the bail bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his attorneys fees so that both of them can
receive their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.H, par. 9).

Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon he
delivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly said
where will they celebrate that evening.
Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before the
Judicial and Bar Council and briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was
rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma
asked Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting with the respondent was
between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to release
the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it
was also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, why, how much is your fees
there? P50,000.00? You double it. (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua
discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most
probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered the
P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that he
withdrew the amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May 3, 1991
at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993).
chanroble s.com:cralaw:red

"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following facts which were
either admitted or undisputed and which he believes established the misconduct and the impropriety of the
respondent as follows:
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a) Respondent Judges admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom he tagged
as the financier of the herein complainants on May 29, 1991; while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991 (p.
11, Comment dated September 28, 1992 of respondent).
b) Respondent Judges admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant Lee saw each other at
the Quezon City Sports Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges Association (p. 11, Comment,
supra).
c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that it is true that respondent met with Johnny N.H. Uy on
October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City . . . (p. 7,
Comment, supra).
Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who were charged with two
(2) criminal cases before his sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic)
a magistrate."
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Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, the latter told him
that the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcoming
convention of Philippine Judges Association to be held at the Quezon City Sports Center.
Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, narrated on the witness
stand that he received a long distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see
him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges
Association was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter introducing himself
to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private conversation for about twenty
minutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty.
Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a little time
to study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied,
"Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against you."
chanrobles.com :cralaw:re d

On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why he approved three exparte motions of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the
accused and, another, for increase of their bail bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to oppose
the same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. I
will just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."
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Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a brother of Ban Hun Flores, who
had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just

give him my telephone number and call me." Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card
bearing his telephone number 7222968.
The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center became the basis for the
charges of "gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
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Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before Judge Abastillas where
the accused were charged with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to
Uy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the
reason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the operation of the corporation, 75%
of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence in St.
Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge
Abastillas house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place.
During that visit, where the background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas
assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson
Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee
about the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October 16, 1991 at
about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problem
about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge
Abastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual friend of Uy
and Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "B").
Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that sometime in the middle of
June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a note that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillas
at six oclock in the evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge
Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson, dont worry," Huwag kang magalala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso nyo sa akin.
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After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, not
having done anything relative to the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of the
bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to
oppose Judge Abastillas application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the ground of his lack of good
moral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge
allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the amount of P20,000.00
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back together
with Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge
Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29, 1991 Johnson Lee, together
with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBCs office where the tape was replayed before then JBC
member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation
and gave it to Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogated
Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for having
allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by delivering himself the
advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge.
As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ92-863 averred and sought to prove the following:
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1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscation
of their bailbonds in view of their failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;
2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still insisted that they be
present at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to some cases, particularly
Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts
and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted in just
five (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be present at the hearing of the Motion to
Quash the Information; whereas in connection with complainants Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Information, their presence was required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied in
open court in a "trifling manner.
3.) Complainants Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous Trial
dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen were

asked to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. In
addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants arrest and fixed an excessive bond of
P50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty.
4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the delivery to court of
the illegally possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items should
have been forfeited in favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame.
5.) Two of complainants motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had remained unresolved beyond
the 90-day reglementary period.
In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as in
his testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or
having received P20,000.00 from him as initial payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his
defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan
(Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, Wilma
B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso (Deputy
Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during
the incumbency of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua enter
the judges chambers.
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While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either
on May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to give the
exact date that:
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"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day, you delivered
P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?
"A Yes. Correct.
"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?
"A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me my old bank
passbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of
the sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, its either on that very same day or immediately the next day
that I delivered the money.
"A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is either a nonworking day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in my
attache case, I remember my kid commenting that Papa, you have so much money in your attache case.
So the money stayed overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept. 15, 1993.)
Seizing upon Atty. Chuns above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most probably was on
May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3
as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded by
car to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of Justice
Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an
affidavit of Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod City) certifying
that he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon
B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the
effect that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where he stayed up to the
following day.
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Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City Sports Center
during the convention of the Philippine Judges Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for a
meeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC
Judge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friend of
Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge
de la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling card that was
introduced as evidence by the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863.
Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening of

June 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account of
Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of the meeting:
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"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and his wife, Mr. and
Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that
occasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7,
1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called me up and
said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing
me; and I had an inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I was willing
to see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me
that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did not
want to meet Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I was
willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was counsel for one of my
brothers-in law (bilas-husband of my wifes sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him
either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at
the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: Bakit ba
nandito iyan? (Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka na;
Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya (I dont know. Please be patient; dont get angry. Let him join
us). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos,
are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by
Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during the Judges Convention.
Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the Investigating
Justice in this proceeding.
"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I showed my
displeasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases."
(At pp. 13 and 14.)
Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas,
was not at his own initiative and the amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is his
version of the meeting:
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"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He did come to my
residence on that date, but that was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting word
from our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but refused to
leave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting,
our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone
Johnny Uy introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said he wanted to talk
to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he
was going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see him,
because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the pushiness and
aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very
insistent that I see him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house on
said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked
him for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over
the phone. Uy was lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for $5,000.00
from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a telephone conversation with me on
October 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him
over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed
$5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or with anybody else."
(Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)
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Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815

The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11, 1993 contempt order were
contained in the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011, to wit:
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1.And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in denying the six (6)
incidents in the manner above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a
favorite nursery rime (sic) (Page 3, par. 5 of the Motion).

