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G.R. No.

161107

March 12, 2013

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as


City Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST
A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the
City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as
City
Engineer
of
Marikina
City, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S
ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
December 1, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75691.
The Facts
Respondents St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St.
Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are
educational institutions organized under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business
addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West
Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.2
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land
measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSAMarikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order,
the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house
for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago.
Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities,
and other improvements.3
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of
Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No.
192,4 entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and
Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998,
Ordinance Nos. 2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend
Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE
Series of 1994

No.

192

ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF


FENCES AND WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative
body of the municipality to "x x x Prescribe reasonable limits
and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, x x x";
WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its
economic and physical development, coupled with urbanization
and modernization, makes imperative the adoption of an
ordinance which shall embody up-to-date and modern
technical design in the construction of fences of residential,
commercial and industrial buildings;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known
as the National Building Code of the Philippines, does not
adequately provide technical guidelines for the construction of
fences, in terms of design, construction, and criteria;

WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall


provide more efficient and effective enforcement of laws on
public safety and security;
WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that
high fences or walls did not actually discourage but, in fact,
even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements
from the view of outsiders once they have gained ingress into
these walls, hence, fences not necessarily providing security,
but becomes itself a "security problem";
WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts earlier enumerated,
and as guardian of the people of Marikina, the municipal
government seeks to enact and implement rules and
ordinances to protect and promote the health, safety and
morals of its constituents;
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green
Program" of the government, lowering of fences and walls shall
encourage people to plant more trees and ornamental plants in
their yards, and when visible, such trees and ornamental plants
are expected to create an aura of a clean, green and beautiful
environment for Marikeos;
WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people
planted on sidewalks to "beautify" the faade of their
residences but, however, become hazards and obstructions to
pedestrians;
WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered "unneighborly" preventing community members to easily
communicate and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-in"
mentality among the populace;
WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and
comments on this proposal, and as a requirement of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the Sangguniang
Bayan of Marikina invited presidents or officers of homeowners
associations, and commercial and industrial establishments in
Marikina to two public hearings held on July 28, 1994 and
August 25, 1994;
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed
ordinance were fully presented to the attendees and no
vehement objection was presented to the municipal
government;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
SANGGUINANG BAYAN OF MARIKINA IN SESSION DULY
ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the
construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots classified or
used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special
purposes.
Section 2. Definition of Terms:
a. Front Yard refers to the area of the lot fronting a
street, alley or public thoroughfare.
b. Back Yard the part of the lot at the rear of the
structure constructed therein.
c. Open fence type of fence which allows a view of
"thru-see" of the inner yard and the improvements
therein. (Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice,
cyclone wire)
d. Front gate refers to the gate which serves as a
passage of persons or vehicles fronting a street, alley,
or public thoroughfare.

Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed


under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than
one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1)
meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty
percent (80%) see-thru; and
(2) Fences on the side and back yard shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. 1096 otherwise
known as the National Building Code.
Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas
specifically reserved or classified as parks.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the
five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front
monument line and the building line of commercial and
industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions.7
Section 6. Exemption.
(1) The Ordinance does not cover perimeter walls of
residential subdivisions.
(2) When public safety or public welfare requires, the
Sangguniang Bayan may allow the construction
and/or maintenance of walls higher than as
prescribed herein and shall issue a special permit or
exemption.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose
existing fences and walls do not conform to the specifications
herein are allowed adequate period of time from the passage
of this Ordinance within which to conform, as follows:
(1) Residential houses eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments five (5) years

On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter


to the respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the
fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and,
at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to
provide parking space for vehicles to park.9 On April 26, 2000,
the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply
with the directive.10 In response, the petitioners, through then
City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of
the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition
with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court,
Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC), docketed as SCA Case No. 2000381-MK.11
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in
excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting
that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. That demolishing their fence and constructing it
six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at least 1,808.34
square meters, worth aboutP9,041,700.00, along West Drive,
and
at
least
1,954.02
square
meters,
worth
roughly P9,770,100.00, along East Drive. It would also result in
the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric
house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards room, guards
post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students,
Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall,
resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The
respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the
ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law; and that
the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their property
through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of
the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not
exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as
sufficient protection for many years.12
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of
which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of
public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.13

(3) Industrial establishments three (3) years


(4) Educational institutions five (5) years 8 (public
and privately owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the
provisions of this Ordinance shall be demolished by the
municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot or
structure.
Section 9. The Municipal Engineering Office is tasked to strictly
implement this ordinance, including the issuance of the
necessary implementing guidelines, issuance of building and
fencing permits, and demolition of non-conforming walls at the
lapse of the grace period herein provided.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. All existing Ordinances and
Resolutions, Rules and Regulations inconsistent with the
foregoing provisions are hereby repealed, amended or
modified.
Section 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons,
local executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof in
conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed and/or
modified accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity. This ordinance takes effect after
publication.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
(Emphases supplied)

