SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 146848 : October 17, 2006]

GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly known as "REPUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.") and REY
VIDAL, Petitioners, v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., TEODORA R. OCAMPO, M.D., VICTOR V.
BUENCAMINO, M.D., CESAR F. VILLAFUERTE, M.D., ARTEMIO T. ORDINARIO, M.D., and VIRGILIO
C. BASILIO, M.D., Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision2 dated January 25, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52240 which reversed and
set aside an earlier decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 881952, an action for damages thereat commenced by the herein respondents Jesus G. Bustos, Teodora R.
Ocampo, Victor V. Buencamino, Cesar F. Villafuerte, Artemio T. Ordinario and Virgilio C. Basilio, all physicians
by profession and the former chairman and members, respectively, of the Board of Medicine, against the
herein petitioners GMA Network, Inc. (formerly Republic Broasting System, Inc.) and Rey Vidal.
The facts:
In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the
physicians' licensure examinations. Out of the total two thousand eight hundred thirty-five (2,835)
examinees who took the examinations, nine hundred forty-one (941) failed.
On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition
for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check
and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous
checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among
other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of
the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news edition of
GMA's Channel 7 Headline News.
The text of the news report,4 as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which GMA Network, Inc. aired and
televised on February 10, 1988, runs:
Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure Examinations today asked the Manila [RTC] to
compel the [PRC] and the Medical Board of Examiners to recheck the August 1987 test papers. The
petitioners [examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to also ask for a special raffling of the case
considering that the next physicians examinations have been scheduled for February [1988] '. They said that
the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years
should now be stopped once and for all.

The last examination was conducted last August - at the PRC central offices, the Far Eastern University and
the Araullo High School, the exams on multiple choice or matching type involve 12 subjects including
general medicine, biochemistry, surgery and obstetrics and gynecology.
21 schools participated in the examination represented by some 2,835 medical student graduates, 1,894
passed and 141 failed.
The results of the exams were released December 9 and were published the following day in metropolitan
papers last years (sic).
A group of failing examinees enlisted the help of the Offices of the President and the Vice President and as a
result were allowed by PRC - to obtain the official set of test questions. The students then researched - and
produced the key answers to the key questions.
The petitioners were also allowed to see their own test papers, most of them copying the papers '.
With these copies, they were able to match the scores and the correct answers in the examinations. They
found that the errors in checking were so material that they actually lowered the scores that formed the
individual ratings of the examinees in the various subjects.
Examples of the discrepancies are to be found in identical answers being rated as incorrect in one
examinee's paper but correct in another. There is also the case of two different answers being rated as
correct. There are indications of wrong counting of total scores per subject so that the totals are either short
by two up to four points.
Finally, there are raw scores that have been transmuted incorrectly so that a passing score was rendered a
failure. The petitioners said that the haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now be
stopped once and for all. They said that the nine years formal studies and the one year internship not to
mention the expenses and the blood, sweat, and tears of the students and their families will have been
rendered nugatory. The petitioners also noted that Com. Francia had promised last January 12 to rectify the
errors in the checking and yet they have not received the appropriate action promised whereas the next
exams have been set for Feb. 20, 21, 27 and 28. (Words in bracket added.)
Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed and narrated by a remorseless
reporter, the herein respondents instituted on September 21, 1988 with the RTC of Makati City a damage
suit against Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broasting System, Inc. In their
complaint,5 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1952 and raffled to Branch 64 of the court, the respondents, as
plaintiffs a quo, alleged, among other things, that then defendants Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless
disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA
Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact on their audience, the
defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make
it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful
examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982
demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and
economic dispute with hospital management.
In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied any wrongdoing, maintaining that their February
10, 1988 late evening telecast on the filing of the mandamus petition was contextually a concise and
objective narration of a matter of public concern. They also alleged that the press freedom guarantee
covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the
conduct of public officials. And vis - -vis the particular allegation on the film footages of the PGH
demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as "neutral." Pressing the point, defendants hastened to
add that the footages were accompanied, when shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea
conjured by the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report.
In the course of trial, the plaintiffs presented testimonial evidence to prove their allegations about the Vidal
report having exposed them, as professionals, to hatred, contempt and ridicule. And in a bid to establish
malice and bad faith on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending to show that the
former exerted no effort toward presenting their (plaintiffs') side in subsequent telecasts.

