Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I.
A.
RULE 113
Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an
arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention.
DAVID ET AL VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017
declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless
violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did
so citing the following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPPNPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting
the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must
be noted that before the said proclamations, the following
course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled
Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming
in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist
safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20 th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to
defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col.
Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of
command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.
The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.
However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA
and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups
within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of
programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well
as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal
of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and
confiscation of news stories and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by
the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and
attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of
the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at
hand.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot
and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on
the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none
of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their
insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless
arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and
to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be
decided provided that the party raising it continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the
present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into
the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the
President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft
of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.
Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of
terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution provides that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless
arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones
presence or it has just been committed based on personal
knowledge both of which are not present in Davids
warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and
arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the
right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale
cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the
principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice
and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure
of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate
the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to
declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU
Facts: Information was filed against several people including
the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought
the petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge
denying his motion to quash the information for rape with
homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground
ArticleVII
ImportationandExportation
1. United States Government equipment,
materials, supplies, and other property
imported into or acquired in the Philippines
by or on behalf of the United States armed
forcesinconnectionwithactivitiestowhich
this agreement applies, shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain
withtheUnitedStates,whichmayremovesuch
property from the Philippines at any time,
free from export duties, taxes, and other
similar charges. The exemptions provided in
thisparagraphshallalsoextendtoanyduty,
PLACER VS VILLANUEVA
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to
compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscals certification in the
informations of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue
warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for
the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the
fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for
the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable
cause.
Petition dismissed.
PEOPLE VS INTING
Facts: On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a lettercomplaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for
allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in
the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and
without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law. Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty.
Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete
City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to
prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and
(3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may
be. After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty.
Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he
filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 38. Dumaguete City) a
ALLADO VS DIOKNO
FACTS:
PetitionersDiosdadoJoseAlladoandRobertoL.Mendoza,alumniof
theCollegeoflaw,UniversityofthePhilippines,arepartnersofthe
LawFirmofSalonga,HernandezandAllado.Inthepracticeoftheir
profession,andonthebasisofanallegedextrajudicialconfessionof
requirethesubmissionofsupportingaffidavitsofwitnessestoaid
himinarrivingataconclusionontheexistenceofprobablecause.
In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the
constitutionalmandate:(a)Thedeterminationofprobablecauseisa
functionofthejudge;itisnotfortheprovincialfiscalorprosecutor
to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination
Of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutorpresentstohim.Byitself,theprosecutor'scertificationof
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcriptofstenographicnotes(ifany),andallother
supportingdocumentsbehindtheprosecutor'scertificationwhichare
materialinassistingthejudgeinhisdeterminationofprobablecause;
and, (c)Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminaryinquirywhichdeterminesprobablecausefortheissuance
ofawarrantofarrestfromthepreliminaryinvestigationproperwhich
ascertainswhethertheoffendershouldbeheldfortrialor released.
Evenifthetwoinquiriesbeconductedinthecourseofoneandthe
sameproceeding,thereshouldbenoconfusionabouttheirobjectives.
Thedeterminationofprobablecauseforthewarrantismadebythe
judge.Thepreliminary investigationproperwhetherornotthereis
reasonablegroundtobelievethattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffense
chargedandtherefore,whetherornotheshouldbesubjectedtothe
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of thE
prosecutor.
Dispositive:Petitiongranted
SALONGA VS CRUZ PANO
Facts:Thepetitionerinvokestheconstitutionallyprotectedrightto
lifeandlibertyguaranteedbythedueprocessclause,allegingthatno
prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
informationforsubversionagainsthim.PetitioneraskstheCourtto
prohibitandpreventtherespondentsfromusingtheironarmofthe
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democraticoppositioninthePhilippines.
Thecaserootsbackstotherashofbombingswhichoccurredinthe
MetroManilaareainthemonthsofAugust,SeptemberandOctober
of1980.VictorBurnsLovely,Jr,oneofthevictimsofthebombing,
implicatedpetitionerSalongaasoneofthoseresponsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co
accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above
entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12,
1980andthatpetitionerwasgiventen(10)daysfromreceiptofthe
charge sheetand thesupporting evidencewithin whichto filehis
counterevidence.Thepetitionerstatesthatuptothetimemartiallaw
wasliftedonJanuary17,1981,anddespiteassurancetothecontrary,
hehasnotreceivedanycopiesofthechargesagainsthimnorany
copiesofthesocalledsupportingevidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaintsignedbyGen. Prospero Olivas, dated12March1981,
chargingSalonga,alongwith39otheraccusedwiththeviolationof
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October1981,thecounselforSalongafiledamotiontodismissthe
chargesagainstSalongaforfailureoftheprosecutiontoestablisha
primafaciecaseagainsthim.On2December1981,JudgeErnani
CruzPano(PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,
BranchXVIII,QuezonCity)deniedthemotion.On4January1982,
he(Pano)issuedaresolutionorderingthefilingofaninformationfor
violationoftheRevisedAntiSubversionAct,asamended,against40
people,includingSalonga.Theresolutionsofthesaidjudgedated2
December1981and4January1982arethesubjectofthepresent
petitionforcertiorari.ItisthecontentionofSalongathatnoprima
faciecasehasbeenestablishedbytheprosecutiontojustifythefiling
ofaninformationagainsthim.Hestatesthattosanctionhisfurther
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admitthatnoruleoflawexistsinthePhilippinestoday.
Issues:1.Whethertheabovecasestillfallsunderanactualcase
2.Whethertheabovecasedroppedbythelowercourtstilldeservesa
decisionfromtheSupremeCourt
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draftponenciawas circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
RodolfoOrtizgrantedthemotionofrespondentCityFiscalSergio
Apostoltodropthesubversioncaseagainstthepetitioner.Pursuantto
instructionsoftheMinisterofJustice,theprosecutionrestudiedits
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questionedresolution.
Thecourtisconstrainedbythisactionoftheprosecutionandthe
respondentJudgetowithdrawthedraftponenciafromcirculatingfor
concurrencesandsignaturesandtoplaceitonceagainintheCourts
crowdedagendaforfurtherdeliberations.
Insofarastheabsenceofaprimafaciecasetowarrantthefilingof
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
mootandacademicbytheactionoftheprosecution.
2.Yes.DespitetheSCsdismissalofthepetitionduetothecases
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protectiongivenbyconstitutionalguarantees.