2.To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are being railroaded against them (Page 5,
2nd par. of the Motion).
3.Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous actuations of the
Court, which have gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or corrective
disciplinary sanctions urgently required, so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations created
by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly
prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of justice and in effect, constitute
a desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge RENATO E.
ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy of
this Motion is made under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R.
Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the impending formal
administrative complaint the accused will in due time institute with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of
the Motion)."
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In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded his charges against
Atty. Chua to include the following:
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A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar and he violated his
oath of office for the reason that:
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1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed the
crime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of the Philippines versus
Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;
3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v.
Atty. Enrique S. Chua;"
4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedings
under oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that he
never gave any bribe money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements in
the proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas.
B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:

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1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to
Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991;
2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and memoranda against
Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice;
3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring that be gave
P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false evidence in the form of a taped
conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua
violate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and
4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 not to attend the scheduled arraignment.
Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before Justice Lagamon that
he gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas, what was your advise
to your clients?
"A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically meritorious. So I do not see any
reason giving money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that.
"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?

"A That is what I told them.

"Q What did your clients tell you?
"A They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their reason is the sad experience they
had undergone with the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you just cannot
underestimate my sister Banua and perhaps you do not know her. And he said giving of money is not in
reality a bribe because we are in effect buying justice. And he told me I have to be practical about the whole
thing.
"Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but you were only buying justice?
"Q I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life approach such practice but I
really do not know why I gave in to their constant persistent pleadings.
"Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your clients?
"A Partly maybe.
"Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly asking from you?
"A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN., Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-8.)
Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863
We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in
view of Atty. Chuas uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money. His final estimate of the date on
cross-examination May 3, 1993 had afforded Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.
However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly and knowingly
discussed with interested parties with whom he met at least three (3) times, the possible dismissal of the
criminal cases for a certain consideration.
Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine Judges convention at the Quezon City
Sports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he
accepted as visitor in his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 Johnny K.H. Uy, a
party interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This meeting was followed by a telephone call made
by Uy to Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed the latter that there will be no
problem about the 5T (meaning US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared first, to
which Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both.
Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to Johnny Uy on the phone on
October 16, 1991, except to say, "It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I
categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we even discussed $5,000.00, (p. 16, Sworn
Statement, Em. "27"). Judge Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that Johnny
Uy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the
callers might be a certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his voice." (TSN, p. 25,
November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment dated September 28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas
declared he had telephone conversation with Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his house on October 7,
1991. Thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uy
wanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that he
be allowed to see respondent in his house. Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he had
a 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to get rid of him,
respondent agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latters house. After
introducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein.
"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all
that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.)

Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uys voice on the phone and in fact they had a face-to-face
conversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judges house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could
not say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and
shallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious.
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation as recorded in the
tape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation was
replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and
recognized the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.
In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that there will be no problem
about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first.
Judge Abastillas response was to advise Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan.
It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US$5,000.00. However, the taped
conversation as the evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a
sequel of a series of interlinked events that had earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge
Abastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment, followed by the meeting
between Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and
the meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latters house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon
City where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion
that Judge Abastillas knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit.
Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about the "5T" mentioned
by Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not,
which goes to show he filly understood what the "5T" stood for.
cralawnad

It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the latters reply did not
appear to be responsive because he mentioned something like Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The
theory is advanced that it would be illogical for a person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and
a lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge
Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding the direct
personal involvement of the taker in the payoff.
In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh.
13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice Lagamon.
We do not believe that Judge Abastillas meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center was not
pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judges
party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the discussion in complainants memorandum in Adm. Case No.
RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met complainant Lee by way of
his justification in meeting the said Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak.
Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being
instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges was
presented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of Judge
Ponferrada (Annex 4 of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on May 3,
1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from
Judge Ponferrada to bolster the circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually conducive and cordial circumstances
which subsequently led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable.
3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of May 29, 1991 with
complainant Lee at the Judges convention, he did not give him the opportunity to see respondent again
and that he took all steps necessary so that he could not have to talk again to Lee, is a pure lie, and thus
cannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was confronted with
a calling card (EXH.D) of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in the
presence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck
after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no longer pretend to be that resolute in avoiding

complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint (sic) Lee was a gatecrasher on that occasion.
This, by itself is extremely difficult to believe.
Even respondent Judges explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner is
silly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already had an inkling on what was in
Arty. Simbulans mind when the latter insisted in seeing him at the time he and his wife were already on
their way to the Manila Hotel for a foursome dinner. That inkling according to respondent Judge, are the
two criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willingly
allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, prior to
this, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda. Thus if
indeed respondent Judge is so determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding
at all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating Justice, then, he could have
easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their meeting at
the Judges convention.
Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that complainant Lee was really a
gatecrasher or request Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guest
during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lees having
his calling card (EXH.C), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him up by telephone prior to their
seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in the outcome of
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases were
discussed manifested Judge Abastillas willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivations
incongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed serious misconduct
no less.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule
2.01).
It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high
degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesars wife,
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the
high standard of moral ethics required of judges.
cralawnad