In a decision6 dated October 17, 1995, the trial court found for the herein petitioners, as defendantsa quo,
on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in question is privileged. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, plaintiffs' complaint for damages against defendants
Republic Broasting System Incorporated and Rey Vidal is hereby DISMISSED.
The defendants' counterclaim for damages is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 7 herein respondents went on appeal to the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 52240. As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision 8 of January 25,
2001, reversed and set aside that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 17, 1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and [petitioners]
are hereby ordered to pay, in solidum, the following:
a) the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents] as moral damages;
b) the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents] as exemplary damages;
c) the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fee;
d) and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets added.)
Hence, petitioners' present recourse, submitting for the Court's consideration the following questions:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA, AFTER DECLARING THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 AS
QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN INJECTING ACTUAL MALICE TO THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 JUST SO
THAT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE COULD RECOVER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN COMPLETELY
REJECTING PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE THAT THE CHARACTER GENERATED WORDS 'FILE VIDEO' WERE
INDICATED ON SCREEN TO IDENTIFY THE SHOWING OF THE OLD FILM FOOTAGE IN THE NEWS TELECAST
OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR - IN IMPUTING MALICE UPON PETITIONERS
FOR NOT PRESENTING A TAPE COPY OF THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 ON THE GRATUITOUS
DECLARATION THAT A TAPE COPY COULD BE EASILY SECURED FROM THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) WHICH ALLEGEDLY KEEPS FILE COPIES OF ALL SHOWS FOR A
CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME.
D.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS THEREOF, WHO NEVER
QUESTIONED THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 25, 2001 IN A SEPARATE AND

INDEPENDENT PETITION BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT, CAN ASK FOR AN INCREASED AWARD IN
DAMAGES FROM THE HONORABLE COURT UNDER THEIR COMMENT DATED 7 MAY 2001.
Summed up, the issues tendered in this petition boil down to the following: (1) whether or not the televised
news report in question on the filing of the petition for mandamus against the respondents is libelous; and
(2) whether or not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of PGH in their
1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents.
It bears to stress, at the outset, that the trial court found the disputed news report not actionable under the
law on libel, hence no damages may be recovered. Wrote that court:
This Court finds the telecast of February 10, 1988 aired over Channel 7 by [petitioner] Rey Vidal as a
straight news report of the acts and conduct of the members of the Medical Board of Examiners who are
public officers, devoid of comment or remarks, and thus privileged, and recognized under the 1987
Constitution.
A comparative examination of the telecast of the disputed news report with the Petition for Mandamus
entitled Abello, et al., v. Professional Regulation Commission - filed before the [RTC] by the medical
examinees reveals that the disputed news report is but a narration of the allegations contained in and
circumstances attending the filing of the said Petition for Mandamus. In the case of Cuenco v. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-29560, March 31, 1976 ', [it was] - held that the correct rule is that a fair and true report of a
complaint filed in Court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision
promulgated should be covered by the privilege. xxx. This Court adopts the ruling [in Cuenco] to support its
finding of fact that the disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said
Petition for Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the same falls within the protected ambit of
privileged communication.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, [petitioners], in consideration of the foregoing observations - cannot be held liable for damages
claimed by [respondents] for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern. 9 (Words in
brackets supplied.)
The CA, too, regarded the text of the news telecast as not libelous and as a qualifiedly privileged
communication, "[it having been] merely lifted or quoted from the contents and allegations in the said
petition [for mandamus]."10 But unlike the trial court, the CA saw fit to award damages to the respondents,
it being its posture that the insertion to the news telecast of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket film footage is
evidence of malice. Without quite saying so, the CA viewed the footage insertion as giving a televised news
report otherwise privileged a libelous dimension. In the precise words of the appellate court:
While it is the duty of the media to report to the public matters of public concern and interest, the report
should be a fair, accurate and true report of the proceedings. The subject telecast failed in this aspect. The
insertion of the film footage showing the doctors' demonstration at the PGH several times during
the news report on the petition filed by the board flunkers undoubtedly created an impression
that the said demonstration was related to the filing of the case by the board flunkers. The
insertion of the film footage without the words 'file video', and which had no connection
whatsoever to the petition, was done with the knowledge of the [petitioners], thus, in wanton and
reckless disregard of their duty to the public to render a fair, accurate and true report of the same.
xxx
The findings of malice on the part of the [petitioners] should not be construed as a censure to the freedom
of the press since their right to render a news on matters of public concern was not the issue but rather the
misrepresentation made when they inserted a film footage of the doctors' demonstration which created a
wrong impression of the real situation. Unquestionably, the news reporting, interview and the showing of
[the flunkers] filing the case were fair reporting. At this point, that would have been sufficient to inform the
public of what really happened. However, for reasons only known to [petitioners], they inserted the
questioned film footage which had no relation to the news being reported. There is no other