IndelaCamaravsEnage(41SCRA1),thecourtruledthat:
Thefactthatthecaseismootandacademicshouldnotpreclude
thisTribunalfromsettingforthinlanguageclearandunmistakable,
theobligationoffidelityonthepartoflowercourtjudgestothe
unequivocalcommandoftheConstitutionthatexcessivebailshall
notberequired.
InGonzalesv.Marcos(65SCRA624)whetherornottheCultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
CentersnewcharterpursuanttothePresidentslegislativepowers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph2oftheConstitution).
InthehabeascorpuscaseofAquino,Jr.,v.Enrile,59SCRA183),
thefactthatthepetitionwasmootandacademicdidnotpreventthis
Courtintheexerciseofitssymbolicfunctionfrompromulgatingone
ofthemostvoluminousdecisionseverprintedintheReports.
LIM VS FELIX
Facts:
-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality
of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination
plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
this
PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
FACTS
- On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in
Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five
persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact
transpired is still unclear. According to one version,
armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu,
with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties.
Another version has it that a group that was on its way
to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been
ambushed- The next day, a lawyer (Atty. Batuampar) of
one of the widows filed a letter-complaint with the
fiscal, asking for a full blast preliminary investigation.
The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent
persons being implicated by the parties involved on
both sides none of whom was, however, identified and
promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be
filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a"1st
endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting
Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases
that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that
happened in the afternoon of July 27,1985," be
forwarded to his office, which "has first taken
cognizance of said cases.- On August 10, 1985, a
criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed. On
the same day, respondent Judge examined personally
the 3witnesses. Thereafter, the Judge approved the
complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the14
petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and 50
"John Does.- On Aug 14, 1985, an ex-parte motion was
filed by Atty. Batuampar seeking recall of the warrant
of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough
investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial
investigation had been "hasty and manifestly
haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been
propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion
for "lack of basis;" hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue the
warrant of arrest without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation
HELD
YES.- What the Rule provides is that no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court may be filed without completing that
procedure. Sec. 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the
MTC to issue a warrant even before opening the second
phase.- This was equally true under the former rules,
where the first phase of the investigation was expressly
denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish
it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation
proper
- Sec 3 of rule 112 consists of 2 phases:- The first
phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the
sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and
other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends
with the determination by the Judge either:(1) that
there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in
which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits
the order of dismissal, together with the records of the
case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2)that the complaint
HOW EFFECTED
RULE 113
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.
RULE 113
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer
making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as
he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every
person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting
the arrest when he can render such assistance without
detriment to himself. (10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure.
An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a
warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may
break into any building or enclosure where the person to be
arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused
admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and
purpose. (11a)
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.
Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in
accordance with the preceding section, he may break out
therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.
2. warrantless
a. when justified
rule 113 sec 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112
PEOPLE VS TUDTUD
Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian
asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier
related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their
area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta
and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the
Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For
5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the
police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as
big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m.
that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and
SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian
clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5
feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that
one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a
plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the
suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received information that stocks of
illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled
Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud
obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as
his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag
and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as
marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,
informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station.
The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained
3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained
another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong,
were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however,
reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud,
denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the
prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign,
among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana
leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds
statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the
box be opened) be considered a waiver.
Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the
warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception,
as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful
arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that
the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with
an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is
whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree
of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is
insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the
arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be
described as personal, having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud.
Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious
informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his
illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets
there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not
identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites
are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it
was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's
implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack
of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of
his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come
under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And
as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al.
cannot be sustained.
PEOPLE VS CHUA
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by
R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and
Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their
confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to
deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives.
The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway
near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group
acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accusedappellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of
the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car
carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2
Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as
police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a
small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud
subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20)
pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance.
SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic
bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene
brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at
the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against
him and narrated a different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his
wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he
decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He
stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy
old, left their house to collect bets on the PBA ending games
from the local residents. When she did not return home that
evening, Rico asked his father Ambrosio and his daughter
Jinky to look for Candy, but they did not find her. Information
that Candy was in Mapanas with her mother proved wrong. On
December 12, 1996, word reached Rico that a young girl was
found dead in Sitio Tinotogasan. Rico immediately went to the
place and found the lifeless body of Candy. Her panty and
shorts were hanging from an ankle, while her shirt was rolled
up to her throat. She had wounds in different parts of her body.
Rico sought the help of the police and Barangay Captain Pedro
Gomba.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Having heard that a certain Ronnie
Cabagtong[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] was involved in the killing of his
daughter, Rico filed a complaint against Ronnie, who was then
investigated by the police. While Ronnie was under
investigation at the police headquarters, his mother, Aurea
Cabagtong, came to the station. She told Rico Dolim that she
knew what actually happened to Candy and offered to be a
witness.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Aurea Cabagtong pointed to
accused-appellants Baby Cabagtong[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] and
Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the crime.
Rico Dolims statement, as well as that of his father, was taken
by the police, as were those of Aurea Cabagtong, Dimas
Pugnit, and Ronnie Cabagtong. Rico said he knew accusedappellant Renante Mendez because he was their neighbor. He
was acquainted with accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong
because the latter was also from Barangay Burabud. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Rico Dolim claimed he had suffered
unbearable loss as a result of his daughters death and that he
had incurred burial and other incidental expenses which he
estimated to be P7,000.00.
For her part, Aurea Cabagtong claimed that, on the night of
December 8, 1996, accused-appellants Renante Mendez and
Baby Cabagtong went to her house. They were soaked from
the rain. She said that her son Ronnie, who was already about
to sleep, asked her to let the two inside. She said her son
talked with accused-appellants, but she did not understand
what they had been discussing. Aurea Cabagtong said she
saw accused-appellants washing their clothes to remove
bloodstains on them. The two spent the night in her house with
her son Ronnie. When she woke up the following morning, she
found they had already left.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Aurea said she was able to talk to her son about accusedappellants visit only when she went to the police headquarters
while Ronnie was being investigated. She gave a statement,
which was reduced in writing, before SPO2 Noli Cernio. [if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On cross-examination, Aurea said that
Ambrosio Dolim had asked her to testify in this case. According
to her, Ambrosio went to her house and paid for her expenses
in attending court sessions.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Ronnie Cabagtong, the third witness for the prosecution,
claimed to be an eyewitness to the crime. He said that, on the
night of December 8, 1996, he watched a Betamax show in
Kagawad Tesoros house in Occidental II, poblacion of Gamay.
