Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No.

146710-15, March 2, 2001

PUNO, J.

FACTS: On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to

as Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late
2000, word spread of Eraps alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng
money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups and
public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And
because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000.
Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with
P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked
out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a
press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he
signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of

prejudicial publicity.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that as of the issue of prejudicial publicity, this
would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the
free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said
that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."

Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the

Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional
Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a
pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of Facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into

during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The
agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval
of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense
may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law,
public morals, or public policy.

Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or

the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper
sanctions or penalties.

Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall
bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action
during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime,
except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall,
after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case
for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible
time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court.

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before
the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen
(15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from
arraignment as fixed by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such
defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried
again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court
retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of
witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty
(30) days impractical.

Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this

Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit
with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit
shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time
limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.

Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing
the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental
competency, or physical incapacity;

(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does
not exceed thirty (30) days,

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of

venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or
an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered

absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to
avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due
diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever
his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a
charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be
joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to
the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there
been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-
accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for
trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge
motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public
prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be
excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either
orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting
of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.

Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a
justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under
subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:

(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely
to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of
justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to
the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this
Act.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general

congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain
available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.

Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public
attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because
he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a
non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the
public attorney shall promptly:

(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be
served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise
the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly
advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time
thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such
person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney
a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner
shall be made available to that public attorney.

Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If
an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as
extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The
accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution
shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the
exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall
consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances
of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the
implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to
move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismissal under this section.

Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public
prosecution or public attorney:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a
necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally
frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows
to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal
and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring
counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:

(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an
accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to
which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not
exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before
the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other
authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures
established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant
to this section.

Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to
proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.

Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the
Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional
amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision
of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required
by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.

Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided,
That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the
aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.

Approved: February 12, 1998

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM
No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011

Facts:

Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition
before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist
the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast
coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the freedom of the
press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition
the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed
as AM No. 10-11-5-SC.

Issue:
Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings?

Ruling:

Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held that the impossibility of
holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested
parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if
the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to
witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.