Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed
against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a
series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole
purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and
their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to
the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
"professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and
patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted
litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with
respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses
were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an
execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property,
why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso
Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They
chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected
execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has
yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the
issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer.
For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy
and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection
with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was
decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which
latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of
first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex
parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is
clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the
Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and,
anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was
actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August
15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of
Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her
aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing,
prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel
for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing.
In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his
urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for
resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction
(since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her
husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution),
in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably
anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on
November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power
to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the
very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already
prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407
an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's abovementioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in
the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with
supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank. 1 As a matter of fact,
when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled. 2 Consequently, the
respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the
movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted
with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the

chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their
counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money
judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to
adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this
Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are
persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper
remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall
of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in
which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the
subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the
course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices
of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been
instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out
of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said
civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII)
where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or
interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall
and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the
termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to
continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil
case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil
case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532
was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually
deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary
injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on
March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for
certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more
assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each
counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed
against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either
singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil
case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it
is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance
in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for
Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision abovementioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with
Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon.
Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law
firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion
is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby
modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the
treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the
ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he
became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal
relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D).
Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil
ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the
evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his
mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he
has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she
discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo
Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their
housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94
Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their
testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn
Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the
apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He
admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial
assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses.
He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure
the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to
Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His
lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has
proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own
husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within
"that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608,
August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her
counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined
the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with
complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno"
appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The
complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were
engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that
they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the
rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant
acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book
as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent
proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing
the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give
up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed,
removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the
bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to
submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00
o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after
the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more
but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said
sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant
repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to
comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of
marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on
June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a
quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the
intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.
Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his
behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April
27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified
that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A.

Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the
Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1,
1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City.
When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of
that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in
October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies
from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him
to comply with his promise to marry her.1wph1.t
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise
admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified
by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records
clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that
she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that
he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit
complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were
sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is
established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255,
t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage
and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court,
now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the
practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong
vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent
denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958,
but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that
the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not
be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567,
citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 145

December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,

vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and
Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.
Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:
On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F. Aspiras, alleging
substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and eventually won her
affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married,
and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after December 31, 1952 upon being
assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a marriage license
was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of
respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the
marriage, she and respondent continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at
the indication of respondent, who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and
destroy her.
On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her
complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her marriage to
respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".
Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal profession 1, this
Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.
On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son Cesar
Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she knew all the time he
was a married man.
On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by the
petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.
Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.
However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she had asked
for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement with the respondent;
but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, from April to November,
1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she was on the family way. She also charged
the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living
together".
On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the Solicitor
General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor General filed
in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his disbarment, on the ground that
he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up his illicit relations, he made his son,
Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14, 1953; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the
respondent continued having sexual relations with the spouse of his own son.

On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government
prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he asked for, and
was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and forwarded by, the
Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any.
At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a memorandum-which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation were not supported by the
evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is not
sufficient ground for disbarment.
In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable doubt the
following facts:
In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed mother in
Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the respondent. Atty.
Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented himself as single, although
he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven children.
A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her trusting
heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without much ado she
approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was invited to stay and spend
the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m., while the mother was in the
kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly promising marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that
time on, and without the benefit of marriage she gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his
invitation, Josefina came to Manila in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's
desire to have the marriage celebrated the following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching until
the end of the school term. She stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.
Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the first time,
she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her bridegroom-to-be. She says
respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of them (with Atty. Espino) at the City
Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote
the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.
In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina discovered
or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to enter into a sham
marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her
face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.
Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before Judge
Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the ceremony, the two
contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife. However, the respondent continued up
to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy on
January 24, 1954.
Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is confirmed
by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net
. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)

Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the
first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to you.
(Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)
And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein respondent is borne
out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953 Exhibits A-19 and A-21.
Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became worse when
he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover up his illicit relations,
as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning him into an accomplice of his
marital infidelities.
But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each other.
Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited with the wife of his own
son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault in pari delicto, respondent suggests -because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of unworthy members, to
protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently ask for dismissal, the matter may
not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not
always a complete defense 4
Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney may be
disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on grounds other than those
enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that principle in Balinon vs. De
Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.
In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . . and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur.
417.)
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she
shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to admission to the bar,
and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of this
court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this
court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a showing that he lacked the necessary
qualification, so is its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R.
1361.)
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and on this we
do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of the latter's honor, the undersigned
all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the bar. 7
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.lawphil.net