conclusion that there was motive to create an impression that the issue also affected the doctors
which forced them to demonstrate. xxx. (Words in brackets supplied).
With the view we take of this case, given the parallel unchallenged determination of the two courts below
that what petitioner Vidal reported was privileged, the award of damages is untenable as it is paradoxical.
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory
imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to
another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person.11 Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or
imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 12
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the
grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice, as we wrote in Brillante v. Court of Appeals,13is a term
used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or
defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity thereof.
In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation aired in its Channel 7 in the
February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was basically a narration of the contents of the aforementioned
petition for mandamus . This is borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial
court. And the narration had for its subject nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper checking and
the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August 1987 physicians' licensure examinations
attributable to the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine.
Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the respondents had been ascribed in that
news telecast, it bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be
any, are considered malicious thus supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In
fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified.14 Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless
of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala orbona fides of the
author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are
speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the
other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an
otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The
second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided
the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as
exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. 15
To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege
communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the
privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. 16 .
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter,
the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamuspetition of
examinees Abello, et al., devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the
narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom
petitioners Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition
filed against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of
Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal's job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover
government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated
that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication
protected under the 1987 Constitution.

This brings us to the more important question of whether or not the complaining respondents, in their effort
to remove the protection accorded by the privilege, succeeded in establishing ill-will and malice on the part
of the petitioners in their televised presentation of the news report in dispute, thus committing libel.
The CA, adopting the respondents' line on the matter of malice, resolved the question in the affirmative. As
the CA noted, the insertion of an old film footage showing doctors wearing black armbands and
demonstrating at the PGH, without the accompanying character-generated words "file video," created the
impression that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees.
The Court disagrees.
Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been
superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage
is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to
prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public."17 The trial court added the observation
that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." 18 At any rate, the absence of the
accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the
privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with the view we take of the
state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices,
it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.
And lest it be overlooked, personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and
enjoying a reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant" in the community.19 Clearly then, it
is the community, not personal standards, which shall be taken into account in evaluating any allegations of
libel and any claims for damages on account thereof.
So it is that in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel,20 we held:
The term "community" may of course be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his
purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more general meaning of
community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep in our constitutional
law. That reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free speech
and expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and territorial community. A
newspaper - should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate
interest, wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum
fear of being hauled to court by one group or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges
for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the general community. Any other rule on
defamation, in a national community like ours with many, diverse cultural, social, religious an other
groupings, is likely to produce an unwholesome "chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected
operations of the press and other instruments of information and education.
It cannot be over-emphasized furthermore that the showing of the 1982 film footage, assuming for
argument that it contained demeaning features, was actually accompanied or simultaneously voiced over by
the narration of the news report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. As aptly put by the
petitioners without controversion from the respondents, there was nothing in the news report to indicate an
intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond what was reported. 21
To be sure, actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of petitioners
having dubbed in their February 10, 1988 telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the
said footage, be it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation
impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone a false one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like
personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were not even named or specifically identified in the
telecast. It has been said that if the matter is not per selibelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere
fact of publication.22 And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not personally
know or had dealings with any of the respondents. The Court thus perceives no reason or motive on the part
of either petitioner for malice. The respondents too had failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that
petitioners were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a
discomforting light.

