Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
Lefebvre’s writing has inspired planners and designers with the sense his
writing gives of an urban fully implicated with the historical and the social, and
of a complex evolving urban order driven at least partly by the force of
everyday life. It is this evocation of social urban landscapes of life and power
– whose intensities and differences are at the same time hidden by the
normalising and regularising procedures that are an equal part of the urban
process – that we would like to try to begin to address. Lefebvre’s work
outlined a powerful critique of existing urban form and practices, without
offering more than some rather obscure hints at how we could turn these
suggestions into a revolutionary or forward thinking praxis. His analysis has
been criticised as vague and imprecise (Castells 1977) and it is true there
seems little in the way of solid recommendations or constructive principles to
hold onto. The new praxis demanded of us involves, we will suggest, a better
understanding of the way city building is capable of producing spaces of
openness and enablement. This is about more than adapting to a change
from concentric urban growth to polycentricity. It is also not so much about the
integration of “the categories of ‘city’ and ‘space’ ... into an overarching social
theory” (Schmid 2006, p.165) as it is today, as it has been in the past, about
the way “differences are maximised” and maximised differences rearticulated
in new socio-spatial and socio-technical orders. Evolving orders of the urban
engender new forms of society in Lefebvre, and challenge the way we think of
the social as producer and production. They also, we will argue, challenge our
conceptions of the technological – and perhaps more to the point challenge
some of Lefebvre’s own conceptions of the technological. They demand we
understand better the ways technologies participate in forming cities and how
we can devise means to act against the ever-increasing minimisation of
difference in the most developed parts of the world – and the concomitant
collapse of urban systems in the Global South.
Lefebvre however never intended his writing as a guide for urban designers.
His was a critical writing, carried out in an open version of Marxism, which
addressed the question of social formation (Charnock 2010). Lefebvre saw
well enough the problems of escaping closure and achieving an open praxis
in existing models, and he adopted a ‘metaphilosophy’ of theory and praxis
which placed him at odds with structuralist Marxism, which he criticised for its
determinism and denial of the openings of history and becoming (Elden 2004:
24). For Lefebvre this closure of the social heralds a marginalisation of civil
society dominated by what he calls “absolute politics” in which individuals and
groups are transformed into subjects of power. Power is drained out of
everyday action and sociality and its real situations and surrendered to an
increasingly abstract and authoritarian state and its knowledge institutions.
“Between [politics and life] lies ... nothing, a void, intermediary bodies having
disappeared or been rendered ineffective” (McDonough 2008). The task of
metaphilosophy is to find the instruments to make “the urban ... more or less
the oeuvre of its citizens instead of imposing itself upon them as a system, as
an already closed book” (Lefebvre 1996: 117).
Lefebvre’s method was to get “back from the object (product or work) to the
activity that produced and/or created it. It is the only way ... to illuminate the
object’s nature, or, if you will the object’s relationship to nature, and
reconstitute the process of its genesis and the development of its meaning. All
other ways of proceeding can succeed only in constructing an abstract object
– a model” (Lefebvre 1991: 113). He was committed to opening up thought as
well as social process, and was concerned about overcoming the
“dividing-line between the conceived and the directly lived” – going beyond
philosophy in finding an open path to the future. Nevertheless, it was in the
orientation of his critical thinking to a necessary telos that he could not avoid a
certain ‘closure’. Lefebvre was a political thinker before anything else and his
politics was driven by the finality of the ‘dealienated’ man (Jay 1984), as the
‘end’ of social theory. In fact, we will argue, in order to open up a view on the
‘productivity’ of the urban and the life of the city, this orientation to a political
‘end’ – the assumption in fact of any social or political ‘good’ before the fact –
must necessarily be subsumed to this other concern of the open urban. There
is no open city which guarantees the rights and well-being of its citizens.
Openness and this open right is also openness to failure, and to unexpected
mishap or disaster. But it is this open productivity that also opens up
multifarious types of sociability and action that resist systematisation or
domination and open creative pathways to the future.
