Ix

Gaminde vs Commission on Audit

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President appointed petitioner as Commissioner of the CSC for a term expiring on February 2, 1999.
She took her oath of office on June 22, 1993 and was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on September 7, 1993. The
Commission on Audit issued a decision that her term expired on Feb. 2, 1999.
Issue: whether or not the term of gaminde as commissioner has expired
HELD: The constitution adopted a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions. The operation of the rotational plan requires that the terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common date
and any vacancy before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the term
of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions must start on a common date, irrespective of variations in
the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first terms should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. February 2, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commission, as the beginning of the term of office is understood to coincide with
the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.

Laurel V vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195

FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin
Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which
belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of
Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator.
Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position
which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin
Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are
related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions
provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered
since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.
Petitioners contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be
accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation,
because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction
between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to
circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation.
Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment.
Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by
appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is
vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes
the same purpose.

Briones v. Osmea
Fact:
An action for mandamus with damages to declare the abolition of the petitioners position void, and to order the respondent City
Mayor to reinstate them to their former positions.

Ordinance No. 192 abolished 15 positions in the City Mayors office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board with an
alleged economic and efficient reason for the abolition.
Issue: whether or not the petitioners should be reinstated
Held: yes. Petitioners should be reinstated.
The reason given for the abolition of the positions is untrue, and constitutes a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the
said appellees, in violation of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. Prior to the abolition of the positions, the office of
the City Mayor no less than 35 new positions calling for an outlay of 68,100pesos per annum.
A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, who have rendered long and
honorable services, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should be left at the mercy
of political changes.

Dadole vs CoA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces
and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances
of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they
received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will
and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are

exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
President's supervisory powers over LGUs
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, 474 SCRA 258 (2005)
Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati holds respondent, in a Notice of Assessment, liable to pay the correct business taxes, fees
and charges totaling to P1.6M in which the respondents protested contending that condominium does not fall under the definition of a
business,
thus,
they
are
not
liable
for
such
taxes.
Issue: Whether or not the City Treasurer of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations
Held: Petition denied. Accordingly, and with significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium corporations are generally
exempt from local business taxation under the LGC, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise.
The power of the local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which
recognizes the power of these units to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Xi

ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. PURISIMA- Attrition Act of 2005, R.A. No. 9335

FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed
their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2)
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to
the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by
creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws implementing rules.

ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?

HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
review the laws IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely speculative as the
law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc.
Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the
common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.

However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of
the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since
Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The
justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government
act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was
met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.

Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case brief summary

Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case brief summary
Facts:
This is a motion for further clarification filed by the Ombudsman, of the courts ruling in its decision that the prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, that the Ombudsman has no authority
to prosecute acses falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has authority to exercise prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
Ruling:
No, the power of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority between the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in prosecution of cases.
Xii

Lee Hong Kok vs. David

on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM

Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of
award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original
certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This
was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they
been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity
with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of
sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under
dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Jan. 21, 2004
Facts: R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar
provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
Petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order alleging that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already
been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned
corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining
company over offshore areas.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for
large-scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership
over natural resources since the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our
economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need for capital and technology to develop our natural
resources without sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the safeguard of a special
law which requires two-thirds vote of all the members of the Legislature.
It is true that the word technical encompasses a broad number of possible services. However, the law
follows the maxim casus omisus pro omisso habendus est which means a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

FACTS:

William H. Quasha

a member of the Philippine bar, committed a crime of falsification of a public and commercial document for causing it to appear that
Arsenio Baylon, a Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was the owner of 60.005 % of the subscribed capital stock of Pacific
Airways Corp. (Pacific) when in reality the money paid belongs to an American citizen whose name did not appear in the article of
incorporation,

to circumvent the constitutional mandate that no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public utility in the Philippines unless 60% of
its capital stock is owned by Filipinos.

Found guilty after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a fine

Quasha appealed to this Court

Primary purpose: to carry on the business of a common carrier by air, land or water

Baylon did not have the controlling vote because of the difference in voting power between the preferred shares and the common
shares

ART. 171.
Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister
.

The penalty of
prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

ART. 172.
Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
.