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another,
such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April
1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to
"suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to
the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension
Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14
June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to
a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage,
Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings
with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla;
that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage
with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted
that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid
risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she
had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay
for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case
for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and
presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and
held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent
once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case.
The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a
warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to
have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given
time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent
Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this
Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she
and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz
City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was
then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10);
they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their
education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 1516); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she
decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her
that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid,
p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license,
despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining
that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as
such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of
Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of
their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married
state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent,
in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was
unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a
certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently
filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit
D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was
found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an
administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when
respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on
absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted
marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May
1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been
initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration
of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of

respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio
(Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage
with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second
marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As
noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she
was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent
abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a
hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed,
not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the
Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on
her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values.
Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he
made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ."
The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission
to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre
in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified
complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for
several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's
lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr.
Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any
personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of
special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University,
the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11,
15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to
approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would
pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with
him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50,
tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the
same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they
stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant
at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn,
June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where
respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for
her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects
(p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was
suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July
17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of
medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her
(p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato
fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined
by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an
inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17,
1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion
had already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt
pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 3840)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant
introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975;
Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations
and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p.
42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel
with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in
December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p.
13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the
latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with
him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13,
1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent
Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance
of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974
because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the
hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her
subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As
respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to
believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel
in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that
if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs.
"A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he
presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept
with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help.
None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on

February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban
testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December,
1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any
intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be
considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together
with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent
Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed
upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf,
the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on
material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse
with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and
proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and
exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by
the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States
v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should
merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of
about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a
three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now
consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot
and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at
issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of
a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would
not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was
enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as
counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a
rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court"
(Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The
fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of
good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing
qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of
law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]),
this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage
of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her
subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 376

April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the
respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in
the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the
allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the
respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left
her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged
her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for
help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor,
then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh
with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to
her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing
clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor
of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June
2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not
report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked
his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to
buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March
25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service
to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read
the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957
to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their
first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later,
on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the
opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for
her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their
relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he
wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant
claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned
are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent.
From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than
of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of
him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship
with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced
Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June
2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of
marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her
husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence
over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or
18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22,
1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any
time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the
present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,
knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact
permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme

Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or
to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the
Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same
misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double
standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the
office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J.
Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged
rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which
he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at
the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus
rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and
praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as
a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit
action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of
action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules
of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be
dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence.
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was
filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was
committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the
respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to
be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who
testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941
at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by
the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and
Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n.
24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25).
She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n.

26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living
together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were
living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat,
but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual
relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to
Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already
a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her
father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n.
35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators,
March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also
granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter
was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958,
when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to
alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia
on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found
Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as
common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he
could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join
her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and
to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him
that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that
Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with
another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state
said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral
character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did
not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of
the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing
immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by
continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3)
That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married
woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record,
the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum
in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several
times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited
with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the
complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape,
seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are
not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be
disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to
exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases
unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be
disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its
rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is
that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules)
do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed
for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is
derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The
moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or
non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than
statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent.
His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual
intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself
merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with
his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law
wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor
General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of
his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts,
proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment.
This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with
approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal
(12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between
court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require
that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a
license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts.
For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede
that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not
disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity
as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral
depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that
she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not
allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an
excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes
his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could
have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining
adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the
latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and
unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission
of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S.
735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from
those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report
to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be
exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General
to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for
disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed
against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be
justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character.
This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what
a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An
applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such
conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d]
744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82
N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to
the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have
acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his
immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the
roll of attorneys.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador F.
Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred the
Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent and his
counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the hearing. The
hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon
failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18
August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both complainant and
respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988 because only
complainant appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20
September 1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither complainant nor her counsel appeared. The
hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally,
the hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second
to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to appear at the
hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter
submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989.
On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:
1. Exh. 'A' Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan
Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as
shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict
Laguitan.
Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the
child as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel
Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a
baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's
Hospital and for which respondent paid the bills for the
hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of
doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' Receipts issued by the Paulino
Medical Clinic.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy at
said clinic and for which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' Baptismal certificates of Sheila L.
Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the
children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' The family pictures showing
respondent either singly or with the rest of the family
during happier times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived
together as husband and wife and begot two children and the respondent
admits these through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' The school records of Sheila L.
Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the schooling
of the children as he himself signed the correspondence and was marked as
Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors submitted to us its
findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became lovers. Beginning
in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant bore respondent two (2)
children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the course
of this relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage
with someone else and that the prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with
respondent until eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by
the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's parents in
supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave her P400.00 and advised
her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP
Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and his having
begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate children
but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board
recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having cohabited with the
complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in effect until
respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not merely
because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also because for a
prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the
requirement of good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law until
further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the
Commission and to this Court that respondent is supporting or has made provision for the support of his
illegitimate children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on Leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within
ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a
revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an
answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit
before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on
25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25
February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to
appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings
scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband
had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them