On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary


injunction, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the
demolition of the fence at SSCs Marikina property.14
Ruling of the RTC
On the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision, 15 dated October
2, 2002, granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a
writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently
desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on
the respondents property.
The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the
petitioners to demolish the fence at the SSC property in
Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount to
an appropriation of property which could only be done through
the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the petitioners
could not take the respondents property under the guise of
police power to evade the payment of just compensation.
It did not give weight to the petitioners contention that the
parking space was for the benefit of the students and patrons
of SSA-Marikina, considering that the respondents were
already providing for sufficient parking in compliance with the
standards under Rule XIX of the National Building Code.
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement could
run counter to the respondents right to privacy, considering
that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine
sisters, who were entitled to some sense of privacy in their
affairs. It also found that the respondents were able to prove

that the danger to security had no basis in their case.


Moreover, it held that the purpose of beautification could not be
used to justify the exercise of police power.
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, provided for retroactive application. It held, however,
that such retroactive effect should not impair the respondents
vested substantive rights over the perimeter walls, the sixmeter strips of land along the walls, and the building,
structures, facilities, and improvements, which would be
destroyed by the demolition of the walls and the seizure of the
strips of land.
The RTC also found untenable the petitioners argument that
Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or curative statute intended
to correct the defects of buildings and structures, which were
brought about by the absence or insufficiency of laws. It ruled
that the assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor curative
in nature, considering that at the time the respondents
perimeter wall was built, the same was valid and legal, and the
ordinance did not refer to any previous legislation that it sought
to correct.
The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to
expropriate the subject property through eminent domain.
The RTC, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance
No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on petitioners property
in question located at Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the CA
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the
petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance
No. 192 did not justify the exercise of police power, as it did not
only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the
respondents property without due process of law. The
respondents were bound to lose an unquantifiable sense of
security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a total of
3,762.36 square meters of property. It, thus, ruled that the
assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it clearly
invaded the personal and property rights of the respondents
and "[f]or being unreasonable, and undue restraint of trade."17

In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a


curative statute, the CA found that the petitioner failed to point
out any irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of the National
Building Code that required correction or cure. It noted that any
correction in the Code should be properly undertaken by the
Congress and not by the City Council of Marikina through an
ordinance.
The CA, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the instant
appeal is DENIED.1wphi1 The October 2, 2002 Decision and
the January 13, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marikina City, Branch 273, granting petitioners-appellees
petition for Prohibition in SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now
before this Court presenting the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY
ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE
OF THE CITY OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CITY VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN
IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF
1994; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.19
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed
ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback requirement is,
as held by the lower courts, invalid.20 Nonetheless, the
petitioners argue that such invalidity was subsequently cured
by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, series of 2000. They also
contend that Section 3, relating to the 80% see-thru fence
requirement, must be complied with, as it remains to be valid.
Ruling of the Court

It noted that although the petitioners complied with procedural


due process in enacting Ordinance No. 192, they failed to
comply with substantive due process. Hence, the failure of the
respondents to attend the public hearings in order to raise
objections did not amount to a waiver of their right to question
the validity of the ordinance.
The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter
setback provision for parking was a legal easement, the use
and ownership of which would remain with, and inure to, the
benefit of the respondents for whom the easement was
primarily intended. It found that the real intent of the setback
provision was to make the parking space free for use by the
public, considering that such would cease to be for the
exclusive use of the school and its students as it would be
situated outside school premises and beyond the school
administrations control.

The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1


and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power
by the City Government of Marikina.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people."21 The State, through the legislature, has delegated
the exercise of police power to local government units, as
agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is
embodied in Section 1622 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare
Clause,23 which has two branches. "The first, known as the
general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to
enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law,
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes

the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and


proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property."24
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the test
of a valid ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.26
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina
in the apparent exercise of its police power. To successfully
invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court
the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly
in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational
basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.27
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test,
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not
being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys purpose.
More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass
the following requisites as discussed in Social Justice Society
(SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:28
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.29
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.30
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the
issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1)
meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be an
open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the