The penalty of
prisioncorreccional
in its medium and maximum period and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who
shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document. ISSUE: W/N Quasha
should be criminally liable HELD: NO. Acquitted.

falsification consists in not disclosing in the articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere trustee ( or dummy as the prosecution
chooses to call him) of his American co-incorporators, thus giving the impression that Baylon was the owner of the shares subscribed
to by him

For the mere formation of the corporation such revelation was not essential, and the Corporation Law does not require it

The moment for determining whether a corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when it applies for a franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for that purpose
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to
the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and
regulations insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be
delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control
of the business.

Xiii

Pdf jaculbe

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG
and
other
teacher-members
so
numerous
similarly
situated,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIO in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
Facts: September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no question that the some
800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in
G.R. No. 95590, 4 they converged at the LiwasangBonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to the National Office
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly.
Issue:

Do public teachers have the right to strike?

Ruling : NO,THE MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION HAS NO RIGHT TO STRIKE DURING CLASS
HOURS.
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the public school teachers on their right to petition
the government for redress of grievances.

DUNCAN VS. GLAXO

July 4, 2015

No Comments

DUNCAN VS. GLAXO

G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
Facts: Petitioner, Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative. The Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to managementany existing future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management
find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Companys Code of Employee Conduct
provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur- Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic
relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxos competition. Before getting married, Tecsons District Manager reminded him
several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him of
conflict of interest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition. Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to
the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxos
Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships
between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another
sales territory. Upon appeal for petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review
on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its
employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is
a valid exercise of management prerogatives
Ruling: Yes.Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

Federation of Free Farmers vs. CA

There are 4 parties in this case: a. FFF (union representingthe farmers) b. Planters (the group which harvests the lands where the
farmerswork) c. Santos and Tikol (individual planters) d. Central or Victorias(milling corp, Planters bring their harvest here to be
milled).

The law, Sugar Act of 1952 - RA 809 stipulates that anyincrease in the share of proceeds of milled sugarcane and derivatives
obtainedby planters from the Central, 60% of said increase should be paid by plantersto their respective laborers.

1.
FFFalleged that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the 10% increase andfrom 1953-1974 with the 4% increase.
CA ruled planters and Victorias jointlyand severally liable. FFF claimed too that Planters and Victorias entered intoan agreement when
they have no legal right because the law has already providedthe ratio of division.
2.
Victoriasclaimed that they should not be held jointly and severally liable. The actionfiled was not founded on torts but on
either an obligation created by acontract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has prescribed. They havepaid the Planters so the
Planters should only be the one sued.
3.

Plantersclaim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might agree. And that theyhave paid the laborers.

Issue: a. WON Planters and Victorias should be severallyliable

b. WON agreement bet Planters and Victorias were permissibleunder RA 809

Held: a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which doesnot impose upon Centrals any liability, whether expressly or impliedly,
anyjoint and several liability. No contractbet sugar mill and the laborers. Principal liability on Planters andsecondarily on Dept or
Labor.

b. YES. RA 809 applicable only in the absence of a writtenmilling agreement or in the absence of any stipulation on the benefits
whichthe laborers are entitled.

xIv

REGINO VS. PANGASINAN COLLEGE

G.R No. 156109 November 18, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Kristine Regino was a poor student enrolled at the Pangasinan College of Science and Technology. Thus, a fund
raising project pertaining to a dance party was
organized by PCST, requiring all its students to purchase two tickets in consideration as a prerequisite for the final exam.
Regino, an underprivileged, failed to purchase the tickets because of her status as well as that project was against her religious belief,
thus, she was not allowed to take the final examination by her two professors.
Issue: Was the refusal of the university to allow Regino to take the final examination valid?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court declared that the act of PCST was not valid, though, it can impose its administrative policies,
necessarily, the amount of tickets or payment shall be included or expressed in the student handbooks given to every student before the
start of the regular classes of the semester. In this case, the fund raising project was not included in the activities to be undertaken by
the university during the semester. The petitioner is entitled for damages due to her traumatic experience on the acts of the university
causing her to stop studying sand later transfer to another school.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper were subjected
to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the
Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit
contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead
of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the
jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of
said
Discipline
Board
over
the
defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always
absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus
Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is
an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to
hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.1wph
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EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing

Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands
were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be
P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from
further
hearing
the
case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved
to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