Several people were there, including accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong and the victim Candy
Dolim. He said that Candy Dolim left after the first show to
solicit bets for the PBA ending games. Accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong followed. Ronnie said
he left Kagawad Tesoros house five minutes later and met
Dimas, who told him that he had seen accused-appellants with
a girl. According to Ronnie, he was about three meters away
when he later saw accused-appellants. Renante Mendez was
on top of Candy, having sexual intercourse with her, while Baby
Cabagtong was holding the victims hands. It was raining and
there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he recognized
Renante and Baby because of a lantern which illuminated the
place. According to Ronnie, he proceeded home and, at about
9 oclock that night, he heard someone calling from the outside.
[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
After Randy had left their house, Josefina and her husband
went to the house of her in-laws. A few days later, they asked a
neighbor to seek the help of the barangay captain. It was the
barangay captains son, July Gobatana, who came and brought
them to his house. They stayed there for almost three weeks,
and left the barangay captains house only when they were
informed that Randy had gone to Manila. [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Josefina said she gave the note she had made to Eladio
Cabagtong. She then sought the help of Isabelo Lucero, a
barangay captain in Laoang and a godfather of the victim.
Isabelo Lucero wrote a letter to Erma Ada, the victims mother.
Josefina went with Isabelo Lucero to deliver the letter to Erma,
but she did not know its contents. Josefina said she knew
accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Cabagtong
and that she did not see either of them near the area where the
incident took place at any time during that day.[if !supportFootnotes][29]
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
The defense then presented its evidence. Its theory is that the
crime was committed by one Randy Gomba, and not by
accused-appellants, as charged by the prosecution. The first
witness, Josefina Bernas, testified that, on the day of the
crime, she and her husband were in Sitio Tinotogasan making
copra. While they were working, they heard a woman crying.
When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being
raped by a man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy
Gomba. The girl was lying on her back with her legs raised, her
shorts were at her ankle and her blouse was around her neck.
She saw Randy Gomba holding the girl in his arms. She was
bleeding profusely. Randy warned her: No such story would
come out, otherwise, [I will] kill [you]. Frightened, Josefina ran
fast until she reached her husband. After she had told her
husband what she had witnessed, they hurriedly went home,
passing through another route because they were afraid they
might encounter Randy Gomba.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Upon reaching home, Josefina wrote the date and time of the
incident and told her husband to watch out as Randy Gomba
might come to their house. Randy in fact went to their house
and threatened to harm them if they told anybody about the
incident. Josefina said Randy even asked P20.00 from them
for his fare, but they had no money at that time. [if !supportFootnotes][27]
[endif]
[endif]
Gamay, informing the latter what Josefina had told him and
recommending that Gomba be arrested. However, the Chief of
Police did not heed his advice.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Accused-appellant Rene Baby Cabagtong testified in his
defense. He said that he was arrested on December 13, 1996
in his farm in Sitio Pinamihagan, Gamay, Northern Samar, by
barangay tanod Mano Mejica.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Accusedappellant Baby Cabagtong was on his way home to take his
meal when he met Mejica, who asked him to go with him.
When Baby demanded to know why he should do so, Mejica
pointed a gun at him. Baby was taken to the municipal hall of
Gamay, where he was investigated by policeman SPO2 Noli
Cernio. A certain Peter Longcop was the sole companion of
SPO2 Cernio during the investigation. Cernio asked him his
whereabouts on that particular Sunday when the crime
occurred, and Baby answered that he was at his farm for it was
customarily a working day. According to Baby, SPO2 Cernio
asked him only one question. Peter Longcop, on the other
hand, asked Baby to testify against accused-appellant Renante
Mendez because they wanted Baby to implicate him, but he
refused.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] He claimed he was told to go
downstairs and was then placed in jail. There were other
prisoners inside the jail cell, including accused-appellant
Renante Mendez.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong said everything Ronnie
Cabagtong had said was a lie and that SPO2 Noli Cernio
convinced Ronnie to testify against them as a condition for the
latters release. Baby claimed that at the time of the incident, he
was with his parents and siblings in his house at the outskirts
of Barangay Burabud, more than one kilometer, from the scene
of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong
testified that he was not aware of an order of the MCTC of
Gamay (Exhibit H), requiring him and Mendez to submit their
counter-affidavits. Baby Cabagtong told the court that he
harbored no grudge against Farvesio Banawis, with whom he
was acquainted, and Aurea Cabagtong, who was his aunt,
although a distant relative. He also knew Gil Ada, the Clerk of
Court of MCTC of Gamay, and he even appeared in court
before him. Gil Ada had required them to sign a waiver which
they did not sign.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
Accused-appellant Renante Mendez also took the witness
stand. He claimed that in December 1996, he was in Gamay,
helping his father make copra. He was arrested on December
12, 1996 as a suspect in this case, together with Ronnie
Cabagtong, by SPO2 Noli Cernio, Peter Longcop, Gejada and
Barredo, all of whom were members of the PNP of Gamay. He
was not shown any warrant when they were arrested.[if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]
FISCAL LAGRIMAS
Q: Did you finally know the persons or perpetrators responsible
for the death of your daughter?
A: Yes, I finally [knew] the perpetrators who committed the
crime against my daughter from somebody who told me that
[she] would be a witness.
Q: Who is this person who told you about the persons
responsible for the death of your daughter?
A: She is Mrs. Aurea Cabagtong.
Q: When did she tell you?
A: After the funeral of my daughter.
Q: Where did she tell you?
A: At the police headquarters.
Q: Why was she in the police headquarters?
A: Because she was there to look after her son because I
?
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed
Jun the marked bills and Jun instructed PO3 Manlangit to
wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate.
?
When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something
wrapped in plastic upon which PO3 arrested Jun. They
frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named neneth
?
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dinin table and noticed something
wrapped in plastic inside the box.
?
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of
the box and found that it ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves.
?
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked
bills from Neneth. The policemen arrested Neneth and took
both her and Jun, together with the coz, its contents and the
marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters,
?
Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while
Neneth is Violata Gaddao.
?
They were both convicted feloniously selling,
administering and giving away to another 11 plastic bags of
suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as
amended by RA 7659
Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable
?
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can
be raised by an accused & partakes the nature of a confession
& avoidance.
?
American federal courts and state courts usually use
the subjective or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v.
U.S. to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The
focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to
commit the offense is charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents.
?
Another test is the objective test where the test of
entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement
agenst was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person,
other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.
?