It was partly the refusal of the degraded urban ghetto and the “tactic of
destruction” of the events of 1871 and 1968 that motivated Lefebvre’s call for
this right which was not just a right to housing and sustenance but a right to
the city and the street with its festivity and spontaneity, with its sociability and
extended networks as ways to the open possibilities of life (Lefebvre 1996). It
is with this productivity of space, rather that the critique of its production that
we are concerned here. We will be making some speculative proposals of our
own regarding urban relationality and materiality and the ‘ends’ of process,
which is to say space-time, in order to try to begin to imagine a way to the
extension of this ideal of openness into as yet unknown or undiscovered
urban forms.
According to Lefebvre a revolutionary praxis needs to see through
mystifications of both past and present space productions in order to
deliberately create new spaces. We need to read, analyse potentials,
formulate questions, imagine answers, and build. Lefebvre's proposal begins
with "a counter-space [inserting] itself into spatial reality" against the
geographical gaze that sees only “quantity and homogeneity” (Lefebvre 2003:
382) so as to demystify not only the physical arrangements of the city, but all
modes and institutions that those arrangements sanctify and support.
"Pressure from below must ... confront the state in its role as organiser of
space, as the power that controls urbanisation, the construction of buildings
and spatial planning in general (Lefebvre 2003: 383). But, any programme for
change must have the creation of space at its core, and “there must be an
alignment between the macro-structures of politics and economy on the one
hand and everyday life on the other.” What’s more any new arrangements
“must display themselves, be tended, and be reinforced through a quotidian
existence aligned with them” (Moloch 1993: 887).
We can, we believe, extract from Lefebvre suggestive indications of how
things work and how to further his project, but in order to do this we believe
we have to move beyond what was essentially an “adventure of the 20th
century” (Kipfer et al 2008) guided by some very 19th century ideas, into one
of the 21st century – guided by some ideas of the 20th century, ideas
Lefebvre in any case would have been well aware of.
Complexity
Lefebvre described ‘the everyday’ as the ‘connective tissue’ of urban society.
This seems from the above to be intended to be more than idle metaphor: the
commitment to a reality beyond metaphysics recalls a discourse around the
complex sciences of life and he would have known much of the science.
Perhaps the closest Lefebvre came though to a readily recognisable
complexity view of the city was in his and Régulier’s ideas of the polyrhythmy
of the city (Lefebvre 2004). Nevertheless a sense of a dynamic and intrinsic
order in the materiality of the urban world pervades all his urban writings and
there could be some mileage in looking at him as some sort of urban biologist.
Lefebvre struggled with trying to combine materialist and humanist ideas,
recognising the difficulties inherent in the Marxist-Hegelian tendency to
finalism, refusing the regularising orders of classical science and
institutionalised knowledge production, but being pulled nevertheless between
his will for a final ‘end’ of man and his desire for an urban capable of opening
pathways to always open futures.
Lefebvre based his view of the city around a conception of ‘urban society’ and
new spatial developments he called ‘mondialisation’. He saw fundamental
changes occurring in the conditions of our inhabitation of this earth and was
trying to describe how these changes were happening and what they meant.
Another important commitment however was to moving beyond what he saw
as the limitations of philosophy and its “speculative abstractions” to a reality of
an urban society embodied in its own material relations (Lefebvre 2003: 64).
Urban reality was for him something more than a social or political-economic
product, it was a productive force in its own right, reacting against social
relations as well as expressing them (Lefebvre 2003: 15).
