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PART III: ARREST

I.
A.

NATURE AND DEFINITION


DEFINITION

RULE 113
Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an
arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention.
DAVID ET AL VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017
declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless
violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did
so citing the following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPPNPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting
the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must
be noted that before the said proclamations, the following
course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled
Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming
in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist
safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20 th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to
defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col.
Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of
command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.
The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.
However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA
and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups
within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of
programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well
as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal
of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and
confiscation of news stories and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by
the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and
attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of
the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at
hand.

ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot
and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on
the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none
of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their
insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless
arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and
to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be
decided provided that the party raising it continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the
present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into
the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the
President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft
of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.
Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of
terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution provides that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless
arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones
presence or it has just been committed based on personal
knowledge both of which are not present in Davids
warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and
arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the
right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale
cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the
principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice
and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure
of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate
the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to
declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU
Facts: Information was filed against several people including
the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought
the petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge
denying his motion to quash the information for rape with
homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground

he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the


death of only two persons. The petitioner submits that the
seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have
died seven times.
Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the
petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is being
charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only
two persons.
Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more
offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a
constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide
as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of
homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty
to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an
independent offense, but assumes a new character, and
functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of
law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of
a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific
penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his
six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed
by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta
instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape.
In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl
was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking
turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill
and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is
being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in
raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed
against each of them allege that each of the seven successive
rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta
and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven
attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession
by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
PEOPLE VS SEQUINO
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation
of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was
issued against her with bail for her release fixed at
P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post
cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked
for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be
allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile,
it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by
reason of the announcement she made, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media,
that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a
fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing
its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance

of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary


Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the hold departure order considering that it had
not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued
sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise
argued that the hold departure order violates her right
to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
Issues:
1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Santiago?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold
departure order without any motion from the
prosecution and without notice and hearing?
3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?
Held:
1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was
duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's
jurisdiction
thereover,
appearing
for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the
filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave
"that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings," and
categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting
in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and
that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court.
Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for,
by her own representations, she is effectively estopped
from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to
exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.
2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure

order was a valid exercise of the presiding


courts inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over
the case and the person of the accused.
Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even
made a public statement that she had every intention
of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action
adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice
of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order.
To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an
exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself
amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, thus, he may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case.
Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in
her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times
to the orders and processes of the court, she may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during
the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases
should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in
the best position to pass upon such applications and to
impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they
are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof.
COJUANGCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
A complaint was filed against the defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr., the ACCRA lawyers, Danilo Ursua and 71
corporations by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) referred here as Republic of the
Philippines with regard to a block of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) stock which were allegedly bought through the CIIF
Holding Companies and funded by the coconut levy fund
passing through the Unicom Oil Mills and directly from UCPB.
The coconut levy funds were considered as government funds
since this came from contributions from the coconut farmers
with the purpose of improving and stabilizing the coconut
farming industry, however these were said to be privatized
under presidential directives of then Pres. Marcos. Defendant
Cojuangco Jr., being close with the Marcoses is said to have
taken undue advantage of his association, influence and
connection, embarked upon different devices and schemes
including the use of the ACCRA Lawyers as nominee
shareholders and the defendant corporations as fronts to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people when he misused the coconut levy fund, amounting to
$150 million, to purchase 33 million shares of the SMC through
the holding companies. Hence with the allegations mentioned
and with different cases and issues which remain unresolved,
the block of shares representing 20% of the outstanding capital
stock of SMC remained sequestered by the government.
During the pre-trial brief, the Sandiganbayan sought
clarification from the parties, particularly the Republic, on their
respective positions, but at the end it found the clarifications
"inadequately" enlightening. To resolve various pending

motions and pleadings, Sandiganbayan lifted and declared the


Writs of Sequestration null and void.
Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the
Republic continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet
to be resolved, it is hereby ordered that the following shall be
annotated in the relevant corporate books of San Miguel
Corporation:
(1) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of
the shares of the Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. shall
be subject to the outcome of this case;
(2) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20)
days written notice by Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.
prior to any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of the
shares;
(3) in the event of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the
shares, by the Defendants Cojuangco, et al., the consideration
therefore, whether in cash or in kind, shall be placed in escrow
with Land Bank of the Philippines, subject to disposition only
upon further orders of this Court; and
(4) any cash dividends that are declared on the shares shall
be placed in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court. If
in case stock dividends are declared, the conditions on the
sale, pledge, mortgage and other disposition of any of the
shares as above-mentioned in conditions 1, 2 and 3, shall
likewise apply.
Sandiganbayan denied both Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Modification but eventually reduced its resolution
deleting the last 2 provisions. Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion
for Authority to Sell San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares,
praying for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares and
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Cojuangco, et al. later
rendered a complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale
of the Cojuangco block of shares of SMC stock, informing that
a total amount of P 4,786,107,428.34 had been paid to the
UCPB as loan repayment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of
dicretion in:
(a) in lifting the Writ of Sequestrations on the sequestered SMC
shares.
(c) in deleting the last two conditions the Sandiganbayan had
earlier imposed on the subject shares of stock.
RULING
Among the WOS issued, only one writ WOS 87-0218 complied
with PCGG Rules and Regulations requirement that the
issuance be made by at least two Commissioners. However,
even if Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 complied with the
requirement that the same be issued by at least two
Commissioners, the records fail to show that it was issued with
factual basis or with factual foundation. It is the absence of a
prima facie basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration and
not the lack of authority of two (2) Commissioners which
renders the said writ void ab initio. Thus, being the case, Writ
of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted.
Consequently, the writs of sequestration nos. 86-0062, 860069, 86-0085, 86-0095, 86-0096, 86-0097 and 86-0098 must
be lifted for not having complied with the pertinent provisions of
the PCGG Rules and Regulations, all of which were issued by
only one Commissioner.
Nor did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in
reducing from four to only two the conditions imposed for the
lifting of the WOS. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted with the
best of intentions, being all too aware that the claim of the

Republic to the sequestered assets and properties might be


prejudiced or harmed pendente lite unless the protective
conditions were annotated in the corporate books of SMC.
Moreover, the issue became academic following the
Sandiganbayans promulgation of its decision dismissing the
Republic's Amended Complaint, which thereby removed the
stated reason - "the Republic continues to hold a claim on the
shares which is yet to be resolved" - underlying the need for
the annotation of the conditions (whether four or two).
DIPLOMATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES FROM
ARREST
ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
RPC Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats,
or fraud to prevent any member of the National
Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending
the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of
its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the
penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who shall, while the
Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session,
arrest or search any member thereof, except in case
such member has committed a crime punishable under
this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
VIENNA CONVENTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
Article 31
1.A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also
enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) A real action relating to private immovable property
situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless
he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the
purposes of the mission;

article, and provided that the measures concerned can


be taken without infringing the inviolability of his
person or of his residence.
4.The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him
from the jurisdiction of the sending State.
Article 37
1.The members of the family of a diplomatic agent
forming part of his household shall, if they are not
nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges
and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36.
2.Members of the administrative and technical staff of
the mission, together with members of their families
forming part of their respective households, shall, if
they are not nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and
immunities specified in articles 29 to 35, except that
the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving State specified in paragraph 1 of article
31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the
course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the
privileges specified in article 36, paragraph 1, in
respect of articles imported at the time of first
installation.
3.Members of the service staff of the mission who are
not nationals of or permanently resident in the
receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts
performed in the course of their duties, exemption from
dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by
reason of their employment and the exemption
contained in article 33.
4.Private servants of members of the mission shall, if
they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the
receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the
emoluments they receive by reason of their
employment. In other respects, they may enjoy
privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted
by the receiving State. However, the receiving State
must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in
such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the
performance of the functions of the mission.
VISITINGFORCESAGREEMENT

(b) An action relating to succession in which the


diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator,
heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of
the sending State;
(c) An action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions.
2.A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as
a witness.
3.No measures of execution may be taken in respect of
a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this

ArticleVII
ImportationandExportation
1. United States Government equipment,
materials, supplies, and other property
imported into or acquired in the Philippines
by or on behalf of the United States armed
forcesinconnectionwithactivitiestowhich
this agreement applies, shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain
withtheUnitedStates,whichmayremovesuch
property from the Philippines at any time,
free from export duties, taxes, and other
similar charges. The exemptions provided in
thisparagraphshallalsoextendtoanyduty,

tax, or other similar charges which would


otherwisebeassesseduponsuchpropertyafter
importation into, or acquisition within, the
Philippines.Suchpropertymayberemovedfrom
the Philippines, or disposed of therein,
providedthatdispositionofsuchpropertyin
the Philippines to persons or entities not
entitled to exemption from applicable taxes
anddutiesshallbesubjecttopaymentofsuch
taxes, and duties and prior approval of the
PhilippineGovernment.

2. Reasonablequantities ofpersonal baggage,


personal effects, and other property for the
personaluseofUnitedStatespersonnelmaybe
importedintoandusedinthePhilippinesfree
ofallduties,taxesandothersimilarcharges
during the period of their temporary stay in
the Philippines. Transfers to persons or
entities in the Philippines not entitled to
importprivilegesmayonlybemadeuponprior
approval of the appropriate Philippine
authoritiesincludingpaymentbytherecipient
of applicable duties and taxes imposed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The exportation of such property and of
propertyacquiredinthePhilippinesbyUnited
States personnel shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar
charges.
PEOPLE VS SIAO
On May 27, 1994, at about 3PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao
in his residence ordered Reylan Gimena, his familys 17yr old
houseboy, to pull Estrella Raymundo, their 14yr old
housemaid, to the womens quarters. Once inside, appellant
Siao pushed her to the wooden bed and asked her to choose
one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. Appellant lit
the candle and dropped the melting candle on her chest.
Estrella was made to lie down on her back on the bed w/ her
head hanging over one end. Appellant then poured sprite into
her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun
pointed to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and
hands w/ an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face
down on the bed. As Siao pointed his pistol at her, he ordered
Estrella to undress and commanded her to take the initiative on
Gimena. Not understanding what he meant, appellant
motioned to her poking the gun at her temple. Gimena was
then ordered to remove his shorts. He did not do so but only
let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of Estrella
and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and
shouted for help twice. Siao then ordered Gimena to rape
Estrella. At first, Gimena refused because he has a sister.
However, Siao said that if they would not obey, he would kill
both of them.
?
Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated
at gunpoint by Siao to have carnal knowledge of each other.
They performed the sexual act because they were afraid they
would be killed. Siao commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3
diff positions (i.e. missionary position, side-by-side and dog
position as narrated vividly in the case), pointing the handgun
at them the whole time. Thereafter, Siao warned them, If you
will tell the police, I will kill your mothers.
?
Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole
event. He asserts that she retaliated through this accusation

because Estrella herself was accused of stealing many of his


familys personal effects.
?
TC held Rene Siao guilty as principal by induction of
rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and indemnification of PhP50K. Gimena was acquitted for
having acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an
equal, if not greater injury.
HELD: SC respected TCs finding of facts and found any
inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies inconsequential
considering that they referred to trivial matters w/c have
nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape,
that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo,
even if it was pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena
ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30 mins, w/c does not
conform to common experience, rape was still present from the
evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.
Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what
constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by
many people at the time of the crime, rape was still committed
because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrellas
and Gimenas decision not to flee proves only the fear and
intimidation that they were under because Siao was after all
their amo or employer who threatened to kill them or their
family if they did not succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659
w/c imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed w/ the use of a deadly weapon. The TC overlooked
and did not take into account the aggr circumstance of
ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that
where the accused in committing the rape used not only the
missionary position i.e. male superior, female inferior but also
the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was
proven in the case, the aggr circumstance of ignominy
attended the commission thereof.
However, the use of a deadly weapon serves to increase the
penalty as opposed to a generic aggr circumstance w/c only
affects the period of the penalty. This nonetheless should be
alleged in the information, because of the accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Considering that the complaint failed to allege the use of
a deadly weapon, the penalty to be reckoned w/ in determining
the penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua, as prescribed
for simple rape. Simple rape is punishable by the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, w/c must be applied
regardless of any mit/aggr circumstance w/c may have
attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the TC is correct.
Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral
damages, w/c is automatically granted in rape cases w/o need
of any proof, in the amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the
presence of the aggr circumstance of ignominy justifies the
award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC.
Judgment affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.
B. TYPES
A.

WHEN AND HOW WARRANT ISSUED

ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION Section 2. The right of


the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

PLACER VS VILLANUEVA
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to
compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscals certification in the
informations of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue
warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for
the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the
fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for
the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable
cause.
Petition dismissed.
PEOPLE VS INTING
Facts: On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a lettercomplaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for
allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in
the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and
without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law. Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty.
Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete
City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to
prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and
(3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may
be. After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty.
Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he
filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 38. Dumaguete City) a

criminal case for violation of section 261, Paragraph (h), Omnibus


Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated 30
September 1988, the court issued a warrant of arrest against the OIC
Mayor. It also fixed the bail at P5,000.00 as recommended by the
Provincial Election Supervisor. However, in an order dated 3 October
1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set
aside its 30 September 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is
not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give
due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the
written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution
of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter." In
another order dated 22 November 1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas
15 days from receipt to file another information charging the same
offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Atty.
Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated 8
December 1988, the trial court quashed the information. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is necessary
before the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor
may be given due course by the trial court.
Held: As to the constitutional mandate that "xx no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge xx," (Article III, Section 2,
Constitution) the determination of probable cause is a function of the
Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone
makes this determination. On the other hand, the preliminary inquiry
made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him
to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not
have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the
report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any),
and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination. Thus, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish
the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of
one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not be
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial
is the function of the Prosecutor. Preliminary investigation should
be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information
or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly
called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged
with the judge.

ALLADO VS DIOKNO

FACTS:
PetitionersDiosdadoJoseAlladoandRobertoL.Mendoza,alumniof
theCollegeoflaw,UniversityofthePhilippines,arepartnersofthe
LawFirmofSalonga,HernandezandAllado.Inthepracticeoftheir
profession,andonthebasisofanallegedextrajudicialconfessionof

a security guard (Umbal), they have been accused of the heinous


crimeofkidnappingwithmurderofaGermannationalnamedVan
Twest by the Presidential AntiCrime Commission (PACC) and
orderedarrestedwithoutbailbyrespondentjudge.
Petitioners filed this petition and principally contended that
respondentjudgeactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionandinexcess
ofjurisdictionin"whimsicallyholding thatthereisprobablecause
against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidenceagainstpetitionersandwithoutevenstatingthebasis
ofhisfindings,"andin"relyingontheResolutionofthePaneland
theircertificationthatprobablecauseexistswhenthecertificationis
flawed." Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary
investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to
establishprobablecauseagainstthemtojustifytheissuanceof
the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors'
"clearsignofbiasandpartiality."
Ontheotherhand,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralarguesthatthe
determination ofprobablecauseisafunctionofthejudgewhois
merelyrequiredtopersonallyappreciatecertainfactstoconvincehim
thattheaccusedprobablycommittedthecrimecharged.
ISSUE:
WONtherespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionin
the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuanceofawarrantofarrest.
HELD:
IntheOrderofrespondentjudge,itisexpresslystatedthat"[t]his
courtaftercarefulevaluationoftheevidenceonrecord,believesand
rulesthatprobablecause exists;andtherefore,awarrantofarrest
shouldbeissued."However,weareunable toseehowrespondent
judgearrivedatsuchruling.Wehavepainstakingly
examined the records and we cannot find any support for his
conclusion.Onthecontrary,wediscernanumberofreasonswhywe
considertheevidencesubmitted tobeinsufficientforafindingof
probablecauseagainstpetitioners. ThePACCreliesheavilyonthe
swornstatementofSecurityGuardUmbalwhosupposedlyconfessed
hisparticipationintheallegedkidnappingandmurderofVanTwest.
Forone,thereisseriousdoubtonVanTwest'sreporteddeathsince
thecorpusdelictihasnotbeenestablished,norhavehisremainsbeen
recovered.UmbalclaimsthatVanTwestwascompletelyburnedinto
asheswiththeuseof gasoline and rubber tires from around ten
o'clockintheeveningtosixo'clockthenextmorning.Thisishighly
improbable,ifnotridiculous.Ahumanbodycannotbe pulverized
intoashesbysimplyburningitwiththeuseofgasolineandrubber
tiresinanopenfield.Evencrematoriauseentirelyclosedincinerators
wherethecorpseissubjectedtointenseheat.Thereafter,theremains
undergoaprocesswherethebonesarecompletelygroundtodust.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest'sreported abduction
which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel
continued to represent him beforejudicial and quasijudicial
proceedings.Hence,evenAsst.SolicitorGeneralEstoesta
believesthatcounselofVanTwestdoubtedthelatter'sdeath.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuingthewarrantforthearrestofpetitionersitappearingthathedid
not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the
complainantandhiswitnessesinthefaceoftheirincredibleaccounts.
Instead,hemerelyreliedonthecertificationoftheprosecutors
thatprobablecauseexisted.For,otherwise,hewouldhavefoundout
that333the evidencethusfarpresentedwasutterlyinsufficientto
warrantthearrestofpetitioners.
In Solivenv. Makasiar, we saidthat thejudge (a)shallpersonally
evaluatethereport andthesupportingdocumentssubmittedbythe
fiscal regarding the existence ofprobable cause and, on the basis
thereof,issueawarrantofarrest;or,(b)ifonthe basisthereofhe
findsnoprobablecause,maydisregardthefiscal'sreportand

requirethesubmissionofsupportingaffidavitsofwitnessestoaid
himinarrivingataconclusionontheexistenceofprobablecause.
In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the
constitutionalmandate:(a)Thedeterminationofprobablecauseisa
functionofthejudge;itisnotfortheprovincialfiscalorprosecutor
to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination
Of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutorpresentstohim.Byitself,theprosecutor'scertificationof
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcriptofstenographicnotes(ifany),andallother
supportingdocumentsbehindtheprosecutor'scertificationwhichare
materialinassistingthejudgeinhisdeterminationofprobablecause;
and, (c)Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminaryinquirywhichdeterminesprobablecausefortheissuance
ofawarrantofarrestfromthepreliminaryinvestigationproperwhich
ascertainswhethertheoffendershouldbeheldfortrialor released.
Evenifthetwoinquiriesbeconductedinthecourseofoneandthe
sameproceeding,thereshouldbenoconfusionabouttheirobjectives.
Thedeterminationofprobablecauseforthewarrantismadebythe
judge.Thepreliminary investigationproperwhetherornotthereis
reasonablegroundtobelievethattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffense
chargedandtherefore,whetherornotheshouldbesubjectedtothe
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of thE
prosecutor.
Dispositive:Petitiongranted
SALONGA VS CRUZ PANO
Facts:Thepetitionerinvokestheconstitutionallyprotectedrightto
lifeandlibertyguaranteedbythedueprocessclause,allegingthatno
prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
informationforsubversionagainsthim.PetitioneraskstheCourtto
prohibitandpreventtherespondentsfromusingtheironarmofthe
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democraticoppositioninthePhilippines.
Thecaserootsbackstotherashofbombingswhichoccurredinthe
MetroManilaareainthemonthsofAugust,SeptemberandOctober
of1980.VictorBurnsLovely,Jr,oneofthevictimsofthebombing,
implicatedpetitionerSalongaasoneofthoseresponsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co
accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above
entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12,
1980andthatpetitionerwasgiventen(10)daysfromreceiptofthe
charge sheetand thesupporting evidencewithin whichto filehis
counterevidence.Thepetitionerstatesthatuptothetimemartiallaw
wasliftedonJanuary17,1981,anddespiteassurancetothecontrary,
hehasnotreceivedanycopiesofthechargesagainsthimnorany
copiesofthesocalledsupportingevidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaintsignedbyGen. Prospero Olivas, dated12March1981,
chargingSalonga,alongwith39otheraccusedwiththeviolationof
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October1981,thecounselforSalongafiledamotiontodismissthe
chargesagainstSalongaforfailureoftheprosecutiontoestablisha
primafaciecaseagainsthim.On2December1981,JudgeErnani
CruzPano(PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,
BranchXVIII,QuezonCity)deniedthemotion.On4January1982,
he(Pano)issuedaresolutionorderingthefilingofaninformationfor
violationoftheRevisedAntiSubversionAct,asamended,against40
people,includingSalonga.Theresolutionsofthesaidjudgedated2

December1981and4January1982arethesubjectofthepresent
petitionforcertiorari.ItisthecontentionofSalongathatnoprima
faciecasehasbeenestablishedbytheprosecutiontojustifythefiling
ofaninformationagainsthim.Hestatesthattosanctionhisfurther
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admitthatnoruleoflawexistsinthePhilippinestoday.
Issues:1.Whethertheabovecasestillfallsunderanactualcase
2.Whethertheabovecasedroppedbythelowercourtstilldeservesa
decisionfromtheSupremeCourt
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draftponenciawas circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
RodolfoOrtizgrantedthemotionofrespondentCityFiscalSergio
Apostoltodropthesubversioncaseagainstthepetitioner.Pursuantto
instructionsoftheMinisterofJustice,theprosecutionrestudiedits
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questionedresolution.
Thecourtisconstrainedbythisactionoftheprosecutionandthe
respondentJudgetowithdrawthedraftponenciafromcirculatingfor
concurrencesandsignaturesandtoplaceitonceagainintheCourts
crowdedagendaforfurtherdeliberations.
Insofarastheabsenceofaprimafaciecasetowarrantthefilingof
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
mootandacademicbytheactionoftheprosecution.
2.Yes.DespitetheSCsdismissalofthepetitionduetothecases
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protectiongivenbyconstitutionalguarantees.
IndelaCamaravsEnage(41SCRA1),thecourtruledthat:
Thefactthatthecaseismootandacademicshouldnotpreclude
thisTribunalfromsettingforthinlanguageclearandunmistakable,
theobligationoffidelityonthepartoflowercourtjudgestothe
unequivocalcommandoftheConstitutionthatexcessivebailshall
notberequired.
InGonzalesv.Marcos(65SCRA624)whetherornottheCultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
CentersnewcharterpursuanttothePresidentslegislativepowers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph2oftheConstitution).
InthehabeascorpuscaseofAquino,Jr.,v.Enrile,59SCRA183),
thefactthatthepetitionwasmootandacademicdidnotpreventthis
Courtintheexerciseofitssymbolicfunctionfrompromulgatingone
ofthemostvoluminousdecisionseverprintedintheReports.
LIM VS FELIX
Facts:
-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality
of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination
plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.