We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 against Judge
Abastillas without merit. We quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamons report relative
to said accusations:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when the accused
Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty.
manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in Court because a day before the date set for
arraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be heard
on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should have
displayed their respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the
arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court from orally denying the motion to
quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears that the motion which was filed only one day before
the scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into
account that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in the presence of
Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.
The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and
8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the case be delivered to the custody of
the Court for proper disposition.
The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner just because counsel
for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a full-blown trial type hearing was

conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the
complainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991 arraignment
notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two cases cannot be
equated because in the first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstanding
notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the
Order of the Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order.
We are fully aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of the
firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the delivery of the firearms
for proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changing
the phrase to this Court to to him, thereby creating an implication that the respondent entertained
personal interest in the firearms.
The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be delivered to the
court and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC
Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.15, p. 143, records).
chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad

The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim v. Lim) within 90 days
cannot be given much consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the
branch to the effect that the case was partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who took
down the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the same. There is. therefore, a
need for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as
well as the motion for reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February
5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on January 20, 1992
through a supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions
were all resolved."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815

Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
view of his admission that he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby
allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
cralaw virtua1aw library

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed
his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that particular moment of my life
as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist,"
he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).
Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon
him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.
chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library

Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find it
difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of being
administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the
very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, is hereby
found GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met with persons involved
and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and Sonny
Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe in
connection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.
Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation
committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3452

June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the
status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This is
because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby
merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against
respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City. In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of
professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1

1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case
No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint
was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis--vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial
court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiffs side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three
months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes, namely:
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the
cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;
2

2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued
on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that "[t]he formal offer of plaintiffs exhibits
is rather very late;" and
3

3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the counsel.
In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the
reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.
4

On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on
June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other
charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their
agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing
fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply
on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2,
1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment); and that it
was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989. Anent his
nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the
arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival
in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time,
pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits
despite his request because of the latters absence from the country. He countered that it was
Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at
least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his
acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued
by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with
the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
5

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samontes submission of a motion to change counsel, stating
that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not
meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check
after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted
upon unless it carried Atty. Abellanas conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged
the check.
8

On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samontes letter dated May 8, 1990 embodying additional
charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the
annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment
of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of
Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in
Samontes behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5. Samonte denied being the
10

11

cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary
exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party
not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12
Million; that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he
gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellanas services after discovering the latters inefficiency and
fraudulent practices.
12

On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
14

Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at 10:00 am
on November 18, 1994. However, the parties sought postponements. The hearing was reset
several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner
being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002,
with the hearing being cancelled; and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until
further notice.
15

16

18

19

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana, seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on
the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.
20

Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on February 9,
2005, declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.
21

On March 22, 2005, IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared; hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless,
the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.
22

23

24

Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005. On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.
25

26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.
27

Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005, in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused
any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his work
as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying
his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil
case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the
above-stated replies.
28

On May 1, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling
certain aspects of his clients case, like not filing a reply to the defendants answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make
it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of
exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It
observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his clients
case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and
deceitful practices were a different matter; noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first
being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite
the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the
second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by
producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial
courts; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had
explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainants
failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without
presenting proof of his having actually filed such in court.
29

30

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana, observing as
follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has shown a
facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of
diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the respondents acts are
nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Gines
Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for
failure to exercise honesty and trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis
supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to

falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year. (Bold emphasis supplied)
31

On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following grounds:

32

A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of
law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that
it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated that the
"enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached
as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position Paper of respondent." It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and
Annex 9 of Atty. Abellanas position paper were different documents, namely: Annex
8 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex
9 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the records of
the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute
any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that
Samonte had only said that both documents "seemed to be falsified documents" based on the
certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
33

34
35

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellanas motion for reconsideration.

36

In his comment dated October 21, 2008, Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty. Abellana;
insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and
motion for reconsideration.
37

On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit certified true
copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.
38

On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.

39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.

40

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.
41

Ruling

We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in
the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide
member of the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means
a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
42

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to clients request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings
with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the
complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on
account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10,
1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered
less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to
remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law
Profession than his transactions with his client.

Atty. Abellanas perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in
explaining his mishandling of the latters civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the
Court no less. To counter Samontes accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he
knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP,
and represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His
intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two
documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the
rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTCs, as borne out by
the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court. He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that "court
personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp." In
these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
43

44

The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the handling of Samontes case was entirely warranted. He
admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence
in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC
Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana
was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the
belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. In order to determine if the evidence
of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that
the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability
of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so
far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does
not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
45

The complainants evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To
start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the "0" on "4" but justified himself by claiming that
he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees
required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed
in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint
on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended
himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using
the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify
his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified
copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings

conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he
had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment,
but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can
lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood
or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to
bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still,
the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his
client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his
counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper
sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from
the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit
when in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of
his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v.
Magat, the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the
complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was
false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for
six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore,
suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a
repetition suffices.
46

47

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this
decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be
punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313

September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual.
As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being
the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in
those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug
(complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said,"
the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor
daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to
respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter 2 in her behalf
to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give,
plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual
relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her
shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her,
giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant,
to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim
that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the
birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the
contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant
nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00
cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check 6 in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part
of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore,
he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as
well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. 7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage
had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak
emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself
money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed
the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer
who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate
Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child. 10 Subsequently, he
and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to
study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less thanP500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until
the amount was lowered toP200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in
equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the
checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total ofP12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent
prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document
and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and
understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he
assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that
she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted,
she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition
for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give
her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to
meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant
begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States
would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him
that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to
relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that
respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly
for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x 15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for

Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing
that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning
in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" 20 in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy
his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises
of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former
lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her.

Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time
in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. 29Respondent's numerous
visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At
best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does
not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not
badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that
she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were
not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. 31 We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over
her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support
case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It
is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her
head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if
she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which
the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she

knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. 33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return
the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two
postdated checks amounting toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent
essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more
and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in
his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he
cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of
either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only
on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the

assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to
state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that
he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs
that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this
case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004]

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant,

NGASEO, respondent.

vs.

ATTY.

PATRICIO

A.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo

for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the
Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the
delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for
his appearance fees.
The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:
Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty.
Patricio Ngaseos Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a
case involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent
agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance
fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and other
incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the
respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.
[1]

[2]

On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondents office to

inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the
decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure upon
the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal

the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and
another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.
[3]

Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the

respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of
the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent
filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period.
On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the
respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he
allegedly promised as payment for respondents appearance fee. In the same
letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant
would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client,
Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage
his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated
in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainants family lost 7 years earlier
through an execution sale in favor of one Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who
was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog haltingly, was assisted
by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan because no
lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant,
through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not
engage their services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One
local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least one-half of the land
involved as his attorneys fee, plus cash expenses, while the other asked for of
the land in addition to a large sum of money. Respondent agreed to handle
the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance fee of
P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his
siblings on the matter.
Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose
Castillo, went to respondents office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant,
through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee
of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the
remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after their treasure hunt operations in Nueva
Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00

per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case,
if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition,
complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and
other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainants offer.
Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC
2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged
as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one
Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an
offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the
remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a
written commitment and gave respondents secretary P2,000.00 of the
P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellants brief.
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision
ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his
siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which
compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP
charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m.
parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.
In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
[4]

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads:
[5]

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable

laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP
Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
[6]

Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code
because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which
was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has
been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare
parcel of land to the family of the complainant.
Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance
fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum
meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable
because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an
acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved
which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their
profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only
sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale
advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and
confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded
on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only
if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the clients property. Consequently, where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
[7]

[8]

[9]

Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal
transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property
either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual.
In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and
suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he registered a deed of
assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the
estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the
subject property. In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v.
Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for
six (6) months from the practice of law when he purchased his client's
property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.
[10]

[11]

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in

litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery
which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the
litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming
arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondents act does
not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January
29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128
became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly
specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We
find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not
proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to
disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or
suspension be imposed as a penalty. All considered, a reprimand is deemed
sufficient and reasonable.
[12]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A.

Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal
profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the

same act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

BEL-AIR TRANSIT SERVICE Adm. Case No. 6107

CORPORATION (DOLLAR
RENT-A-CAR), Present:
Complainant,
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus - TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA,
Respondent. January 31, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In a verified Complaint[1] dated June 11, 2003, Bel-Air Transit

Service Corporation (Dollar Rent-A-Car) charged Atty. Esteban Y.
Mendoza with grossly immoral and unethical conduct, praying for
his disbarment and that his name be stricken-off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

The complainant narrated that, on September 19, 2001, the

respondent rented a car from it, a Toyota Camry with Plate
No. WMK 232, for the amount of P5,549.00. Under the terms of
the

Rental

Agreement

No.

97206,[2] which

the

respondent

personally signed, the latter was to be fetched at his residence at

No. 483 Northwestern Street, East Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
The

respondent

rented

another

Toyota

Camry

from

the

complainant on September 28, 2001, this time with Plate No. WRT
557, and was, likewise, fetched at his residence in accordance
with the Rental Agreement No. 97420.[3] This second contract was
also personally signed by the respondent. The statements of
account[4]were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his office and
business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland

Show Tower, Mandaluyong City. Despite repeated demands for

payment, the respondent refused to pay his account, which
constrained the complainant to send a formal and final demand
for payment through counsel.[5] This formal demand was, likewise,
ignored by the respondent, further compelling the complainant to
resort to filing a complaint[6] for recovery of money on March 12,
2003 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65,
docketed as Civil Case No. 81392.

According to the complainant, the respondents refusal to pay

for the complainants car rental services constitutes deceit and
grossly immoral and unethical conduct, which violates the Canons
of Professional Ethics and Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
on Human Relations. The complainant further alleged that this is a
sufficient ground for the respondents disbarment, considering that
the respondent even ignored the complainants repeated demands
for payment.[7]

In his Comment, the respondent denied the allegations

against him. He averred that it was the law firm of Martinez &
Mendoza which engaged the services of the complainant, and
that all the trips undertaken were for an out-of-town engagement
in Lucena City. To support his claim, the respondent incorporated
a letter[8] addressed to the Chief Operations Manager of the
complainant requesting for the latters services.