Lefebvre was concerned with the ‘complexification’ (Lefebvre 2003: 45) of an
urban social order by which he meant something other than the simple
complication of things already understood. He did speak of this complexity as
a compounding of the orders of our categories of economy, society and
politics (45??), and as a Marxist and political thinker it would have been very
difficult for him to abandon these categories. But in his metaphilosophical
ambitions he also looked beyond established categories to a certain real-
relational ‘proliferation’ implying a progression towards order. Philosophy will,
according to Lefebvre, always aim for totality and synthesis, attempting to
detach its concepts “from the contexts and philosophical architectures in
which they arose” (Lefebvre 2003: 63-4). He refused the imposition of a
universal rationality over life, his instinct was to recognise the autonomy of
cases in multileveled, dense relational constellations that made them what
they were. The ‘totality’ of this other order refused this disembodied synthesis
and entered into a real he saw as emerging out of new conditions of the
urban. Lefebvre was clear also that this ‘real totality’ was characterised by
‘virtuality’, or the way it incorporated the potential of the ‘as yet unmade’. It
was radically open to diverse outcomes constrained only by its material and
spatiotemporal conditions. With this open-endedness we sense a break with
the Marxist-Hegelian progress to societal completion, but also with any ‘social
construction of reality’. In what is more like a biologist’s ‘construction of reality’
it is the social itself, its forms and content, that is the open and uncertain
outcome of this ‘progress’ in a spatiotemporal process called urbanisation.
In place of the analytical procedures of geography, demography, history,
psychology and sociology (Lefebvre 2003: 48), Lefebvre proposed we
consider the city as a differential, or complex of real relations. Philosophy is
no help here; it has, according to Lefebvre, not resolved the contradictions
around the gap between the conceived and the lived. In his work, this
distinction was not a given but a tactical device, the task of which was “to
uncover the characteristics of the philosophy that used to be, its language and
its goals, to demonstrate their limitations and to transcend them” (Lefebvre
1991: 405). Lefebvre’s aim was to undermine dichotomies of structure and
agency, theory and practice, and go beyond them. His concern is the reality of
social life and space and the reintegration of its perceptual, conceptual and
practical dimensions. We will try to develop this idea, to argue further that,
ultimately, distinctions between the lived and the thought, the abstract and the
concrete miss the point. We agree with Osborne and Rose that the spaces
with which we are concerned “are experienced as much as conceptualised,
lived as much as represented. These spaces have a materiality which is not
merely imagined but is realised” (Osborne & Rose 2004: 212).
We are moving also beyond ‘urbanism’, which was for Lefebvre an ideology
that failed to grasp the urban because it understood it as a closed system.
The differential space Lefebvre proposed opposed coded oppositions (private-
public; work-residence) that deny urban process and its promise of an open
urbanity. “The urban is ... pure form: a place of encounter, assembly,
simultaneity. This form has no specific content, but is a centre of attraction
and life. It is an abstraction, but unlike a metaphysical entity, the urban is a
concrete abstraction, associated with practice” (Lefebvre 2003: 118-9). This
form “absorbs ... contents ... combines them actively in a totality or virtual
synthesis, which does not need philosophy for its fulfilment but can simply be
recognised as a channel (strategy) for action” (Lefebvre 2003: 122).
It is this concern with a practical engagement with the “limits of philosophy”
that Lefebvre shared with complexity science, and where we may find a
possible convergence with some contemporary biological and ecological
thinking. The issues of openness-closure and of technology come to the fore
in this way of thinking and are dealt with here in a very particular way.
The scientist in biology is also no structuralist: what he or she deals with are
not the ‘authoritarian doctrines’ of science (Elden 2004: 23) but cases on the
dissecting table or in the field in a more integral and practical process of
enquiry that involves at once seeing, conceiving and doing. The scientist
actively seeks out and constructs descriptions of the aspect of reality under
investigation. And “[s]cientists no longer address a system as explained by
what they know about it, even if they know it perfectly well ... . Their questions
imply an open situation: ‘what will it be able to produce?’ ‘What kind of
behaviour will emerge?’ And the question must be asked each time, with each
new situation” (Stengers 2004: 96). The scientist finds him or herself having
to be attentive, tracking and manipulating processes and their coupling. He or
she is in a situation where models change with changing determinations of
significance and purpose, and where models produce rather than deduce
results.