five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front
monument line and the building line of commercial and
industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from
requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2)
build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% seethru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to
provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires
the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking
area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the
parking area to be created would remain with the respondents
as it would primarily be for the use of its students and faculty,
and that its use by the public on non-school days would only
be incidental. In their Reply, however, the petitioners admitted
that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being repugnant to the
Constitution.31
The Court agrees with the latter position.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the
setback requirement was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the
exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available
for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of
title nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In
fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine
whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or
amounts to a compensable taking.32 The Court is of the view
that the implementation of the setback requirement would be
tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of
the respondents private property for public use without just
compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful
acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a
parking area has no logical connection to, and is not
reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback
requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.33 The
Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive
as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial
use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly,
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5
was properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, 34 Series of
2000, which classified the respondents property to be within
an institutional zone, under which a five-meter setback has
been required.
The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of
2000, has no bearing to the case at hand.
The Court notes with displeasure that this argument was only
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court in the
petitioners Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was

enacted on December 20, 2000, the petitioners could very well


have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002. The
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change the
legal theory of this case under which the controversy was
heard and decided in the trial court. It should be the same
theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought
to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily
considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. This will be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.35
Furthermore, the two ordinances have completely different
purposes and subjects. Ordinance No. 192 aims to regulate
the construction of fences, while Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning
ordinance which classifies the city into specific land uses. In
fact, the five-meter setback required by Ordinance No. 303
does not even appear to be for the purpose of providing a
parking area.
By no stretch of the imagination, therefore, can Ordinance No.
303, "cure" Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192.
In any case, the clear subject of the petition for prohibition filed
by the respondents is Ordinance No. 192 and, as such, the
precise issue to be determined is whether the petitioners can
be prohibited from enforcing the said ordinance, and no other,
against the respondents.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences to
one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at
least 80% see-thru, should remain valid and enforceable
against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the
petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.36
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage,
suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful
acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the
prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The
means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is
unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not
adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this
Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better
protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It
may even be argued that such exposed premises could entice
and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a seethru fence would be easier to bypass and breach. It also
appears that the respondents concrete wall has served as
more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as
previously discussed, the State may not, under the guise of
police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the
aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court
cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in
accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their property.

It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via


a see-thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering
that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been
considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution
that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to
privacy is essentially the right to be let alone,37 as
governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of its citizens.38 It is inherent in the
concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in
Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.39
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an
undue interference with the respondents rights to property and
privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid
and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
No Retroactivity
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192
by including the regulation of educational institutions which
was unintentionally omitted, and giving said educational
institutions five (5) years from the passage of Ordinance No.
192 (and not Ordinance No. 217) to conform to its
provisions.40 The petitioners argued that the amendment could
be retroactively applied because the assailed ordinance is a
curative statute which is retroactive in nature.
Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192
cannot be enforced against the respondents, it is no longer
necessary to rule on the issue of retroactivity. The Court shall,
nevertheless, pass upon the issue for the sake of clarity.
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or
to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for
want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb
certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into
effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed
of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid.
Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have
been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very
essence, are retroactive."41
The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192 is a curative
statute as it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National
Building Code, namely, its failure to provide for adequate
guidelines for the construction of fences. They ultimately seek
to remedy an insufficiency in the law. In aiming to cure this
insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking provisions
to the National Building Code. This is not what is contemplated
by curative statutes, which intend to correct irregularities or
invalidity in the law. The petitioners fail to point out any
irregular or invalid provision. As such, the assailed ordinance
cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency in the National
Building Code with respect to parking provisions in relation to
the issue of the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of
the Rules and Regulations of the said code requires an
educational institution to provide one parking slot for every ten
classrooms. As found by the lower courts, the respondents
provide a total of 76 parking slots for their 80 classrooms and,
thus, had more than sufficiently complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative
statute which may be applied retroactively.
Separability

Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are,


thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is
void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced."42 Thus, the other
sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid and
enforceable.
Conclusion
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that
the petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in
enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA
was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the
writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist
from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on
the respondents' property in Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in SCA Case No. 2000381-MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections
3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended,
on the petitioners' property in question located in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191805

April 16, 2013

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF


AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ,
NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO
G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL.
REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT.
COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN
and VINCENT CALLAGAN,Respondents.
x-----------------------x

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial


Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review
in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent
Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate
action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within
their respective legal competence, that may have been
incurred by respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig.
Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to
submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of
six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their
respective posts, the directives mandated in this Decision and
in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent
officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with
the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court was
convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient
evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division of the military abducted petitioner
Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured
him until 17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the
Ombudsman to take further action, Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio Morales sent this Court a letter dated 23 May 2012,
requesting an additional two-month period, or until 24 July
2012, within which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated
that Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his family refused to
cooperate with the investigation for security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration,1 arguing that the soldiers belonging to the
17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military
cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction and
torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on the
claim that respondents were never specifically mentioned by
name as having performed, permitted, condoned, authorized,
or allowed the commission of any act or incurrence omission
which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to life,
liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his family.2