-An investigation of the incident then followed.


-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O.
Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service
at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate
accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,Mayor Susana
Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, MayorNestor C.
Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple
murder and frustrated murder in connectionwith the
airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 9211.
-After conducting the preliminary investigation, the
court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating
therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by
the witnesses for the prosecution during the
preliminary examination in searching questions and
answers, concludes that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
named accused in the amended complaint, namely,
Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog,
Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim,
Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime
Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.
- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with
the
respondent
court
several
motions
and
manifestations which in substance prayed that an
order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial
records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate
for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a
probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant
shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have
himself been personally convinced of such probable
cause.
- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the
court conduct a hearing to determine if there really
exists a prima facie case against them in the light of
documents which are recantations of some witnesses
in the preliminary investigation.- It should also be
noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent
Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose
testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case
against them.-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court
issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions
and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.
The judge wrote,
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate,
Masbate which found the existence of probable cause
that the offense of multiple murder was committed and
that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which
was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor
who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four

separate informations for murder. Considering that


both the two competent officers to whom such duty
was entrusted by law have declared the existence of
probable cause, each information is complete in form
and substance, and there is no visible defect on its
face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutor's certification in each information
-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix
(statement
immediately
preceding
paragraph,italicized).

this

ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest


without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists.
RULING:
The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S.
Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated
July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
RD:
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be necessary
documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually,
this depends on the circumstances of each case. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go
beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary.
As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims
presented documents of recantations of the witnesses.
Although, the general rule is that recantations are not
given much weight in the determination of a case and
in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge
before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the
very least, have gone over the records of the
preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light
of the evidence now presented by the concerned
witnesses in view of the "political undertones"
prevailing in the cases.
In making the required personal determination, a Judge
is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier
gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the
reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having
no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a
grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutors
certification and issued the questioned Order dated
July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis
for his personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause.

PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
FACTS
- On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in
Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five
persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact
transpired is still unclear. According to one version,
armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu,
with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties.
Another version has it that a group that was on its way
to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been
ambushed- The next day, a lawyer (Atty. Batuampar) of
one of the widows filed a letter-complaint with the
fiscal, asking for a full blast preliminary investigation.
The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent
persons being implicated by the parties involved on
both sides none of whom was, however, identified and
promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be
filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a"1st
endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting
Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases
that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that
happened in the afternoon of July 27,1985," be
forwarded to his office, which "has first taken
cognizance of said cases.- On August 10, 1985, a
criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed. On
the same day, respondent Judge examined personally
the 3witnesses. Thereafter, the Judge approved the
complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the14
petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and 50
"John Does.- On Aug 14, 1985, an ex-parte motion was
filed by Atty. Batuampar seeking recall of the warrant
of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough
investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial
investigation had been "hasty and manifestly
haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been
propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion
for "lack of basis;" hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue the
warrant of arrest without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation
HELD
YES.- What the Rule provides is that no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court may be filed without completing that
procedure. Sec. 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the
MTC to issue a warrant even before opening the second
phase.- This was equally true under the former rules,
where the first phase of the investigation was expressly
denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish
it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation
proper
- Sec 3 of rule 112 consists of 2 phases:- The first
phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the
sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and
other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends
with the determination by the Judge either:(1) that
there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in
which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits
the order of dismissal, together with the records of the
case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2)that the complaint

and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to


continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second
phase.- This second phase is designed to give the
respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this
stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and
propound to the parties and their witnesses questions
on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The
second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his
resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which shall be
transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial
fiscal for appropriate action.- The argument, therefore,
must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of
arrest against petitioners without first completing the
preliminary investigation in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been
that such issuance need only await a finding of
probable cause, not the completion of the entire
procedure of preliminary investigation- Also without
appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that
there was scarcely time to determine probable cause
against sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and
fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday
when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Nothing in the record before this
Court belies or discredits those affirmations which
have, besides, the benefit of the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.- Insofar,
however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50)
"John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of
a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed
as
unconstitutional
and
once
an
athematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional
injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized, the
warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.
Dispositive
Warrants against petitioners upheld; warrants against
John Does denied
DOJ-NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE MANUAL FOR
PROSECUTORS
PART VI. ARREST

SECTION 1. Definition of probable cause as a ground for


an arrest or issuance of a warrant of arrest. - Probable cause is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.1
B.

whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for


execution shall cause the warrant to be executed
within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10)
days after the expiration of the period, the officer to
whom it was assigned for execution shall make a
report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of
his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the
reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made
on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant.
When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has
been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the
warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but
after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the
warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
PEOPLE VS LUMAYOK
PEOPLE VS ALBIOR
On or about May 30, 1984, the accused, conspiring and
confederating one another, nighttime purposely
sought, with intent of gain and by means of force upon
things, willfully and feloniously rob the house of Garces
by destroying the window glass frame of complainant's
house and when they went in, accused Peter Doe Alias
"Bernardo," had sexual intercourse with Dana Garces
and hitting her with a wooden baluster on the different
parts of her body causing her death and after which,
rob, and carry away the personal properties of
Florencio Garces.
The accused Rodeolfo Vasquez, having knowledge of
the crime of Robbery, and without having participated
therein either as principal or accomplice, took part to
its commission by helping the offenders to sell the
goods.

HOW EFFECTED

RULE 113
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an


arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of
the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to
deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without
unnecessary delay. (3a)
Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to

The trial court rendered the accused Albior guilty of the


crime of robbery with homicide with rape. Accused
Vasquez was found guilty as an accessory to the crime
of robbery.
The medico-legal officer testified that he conducted the
autopsy on the victim and found a hematoma on the

right parietal region and several contusions and


abrasions on different parts of the body. He also found
lacerations on the victim's hymen.
The accused Albior alleged that at the time of the
commission of the crime, he was at the house of his
cousin. He said that he did not understand Tagalog, the
dialect in which the extra-judicial confession was
written, being a Cebuano, and that he only signed it
because he was told that if he did he would be
released. He also assailed the legality of his arrest and
the seizure of the stolen goods by the CIS agents.
However, as these issues were never raised in the
proceedings before the trial court, they cannot be
considered and passed upon on appeal.
ISSUE: W/N At this the other evidence adduced by the
prosecution would sustain a finding that accused was
guilty
RULING: The statement of Vasquez must however be
taken with caution as in the proceedings before the
trial court he testified that he was not allowed to read
his statement before signing it and that he was
threatened with physical violence during his custodial
investigation. Further, no explanation was given by
Vasquez how he came to know that Albior was one of
those who participated in the robbery when he
(Vasquez) did not participate in or even witness its
commission.
These circumstances cannot but cast doubt on the trial
court's conclusion that accused Albior participated in
the robbery, rape and homicide of Dana May Garces.
That accused Albior conspired with Bernard Reyes,
Carlos Manalangsang and "Jun" to commit the robbery
has not been established either. The extrajudicial
confessions of Manalangsang and Vasquez, the only
evidence remaining against Albior with the rejection of
his sworn statement, are contradictory as to whether or
not Albior was actually part of the conspiracy. While
Manalangsang claims that the plan included Albior and
"Jun" as look-outs, he categorically stated that Reyes
and himself had no other companions when they
perpetrated the robbery . On the other hand, Vasquez,
whose information was undoubtedly hearsay, said that
Albior and "Jun" were with Reyes and Manalangsang,
but stated that Reyes and Manalangsang narrated
during a drinking spree that only they were involved.
Without a doubt, no conviction can be had on the basis
of these contradictory statements.
Clearly, the requirement of proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt has not been met. Thus, although the
Court condemns in the strongest possible terms the
brutal and shocking rape and slaying of Dana May
Garces, given the attendant circumstances, it finds
itself with no other recourse but to apply the law and to
acquit Francisco Albior of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accusedappellant Francisco Albior is hereby ACQUITTED
c. assistance; breaking into and out of building or
enclosure

RULE 113
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer
making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as
he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every
person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting
the arrest when he can render such assistance without
detriment to himself. (10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure.
An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a
warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may
break into any building or enclosure where the person to be
arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused
admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and
purpose. (11a)
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.
Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in
accordance with the preceding section, he may break out
therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.
2. warrantless
a. when justified
rule 113 sec 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112
PEOPLE VS TUDTUD
Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian
asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier
related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their
area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta
and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the
Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For
5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the
police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as
big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m.
that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and
SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian
clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5
feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that
one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a
plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the
suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto

informed them that the police had received information that stocks of
illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled
Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud
obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as
his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag
and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as
marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,
informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station.
The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained
3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained
another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong,
were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however,
reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud,
denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the
prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign,
among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana
leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds
statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the
box be opened) be considered a waiver.
Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the
warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception,
as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful
arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that
the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with
an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is
whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree
of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is
insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the
arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be
described as personal, having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud.
Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious
informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his
illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets

there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not
identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites
are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it
was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's
implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack
of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of
his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come
under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And
as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al.
cannot be sustained.

PEOPLE VS CHUA
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by
R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and
Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their
confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to
deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives.
The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway
near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group
acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accusedappellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of
the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car
carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2
Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as
police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a
small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud
subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20)
pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance.
SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic
bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene
brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at
the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against
him and narrated a different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his
wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he
decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He
stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy

cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man


approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he
called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled
out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised
hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his
wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the
policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car.
At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the
scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene,
pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others
searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held
inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez
arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence
of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accusedappellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being
taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of
1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Issue: Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was
lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person and the
subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were
conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
Held: The lower court believed that since the police received
information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that
evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police
officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure
a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and
frisk.
The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of
the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the
law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be
madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case
at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner.
For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation
that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Reliable
information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion
or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-

and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of


effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle
to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case
at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before
the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make
any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the
vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying.
The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop
and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless
arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby
Acquitted.
PEOPLE VS MENDEZ
This is an appeal from the decision [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Laoang, Northern Samar,
finding accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby
Cabagtong guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and
sentencing each of them to death and to indemnify the heirs of
victim Candy Dolim in the amount of P100,000.00 as damages.
Because the record of this case is replete with numerous
instances of procedural and evidentiary lapses, we are
constrained to reverse the judgment of the trial court and
acquit accused-appellants on the basis of reasonable doubt.
The prosecution in this case began with the filing of an
information by Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas on March 5,
1997. The information alleged
Thatonoraboutthe8thdayofDecember,1996,atabout7:30inthe
evening,moreorless,atSitioTinotogasan,Brgy.Burabud,Gamay,
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, by means of force and
intimidation, and with lewd design did, then and there willfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslyhavesexualintercoursewiththeprivate
offendedpartynamedCANDYDOLIM,whichisagainstherwill
andconsent;andthatontheoccasionofsaidincident,theabove
namedaccusedwithintenttokillandwithoutanyjustifiablecause,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assaultandstabsaidCANDYDOLIM,onthedifferentpartsofher
body,whichwoundscausedtheinstantaneousdeathofthelatter.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Accused-appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
The prosecution presented six witnesses: Rico Dolim, Aurea
Cabagtong, Ronnie Cabagtong, SPO2 Noli Cernio, Zosimo
Mager Mejica and Dr. Santiago M. Engo, Medical Officer III of
Gamay District Hospital, Gamay, Northern Samar.
Rico Dolim is the father of the victim. (It appears that he and
his wife, Erma Ada, were estranged.) He testified that, in the
morning of December 8, 1996, Candy Dolim, then 13 years

old, left their house to collect bets on the PBA ending games
from the local residents. When she did not return home that
evening, Rico asked his father Ambrosio and his daughter
Jinky to look for Candy, but they did not find her. Information
that Candy was in Mapanas with her mother proved wrong. On
December 12, 1996, word reached Rico that a young girl was
found dead in Sitio Tinotogasan. Rico immediately went to the
place and found the lifeless body of Candy. Her panty and
shorts were hanging from an ankle, while her shirt was rolled
up to her throat. She had wounds in different parts of her body.
Rico sought the help of the police and Barangay Captain Pedro
Gomba.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Having heard that a certain Ronnie
Cabagtong[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] was involved in the killing of his
daughter, Rico filed a complaint against Ronnie, who was then
investigated by the police. While Ronnie was under
investigation at the police headquarters, his mother, Aurea
Cabagtong, came to the station. She told Rico Dolim that she
knew what actually happened to Candy and offered to be a
witness.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Aurea Cabagtong pointed to
accused-appellants Baby Cabagtong[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] and
Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the crime.
Rico Dolims statement, as well as that of his father, was taken
by the police, as were those of Aurea Cabagtong, Dimas
Pugnit, and Ronnie Cabagtong. Rico said he knew accusedappellant Renante Mendez because he was their neighbor. He
was acquainted with accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong
because the latter was also from Barangay Burabud. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Rico Dolim claimed he had suffered
unbearable loss as a result of his daughters death and that he
had incurred burial and other incidental expenses which he
estimated to be P7,000.00.
For her part, Aurea Cabagtong claimed that, on the night of
December 8, 1996, accused-appellants Renante Mendez and
Baby Cabagtong went to her house. They were soaked from
the rain. She said that her son Ronnie, who was already about
to sleep, asked her to let the two inside. She said her son
talked with accused-appellants, but she did not understand
what they had been discussing. Aurea Cabagtong said she
saw accused-appellants washing their clothes to remove
bloodstains on them. The two spent the night in her house with
her son Ronnie. When she woke up the following morning, she
found they had already left.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Aurea said she was able to talk to her son about accusedappellants visit only when she went to the police headquarters
while Ronnie was being investigated. She gave a statement,
which was reduced in writing, before SPO2 Noli Cernio. [if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On cross-examination, Aurea said that
Ambrosio Dolim had asked her to testify in this case. According
to her, Ambrosio went to her house and paid for her expenses
in attending court sessions.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Ronnie Cabagtong, the third witness for the prosecution,
claimed to be an eyewitness to the crime. He said that, on the
night of December 8, 1996, he watched a Betamax show in
Kagawad Tesoros house in Occidental II, poblacion of Gamay.
Several people were there, including accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong and the victim Candy
Dolim. He said that Candy Dolim left after the first show to
solicit bets for the PBA ending games. Accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong followed. Ronnie said
he left Kagawad Tesoros house five minutes later and met
Dimas, who told him that he had seen accused-appellants with
a girl. According to Ronnie, he was about three meters away
when he later saw accused-appellants. Renante Mendez was
on top of Candy, having sexual intercourse with her, while Baby
Cabagtong was holding the victims hands. It was raining and
there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he recognized
Renante and Baby because of a lantern which illuminated the
place. According to Ronnie, he proceeded home and, at about
9 oclock that night, he heard someone calling from the outside.

It was accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby


Cabagtong. Ronnie said he asked his mother to let the two
inside their house. He noticed that they had bloodstains on
their shirts. He said the two washed their clothes to remove the
stains and later slept in his room. They warned Ronnie not to
tell anyone about what he saw or else they would kill him and
his family. Ronnie said that he and accused-appellants then
went to sleep. The next morning, accused-appellants left.[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Ronnie said he later learned that Candy had
been killed and she was buried on December 12, 1996.
That same day, December 12, 1996, Ronnie, together with
Renante Mendez, was apprehended by SPO2 Noli Cernio.
Ronnie testified that he did not immediately tell the police or
SPO2 Cernio what he knew about the case because Renante
had a cousin who was a policeman. SPO2 Cernio did not put
his statement in writing. Ronnie was later released by the
police. In February 1997, he went to Manila to avoid
involvement in this case and to look for a job. [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
He was fetched from Manila by his mother on April 29, 1997
and was later taken to Catbalogan, where he was investigated
by the NBI.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] According to Ronnie, he finally
decided to talk about this case because he was bothered by
his conscience. He said he had been acquainted with accusedappellants for a long time, particularly Renante Mendez, whom
he had known since he was a boy. He denied any relation to
Baby Cabagtong and claimed that he had no grudge against
accused-appellants.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
On cross-examination, Ronnie reiterated that, at around 8
oclock in the evening of December 8, 1996, he saw accusedappellant Renante Mendez raping Candy. He recognized
Renante because of the light from a lantern. He did not stay
long in the area because it was drizzling. Ronnie could not
remember what Candy and Renante were wearing at that time.
Neither did he hear cries from the victim. He said he did not tell
his mother about the incident because he went to sleep
immediately after eating dinner. When Renante and Baby went
to his house at around 10 oclock in the evening, Ronnie asked
his mother to let them in because they were his acquaintances.
He claimed he agreed to testify in this case because Candy
was his cousin.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Dr. Santiago M. Engo performed the autopsy on Candy Dolim.
He found the body of Candy in a state of decomposition. In his
report,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] he stated he found five (5) wounds on
different parts of Candys body: (1) a hack wound on the neck,
which, according to him, was fatal; (2) an incised wound, 5
inches long, gaping and 1 1/2 inches deep, located at the
anterior upper third of the left arm; (3) an incised wound, 3
inches long, gaping and 2 inches deep, located at the lateral 3rd
of the right forearm; (4) an incised wound, 7 inches long,
gaping and 2 inches deep, located at the anterior upper 3 rd of
the right forearm extending up to the lower 3 rd of the arm of
said side; and (5) a lacerated vaginal wound, 2 inches long,
located at the 6 oclock position of the vaginal orifice. [if !
supportFootnotes][17][endif]

Dr. Engo stated that wounds no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were caused by


a sharp bladed instrument, with the victim facing his assailant,
and that wound no. 4, the vaginal laceration, was caused by a
blunt instrument. Only wound no. 1 (the hack wound in the
neck) was serious and could have caused the instantaneous
death of the victim. It was possible that the assailant was on
top of the victim and that he was right-handed. By Dr. Engos
estimate, Candy Dolim could have died either on December 7
or December 8, 1996. Due to the decomposition of the body,
Dr. Engo was not able to extract or take any semen samples
from the vagina, although he was able to examine the wound
found on it. He said he could not be certain if the victim had
been sexually assaulted.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Farvesio Banawis, also testifying for the prosecution, declared
that he owned a coconut plantation in Barangay Bato, Gamay,

Northern Samar. On December 8, 1996, while he was on his


way home to Barangay Burabud from Barangay Bato, where
his plantation was situated, he met three persons, one of
whom was Candy Dolim. He knew her to be the granddaughter
of a certain Bokoy. He identified accused-appellants in court as
the persons in the company of Candy that night. He said he
even talked with Candy Dolim. He asked her what she was
doing, and she answered she was looking for the winner of the
PBA ending games. He did not talk with accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
The following day, Farvesio said, he left for Manila. A week
later, he learned from his townmates, who had come from the
province, that a little girl had been found dead in Gamay. He
thought it might be the girl he had met near his property. But he
stayed long in Manila and only went home to Gamay in May.
After he had verified the news about Candy Dolim, he went to
Ambrosio Dolim and told him that he was willing to testify in
this case.
Farvesio was investigated by SPO2 Noli Cernio. He executed
a sworn affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] before the clerk of court of
the Municipal Court of Gamay, Gil Ada. He said that it was
possible that accused-appellants raped and killed Candy
because they were the ones following her. He claimed he had
no grudge against accused-appellants. He volunteered to be a
witness in this case, but, according to him, his affidavit was
executed only when this case was already filed in court
because he stayed in Manila for a long time.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
The next witness for the prosecution, SPO2 Noli Cernio,
testified that he was a member of the PNP of Gamay assigned
as an investigator in the Intelligence Section. In the morning of
December 8, 1996, he was informed that a dead body had
been found in Sitio Tinotogasan. For this reason, he went to
Barangay Burabud with Chief of Police Peter Longcop and Dr.
Santiago Engo to conduct an investigation. When they arrived
in Sitio Tinotogasan, Barangay Burabud, they found the lifeless
body of Candy Dolim. Candys grandfather identified her body.

accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong


were always seen together.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
On cross-examination, SPO2 Noli Cernio testified that he filed
the case against accused-appellants Renante Mendez and
Rene Baby Cabagtong because he had been informed that
they had watched a Betamax show together with the victim.
From other sources, he had learned that the victim and
accused-appellants were in Barangay Burabud on the date and
time in question. He investigated Ronnie Cabagtong, but he
did not take down the latters affidavit because he believed his
claim that he was at home at the time of the incident. [if !