1
Stengers quotes both Stephen Jay Gould and Stuart Kauffman who propose
respectively a ‘general’ and a ‘structural’ biology as a mode of science that recognises
both history and the spatial or ‘differential’ nature of reality.
intimately involved with and interpreting. Essentially it is the embodied form of
this enquiry – in the relation of the observer with the reality of the situation
under investigation – that Stengers holds up as the frame. The form is a ‘real
totality’ of seeing, conceiving and doing that includes subject, object and
equipment, “put[ting] the ones who use them in a very interesting new
practical position with regards to what they address” (Stengers 2004: 97) –
modifying at the same time both subject and object. The materially ‘dialectical’
and ‘hermeneutical’ science Stengers advocates, involves the explicit
acknowledgement of practical procedures, models and equipment as means
of embodying enquiry and realising it. The scientist is involved in configuring
material in such a way as to support new phenomena in a practical and
material situation. The scientist performs a ‘material hermeneutic shift’, to
combine terms of Patrick Heelan and Don Ihde, shifting the subject side of the
subject-object divide into the material conditions in which the scientific results
are produced. It involves, in other words, producing some very precisely
controlled and even unstable results in material and technical conditions
manipulated and maintained to the order of the scientist’s intentionality.
What made this realignment of science around its practice possible – what in
effect allowed us to escape the metaphysics embedded in science – was
firstly the realisation that there is no simple or pure observation. Heelan (and
others like Hansen and Feyerabend) collapsed perception and conception,
proposing there was no substantive distinction between observational and
theoretical entities. “[T]heory says what observation can see, and observation
is always ‘theory-laden’” (Heelan 1977 29-30). Heelan realised in addition that
observation is achieved for the most part technologically and in particular, it is
the instrumentation which for the most part defines what objects the
experimenter sees. The observer is in a practical and intentional orientation to
technology that is set up in highly synthetic local conditions productive of not
just practical understanding but the objects which are the measure of
success. The equipment embodies the rationality of the intentional and
observational act, and objects are produced in the rationality embodied. We
can see why Don Ihde calls Heelan an ‘instrumental realist’ (Ihde 1991).
For Heelan the key is the ‘hermeneutic shift’ of the subjective and intentional
side of the experiment into the material of the equipment. He calls this
material structured to intentionality ‘non-objective’. As a Heideggerian he
clearly has something in mind here and this is what Heidegger calls the
‘ready-to-hand’ or Zuhanden.2 Local configurations of order are constructed in
equipment which becomes an integral part of the intentionality structure of any
specific action. We will be continuing this discussion when talking about
2
It is also what Graham Harman calls ‘tool-being’. Harman proposes that the radical
implications of Heidegger’s tool analysis have not been fully understood – that it
amounts to a new ontology of objects. I agree with Harman – in fact I think he
understates the case because we are nowhere near understanding the staggering order
we have embedded in the world or the staggering extent to which we are immersed in
phenomenotechnical systems and depend on them. But would like to point to Patrick
Heelan and Karin Knorr Cetina as people who are contributing with their work to the
achievement of this radical but as yet not fully realised potential of Heidegger’s
thinking.
technology later but we can see already that practice aligns itself with theory
and theory is embodied in practice and situation. Material here does not stand
against thought but rather participates practically in it. We see also that
observation, understanding and even ‘objectivity’ are embodied in highly
synthetic local conditions.
The ‘model’ and the ‘system’ as well as the idea of ‘structure’ are here quite
different to the abstractions Lefebvre warns against. According to Heelan,
“science is not about models (as substitutes for reality) but about reality as
understood through the appropriate – not substitutive – use of models” (37).
Models are practical analogues of thought processes and while they may be
theoretical and abstract they may be also concretely embodied in material
constructions. Causal and explanatory factors are embedded in the practical
actions and situations of exploration, manipulation and ‘seeing’ of what
something is and how it works – and they are embodied in equipment.
‘Seeing’ in fact needs to be learned as well as embodied and we learn the
material systems on which our seeing depends (Star & Ruhleder 1996). We
will extend this later to infrastructures where we may ‘see’ London for
example through the underground system, and financial traders may ‘see’ the
market through graphics animated on computer screens. We will take this
material non-objective structure to be equivalent to ‘space’. While we won’t
claim yet that it will perform the whole job Lefebvre’s space was designed to
do, it is a product of a similar metaphilosophy, and what it will do is help us
begin to address some of the ideas Lefebvre proposes for urban form.