G.R. No. 193160


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE
VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E.
MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and
VICENTE
A.
CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court promulgated its Decision in
the present case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman submitted the


Investigation Report, as compliance with the Courts directive
to take appropriate action with respect to possible liabilities
respondents may have incurred. The exhaustive report
detailed the steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO)
of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal,
civil, or administrative liabilities may be imputed to the
respondents. It was reflected therein that the lawyers for the
Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the latter are
hesitant to appear before them for security reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides
legal assistance to victims of human rights violations and their
families) could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this writing,
the Rodriguezes refused to participate in the present factfinding investigation for security reasons. Atty. Yambot
disclosed (through a Manifestation dated March 30, 2012 that
despite efforts to convince Noriel to participate in the present

proceedings, the latter remains unconvinced and unwilling to


this date.
Recent information, however, revealed that Noriel and his
family are no longer interested in participating in the present
case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a conference under
oath, SPO1 Robert B. Molina submitted an Affidavit dated June
13, 2012 stating that on September 15, 2009, at around 11:00
oclock in the morning, Wilma H. Rodriguez appeared before
the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter into the
blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in Sitio
Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered
information relative to Wilmas report "but the community
residence failed to reveal anything".3
The other accounts specifically that of respondent Antonino
C. Cruz, Special Investigator II of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of respondents Mina and
De Vera that they had disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had
become an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion have
been thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in our Decision. The
OMB further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be asked to
verify the circumstances under which he executed these
subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally be
settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who can attest on
whether detention and torture were indeed committed by any
of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez himself, the
supposed victim."4

Respondents claim that they were not competently identified


as the soldiers who abducted and detained the petitioner, or
that there was no mention of their names in the documentary
evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguezs
Sinumpaang Salaysay7 as a meticulous and straightforward
account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the
manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account
of his suspected membership in the NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he
noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who appeared
to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as
"sir."9 He saw Matutina again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September
2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation in
the mountains. His narration of his suffering included an
exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal
circumstances, and perceived observations. He likewise
positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col.
Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture.10 These facts were further corroborated by Hermie
Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,11 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victims capture.
Respondents main contention in their Return of the Writ was
correctly deemed illogical and contradictory by the CA. They
claim that Rodriguez had complained of physical ailments due
to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet nevertheless signified his
desire to become a double-agent for the military. The CA
stated:

The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or


participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security
reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the
CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the
existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may
be imputed to the respondents is not the province of amparo
proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and
curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks
the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.5 In this case then, the thrust of
ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to
life, liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains.

In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged


that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl. Navarro,
that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become
an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the
CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state
that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military
and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get
information regarding the movement directly from the source. If
petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to
become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would
agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside
soldiers in the mountains or the wilderness he dreads to
locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.12 (Emphasis
supplied.)

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

Respondents conveniently neglect to address the findings of


both the CA and this Court that aside from the abduction of
Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had
violated and threatened the formers right to security when they
made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of
his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far
as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung on
the wall of the house, and the innermost portions of the
house.13 There is no reasonable justification for this violation of
the right to privacy and security of petitioners abode, which
strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, respondents also neglect to
address our ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and effective
investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to
Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty, and security.14

The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that


requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As
explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
even administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of
the writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in
Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. 6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the
privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present motion for
reconsideration raises no new issues that would convince us
otherwise.

The writs curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation


of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not only
by a public officials act, but also by his omission.
Accountability may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.15 The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as
a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.16
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT.
Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina

conducted a perfunctory investigation which relied solely on


the accounts of the military. Thus, the CA correctly held that the
investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely
on the report prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts
were undertaken to solicit petitioners version of the incident,
and no witnesses were questioned regarding it.17 The CA also
took into account the palpable lack of effort from respondent
Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. Let a copy
of this Resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for whatever
appropriate action she may still take under circumstances.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179736

June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA


vs.
ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY,
SR.
CHOACHUY, Respondents.

HING, Petitioners,
and

ALLAN

petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the


video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that
they did not install the video surveillance cameras, 16 nor did
they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners
of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the
application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining
Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the
filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court
sets at P50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue
against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove
the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their
building overlooking the side of petitioners lot and to transfer
and operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners
property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 23 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

DECISION

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC


denied the same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not


likewise compel respect for one's personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference
demands respect."1

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby


DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the


Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3and the
September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application
for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Factual Antecedents
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a
Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for
issuance
of
a
Writ
of
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as
Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a
parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of
Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901
and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo
Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed
a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners
were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is
adjacent to petitioners property;9 that the court, in that case,
denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to
support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally
set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners
property;11 that respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners on-going construction;12 and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.13 Thus,