[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]

After Randy had left their house, Josefina and her husband
went to the house of her in-laws. A few days later, they asked a
neighbor to seek the help of the barangay captain. It was the
barangay captains son, July Gobatana, who came and brought
them to his house. They stayed there for almost three weeks,
and left the barangay captains house only when they were
informed that Randy had gone to Manila. [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Josefina said she gave the note she had made to Eladio
Cabagtong. She then sought the help of Isabelo Lucero, a
barangay captain in Laoang and a godfather of the victim.
Isabelo Lucero wrote a letter to Erma Ada, the victims mother.
Josefina went with Isabelo Lucero to deliver the letter to Erma,
but she did not know its contents. Josefina said she knew
accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Cabagtong
and that she did not see either of them near the area where the
incident took place at any time during that day.[if !supportFootnotes][29]

SPO2 Cernio found the victim to have been stabbed several


times. She was lying on a grassy area with her panty pulled
down to her feet and her upper dress raised up to her neck.
Her body was already in a state of decomposition. The right
side of Candys face was unrecognizable. SPO2 Cernio took
pictures of the dead body, which were marked as Exhibits G,
G-1 and G-2.
SPO2 Cernio said he questioned Ronnie Cabagtong and
accused-appellant Renante Mendez. Ronnie told him that
accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong
went to his house at around 10 oclock in the evening on the
day of the incident. SPO2 Cernio said he did not take the
sworn affidavit of Ronnie Cabagtong because the latter denied
involvement in the case and claimed that he was in their house
on the night of the incident.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
SPO2 Cernio said that Ronnie Cabagtong was released from
custody after he had informed the Chief of Police that he was
innocent. Accused-appellant Renante Mendez remained in
custody for investigation, while the Chief of Police ordered
accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong to be arrested. SPO2
Cernio investigated accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, who
denied participation in the incident. The investigation was not
put in writing. Cernio said he also investigated Aurea
Cabagtong, Rico Dolim and Ambrosio Dolim. He testified that
he knew accused-appellant Renante Mendez because there
were several cases filed against the latter, including a rape
charge which was dismissed after Renante married the
complainant. With respect to accused-appellant Baby
Cabagtong, SPO2 Cernio said he too had several complaints
against him, but not all were filed in court. SPO2 Cernio
claimed that accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong was a
trouble-maker. He also said that Ronnie Cabagtong and

supportFootnotes][25][endif]

The defense then presented its evidence. Its theory is that the
crime was committed by one Randy Gomba, and not by
accused-appellants, as charged by the prosecution. The first
witness, Josefina Bernas, testified that, on the day of the
crime, she and her husband were in Sitio Tinotogasan making
copra. While they were working, they heard a woman crying.
When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being
raped by a man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy
Gomba. The girl was lying on her back with her legs raised, her
shorts were at her ankle and her blouse was around her neck.
She saw Randy Gomba holding the girl in his arms. She was
bleeding profusely. Randy warned her: No such story would
come out, otherwise, [I will] kill [you]. Frightened, Josefina ran
fast until she reached her husband. After she had told her
husband what she had witnessed, they hurriedly went home,
passing through another route because they were afraid they
might encounter Randy Gomba.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Upon reaching home, Josefina wrote the date and time of the
incident and told her husband to watch out as Randy Gomba
might come to their house. Randy in fact went to their house
and threatened to harm them if they told anybody about the
incident. Josefina said Randy even asked P20.00 from them
for his fare, but they had no money at that time. [if !supportFootnotes][27]
[endif]

[endif]

On cross-examination, Josefina said that she came forward


because she was bothered by her conscience. She decided to
tell what she knew about the case so that justice [would] be
[done] to the victim as well as to accused-appellants, who
would suffer imprisonment even though they were innocent.
She said that she blamed herself for not reporting the matter to
the authorities until February 1997.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
Isabelo Lucero, barangay captain of Barangay Guilaoangi,
Laoang, Northern Samar, confirmed that Josefina Bernas had
told him that she had seen a girl raped and killed. The girl was
Isabelo Luceros goddaughter, Candy Dolim. He said that
Josefina told him that the assailant was a certain Gomba,
whose first name she could not remember. Josefina Bernas
and Isabelo Lucero did not discuss whether accused-appellant
Renante Mendez or Baby Cabagtong were involved in the
crime. Isabelo Lucero wrote a letter to the Chief of Police of

Gamay, informing the latter what Josefina had told him and
recommending that Gomba be arrested. However, the Chief of
Police did not heed his advice.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Accused-appellant Rene Baby Cabagtong testified in his
defense. He said that he was arrested on December 13, 1996
in his farm in Sitio Pinamihagan, Gamay, Northern Samar, by
barangay tanod Mano Mejica.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Accusedappellant Baby Cabagtong was on his way home to take his
meal when he met Mejica, who asked him to go with him.
When Baby demanded to know why he should do so, Mejica
pointed a gun at him. Baby was taken to the municipal hall of
Gamay, where he was investigated by policeman SPO2 Noli
Cernio. A certain Peter Longcop was the sole companion of
SPO2 Cernio during the investigation. Cernio asked him his
whereabouts on that particular Sunday when the crime
occurred, and Baby answered that he was at his farm for it was
customarily a working day. According to Baby, SPO2 Cernio
asked him only one question. Peter Longcop, on the other
hand, asked Baby to testify against accused-appellant Renante
Mendez because they wanted Baby to implicate him, but he
refused.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] He claimed he was told to go
downstairs and was then placed in jail. There were other
prisoners inside the jail cell, including accused-appellant
Renante Mendez.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong said everything Ronnie
Cabagtong had said was a lie and that SPO2 Noli Cernio
convinced Ronnie to testify against them as a condition for the
latters release. Baby claimed that at the time of the incident, he
was with his parents and siblings in his house at the outskirts
of Barangay Burabud, more than one kilometer, from the scene
of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong
testified that he was not aware of an order of the MCTC of
Gamay (Exhibit H), requiring him and Mendez to submit their
counter-affidavits. Baby Cabagtong told the court that he
harbored no grudge against Farvesio Banawis, with whom he
was acquainted, and Aurea Cabagtong, who was his aunt,
although a distant relative. He also knew Gil Ada, the Clerk of
Court of MCTC of Gamay, and he even appeared in court
before him. Gil Ada had required them to sign a waiver which
they did not sign.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
Accused-appellant Renante Mendez also took the witness
stand. He claimed that in December 1996, he was in Gamay,
helping his father make copra. He was arrested on December
12, 1996 as a suspect in this case, together with Ronnie
Cabagtong, by SPO2 Noli Cernio, Peter Longcop, Gejada and
Barredo, all of whom were members of the PNP of Gamay. He
was not shown any warrant when they were arrested.[if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]

Accused-appellant Renante Mendez and Ronnie Cabagtong


were brought to the municipal hall, where their pictures were
taken. After they were investigated, Renante was locked up in
jail and brought downstairs, while Ronnie Cabagtong was
taken upstairs. Renante overheard the police asking Ronnie to
testify against him in this case. Because he agreed, Ronnie
was released and later utilized as a witness.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]
Upon cross-examination, accused-appellant Renante Mendez
testified that he was not aware that the municipal court of
Gamay had ordered him to submit counter-affidavits nor was
he furnished with a copy of the charges filed against him. He
denied participation in the crime, saying he did not leave his
house that evening of December 8, 1996 because he was sick.
He knew the mother of Ronnie, Aurea Cabagtong, as well as
Farvesio Banawis. According to accused-appellant Renante
Mendez, he did not harbor any ill will against Farvesio
Banawis, Aurea Cabagtong or Ronnie Cabagtong. [if !supportFootnotes]
[38][endif]

On October 5, 1999, Gil Ada, the Clerk of Court of MCTC of


Gamay, Northern Samar, was presented as a defense witness.

Ada said that, as Clerk of Court of MCTC of Gamay, he had


issued an order requiring accused-appellants Mendez and
Cabagtong to appear and submit their counter-affidavits,
together with those of their witnesses, in connection with the
criminal complaint filed against them. Ada said he had issued
the order on the authority of Judge Espina, now retired, and
upon the order of the present judge, Judge Lagrimas, who
conducted the preliminary examination in this case.[if !
supportFootnotes][39][endif]

On cross-examination, Gil Ada said that it was usual for the


court to issue an order for the submission of counter-affidavits.
Ada did not know, however, if accused-appellants submitted
their counter-affidavits. On re-direct examination, he testified
that his purpose in issuing the order was to let accusedappellants answer the complaint, but he could not say if it was
also for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. [if !supportFootnotes][40]
[endif]

The prosecution presented SPO2 Noli Cernio as a rebuttal


witness. SPO2 Cernio denied that he taught Ronnie
Cabagtong what to say in court. According to him, Ronnie was
not arrested but only invited to the police headquarters. Aurea
Cabagtong informed them that Ronnie was not involved in the
case and that Ronnie would be willing to testify against the
perpetrators. He said that accused-appellant Renante Mendez
could not have overheard him promising liberty to Ronnie if the
latter agreed to testify. SPO2 Cernio said that the Chief of
Police had ordered the arrest of accused-appellants on the
basis of information given by Aurea Cabagtong. SPO2 Cernio
said no pictures were taken of accused-appellants.[if !supportFootnotes]
[41][endif]

On cross-examination, SPO2 Cernio told the court that the


arrest of accused-appellant Renante Mendez without a warrant
was based on their knowledge of his guilt. He claimed that they
had released accused-appellant Renante Mendez from
custody, but he did not want to leave because he was afraid of
getting involved in the case. On the other hand, Magno Mejica
arrested Rene Baby Cabagtong, also without a warrant, based
on the citizens arrest law. Mejica knew about the case because
he was from Barangay Burabud and a member of the Citizens
Crime Watch and an NPA surrenderee.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
Zosimo Mejica, resident of Gamay, Northern Samar, also
testified. Mejica declared that he knew accused-appellant Baby
Cabagtong because Babys mother was his second cousin.
When he learned that Candy Dolim had been raped and killed,
he went to the place where Candys body had been found.
There were no houses near the crime scene, the nearest
being, in his estimate, 100 meters away. When he arrived at
the scene, he saw Candy lying face up, with her panty on her
ankles and her T-shirt raised up to her neck. Several people
were present at the scene, including SPO2 Noli Cernio.
Candys body was taken to her grandfathers house. Mejica
knew that the police conducted an investigation, which,
according to him, pointed to accused-appellants as the ones
responsible for the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Mejica recalled that, on December 13, 1996, while he was on
his way to Sitio Pinamihagan, he met accused-appellant Baby
Cabagtong. He said he collared accused-appellant and told
him that he was being arrested as one of the suspects in the
rape-slay of Candy Dolim. According to Mejica, Baby tried to
escape but failed. He took Baby to the headquarters and
turned him over to the police. Mejica stated that he did not use
a gun in arresting Baby Cabagtong, but a small bolo belonging
to Baby, which he pretended to borrow from the latter. He
turned over the small bolo (tinogon) to the police. Mejica said
he was present when the police and the mayor investigated
accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong. According to Mejica, he
based his arrest of Baby from the statement of Aurea
Cabagtong. This was not the first time, he said, that he had
arrested a suspect in a case.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif]

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution,


particularly the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his
mother, credible and rendered judgment for the prosecution.
The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 22,
2000, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both
accusedRenanteMendezandBabyCabagtongguiltyoftheoffense
of Rape with Homicide beyond all reasonable doubt and hereby
sentencesthemtothesupremepenaltyofDEATH.Theaccusedare
furthercondemnedtoindemnifytheheirsofthevictimtheamountof
P100,000.00eachasdamages.
SOORDERED.[if!supportFootnotes][45][endif]
Assailing the decision of the trial court, accused-appellants
argue that
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES RONNIE
CABAGTONG AND AUREA CABAGTONG.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE MERELY FALL GUYS TO
THE RAPE-SLAY OF CANDY DOLIM.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
We find the appeal to be meritorious.
I.
First. As already noted, the prosecution is anchored mainly on
the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother, Aurea
Cabagtong. Upon closer examination, however, certain
circumstances make these testimonies suspect. It is doubtful
whether Ronnie really saw accused-appellant Renante
Mendez raping Candy, with the latters hands being held by the
other accused-appellant, Baby Cabagtong. Ronnie admitted
that it was raining that evening and that it was dark as there
was no moonlight. He claimed, however, that he was
nevertheless able to recognize accused-appellant Renante
Mendez and Baby Cabagtong because of a light from a lantern
(parol) hanging about five meters away from the trail where the
crime had been committed.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] His testimony is
contrary to the testimony of another prosecution witness,
Zosimo Mejica, who categorically stated that there were no
houses near the area where Candys body was found and that
it was surrounded by trees. Mejica testified:[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
FISCAL LAGRIMAS:
Q: That place where Candy Dolim was discovered dead, is it
near a trail or street?
A: It is about 50 meters [from] the trail.
Q: Are there bushes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tall bushes?
A: Yes, sir, taller than a man standing.
Q: What kind of grass is that?
A: There were trees and some vines.
Q: So it is not grass, is it a tree?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is that a forest?
A: There are plenty of trees.
Q: Are there houses nearby?
A: None.
Q: The nearest house from the place where the body of Candy
Dolim was discovered is about how far?
A: More than 100 meters.
If there were no houses near the crime scene, it is cause for
wonder how the parol, where the light allegedly came from,
could have been hanged within a distance of five meters from
the place where Ronnie claimed he witnessed the incident.
Even if the crime was committed near the trail, and not on the
exact spot where Candys body was found, the nearest house
would have to be at least 50 meters away. Ronnie even

embellished his story by claiming that the parol was made of


wood with a wick, inside a bottle.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif]
Second. Ronnies behavior after allegedly witnessing
the incident belied his pretension. He was supposed to have
witnessed a crime. Yet he went home, took his supper and
went to sleep as if nothing had happened. When accusedappellants went to his house, Ronnie did not show any
apprehension but matter of factly asked his mother to let them
in. This is not the normal reaction of a person who supposedly
has just seen a crime committed. Ronnies claim that the victim
was his cousin all the more makes his story incredible. For if
this was true, why did he show no concern for her at all?
Instead, he showed sympathy for the assailants. Thus, Ronnie
testified:[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif]
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q: After witnessing this act, you went directly home?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not tell your mother what you saw?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why not?
A: Because I immediately went to sleep.
Q: You were able to sleep at once after having witnessed that
lustful act?
A: I ate first then I went to sleep.
Q: You mean you were able to eat and sleep after having
witnessed this [dastardly] act and this involved your friends?
A: Of course because I was hungry.
Q: Before December 8, 1996, Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong used to go to your house?
A: No, sir.
Q: They are not your friends?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you sure?
A: They are not my friends.
Q: They are your enemies?
A: No, sir.
Q: But they are your acquaintances?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And also Candy Dolim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Especially so that Candy Dolim is your cousin?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is why you are a witness in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
The fact is that another key prosecution witness, SPO2 Noli
Cernio, testified that Ronnie and accused-appellants, Renante
and Baby, were often seen together. In fact, Ronnie and
Renante were picked up and investigated together by the
police.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] If Ronnie was later released, while
Renante was detained at the municipal jail, it was only
because his mother, Aurea, went to the police station and
pointed to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
As Rico Dolim, the father of the victim, testified:[if !supportFootnotes][52]
[endif]

FISCAL LAGRIMAS
Q: Did you finally know the persons or perpetrators responsible
for the death of your daughter?
A: Yes, I finally [knew] the perpetrators who committed the
crime against my daughter from somebody who told me that
[she] would be a witness.
Q: Who is this person who told you about the persons
responsible for the death of your daughter?
A: She is Mrs. Aurea Cabagtong.
Q: When did she tell you?
A: After the funeral of my daughter.
Q: Where did she tell you?
A: At the police headquarters.
Q: Why was she in the police headquarters?
A: Because she was there to look after her son because I

made [a] complain[t] against him, Ron[nie], the son of Aurea.