The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that
the details of the purported transaction must be clearly &
adequately shown. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validty of
the defense of inducement.
?
In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest uner
Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all
for Gaddao to flee from the policement to justify her arrest in
hot pursuit
?
Neither could her arrest ne justified under second
instance of personal knowledge in Rule 113 as this must be
based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely
on the basis of the alleged indentification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct
examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in
response to his query as to where the marked money was.
Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills.
This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If there is
no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of the acts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.
?
Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6
kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddaos house does not
to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As
Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner
Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side
of his waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and
warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his
possession a .38 caliber paltik revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then
apprehended Caduas companion, who was later identified as Joselito
Aguilar. In Aguilars possession was found a fan knife. [if !supportFootnotes][9]
[endif]
they add, the search and seizure are valid and lawful for being
incidental to the warrantless arrest.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
Petitioners denial regarding possession of the .38 paltik
revolver has no independent support nor corroboration, according to
respondents. On this matter, the Solicitor General comments as
follows:
...PO3Burdeosclearlytestifiedthathesawthe.38paltikrevolverin
the possession of petitioner when he arrested the latter. Thus,
petitioners defense of denial, which is uncorroborated and self
servingnegativeevidence,cannotbegivengreaterweightthanthe
declaration of PO3 Burdeos who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535). Moreover, no proof was
shownthatthearrestingofficershadimproperorillmotivetotestify
falsely against petitioner. Accordingly, PO3 Burdeos testimony
shouldbegivenfullfaithandcredit(Peoplevs.Gazmen,247SCRA
414).Besides,asanarrestingofficerwhoisdutyboundtoenforce
thelaw,PO3Burdeosispresumedtohaveregularlyperformedhis
officialduty(Section3[m],Rule131oftheRulesofCourt;People
vs.Basilgo,235SCRA191; Peoplevs.Pacleb,217SCRA92).[if !
supportFootnotes][26][endif]
crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission. [if !supportFootnotes][41]
[endif]
offenseofillegallypossessingthesaidgun.Besides,beingnegative
ofgunpowderburnsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthataccusedappellant
hasnotfiredthegun....
xxx
Asstatedbythetrialcourt:
OnquestioningbytheCourt,witnesscitedseveralfactorswhereina
personwhohasfiredhisfirearmbutwasnegativefornitrates;the
typeofcaliberoftheammunitionofthefirearmitself;anewfirearm
orrevolvertypewouldbesoclosethatnitratescouldnotescapefrom
thebridgeofthegun,whereasanoldfirearmwherethemechanismis
alreadyalittlebitloose,morenitratesappearonthesubjectwhofired
thegun;thedirectionofthewindifthesubjectisfiringthefirearm
againstthetarget,thenitrateswillbeblownawayfromthesceneand
sohewouldalsobenegativeofnitrates;dependingonthevelocityof
thewind,humidityoftheareawheretheshootinghappened;ina
closedroomorplaceand[where]thereisnowindonoragainstthe
firearm,hecouldbepositivefornitrates;whereasoutsidetheroom
hewouldbenegativeandthelesshumidareathelessfallofnitrates
on the subject, and another possibility is if the subject is using
somethingtocoverhishandfiringthegunitwouldbenegativefor
nitratesandinusinga.45calibergun,whichhasacloseandtight
compartment where the bullet is set and with the revolver type
firearm which has an open chamber, the former has a greater
possibilitythathewouldbenegativefornitrates.[if!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
The penalty imposed upon petitioner, however, deserves a
review. At the time that he was convicted, the penalty for Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree 1866 was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The trial
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, imposed on petitioner the
penalty of 12 years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] In view of the enactment of Republic
Act 8294 on June 6, 1997, certain provisions of P.D. 1866 have been
amended. With the passage of the aforementioned law, the penalty for
simple illegal possession of a low-powered firearm, such as paltik,
has been reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period[if !
supportFootnotes][50][endif]
and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00). Therefore following R.A. 8294, the penalty imposed on
petitioner should now be lowered to benefit the petitioner. For the
penalty provided for simple illegal possession in the amendment is
lower than that provided for under the old law. Since the provision of
R.A. 8294 is favorable to petitioner, it should have a retroactive
effect, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. [if !supportFootnotes]
[51][endif]
Moreover, in conjunction with the new law, we should also
apply the doctrine laid down in People vs. Martin Simon[if !supportFootnotes]
[52][endif]
in relation to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[if !
supportFootnotes][53][endif]
Although Illegal Possession of Firearms is
considered a special law, the penalty provided is taken from the range
of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, thus, in relation to Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is covered by the first clause of
said section. Here applicable by analogy and extension is the holding
in Simon:
ItistruethatSection1ofsaidlaw,afterprovidingforindeterminate
sentenceforanoffenseundertheRevisedPenalCode,statesthatif
theoffenseispunishedbyanyotherlaw,thecourtshallsentencethe
accusedtoanindeterminatesentence,themaximumtermofwhich
shallnotexceedthemaximumfixedbysaidlawandtheminimum
shallnotbelessthantheminimumtermprescribedbythesame.We
holdthatthisquotedportionofthesectionindubitablyreferstoan
offense undera speciallaw whereinthe penaltyimposed wasnot
takenfromandiswithoutreferencetotheRevisedPenalCode,as
discussedintheprecedingillustrations,suchthatitmaybesaidthat
the offense is punished under that law. (Emphasis Supplied)[if !
supportFootnotes][54][endif]
PEOPLE VS BURGOS
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur
Facts:
One Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at the
Davao del Sur Constabulary HQ.
He testified that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him as
member of NPA. Burgos threatened him with the use of a
firearm. Masamlok attended the seminar where Burgos spoke
about his membership with the NPA and the organizations
desire to overthrow the government.
Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to house
of accused. Accused was plowing the field when they arrived.
Pat. Bioco called accused and asked him about the firearm.
Accused denied possession of said firearm but later, his wife
pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in
the ground.
After the recovery of said firearm, accused pointed to a stock
pile of cogon where the officers recovered:
14 marron notebook
15 pamphlets: Ang Byan, Pahayagan ng Paritdo Komunista
ng Pilipinas ets
Accused admitted that firearm was issued to him by Nestor
Jimines, team leader of sparro unit.
RTC: convicted
Issue: WON warrantless arrest was valid
Held: NO
Ratio:
Not under the conditions provided in rules
The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator
Under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a person to be arrested has committed a
crime; a crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first.
Issue: WON search was valid
Held: NO
Ratio:
If an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is
made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful.