The scientist is often working with and observing things that already work on
their own terms. So that when biologists model biological function for
example, they address something which has in a sense already produced its
own model. The material is already organised and functional and the scientist
stands in an interpretive relationship with it. A new theory needs therefore,
according to Stengers, to recognise the autonomies of complex working
arrangements. These are not particulars as representatives of genera or
abstractions, and their cases do not depend – at least in the first instance – on
the values human scientists confer upon them. It is the functions themselves
which, at least firstly, create meanings and values and to which our definitions
need to be fitted. In biology, this is often quite literally a matter of life and
death as the object of the science is not indifferent to its own meaningful and
functional structures. So that the situation biologists or experimental
biochemists face is one of negotiation with concrete situations which are
already in their own terms meaningful, and science “is thus a confrontation
between human language, which is also to say human devices, and non-
human creation ... and it is a speculative confrontation because it is not life, it
is our human languages and devices which are put to the test” (Stengers
2000: 93-4).
Constructing worlds
One way of grasping this practical or real ‘totality’ both Lefebvre and the
complexity scientists are interested in would be through the notion of ‘world’.
Lefebvre was not primarily interested in the question of the ‘world’ as a scale
of global geopolitics or production, he was interested, according to Stuart
Elden, in the process of comprehending the world as a totality in thought and
practice (Elden 2008: 80). A source of this emphasis is Marx’s concern with
realisation and of the necessity of thinking the real through in practice. But it
originates also in Heidegger’s idea that the “world never is, but worlds”
(Heidegger 1998: 126). This is not the world as it might be understood by a
physical geographer: “our understanding of being is thoroughly linked to the
world ... the being of beings and the being worldly of things are almost
synonyms”. The human and the world are not related as two separate things,
but are both “enclosed … and disclosed together” (Eugen Fink, Spiel als
Weltsymbol, pp. 47; 210-11; 232-3 quoted in Elden 2008a: 51; 53).
Elden proposes that globalisation comes after and is made possible by this
more primitive disclosure of the world, which, following Lefebvre, he calls
‘mondialisation’. He claims that for Lefebvre (quoting Axelos), “[g]lobalisation
names a process which universalises technology, economy, politics, and even
civilisation and culture. But it remains somewhat empty. The world, as an
opening is missing. The world is not the physical and historical totality, it is not
the more or less empirical ensemble of theoretical and practical ensembles. It
deploys itself. The thing that is called globalisation is a kind of mondialisation
without the world.” (Axelos 2005: 27)
Lefebvre’s view of technology depends on Marx but it depends particularly on
the critique of Marx in terms of the alienating power of technology of Kostas
Axelos. In Marx technology is a mode of human labour which develops in the
context of our interactions with nature. Technology is the factor we use to
meet our needs and further our projects, changing both nature and ourselves
in the process. Our increasing knowledge and skills are embedded in tools
and machinery which we then use to further change and control nature and
continue to shape human culture and understanding. Man externalises nature
in this ongoing development of technique and the direction of technical
civilization is an accelerating rationalisation and instrumentalisation with ever
more of human society in the service of production. Axelos, in a reflection of
Heidegger’s later technological thinking (Heidegger 1977: 3-35), argues that
this technologically driven history implies the eventual complete “technification
of nature” and Marxist history “becomes the history of the development of
technique” (Axelos 27). The world becomes what technology (in the singular
and embodying a singular technological, calculative rationality) presents and
produces. For Axelos it is technique itself that is alienating and the history of
technology is coeval with the history of alienation.
At the same time production in thought in Marx is more primitive than the
material output that proceeds from thought. This is the significance of Marx’s
well-known comment about architects and bees, in which the architect does
what the bee cannot: constructs edifices in thought before they are
constructed in material. For Axelos and Lefebvre, the world is “an object of
thought in its own terms” (Elden 83). But the subjectivity of pure or originary
thought implied here is at odds with the materiality of situated knowing implied
by Heelan. In Heelan what seems to be originary is a practical grasping which
implies no originary disembodied thought but first a questioning of how exactly
and under what material conditions something is grasped. What is brought to
or disclosed in thought will depend very profoundly on the material conditions
which pertain.