LUPANGCO v CA and PRC

FACTS
In 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105, which prohibited the
examinees in
accountancy from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like 3 days before the
date of the exam.
As reviewees preparing to take the licensure exam in accountancy that year, Lupangco et al filed with the
RTC of Manila a
complaint for injunction against the PRC and for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
Resolution.
PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review and entertain the
case, since both
entities are co-equal bodies. To further strengthen its contention, it cited BP 129, Sec. 9 (3), which states
that the CA has the
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions... of the RTC and quasijudicial agencies...."
ISSUE
W/N the RTC and the PRC are co-equal bodies, with the latter having quasi-judicial power
HELD
NO. In order to invoke Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling, which resulted from
proceedings wherein
the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions.

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion etc of public administrative officers or
bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. It is a determination of rights, privileges and
duties resulting in a
decision or order, which applies to a specific situation. This does NOT cover rules and regulations of
general applicability
issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like
Resolution No. 105, which
was adopted by the PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure exams.
As to the constitutionality of the Resolution, the Court held that although it was adopted for a
commendable purpose--to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure exams, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
unreasonable in that the
examinee cannot even attend any review class or receive any handout etc. It is even more unreasonable
that one who is
caught violating this prohibition is barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.
Furthermore, the Resolution infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
PRC has NO
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure exams.
They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
public accountants.
The Resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of
review that these schools believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before
becoming a full
fledged public accountant.
It is an axiom in administrative law that admin authorities should NOT act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules
and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end
in view.

Xv

Sin vs Sin
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed
Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion

between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain
hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of
the State in the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may
be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of
the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

Antonio vs Reyes
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after
their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even
did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of
their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for
good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared
null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null
and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a
mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist
and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological
incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity
of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended
to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is
incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne Reyes (G.R. No. 155800)

Posted: August 16, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Divorce, Marriage, Psychological Incapacity
0
FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage due to Maries
Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. Shed claim she is a singer
with the company Blackgold and that she is the latters number 1 money maker but shes not. Shed also spend lavishly as opposed to
her monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo presented an expert that proved
Maries PI. Marie denied all Leos allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and
annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman
Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the case.
HELD: Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at
bar.
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the
misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In
Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. These provisions of
Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but
rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies
sought to vitiate Leos consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy
from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
GONZALO A. ARANETA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174205 June 27, 2008

Facts:
As culled from the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution was able to
establish that at the time of the commission of the crime, AAA was 17 years old, having been born on 28
March 1981, in Batohon Daco, Dauin, Negros Oriental. Because she was then studying at Dauin Municipal
High School located at Poblacion, District III, Dauin, AAA left her birthplace to live near her school. She
stayed at the house of a certain DDD as a boarder.
At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of 10 April 1998, while AAA and her two younger sisters, BBB and
EEE were sitting on a bench at the waiting shed located near her boarding house, petitioner approached
her. Petitioner, who had been incessantly courting AAA from the time she was still 13 years old, again
expressed his feelings for her and asked her to accept his love and even insisted that she must accept him
because he had a job. She did not like what she heard from petitioner and tried to hit him with a broom
but the latter was able to dodge the strike. She and her two sisters dashed to the boarding house which
was five meters away and went inside the room. When they were about to close the door, the petitioner,
who was following them, forced himself inside. The three tried to bar petitioner from entering the room by
pushing the door to his direction. Their efforts, however, proved futile as petitioner was able to enter.
There petitioner embraced AAA, who struggled to extricate herself from his hold. AAA then shouted for
help. Meanwhile, petitioner continued hugging her and tried to threaten her with these words: Ug dili ko
nimo sugton, patyon tike. Akong ipakita nimo unsa ko ka buang (If you will not accept my love I will kill
you. I will show you how bad I can be). BBB, tried to pull petitioner away from her sister AAA, but to no
avail. Andrew Tubilag, who was also residing in the same house, arrived and pulled petitioner away from
AAA. AAA closed the door of the room and there she cried. She then went to the police station to report
the incident.
The RTC rendered a decision totally disregarding petitioners bare denials and flimsy assertions. In
convicting petitioner of the crime charged, it held that petitioners act of forcibly embracing the victim
against her will wrought injury on the latters honor and constituted child abuse as defined under Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610. It further ruminated that if the mentioned statute considers as
child abuse a mans mere keeping or having in his company a minor, twelve years or under or ten years or
more his junior, in any public place, all the more would the unwanted embrace of a minor fall under the
purview of child abuse.
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
claimed that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of child abuse despite failure of the prosecution to
establish the elements necessary to constitute the crime charged. Petitioner concludes that an act or word
can only be punishable if such be prejudicial to the childs development so as to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. In other words, petitioner was of the
opinion that an accused can only be successfully convicted of child abuse under Section 10(a) if it is
proved that the victims development had been prejudiced. Thus, according to petitioner, absent proof of
such prejudice, which is an essential element in the crime charged, petitioner cannot be found guilty of
child abuse under the subject provision.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, believes that the questioned acts of
petitioner fall within the definition of child abuse. According to the OSG, when paragraph (a) of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 7610 states: Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other condition prejudicial to the childs
development x x x, it contemplates two classes of other acts of child abuse, i.e., (1) other acts of child
abuse, cruelty, and exploitation; and (2) other conditions prejudicial to the childs development. It argues
that unlike the second kind of child abuse, the first class does not require that the act be prejudicial to the
childs development.