16 There was to waiver to search in case at bar.
To constitute waiver, 3 requisites must concur:
that the right exists
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
Others:
17 denied of right to counsel during custodial interrogation
.
....
Ifhomicideormurderiscommittedwiththeuseofanunlicensed
firearm,suchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsideredasan
aggravatingcircumstance.(Emphasisadded)
Apparently, even though the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be
applied in this case so as to favor accused-appellant in view of
the proviso in 1 that the first paragraph, providing for lighter
penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has
been committed. Nor can the third paragraph be applied by
considering the illegal possession of firearm as a mere
aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized
was used in the commission of a crime, this case concerns
solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The criminal
case for homicide is not before us for consideration.
Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with
the ruling in People v. Quijada,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] that a person
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty
of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised
Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under
P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERRY VS OHIO
ThePetitioner, JohnW.Terry(thePetitioner),wasstoppedand
searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner
seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
approachedthePetitionerforquestioninganddecidedtosearchhim
first.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individualonastreetcornerwhilerepeatedlywalkingupanddown
thesamestreet.Themenwouldperiodicallypeerintoastorewindow
andthentalksomemore.Themenalsospoketoathirdmanwhom
theyeventuallyfollowedupthestreet.Theofficerbelievedthatthe
Petitionerandtheothermenwerecasingastoreforapotential
robbery.Theofficerdecidedtoapproachthemenforquestioning,
andgiventhenatureofthebehaviortheofficerdecidedtoperforma
quicksearchofthemenbeforequestioning.Aquickfriskingofthe
Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
chargedwithcarryingaconcealedweapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for
arrestisanunreasonablesearchundertheFourthAmendmenttothe
UnitedStatesConstitution(Constitution)?
Held.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SupremeCourt)
heldthatitisareasonablesearchwhenanofficerperformsaquick
seizureandalimitedsearchforweaponsonapersonthattheofficer
reasonablybelievescouldbearmed.Atypicalbeatofficerwouldbe
undulyburdenedbybeingprohibitedfromsearchingindividualsthat
theofficersuspectstobearmed.
Onthelateeveningof25June1995,thevictimwasreportedmissing
by her mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a
passengerjeepneyanddisappeared.
Thevictimsbodywasfound,lifeless,ataround7:30amthatsame
day.Shewasfoundintheseptictankwearingherblouseandno
underwear.Theautopsyshowedthatthevictimwasrapedandwas
strangledtodeath.
Uponreexaminingthecrimescene,policemenfoundapairofdirty
whiteshortpants,abrownbeltandayellowhairribbonwhichwas
identifiedbythevictimsmothertobelongtoherdaughter. Also,
theyfoundapairofblueslipperswhichIsipidentifiedasthatofthe
appellant.Alsofoundintheyard,threearmslengthawayfromthe
septictankwereanunderwear,aleatherwallet,apairofdirtylong
pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants
belongings.
ThecasewasforwardedtotheSupremeCourtforautomaticreview.
Issues
WONtheappellantsextrajudicialconfessionwasvalidlytakenand
inaccordancewithhisrightsunderSection12oftheBillofRights;
and
Ruling
Theconvictionoftheappellantisaffirmed.
RatioDecidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was
taken within the ambit of the law as evinced by the records and
testimonyofthelawyerwhoassisted,warnedandexplainedtohim
hisconstitutionallyguaranteedpreinterrogatoryandcustodialrights.
Astothesecondissue,theappellantarguesthatthecircumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a
convictionofhisguilt.However,theCourtruledotherwise.
TheCourtrecalledtheRuleonEvidenceandsettledjurisprudence.
Absence of direct proof does not absolve the appellant because
conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following
requisitesasstatedintheRulesofCourt:
1.thereismorethanonecircumstance;
thefactsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedareproven;and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
convictionbeyondreasonabledoubt.
TheCourtrecalledtherulinginPeoplev.DeGuia,280SCRA141,
allcircumstancesmustbeconsistentwitheachother,consistentwith
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistentwiththehypothesisthatheisinnocentandwithevery
otherrationalhypothesisexceptthatofguilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v.
Abitona,240SCRA335,thatfactsandcircumstancesconsistentwith
guiltandinconsistentwithinnocence,constituteevidencewhich,in
weightandprobativeforce,maysurpassevendirectevidenceinits
effectuponthecourt.
TheCourtagreedwiththetrialcourtsdecisioningivingcredenceto
severalcircumstantialevidence,whichismorethanenoughtoprove
appellantsguiltbeyondtheshadowofreasonabledoubt.
TheCourtalsoupdatedtheMirandarightswiththedevelopmentsin
lawthatprovidedtherightsofsuspectsundercustodialinvestigation
indetail.
Apersonundercustodialinvestigationshouldbeinformed:
1.Inalanguageknowntoandunderstoodbyhimofthereasonfor
thearrestandhemustbeshownthewarrantofarrest,ifany;Every
otherwarnings,informationorcommunicationmustbeinalanguage
knowntoandunderstoodbysaidperson;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makesmaybeusedasevidenceagainsthim;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presenceofanindependentandcompetentlawyer,preferablyofhis
ownchoice;
4.Thatifhehasnolawyerorcannotaffordtheservicesofalawyer,
onewillbeprovidedforhim;andthatalawyermayalsobeengaged
byanypersoninhisbehalf,ormaybeappointedbythecourtupon
petitionofthepersonarrestedoroneactinginhisbehalf;
5. That nocustodial investigationin anyform shallbe conducted
exceptinthepresenceofhiscounselorafteravalidwaiverhasbeen
made;
6.That,atanytime,hehastherighttocommunicateorconferbythe
mostexpedientmeanstelephone,radio,letterormessengerwith
his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediatefamily,oranymedicaldoctor,priestorministerchosenby
himorbyanyonefromhisimmediatefamilyorbyhiscounsel,orbe
visitedby/conferwithdulyaccreditednationalorinternationalnon
governmentorganization.Itshallbetheresponsibilityoftheofficer
toensurethatthisisaccomplished;
7.Thathehastherighttowaiveanyofsaidrightsprovideditismade
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understoodthesame;
8.ThatthewaivermustbedoneinwritingANDinthepresenceof
counsel,otherwise,hemustbewarnedthatthewaiverisvoidevenif
heinsistonhiswaiverandchoosestospeak;
9.Thathemayindicateinanymanneratanytimeorstageofthe
processthathedoesnotwishtobequestionedwithwarningthatonce
hemakessuchindication,thepolicemaynotinterrogatehimifthe
samehadnotyetcommenced,ortheinterrogationmustceasedifit
hasalreadybegun;
10.Thathisinitialwaiverofhisrighttoremainsilent,therightto
counseloranyofhisrightsdoesnotbarhimfrominvokingitatany
timeduringtheprocess,regardlessofwhetherhemayhaveanswered
somequestionsorvolunteeredsomestatements;
11.Thatanystatementorevidence,asthecasemaybe,obtainedin
violationofanyoftheforegoing,whetherinculpatoryorexculpatory,
inwholeorinpart,shallbeinadmissibleinevidence.