Surely, the petitioners' failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain and telecast the respondents' side
is not an indicia of malice. Even the CA, by remaining mum on this point, agrees with this proposition and
with the petitioners' proffered defense on the matter. As petitioner Vidal said while on the witness box, his
business as a reporter is to report what the public has the right to know, not to comment on news and
events, obviously taking a cue from the pronouncement of the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New York
Times Co. v. Connor23 that "a reporter - may rely on statements made by a single source even though they
reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official."
What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence that he or all of them
collectively was or were among the demonstrating PGH doctors in the 1982 video footage. It thus puzzles
the mind how they could claim to have been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news
telecast.
Given the foregoing considerations, the propriety of the award by the CA of moral and exemplary damages
need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that moral damages may be recovered only if the existence of the
factual and legal bases for the claim and their causal connection to the acts complained of are satisfactorily
proven.24 Sadly, the required quantum of proof is miserably wanting in this case. This is as it should be. For,
moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed not to impose a penalty but to
compensate one for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. 25 Exemplary damages, on the other
hand, may only be awarded if the claimants, respondents in this case, were able to establish their right to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.26 Not being entitled to moral damages, neither may
the respondents lay claim for exemplary damages.
In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, a simple
narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful
examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we find the
petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be held liable for damages sought by the
respondents, who, during the period material, were holding public office.
We close this ponencia with the following oft-quoted excerpts from an old but still very much applicable
holding of the Court on how public men should deport themselves in the face of criticism:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his officials acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity
of the individual be exalted. xxx. 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated January 25, 2001
of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 52240 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial court
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 170643 : September 8, 2006]
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor daughter, JOANNA* MARIE BIANCA S.
BINAY, Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENIVI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G.
TIROL,Respondents.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review assails the November 22, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75989, which affirmed the Resolutions dated July 2, 20022 and January 8, 20033 of the Secretary of Justice
reversing the Makati City Prosecutor's finding of probable cause against private respondents and ordering
the withdrawal of the information for libel filed in court against them, as well as the November 25, 2005
Resolution,4 denying petitioner's** motion for reconsideration.
In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled "ALYAS ERAP JR." was
published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets that they acquired while in
public office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:
Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng panty na
nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarbo ang pamumuhay ng batang ito
dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.
Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, 5 filed a complaint6for libel
against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the article, with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati. The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
xxx
5. GENIVI V. FACTAO, as writer of the said article, voluntarily, illegally, and with the object to insinuate and
made it understood, and was in effect understood and interpreted by the public who read it, that the young
lady referred to therein can be no other than my daughter Joanne, in this manner transmitting maliciously
and intentionally to the public the impression that Joanne is a spoiled, spendthrift brat who would not mind
or care to spend P1,000 for her underwear, all as already stated, with the object of destroying her reputation
and discrediting and ridiculing her before the bar of public opinion.
6. The said article, for whatever its avowed purpose may be, is clearly aimed at scurrilously attacking my
husband Jejomar C. Binay. In which case, the insinuations directed at Joanne are clearly pointless and was
done only for purposes of exposing Joanne to public contempt.
6.1. That the said article should specifically focus in on Joanne's panty is a clear and malicious invasion of
her privacy and calculated to heap scorn and ridicule upon her. On top of this, there is no connection
whatsoever to her being an adopted child despite which this was needlessly and maliciously highlighted. 7
Joanna also submitted an affidavit8 where she claimed that:
4. The article was completely unmindful of the hurt and anguish I felt after it needlessly and maliciously
highlighted my being an adopted daughter. Furthermore, the article is a blatant lie. I have never in my life
bought an underwear costing P1,000.00 or more. On the contrary, I have always maintained to keep a
simple and modest life as it is how my parents had brought me up. The questioned article has no valid
object except to destroy my reputation and to discredit and to bring ridicule upon me before my peers and
that of the public.
Private respondents did not file their counter-affidavits.
The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case for libel and recommended the filing of information against
private respondents. The case9 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Alleging that they did not receive the subpoena and copy of the complaint, private respondents filed an
omnibus motion to re-open the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor, however, denied private
respondents' motion for reconsideration,10 thus they filed a Petition for Review 11 with the Secretary of
Justice.