to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded
and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors
submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children
were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married
and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived
together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and
Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to
establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate
family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent
promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to
neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to
Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living
with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and
his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband
and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and
respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most
recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and
wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ...
of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. "
2
It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good
moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the
inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the

heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged,
respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his
immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a
married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate
family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform"
respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young
daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage
and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until
farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits
proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ADM. CASE No. 5252

May 20, 2004

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross misconduct and as
being unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a three-page complaint-affidavit complainant averred that
respondent obtained a loan from the former and, to secure the repayment thereof, drew and issued two BPI
Family Bank checks. When the first check (No. 0350973) was presented for payment upon maturity, the same
was dishonored for insufficient funds. According to complainant, respondent, acting with malice and deceit,
dated the second check "January 24, 1996," so that, once presented for payment, it would be, considering, in

passing, that the loan was incurred on 23 November 1996, a stale check. She alleged that, despite repeated
verbal and written demands, respondent had failed to make good his obligation.
Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. In
a letter, dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked that the complaint be now considered submitted for
resolution in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of the Court requiring him to file his
comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the Court noted the letter of complainant, and it directed
that the complaint be thereby referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the complaint, respondent continued to
ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. The complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his having been duly notified of the
hearing by personal service effected on 12 February 2002. Respondents failure to appear prompted the
Commission on Bar Discipline to grant the request of complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An
order was issued setting the proceedings on 18 March 2002 for such reception of evidence. A copy of the order
was served on respondent on 28 February 2002 at his given address.
On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of PTT,
requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was already
committed to attend a hearing at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20 March 2002.
The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainants evidence ex-parte was held, but the
same was without loss of right on the part of respondent to conduct, if desired, a cross-examination of the
witness. The evidence of complainant showed that complainant used to avail of the notarial services of Atty.
Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In 1995, respondent requested complainant, and the
latter agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the baptismal of his daughter. In November 1996, respondent
accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence of complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent
the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at 5% a month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank
Checks No. 35073 and No. 35076, each for P31,800.00, dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996,
respectively. When presented for collection Check No. 035073 was dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. The other check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24 January 1996,
was not accepted for being a stale check.
Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to be futile. Several demand letters
were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainants lawyer, but these letters also failed to elicit
any response. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No. 035073. Finding probable cause, the complaint was subsequently
elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A warrant of arrest was issued by the court, but respondent somehow
succeeded in evading apprehension. Sometime in November 2000, respondent went to the house of complainant
and promised to pay the checks within a months time. Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of
arrest withheld but, again, respondent failed to make good his promise.
The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer was directed to
transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An order was issued to this
effect, and a copy thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.
On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear despite due
notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant that she had no other witness to present and was ready to
close her evidence, she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a formal offer and
respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit his comment and/or opposition thereto. The order, dated
22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on 28 May 2002. The formal offer of complainants evidence was