C. METHOD OF ARREST BY PRIVATE PERSON
RULE 113 Section 9. Method of arrest by private person.
When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the
person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause
of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its
commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before
the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him,
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
D. POST ARREST PROCEDURE
RULE 112 Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without
warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided in this Rule
E. EXCEPTION CONSTRUED STRICTLY
DAVID ET AL VS ARROYO
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017
declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless
violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did
so citing the following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPPNPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting
the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must
be noted that before the said proclamations, the following
course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled
Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming
in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist
safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20 th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to
defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col.
Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of
atthehouseofRandyTibuleinManaoag,Pangasinan.Theywere
discussinghowtogototheweddingpartyofJeanMariescousinin
SitioCabaoangan(TSNJune11,1996,pp.78;June18,1996,pp.
2324).
Afterdiscussion,theyrodeinthetricycledrivenbyRamonGarcia
goingtoCabaoangan.BehindGarciawereTibuleandWillie.Jean
was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSNJune11,1996,pp.711;TSNJune18,1996,pp.2325).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio
Cabaoangan,theymetappellantRolandoValdezandhiscompanions
whowerearmedwithguns.Thetricyclesheadlightflashedontheir
faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at
Montanos group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan,
mapan tayon (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companionsleft(TSNJune11,1996,pp.1114).
TheshootingincidentleftRamonGarcia,JeanMarieGarcia,Sandra
MontanoandWillieAcostadead(TSNJune11,1996,pp.1416).
Theysustainedthefollowinginjuries:
JeanMarieGarcia:
gunshotwound.5cm.indiameter,1inchlateralofthenippleright
through and through trajecting the middle lobe of the lungs, rt
ventricleoftheheart,middlelobeofthelung,leftwithpointofexit1
inchindiameter1inchlateralofthenipple,left.
(ExhibitB)
RamonGarcia:
gunshotwound,.5cm.diameterpointofentranceearcanalthruand
thrutrajectingtheskullbrainsubstancewithpointofexittemporal
arearight.
Another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance
anterioraxilliarylineleftatthelablenippletrajectingthelung(left)
heartventricleandlung(right)withpointofexit1cm.indiameter,1
inchlateralthenippleright.
(ExhibitC)
SandraMontano:
gunshotwound.6cm.indiameter,pointofentranceatthetemporal
arealeft,penetratingtheskin,skullminigas,brainsubstance(right)
(tempralregis)wherethesluglodge.
(ExhibitD)
WillieAcosta:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of
entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru
trajectingtheupperthirdofthestomachofthoracicveinwiththe
point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7 th thorasic
vertebrae.
(ExhibitE)
Ontheotherhand,WilliamMontanoandRandyTibulesurvivedthe
attack.Theysufferedseriousgunshotinjuriesthatcouldhavecaused
theirdeathwereitnotforthetimelymedicalattentiongiventhem
(TSNJuly3,1996,p.6).Montanosustainedseveralgunshotwounds
on the left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the left
shoulderandmiddlerightfinger(TSNJune25,1996,p.608).Tibule
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant
(stomach)andtheotherattheleftperiumbelical(TSNJuly3,1996,
pp.78).
(pp.215219,Rollo.)
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding and
disposing:
INCRIMINALCASENO.U8747:
theaccusedROLANDOVALDEZyLIPURDA,GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH
DOUBLEFRUSTRATEDMURDERdefinedandpenalizedunder
RepublicActNo.7659otherwiseknownastheHeinousCrimeLaw,
theoffensehavingbeenacomplexcrimethepenaltyofwhichisin
themaximum,andwiththeattendantaggravatingcircumstancesof
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the
victim might make (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The
settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it
is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or depend himself against such attack. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without slightest provocation from the victim
who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any
showing of evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant.
While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation
between Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently
prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be evident
premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the
following have to be prove: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution to allow the
offender to reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan,
254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the
crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the existence
of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the
offenders determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their
act of arming themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter
waiting for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have also
indicated that they clung to their determination to commit the crime
(the second element). More important that these two elements is the
proof that a sufficient period of time had lapsed between the outward
act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense (the third
element). There must have been enough opportunity for the initial
impulse to subside. This element is indispensable for circumstance of
evident premeditation to aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial,
46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only
whentherehadbeenacoldanddeepmeditation,andatenacious
persistenceintheaccomplishmentofthecriminalact.Theremustbe
an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the
meaningandtheconsequencesofwhattheyhadplannedtodo,an
interval long enough for the conscience and better judgment to
overcometheevildesireandscheme.
(p.649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the
Court had stressed the importance of sufficient time between the
criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent,
affording such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at
a calm judgment. Obviously, this element is wanting in the case at
bar. Right after the supposed heated argument between Bernard
Castro and Capistrano, Castro and company went home to get the
firearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault. There was no
chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the case at bar had no
opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm
judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial
court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the very
basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery
(People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1
[1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating
contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the
rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in
the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in
their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was
valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of
the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of
the crime, the accused was a member of the House of
Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this
allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating
circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We
doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The
offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his
office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma.
Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just
as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the
Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects
with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and
concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one
exception, it results that the judgment appealed from must be,
as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the
defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and
one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this
instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this
judgment into effect issue.
PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the
issuanceofawarrantofarrest.Petitionersassertthattherespondent
Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) John Does
transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such
warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be
seized.
Issue:Whethersaidwarrantisvalid
Held:No.
Insofarassaidwarrantisissuedagainstfifty(50)JohnDoesnot
oneofwhomthewitnessestothecomplaintcouldorwouldidentify,
itisofthenatureofageneralwarrant,oneofaclassofwritslong
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally
subversiveofthelibertyofthesubject.[30]Clearlyviolativeofthe
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describethepersonorpersonstobeseized,[31]thewarrantmust,as
regardsitsunidentifiedsubjects,bevoided.