Q: Why did you have Ron[nie] Cabagtong [investigated] in
relation to the death of your daughter?
A: Because of the rumors circulating around that I must have to
[pin] the person the fact that he is Bogoy-bogoy, he may be
involved.
Q: Was he investigated by the police?
A: He was investigated by the police.
Ronnie Cabagtong was released upon the recommendation of
SPO2 Cernio to the Chief of Police. When asked why he did
not take Ronnies statement during the investigation, SPO2
Cernio testified:[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif]
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q: You likewise investigated Ron[nie] Cabagtong?
A: Yes, sir, I investigated [him].
Q: All of these witnesses you have mentioned except Ron[nie]
Cabagtong executed affidavit[s] which you took, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you not take the affidavit or statement of Ron[nie]
Cabagtong?
A: I made an affidavit for his mother instead.
Q: But Ron[n]ie gave his statement to you, but you did not
reduce [it] into writing?
A: Yes, I did not.
Q: Why did you not reduce into writing the statement of
Ron[nie]. . . ?
A: Because Ron[nie] was not present during the incident, He
was at home.
Q: Why, [were] these other witnesses present, these witnesses
you have listed in the Complaint, [whose affidavits you have
taken], were they present?
A: No, they were not.
Q: Not [one] of them was present during the incident, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir. Nobody was there.
Q: So that the only reason why you did not take the statement
of Ron[nie] was that he was not present during the incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Ron[nie] actually told you that he was not [at] the scene of
the incident as he was in his house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You will not change that statement?
A: Yes, sir.
Thus, SPO2 Cernio took at face value Ronnies word that he
was innocent. Ronnie and his mother were only too willing to
testify against accused-appellants in exchange for his liberty.
From the time of Ronnies release until the time he gave his
statement, Ronnie and his mother had sufficient time to iron
out the details of their testimonies.
It has been held time and again that, to be credible, testimonial
evidence should come not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but it should itself be also credible, reasonable and in
accord with human experience.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] The
testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother Aurea simply
do not meet these standards.
If for any reason there is a possibility that a witness might have
been prompted to testify falsely, courts should be on guard in
assessing the witness credibility.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] While we
do not want to speculate on Ronnies participation in the crime,
we cannot overlook the ulterior motive that he and his mother
had in pointing to accused-appellants as the culprits. For this
reason, we cannot accord full faith and credit to their
testimonies.
II.
The only evidence left against accused-appellants is
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, to pass muster, must
meet the following criteria: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the

circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond


reasonable doubt. Such circumstances must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is guilty. The combination of
evidence must leave no room for doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif]
In this case, Farvesio Banawis said that he met the victim
Candy Dolim while he was on his way home. According to him,
he saw accused-appellants following Candy.[if !supportFootnotes][57][endif]
His testimony merely establishes the fact that, at one point
during the day of the incident, Candy Dolim was in the
company of accused-appellants. However, this fact alone does
not warrant the conclusion that accused-appellants raped and
killed Candy. It is too dangerous a conclusion to be bridged by
this singular event. Farvesio himself admitted that he was
merely thinking that maybe the two guys (referring to accusedappellants) who were following the girl (Candy) were the [ones]
responsible.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
On the other hand, the defense presented Josefina Bernas,
who claimed to have actually witnessed the crime. It puzzles
the Court why no investigation was conducted to follow up this
lead, considering the persistent efforts shown by the police of
Gamay in pursuing accused-appellants. The information was
not insignificant. It was an alleged eyewitness account
identifying the perpetrator as a certain Randy Gomba. It was
even reported through Isabelo Lucero, a barangay captain and
a godfather to the victim. It would seem, however, that the
police were keen on pinning the blame on accused-appellants,
who made for easy targets because of their reputation in their
community. But while SPO2 Cernio testified as to the
troublesome nature of accused-appellants, he offered no proof
for his assertion. There is no record of any case previously filed
against them.
Accused-appellants defense is alibi. But it is settled that where
the evidence of the prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as
to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, alibi
assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength.
The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never
intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, the accused would be put in the difficult position of
having to prove his innocence even where the prosecutions
evidence is vague and weak. The prosecution cannot profit
from the weakness of accused-appellants alibi. It must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and establish the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.[if !supportFootnotes][59]
[endif]

Indeed, unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, an


accused is entitled to an acquittal.[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif] Only when
the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed
by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction. [if !
supportFootnotes][61][endif]
We find that the prosecution in this case failed
to establish the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable
doubt. The evidence presented against them failed to prove
that they were responsible for the crime. While we deplore this
gruesome incident and commiserate with the victims family, we
cannot sustain accused-appellants conviction on the wretched
testimony of an alleged eyewitness presented by the
prosecution.
Nor can we close our eyes to the palpable violations of the
rights of accused-appellants during the period of their
detention. The record shows that accused-appellants were
arrested without any warrants from the courts. Contrary to his
claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest
of Renante Mendez. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests
without warrant under 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is based on actual

facts, i.e., when it is supported by circumstances sufficiently


strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested.[if !supportFootnotes][62][endif]
There is also an inconsistency between Ronnies testimony and
that of SPO2 Cernio. SPO2 Cernio testified that Ronnie told
him the day he was arrested that accused-appellants Renante
Mendez and Baby Cabagtong went to Ronnies house at
around 10 oclock on the night of the incident. But Ronnie
denied that he told the police what he knew of the incident
when he was investigated because he feared for his life. The
police failed to record the investigation, and so it is not now
possible to determine who was actually telling the truth. It is
clear from the records, however, that accused-appellant
Renante Mendez was arrested together with Ronnie
Cabagtong. On the other hand, the only time the police had
evidence against accused-appellant Renante Mendez was
when Aurea Cabagtong came forward after her sons arrest and
pointed to him (Renante Mendez) and Baby Cabagtong as the
perpetrators. But that was only on December 12, 1996, four
days after the commission of the crime, and it could not justify
the arrest of accused-appellants without a judicial warrant.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, on the other hand, was
arrested by Zosimo Mejica, a member of the Citizens Crime
Watch, on the basis of the citizens arrest law. Mejica was
neither a police officer nor a witness to the incident. He was not
a member of the investigating team. He did not have any
personal knowledge of the incident. He admitted during crossexamination that he merely based his arrest on the information
supplied by Aurea Cabagtong to the police.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif]
This does not constitute personal knowledge to warrant a
citizens arrest.
Finally, the records do not show that accused-appellants were
assisted by counsel in the course of the investigation. During
their questioning at the headquarters, only the police
investigators were present. Nowhere in the records was it
shown that they were apprised of their rights under the
Constitution. While no confession was obtained from them,
their interrogation at that time could nonetheless have given
the police valuable leads into the unsolved crime. Accusedappellants also insist that they did not receive a copy of the
order requiring them to submit counter-affidavits. The Clerk of
Court of the MCTC of Gamay merely testified as to the
issuance of said order, but testimony does not confirm that
such it was received by accused-appellants.
The fact that these irregularities were never raised before
arraignment, and were therefore considered waived when
accused-appellants entered their pleas, does not justify the
short cuts. These procedural lapses clearly indicate that the
police had shut its mind off to the possibility that other parties
might have committed the crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, Laoang, Northern Samar, dated December 22,
2000, is REVERSED and accused-appellants Renante
Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong are ACQUITTED of the
crime of rape with homicide on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith
cause the release of accused-appellants unless the latter are
being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice of the action taken
herein.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS DORIA
Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one
Jun was engaged in illegal drug activities and the Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrenst Jun in a buy-bust
operation.

?
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed
Jun the marked bills and Jun instructed PO3 Manlangit to
wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate.
?
When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something
wrapped in plastic upon which PO3 arrested Jun. They
frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named neneth
?
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dinin table and noticed something
wrapped in plastic inside the box.
?
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of
the box and found that it ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves.
?
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked
bills from Neneth. The policemen arrested Neneth and took
both her and Jun, together with the coz, its contents and the
marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters,
?
Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while
Neneth is Violata Gaddao.
?
They were both convicted feloniously selling,
administering and giving away to another 11 plastic bags of
suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as
amended by RA 7659
Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable
?
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can
be raised by an accused & partakes the nature of a confession
& avoidance.
?
American federal courts and state courts usually use
the subjective or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v.
U.S. to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The
focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to
commit the offense is charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents.
?
Another test is the objective test where the test of
entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement
agenst was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person,
other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.
?
The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that
the details of the purported transaction must be clearly &
adequately shown. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validty of
the defense of inducement.
?
In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest uner
Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all
for Gaddao to flee from the policement to justify her arrest in
hot pursuit
?
Neither could her arrest ne justified under second
instance of personal knowledge in Rule 113 as this must be
based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely
on the basis of the alleged indentification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct
examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in
response to his query as to where the marked money was.
Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills.
This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If there is
no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of the acts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.
?
Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6
kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddaos house does not

justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.


?
The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in the sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao
is acquitted
CADUA VS CA
On appeal by certiorari are the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16312, promulgated on June
30, 1995, and the subsequent Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated
December 15, 1995, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The appellate courts decision affirmed in toto the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-9227261,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] which disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thisCourtfindstheaccused
EdwinCaduaguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimecharge
(sic) against him, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminatepenaltyof12years5monthsand10daysofReclusion
TemporalasMinimumto17years,4monthsand1dayofReclusion
TemporalasMaximum,andtopaythecost.Theaccusedisentitled
tothebenefitsoftheprovisionofArticle29oftheRevisedPenal
Code,asamended,providedhedoesnotfallwithintheexceptions
thereof.
SOORDERED.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of
Firearms. The Information reads:
TheundersignedAssistantCityProsecutoraccusesEDWINCADUA
YQUINTAYOov(sic)violationofPD1866(IllegalPossessionof
FirearmsandAmmunitions),committedasfollows:
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 1992, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,withoutanyauthorityin
law,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyhavein
his possession and under his control and custody one (1) .38 cal.
revolver Smith and Wesson paltik, brown finished and wooden
handlewithfour(4)liveammunitions,withoutfirsthavingobtained
theproperlicensethereforfromtheproperauthorities.
Contrarytolaw.[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Assisted by counsel de oficio, petitioner was arraigned in
open court, waived the reading of the Information, and entered a plea
of not guilty.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
As culled from the records, the following factual and
procedural antecedents are pertinent to this appeal.
In the evening of January 2, 1992, between 6:30 and 7:00 in
the evening, PO3 Joselito Burdeos and companions, all assigned with
the Central Police District in Quezon City, were aboard mobile unit
118 patrolling the vicinity of Fairview, Quezon City. Their tour of
duty was from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. While deployed, they received
a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed to Lot 10 Block 14,
Alden Street, North Fairview. Said dispatch was based on a report
concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her
daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]

At said address, police officers found both complainants who


stated that the alleged holduppers had just fled. PO3 Burdeos asked
where the robbery took place. Complainants replied that they were
held up by two (2) men at the corner of Archer and Regalado Streets,
near their house. The police officers also asked in what direction the
alleged holduppers fled and what they were wearing. Then, the police
officers requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in order to
facilitate the search for the two (2) men. [if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] As they
were patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police
officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt
while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants. The police
officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and as
the officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the
complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of
which is the petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down

to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As
Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner
Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side
of his waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and
warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his
possession a .38 caliber paltik revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then
apprehended Caduas companion, who was later identified as Joselito
Aguilar. In Aguilars possession was found a fan knife. [if !supportFootnotes][9]
[endif]

Verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit revealed


that petitioner-accused Edwin Cadua is not a valid license holder of
a .38 caliber paltik revolver.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Originally, Chief Inspector Herminigildo Faustino referred to
the City Prosecutors Office for investigation the cases of Robbery,
Violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and Violation
of PD 5121 (Concealment of a Deadly Weapon). [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
However, Assistant City Prosecutor Edgaro Paragua by resolution
dated January 6, 1992, found only the case for Illegal Possession of
Firearms warranting the filing of an Information. According to
Prosecutor Paragua, during the investigation for robbery,
complainants manifested their doubts as to the identity of the
respondents, hence he set this matter for further investigation. As to
the charge for Violation of City Ordinance 5121 against Aguilar, for
concealment of a deadly weapon, it was found that there was
sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of an Information against
him. But, considering that said violation falls under the Rules of
Summary Procedure, it could not be included in the Information [if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif]
for alleged possession of firearms, which concerned
only herein petitioner. On the same day that this Resolution by
Prosecutor Paragua was released, the Information against petitioner
was filed.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued, resulting in his conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause and that
the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to
his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the
arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in
evidence. Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of
prosecution witness Joselito Burdeos, that the .38 paltik revolver was
found in petitioners possession, already proved one of the essential
elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms. [if !supportFootnotes]
[15][endif]
The CA further held that:
...Asbetweenthepositivedeclarationofprosecutioneyewitness
and only the negative assertion of accusedappellant, the former
deservesmorecredenceandisentitledtogreaterevidentiaryweight.
(Peoplevs.Regalario,220SCRA368)Besides,courtsgenerallygive
full faithand credenceto testimonyof policeofficers asthey are
presumed to have acted in the performance of official duty in a
regularmanner. (Peoplevs.Cabisada,226SCRA383)Moreover,
accusedappellant has not imputed any ill motive on the said
prosecution witnesses as to why they would testify against him,
except to tell the truth. (People vs. Lizada, 225 SCRA 708)[if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]

Petitioner now comes before us on certiorari under Rule 45


of the Rules of Court, assigning the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTIONANDNOTREVERSINGTHESAME.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PALTIK WAS RECOVERED IN AN INCIDENTAL SEARCH
DURINGAWARRANTLESSARRESTMADEBYTHEPOLICE
OFFICERS,HENCEADMISSIBLEINEVIDENCE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN BELIEVING THE
TESTIMONYOFTHEPOLICEOFFICERSWHENITISCLEAR
THAT THE APPREHENSION OF THE ACCUSED WAS
ILLEGAL AND THAT THE FILING OF THE CHARGES FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS BUT AN

AFTERTHOUGHT SINCE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT


ADMITTED THAT THE ACCUSED CADUA WAS NOT THE
HOLDUPPER.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINNOTACQUITTINGTHE
ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.[if !supportFootnotes][17]
[endif]

Discussion of petitioners assignment of errors may first be


subsumed into one principal inquiry: whether or not his right to be
protected from any unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated.
According to petitioner, since his arrest is null and void, the search
conducted by the police officers as an incident to his arrest is likewise
defective. In support of his claim, petitioner seeks to invoke his
constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] and the corresponding prohibition against
admitting into evidence anything obtained in violation of such right.
[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]

Petitioner further claims that the police officers incorrectly


premised their action on the instances provided for in warrantless
arrests. He adds that since the complainants later on disclaimed
petitioners identity as the holdupper and that no case of robbery was
filed against him, any probable cause or personal knowledge thereof,
alleged by the arresting officers, had been totally negated. Thus,
petitioner now posits that, absent probable cause or personal
knowledge by the arresting officers, the arrest and the incidental
search are illegal; hence, the paltik they seized is inadmissible in
evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] According to petitioner, despite lack of
probable cause, he was still arrested because [k]nowing that the
police officers committed a blunder they concocted a story that they
were able to recover a paltik from the accused, so that even if the
accused is freed from the robbery charge they can still keep him for
alleged possession of firearms.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
When police officers realized that they caught the wrong
persons, they would not [have] to (sic) go home empty handed, [if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif]
petitioner asserts. In order to bolster his claim of
innocence, he cites findings on record which showed that he was
negative for powder burns, although the paltik at the time of its
confiscation was positive for gun powder residue. [if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), maintain that the search was an incident to a lawful arrest.
Ergo, they assert that the .38 paltik revolver recovered from petitioner
is admissible in evidence. They add that petitioners denials cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of PO3 Burdeos. The finding that
petitioner was negative for powder burns is immaterial, according to
respondents.
Both the trial and appellate courts, according to respondents,
found that at the time that petitioner was arrested, the police officers
had probable cause to arrest him based on the information which was
given by the complainants. Petitioner Cadua and his companion,
Aguilar, were positively identified by both complainants (mother and
daughter) as the perpetrators of the robbery even before the police
officers alighted from the car to approach petitioner and his
companion, according to respondents. When the police officers
effected the arrest, they already had probable cause and personal
knowledge that petitioner was a suspect in an offense just committed.
As a logical consequence, according to respondents, the search
incidental to the arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered admissible
in evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
According to the Solicitor General, apart from the warrantless
arrest covered under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
wherein an offense has just been committed and the arresting person
has personal knowledge of such offense, warrantless arrest is also
provided for under paragraph (a) of the aforementioned section, that
is, when in the presence of the arresting officer, the person is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense.
In this case, at the time petitioner was called by PO3
Burdeos, petitioner was actually committing an offense when he
made an attempt to pull the revolver which was tucked in his waist,
according to the respondents. Taking this circumstance into account,

they add, the search and seizure are valid and lawful for being
incidental to the warrantless arrest.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
Petitioners denial regarding possession of the .38 paltik
revolver has no independent support nor corroboration, according to
respondents. On this matter, the Solicitor General comments as
follows:
...PO3Burdeosclearlytestifiedthathesawthe.38paltikrevolverin
the possession of petitioner when he arrested the latter. Thus,
petitioners defense of denial, which is uncorroborated and self
servingnegativeevidence,cannotbegivengreaterweightthanthe
declaration of PO3 Burdeos who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535). Moreover, no proof was
shownthatthearrestingofficershadimproperorillmotivetotestify
falsely against petitioner. Accordingly, PO3 Burdeos testimony
shouldbegivenfullfaithandcredit(Peoplevs.Gazmen,247SCRA
414).Besides,asanarrestingofficerwhoisdutyboundtoenforce
thelaw,PO3Burdeosispresumedtohaveregularlyperformedhis
officialduty(Section3[m],Rule131oftheRulesofCourt;People
vs.Basilgo,235SCRA191; Peoplevs.Pacleb,217SCRA92).[if !
supportFootnotes][26][endif]

Lastly, respondents refute petitioners arguments that the


negative findings of gun powder residue should be taken to mean that
he did not have possession of the gun. Whether or not petitioner fired
the gun is not pertinent to the charge of illegal possession of firearms,
respondents argue. It does not follow that just because a person is
found negative for powder burns, he did not fire a gun, they add.
They also cite the findings that even if one has just fired a gun, he
may be negative for nitrates.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
From a careful study of the records of this case, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings by the trial court as affirmed by
the appellate court. Petitioners declaration that the police officers
trumped up a charge of illegal possession just so that they would not
go home empty-handed is far from persuasive. Findings of the trial
court as to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution and the
lone testimony of the defense deserve, in our view, great weight.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case, its findings on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Furthermore, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
strengthens the foregoing doctrine on the credibility of witnesses. The
uncorroborated claim of the accused that he had been framed [if !
supportFootnotes][30][endif]
is, to our mind, self-serving as well as baseless.
Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that there
was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest of petitioner for
illegal possession of firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, provides that:
Sec.5. Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful. Apeaceofficerora
privatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:
(a)When,inhispresence,thepersontobearrestedhascommitted,is
actuallycommitting,orisattemptingtocommitanoffense;
(b)Whenanoffensehasinfactjustbeencommitted, and he has
personalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatthepersontobearrested
hascommittedit;and
(c)Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgmentortemporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending,orhas
escapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrestedwithoutawarrantshallbeforthwithdeliveredtothenearest
policestationorjail,andheshallbeproceededagainstinaccordance
withRule112,Section7.
The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate
court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5
abovecited. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report

and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery


had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As
explained by a respected authority on criminal procedure:
Ithasbeenruledthatpersonalknowledgeoffacts,inarrestswithout
warrantmustbebaseduponprobablecause,whichmeansanactual
belieforreasonablegroundsofsuspicion....Peaceofficersmay
pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious
placesorundersuspiciouscircumstancesreasonablytendingtoshow
thatsuchpersonhascommitted,orisabouttocommit,anycrimeor
breachofthepeace.Probablecauseforanarrestwithoutwarrantis
suchareasonablegroundofsuspicionsupportedbycircumstances
sufficientlystronginthemselvesastowarrantareasonablemanin
believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion,actioningoodfaithisanotherprotectivebulwarkforthe
officer.Undersuchconditions,evenifthesuspectedpersonislater
foundtobeinnocent,thepeaceofficerisnotliable.Thecaseshold
thatapeaceofficermightarrestanddetaininprisonforexamination
persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable
groundtosuspectoffelony,althoughthereisnoproofofafelony
havingbeencommitted;butthearrestwouldbeillegaliftheperson
soarrestedwasinnocentandtherewerenoreasonablegroundsof
suspiciontomisleadtheofficer.Thereasonoftheruleisapparent.
Goodpeopledonotordinarilylurkaboutthestreetsanduninhabited
premisesatmidnight.Citizensmustbeprotectedfromannoyanceand
crime.Preventionofcrimeisjustascommendatoryasthecaptureof
criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await the
commissionofrobberyorotherfelony.Theruleissupportedbythe
necessitiesoflife.[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Petitioner could not dispute that there was an initial report to
the police concerning the robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to
the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the
authenticity of the radio message. When they reached said place, they
met up with the complainants who initiated the report about the
robbery. Upon the officers invitation, both mother and daughter
boarded the mobile unit to join them in conducting a search of the
nearby area. The accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the
reported statements of complainants, he was identified as a logical
suspect in the offense just committed.
Moreover, at that time that PO3 Burdeos called out to
petitioner, the latter was on the act of drawing out his paltik revolver.
Burdeos testimony on this matter reads:
WITNESS:
We alighted and approached and we noticed that there is something
the accused is trying to hide and also trying to pull out.
FISCAL:
Was he able to pull that something?
WITNESS:
No.
FISCAL:
And, what was that?
WITNESS:
The .38 paltik.
FISCAL:
When you saw [that] what did you do . . . when you saw the accused
pulling out that .38 paltik?
WITNESS:
I pointed [at] him my gun [then] shouted dont move or Ill shoot! [if !
supportFootnotes][32][endif]

