Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ANECITO
CASCANTE, petitioner, vs.
THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
1 of 27
Page
2 of 27
Page
3 of 27
Page
4 of 27
1. CITIZENSHIP;
NATURALIZATION;
ABSENCE DURING PERIOD INTERVENING BETWEEN
FILING OF APPLICATION AND HEARING AN
OBSTACLE TO PETITIONER'S NATURALIZATION.
Where
the
petitioner
left
the
Philippines
immediately after the filing of his petition for
naturalization and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing
thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under
oath, that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines "from the date of the filing of his
petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship", he has not complied with
the
requirements
of
section
7
of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently,
not entitled to a judgment in his favor.
DECISION
Page
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor
General from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, granting the application of
Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of
the Philippines.
The main facts are not disputed. Petitionerappellee was born, of Chinese parents, in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927.
He began his primary education at the Saint
Theresa's College in said municipality.
Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of
Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos College and,
still later the Siliman University all in the same
locality where he completed the secondary
course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester,
in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila.
Soon after, he went to the United States, where,
from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland
Stanford Junior University, in California, and was
graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor of
Science. In April of the same year he returned to
the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then,
to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present
application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith,
he returned to the United States and took a
postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in
another educational institution, in Fort Wayne,
Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but
did not return to the Philippines until October 13,
1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally
scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be
postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.
The only question for the determination in
this appeal is whether or not the application for
naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the
fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately
after the filing of his petition and did not return
until several months after the first date set for the
hearing thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu
decided this question in the affirmative and
accordingly rendered judgment for the petitioner.
The Solicitor General, who maintains the negative,
has appealed from said judgment.
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 reads as follows:
"Any person desiring to
acquire Philippine citizenship shall
file with the competent court, a
petition in triplicate, accompanied by
two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname,
his present and former place of
residence; his occupation; the place
and date of his birth; whether single
or married and if the father of
children, the name, age, birthplace
and residence of the wife and of each
of the children; the approximate date
of his arrival in the Philippines, the
name of the port of debarkation, and
if he remembers it, the name of the
5 of 27
Page
6 of 27
Page
however
continue.
long
such
stay
may
7 of 27
Page
8 of 27
Page
9 of 27
Page
10 of 27
Page
11 of 27
Page
12 of 27
Page
13 of 27
Page
14 of 27
34
We
Page
15 of 27
Page
16 of 27
Page
some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence
between the husband and the wife during the marriage
is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil
Code on the question of a common matrimonial
residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled
to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of
her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to
opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this
Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where
the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband
either by taking new residence or reverting to her
domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife
could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are
convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. Of course where the property rights of one
of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined
to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic)
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and he experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that
the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make
a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and inWeldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the
injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
17 of 27
Page
18 of 27
Page
purpose
of
his
19 of 27
coming
is
Page
20 of 27
Page
SYLLABUS
1. INHERITANCE
TAX;
DOMICILE
OF
TAXPAYER. To effect the abandonment of one's
domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
residence in the place chosen, with a declared or
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a
complete dearth of evidence in the record that M
ever established a new domicile in a foreign
country.
2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. As
M's legal domicile at the time of his death was the
Philippine Islands and his estate had its situs here,
the inheritance and income taxes here involved
were lawfully collected.
BUTTE, J p:
21 of 27
Page
22 of 27
Page
23 of 27
Page
24 of 27
IN
THE
MATTER
OF
THE
ADOPTION
OF
THE
MINOR
NORMA LEE CABER. RICARDO R.
CARABALLO, petitioner-appellee, vs
. REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, opponent-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE.
A person is deemed a resident of a place in a
country or state where he has his abode and lives there
permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and
voluntarily, although he may later on change his mind
and live elsewhere. A place in a country or state where
he lives and stays permanently and to which he
intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter
how long, is his domicile.
2. ADOPTION; PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIEN TO ADOPT;
CASE AT BAR. Petitioner, an American citizen, lives in
Clark Filed, municipality of Angeles, province of
Pampanga, Republic of the Philippines, because of his
assignment as staff sergeant in the United States Air
Force. Held: Petitioner's stay in the Philippines being
temporary, he is a non-resident alien who, pursuant to
clause 4 of Article 335 of the Civil Code, is disqualified
to adopt a child in the Philippines.
In a verified petition filed on 26 September 1958 in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Ricardo R.
Caraballo, an American citizen enlisted in the United
States Air Force as staff sergeant detailed in Clark
Field, Angeles, Pampanga, where he and his wife
Graciela G. Caraballo live, alleges that he and his wife
have no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, natural children by legal fiction or any other
descendant; that with his wife's written consent
(Exhibit C) he desires to adopt as his child Norma Lee
Caber, a five- day old natural daughter of Mercedes J.
Caber begotten by an unknown father, who gave her
consent to the adoption in a sworn statement (Exhibit
B); that since the day following her birth Norma Lee
Caber has been reared and cared for by him and his
wife who have developed love and affection for her;
that he never has been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude; that financially and morally
he is able to support, bring child for all intents and
purposes, free from any obligation of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother
Mercedes J. Caber (Sp. proc. No. 1391).
On 26 September 1958 the Court ordered the verified
petition filed by Ricardo R. Caraballo to be published
and was published in the Daily Mirror once a week for
three consecutive weeks setting the petition for
hearing on 18 October 1958. (Exhibit A). As at the
hearing nobody appeared to object to the petition for
adoption, petitioner's counsel prayed for an order of
default, which was entered against all interested
parties, except the Solicitor General or Provincial Fiscal
who, according to the Court, must appear in adoption
cases.
Page
25 of 27
Page
26 of 27
Page
27 of 27