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision 26 granting the


Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated
since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the
owners of the building, they could not have installed video
surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo,
which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not
the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this
case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and
February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN


IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC
DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006
HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT
THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE
PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING,
THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS
ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO
SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A
PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE
CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF
BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE
COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a
violation of petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this


case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our
laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the
right to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and
protects them against the States abuse of power. In this
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be
secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in
case of overriding social need and then only under the
stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the
privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
against abuses that may be committed against him by other
individuals. It states:

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction because respondents installation of a
stationary camera directly facing petitioners property and a
revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same
property constitutes a violation of petitioners right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which
enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of
others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of
anothers residence, petitioners opine that it includes business
offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners property is used for
business, it is still covered by the said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in
this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one
and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind
Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are
not the real owners of the building, where the video
surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no
business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the
court.39
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that
petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the
property involved is not used as a residence. 40 Respondents
maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the
video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo,
the registered owner of the building, 41 as additional security for

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,


privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle,
where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted
by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the
consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law
expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence." This does not mean, however, that only
the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers
also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same
privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x
x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as
it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the

privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places,


locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA,
therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.

indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA


erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.

The
"reasonable
privacy"
test
is
whether
there
is
a
to privacy.

A
real
party
defendant
is
one
who
has
a
correlative
legal
obligation
to
redress
a
wrong
done
to
the
plaintiff
by
reason
of
the
defendant's
act
or
omission
which
had
violated
the
legal
right
of
the
former.

expectation
of
used
to
determine
violation
of
the
right

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to


privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.
This test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends
on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case
basis since it depends on the factual circumstances
surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should
not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence
or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200
or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for
Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the
application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on
their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who
are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only
focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the
back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually
spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving
camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion
of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents
in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and
factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards
their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be
made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners
would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as
a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property
or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent,
is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not
belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the
case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave
abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are


the proper parties to this suit.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal
right of the former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA
reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could
not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such
reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents
are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of
the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for
evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another
case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately
broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and
thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and
eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy
family concerning the boundaries of their respective
properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we
believe that respondents are the proper parties to be
impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate
and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a
family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding
their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the
court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular
inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge
Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video
surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for
reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the
RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would
suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion
that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo
as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the
foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to
this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision


dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated
October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. 107383

February 20, 1996

CECILIA
ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use
in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives
were
enjoined
from
"using
or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers
in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in
question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and
that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without
his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in
Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of
respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney,

Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross


misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead
of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty.
Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr.
committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint
against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with
merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of


respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal
separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional
Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the
genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent
to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him
in the legal separation case pending in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru
his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath, Such
verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and,
therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission
and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By
no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was
acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the
time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the
order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court.
The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective
again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible


in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only

exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a


"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC.
ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution
dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition
for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and
Roberto Rafael Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their detained
clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG
James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen.
Cabuay"), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of the
detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen.
Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are
respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and
National Security Adviser, because they have command
responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led
by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of

the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an


upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of
Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the
explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn
over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian
authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the
Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an
Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27
July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors
accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment
Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes
IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the
Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major
Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain
under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court
issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require
respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18
August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c)
refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLEamong the
Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision
thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court
within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12
August 2003 directing respondents to make a return of the writ
and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees
before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing
and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court,
respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to
the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of
Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed
their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court
considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate
court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to
uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with
Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate
court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made
in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to
exercise for two hours a day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals


The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already
charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality
of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also
be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if
there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the
appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to
have been violated in this case do not directly affect the
detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation
of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is
reasonable under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and
reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right
to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to
illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas
corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered
Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to
uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to
exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby
ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the
constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the
Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting
hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2)
hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND
REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE
LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED
JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order
granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus
argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any
question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August
2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the Court of
Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers
detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the
Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the
Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the
detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual
before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the
petition.6 The respondent must produce the person and explain

the cause of his detention. 7 However, this order is not a ruling


on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of
Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of
the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas
corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety
of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the
detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the
Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable.
After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of
their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees
complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person.8 The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release
of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas
corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. 10 Neither can
it substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to
circumstances where there is deprivation of a persons
constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional
right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the
writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed
and such sentence is void as to the excess. 13 Whatever
situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high.
The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void
the entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the
detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful
indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses.
What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen.
Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners
as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time
of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438
("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it
difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before
the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP
officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual
punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees
from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP
officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement.16 However, the fact that the detainees are
confined makes their rights more limited than those of the
public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and
the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power
of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable

measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his


escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer,
any member of the immediate family of a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from
visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from examining
and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4)
years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any
security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee
or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a
lawyer from visiting a detainee client "at any hour of the day or,
in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last paragraph of
the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that
"notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the
detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a
clear standard. The regulations governing a detainees
confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his
safety and prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be
reasonably connected to the governments objective of
securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee.
The law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake
such reasonable measures" or regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the
detainees right to effective representation when petitioners
visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners
assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to
be released from detention.
Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of
visiting hours does not render void the detainees indictment for
criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release
from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely
regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the
regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to
secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases
are instructive on the standards to determine whether
regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
held that regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining
security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose.
Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and
purposeless.19 However, Bell
v.
Wolfish expressly
discouraged courts from skeptically questioning challenged
restrictions in detention and prison facilities. 20 The U.S.
Supreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators
"wide-ranging deference" in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA
7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention
centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his
escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to
the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they
want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face

meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that


there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel.
Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The
visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours
when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices.
Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of
reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could
always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with
their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the
detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined
by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate
and the Feliciano Commission,22 petitioners were given time to
confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves
admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right
to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees
from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their
cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive
punishment. This argument fails to impress us.Bell v.
Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished
prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to
live comfortably.24The fact that the restrictions inherent in
detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably
does not convert those restrictions into punishment. 25 It is
when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts
will infer intent to punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to punish
even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the
alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in
relation to that purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required to
use the least restrictive security measure.28 They must only
refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive
to the purpose it serves.29
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert,
and respondents concede, that the "essential objective of
pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at
trial." While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original
decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not
accept respondents argument that the Governments interest
in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective
that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is
lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government could
confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the
extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest
would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of
detention." The Government also has legitimate interests that
stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require
administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly
speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at
trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps
to maintain security and order at the institution and make
certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints
that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and
are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced
had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate
governmental interests that may justify conditions or
restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to
recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees presence
at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once
the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention
and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as
punishment.30

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action


causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2)
the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. 31 Punishment

also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater


than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish,
upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice
was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of
innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to
detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for
serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal
conviction.34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to
hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes. 35 Contact
visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in
weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on
contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they
could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and
weapons.37 The security consideration in the imposition of
blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the
sentiments of the detainees.38
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits
bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal
security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine
enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint,
based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction
over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise.40
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the
separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars,
which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars
separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual,
verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their
visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is
not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block
v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to
valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security
within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to
fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another.
The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and
crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and
ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention,
and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman,
degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate
cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees
are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals
noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to
the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails,
which are congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals
found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that
the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility.
Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army
("NPA") member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are
detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of
the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the
petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were
not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were
no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners
contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a
citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor
General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the
letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to
open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted
prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the
prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes.41 Even in the
absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from
opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based

on the principle of "civil deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to


have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The
only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right
of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the
communications between the inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys,
courts, and court officials received respect.44 The confidential
correspondences could not be censored.45 The infringement of
such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the
inmates First Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right to
consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not
abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the
administration of the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small
that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison
security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the
privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial
detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono49 recognized
that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a
limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pretrial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and
counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be
inspected for contraband and read in certain instances,
outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or
read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving
convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison
officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming
mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could
not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S.
Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open
and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been
considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The
prison regulation under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming
and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no
exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail
from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they may open all
letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of
the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether
letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be
opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or
whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal
detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a
communication was from an attorney before opening it for
inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be
imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require
any such communications to be specially marked as originating
from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if
they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly be
permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer
desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and
his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters
marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to
the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this
could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not
be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the
inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the
mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters,
even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison
officials opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of
Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate
circumstances. Since a flexible test, besides being
unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of
the possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent,
we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the
inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have
done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution
requires.51

In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an


inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell.
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily
lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many
significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some
cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system." The
curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter,
to accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and
objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is internal
security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice,
deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to
correction.53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer,
abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction
as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v.
Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United
States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the
furtherance of a substantial government interest such as
security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the
mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v.
Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual
surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure
institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that
society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest
in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our
society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are
inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial
detainee and a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in
the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose
an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v.
Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial
may in many cases be individuals who are charged with
serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore
pose a greater risk of escape than convicted
inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is
impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial
detainees non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail
security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an
envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. 58 A pretrial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his
incoming mail.59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of
inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can
open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read
the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond
with his lawyer.60 The inspection of privileged mail is limited to
physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the
opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present
case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication.
The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of
the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP

Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are


marked confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters
but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude
on a citizens privacy rights62 is a guarantee that is available
only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained
or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject
to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in
lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison
facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights
of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance
the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns
of prison administrators."63 The deferential review of such
regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their
ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused
of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime
punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident
involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk
persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give
the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The military custodian is in a better position to know the
security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together
with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of
detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts
for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in
detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional
rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected
to
arbitrary
and
inhumane
conditions.
However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.67The writ of habeas corpus will only
lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167798

April 19, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF


LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR
T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M.
TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT
OF
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

BUDGET

and

x-----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 167930

April 19, 2006

BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO,


TEODORO A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA
WOMENS PARTY Representative LIZA L. MAZA,
ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL V. MARIANO and
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, Rep.
EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III,
DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M.
REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of
KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND
GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM,
WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN
of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,
SHARON R. DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L.
FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR
RELIGIOUS
SUPERIORS
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
(AMRSP), Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of the
NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(NEDA) and the Administrator of the NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO
420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13
April 2005, reads:
REQUIRING
ALL
GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES
AND
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
AND
CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE
THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this
Administration;

virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the


following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose
identification (ID) system for government.1avvphil.net All
government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the
following objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial
burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the
maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those
transacting business with the government and those
availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the
wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this
executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of
government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and
effective government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID
cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this
executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system
The data to be collected and recorded by the participating
agencies shall be limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in


government have created unnecessary and costly
redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it
inconvenient for individuals to be holding several identification
cards;

Marital Status

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate


the processes and issuance of identification cards in
government to reduce costs and to provide greater
convenience for those transacting business with government;

Weight

WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private


businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of governmentissued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent
violations of laws involving false names and identities.
NOW,
THEREFORE,
I,
GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by

Names of Parents
Height

Two index fingers and two thumbmarks


Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and
others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the
participating agency and a common reference number shall
form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the
first five items listed above, including the print of the right

thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored,


shall appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual
verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, to Harmonize All
Government Identification Systems. The Director-General,
National Economic Development Authority, is hereby
authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID
systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the DirectorGeneral, National Economic and Development Authority.
In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the
Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this executive order a unified government ID system
containing only such data and features, as indicated
in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of
the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments,
through their respective leagues of governors or
mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
and with other branches or instrumentalities of the
government, for the purpose of ensuring governmentwide adoption of and support to this effort to
streamline the ID systems in government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution,
or create subcommittees or technical working
groups, to provide such assistance as may be
necessary or required for the effective performance of
its functions; and

participating agency issuing the identification card


shall prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended
by the Department of Budget and Management shall be
provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or
issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with this
executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of
Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government.
Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens
right to privacy.1
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void
based on the following grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards
and violates the decision of this Honorable Court
inOple v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23,
1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the
Social Security Act of 1997.

d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be


necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this
executive order.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of


Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use
public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.

Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National


Economic and Development Authority, and the pertinent
agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and
adequate to ensure that the right to privacy of an individual
takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such
safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the


right to privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential
data without the owners consent.

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be


used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3
of this executive order;

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate


safeguards or penalties for any violation of
its provisions.

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of


other data in violation of a persons right to privacy
shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will


legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the


identification system shall be instituted;

4. Granting without conceding that the President may


issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued
without public hearing.

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be


kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal
or written authorization of the Owner shall be required
for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be
protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology; and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification
card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the

5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on


equal protection of laws and results in the
discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those
without ID.2
Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners
claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on
the citizens right to privacy.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the


ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are
bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised
under the circumstances of paramount public concern or of
transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also
present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination
because all government entities currently issuing identification
cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners
claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes
cognizance of the petitions.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. All government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be
covered by this executive order." EO 420 applies only to
government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples
of
these
government
entities
are
the
GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayors
Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and
similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to
"adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions
under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420
enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and
format, namely:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial
burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the
maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those
transacting business with the government and those
availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the
wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this
executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of
government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and
effective government service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID
format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability,
insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people
served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and
recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items,
namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5)
Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital
Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two
index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax
Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for
personal identification by government entities, and even by the
private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers
license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably


more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420
will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in
the ID databases of the government entities. Government
entities cannot collect or record data, for identification
purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and
record data for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly
by the nature of the functions of these government entities.
Under their existing ID systems, some government entities
collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At
present, the data collected and recorded by government
entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court, 9 the IDs that the Court
issues to all its employees, including the Justices, contain 15
specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4)
Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8)
Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy
Number; (14) Name and Address of Person to be Notified in
Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the
picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the
employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420
requires only "the first five items listed" in Section 3, plus the
fingerprint, agency number and the common reference
number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the
Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed
uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature
of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more
financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government
entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will
admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are
savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the userfriendliness of a single ID format for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually
limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific
items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that
these government entities can individually adopt the ID format
as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly
within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the
government entities that are already authorized under existing
laws to issue IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they
can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the
exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative
order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the
President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,

reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The


Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the
COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to
issue voters ID cards. 10 This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to
establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches
of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws
mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services.11The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to promulgate. The President has not usurped
legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of
Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of
control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also
compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or
repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities
under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary
personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require
legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their
employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID
cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations
issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID
cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as
an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards,
although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are
voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an
employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of
an ID card system requires a special appropriation because
there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether
they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data
beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special
appropriation because the existing ID card systems of
government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper
appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens.
EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and
recording of personal data while safeguarding the
confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and
recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420


does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420
applies only to government entities that under existing laws are
already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their
governmental functions. Every government entity that presently
issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own
name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only
the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the
fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference
number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure
integrity and reliability of identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under
the Executive department should undertake cost savings,
achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of
equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service to
the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards
are day-to-day functions of many government entities under
existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its own ID system
for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts.
The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the
appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan
and Court of Tax Appeals.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems
of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for
government entities under the Executive department. If
government entities under the Executive department decide to
unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance
systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and
convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any
legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not
constitute usurpation of legislative power.
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other
government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
performance of their governmental functions. There have been
no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these
government entities violate their right to privacy. There have
also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities
in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID
systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their
right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they
even have less basis to complain against the unified ID system
under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID
system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data,
and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The
data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420
will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than
under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in
determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected
and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government
entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data
mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific
data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID
shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to
government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection,
recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to
protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420,
the following safeguards are instituted:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be
used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3
of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of


other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be
allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
identification system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be
kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal
or written authorization of the Owner shall be required
for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be
protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology;

in a central database information on citizens gathered from


public records across the country. In fact, the law authorized
the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints
and other criminal identification records nationwide. The law
also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such
information with "officials of States, cities and other
institutions." The Department of Justice treated such
information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the
Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four
members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of
Information Act expressly exempts release of information that
would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"
and the information demanded falls under that category of
exempt information.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it


even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded
and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government
entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect
the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior
ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card,


the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are
treated as "strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420.
These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal
matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants
the "right of the people to information on matters of public
concern." Personal matters are exempt or outside the
coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of
public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under
EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public
concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the
press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not
collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID


systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries
have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies
such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have
national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have
sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. 12 Even
with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries
that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other
specific purposes.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the


constitutional protection for control over information. In
Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New
York law that required doctors to furnish the government
reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs
that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a
central computerized database containing the names and
addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the
prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the
database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals
who want to keep their personal matters confidential. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS,


SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and
efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws.
Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses
arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the
LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable
ID system.

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to


hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public
health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical
practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on
the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having responsibility for the health
of the community does not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the


right to privacy, namely, Griswold v. Connecticut, 13U.S. Justice
Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press,14 and Whalen v. Roe.15 The last two decisions actually
support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to
the present case.

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure


to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required
for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are
far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific
data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems,
unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical
records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen,
therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to
privacy.

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification


card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card
shall prescribe.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional


a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of
contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow
the police entry into the bedrooms of married couples.
Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the police
to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship." Because the facts and the issue involved in
Griswold are materially different from the present case,
Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the
State could collect and store information on individuals from
public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold
such information from the press. The premise of the issue in
U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated


Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,16 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law
that required doctors performing abortions to fill up forms,
maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of
such records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that "recordkeeping and reporting requirements
that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health and that properly respect a patients confidentiality and
privacy are permissible."
Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,17 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required

doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the


government that included the doctors name, the womans age,
the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman
had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of
the fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of statefunded institutions, the law made such information publicly
available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "The
collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital
element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the
requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion
more difficult."
Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that
the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld in Whalen, Danforth and
Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure
requirements under EO 420 are far benign and cannot
therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420
requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID
purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate
anyone.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right
to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere
facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws
the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres 18 is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and
devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that
the subject matter required legislation. As then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive
only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on
this ground that the petition is granted by this Court."

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already


maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their
regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant
such government entities any power that they do not already
possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed
executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a
"National Computerized Identification Reference System,"19 a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed
executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data
collection and card issuance system where none existed
before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less
costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the Presidents constitutional power of control over government
entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order
No. 420 is declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.

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