Nothing in petitioners testimony successfully rebuts Burdeos


narration. Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which
petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer contemplated in
paragraph (a), Section 5 of the abovementioned Rule.
The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does
not mean that the legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest
does not depend upon the indubitable existence of the crime. [if !
supportFootnotes][33][endif]
It is not necessary that the crime should have been

established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. The


legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual
commission of the crime but upon the nature of the deed, where from
such characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for
the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. [if !
supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that police
authorities can stop a person forcibly when such action is based on
something more than a mere reasonable and articulable suspicion that
such a person has been engaged in criminal activity. [if !supportFootnotes][35]
[endif]
All told, the arresting officers reasonably acted upon personal
knowledge at the time, and not on unreliable hearsay information, [if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]
to effect a lawful arrest.
That the victims of the reported robbery failed to pursue a
formal complaint is not decisive in this case. What is material is that
the officers acted in response to the events which had just transpired
and called for the appropriate police response. As to the element of
personal knowledge, the officers could not be faulted. It is not correct
to say they acted without observing standards of reasonableness and
probable cause. They responded promptly to a legitimate complaint
of the victims and they had a reasonable suspicion that the persons
pointed out at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. This in
itself is sufficient justification for the officers to call the attention of
the accused at that point in time when he was identified as a suspect
by the complainants.
The reason which prompted complainants to refrain from
identifying the accused during the examination by the police
regarding the robbery is not determinative of the resolution of the
present case. It bears stressing that the case now before us is for the
illegal possession of firearms, and not for the robbery. Petitioner
proceeds from a wrong premise when, in support of his assigned
errors, he argues that the arrest and the search should be considered
invalid merely because the robbery charge was never formally filed
and prosecuted. In Rabaja vs. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] a
Department of Environment and Natural Resources employee,
Rabaja, was charged with and convicted of Illegal Possession of
Firearms even though the private complainant whom he threatened
eventually dropped the charges against him. The charge for illegal
possession was pursued by the authorities.
Petitioner avers that complainants admitted that accused was
not the holdupper.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] A perusal of the records shows
no such admission. The resolution, issued by Assistant City
Prosecutor Paragua in the robbery case, stated that no information
could yet be filed because complainants manifested doubts as to the
identity of their assailants. [if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] The resolution should
not be taken to mean an admission that petitioner Cadua had been
totally ruled out as a suspect in the crime. If petitioner wanted to
impress the Court that even on probable cause he could not be
accosted, then that impression is inaccurate and wrong. On crossexamination, petitioner himself did not object to the question but
admitted the fact that the complaint was withdrawn, but not for the
reason that he was ruled out as the person who committed the
offense.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to
affirm the finding below that the warrantless arrest of petitioner is
lawful. We also agree that the incidental search and subsequent
seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and
valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec.12.Searchincidenttolawfularrest.Apersonlawfullyarrested
maybesearchedfordangerousweaponsoranythingwhichmaybe
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is
actually being committed, or soon after its commission. The right to
search includes in these instances that of searching the person of one
who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the

crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission. [if !supportFootnotes][41]
[endif]

When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the


arrest, the paltik was found in his possession, and seized. Such
seizure cannot be considered unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover,
at that moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the
arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that petitioner was
armed. Petitioners movements clearly suggested the presence of a
weapon tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an
immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive response
to petitioners actions which, under the circumstances, indicated a
high probability of an offensive attack with a lethal weapon.
Petitioners counsel mistakenly relies on the case of People
vs. Aminnudin.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] In said case, Aminnudin was
acquitted on the charge of illegally transporting marijuana because
the Court found that the search could not be considered an incident to
a lawful arrest considering that the circumstances did not come under
the exceptions provided for by applicable law and the Rules of Court.
It was therein held that the warrantless arrest and the subsequent
search were illegal, hence the evidence thereby obtained was
inadmissible. However, Aminnudin differs radically from the case
now before us. In Aminnudin, [i]t is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known. The vehicle was identified. And from the
information they had received they could have persuaded a judge that
there was probable cause, indeed to justify the issuance of a warrant. [if
!supportFootnotes][43][endif]

A situation involving a surveillance mission like that of


Aminnudin could not compare to that of an unexpected crime of
holdup-robbery. Police behavior in the latter case would necessitate a
different course of action as well as different rules of engagement,
compared to the former. In the case now before us, there is no
supervening event, much less considerable amount of time between
reaching the scene of the crime and the actual apprehension of the
suspect.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, to the arrest, or question concerning the defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] The records in this case shows no
such objection to the arrest, nor any question as to the irregularity of
his arrest, raised by petitioner.
Petitioners arrest having been found valid and the seizure of
the firearms lawful, we now focus on the second issue for resolution,
whether or not petitioner is liable for the offense of illegal possession
of firearms?
Here two elements must be proved: (a) positively, the
existence of the subject firearm, and (b) negatively, the fact that the
accused did not have a license or permit to possess the same. [if !
supportFootnotes][45][endif]
We find both elements present in this case.
First, testimony of witnesses on record affirms that the paltik
revolver was taken from the person of petitioner at the time he was
arrested. Further SPO1 Cesar Gabitan, of the Firearms and Explosive
Unit, testified without contradiction that petitioner had no license or
permit to possess the gun.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] This Court has ruled in
several cases that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police- Firearms and
Explosives Office (PNP-FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee
of any firearm suffices to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of illegal possession of firearms.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
Petitioners claim that since he was found negative for gun
powder burns, he should be held innocent and acquitted of the charge,
considering that the paltik at the time of its confiscation was positive
for gun powder residue, does not quite add up logically. The appellate
courts holding on the matter deflates petitioners defense:
Neither do [w]e find accusedappellants assertion that he was
negativeforgunpowderburnstoberelevantinthiscase.Whetheror
notaccusedappellantfiredtheguninquestiondoesnoterasehis

offenseofillegallypossessingthesaidgun.Besides,beingnegative
ofgunpowderburnsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthataccusedappellant
hasnotfiredthegun....
xxx
Asstatedbythetrialcourt:
OnquestioningbytheCourt,witnesscitedseveralfactorswhereina
personwhohasfiredhisfirearmbutwasnegativefornitrates;the
typeofcaliberoftheammunitionofthefirearmitself;anewfirearm
orrevolvertypewouldbesoclosethatnitratescouldnotescapefrom
thebridgeofthegun,whereasanoldfirearmwherethemechanismis
alreadyalittlebitloose,morenitratesappearonthesubjectwhofired
thegun;thedirectionofthewindifthesubjectisfiringthefirearm
againstthetarget,thenitrateswillbeblownawayfromthesceneand
sohewouldalsobenegativeofnitrates;dependingonthevelocityof
thewind,humidityoftheareawheretheshootinghappened;ina
closedroomorplaceand[where]thereisnowindonoragainstthe
firearm,hecouldbepositivefornitrates;whereasoutsidetheroom
hewouldbenegativeandthelesshumidareathelessfallofnitrates
on the subject, and another possibility is if the subject is using
somethingtocoverhishandfiringthegunitwouldbenegativefor
nitratesandinusinga.45calibergun,whichhasacloseandtight
compartment where the bullet is set and with the revolver type
firearm which has an open chamber, the former has a greater
possibilitythathewouldbenegativefornitrates.[if!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
The penalty imposed upon petitioner, however, deserves a
review. At the time that he was convicted, the penalty for Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree 1866 was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The trial
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, imposed on petitioner the
penalty of 12 years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] In view of the enactment of Republic
Act 8294 on June 6, 1997, certain provisions of P.D. 1866 have been
amended. With the passage of the aforementioned law, the penalty for
simple illegal possession of a low-powered firearm, such as paltik,
has been reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period[if !
supportFootnotes][50][endif]
and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00). Therefore following R.A. 8294, the penalty imposed on
petitioner should now be lowered to benefit the petitioner. For the
penalty provided for simple illegal possession in the amendment is
lower than that provided for under the old law. Since the provision of
R.A. 8294 is favorable to petitioner, it should have a retroactive
effect, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. [if !supportFootnotes]
[51][endif]
Moreover, in conjunction with the new law, we should also
apply the doctrine laid down in People vs. Martin Simon[if !supportFootnotes]
[52][endif]
in relation to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[if !
supportFootnotes][53][endif]
Although Illegal Possession of Firearms is
considered a special law, the penalty provided is taken from the range
of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, thus, in relation to Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is covered by the first clause of
said section. Here applicable by analogy and extension is the holding
in Simon:
ItistruethatSection1ofsaidlaw,afterprovidingforindeterminate
sentenceforanoffenseundertheRevisedPenalCode,statesthatif
theoffenseispunishedbyanyotherlaw,thecourtshallsentencethe
accusedtoanindeterminatesentence,themaximumtermofwhich
shallnotexceedthemaximumfixedbysaidlawandtheminimum
shallnotbelessthantheminimumtermprescribedbythesame.We
holdthatthisquotedportionofthesectionindubitablyreferstoan
offense undera speciallaw whereinthe penaltyimposed wasnot
takenfromandiswithoutreferencetotheRevisedPenalCode,as
discussedintheprecedingillustrations,suchthatitmaybesaidthat
the offense is punished under that law. (Emphasis Supplied)[if !
supportFootnotes][54][endif]

Finally, consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in a


criminal case throws the whole case open for review, we find that the
appellate court may, in applying the new or amended law,

additionally impose a fine which if unpaid will subject the convict to


subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] Thus, here we find the imposition of a fine
also in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to
2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days of prision correccional
maximum as maximum, there being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, plus a fine of P15,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment should petitioner fail to pay. However, since petitioner
has already served more than seven (7) years, (5) months in prison,
which is now beyond the maximum principal penalty imposed at
present for his offense, even if a subsidiary penalty for unpaid fine is
included, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is
being held for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS MONTILLA
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers
Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a
drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to
Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of
marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at
Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting
shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then
apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag
and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla
denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite
from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects
with him at that time except for some pocket money.
He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that
the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there
was no warrant and that he should have been given
the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He
said that if the informant has given the cops the
information about his arrival as early as the day before
his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to
secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest
conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal
and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the
Constitution has its exception when it comes to
warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the
information relayed by informant to the cops was that
there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early
morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could
not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that
they could readily have access to a judge or a court

that was still open by the time they could make


preparations for applying therefor, and on which there
is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not
only the intervening time is controlling but all the
coincident and ambient circumstances should be
considered, especially in rural areas.
A
legitimate
warrantless
arrest,
as
above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from
the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense.

PEOPLE VS BURGOS
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur
Facts:
One Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at the
Davao del Sur Constabulary HQ.
He testified that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him as
member of NPA. Burgos threatened him with the use of a
firearm. Masamlok attended the seminar where Burgos spoke
about his membership with the NPA and the organizations
desire to overthrow the government.
Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to house
of accused. Accused was plowing the field when they arrived.
Pat. Bioco called accused and asked him about the firearm.
Accused denied possession of said firearm but later, his wife
pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in
the ground.
After the recovery of said firearm, accused pointed to a stock
pile of cogon where the officers recovered:
14 marron notebook
15 pamphlets: Ang Byan, Pahayagan ng Paritdo Komunista
ng Pilipinas ets
Accused admitted that firearm was issued to him by Nestor
Jimines, team leader of sparro unit.
RTC: convicted
Issue: WON warrantless arrest was valid
Held: NO
Ratio:
Not under the conditions provided in rules
The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator
Under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a person to be arrested has committed a
crime; a crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first.
Issue: WON search was valid
Held: NO
Ratio:
If an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is
made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful.
16 There was to waiver to search in case at bar.
To constitute waiver, 3 requisites must concur:
that the right exists
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
Others:
17 denied of right to counsel during custodial interrogation

18 counsel was only called when accused subscribed under


oath his statement
Masamloks testimony was uncorroborated. He was an
interested witness. Wanted trade-off: membership with Civil
Home Defense Force.
Disposition. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS JAYSON
Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson was charged with
violation of P.D. No. 1866 in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City. The amended information alleged
ThatonoraboutMarch16,1991,intheCityofDavao,Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
mentionedaccusedwilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslywithintentto
possess, had in his possession and under his custody one (1) .38
caliberrevolver(Paltik),withSerialNumber91955andfour(4)live
ammunitions inside the chamber of said revolver, without first
securingthenecessarylicensetopossessthesame.
Thatthesame.38caliberrevolverwasusedbytheaccusedinkilling
NelsonJordanonMarch16,1991.
Contrarytolaw.
DavaoCity,Philippines,July12,1991.
The prosecution evidence shows that in the evening of March
16, 1991, accused-appellant, then a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw
nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City, shot one Nelson
Jordan. He was arrested after he had been pointed by
eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was a .38
caliber revolver with serial number 91955, [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
four live bullets, and one empty shell.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The
firearm and ammunition were covered by a memorandum
receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation
and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District
Command.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The mission order authorized
accused-appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds
of ammunition [t]o intensify intel[ligence] coverage and was for
a three-month duration (from February 8, 1991 to May 8,
1991), subject to the following restrictions:[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
VII.Thecarryingoffirearmsisprohibitedinplaceswherepeople
gather for political, religious, social, educational, and recreational
purposes, such as churches or chapels, carnival grounds or fans,
nightclubs,cabarets,dancehalls,dancingplacesduringfiestasand
othercelebrations,bars,liquordrinkingplaces,theatersormovies,
cockpits, race tracks and the like, except when the personnel
concerned is on official mission in such places for which he was
authorizedtocarryfirearms.
Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder[if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
in an information filed on March 20, 1991 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Davao City but, after plea-bargaining, he
was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. [if !
supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In a decision dated September 24, 1991, the
trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On July 15, 1991, he was charged with illegal possession of
firearm.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] The information against him was
amended on October 8, 1991 in order to allege that the firearm
subject of the charge had been used in the killing of a person
(Nelson Jordan) on March 16, 1991.
On June 17, 1993,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] he was found guilty by the
Regional Trial Court and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
The trial court found accused-appellant acted in good faith,
believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt
issued to him were valid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] increased
the penalty on accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua and, in

accordance with Rule 124, 13 of the Rules on Criminal


Procedure, certified the case to this Court for review. Both
accused-appellant
and
plaintiff-appellee
have
filed
supplemental briefs.
Accused-appellant maintains that he acted in the good faith
belief that he was authorized to carry the firearm by virtue of
the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him by
Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District
Command. He argues that the failure of the prosecution to
present as witness the government official who had certified
that accused-appellant was not the holder of a firearms license
is fatal to the prosecution of this case.
I.
Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant, it is
pertinent to consider the circumstances surrounding accusedappellants arrest and the seizure from him of the firearm in
question considering that both were made without any warrant
from a court.
With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro[if !supportFootnotes][11]
[endif]
testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of March 16,
1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas
were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from
their camp directing them to proceed to the Ihaw-Ihaw on
Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly,
they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson
Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one
who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant.
Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number
91955. The firearm was covered by a mission order and
memorandum receipt. Considering these facts, we hold that
the warrantless arrest and search were valid.
Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
privatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:....
(b)Whenanoffensehasinfactjustbeencommitted, and he has
personalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatthepersontobearrested
hascommittedit.
In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen
summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not
gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw),
although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted
on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim
and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the
assailant.
This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous
circumstances. In People v. Tonog, Jr.,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] the
police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab
wounds. An informer pointed to the accused as the person who
had killed the victim. That afternoon, police officers arrested
the accused. On their way to the police station, a policeman
noticed bloodstains on the accuseds pants which, when
examined, was found to be the same blood type O found on
the fatal knife. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest and
ruled that the blood-stained pants, having been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest, was admissible in evidence.
In People v. Gerente,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] the police arrested the
accused three hours after the victim had been killed. They
went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block used by the killers in
bludgeoning the victim to death. A neighbor of the accused
who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the
assailants. The warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule
113, 5(b).
In People v. Acol,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] a group held up a
passenger jeepney. Policemen immediately responded to the
report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons

walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his


jacket. He pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw
the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. Three
were caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an
unlicensed revolver and charged with illegal possession of
firearms. The accused claimed that the warrantless seizure of
firearms was illegal. The Court rejected their plea and held that
the search was a valid incident of a lawful arrest.
The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the
seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful. Rule 126,
12 states:
Sec.12.Searchincidenttolawfularrest.Apersonlawfullyarrested
maybesearchedfordangerousweaponsoranythingwhichmaybe
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
In People v. Lua,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] a buy-bust operation was
conducted against the accused. After accused had gone inside
his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana
and received the marked money, the designated poseur-buyer
gave the signal to his fellow police officers who closed in and
arrested the accused. In the course of the arrest, a police
officer noticed something bulging at accuseds waistline, which
turned out to be an unlicensed .38 caliber paltik with two live
bullets. Accused was charged with illegal possession of
firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a lawful
arrest.
II.
We now come to the main question of accused-appellants
liability for illegal possession of firearm. There is no dispute
that accused-appellant was in possession of the gun in this
case. His defense is that the gun is covered by a memorandum
receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military
Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan
District Command.
The issuance of mission orders is governed by Memorandum
Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986 of the then Ministry of
Justice, which in pertinent part states:[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
..Itisunlawfulforanypersonorofficetoissueamissionorder
authorizing the carrying of firearms by any person unless the
followingconditionsaremet:
1.ThattheAFPofficerisauthorizedbythelawtoissuethemission
order;
2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also
authorizedbythelawtohaveamissionorder,i.e.,hemustbean
organicmemberofthecommand/unitoftheAFPofficerissuingthe
missionorder.Ifmissionordersareissuedtocivilians(notmembers
oftheuniformedservice),theymustbecivilianagentsincludedinthe
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcementandarereceivingregularcompensationfortheservices
they are rendering. (In this case, the agency head or officials so
designatedbythelawshallissuethemissionorder.)....
As the Court of Appeals held, however, Major Arquillano, who
had issued the mission order in question, was not authorized to
do the same. Neither was accused-appellant qualified to have
a mission order.
Admittedly, Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue
mission orders to civilian agents of the AFP as he was not any
of the following officers mentioned in the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, 5(a), to wit: [if !supportFootnotes][17]
[endif]

(1) The Minister of National Defense and such other Ministry


officialsdulydesignatedbyhim;
(2)TheChiefofStaff,AFP;
(3) Chief of the General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs of
GHQAFP;
(4)CommandersoftheAFPMajorServicesincludingtheChiefsof
theirrespectiveGeneral/Special/TechnicalandPersonalStaffs;

(5) Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of AFPWSSU and major


commands/unitsoftheAFPandtheMajorServices;
(6)Commandersofbattalionsandhigherunitsandtheirequivalentin
thePhilippineAirForceandPhilippineNavy;
(7)CommandersofAFPintelligenceunitsfromGHQAFPdownto
regionalcommandlevels;
(8) Provincial Commanders, METRODISCOM Commanders,
company commanders and their equivalent in the Philippine Air
ForceandPhilippineNavy;and
(9) Detachment commanders in remote areas whose higher
commandersarenoteasilyavailabletoissuesuchorders.
Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida,
had authorized him (Major Arquillano) to exercise this function
so that people would not be swarming [in Calidas] office.[if !
supportFootnotes][18][endif]
As the appellate court well stated, full faith
and credit cannot be given to such bare assertion. Not only
was there no written delegation of authority to Major Arquillano,
it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of
the unit had authority to issue mission orders, could delegate
this authority to his deputy.
Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a mission
order because he was a mere reserve of the Citizen Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly
compensation. In fact he worked as a bouncer in a nightclub,
and it was as a bouncer that he used the gun seized from him.
Even assuming that the issuance to accused-appellant of the
mission order was valid, it is clear that, in carrying the firearm
inside the nightclub where he was working as a bouncer,
accused-appellant violated the restrictions in the mission order.
These restrictions prohibited him from carrying firearms in
places where people converge unless on official mission.
Accused-appellants claim that he had been told by Major
Arquillano that he could carry the firearm anywhere in Davao
City[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] was flatly denied by Major Arquillano
who testified that precisely he called accused-appellants
attention to the restrictions.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Nevertheless, it is argued that the prosecution failed to prove
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt because
the prosecution did not present SPO4 Welliejado S. Sim of the
FAS/Explosive NCO Davao Metropolitan District Command,
who had certified that per records on file [in] this Command Mr.
Wenceslao Jayson does not exist/appear in the list of license
holders as of this date. Accused-appellant claims that the
prosecution merely presented as Exhibit H the certification
without calling the issuing authority to testify so that he could
be cross-examined with regard to his certification.
Objection based on this ground must be deemed waived in
view of accused-appellants failure to object to the presentation
of the evidence. The certification in question was marked when
the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, [if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
but accused-appellants counsel did not object. Neither did
counsel object when the certification was offered in evidence
by the prosecution.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
In any event, accused-appellant does not claim to be the
holder of a regular license but only of a mission order and
memorandum receipt. Considering the invalidity of these
documents, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
correctly held accused-appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.
Nor can accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good
faith belief that the documents issued to him sufficed as legal
authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals
pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
valid defenses because the offense committed is malum
prohibitum punishable by special law.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
III.
It remains for us to determine whether the provisions of the
recently enacted R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, [if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]
can be applied to this case on the theory that

it is more favorable to accused-appellant.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]


R.A. No. 8294, provides in pertinent part:
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or ammunition or Instruments Used or
IntendedtobeUsedintheManufactureofFirearmsorAmmunition.
Thepenaltyof prisioncorreccional initsmaximumperiodanda
fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be
imposeduponanypersonwhoshallunlawfullymanufacture,dealin,
acquire,dispose,orpossessanylowpoweredfirearm,suchasrimfire
handgun,.380or.32andotherfirearmofsimilarfirepower,partof
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intendedtobeusedinthemanufactureofanyfirearmorammunition:
Provided,Thatnoothercrimewascommitted

.
....
Ifhomicideormurderiscommittedwiththeuseofanunlicensed
firearm,suchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsideredasan
aggravatingcircumstance.(Emphasisadded)
Apparently, even though the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be
applied in this case so as to favor accused-appellant in view of
the proviso in 1 that the first paragraph, providing for lighter
penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has
been committed. Nor can the third paragraph be applied by
considering the illegal possession of firearm as a mere
aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized
was used in the commission of a crime, this case concerns
solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The criminal
case for homicide is not before us for consideration.
Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with
the ruling in People v. Quijada,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] that a person
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty
of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised
Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under
P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERRY VS OHIO
ThePetitioner, JohnW.Terry(thePetitioner),wasstoppedand
searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner
seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
approachedthePetitionerforquestioninganddecidedtosearchhim
first.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individualonastreetcornerwhilerepeatedlywalkingupanddown
thesamestreet.Themenwouldperiodicallypeerintoastorewindow
andthentalksomemore.Themenalsospoketoathirdmanwhom
theyeventuallyfollowedupthestreet.Theofficerbelievedthatthe
Petitionerandtheothermenwerecasingastoreforapotential
robbery.Theofficerdecidedtoapproachthemenforquestioning,
andgiventhenatureofthebehaviortheofficerdecidedtoperforma
quicksearchofthemenbeforequestioning.Aquickfriskingofthe
Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
chargedwithcarryingaconcealedweapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for
arrestisanunreasonablesearchundertheFourthAmendmenttothe
UnitedStatesConstitution(Constitution)?
Held.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SupremeCourt)
heldthatitisareasonablesearchwhenanofficerperformsaquick
seizureandalimitedsearchforweaponsonapersonthattheofficer
reasonablybelievescouldbearmed.Atypicalbeatofficerwouldbe
undulyburdenedbybeingprohibitedfromsearchingindividualsthat
theofficersuspectstobearmed.