Here technology returns but in a different and much less abstract guise.
Technologies are part of the very intentionality structures in which we know
and do things. How may the world ‘world’ for us but through technique and
equipment? This is a world that only exists as such as a ‘real totality’
constructed in equipment, and not as disembodied thought or theory. Again,
seeing, thinking and doing the world happen together and we introduce a
metaphilosophical basis to the thinking of the space of the world. There is no
pre-technological mondialisation – it would be like suggesting Europeans
could have known China before ships and camel-trains! At the same time it
pluralises ‘worlding’ because the world disclosed, in which we are disclosed-
enclosed, depends on the particular technologies practically absorbed in
particular actions.
We can begin to enrich this view of world in its practical and material
dimensions by looking at another concept from biology. In a previous paper
(Read 2010) one of us argued that the view we outlined earlier of the shifting
of intentional structures into material has an affinity with Stuart Kauffman’s
idea of ‘biosphere’ (Kauffman, 2000), manipulated and adjusted by the actions
of involved beings for whom life and survival matters. Researchers in
biosemiotics freely mix the theory of language and the kind of material
hermeneutics we have been describing in a thinking just as tactical and
metaphilosophical as Lefebvre’s to try to reconnect communication means
and meaning in a “hermeneutics of the living” (Markoš et al 2009: 8). What
they are talking about is the way living beings to whom being matters are
united in a dynamic meaning space, kept together by shared ‘languages’
through which meaning is negotiated and continually adjusted. “There are no
rules and no goals ... but those negotiated by critters existing here and now,
each bearing the experience of its lineage back to the dawn of life, and laying
down the rules for one version of the adjacent possible” (240). [T]he existence
of this superposed and commonly shared field allows mutual games of
understanding, misunderstanding, cheating and imitation at all levels of the
biosphere” (Markoš et al, 2007: 237). And it is “only after habits have been
negotiated, rules settled and ‘artefacts produced’, that one can point with the
index finger and distinguish ‘this’ and ‘that’, to recognise rules, habits, or even
objects” (241).
These beings will move to avoid danger or find advantage and adjust their
relations with other creatures or conditions. They will adjust to and adjust their
environments in ways which increase their functionality, comfort and survival
prospects. The environment becomes a creation of the beings environed, who
shift material (and materially shift) into structures meaningful and usually
advantageous at individual and species levels. What is this shifting of material
if not technique? What is it if not culture? It is this notion of a narrative or
pathway of exploration of the ‘adjacent possible’ (Kauffman 2000) that is the
key to understanding living beings as participants as well as factors in an
historical process of constructive inhabitation, and even as the driving force of
development. Beings integrate the biosphere into a significant space – or
rather into sets of mutually interdependant significant spaces – held together
by interactions and preserving traces of those interactions in structures that
could be seen as embodied scripts for repeated behaviour. ‘Worlds’ are, in
this conception, constructions – but not as ‘reflections’ of preconceived social
or subjective form, rather as material non-objective structures that support
particular practices of seeing, thinking and doing.
Participants interact and communicate, and are creators and builders of their
own worlds, from integrated backgrounds of experience and memory, rather
than being simply tuned to environmental niches. The importance of
distinguishing particular action spaces from the biosphere as a whole is very
apparent. No creature acts in the total space; each creature (and each group)
will have meaningful spaces, each with their own objects and their own
realised intentional structures. The creation or adjustment of these particular
spaces will be as a response to material conditions, including the presence of
other creatures and groups and their spaces – and will happen in another
historical and ‘cultural’ timeframe. Biospheres are ‘real totalities’ integrated
across different levels and spaces of their organisation, their ‘codes’
negotiated and appropriated in interactions in simultaneous stepwise
adjustments.