On July 2, 2002, then Acting Justice Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez 12 reversed the City Prosecutor's
findings and directed the withdrawal of the information filed in court. 13 Elenita's motion for reconsideration
was denied in the Resolution14 dated January 8, 2003, hence a petition forcertiorari and prohibition15 was
filed with the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision dated November 22, 2004, denying the
petition and sustaining the Justice Secretary's ruling that there was nothing libelous in the subject article.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and
January 8, 2003 of public respondent are affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.16
The Court of Appeals also denied Elenita's motion for reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the
following issues:
I. The CA erred in not holding that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
II. The CA erred in not holding that the public respondent gravely abused its discretion for not abiding by the
ruling in Sazon v. Court of Appeals which states that an attack upon the private character of a public officer
on matters which are not related to the discharge of his official functions may be libelous.
III. The CA erred in not holding that there is probable cause to indict private respondents for the crime of
libel and that they are probably guilty thereof.17
In a resolution dated March 20, 2006, the Court granted the motion of Jejomar C. Binay to replace his wife,
Elenita S. Binay, as petitioner and representative of their minor daughter Joanna. 18
The issue to be resolved is whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject article was
libelous.
Petitioner claims that the article is defamatory as it tends to, if not actually, injure Joanna's reputation and
diminish the esteem, respect, and goodwill that others have of her. Petitioner alleges that there is no good
intention or justifiable motive in publishing Joanna's status as an adopted child which is essentially a private
concern and the purchase of an expensive intimate apparel, but to ridicule and to induce readers to lower
their perception of Joanna.
On the other hand, private respondents allege that they did not harp on Joanna's status as an adopted child
as the same was mentioned only once in the article; that they did not intend to injure her reputation or
diminish her self-esteem; that they referred to the price of the underwear not for the purpose of maligning
her or to make her look frivolous in the public's eyes, but to show that petitioner and his family lead lavish
and extravagant lives; and that this matter is within the realm of public interest given that petitioner is an
aspirant to a public office while his wife is an incumbent public official.
We grant the petition.
Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead." Its elements are as follows: (a) an imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) the
existence of malice.19 Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, it must be defamatory, malicious, published,
and the victim is identifiable.20

The elements of publication and identity of the person defamed are present in this case. Thus, in resolving
the issue at hand, we limit our discussion on whether paragraph 25 of the subject article contains the two
other elements of libel, to wit: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another, i.e., whether the
paragraph is defamatory; and (b) existence of malice.
In MVRS Pub. Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc.,21 we defined defamatory language in this
wise:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that whichtends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of
a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend
to have, of the plaintiff.
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per
se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not
make it actionable by itself. (Emphasis added)
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety and taken
in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. 22
Tested against the foregoing, we find that there is prima facie showing that paragraph 25 of the subject
article is defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and vexatious as it has absolutely nothing to do with
petitioner's qualification as a mayoralty candidate or as a public figure. It appears that private respondents'
only purpose in focusing on Joanna's status as an adopted child and her alleged extravagant purchases was
to malign her before the public and to bring her into disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of her
privacy.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People,23 the Court found libelous a letter addressed to a lawyer for using words such as
"lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan." It cast aspersion on the character, integrity and
reputation of respondent as a lawyer and exposed him to public ridicule. Evidencealiunde was found
unnecessary to prove libel.
In the same manner, we need not require any evidence aliunde to prove that paragraph 25 is defamatory. It
has exposed Joanna to the public at large as a spoiled and spendthrift adopted daughter and a compulsive
buyer who has no qualms buying expensive lingerie.
Private respondents argue that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication because it was a fair
comment on the fitness of petitioner to run for public office, particularly on his lifestyle and that of his
family. As such, malice cannot be presumed. It is now petitioner's burden to prove malice in fact.
We are not convinced.
In the first place, paragraph 25 does not qualify as a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication,
which Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code limits to the following instances: (1) A private communication
made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