deemed submitted for resolution on 25 June 2002 pending proof of service of a copy thereof upon respondent
and the filing of the necessary comment or opposition thereto by the latter.
In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of evidence for respondent on 13
November 2002 in order to give him another opportunity to rebut the evidence of complainant. Respondent
again failed to appear on the date set therefor, prompting the Commission to rule on the admissibility of Exhibits
"A" to "D" with their submarkings. There being no appearance on the part of respondent despite due notice, the
case was considered submitted for resolution by the Commission in its order of 26 February 2003.
The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending the suspension
of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that he be ordered to
pay to complainant the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to complainant.
The Court adopts the recommendation.
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or
misconduct in office.1 The word "conduct" used in the rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
with the performance of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not
connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the
Rules of Court are not limitative2 and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity.3 Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law,4 in serious doubt.
Respondents issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation for
nearly eight years is appalling5 and hardly deserves compassion from the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt hereof. This decision
is without prejudice to the outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against
him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8392
June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION
Per Curiam:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct
which she detailed in her Position Paper2 as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October
2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with
a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader.
Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return
home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his
followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007,
the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale
food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and
walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social
Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group
refused to release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and
PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with
bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his
marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit 3 of Delia dated
February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the
Certificate of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract 6 between
respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the
marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H.
Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution8 of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of
herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to
submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense
in a verified pleading,"11 he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only
complainants counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation 12 dated
September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny,
are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and
torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent
had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral
conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala,
the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married
woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for
contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his
secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances
showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend
the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the
Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners evaluation and recommendation
well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.15 When a
lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present
evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in
the Roll of Attorneys.16
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges
brought against him, suggesting that they are true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he
would come up with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that
I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainants charge against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of
strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really
physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on
the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already freely
roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary
that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was
always accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially
considering the remoteness and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran
where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders
coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely.
That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded
whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein
co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainants witnesses, and that the allegations against him
remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.20
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.21
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE No. 3319

June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl
Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos
Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in
Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at
her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would
turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to
an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on
an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that
Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She
stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got
married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter
continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let
the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to
the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in
June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few
days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself
to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating
with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad
and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged
to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds. 6 By
way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against
respondent.

In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that
Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos
Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between
the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence
however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988
and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No.
26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to
live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos
left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence
had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband
and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable
to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a
statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on
the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want
of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the
same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and
Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in
her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the
Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to
Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the
Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii
State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22,
1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason
for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first
child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a

violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that
the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document
are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she
annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in
her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character
for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not
Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact,
respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at
that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he
was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos
Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988.
Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for
changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS
313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing
Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral
manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a
private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the
Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal
of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or
illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship
with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can
it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her
discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married
man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the

bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was
living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for
submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant,
there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The
allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made
known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the
light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to
the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time
did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that
can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she
was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation.
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream
cherished by every single girl.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate

of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to
the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of
good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership
in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena,
117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left
him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined.
Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility
and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence

and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise
its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This,
herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable
to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which
was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the
case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and
highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar,
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality,
is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,
vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of
Branch VI. City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores,
Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q- 7171), Branch IV, Court of
First Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a
fine of P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the undersigned and to
my present deputy clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon
request of the undersigned primarily to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores,
which I strongly disapproved of, and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer
with unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten notes, he
persisted in taking this unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use
of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter,
dated March 11, 1976. 1
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was required to file
his answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case was transferred to the First Division. 2
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, that his conviction for
libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then Commissioner Abelardo Subido, who was also convicted of
the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had approved his appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch
VI of the City Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to unduly influence the complainant in the
discharge of the latter's duties and responsibilities; that while respondent's language in his letter dated March 11,
1976 is strong, the same could not be considered contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as much as he
was merely expressing the sentiments of an aggrieved employee who deserves a better treatment from his
superior after more than six years and nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in the City
Court of Quezon City; that if ever respondent requested favors from his superior, these were all done in the spirit
of friendship which the complainant professed to him before he left Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City
on March 9, 1976; that from October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March 8, 1976, the respondent was
practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored the complainant on the fine

interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge Zari who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered
from the following instances: On January 8, 1976, after the trial in Criminal Case No VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua
and two criminal cases against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the respondent to conduct an ocular
inspection on the illegal constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise, told the respondent to join
him for lunch at Alfredo's Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after conducting the ocular inspection, the
respondent proceeded to Alfredo's Steakhouse where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel
of Chua and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the
ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records of
said cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime of
estafa, the respondent was instructed to convict both the accused because the complainant was a relative of a
certain Judge Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio Villanueva y
Elazo, Dominador Garcia y Orteza and Balbino Domingo y Ramos, for the crime of theft, he was instructed by
Judge Zari to convict the accused Dominador Garcia y Orteza because according to said judge, the complainant
is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of the
respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the respondent that he had not allowed the respondent to
interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions; that while the complainant is aware of his limitations, he is
certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of the Philippine Bar to "tutor" and give him finer
interpretation of the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua and
VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before this court; that he did not call the respondent to his
chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal constructions; that he did not invite the
respondent for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the trial, he went to Alfredo's Steakhouse in the
company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that while in the said place, the complainant was surprised to see
the respondent in the company of the accused; that he counseled the respondent to be more circumspect as these
people had cases before his sala; that it is true that from then on up to the relief of the respondent on March 8,
1976, the records of the aforesaid case could not be found by the respondent because the complainant had the
records brought inside his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the respondent to manipulate
the records; that he did not instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 and
in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the complainant is a relative of a certain Judge
Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he requested Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all orders,
decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint responsibility. 5
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the respondent applied for the position of Deputy
Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted, among others, an affidavit dated June 10,
1969 that contains the following statement "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have
no administrative, criminal or police record;" that the respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212
(1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data
sheet, the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by
notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community,
because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established
in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and
recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and City Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit
themselves from investigating this
case. 6
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the investigation of this administrative case recommended
that the respondent be separated from the service on the following findings:
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude."
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of the grounds for
disciplinary action is "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."

Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the respondent was that on
April 28, 1967 respondent was convicted of the crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171
of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay
a fine of P5,000.00 which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.
Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 7
Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral
turpitude are adultery, concubinage, 8 rape, arson, evasion of income tax,
barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 9 criminal conspiracy to smuggle
opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records,
fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction
under promise of marriage, 10 estafa, 11 falsification of public document, 12
estafa thru falsification of public document. 13
"Moral turpitude" has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men,
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. 14 It implies something immoral in itself,
regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely
be mala prohibita but, the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing
of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 15
Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being
positively prohibited. 16 Hence, the crime of illegal possession of firearm or
ammunition does not involve moral turpitude for under our laws, what is
punishable is the possession of a firearm or ammunition without a license or
authority. 17
Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude. 18
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander, against a
municipal officer is not a ground for suspending him from office, as such
offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. 19
When respondent submitted his application for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court of
Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted among others an affidavit dated June 10,
1969, which reads as follows:
That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no
administrative, criminal or police record.
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question No. 10, which
asked if applicant has previously been convicted of a criminal offense,
accused placed no. It was later discovered that accused was previously
convicted of theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of public
document under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal obligation to
reveal previous conviction. 20 However he maybe guilty of perjury under
Art. 183. 21
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is
"falsification of public documents."

The second charge is "persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to
undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the
complainant and to his present Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano."
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits "F", "F-1", "F-2", & "F-3"),
he intervened for and in behalf of Gaw Chin in Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the
sala of the complainant because the accused was a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.
On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was practically doing the work of
the complainant and tutoring him in the finer interpretation and application of the law, and he
was preparing the decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying to
influence the complainant.
The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", & "F-3" speak for themselves. There is no
need for the undersigned to quote the same.
A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his wife the family of
the judge before whom the client's cause is to be heard, and to endeavor, in
conversation thus to be had in advance of the hearing, to commit the judge
to an expression of opinion favorable to the client's case warrants his
dismissal from the bar. 22
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 23
The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested by respondent in calling
for and unjust use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the city judges when he
wrote the letter, dated March 11, 1976."
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of heart and have
developed cold feet. You have badly shaken my belief in your credibility.
Indeed, you are truly a woman, very fickle and unpredictable, but very
impulsive.
I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the sympathies and, if
possible, like the other five (5) judges, involved them in the mess originally
of your own making and design and align them with you against me, hoping
to impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be convinced that
mine is a lost cause.
However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your conduct, you have
dismally failed to live up to your oaths, ...
Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of your wits when
you all decided to lay the blame on me and condemned without trial for the
alleged inefficiency.
Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring under deep
and nagging hallucinations, induced and prompted by your serious concern
to save the face of a colleague.
By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of Branches I, III, V & IX
honestly and truthfully say the public service in their respective branches is
efficient, so that they could now come to the succor of a colleague and are
also competent to promote the efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is
true, promotions of Judges in the City Court would be fast, the Purge in the

Judiciary would not have affected Quezon City and the unprepared and the
inexperienced would not have come to the Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in his letter was justified and
very much called for it being the indubitable manifestation of the indignation and disgust of
the respondent, urged upon him by the complainant who engineered the respondent's illegal
transfer from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a valid and
subsisting appointment to the Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a letter of the
Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to quote the pertinent provision of which:
'as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after due and
circumspect deliberation by and among the judges. '
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge under Administrative Order No. 6 of
the Supreme Court which provides as follows:
To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another
branch (sala) or to the Office of the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the
position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the interest of the
service requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in
consultation with the Presiding Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and in
case of disagreement, the assignment of the Executive Judge shall be
effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of the branch concerned who
is the complainant in this case.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a
limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical
and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification
for the detail, he may appeal his case to the commission. Pending appeal, the
decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered
by the commission. 24
An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in
the same agency. Provided: That such reassignment shall not involve
reduction in rank, status or salary. 25
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee from one branch to the
Office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme
Court and in consonance with PD 807.
The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the
Supreme Court as a "Civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would
suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's
decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being
interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the
other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits
received from any of the petitioners including the President constitute
disrespectful language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the
administration of justice.
The language is necessary for the defense of client is no justification. It ill
behooves an attorney to justify his disrespectful language with the statement
that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not
permanent an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that "since lawyers are

