PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)

FACTS:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While
entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the
truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These
cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of
the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and
whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence
required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)
HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the
defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the
fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence,
he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected.
The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and
therefore the knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier
from responsibility.

PAL vs. CA and ZAPATOS

G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent was among the 21 passengers of Flight 477 that took off from
Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato.
The pilot received a radio message that Ozamiz airport was closed due to heavy
rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead.

Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of
their options to return to Cebu on the same day and then to Ozamiz, or take the
next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next
available flight to Ozamiz City. Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-over
at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only 6 seats
available.
Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he
checked-in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477.
He was forced to stay at Cotabato City despite the local war between the military
and the muslim rebels. He tried to ferry the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel but
said pick-up vehicle did not accommodate him. The personnel of PAL did not secure
his accommodation in Cotabato City.
He received a free ticket on a flight to Iligan, but chose to buy his own. He lost his
personal belongings, including a camera.
Issue:
1. WON PAL can properly invoke the defense of fortuitous event of bad weather in
Ozamiz to exempt itself from paying damages to the PR? NO
2. WON the exemplary damages was properly awarded by the appellate court? NO
Held:
1.
PAL remissed in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being
stranded in Cotabato City.
PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event.
Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its passengers.
Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL
is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. The relation of
carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still

have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience

and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination.
PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces
and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a
stranger to the place.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. Because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with
the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail
of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver
its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendants failure to provide
comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence,
the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but
due to something which defendant airline could have prevented, PAL becomes liable
to plaintiff.
2.
The award of moral damages was excessive and was reduced by the Court. There
was no clear basis that PAL failed to entertain the plaintiff and answer its queries. In
fact, the manager accommodated him in his office. Moral damages are not intended
to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded only to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action.
The plaintiffs claim on loss of business opportunities was based only on pure
speculation. It must depend on competent proof.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.

ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989)

FACTS:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the
port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.
The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked
from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel
to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side
of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired
three (3) days thereafter.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of
contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the
vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the
vessel of Aboitiz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of
cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been

landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after
leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrierpassenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to
claim his baggage.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the
fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness
of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind
of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and
therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such
other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no
appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in
the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The
primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number
of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both
as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will
need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his
baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very
short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La
Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine
enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel.

As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Sps Marcelo Landingin vs PANTRANCO (1970)Petitioners two spouses respective daughters were
among the passengers who rode thePantrancoBus field trip travel from Dagupan City to Baguio City. When
the Bus was travelling uphill the KennonRoad, the Bus stalled for a few moments with the motor ceasing
to function causing the bus to slideback unchecked. When the driver suddenly swerved and steered the
bus toward the mountain sidecausing petitioners daughters among others to panick and jump out from
the open side of the busresulting to their injuries that caused their death. The malfunctioning resulted
from the breakage of the cross joint which the defendants claim to have inspected as in order the day
before. The court aquo concluded the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of
God brought about bysome extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or
its employees. Doesthe mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order
would exempt thecarrier from liability?Held: No. When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is
that the common carrier is at faultor that it acted negligently. This presumption is only rebutted by
proof on the carrier's part that itobserved the "extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and
the "utmost diligence requiredof a very cautious person." In the instant case it appears that although the
day before the broken joint was duly inspected and found to be in order, due regard for all the
circumstances like the buswas heavily laden with passengers; that it would traverse mountainous,
circuitous and ascendingroads were not considered in connection with the said inspection. Unless it is
shown that theparticular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered, the
mereinspection would not exempt the carrier from liability

La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals (17 SCRA 739)

Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca
bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the
father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus
to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel.
While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage,

the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run
over and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca
liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when
the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage
terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the
passenger alighted form the vehicle.
Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a
place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative.
It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carriers premises, to be determined from the
circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping
the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus
conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of
said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists.
Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the
contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the
alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming
arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held
liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only
question raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of
P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.

G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957.]

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA,OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVAVDA. DE BATACLAN
,
plaintiffs-appellants
,
vs
. MARIANO MEDINA
,
defendant-appellant
.
DOCTRINE:
PROXIMATE CAUSE:
That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficientintervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
( see below forlong version )
o
When through the negligence of the driver a vehicle turn turtles and causes injuries to its
passengers
and then subsequently the bus catches fire, the drivers negligence may still be considered
the
proximate cause of the consequences of that fire.
COMMON CARRIER:
Medina Transportation (owned by: Mariano Medina, defendant )
PROBLEM:
Due to the negligence of the driver a bus flips out of control. Soon after it catches fire
killing thehusband (and father) of plaintiffs.
Who WON:
Salud Bataclan and minor children (plaintiffs)
ERFACTS:
Shortly after midnight, Juan Bataclan (deceased) was on a bus owned by Medina
Transportation (ownedby: Mariano Medina, defendant ) travelling from Cavite to Pasay.
While on its way, the driver of the bus wasspeeding through and when he applied the

brakes ( after the tires burst) it cause the bus to be overturned. Thedriver, the
conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except
Bataclan(deceased) and 3 others. The 4 stranded passengers called for help. Help arrived
soon thereafter and as it wasdark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and
the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers ofthe fact that gasoline has spilled
from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus therebykilling the 4
passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were
old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of thetorches which ignited the gasoline (or was it
the fires?)
.
HELD:
The drivers negligence was the proximate cause
. The proximate cause was the overturning of the buswhich was caused by the negligence
of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised byMedina to change
the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The
torchescarried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
villagers to respond to the callfor help from the passengers and since it is a rural area
which did not have flashlights, torches are the naturalsource of lighting. Further, the
smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductorfailed to
provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
FULL CASE
The trip:

When:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952,
Vehicle :
bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant
Mariano Medina,under a certificate of public convenience, divern by Conrado Saylon
Route:
left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City
Passengers (18):
Including Driver and ConductorJuan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver,
Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan,another passenger apparently from the
Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,apparently not knowing his name,

seated on the left side of the driver, anda woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just
behind the four last mentioned.
The Incident :Tires burst, Bus flips, some passengers escape leaving 4 behind
.At about 2 :00 AM, One of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditchon the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to
be helped orpulled out,while the 4 passengers could not get out:
trivia alert:
these first 3 were seated beside the driver)Bataclan,Lara, the Visayan and Natalia
Villanueva (was seated behind the 3)passengers that escape bring back help BUT
, one with a TORCH accidentally ignites some gas andtorches the bus killing the 4.
Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard shouts for help
fromBataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus.There, is nothing in
the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already freefrom the wreck, including
the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull outor extricate and rescue the
four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls orshouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch

(trivia alert: the torch was made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum.)

These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, afierce
fire started, burning the bus and the 4 inside.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak on theside of the
chassis, permeating the body of the bus and the ground underand around it.

The touch had lit it.

Wife and minor children file suit; they win with lower courts
That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside the bus were
removed and dulyidentified, specially that of Juan Bataclan.By reason of his death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, broughtthe
present suit

to recover from Mariano Medina

compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees

amount of P87,150.
Court of First Instance of Cavite found for Salud (plaintiff),
o
(trivia alert : the CFI awarded not only damaged (1k php) and atty fees (600 php) but also
forthe value of merchandise (100 php)

the SC will later on increase this to 6k+800+100)

The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter court endorsedthe appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of thetorches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD:Doctrines/ Codal we already know"ART. 1733
. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons ofpublic policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods andfor the safety
of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of eachcase. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed inarticles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety ofthe passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."
"ART. 1755.
A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as humancare and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
dueregard for all the circumstances."
"ART. 1756
.In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumedto have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observedextraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"ART. 1759.
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengersthrough the
negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees mayhave
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
commoncarriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised allthe diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees."
"ART. 1763.
A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger onaccount of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the commoncarrier's

employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
haveprevented or stopped the act or omission."
Evidence of negligence : testimony of speeding + air time of bus
Witnesses testified :

at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding

from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturnedafter zig-zagging, there was a
(trivia alert)
distance of about 150 meters.
o
This was due to the velocity of the bus at the time (causing it to tumble so far)
TOPIC doctrines
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The
only question is to whatdegree
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals (17 SCRA 739)
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca
bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the
father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus
to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel.
While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage,
the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run
over and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca
liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when
the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage
terminated.
1.Relation of passenger and
carrier subsisting when accident occurred
Although it is true that Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child)had
alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it
was alsoestablished that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to

get one of his bags orbayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no
controversy that as far as the father isconcerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was
not unloaded, the relation of passenger andcarrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting.
For, the relation of carrier and passenger does notnecessarily cease where the latter, after alighting
from the car, aids the carriers servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
2.Relation of carrier and passenger does not cease until the passenger
h a s r e a s o n a b l e t i m e o r opportunity to leave the carriers premises
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights
from thecarriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until
the passengerhas had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises.
3.Reasonable time determined from circumstances
What is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within the rule is to be determined from all
thecircumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is
consideredstill a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding
by the usual wayto leave the companys premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that
his brother, a fellowpassenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of
engaging in the difficulty, returns torelieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the
railroad and company and its agents.
4.Utmost diligence of very cautious person not observed
In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier s agent had exercised t
h e u t m o s t diligence of a very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by acommon carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport
safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not
put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the buseven before the bus conductor gave him the signal to
go and while the latter was still unloading part of thebaggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was notunreasonable and they are, therefore,
to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract
of carriage.
Transportation Law, 2004 ( 257 )
Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
5.Alternative causes of action (Section 2, Rule 8); Carrier
m a y b e a l s o b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r negligence of its driver
Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can be
heldliable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the
CivilCode. Paragraph 7 of the complaint is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this
averment forquasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of
carriage, is permissible underSection 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows
a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to
the end that the real matter in controversy may beresolved and determined.
6.Culpa sufficiently alleged; Presumption of negligence not overcome
by defendant
The Beltrans sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated whenit
was alleged in the complaint that the death of Raquel Beltran was caused by the negligence and want
ofexercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of La Mallorca and
their agent. Thisallegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even
before receiving theproper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running
board of the bus and nearit, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of
its employee gave rise to thepresumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father

of the family in the selectionand supervision of its employees. And this presumption, La Mallorca had
failed to overcome. Consequently,La Mallorca must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for the death of
the child Raquel Beltran.
7.Increase of award of damages cannot be sustained
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court
o f Ap p e a l s , however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and
consider questions orissues raised and argued in appellants brief. Herein, the Beltrans did not
appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them only P3,000.00 damages
for the death of their daughter. Neitherdoes it appear that the Beltrans have pointed out in their
brief the inadequacy of the award, or that theinclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a
clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.