To qualify under the first category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, paragraph 25
must fulfill the following elements: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. 24
Whichever way we view it, we cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's status as
an adopted daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth
P1,000.00. Whether she indeed bought those panties is not something that the public can afford any
protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious that private respondents' only motive in inserting
paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass Joanna before the reading public.
In addition, the claim that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication is a matter of defense, 25 which
is can only be proved in a full-blown trial. It is elementary that "a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof."26
Moreover, under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. It is thus
incumbent upon private respondents to prove that "good intention and justifiable motive" attended the
publication of the subject article.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75989 dated
November 22, 2004, upholding the Justice Secretary's Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and January 8, 2003,
ordering the withdrawal of the information filed against private respondents Genivi V. Factao and Vicente G.
Tirol and the Resolution dated November 25, 2005, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City isORDERED to continue and proceed
with the case for libel against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol and Genivi V. Factao.
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An
Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
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Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer
and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On
even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective
officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
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The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance
Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang
Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health
Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers, 4 and joined by
concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr.,
Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan,
Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus,
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Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng
mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and
Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
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On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty
(CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
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Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations
mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19,
2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations
raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
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Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council 9 composed of, at the time
of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
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The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,
National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the
AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and
investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
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Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of

constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.10
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In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.11
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Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary 12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
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Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it haspersonally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated,
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
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Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces
any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that
they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate." 14
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Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out
that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and theimplementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.15 The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
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The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which
are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man
ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of
common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. 16 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
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No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension
is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed
against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminenceof their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on
their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. 19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet
to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or
outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any
threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
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Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino

Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan, 20 urged the government to resume peace
negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation
of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of
the Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently
disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
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More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the
questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section
1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf
Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
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Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by
alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then PartyList Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel
Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion
charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua,
Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist
movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.26
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The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges
were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is
defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by
the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion,
its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA
9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has
been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold
the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those
arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or
any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have
not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
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Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance,"
also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political
surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA
9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III,
who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.
Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also
conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early"
and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which
they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been
held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the
settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is
proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, 28 whereas citizen
standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding. 29
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RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest
in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
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As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
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An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.32
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Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC 33 cannot be more emphatic:

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[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a
real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to bean actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. 34 Similarly, a
petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been
denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the
Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
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The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections 36 for failure to cite
any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It
refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein
petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and
those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.
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The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any
constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is

qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate
the issues.38
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Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 39 allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of
the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1), 41 proscribing the provision of material support to
organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they
intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.
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Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly
shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there
would then be a justiciable controversy.42
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Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions
of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat
has been established, much less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts"
in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.43
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Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency,"
where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
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The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of
the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise
of any power granted by law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
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A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
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Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no
application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372
regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of
thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to
assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two
doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.48
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The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes." 50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision,
under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague. 51
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While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness
analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense 53 under the Voters Registration Act of
1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language. 54
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The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from
ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
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The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial"
invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal
statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such
statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a

particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes
a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be
made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine,"
to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
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The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due
process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate
rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 58
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As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it
is protected.59
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A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. 60
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Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot
thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
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The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. 62 As reflected earlier, this
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rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.63
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The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and
"underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed." 64
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[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have
said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair
the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from
defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. 65 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
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It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable
until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
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In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, 67 observed
that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if
ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression." 71
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Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent anactual or
imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test
on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to
review the law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73
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American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment
must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity."
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For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty
under law."75
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In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized
in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, 76 the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the
crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to
those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually chargedwith the therein assailed penal
statute, unlike in the present case.
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There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements
may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime
sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that
the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism 77 must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
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The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime,
including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S.
case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require
an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
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Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the
intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not

speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about
through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated,evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws
against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed
injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
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Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a
prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
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IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject
penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent
crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the
assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.