The respondent alleged that the driver assigned to him by

the complainant during the trip from Lucena City on September
19, 2001 did not exercise extraordinary diligence. He averred that
they almost figured in an accident, and when he inquired as to
why the said driver was not cautious with his driving, the latter
replied that he had just been on another out-of-town trip driving
for another client and only had three hours of sleep the night
before. The respondent decided not to report the incident to the
complainant, thinking that it was going to be the first and last
incident. However, during the trip of September 28, 2001, the
respondent again almost figured in an accident, prompting the
respondent to contact the complainant to complain as to why the
latter was providing drivers to their law firm who had not had
enough sleep. No one from the complainants staff could provide
him with a decent answer, merely Pasensiya na. The respondent
then demanded a meeting with the complainants president in
order to resolve the matter, but despite repeated requests, the

latter refused to meet with him. The respondent further averred,

thus:

14. It is not only inaccurate but also unfair for the

complainant to baselessly accuse the respondent or M&M
of refusing to pay their claims. As shown above, M&M
immediately paid all of complainants billings for August
2001. It was only the billings for September 2001 that
remained unpaid because M&M and respondent first
wanted to meet with the President of the complainant to
resolve their complaint. M&M and respondent do not have
a history of not honoring their obligations. As officers of
the court, it is cognizant that [they] should conduct
[themselves] properly so as not to do injustice to anyone,
including the complainant.

14.1. Respondent almost met an accident because

the complainant provided him with drivers that did not
have enough rest and sleep before they drove for him. It
is the respondent who is the aggrieved party here and not
the complainant. Thus, it is very unfortunate that it is the
respondent who is slapped with a disbarment case. M&M
did not even file a complaint with the Department of
Trade and Industry for violation of the Consumers Act of
the Philippines because it wanted to resolve its complaint
amicably.

14.2 Respondent respectfully manifests that, only to

buy peace, the questioned billings of the complainant
which [were] made the subject of a complaint they filed
against him had already been fully satisfied.

A copy of Official Receipt No. 52095 dated 4

September 2003 in the name of Martinez & Mendoza Law
Office is attached hereto and made an integral part
hereof as Annex H.[9]

The respondent concluded that the complainant did not have

a cause of action for disbarment against him, as he was merely
exercising his right to contest its questionable billings.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
and was assigned to IBP Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay. During
the hearing of March 1, 2004, the counsel for the complainant
manifested that although the respondent had already paid his
account, such payment was made only after the court had already
decided the case against the respondent and after the filing of a
motion for execution,[10] which the respondent admitted. Thus, the
parties agreed during the hearing that as far as the monetary
obligation was concerned, the said judgment had already been
satisfied by the respondent. The parties were then required to file
their respective position papers, which were basically reiterations
of their previous allegations.

In his Report and Recommendation dated April 19, 2004,

Commissioner Dulay made the following findings:

Respondent offers two reasons for non-payment:

First, that the obligation was incurred not by him but by
his law office Martinez & Mendoza. Second, that the
respondent almost met an accident on the two occasions
he used the services of the complainant and therefore he
should not be penalized for exercising its right to contest
complainants questionable billings.
...
As to the first reason, we reiterate that as decided
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, respondent was liable for
the obligation to the complainant. Indeed, respondent
cannot avoid the obligation and pass it on to his law firm
and just make a complete denial considering that he is a
name partner in the firm and law partnership of Martinez
and Mendoza. The Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore,
ruled that respondent was, nevertheless, liable for the
obligation of his law partnership. Independent of the said
decision, we find that the documents attached as
Annexes A and B to the complaint appear to have been
signed by the respondent and even assuming that it was
the law firm that was liable, there is nothing on record to
show that the law firm questioned the billings of the
complainant or that the respondent referred the same to
the law firm for proper disposition.

As to the second reason, respondent admits that

there was no written demand made for the complainant
to account and answer for the near accidents alleged by
respondent, which near accidents as we understand are

his reasons for not immediately paying. We find the

absence of a written demand from the respondent quite
odd especially in the case of a lawyer who is seeking to
exercise his right to contest complainants questionable
billings or otherwise hold complainant accountable for the
said near accidents. It would perhaps be understandable
if the omission was made by a layman; but for a lawyer
not to put his demand in writing, it would be
uncharacteristic to say the least. Neither was a demand
made by the law firm of Martinez and Mendoza as a basis
for non-payment. We are, therefore, inclined to look at
this reason, (near accident) as a mere afterthought and
would not justify respondent in not paying for two (2)
years what appears to be a clear and simple obligation to
complainant. As pointed out by complainant, it was only
after a writ of execution was issued when payment was
made.

The reason offered by respondent for not paying

complainant particularly the alleged near accident is,
therefore, not justifiable. The said reason appears to us
trite and contrived. Lack of funds to pay an obligation
may perhaps be a good reason but to use as a reason the
said near accident on the bare assertion of respondent
alone and not supported by any corroborating evidence
may not be readily acceptable. We are, on the other hand,
also not convinced that respondent was deceitful or
grossly negligent by his actions. There is no evidence to
show that respondent was acting with deceit in not
paying for the obligation incurred. However, we find
respondent lacking in probity and forthrightness in
dealing with the complaint and quite simply negligent in
the handling of this particular obligation to complainant.
Taken in the light of the circumstances presented, we
believe respondent should be admonished and warned to
avoid such similar conduct in the future.

It

was,

thus,

recommended

that

the

respondent

be

admonished and advised to be more forthright in the handling of

his monetary obligations in the future. On July 30, 2004,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline then issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-378, adopting and approving the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, considering that there was no
evidence to show that the respondent had acted with deceit in not
paying for the questioned obligation.