administrators of justice, oathbound servants of society, their first duty is not

to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this
their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and
must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 26
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had committed
insubordination, a ground for disciplinary action. 27
The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the
respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to
Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and
uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of
Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted undue
influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact
of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of
the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to malign
people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided
by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the
respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative,
criminal or police record. " This averment is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28,
1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the investigation
conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch
VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency
including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position
papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it
is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and
"legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave
no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services
it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled
but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the
Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission
to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services,
but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which

course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of
the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed
to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule
or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also,
law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson
to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court
See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds
out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration
of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to
do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading

impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose
of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it
is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause
the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country.
While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is
certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce,
where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients
by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of
the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall

recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only

presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the
like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, wellestablished method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before
me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as
the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be

practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew

employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in
the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate
sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his
men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules
of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the

practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of
a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large.
There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having
an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause
of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory.
"It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks
the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken
, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,

one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal
advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the
client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation,
Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold
or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had
a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of
pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate
taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the
state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives
will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation
in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it

within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for
his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements
for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required
by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be
its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.
28
As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals
in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The
Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which
are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . .
. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For

that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that
the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering
that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal
Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which
is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against

unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the
factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5299

August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053

August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/5212667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee
a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of

children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the
time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se
are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On
June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent
guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on
November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No.
5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be
a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18
Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the
time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. 21
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: 22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;

membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No, 6854
April 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia,
Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she
attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan,
Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and
Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed person has
started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners
of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. SorianoDulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the
undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties,
health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with standard
height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its
accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds residential house in
particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the protection of the
safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter
please at your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel
of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under
construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and
on the part of your good office, your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same
foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said Sections 301,
302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to
penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge
against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondents
marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting. 5
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit6 he filed against respondent before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).9

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following
findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife for a
building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant
was that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other
reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his
building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the charges and
accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or
suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred
against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the
presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required
evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him
should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs.
Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda
Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December
17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 200515 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4
(a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz
addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainants building
permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after conducting an
investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code for constructing without a building
permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued.
Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia
applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being processed pending
approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant.
Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being
employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken

into consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious.
Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the
complaints against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and
7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his
own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application for
building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the requirements provided for
by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their
properties, health and safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28, 2004,17 whereas the
questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal
Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal
action against you."18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 200519 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed,
complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the
Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law while he
was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing authority,
suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not prohibited.20
It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is
still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,21 when the
Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have
had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. 23 For while Article
256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification
thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to
grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community."24 Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 25
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,26 this Court declared that the therein respondents
act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct,
for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7)
years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went
to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.27
In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his
claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage
abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until his
marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any woman.
And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which
they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999
and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he contracted his
second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second
marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.28
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was
in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second
wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the
rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING, respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.

PER CURIAM: pp
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the
exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the
original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land
dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia
spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish
ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale
written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and
Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 2122).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for
the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia
Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).

Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw.
Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano.
For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the
signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was
executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic.
(Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court
of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the
petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in
this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution
was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining
portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative
Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against
Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as
Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a
counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of
"Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys.
Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article
1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against
her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty.
Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by
one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal
had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with
Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2)
deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were
not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had
filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal
(complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the
living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights
over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same
property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from
claim-ing the property).

On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and
notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her
grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal)
and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated
the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543)
against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the
Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3,
1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were
ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. When
Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We
referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch
50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of
complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala
of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos
and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension
of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the
"Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of
the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial
documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail
any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste,
40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of
Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest
or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
(Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may
either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the
litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground
for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No.
V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This
charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight
than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan.
31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs.
Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by
another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so
delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its
subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the
court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the
expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is
not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and
honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may
suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR,
136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood

but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in
them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination,
but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded.
She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not
accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be
dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso
facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122
SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to
substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information
furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence,
hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand."
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is
inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391
was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in
executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors and
only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer,
would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue
the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his
house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the
conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One
of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his
brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive
mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391
against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.