The ‘cultural’ aspect of all this is not difficult to see. We share with other
creatures the character of living in a world of communication and significance
and acting and reacting within it, choosing – at least in the early stages of this
process – life over death, well-being over degeneration, and configuring and
reconfiguring a ‘non-objective’ material world in the process. Material merges
with meaning in an order as cultural as it is material (see also Eco 1979). Our
knowledge, language, and real-world interactions are parts of an on-going
exploration in interpretative cycles which define the state of the world on the
basis of temporal narratives rather than on absolute or eternal laws. Things
and our knowledge of things are tied together in coevolving socio-technical
complexes, of which the city may be one of our most complex and developed
forms.
In the popular understanding of technologies we highlight those that are new
and high-tech, while “[t]elevision, indoor plumbing, and ordinary telephony ...
draw little but yawns ... [and] inventions of far larger historical significance,
such as ceramics, screws, basketry, and paper, no longer even count as
‘technology’” (Edwards 2003: 186). They disappear from view because they
are not objective in the way we incorporate them in our lives; they are
implicated instead in intentional structures and part of the way we reach out
for and know and use other things. Maurice Merleau-Ponty used the
examples of the blind man’s cane and that of the feather in the lady’s hat to
demonstrate how we engage the world through everyday objects which
become part of our body-awareness (Merleau-Ponty 1962). We notice these
objects only when we engage them directly as objects, the rest of the time
they are just part of us.
What does this mean for the body? Is the blind man and his stick a unit as
Merleau-Ponty suggests? When the blind man and his stick get on the tram
are these a unit? If we say “yes” to both these questions the consequence, as
the kind of complexity we have already outlined should already indicate would
be again to problematise the mind-centred (and spaced – see Lefebvre
1991:172...) notion of subjectivity and displace action and intelligence from
the mind to the body and thence to the body-technology or body-world
conjunction. It would locate the spider’s intelligence in its unity with its web
(173) and human power and intelligence in our unity with the multiple
technologies available to us – and lack of power in our lack or exclusion from
them.
Form
Political spaces are “a founding violence” (280), and ‘abstract’. Abstract space
“serves those forces which make a tabula rasa of whatever stand in their way”
(285). They promote “continuous, rational economic calculation in the spheres
of production and exchange” (Brenner & Eldon 2009: 358). They are also,
according to the argument we are here outlining, all of them constructed in
specific technologies and infrastructures. Power is embodied in these devices
and infrastructures. Power is bought at the cost of the arrangements that will
establish and sustain isotopy, regularising particular actions, organising and
externalising them (281). It is an acquisition of the power of occupation (). But
dominated spaces are also spaces without life, vulnerable to their own need
for maintenance.
But something irregular always escapes domination: against the regularity or
isotopy of the town, Lefebvre proposed the heterotopy of the border.
Exchange and trade were initially irregular activities, carried out by itinerants,
“suspicious individuals, ... ‘strangers’”; places of exchange were excluded
from the political space, “caravanserais, fairgrounds, suburbs”. Lefebvre
called these irregular spaces ‘heterotopic’ and described how their inclusion
into the political city was resisted by political power. It is also clear however
that the eventual inclusion of these heterotopic spaces into the city was
facilitated and eventually made inevitable by the increasing power of these
other spaces of traders and travellers (Lefebvre 2003: 9). Heterotopic spaces,
originally outside rationality, became regularised and rationalised themselves
in new spaces that affirmed and absorbed what was creative and that other
spaces came to depend on.
The overland, river and sea routes of the strangers and itinerants, themselves
became regularised by degrees, becoming, by early modern times, political
spaces on their own account, organising, protecting and furthering their own
activities and interests. The political spaces Lefebvre proposed therefore are
clearly not constrained by any singular rationality. Different spaces are
specific and designed, as they must be, as specific infrastructures, structured
to specific aims, orders and rationalities. Different spaces then overlap and
intersect with one another: different cities had, by early modernity, relations
with one another, and they had this in an increasingly regularised fashion and
through the political spaces of trading leagues, intercity alliances, empires,
duchies and counties. Different levels of order and rationality emerged
therefore, each with their own isotopies of related objects and practices, and
each with their heterotopies of objects and practices standing outside that
order, from another space. The heterotopies became, in the best cases,
places of negotiation and exchange between different spaces.