It is settled that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for

any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.[11] A lawyer must, at all times, uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. Indeed, a lawyer brings honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity in the
legal

profession.[12] Thus,

lawyers

must

promptly

pay

their

financial obligations.[13] Their conduct must always reflect the

values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.[14]

In this case, the respondent refused to pay for the services

of the complainant, constraining the latter to file charges in order
to collect what was due to it under the contracts, in which the
respondent himself was the signatory. Moreover, as pointed out
by IBP Commissioner Dulay, the respondents claim that he almost
twice figured in accidents due to the negligent drivers employed
by the complainant and that he intended to question the
companys billings (which he also posited was a valid excuse for
non-payment), appears to have been concocted as a mere
afterthought.

Verily, the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a

member of the bar, and should be admonished for his actuations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza is

hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his financial
obligations and his dealings with the public. He is STERNLY
WARNED that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents

files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO,

A.C. No. 6705

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Promulgated:

Respondent. March 31, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim
and Special Administratrix of his estate. [1] Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. [2]
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries,
Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, [5] and its operations ceased in
1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat
employees) filed a criminal complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et
al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal
complaint).[7] Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who
took over the management and control of Taggat after the death
of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages
without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned

to conduct the preliminary investigation. [9] He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations[10] for violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article
116[12] of the Labor Code of the Philippines.[13]

Complainant now charges respondent with the following

violations:
1.

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing

conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees.[14] Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and
threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to
support the complaint.[15]
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months
of January and February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months
of April and May 1995,[17] andP5,000 for the month of April 1996.
[18]

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for

violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters
that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation.[19]
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was
filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years.[20] Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
undivided loyalty to Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his
sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.
[22]
Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack
of impartiality when he performed his duty. [23] Respondent points
out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint [24] but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without
mental reservation.[25]

Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a

motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainants statement during the hearing conducted on 12
February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he
would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he
was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be
trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me
he gonna help me. x x x.[26]

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist

because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. [27] Respondent
argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act
was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. [28]

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he

instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of
proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination. [29]

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his

appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from
complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996.

[30]
Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his
consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent
submits that consultation is not the same as representation and
that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.
[31]
Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as
token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for
retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no
relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints
filed by former Taggat employees.[32]

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to

prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the
retained counsel or legal consultant. [33]

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and

Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.
[34]
Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. [35]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating
Commissioner
Ma.
Carmina
M.
Alejandro-Abbas
(IBP
[36]
Commissioner Abbas) heard the case
and allowed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. [37] Due to IBP Commissioner
Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa (IBP Commissioner Funa). [38]

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to

resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution) dated 4 November 2004
adopting with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funas Report and
Recommendation (Report) finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years
suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former

lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of whether
the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former

position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of

Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation of Labor

Code (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex B of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie LimSantiago, was being accused as having the management
and control of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros.
Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal

Counsel
of
Taggat,
herein
Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of
Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedlydealt with and related
with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in
I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240,
are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues
of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much
familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client.

Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect
him in any matter in which he previously represented
him (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten,
however, that a lawyer has animmutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously
handled for that former client. In this case, matters
relating
to personnel,
labor
policies,
and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was
for Violation of the Labor Code. Here lies the conflict.
Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240
not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as
it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a
former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and

the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years
1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel
of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations
with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part
of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving Retainer Fees or

consultancy fees from herein Complainant while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor,
this
matter
had
long
been
settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to
engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647).
The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To
engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re:
David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of
court, which required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105
Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing

certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of

conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor.[40]

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the

Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B [41] of the Rules
of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of

violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
against unlawful conduct.[42] Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713).

Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in

government service in the discharge of their official duties. [43] A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition not [to]
represent conflicting interests.[44] However, this rule is subject to
certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when
a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of
the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.
[45]
Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.[46]
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not
to engage in unlawful x x x conduct. Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee
to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice

will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions. [47]

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim

that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various
tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency
of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment. [49] In essence, what a lawyer
owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
[50]

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when

respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent
was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting

interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent
used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential
information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the

criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the

preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not
necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential
information from his previous employment with complainant or
Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager
and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as
government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis
to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A
lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty
of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law

while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[51]

Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the

same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the
public as a lawyer.[52]

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy

services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers
with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the
ambit of the term practice of law.

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal

services to complainant while working as a government
prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments
by Taggat were for Retainers fee. [53] Thus, as correctly pointed out
by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA
6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary

action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the
violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a

violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondents admission that he received from
Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government
prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of
Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him

with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be

permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of
the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on
the following grounds:

xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross
violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. [54]

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[55]

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government
employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.
[56]
We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in
this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B.

Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, weSUSPEND respondent
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY
TAN,

A.C. No. 6634

Present:

Complainant,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
- versus -

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES,
Respondent.

August 23, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Tan Tiong

Bio, a.k.a. Henry Tan, against Atty. Renato L. Gonzales for allegedly notarizing a
conveying deed outside the territory covered by his notarial commission and
without requiring the personal presence before him of the signatories to the deed
before notarizing the same, inviolation of the Notarial Law and the lawyers oath.