B.METHOD OF ARREST BY OFFICER


RULE 113 Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without
warrant. When making an arrest without a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority
and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged
in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after
its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of
such information will imperil the arrest.
PEOPLE VS MAHINAY
AppellantLarryMahinayworkedasahouseboywithMariaIsip,one
of his tasks was to take care of Isips house which was under
constructionadjacenttothelattersresidence.Thevictimwasa12
yearoldgirlwhousedtofrequenttheresidenceofIsip.

Onthelateeveningof25June1995,thevictimwasreportedmissing
by her mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a
passengerjeepneyanddisappeared.

Thevictimsbodywasfound,lifeless,ataround7:30amthatsame
day.Shewasfoundintheseptictankwearingherblouseandno
underwear.Theautopsyshowedthatthevictimwasrapedandwas
strangledtodeath.

Uponreexaminingthecrimescene,policemenfoundapairofdirty
whiteshortpants,abrownbeltandayellowhairribbonwhichwas
identifiedbythevictimsmothertobelongtoherdaughter. Also,
theyfoundapairofblueslipperswhichIsipidentifiedasthatofthe
appellant.Alsofoundintheyard,threearmslengthawayfromthe
septictankwereanunderwear,aleatherwallet,apairofdirtylong
pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants
belongings.

The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extrajudicial


confessionwhereinhenarratedhowthecrimewascommitted.The
trialensuedandthelowercourtconvictedhimofthecrimeofRape
andwassentencedtodeath.

ThecasewasforwardedtotheSupremeCourtforautomaticreview.

Issues

WONtheappellantsextrajudicialconfessionwasvalidlytakenand
inaccordancewithhisrightsunderSection12oftheBillofRights;
and

WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution


sufficienttoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt

Ruling

Theconvictionoftheappellantisaffirmed.

RatioDecidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was
taken within the ambit of the law as evinced by the records and
testimonyofthelawyerwhoassisted,warnedandexplainedtohim
hisconstitutionallyguaranteedpreinterrogatoryandcustodialrights.

Astothesecondissue,theappellantarguesthatthecircumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a
convictionofhisguilt.However,theCourtruledotherwise.


TheCourtrecalledtheRuleonEvidenceandsettledjurisprudence.
Absence of direct proof does not absolve the appellant because
conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following
requisitesasstatedintheRulesofCourt:
1.thereismorethanonecircumstance;
thefactsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedareproven;and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
convictionbeyondreasonabledoubt.
TheCourtrecalledtherulinginPeoplev.DeGuia,280SCRA141,
allcircumstancesmustbeconsistentwitheachother,consistentwith
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistentwiththehypothesisthatheisinnocentandwithevery
otherrationalhypothesisexceptthatofguilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v.
Abitona,240SCRA335,thatfactsandcircumstancesconsistentwith
guiltandinconsistentwithinnocence,constituteevidencewhich,in
weightandprobativeforce,maysurpassevendirectevidenceinits
effectuponthecourt.
TheCourtagreedwiththetrialcourtsdecisioningivingcredenceto
severalcircumstantialevidence,whichismorethanenoughtoprove
appellantsguiltbeyondtheshadowofreasonabledoubt.
TheCourtalsoupdatedtheMirandarightswiththedevelopmentsin
lawthatprovidedtherightsofsuspectsundercustodialinvestigation
indetail.

Apersonundercustodialinvestigationshouldbeinformed:
1.Inalanguageknowntoandunderstoodbyhimofthereasonfor
thearrestandhemustbeshownthewarrantofarrest,ifany;Every
otherwarnings,informationorcommunicationmustbeinalanguage
knowntoandunderstoodbysaidperson;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makesmaybeusedasevidenceagainsthim;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presenceofanindependentandcompetentlawyer,preferablyofhis
ownchoice;
4.Thatifhehasnolawyerorcannotaffordtheservicesofalawyer,
onewillbeprovidedforhim;andthatalawyermayalsobeengaged
byanypersoninhisbehalf,ormaybeappointedbythecourtupon
petitionofthepersonarrestedoroneactinginhisbehalf;
5. That nocustodial investigationin anyform shallbe conducted
exceptinthepresenceofhiscounselorafteravalidwaiverhasbeen
made;
6.That,atanytime,hehastherighttocommunicateorconferbythe
mostexpedientmeanstelephone,radio,letterormessengerwith
his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediatefamily,oranymedicaldoctor,priestorministerchosenby
himorbyanyonefromhisimmediatefamilyorbyhiscounsel,orbe
visitedby/conferwithdulyaccreditednationalorinternationalnon
governmentorganization.Itshallbetheresponsibilityoftheofficer
toensurethatthisisaccomplished;
7.Thathehastherighttowaiveanyofsaidrightsprovideditismade
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understoodthesame;
8.ThatthewaivermustbedoneinwritingANDinthepresenceof
counsel,otherwise,hemustbewarnedthatthewaiverisvoidevenif
heinsistonhiswaiverandchoosestospeak;
9.Thathemayindicateinanymanneratanytimeorstageofthe
processthathedoesnotwishtobequestionedwithwarningthatonce
hemakessuchindication,thepolicemaynotinterrogatehimifthe
samehadnotyetcommenced,ortheinterrogationmustceasedifit
hasalreadybegun;
10.Thathisinitialwaiverofhisrighttoremainsilent,therightto
counseloranyofhisrightsdoesnotbarhimfrominvokingitatany
timeduringtheprocess,regardlessofwhetherhemayhaveanswered
somequestionsorvolunteeredsomestatements;

11.Thatanystatementorevidence,asthecasemaybe,obtainedin
violationofanyoftheforegoing,whetherinculpatoryorexculpatory,
inwholeorinpart,shallbeinadmissibleinevidence.
C. METHOD OF ARREST BY PRIVATE PERSON
RULE 113 Section 9. Method of arrest by private person.
When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the
person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause
of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its
commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before
the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him,
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
D. POST ARREST PROCEDURE
RULE 112 Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without
warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided in this Rule
E. EXCEPTION CONSTRUED STRICTLY
DAVID ET AL VS ARROYO
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017
declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless
violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did
so citing the following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPPNPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting
the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must
be noted that before the said proclamations, the following
course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled
Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming
in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist
safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20 th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to
defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col.
Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of

command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.


The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.
However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA
and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups
within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of
programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well
as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal
of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and
confiscation of news stories and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by
the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and
attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of
the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at
hand.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot
and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on
the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none
of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their
insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless
arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and
to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be
decided provided that the party raising it continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the
present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into
the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the
President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft
of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.
Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of
terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution provides that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless
arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones
presence or it has just been committed based on personal
knowledge both of which are not present in Davids
warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and
arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the
right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale
cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the
principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much

less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger


of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice
and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure
of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate
the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to
declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the
judgment of conviction promulgated by Branch 45 of the Regional
Trial Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, on October 24, 1996 sentencing him to death for the
complex crime of Multiple Murder with double Frustrated Murder,
and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of
reclusion perpetua for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
The information against accused-appellant, Bernard Castro,
and one John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder charged:
Thatonorabout8:30oclockintheeveningofSeptember17,1995,
at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian, municipality of Manaoag,
provinceofPangasinan,andwithinandjurisdictionofthisHonorable
Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helpingoneanotherwithintenttokill,andeacharmedwithcaliber.
30carbinesdidthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,
withevidentpremeditation,abuseofsuperiorstrengthandtreachery,
simultaneouslyattackedandfiredtheircaliber.30carbinesatRamon
Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta, Sandra Montano,
William Montano and Randy Tibule while they were on board a
tricycle,ontheirwaytoadanceparty,hittingtheminthedifferent
partsoftheirbodieswhichcausedtheinstantaneousdeathofRamon
Garcia,Jr.,JeanMarieGarcia,WillyAcostaandSandraMontano,to
thedamageandprejudiceoftheirrespectiveheirs,andinflictingfatal
injuriestoWilliamMontanoandRandyTibule,inthedifferentparts
oftheirbodies,havingthusperformedalltheactswhichwouldhave
producedthecrimeofmurderwithrespecttobothbutwhichdidnot
byreasonofcausesindependentofthewilloftheaccused,namely,
theableandtimelymedicalassistancegiventhesaidvictimsWilliam
MontanoandRandyTibule,whichpreventedtheirdeath.
ContrarytoArticle248inRelationtoArticle48andArticle6ofthe
RPC.
(pp.12,RecordofCrim.CaseNo.U8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions pertinently averred:
Thatonorabout8:30oclockintheeveningofSeptember17,1995at
Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality of Manaoag,
provinceofPangasinanandwithinandjurisdictionofthisHonorable
Court,thesaidaccused,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyand
feloniously,haveinhispossession,custodyandcontrol,afirearm,to
wit: Caliber .30 carbine without first having secured the proper
licensethereoffromtheauthoritiesandwhichheusedincommitting
theoffenseofmultiplemurderanddoublefrustratedmurder.
ContrarytoPresidentialDecree1866.
(p.1,RecordofCrim.CaseNo.U8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial
are succinctly summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William
Montano(16yearsold), RandyTibule(17yearsold), JeanMarie
Garcia,WillieAcosta,SandraMontanoandRamonGarcia,Jr.,were

atthehouseofRandyTibuleinManaoag,Pangasinan.Theywere
discussinghowtogototheweddingpartyofJeanMariescousinin
SitioCabaoangan(TSNJune11,1996,pp.78;June18,1996,pp.
2324).
Afterdiscussion,theyrodeinthetricycledrivenbyRamonGarcia
goingtoCabaoangan.BehindGarciawereTibuleandWillie.Jean
was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSNJune11,1996,pp.711;TSNJune18,1996,pp.2325).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio
Cabaoangan,theymetappellantRolandoValdezandhiscompanions
whowerearmedwithguns.Thetricyclesheadlightflashedontheir
faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at
Montanos group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan,
mapan tayon (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companionsleft(TSNJune11,1996,pp.1114).
TheshootingincidentleftRamonGarcia,JeanMarieGarcia,Sandra
MontanoandWillieAcostadead(TSNJune11,1996,pp.1416).
Theysustainedthefollowinginjuries:
JeanMarieGarcia:
gunshotwound.5cm.indiameter,1inchlateralofthenippleright
through and through trajecting the middle lobe of the lungs, rt
ventricleoftheheart,middlelobeofthelung,leftwithpointofexit1
inchindiameter1inchlateralofthenipple,left.
(ExhibitB)
RamonGarcia:
gunshotwound,.5cm.diameterpointofentranceearcanalthruand
thrutrajectingtheskullbrainsubstancewithpointofexittemporal
arearight.
Another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance
anterioraxilliarylineleftatthelablenippletrajectingthelung(left)
heartventricleandlung(right)withpointofexit1cm.indiameter,1
inchlateralthenippleright.
(ExhibitC)
SandraMontano:
gunshotwound.6cm.indiameter,pointofentranceatthetemporal
arealeft,penetratingtheskin,skullminigas,brainsubstance(right)
(tempralregis)wherethesluglodge.
(ExhibitD)
WillieAcosta:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of
entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru
trajectingtheupperthirdofthestomachofthoracicveinwiththe
point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7 th thorasic
vertebrae.
(ExhibitE)
Ontheotherhand,WilliamMontanoandRandyTibulesurvivedthe
attack.Theysufferedseriousgunshotinjuriesthatcouldhavecaused
theirdeathwereitnotforthetimelymedicalattentiongiventhem
(TSNJuly3,1996,p.6).Montanosustainedseveralgunshotwounds
on the left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the left
shoulderandmiddlerightfinger(TSNJune25,1996,p.608).Tibule
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant
(stomach)andtheotherattheleftperiumbelical(TSNJuly3,1996,
pp.78).
(pp.215219,Rollo.)
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding and
disposing:
INCRIMINALCASENO.U8747:
theaccusedROLANDOVALDEZyLIPURDA,GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH
DOUBLEFRUSTRATEDMURDERdefinedandpenalizedunder
RepublicActNo.7659otherwiseknownastheHeinousCrimeLaw,
theoffensehavingbeenacomplexcrimethepenaltyofwhichisin
themaximum,andwiththeattendantaggravatingcircumstancesof
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby

sentences him the ultimum supplicum of DEATH to be executed


pursuanttoRepublicActNo.8177knownastheLethalInjection
Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR.,
WILLIEACOSTA,JEMARIEGARCIAandSANDRAMONTANO
andRANDYTIBULE,asfollows:
1).TotheheirsofthedeceasedRamonGarcia,jr.:
a)P50,000asindemnity
b)P52,116.00asactualdamages
c)P500,000.00asmoraldamages
2).TotheheirsofthedeceasedWILLIEACOSTA
a)P50,000asindemnity
b)P26,358.00asactualdamages
c)P500,000.00asmoraldamages
3)TotheheirsofthedeceasedJEMARIEGARCIA:
a)P50,000asindemnity
b)P500,000.00asmoraldamages
4)TotheheirsofthedeceasedSandraMontano:
a)P50,000asindemnity
b)P48,269.80asactualdamages
c)P500,000.00asmoraldamages
5)TothevictimWILLIAMMONTANO:
a)P39,133.92asactualdamages
b)P100,000.00asmoraldamages
6)TothevictimRANDYTIBULE:
a)P36,233.65asactualdamages
b)P100,000.00asmoraldamages
andtopaythecosts.
WITHRESPECTTOCRIMINALCASENO.U8749:
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMANDAMMUNITIONS(PresidentialDecreeNo.1866)
andherebysentenceshimtosufferimprisonmentofRECLUSION
PERPETUAandtopaythecosts.
Finally,itissaid:Duralex,sedlex,translatedas:Thelawisharsh,
butthatisthelaw!
SOORDERED.
(pp.180181,Rollo.)
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring
his plea for reversal on the following assigned errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT,
DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
RECANTATIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED,
ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT,
AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE OCCUPANTS OF
MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS DELIBERATE FAILURE TO
PRESENT
THE
POLICE
INVESTIGATORS
WHO
INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE
WHICH PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
ACCUSED ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866
BECAUSE HE DID NOT ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT IN HIS
MEMORANDUM.
(pp.106107,Rollo)
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate
consideration of the arguments of accused-appellant, the Court does
not find enough basis to reverse.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing

to consider what he says are material, substantial, important and


significant discrepancies between the affidavits of prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies in court. Accused-appellant points to
the Statement of William Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on
September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement
taken on September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in
Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City where William Montano specifically
named Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized
tricycle he and the other victims were riding. This, he claims, is
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial where he stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsiam,
Manaoag, Pangasinan?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten
to fifteen meters, somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your
tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our
motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was
immediately recognized by me, sir.
Q Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately
recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the bench
for the accused, and when asked his name, he gave his name as
Rolando Valdez.
(pp.1112,tsn,June11,1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to Bernard
Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden
by the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and his covictim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay sa
Pag-uurong ng Demanda where they disclaimed having seen Bernard
Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that after a more
thorough consideration of what transpired, they have realized that the
filing of the complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake and the
result of misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually
happened. In his testimony in court, William, however, identified
accused-appellant as the person illuminated by the headlight of the
tricycle, for which reason William readily recognized him. We,
therefore, find nothing inconsistent between his declarations during
the investigation and his testimony in court. The lack of precision
with which he distinguished between the person who flagged down
the tricycle and the other person who he recognized because of the
headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as inconsistency at all.
The same holds true with claimed discrepancies between the
statements of Randy Tibule during the investigation and his
testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the
withdrawal or retraction of the accusation of several witnesses
against Bernard Castro, these same witnesses accusation against
accused-appellant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of
his brief to the sworn declarations of prosecution witnesses made
during the investigation of the case, Bernard Castro may have indeed
been identified and named as one of the gunmen. It may readily be
noted in these very same references, however, that all these
prosecution witnesses referred to two other companions, then
unidentified, of Bernard Castro. Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit
7) referred to in page 11 of the brief, the police investigators
categorically referred to Bernard Castro y Nazareno, alias Toti as one
of the suspects or assailants involved in the shooting incident (p. 112,

Rollo). The logical conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that


there is at least one other assailant in addition to Bernard Castro, and
as it developed, accused-appellant was subsequently and positively
named as such. Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-appellants
ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed to Bernard Castro as one of
the perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that accused-appellant
cannot be one other and additional perpetrator anymore. Accusedappellants reasoning on this point is absolutely flawed. It is totally
unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious
withdrawal of the victims charges against Bernard Castro. He
insinuates that such recantation should not have been given any
consideration. But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway, even in
the remotest possibility that the retraction of the accusation against
Bernard Castro may be reversed, it does not get accused-appellant off
the hook. Considering that accused-appellant had himself been
positively identified, together with Bernard Castro, as one of the
other perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may still stand
independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is indicted or
remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro
who had the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the
motorized tricycle, mistaking one of the occupants thereof for Isidro
Capistrano, Castros former classmate and with whom he earlier had
an altercation. It is very clear in his brief, however, that accusedappellant predicates this argument on the mistaken premise that he
was not positively identified in the case at bar although he admits that
it is established that he was at the scene of the crime (p. 114, Rollo).
This argument will not hold simply because it is settled that accusedappellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses and victims
William Montano and Randy Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule
that proof of motive is necessary for conviction only when there is
doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when accused has been
positively identified as in the present case (People vs. Caggaunan, 94
Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs.
Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be noted that lack
of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction,
considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all
(People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecutions
deliberate and intentional failure to present the investigating police
officers and their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) constitutes culpable
suppression of evidence which, if duly taken into account, will merit
his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself
was able to present the police officers, and exhibit 7 (p. 116, Rollo).
It is to be further noted that as earlier pointed out, the declaration of
SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did not categorically rule out the
possibility of convicting other persons as co-principals of Castro. On
the contrary, it is clear from such affidavit that there was more than
just one perpetrator of the crime. It even confirms and corroborates
the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule
pointing to accused-appellant as one of the other companions of
Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and
every piece of evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to depart
from the trial courts accord of credence to the eyewitness accounts of
William Montano and Randy Tibule who positively identified
accused-appellant as one of the persons who shot and fired at them
and their companions that fateful night. We agree with the trial court
that the evidence points beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant was one of those principally responsible for the deaths of
the four victims in this case and the wounding of two others. There is
also sufficient evidence that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the killings, thus, qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime

which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the
victim might make (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The
settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it
is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or depend himself against such attack. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without slightest provocation from the victim
who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any
showing of evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant.
While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation
between Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently
prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be evident
premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the
following have to be prove: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution to allow the
offender to reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan,
254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the
crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the existence
of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the
offenders determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their
act of arming themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter
waiting for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have also
indicated that they clung to their determination to commit the crime
(the second element). More important that these two elements is the
proof that a sufficient period of time had lapsed between the outward
act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense (the third
element). There must have been enough opportunity for the initial
impulse to subside. This element is indispensable for circumstance of
evident premeditation to aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial,
46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only
whentherehadbeenacoldanddeepmeditation,andatenacious
persistenceintheaccomplishmentofthecriminalact.Theremustbe
an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the
meaningandtheconsequencesofwhattheyhadplannedtodo,an
interval long enough for the conscience and better judgment to
overcometheevildesireandscheme.
(p.649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the
Court had stressed the importance of sufficient time between the
criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent,
affording such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at
a calm judgment. Obviously, this element is wanting in the case at
bar. Right after the supposed heated argument between Bernard
Castro and Capistrano, Castro and company went home to get the
firearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault. There was no
chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the case at bar had no
opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm
judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial
court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the very
basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery
(People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1
[1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating

circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial courts premises on the


complex nature of the crime committed, the death sentence, being the
maximum penalty for murder, would still have been the imposable
penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court
however, finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one
death penalty (for the complex crime of multiple murder with double
frustrated murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the complex crime
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four counts of
reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate sentences
of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples
brief that accused-appellant should instead be convicted of four
counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away
by the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple
murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim. Case No.
U-8747). It may be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26,
1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, found a prima facie case for four separate counts of
murder (pp. 101- 102, Ibid.) Too, the same investigating judge in his
Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case for two
counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon
reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated
November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART.48. Penaltyforcomplexcrimes Whenasingleactconstitutes
twoormoregraveorlessgravefeloniesorwhenanoffenseisa
necessarymeansforcommittingtheother,thepenaltyforthemost
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximumperiod.(AsamendedbyActNo.4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances
defined above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear
from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder
resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct
acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than
one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from
that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single
act of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet
shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact
that several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative
positions of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding
the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the
sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to
have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts
which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We
therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime
of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the
four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is
likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder.
Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible
penalty or reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, accused-appellant,
being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty
should be four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being
guilty of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be
meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of 12 years and 1
day of reclusion temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for

illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential Decree


No. 1866. It was recently held in the case entitled People vs. Molina
(G.R.No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People vs.
Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no
separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as
an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294,
which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed
firearm,suchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsideredasan
aggravatingcircumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen
days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in
the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case
of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will
generally have prospective application. In cases, however, where the
new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it
will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic
Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case
No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this present
review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present
case for illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving
illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and
tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294
are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder),
also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for
the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of
four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act
No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly
aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive
application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to
Criminal Case No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of murder and
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of reclusion
perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate
sentences, each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment relating to
the civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is
AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE VS BURGOS (SUPRA)
F.

