CLAUDIO v.

COMELEC
G.R. 140560. May 4, 2000
FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City during the 11 May
1998 elections. He assumed office on 1 July 1998.
On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was formed for the purpose of
convening a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA).
On 29 May 1999, majority of the members of the PRA adopted a Resolution to
Initiate the Recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio for Loss of Confidence.
On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was formally submitted to the Office of
the Election Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in public places in
Pasay City and the authenticity of the signatures therein was verified by the
election officer for Pasay City.
The petition was opposed on several grounds. Principally, that the convening
of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period under Sec. 74,
LGC which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election. xxxx

The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that the petition did not violate
the one-year ban because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999,
one
day
after Claudios assumption of office.

ISSUES
1. WoN the word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC covers a process which includes the
convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall
resolution.
2. WoN the term "regular local election" in the last clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC
includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such
election.
HELD/RATIO
1. The word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC refers to the to the election itself by means of
which voters decided whether they shall retain their local official or elect his
replacement.
Recall is a process which involves the following steps:
(1) the convening of the preparatory assembly or gathering of the
signatures of at least 25% registered voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election; and
(5) holding of the election.

That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC, refers to the recall election itself is
due to the following reasons:
(1) Sec. 69, LGC provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by
the registered voters of the LGU to which the local elective official
belongs. It is clear that the power of recall referred to in Sec. 69 is the
power to retain/replace officials and not the power to initiate recall
proceedings. Thus, the limitations under Sec. 74 (Limitations on Recall)
apply only to the recall elections.
In Garcia v. COMELEC, the delegation of the power to initiate recall
proceedings from the electorate to the PRAs was questioned. The
Supreme Court held that what the Constitution gave to the people is
the power to recall and not the power to initiate the recall proceedings.
The holding of the PRA is not the recall itself.
(2) That the word recall refers to the recall election is consistent with the
purposes1 of the limitations on recall.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of the official (Angobung v. COMELEC). This
judgment is not given during the preliminary proceedings (such as the
convening of the PRA) but through the vote during the recall election
itself.
(3) That the word recall refers to the recall election is to uphold the
constitutional rights of speech and freedom of assembly of PRA
members.
To hold that limitation includes the formation of opinion through public
discussions on the matter of recall of an official is to curtail these
constitutional rights.
2. The term regular elections does not include the election period.
To construe the word regular elections as including the election period would
emasculate the right of the people to exercise the power of recall.
In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the limitations on Sec. 74 (a)
and Sec. 74 (b) would mean that a local elective official may be subject only to
recall during the second year of his/her term (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to
mid-May 2000)
If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b) would include the election
period, which commences 90 days from the date of the election and extends to
30 days thereafter, the period during which the power of recall may be exercised
will be reduced even more. (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-February 2000)
1

(1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of
the official concerned; and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

HELD/RATIO
Petition DISMISSED.