As records reveal, complainant purchased several parcels of land at the

Manila Southwoods Residential Estates (Southwoods, for short), a mix residential-

commercial complex situated in Carmona, Cavite owned/operated by Fil-Estate

Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI
has its office at RenaissanceTowers, Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. In one of the
transactions adverted to, complainant, as vendee, was made to sign
and execute Deed of Sale No. 1108[2] (Deed 1108, hereinafter) covering a lot
described in and covered by the vendors Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T427206. Following payment of the contract price in full, including miscellaneous
expenses, TCT No. 968702 in complainants name was delivered to him with the
corresponding completed deed of sale. Respondent Renato L. Gonzales, employed
as corporate counsel for FEPI and appointed/reappointed from 1996 to 2001 as
notary public for Quezon City[3], was the notarizing officer of Deed 1108 on which
the name and signature of Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (Bondoc) appear as the vendors
authorized representative.

As complainant would allege in his Complaint Affidavit dated November 17,

2003, and its annexes, sometime in 1995, he made another Southwoods purchase
covering Lot10,
Block
27,
Phase
3
(or Lot 10).
Several
years following his payment of the amount of P2,068,523, representing the full
purchase price for Lot 10 and after he had signed a deed with the space for the title
number and technical description left in blank, complainant repeatedly asked for
but was not able to secure a certificate of title for the same or a refund of his
payment. The rebuff, according to complainant, impelled him to file a case
for estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.

In connection with the estafa charge, so complainant claims, Ms.

Bondoc, signatory (for FEGDI as vendor) to Deed 1108, executed a counteraffidavit therein stating that she had not personally met nor transacted with the
complainant either with respect to the negotiations for the sale of the land covered
by TCT No. T-427206 nor during the execution of Deed 1108. Complainant would
add, however, that Ms. Bondoc admitted that she and the complainant did sign the
said deed of sale, but at different times and in different places, and not in each
others presence,[4] like other signed hundreds of deeds (of sale) over other

documents for our behalf of the President [of Fil-Estate] with buyers [she] had
never (even) met.[5]

It is on the basis of Ms. Bondocs foregoing statements that complainant

initiated the present disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), it being his posture that respondent Gonzales notarized Deed 1108 without
requiring him, or Ms. Bondoc, to appear and acknowledge before him the due and
voluntary execution thereof, a practice not only violative of the Notarial Law, but
detrimental to his interests and those similarly situated as well.

Respondent, in his Verified Answer,[6] was less than categorical on the matter
of whether or not complainant and Ms. Bondoc, vis--vis Deed 1108, indeed
appeared before him and attested to the contents and the truth of what are stated in
the deed. Instead, he alleged as follows:

10. Because of the hundreds of documents I have notarized, I do

not recall with absolute certainty the details of the notarization ceremony
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. Nevertheless, what I do know
is that I have personally met both complainant and Atty. Bondoc and
notarized documents which they had acknowledged. Based on the
admissions of both the complainant and Atty. Bondoc that they have not
personally met, it appears that in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale in
question, both complainant and Atty. Bondoc appeared before me and
signed, but at different times.

11. As a matter of practice, I require the personal appearance of

all parties who seek to have deeds of sale notarized. However, the parties
need not necessarily sign and acknowledge their acts in one anothers
presence. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

13. Thus, complainant cannot dispute that both signatories to the
Deed of Absolute Sale personally appeared before me ., albeit at
different times. That is all that is required by law. The fact that the
signatories to the Deed signed and acknowledged the same on different
occasions is of no moment, and certainly does not constitute misconduct
on my part.

xxxxxxxxx

15. The only basis for the charge of professional misconduct

against me is that I allowed the signatories to acknowledge their
signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale at different times. However,
complainant fails to cite any law or rule which obliges a notary public to
require the parties to the instrument to simultaneously appear before
him, as in fact, there is none. Thus, even if I did not require complainant
and Atty. Bondoc to personally appear before me at the same time, I
cannot be faulted for such, as I am not required to do so. [7]

The respondent parlays in his answer the idea of laches, arguing that the
transaction in question took place in 2001, while complainant initiated the
disbarment charge only in November 2003.

At the preliminary conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

(Commission), complainant and respondent entered into the following stipulation
of facts, to wit:

[T]he Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 was duly executed by Mr.
Henry Tan and Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc as authorized signatory of
the seller; that the subject document was notarized by respondent as
document no. 367, page no. 74, book no. 8, series of 2001 of his notarial
register; that respondent admits that his notarial appointment covers
Quezon City and that the subject document was notarized in Pasig City,
specifically, at the Renaissance Tower; and that the parties admit that
Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc and Henry Tan Tan were not present at the
same time when the subject document was notarized xxx (Underscoring
added.)

After due hearings, Investigating Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila

submitted his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated August 27, 2004, which,
as approved by the IBP Director for Bar Discipline, was forwarded to the Court.

In the report, the Commission recommended that respondent be adjudged

liable and penalized for violating the rule proscribing one from acting as a notary
outside the area covered by his commission, but recommended the dismissal of the
complaint insofar as it charges the respondent for notarizing a document without
the personal appearance before him of the party-signatories thereto.

We agree.