WHEREFORE,the warrant complained of is upheld and declared
validinsofarasitordersthearrestofthepetitioners.Saidwarrantis
voidedtotheextentthatitisissuedagainstfifty(50)JohnDoes.
TherespondentJudgeisdirectedtoforwardtotheProvincialFiscal
ofLanaodelSurtherecordofthepreliminaryinvestigationofthe
complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriateaction.
DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 50 GUIDELINES ON THE
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 125 OF THE RPC AS
AMENDED
PEOPLE VS ZUELA
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los
Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte
from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br.
24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed
in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution?
Held:
The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the
crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, the
moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to
the infirmity of
accused-appellants sworn statements did not leave a void in
the prosecutions case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated
the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who,
in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private
person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant
Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
stating that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The
trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualdas testimony.
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the Court
reiterated the doctrine enunciated in the Maqueda case. In
Andan, the Court said that when the accused talked with the
mayor as confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional
rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the
suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and Maria from behind
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Treachery exists when an adult person illegally attacks a child
of tender years and causes his death.
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the
crime as robbery with homicide and not robbery with triple
homicide as charged in the information. The term
homicide in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense,
embracing not only the act which results in death but also all
other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the
nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in
connection with the robbery. The multiplicity of victims slain
on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the
same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo
Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya,
received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at
Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants
were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.
PEOPLE VS RODRIGUEZ
PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent
Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General
Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at
a distance of about 112 meters in front of him was a tricycle driven
by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men
and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag.
After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to
help the woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked
the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on
the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of del
Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion
entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase
and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police
headquarters and reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the
owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team
proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain
where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn
revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario
volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996. On the way to
the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch
kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and
they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15
armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00
p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of
these were happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school,
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might
attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the police
station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May
1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he
was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His
statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also executed a
waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand,
claimed that he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him
to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong"
Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred. He claimed that the 3
men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be
harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however,
he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas,
a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry
and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. While del Rosario
pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large.
Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario
guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia
Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation at the time he was invited for questioning at
the house ofthe barangay captain.
Held: Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was invited" for questioning at the
house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the
prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to
remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime
even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the
same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of
Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a
hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious
designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not
therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A
person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with
his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand,
conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a
whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of
any complicity in the crime charged.
instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case
against Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not
even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have
anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
PEOPLE VS MULETA
PEOPLE VS TAN
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter TAN) seeks his acquittal by a reversal
of the 29 June 1998 decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20688 which affirmed his conviction for
violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] TAN's motion for reconsideration of
said decision and motion for oral arguments were denied for lack of
merit by the Court of Appeals in its 6 October 1998 resolution. [if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Said decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the 19 December 1994 judgment of conviction against TAN
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-45449.
TANs indictment[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] for violation of Republic Act No.
6539 reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and
without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one
(1) Mitsubishi Gallant car colored blue, bearing Plate No. CGS-723
owned by one PHILIP SEE, of undetermined value, to the damage
and prejudice of said Philip See.
Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with the assistance of
counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial immediately
ensued as the parties waived the holding of a preliminary conference.
The trial court's terse recapitulation of the prosecution evidence
proceeded in this manner:[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
xxx [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a
1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-door valued at P420,000.00, bearing
plate no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no. 4G32-FG2704
and serial/chassis no. A161UL-3011. Sometime in March 1992,
accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip by Alvin's fiancee, one
Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends and
started to see each other on several occasions thereafter.
On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip together with his wife
Ruby See and Robert Chua (a neighbor) was at his place of residence
xxx when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to Philip that he
was intending to buy Philip's aforesaid car and that he wanted to testdrive it. On account of their friendship and believing Alvin's
assurance that he would return the car after he shall have test-driven
it, Philip granted Alvin's request xxx. On thus getting hold of the car,
Alvin sped away and never returned. In vain, Philip waited for Alvin
to show up and return the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much
less cause the return of the car. Jksm
Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin at his office at
Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but Alvin avoided him by refusing to answer
the telephone calls or pretending he was not around; and Philip's
attempts to see Alvin at his office similarly proved futile, for
whenever Philip would go to said office, Alvin would refuse to see
him. Dismayed though he was, Philip desisted as long as he could
from reporting and complaining about the matter to the authorities;
Philip still believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually would come
around to returning the car to him. Meanwhile, sometime on March 5,
1993, with the assistance of some personnel of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car's 1993
renewal registration in the absence of the vehicle and he was issued
the corresponding official receipt therefor.
Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to see Alvin at his
place at Roosevelt. Again Philip was told that Alvin was not around.
One of Alvin's employees, however, advised Philip to the effect that
the car was parked and hidden right behind Alvin's warehouse. The
location of the warehouse having been given to him, Philip went to
the place and at a distance of some five feet, he saw the vehicle
parked at the rear end of the warehouse. To his shock and surprise, he
saw that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door, and several interior
accessories, had been dismantled and were already missing. Worse,
several pieces of wood were piled on top of the car as if purposely
hide and conceal it from view.
Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about June 2, 1993,
formally lodged a complaint for carnapping against Alvin before the
QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993, Philip
reported the loss of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Traffic Management Command and he accordingly signed the
corresponding complaint sheets. Too, an alarm for the subject car was
issued. To his further shock and consternation, Philip was informed
by the PNP's Highway Patrol Group (HPG) that somebody had
applied for a clearance to sell the car and that the applicant was made
to appear as one Philip See. xxx Philip denied his alleged signature
on the application and also denied having supposedly applied for
clearance to sell his vehicle.
Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by Philip against Alvin
before the QC police station 1, the police authorities scheduled a visit
to the place of Alvin, with Philip being asked by them to pinpoint and
identify Alvin in the course thereof. Accordingly, at Alvin's place, he
was identified and invited by the police to the station for
investigation. While still at Alvin's office, Philip saw on top of
Alvin's table what Philip believed to be accessories from his car,
consisting of a two-way radio antenna and car stereo, which appeared
to him to have been dismantled from the subject car.
At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to test-drive it on
November 7, 1992, the car was in top condition, had low mileage,
was 'fully loaded' with complete interior accessories including an
imported Kenwood stereo, and had imported magwheels. Chief
Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution's version and presented a
completely diverse tale.
Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter SEE) filed the
complaint to purposely collect a debt from him and wittingly use the
court as collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE instituted
the complaint in revenge of the quarrels they had over TANs
girlfriend whom SEE wooed, and (2) in retaliation against the
complaint for grave threats and illegal possession of firearms filed by
one of TAN's employees against SEE.