Court of Appeals concurred in the opinion of the OSG. It affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
HELD:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the childs development. Contrary to petitioners assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be
convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts
therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation
have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is
different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or
in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the childs development supposes that there are four punishable
acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and
fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The fourth
penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the
three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does
not warrant such construal.
Subsection (b), Section 3, Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child abuse includes:
(2)
Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
The evidence of the prosecution proved that petitioner, despite the victims protestation,
relentlessly followed the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to the room where
she stayed. He forcibly embraced her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept his love for her.
Indeed, such devious act must have shattered her self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased,
degraded or demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass at that time, being
away from her parents, the victim must have felt desecrated and sexually transgressed, especially
considering the fact that the incident took place before the very eyes of her two younger, innocent sisters.
Petitioner who was old enough to be the victims grandfather, did not only traumatize and gravely threaten
the normal development of such innocent girl; he was also betraying the trust that young girls place in the
adult members of the community who are expected to guide and nurture the well-being of these fragile
members of the society. Undoubtedly, such insensible act of petitioner constitutes child abuse. As the RTC
aptly observed:
It bears stressing that the mere keeping or having in a mans companion a minor, twelve (12) years or
under or who is ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place already constitutes child
abuse under Section 10(b) of the same Act. Under such rationale, an unwanted embrace on a minor would
all the more constitute child abuse

Xvi

Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The
drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the
custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENRCENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.
Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners
DENR
and
DENR
Officer
Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application
for
replevin,
is
a
suit
against
the
State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the
State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies
only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or
corruption.
In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing
and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.
Festejo v. Fernando [March 11, 1954]
24 Sep
Festejo v. Fernando
Fact:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without
obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully
took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three
parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
Issue:
w/n this is a suit against the state?

Held:
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiffs land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his
authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiffs land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any other citizen and held
answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and
not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not
in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is Isaias Fernando, Director,
Bureau of Public Works. Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official
responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint of which the defendant, Isaias
Fernando, according to the same pleading, is in charge and for which he is responsible as Director of the Bureau of Public Works
are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the
manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a
property of the Government.

Xvii

Planas v. COMELEC
7/17/2014
0 Comments

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.

PLANAS
49
Ponente:

VS.
SCRA

105;

January
Concepcion,

22,

COMELEC
1973
C.J.

FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention
approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people
for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73
because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December
17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of
free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the
postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the
petitioners filed for an urgent motion praying that the case be decided as soon as possible.
ISSUES:
1.
Is
validity
of
PD
73
justiciable?
2.
Is
PD
73
valid?
3.
Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the
Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides
for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was
declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as
it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to changethe 1987 Constitution and then filed a
petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite forratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes
under thepetition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentaryform of government. COMELEC
did not give it due course for lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v.
Comelecruling.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision

Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance withthe constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people
RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by peopleSec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a
peoples initiative to proposeamendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that thepetition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of theframers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers
intended to adopt relevantAmerican jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign ona petition containing such full text. The essence of
amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon apetition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means twoessential elements must be present.2elementsofinitiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the
full text of the proposed amendments isfirst shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a