As aptly found by the Investigating Commissioner, delving on the second

part of the recommendation, complainant failed to substantiate with competent
proof his allegations that respondent performed the notarial procedure on Deed
1108 without his (complainant) being present to acknowledge the due execution
thereof. Being a notarized document, Deed 1108 and the solemnities attending its

execution are disputably presumed to be regular.[8] Absent convincing evidence to

the contrary, the certification in Deed 1108 that the vendor and the vendee
personally appeared before the respondent to acknowledge the same must be
upheld. As we said in Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos,[9] when a notary certifies to the
due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal, the document
thus notarized is converted into a public document. To us and to the Investigating
Commissioner,[10] the declaration of Ms. Bondoc in her counter-affidavit before the
prosecutors office is not the clear and convincing evidence required to overturn the
presumption of regularity. Ms. Bondocs declaration that she had not met or dealt
directly with Southwoods buyers does not necessarily prove that such buyers and
FEPIs representatives in the purchase did not in fact appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the fact of contract execution before him. If at all, Ms.
Bondocs declaration simply means that she has not personally met the buyers, or,
with like effect, that she, as representative of the seller, has not appeared together
with the buyers before the notarizing officer. As it were, the Notarial Law is silent
as to whether or not the parties to a conveying instrument must be present before
the notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due execution.
There can be quibbling, however, that the respondent breached the
injunction against notarizing a document in a place outside ones commission. As
reported by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged that
from February 1, 1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period Deed 1108 was
notarized, his notarial commission then issued was for Quezon City.
[11]
Deed 1108 was, however, notarized in Pasig City. To compound matters, he
admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in Pasig City, where he used to
hold office, [12] during the period that his notarial commission was only for and
within Quezon City.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of
notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his
notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While
perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation
involved, what the Court said inNunga v. Viray [13] is very much apropos:

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the

Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he
is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,

routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
[14]
Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are
treated with a formality definitely more than casual.[15]

For all legal intents and purposes, respondent, by performing through the
years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized, has indulged in
deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

To be sure, respondent cannot plausibly seek refuge in the complainants

alleged delay in filing the instant complaint for disbarment. He cannot, as a means
to defeat the present charge, invoke the complainants ill-motive in filing said
complaint. We have, time and again, held that the Courts disciplinary authority
cannot be defeated or frustrated by a mere delay in filing the complaint, or by the
complainants motivation to do so. The practice of law is so delicately affected by
public interest that it is both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote public welfare.[16] Indeed, we have held that an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.[17]

Needless to stress, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his

capacity as member of the bar and as a notary public. His proven transgression
does not, however, merit disbarment, as urged by the complainant. This most
severe form of disciplinary sanction ought to be imposed only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a respondent as an
officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired.[18]

The IBP Report recommended the revocation of respondents commission as

a notary public (in any jurisdiction), if still existing, and that he henceforth be
disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. A onemonth suspension from the practice of law for violation of Canon 1 [19] and Rule
1.01[20] of the Code of Professional Responsibility is also recommended for the
respondent.

In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,[21] the Court meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from law practice on Atty. Simpliciano as well as his permanent
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for notarizing several
documents after his commission as notary public had already expired.

Considering the circumstances and the extent of respondents willful

malfeasance, and guided by Zoreta, a penalty higher than that recommended by the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline ought to be imposed.

WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Renato
L.
Gonzales is PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as Notary

Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of

two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and let the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified of this Decision
which is hereby ordered duly recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, A.C. No. 7781
MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE,
NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, Present:
JORGE V. LEGASPI, and
JUANITO V. LEGASPI, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.,
Respondent. September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano,
Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V.
Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized
a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of

Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L.

Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document
were forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the document on July 16,
2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their purported community
tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in
the acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear,
among other things, that complainants personally came and appeared before him
and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence. In the
process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro,
to assume full ownership of their deceased parents property in Tibagan, San
Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the
same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the
document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained that
he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the representation and
assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community tax
certificates appearing in the document were true and correct. Navarro would not,
according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of, each
other for 30 years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury
considering that the falsified document had been revoked and canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned document bore the
signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports to have been executed
by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed notarized the questioned
document on July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did not appear and acknowledge the
document before respondent on July 16, 2004; (4) respondent notarized the
questioned document only on Navarros representation that the signatures appearing
and community tax certificates were true and correct; and (5) respondent did not
ascertain if the purported signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the
document belonged to them.

The Commission concluded that with respondents admission of

having notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as thus
established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial Law had been
committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila, personally
came and appeared the above-named persons with their respective
Community Tax Certificates as follows:
xxxx
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed the
foregoing instrument and they acknowledge to me that the same is their
own free act and deed. x x x

For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with

the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,[1] that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still existing, be
revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two (2)
years. On September 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-147, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises
holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from
affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who
signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the
notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, for under Section 1
of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment is made in accordance with the
following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or
an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act
is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document
is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall

be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal,

and if not, his certificate shall so state. [2]

Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act
or deed.[3] Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries
public the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate)
and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification. [4] Rule II,
Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[5] now requires a party to the
instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.The phrase competent evidence of
identity refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to,
passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters
ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office
ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons
(NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as
amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to
the notary public documentary identification.

One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to

discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that
notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private

document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the

necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. [6] A notarized
document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that
notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIEDfrom being commissioned as notary public for a period of two
(2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same negligent act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
the IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it
entered into respondents personal record.
SO ORDERED.