TAN then traced this legal predicament to the time when his
girlfriend introduced him to SEE in March 1992. TAN and SEE
instantly became friends for they shared a similar acumen for
business and passion for target shooting. Inevitably, they engaged in
and entered into several business transactions which resulted in
TAN's indebtedness to SEE in the amount of P800,000. Inspite of
this, SEE still offered to sell the subject Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for
the amount of P280,000. TAN declined the offer. SEE persisted to the
extent that he brought the car to TAN's residence on 26 November
1992 and generously suggested that he would just add into the latter's
existing indebtedness to him the car's purchase price.
Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect the car's purchase
price but TAN had still no funds. So TAN suggested that he would
apply with a bank for a car loan using the car as security and apply
the proceeds of said loan in payment for the car. SEE agreed.
Subsequently, TAN submitted in his name a loan application with the
BPI Family Bank in Makati. In compliance with the requirements of
the loan application, SEE personally supervised the car's appraisal
and inspection on 19 March 1993. TAN additionally maintained that
he and SEE signed a deed of sale covering the subject automobile but
that TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon SEE's pretext that
he would use it for facilitation of the loan.
The bank approved the loan application but only in the amount of
P129,000. Naturally, SEE considered the amount insufficient and
hence, refused to accept the terms of the loan. Consequently, TAN did
not seek the release of the loan. Esm
The
friendship
eventually
soured
and
the
resulting
"misunderstanding" with SEE impelled TAN on 19 May 1993 to
instruct his warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE's residence.
TAN's employee drove the car to SEE's house, parked the car outside
the gate and then handed over the keys of the car to SEE's wife,
Ruby.
Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June 1993, police officers
arrived at his residence and invited him to the police station; this, to
TAN's additional bewilderment, was in connection with SEE's
complaint for the carnapping of the car he already returned. TAN
peacefully went with the police authorities to the station. [if !supportFootnotes]
[6][endif]
Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court believed in the
prosecutions version, particularly in SEE's clear, positive, and
straightforward account - which said court found amply demonstrated
- that SEE had withdrawn the consent initially given to TAN when
the latter went beyond test-driving and appropriated the car for his
own use and benefit. To the trial court, TAN's failure to return the car
and his consequent appropriation thereof constituted unlawful taking
-- the gravamen of the crime charged. It then concluded that TAN
was obviously actuated by intent to gain. The trial court then
considered as completely undeserving of belief, TAN's supposition
that despite his heavy indebtedness and given his increasing difficulty
to pay his loans, SEE had benignly extended him credit, delivered to
him the subject car and bestowed upon him the ultimate privilege of
paying the car at his convenience. Thus, in a decision promulgated on
19 January 1994, the trial court convicted TAN, the dispositive
portion of which read as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan y Lagamayo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping charged
herein, defined and punished in Sec. 2, in connection with Sec. 14,
both of Rep. Act No. 6539 xxx and, accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
from fourteen years, eight months, and fifteen days as minimum, to
seventeen years and four months as maximum; to restore to the
offended party, Philip See, the subject car x x x or in default thereof,
to indemnify said offended party in the sum of four hundred twenty
thousand pesos; and, to pay the costs, without prejudice to the
application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused's favor. Esmsc
TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which was granted by the trial court in its 4 July 1994 order.
SEE then moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the trial court
in its 1 March 1995 order. SEE challenged these aforementioned
orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court
of Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the appellate court gave due course
to and granted the petition. TAN assailed the decision of the Court of
Appeals through a petition for review before the Supreme Court,
which promptly dismissed the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Subsequently, based on TAN's "Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Ad
Cautelam," the trial court ordered the elevation of the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, TAN challeged the Court of Appeals' affirmance of his
conviction. He argues before this Court that the appellate court erred
in (1) ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on carnapping, (2)
disregarding that there was no unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting
circumstances on record which, if considered, would be sufficient to
acquit him on reasonable doubt.
In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law, TAN contends that
the Court of Appeals should not have employed as bases for his
conviction the basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People v.
Roxas,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] where rice was received, carted away and
consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] where a bar of gold
and P200 in bank notes were received for examination and changing
into coins but instead appropriated, and (3) People v. Trinidad,[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
where a ring was received for pledging but was sold
and the proceeds thereof appropriated for the personal use of receiver.
A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the challenged Court of
If there was really a deed of sale, why could not [TAN] present a
copy thereof?
Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TANs] copy of the deed of sale,
why did he not secure another copy from the notary public who
notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he not present the notary
public to testify on the fact of the sale?
Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to [TAN] at P280,000.00
when the latter was admittedly indebted to the former to the tune of
P800,000?
If [TAN] really bought the subject car from private complainant, why
did he have to return the same (car) to the latter on May 14, 1993?
From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that the Court of
Appeals simply equated the lack of a written deed of sale to SEE's
lack of consent to TAN's taking of the car. But the mere absence of a
written contract of sale in this case does not necessarily mean that
SEE did not also consent to the taking nor that TAN's possession of
the car was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus probandi of
showing that TAN's taking was unlawful. What took place in these
proceedings was that the appellate court magnified the weakness of
the defense and overlooked the prosecutions failure to discharge the
onus probandi -- to show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of
carnapping was indeed perpetrated. In short, the Court of Appeals and
the trial court simply believed and accepted the prosecutions tale. It
ignored the basic legal precepts that conviction rests upon the
strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense; and assuming that the evidence of the
accused is weak, the same is no reason to convict, especially, as in
this case, where the case of the prosecution is not strong enough to
sustain a conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] To reiterate, the burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution, and unless the State succeeds in
proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence applies. A conviction in
criminal cases must rest on nothing less than the moral certainty of
guilt.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Exsm
There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, for upon this principle hinges the rule that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law. However, it
appears on record that the appellate court overlooked, ignored, and
disregarded some fact and circumstance of weight or significance that
if considered would have altered the result. Cogent reasons therefore
exist justifying the disregard of the findings of the appellate court,
superseding the same with our own determinations and conclusions,
and ordering the reversal of the questioned decision and resolution of
said Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the herein impugned 29
June 1998 decision and 6 October 1998 resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts judgment convicting accusedappellant Alvin Tan of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new judgment is entered
ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on ground of reasonable
doubt.
Section 12.
Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION
The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this Section as
well
as
compensation
to
the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
MIRANDA VS ARIZONA
PEOPLE VS DUERO
PEOPLE VS ORDONO