The conflictual relations between different spaces may eventually reflect not
so much a relation between the regular and the irregular as an uneasy
standoff between rival powers that may nevertheless work with each other to
their negotiated mutual benefit. The struggle for domination in early modern
Europe resulted in the rise of the merchant city, which signalled, in Lefebvre’s
analysis, a shift in power to the larger intercity network as merchants and their
infrastructures of isotopic objects and practices took over not just the marginal
spaces and gateways of cities but their most central spaces as well (Lefebvre
2003: 10). This was the time of the city leagues with networks of cities forming
alliances and competing for advantage with other alliances, establishing long-
distance networks of trade but also of regional economic, educational, cultural
and other practices, establishing banking systems with credit and monetary
exchange norms, exchanges of artistic, technological and production
practices and divisions of labour across the networks. And as well as this
being the coming to life of an abstract space of capitalist accumulation (277-
8), it was space itself that was accumulated in these networks.
This imposition of new connective spaces over an existing fabric has been the
way cities have grown in Europe then since early modernity. The rapid
urbanisation which began a century and a half ago saw also the arrival of the
railway and steam shipping. These new infrastructures organised the
locations of industrial sites as, at the same time, the city was reconfigured
internally around public transportation and workers’ housing. The new
infrastructures saw also the consolidation of centres as national and global
places and control-centres. More recent post-industrial and post-socialist
developments have been marked by the privatisation and regionalisation of
transportation and a reconfiguration of the city around freeways and the
rearticulation of suburbs and historic centres into a functional regional
network.
At each stage of this process and with the imposition of new political-
technological spaces, sets of places are regularised and ‘abstracted’ into a
new political and technological space. The new spaces present places to us in
new ‘optics’, as stops in a metro or tram system or turn-offs on a freeway for
example. Our relationships with these places are mediated through the new
technologies and the historic centre for example, a place lived in for hundreds
of years, becomes abstracted to a destination in regional movement systems.
It becomes abstracted at another level as a tourist destination with shuttle
trains and busses linking it to the airport and into a global movement system.
The character of the space and time of these places changes as they become
taken into not just physical infrastructures but also into travel schedules and
commuter patterns, and as they are rearticulated as isotopic with new sets of
places, including residential suburbs and regional business, industrial,
educational and health facilities.
It should be remembered at the same time though that this ‘abstraction’ was a
character of the destinations in trading networks as well so there is nothing
particularly new about this, and ‘abstraction’ into particular and regularised
spaces and times (that of the church bell for example) is feature of all urban
spaces. At each stage new opportunities for heterotopic crossings of spaces
occur which have precipitated changes of fortunes for historical centres and
other significant places in cities. And new spaces become quickly normalised.
Figure 3. Kaunas, Lithuania: a. 1915 b. 1990 c. 2010. At each of these dates
a different technological space was dominant and the city was configured in
around these spaces. No space ever completely disappears unless it is
literally erased so a. was still operating vestigially in b. while a. and b. were
operating vestigially in c. But relatively high-tech examples replace lower-tech
technologies that allowed us to use and know the city in different ways and to
imagine that we knew it in some pre-technological manner. There is a process
of innovation and replacement in the humanisation of the planet which sees
the camel replaced by railways and trunk roads and the carvel and fluit by the
container ship. Networks and places already made are taken into new
dominant spaces and reconfigured and transformed. At each stage of
‘innovation’ however previously ‘heterotopic’ spaces (as the most vivid and
activity and opportunity-rich places may be appropriated by the new structure
of power and absorbed into the new political space.
References:
Axelos, K. (1976) Alienation and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx, (Austin:
University of Texas Press)
Axelos, K. (2005) “Mondialisation without the World: Interviewed by Stuart
Elden”, Radical Philosophy, No 130, , pp. 25-28
Brenner, N. & S. Eldon (2009) Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory,
International Political Sociology 3, 353-377
Wellman, B. (2001) ‘Physical Place and Cyber Place: The Rise of Networked
Individualism’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 25(2),
227-52.