SPECIAL RULE FOR JUVENILES IN CONFLICT


WITH LAW
RJCL Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging
the age of the child in conflict with the law has the burden of
proving the age of such child.
If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the
information in court, a case for determination of age under
summary proceeding may be filed before a court which shall
render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the
appropriate pleadings of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical
finding as to the age of the child.

Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen


years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program as provided
for in Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child
and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption
from civil liability which shall be enforced in accordance with
the provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of
the child involves a quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
shall apply.
3. JOHN DOE
PEOPLE VS VELOSO
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the
crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of
article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four
months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the
accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance
of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the
John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a
member of the House of Representative of the Philippine
Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called
Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As
a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the
secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a
search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court.
Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary
Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date abovementioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and
barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window
of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in
the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were
apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant
Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told
Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John
Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house.
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.
As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling
utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence
of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation
between the policemen and the accused the policemen
insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his
refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So
policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his
resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave
him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the
policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of
Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the
floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards,
cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted

to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and


shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It
was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At
the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen
were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest
in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them were
eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of
proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty
of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the
appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to
pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the
findings of the trial judge, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno.
Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these
findings, except that he stresses certain points as more
favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously
indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the
name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but
instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a
legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this
defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating
particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search
warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the search
warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR
(G)
SEARCH WARRANT
Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduo, Judge, Municipal
Court, Manila.
Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A.
Andres Geronimo, No. 47 Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, District of W. C., City of Manila? A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? A. I do not
know. According to the best of my information the house is
occupied by John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant?
A. It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider
to be reliable that in said premises there are instruments and
devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited
games kept. It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling
conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are
known as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing
premises and believed it to be a gambling house and a place
where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such
as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists
used in prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I
have read the foregoing questions and answers and that I find
the same to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May,
1923.
(Sgd.)
L. GARDUO
Judge, Municipal Court
The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it
will suffice to copy the search warrant alone. This document
reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT
(G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and does
believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him and which is under his control,
namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in
violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips,
reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in
connection with the game commonly known as monte and that
the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and
effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in
violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in
the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to
make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the
house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices and
effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are
commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by
law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.)
L. GARDUO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of
mention that by reason of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth
paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the
present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the
person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right
to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found
provisions of the same import although naturally entering more
into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a
search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and
upon application supported by oath particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized."
(Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and
shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and
after the judge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based, or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant
which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate
search on the person of ............................, or in the house
situated ...................................... (describing it or any other
place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case
may be) for the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is
finally provided that "a person charged with a crime may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of
the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is
issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely
legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the

law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen.


Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The
warrant will always be construed strictly without, however,
going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C.
L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.]
44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore.,
276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest.
Although apprehending that there are material differences
between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining
to John Doe search warrants we propose to take into
consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus
following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42
Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search
warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the
defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In that text
at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth
Edition, is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not
required. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the
body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there
must be such a description of the person accused as will
enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a
wrong name for the party to be apprehended is void, except in
those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx
xxx
xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has
already been said regarding the essential requirements of
warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about
blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person
whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or
"Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void,
without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in
acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the
best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person
or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon
whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and
place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of
which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a
"John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will
not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have
been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted
with approval by the United States Supreme Court, is the case
of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It
there appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the
police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe,
whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown,"
had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which
complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or Richard
Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant
unknown, named in the foregoing complaint." Neither the
complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or
means of identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty
resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was

invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme


Court of Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the
officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant at the time of
the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not
contain the name of the defendant, nor any description or
designation by which he could be known and identified as the
person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a general
warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have
been arrested, as being included in the description, as the
defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary
principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of
the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14,
which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that
all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected
persons or to seize their property be not accompanied with a
special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest
or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an ancient
common law right. It was always necessary to express the
name or give some description of a party to be arrested on a
warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and
without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was
void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248.
1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases
cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of
a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In such
case the best description possible of the person to be arrested
is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate
clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation,
his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his
residence, or other circumstances by which he can be
identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer
had no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted to
serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The
defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by
force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful
acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an
arrest under the warrant in question, if they were guilty of no
improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful
act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so
could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which
they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs
something like this. The law, constitutional and statutory,
requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the
application "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A
failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the
search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must
be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced
by the Attorney-General, and as the law was summarized by
the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical
reflection brings forth certain points of paramount force and
exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of
them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself described the building to be searched as
"the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the
premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S.
Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed.,

757). The police officers were accordingly authorized to break


down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied
by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then
had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a
prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the
commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person, which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or
which may furnish the person arrested with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as
evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno
vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable
that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the
search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person
to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state
that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the
building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation
of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be
forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description
of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described
the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition,
contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the
authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized
that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is
void, "except in those cases where it contains a description
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly
the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As
the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe
was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo
was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not the
home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the
law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially
public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a
high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but
intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character,
unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying
occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose
names would be unknown to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of
himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has a
right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home,
and much less so in a club or public place, the person sought
to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force
than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To
authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality
of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was
possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for
excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a
debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra;
People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard,
Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the
accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein. Mention was
made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint
or information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the
complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The AttorneyGeneral adds to this the argument that the police were
authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being
committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this

contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the
rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in
the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in
their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was
valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of
the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of
the crime, the accused was a member of the House of
Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this
allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating
circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We
doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The
offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his
office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma.
Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just
as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the
Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects
with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and
concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one
exception, it results that the judgment appealed from must be,
as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the
defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and
one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this
instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this
judgment into effect issue.
PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the
issuanceofawarrantofarrest.Petitionersassertthattherespondent
Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) John Does
transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such
warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be
seized.
Issue:Whethersaidwarrantisvalid
Held:No.
Insofarassaidwarrantisissuedagainstfifty(50)JohnDoesnot
oneofwhomthewitnessestothecomplaintcouldorwouldidentify,
itisofthenatureofageneralwarrant,oneofaclassofwritslong
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally
subversiveofthelibertyofthesubject.[30]Clearlyviolativeofthe
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describethepersonorpersonstobeseized,[31]thewarrantmust,as
regardsitsunidentifiedsubjects,bevoided.
WHEREFORE,the warrant complained of is upheld and declared
validinsofarasitordersthearrestofthepetitioners.Saidwarrantis
voidedtotheextentthatitisissuedagainstfifty(50)JohnDoes.
TherespondentJudgeisdirectedtoforwardtotheProvincialFiscal
ofLanaodelSurtherecordofthepreliminaryinvestigationofthe
complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriateaction.
DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 50 GUIDELINES ON THE
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 125 OF THE RPC AS
AMENDED

RA 7438 AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF

PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL


INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS,
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate
to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full
respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his
order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed
to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer.lawphi1
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing
by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is
signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained
does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting
counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise,
such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him;
otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible
as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial
investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national nongovernmental organization duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent
or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or
ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any
lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those
charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall

be entitled to the following fees;


(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave
felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or
municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted,
provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the
province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee:
Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that
no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall
be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained
by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or
employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer
a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than
ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating
officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or
employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating
officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the
latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer,
any member of the immediate family of a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor
or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member
of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than
six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).lawphi1
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any
security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee
or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may
be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as
amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any
daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1
PROCLAMATION1017
II.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
A. SOURCE, DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND PROCEDURE
1. DEFINITION
PEOPLE VS PASUDAG

Facts: On 26 September 1995, at around 1:30 p.m., SPO2 Pepito


Calip of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to
conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence
behind the public school. About 5 meters away, he saw a garden of
about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn
plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to
who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that
Alberto Pasudag y Bokang owned it. SPO2 Calip went to the Police
Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. The latter
dispatched a team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3
Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around
2:30 p.m., the team arrived at Brgy. Artacho and went straight to the
house of Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for Pasudag and asked him
to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about 5 meters
away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a
photographer, who took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of
the marijuana plants. They uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The team
brought Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. On 17
December 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
Emiliano M. Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan,
Urdaneta an Information charging Pasudag with violation of RA
6425, Sec. 9. On 10 February 1997, the trial court arraigned the
accused. He pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The Regional Trial
Court, Pangasinan, Branch 46, Urdaneta found Pasudag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00,
without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law. Pasudag
appealed.
Issue: Whether time was of the essence to uproot and confiscate the
marijuana plants.
Held: As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is
required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person,
house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides
that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." Any
evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.
Herein, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from
the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who
owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and
immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house
were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and
confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no
sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same
day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants, the seized plants
are inadmissible in evidence against Pasudag.

PEOPLE VS ZUELA
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los
Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte
from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br.
24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed
in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution?
Held:
The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the
crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, the
moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to

elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information


which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from
said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his
right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to
rule that Maximo Velardes extra-judicial statement is
inadmissible in evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was
not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements
before Judge Bagalacsa.Nevertheless,

the infirmity of
accused-appellants sworn statements did not leave a void in
the prosecutions case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated
the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who,
in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private
person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant
Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
stating that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The
trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualdas testimony.
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the Court
reiterated the doctrine enunciated in the Maqueda case. In
Andan, the Court said that when the accused talked with the
mayor as confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional
rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the
suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and Maria from behind
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Treachery exists when an adult person illegally attacks a child
of tender years and causes his death.
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the
crime as robbery with homicide and not robbery with triple
homicide as charged in the information. The term
homicide in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense,
embracing not only the act which results in death but also all
other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the
nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in
connection with the robbery. The multiplicity of victims slain
on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the
same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.

PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo
Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya,
received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at
Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants
were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.

The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.


Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions
to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At
approximately 5:00 a.m. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek
from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the
place pinpointed by their informant. The police found Valdez alone in
his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana
plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut. PO2
Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and, according
to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted
the 7 marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police
took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez
was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros
Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon
microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.
She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which
confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez alleged otherwise. He
claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September 1996, he was
weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a
person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the
latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez
to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately
100 meters away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present
and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When
he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police then
took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants.
He was then made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them
to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a
bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought
him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko
Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied
the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because
of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities,
threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise be would
"be put in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, Valdez
reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by
the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged for the
cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana plants. On 15
November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
ensued. On 18 February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 3105,
found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as amended by RA
7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made
pursuant to warrantless search and seizure, based on the plain view
doctrine.
Held: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant.
Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there was no

search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the


existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a
warrant to search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his
name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was
pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a
good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore
that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of
the praiseworthiness of their intentions. The Court finds no reason to
subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that it should apply the
"plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following
elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the
police officers first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was
arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless
arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police
team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look
around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently,
the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view"
doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

PEOPLE VS RODRIGUEZ
PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent
Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General
Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at
a distance of about 112 meters in front of him was a tricycle driven
by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men
and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag.
After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to
help the woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked
the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on
the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of del
Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion
entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase
and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police
headquarters and reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the
owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team
proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain
where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn
revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario
volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996. On the way to
the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch
kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and

they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15
armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00
p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of
these were happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school,
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might
attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the police
station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May
1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he
was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His
statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also executed a
waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand,
claimed that he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him
to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong"
Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred. He claimed that the 3
men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be
harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however,
he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas,
a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry
and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. While del Rosario
pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large.
Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario
guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia
Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation at the time he was invited for questioning at
the house ofthe barangay captain.
Held: Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was invited" for questioning at the
house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the
prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to
remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime
even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the
same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of
Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a
hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious
designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not
therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A
person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with
his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand,
conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a
whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of
any complicity in the crime charged.

RA NO 7438 SECTION 2 F (f) Any person arrested or


detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits
by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or

any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him


or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or
by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited
by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international
non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of
the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his
or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or
sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or
niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law.
BABAT VS NIB
Facts: Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q.
Maglipon, Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo
Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are
columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local
publications. At different dates since July 1980, some of them have
allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected
them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works,
feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives.
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed
by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office
of the City Fiscal, Manila, against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor
of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by
Doyo and published in the 28 March 1982 issue of the Panorama, on
which the author had been interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo
Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director Ponciano
Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio
Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million
claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against
Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, which was superseded by the
amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing
subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and interrogating
them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the
subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Issue: Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to
Babst, et.al., their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of libel
suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they
are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since
they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on
mass media.
Held: Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now
pending in court against Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might
be filed. The writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board
or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it.
The libel cases adverted to are not pending before the NIB or any
other respondent. Further, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by
reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a
matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court
where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The
same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters
that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation
conducted by the NIB, which Babst, et. al. claim to have been
illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a
personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one
among the officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by

instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case
against Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not
even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have
anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

PEOPLE VS MULETA
PEOPLE VS TAN
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter TAN) seeks his acquittal by a reversal
of the 29 June 1998 decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20688 which affirmed his conviction for
violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] TAN's motion for reconsideration of
said decision and motion for oral arguments were denied for lack of
merit by the Court of Appeals in its 6 October 1998 resolution. [if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Said decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the 19 December 1994 judgment of conviction against TAN
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-45449.
TANs indictment[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] for violation of Republic Act No.
6539 reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and
without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one
(1) Mitsubishi Gallant car colored blue, bearing Plate No. CGS-723
owned by one PHILIP SEE, of undetermined value, to the damage
and prejudice of said Philip See.
Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with the assistance of
counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial immediately
ensued as the parties waived the holding of a preliminary conference.
The trial court's terse recapitulation of the prosecution evidence
proceeded in this manner:[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
xxx [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a
1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-door valued at P420,000.00, bearing
plate no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no. 4G32-FG2704
and serial/chassis no. A161UL-3011. Sometime in March 1992,
accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip by Alvin's fiancee, one
Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends and
started to see each other on several occasions thereafter.
On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip together with his wife
Ruby See and Robert Chua (a neighbor) was at his place of residence
xxx when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to Philip that he
was intending to buy Philip's aforesaid car and that he wanted to testdrive it. On account of their friendship and believing Alvin's
assurance that he would return the car after he shall have test-driven
it, Philip granted Alvin's request xxx. On thus getting hold of the car,
Alvin sped away and never returned. In vain, Philip waited for Alvin
to show up and return the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much
less cause the return of the car. Jksm
Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin at his office at
Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but Alvin avoided him by refusing to answer
the telephone calls or pretending he was not around; and Philip's
attempts to see Alvin at his office similarly proved futile, for
whenever Philip would go to said office, Alvin would refuse to see
him. Dismayed though he was, Philip desisted as long as he could
from reporting and complaining about the matter to the authorities;
Philip still believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually would come
around to returning the car to him. Meanwhile, sometime on March 5,
1993, with the assistance of some personnel of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car's 1993
renewal registration in the absence of the vehicle and he was issued
the corresponding official receipt therefor.

Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to see Alvin at his
place at Roosevelt. Again Philip was told that Alvin was not around.
One of Alvin's employees, however, advised Philip to the effect that
the car was parked and hidden right behind Alvin's warehouse. The
location of the warehouse having been given to him, Philip went to
the place and at a distance of some five feet, he saw the vehicle
parked at the rear end of the warehouse. To his shock and surprise, he
saw that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door, and several interior
accessories, had been dismantled and were already missing. Worse,
several pieces of wood were piled on top of the car as if purposely
hide and conceal it from view.
Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about June 2, 1993,
formally lodged a complaint for carnapping against Alvin before the
QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993, Philip
reported the loss of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Traffic Management Command and he accordingly signed the
corresponding complaint sheets. Too, an alarm for the subject car was
issued. To his further shock and consternation, Philip was informed
by the PNP's Highway Patrol Group (HPG) that somebody had
applied for a clearance to sell the car and that the applicant was made
to appear as one Philip See. xxx Philip denied his alleged signature
on the application and also denied having supposedly applied for
clearance to sell his vehicle.
Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by Philip against Alvin
before the QC police station 1, the police authorities scheduled a visit
to the place of Alvin, with Philip being asked by them to pinpoint and
identify Alvin in the course thereof. Accordingly, at Alvin's place, he
was identified and invited by the police to the station for
investigation. While still at Alvin's office, Philip saw on top of
Alvin's table what Philip believed to be accessories from his car,
consisting of a two-way radio antenna and car stereo, which appeared
to him to have been dismantled from the subject car.
At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to test-drive it on
November 7, 1992, the car was in top condition, had low mileage,
was 'fully loaded' with complete interior accessories including an
imported Kenwood stereo, and had imported magwheels. Chief
Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution's version and presented a
completely diverse tale.
Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter SEE) filed the
complaint to purposely collect a debt from him and wittingly use the
court as collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE instituted
the complaint in revenge of the quarrels they had over TANs
girlfriend whom SEE wooed, and (2) in retaliation against the
complaint for grave threats and illegal possession of firearms filed by
one of TAN's employees against SEE.
TAN then traced this legal predicament to the time when his
girlfriend introduced him to SEE in March 1992. TAN and SEE
instantly became friends for they shared a similar acumen for
business and passion for target shooting. Inevitably, they engaged in
and entered into several business transactions which resulted in
TAN's indebtedness to SEE in the amount of P800,000. Inspite of
this, SEE still offered to sell the subject Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for
the amount of P280,000. TAN declined the offer. SEE persisted to the
extent that he brought the car to TAN's residence on 26 November
1992 and generously suggested that he would just add into the latter's
existing indebtedness to him the car's purchase price.
Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect the car's purchase
price but TAN had still no funds. So TAN suggested that he would
apply with a bank for a car loan using the car as security and apply
the proceeds of said loan in payment for the car. SEE agreed.
Subsequently, TAN submitted in his name a loan application with the
BPI Family Bank in Makati. In compliance with the requirements of
the loan application, SEE personally supervised the car's appraisal
and inspection on 19 March 1993. TAN additionally maintained that
he and SEE signed a deed of sale covering the subject automobile but
that TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon SEE's pretext that
he would use it for facilitation of the loan.
The bank approved the loan application but only in the amount of
P129,000. Naturally, SEE considered the amount insufficient and

hence, refused to accept the terms of the loan. Consequently, TAN did
not seek the release of the loan. Esm
The
friendship
eventually
soured
and
the
resulting
"misunderstanding" with SEE impelled TAN on 19 May 1993 to
instruct his warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE's residence.
TAN's employee drove the car to SEE's house, parked the car outside
the gate and then handed over the keys of the car to SEE's wife,
Ruby.
Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June 1993, police officers
arrived at his residence and invited him to the police station; this, to
TAN's additional bewilderment, was in connection with SEE's
complaint for the carnapping of the car he already returned. TAN
peacefully went with the police authorities to the station. [if !supportFootnotes]
[6][endif]

Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court believed in the
prosecutions version, particularly in SEE's clear, positive, and
straightforward account - which said court found amply demonstrated
- that SEE had withdrawn the consent initially given to TAN when
the latter went beyond test-driving and appropriated the car for his
own use and benefit. To the trial court, TAN's failure to return the car
and his consequent appropriation thereof constituted unlawful taking
-- the gravamen of the crime charged. It then concluded that TAN
was obviously actuated by intent to gain. The trial court then
considered as completely undeserving of belief, TAN's supposition
that despite his heavy indebtedness and given his increasing difficulty
to pay his loans, SEE had benignly extended him credit, delivered to
him the subject car and bestowed upon him the ultimate privilege of
paying the car at his convenience. Thus, in a decision promulgated on
19 January 1994, the trial court convicted TAN, the dispositive
portion of which read as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan y Lagamayo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping charged
herein, defined and punished in Sec. 2, in connection with Sec. 14,
both of Rep. Act No. 6539 xxx and, accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
from fourteen years, eight months, and fifteen days as minimum, to
seventeen years and four months as maximum; to restore to the
offended party, Philip See, the subject car x x x or in default thereof,
to indemnify said offended party in the sum of four hundred twenty
thousand pesos; and, to pay the costs, without prejudice to the
application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused's favor. Esmsc
TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which was granted by the trial court in its 4 July 1994 order.
SEE then moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the trial court
in its 1 March 1995 order. SEE challenged these aforementioned
orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court
of Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the appellate court gave due course
to and granted the petition. TAN assailed the decision of the Court of
Appeals through a petition for review before the Supreme Court,
which promptly dismissed the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Subsequently, based on TAN's "Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Ad
Cautelam," the trial court ordered the elevation of the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, TAN challeged the Court of Appeals' affirmance of his
conviction. He argues before this Court that the appellate court erred
in (1) ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on carnapping, (2)
disregarding that there was no unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting
circumstances on record which, if considered, would be sufficient to
acquit him on reasonable doubt.
In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law, TAN contends that
the Court of Appeals should not have employed as bases for his
conviction the basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People v.
Roxas,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] where rice was received, carted away and
consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] where a bar of gold
and P200 in bank notes were received for examination and changing
into coins but instead appropriated, and (3) People v. Trinidad,[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
where a ring was received for pledging but was sold
and the proceeds thereof appropriated for the personal use of receiver.
A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the challenged Court of

Appeals decision reveals that the basic principles of theft alluded to


pertain to the signification of unlawful taking and as to when this
takes place. Thus, the Court in Roxas, de Vera and Trinidad declared
that "the unlawful taking or deprivation may occur at or soon after
the transfer of physical possession" where "an act done by the
receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession resulted in
unlawful taking." In such a case, "the article was taken away, not
received, although at the beginning the article was in fact given and
received." Hence, in applying these principles, the Court of Appeals
adopted the theory of the Solicitor General that SEE entrusted his car
to TAN merely for test driving, and the latter initially received the
same for that purpose only; TAN must perforce be deemed to have
unlawfully "taken" the car soon after the test-driving for he failed to
show-up and return said vehicle.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law,
different from the crimes of robbery and theft included in the Revised
Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent of gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] But a careful comparison of this
special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their
common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent
to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latters consent. However, the anti-carnapping law
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. [if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the
owners consent, whether the taking was done with or without
violence or intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force
upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking
of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or
robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said
statute. Esmmis
Obviously, TANs proposition that the rudiments of theft, particularly
as regards unlawful taking, should not have been applied by the Court
of Appeals, was misplaced. We shall see later on that the appellate
courts interpretation redounded in TANs favor. As an element
common to theft, robbery and carnapping, unlawful taking -- its
import, intention and concept -- should be considered as also
common to these crimes. [if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] However, we reject the
Court of Appeals acceptance, hook, line and sinker of the Office of
the Solicitor Generals thesis that there was unlawful taking in this
case.
SEE asserted that on 7 November 1992 he turned over possession of
his Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for test-driving only, but the latter did
not return the same after the lapse of not just several hours but a
number of months. SEE formally filed the complaint for carnapping
on 2 June 1993. In the meantime, during the seven-month interval
when the car was allegedly in TANs possession, (1) SEE had
persistently and perseveringly attempted to talk to and see TAN but
the latter adamantly refused to respond to his telephone calls or
personally receive him in his visits; (2) SEE was able to register the
car with the LTO on 5 March 1993; and (3) SEE had seen his car on
19 May 1993 from a distance of some five feet, parked at the rear of
TANs warehouse and in the initial stages of dismantling. SEE also
believed that "being a friend, [TAN] eventually would come around
to returning the car to him."[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Esmso
Even solely from this testimony, this Court finds that there was no
unlawful taking. A felonious taking may be defined as the act of
depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable
property without his privity and consent and without animus
revertendi.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Thus, an unlawful taking takes place
when the owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to the
taking; or, if the consent was given, it was vitiated; or in the case of
Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera, where an act by the receiver soon after
the actual transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the
last scenario, the receivers act could be considered as having been
executed without the consent of the giver. SEEs testimony clearly
evinced his assent to TANs taking of the car not only at the time he

yielded the physical possession thereof for the alleged test-driving


but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his consent nor withdrew
the same during the seven month period the car was with TAN. At the
very least, SEE tolerated TAN's possession of the car. A contrary
conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if the car was truly carnapped,
why did SEE wait for seven months before he reported the same?
Further, TANs alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his repeated
attempts to do so should have sufficiently alerted him of the formers
supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not report the taking.
Even if he failed to report the taking, months after the alleged testdriving, he had allegedly seen his car in the initial stages of
dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet, again, he did not report the
carnapping on that day nor on the next, but much later on 7 June
1993 or almost a month thereafter.
SEE said he believed and expected that the car would inevitably be
returned to him. This is not only unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and
contradictory with his imputations of carnapping. For if he believed
that the vehicle would be returned to him for friendship's sake then he
could not have at the same time also believed that this friend
carnapped his car. Clearly, SEEs behavior immediately preceding,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged unlawful taking was
definitely not the distraught conduct of a man whose car was
carnapped. He was even able to register the averred stolen vehicle
without sounding the alarm.
A fortiori, the cases of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera cited by the Court
of Appeals have no application here as no unlawful deprivation or
taking of SEEs possession of, enjoyment and benefit over the car
occurred soon or long after his initial consent to the transfer thereof.
Neither was there an act executed by TAN soon after the alleged testdriving that would constitute unlawful taking. These conclusions are
buttressed by TANs testimony, duly supported by documentary
evidence, that SEE cooperated with him for the availment of a car
loan with the BPI Family Bank in Makati, and that SEE personally
attended to the inspection and appraisal of the subject car. The
records, therefore, do not support the finding of carnapping. Msesm
Noticeably, the Court of Appeals' erroneous contrary conclusions
were heavily predicated on the arguments of the Office of the
Solicitor General that TANs failure to show a written deed of sale and
to seek the release of his car loan "were inconsistent with [the latter's]
idea of sale." It then posed four questions which it concluded
"certainly debilitated the pretensions of [TAN]," thus: [if !supportFootnotes][18]
[endif]

If there was really a deed of sale, why could not [TAN] present a
copy thereof?
Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TANs] copy of the deed of sale,
why did he not secure another copy from the notary public who
notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he not present the notary
public to testify on the fact of the sale?
Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to [TAN] at P280,000.00
when the latter was admittedly indebted to the former to the tune of
P800,000?
If [TAN] really bought the subject car from private complainant, why
did he have to return the same (car) to the latter on May 14, 1993?
From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that the Court of
Appeals simply equated the lack of a written deed of sale to SEE's
lack of consent to TAN's taking of the car. But the mere absence of a
written contract of sale in this case does not necessarily mean that
SEE did not also consent to the taking nor that TAN's possession of
the car was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus probandi of
showing that TAN's taking was unlawful. What took place in these
proceedings was that the appellate court magnified the weakness of
the defense and overlooked the prosecutions failure to discharge the
onus probandi -- to show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of
carnapping was indeed perpetrated. In short, the Court of Appeals and
the trial court simply believed and accepted the prosecutions tale. It
ignored the basic legal precepts that conviction rests upon the
strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense; and assuming that the evidence of the
accused is weak, the same is no reason to convict, especially, as in

this case, where the case of the prosecution is not strong enough to
sustain a conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] To reiterate, the burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution, and unless the State succeeds in
proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence applies. A conviction in
criminal cases must rest on nothing less than the moral certainty of
guilt.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Exsm
There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, for upon this principle hinges the rule that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law. However, it
appears on record that the appellate court overlooked, ignored, and
disregarded some fact and circumstance of weight or significance that
if considered would have altered the result. Cogent reasons therefore
exist justifying the disregard of the findings of the appellate court,
superseding the same with our own determinations and conclusions,
and ordering the reversal of the questioned decision and resolution of
said Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the herein impugned 29
June 1998 decision and 6 October 1998 resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts judgment convicting accusedappellant Alvin Tan of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new judgment is entered
ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on ground of reasonable
doubt.

PEOPLE VS BANIQUET (DI KO MAKITA CASE)


2. DUTY OF POLICE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
PPROCEDURE

Section 12.
Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION

No torture, force, violence, threat,


intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.


The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this Section as
well
as
compensation
to
the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
MIRANDA VS ARIZONA

Facts: [No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March


1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home and
taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was
there identified by the complaining witness. The police
then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the
detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police
officers. The officers did not advise Miranda that he had
a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the
officers emerged from the interrogation room with a
written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the
statement was a typed paragraph stating that the
confession was made voluntarily, without threats or
promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my
legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be
used against me." At his trial before a jury, the written
confession was admitted into evidence over the
objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to
the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the
interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping
and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the
conviction. In reaching its decision, the court
emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not
specifically request counsel.
[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera, was
picked up by New York police on 14 October 1960, in
connection with the robbery three days earlier of a
Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the 17th
Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime
thereafter he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad.
While at the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was
identified by the store owner and a saleslady as the man
who robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was
formally arrested. The police then transported him to still
another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for
detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an
assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing
reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's
answers. This verbatim account of these proceedings
contains no statement of any warnings given by the
assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge
of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the

oral confession. The transcription of the statement taken


was also introduced in evidence. Vignera was found
guilty of first degree robbery. He was subsequently
adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30 to
60 years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed
without opinion by the Appellate Division, Second
Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without
opinion, remittitur amended. In argument to the Court of
Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no
constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel
or his privilege against self-incrimination.
[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At approximately
9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963, Carl Calvin Westover was
arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in
two Kansas City robberies. A report was also received
from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in
California. The local authorities took him to a police
station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges,
and at about 11:45 p. m. he was booked. Kansas City
police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest.
He denied any knowledge of criminal activities. The
next day local officers interrogated him again throughout
the morning. Shortly before noon they informed the FBI
that they were through interrogating Westover and that
the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that Westover was ever
given any warning as to his rights by local police. At
noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the
interrogation in a private interview room of the Kansas
City Police Department, this time with respect to the
robbery of a savings and loan association and a bank in
Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half
hours, Westover signed separate confessions to each of
these two robberies which had been prepared by one of
the agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the
agents testified, and a paragraph on each of the
statements states, that the agents advised Westover that
he did not have to make a statement, that any statement
he made could be used against him, and that he had the
right to see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in
federal court and convicted of the California robberies.
His statements were introduced at trial. He was
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on each count, the
sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course of
investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which
one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her
assailant, Roy Allen Stewart was pointed out to Los
Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken
in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., 31 January
1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and

arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart if they


could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead."
The search turned up various items taken from the five
robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest, police
also arrested Stewart's wife and three other persons who
were visiting him. These four were jailed along with
Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the
University Station of the Los Angeles Police Department
where he was placed in a cell. During the next five days,
police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions.
Except during the first interrogation session, when he
was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was
isolated with his interrogators. During the ninth
interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had
robbed the deceased and stated that he had not meant to
hurt her. Police then brought Stewart before a magistrate
for the first time. Since there was no evidence to connect
them with any crime, the police then released the other
four persons arrested with him. Nothing in the record
specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to
counsel. In a number of instances, however, the
interrogating officers were asked to recount everything
that was said during the interrogations. None indicated
that Stewart was ever advised of his rights. Stewart was
charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and
murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation
and the confession at the last interrogation were
introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of
robbery and first degree murder and fixed the penalty as
death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California
reversed.
Issue: Whether the written confessions made in
uncounselled interrogation, with the accused not
appraised of his right to consult with an attorney and to
have one during the inerrogation, nor his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself, are not admissible as
evidence.
Held: In No. 759, from the testimony of the officers and
by the admission of the State of Arizona, it is clear that
Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to
consult with an attorney and to have one present during
the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled
to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other
manner. Without these warnings the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement
which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had
"full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach
the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights.
Similarly in No. 760, Vignera was not warned of any of
his rights before the questioning by the detective and by

the assistant district attorney. No other steps were taken


to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively
apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right
to have counsel present and his statements are
inadmissible.
In No. 761, there is nothing in the facts that Westover
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain
silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the
time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents
began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for
over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during
that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately
upon the conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas City
police and was conducted in local police headquarters.
There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the
FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an
articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its
interrogation. The record simply shows that the
defendant did in fact confess a short time after being
turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local
police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's
point of view the warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances an
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be
assumed. Law enforcement authorities are not precluded
from questioning any individual who has been held for a
period of time by other authorities and interrogated by
them without appropriate warnings. A different case
would be presented if an accused were taken into
custody by the second authority, removed both in time
and place from his original surroundings, and then
adequately advised of his rights and given an
opportunity to exercise them.
Lastly in No. 584, In dealing with custodial
interrogation, the Court will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and
that his privilege against self-incrimination has been
adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show
that any warnings have been given or that any effective
alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and
intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent
record. Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the
alleged offenses through eight of the nine interrogations
over a period of five days is subject to no other
construction than that he was compelled by persistent
interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
PEOPLE VS OBRERO

FACTS: Appellant was charged with


robbery with homicide. His extra-

judicial confession was presented as


evidence.
HELD: Extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence because
counsel for accused was not
independent. At the time he assisted
accused-appellant, he was the station
commander of the WPD and a PC
captain. As part of the police force,
he could not be expected to have
effectively assisted the accused
during the investigation.
Appellant was convicted of robberry
with homicide.He executed a written
confession as a result of a custodial
ivestigation.The issue is whether such
is valid.
Held:
The extrajudicial confession was
invalid. The perfunctory reading of the
Miranda rights is inadequate to transmit
information to the suspect. Also, Art
IIISec12(1) requires an independent and
competent counsel of the suspects
choice. Atty de los Reyes was not an
independent counsel being the PC
Captain and Station Commander. As
held in P v Bandula, the independent
counsel cannot be a special prosecutor,
private or public prosecutor, municipal
attorney or counsel of the police whose
interest is adverse to the accused.
While there is evidence to the homicide
consisting of the corpus delicti, there is
no evidence of the robbery except the
confession. The lack of objection of
appellant to the introduction of the
constitutionally proscribed evidence
did not satisfy the burden of proof
which rested on the prosecution.
Acquitted of robbery with homicide.

PEOPLE VS DUERO
PEOPLE VS ORDONO

Facts: On 5 August 1994, the decomposing body of a


young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in
Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was
later identified as Shirley Victore, 15 years old, a
resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion, Santol, La
Union, who 3 days before was reported missing. Postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a
medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim
was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources
pointed to Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina as the
authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police
thereupon invited the 2 suspects and brought them to the
police station for questioning. However, for lack of
evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they
were allowed to go home. On 10 August 1994, Ordono
and Medina returned to the police station one after
another and acknowledged that they had indeed
committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the
police immediately conducted an investigation and put
their confessions in writing. The investigators however
could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist
the 2 accused in the course of the investigation because
there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of
Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
that as it may, the statements of the 2 accused where
nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and
assurance that they understood their rights and did not
require the services of counsel, the investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor,
the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol,
La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the
giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who
admitted their participation in the crime. After Medina
said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into
tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement and
so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who
listened to his confession. Pacito Ordono narrated his
story in the afternoon. At the end of his narration Ordono
affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his
signature as he did not know how to write. Thereafter,
Medina and Ordono were detained at the Santol police
station. News about the apprehension and detention of
the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon
spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of
radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the
interview, which was duly tape-recorded both accused
admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated
individually the events surrounding their commission
thereof. According to Medina, his remorse in having

committed the crime was so great but his repentance


came too late. He and Ordono hoped that the parents of
Shirley Victore would forgive them. Upon conclusion of
the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio
station DZNL and played the taped interview on the air.
The same interview was played again on the air the
following morning and was heard by thousands of
listeners. A couple of days later, the police brought the 2
accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La
Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed-door
session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of
the accused of his constitutional rights and, even though
their confessions were already written in their dialect,
explained to them each of the questions and answers
taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them
to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading
them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the 2
separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him
of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective
confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the 2
accused of their constitutional rights, explained the
contents of their respective statements, and finally,
accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC
judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the 2
accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if
they had been coerced into signing their confessions.
They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had
been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance
that they had not been coerced into giving and signing
their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked Ordono
and Medina to affix their signatures/thumbmarks on their
respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before
him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their
assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the
MTC staff who witnessed the signing. Ordono and
Medina were charged for rape with homicide. On
arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the 2 accused
pleaded not guilty. On 11 December 1997, the trial court
adjudged Ordono and Medina guilty of the crime of rape
with homicide attended with conspiracy, and imposed
upon each of them 2 death penalties on the basis of their
extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the custodial investigation made in the
presence of the municipal mayor, parish priest, etc.
and/or the taped interview containing the accuseds
confessions are admissible as evidence.
Held: Custodial investigation began when the accused
Ordono and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol
Police Station to confess and the investigating officer
started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the
accused to counsel automatically attached to them.

Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights


the police sought to provide them with counsel.
However, none could be furnished them due to the nonavailability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union,
and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining
town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers
could be found. At that stage, the police should have
already desisted from continuing with the interrogation
but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused
to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the
police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest
and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of
coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the
accused of their statements before the police.
Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of
a lawyer during the investigation. In the absence of such
valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal
Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police
and other police officers of the municipality could not
stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent
of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was
of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made
in writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2
accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation
would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days
later does not remedy this omission either. Although
there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a
thorough explanation of the rights of the accused,
enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon
them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still
came several days too late. It could have no palliative
effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial
statements were being taken. The second affixation of
the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their
confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting
with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the
signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other
witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an
informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although
reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the
lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an
indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite
standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not
met. The standards utilized by police authorities to
assure the constitutional rights of the accused therefore
fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution

and the law.


As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer
Roland Almoite, the taped interview was offered to form
part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to
whom the admissions were made and to prove through
electronic device the voluntary admissions by the 2
accused that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The
defense objected to its acceptance on the ground that its
integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily
have been spliced and tampered with. However, as
Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the
taped interview; it was not altered; the voices therein
were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the defense never
submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the
circumstances, the Court is inclined to admit the
authenticity of the taped interview. A review of the
contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's
testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free
from any influence or intimidation from police officers
and was done willingly by the accused. Despite
allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or
forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While
it may be expected that police officers were around since
the interview was held in the police station, there was no
showing that they were within hearing distance nor
within the vicinity where the interview was being
conducted. At most, the participation of the police
authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct
an interview. The taped interview likewise revealed that

the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and


even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the
crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made
by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By
analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio
announcer should likewise be held admissible. The
interview was not in the nature of an investigation as the
response of the accused was made in answer to questions
asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. When the accused talked to
the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law
enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their
constitutional rights. Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art.
III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal
confessions of the 2 accused to the radio announcer.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure
of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In relation to this, the admissions of the accused before
the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered
and substantiated by the findings of the NBI MedicoLegal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post
Mortem Findings.

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