Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988
PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION,respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, Third Division * dated February 29, 1984 in AC-G.R. No. CV No. 61705
entitled Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., plaintiff-appellee vs. Primitivo Leveriza Parungao, Antonio C.
Vasco and Civil Aeronautics Administration, defendants-appellants; Primitive Leveriza, Fe
Leveriza Parungao and Antonio C. Leveriza, cross-defendant, affirming in toto the decision of
the trial court dated April 6, 1976.
As found by the trial court and adopted by the Intermediate Appellate Court, the facts of this
case are as follows:
Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case.
These three contracts are as follows:
First Contract. For purposes of easy reference and brevity, this contract shall
be referred to hereinafter as Contract A. This is a "CONTRACT OF LEASE",
executed between the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Defendant CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, as lessor, and ROSARIO
C. LEVERIZA, as lessee, on April 2, 1965, over a certain parcel of land at the
MIA area, consisting of approximately 4,502 square meters, at a monthly rental of
P450.20, for a period of 25 years, (Exhibit "A", Exhibit "I-Leverizas", Exhibit "ICAA").
Second Contracts. For purposes of easy references and brevity, this contract
shall be referred to hereinafter as Contract B. This is a "LEASE AGREEMENT",
executed between ROSARIO C. LEVERIZA, as lessor, and Plaintiff MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee on May 21, 1965, over 3,000 square meters of
that SAME Parcel of land subject of Contract A above mentioned, at a monthly
rental of P1,500.00, for a period of 25 years (Exhibit 'B', Exhibit 4-Leverizas' ).
Third Contract. For purposes of easy reference and brevity, this contract shall
be referred to hereinafter as Contract C. This is a "LEASE AGREEMENT",
executed between Defendant CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, as
lessor, and plaintiff MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee, on June 1, 1968
over that SAME parcel of land (Lot A, on plan being a portion of Parcel, Psu
2031), containing an area of 3,000 square meters more or less, at a monthly
rental of P.25 per square meter for the second 200 square meters, and P.20 per
square meter for the rest, for a period of 29 (sic) years. (Exhibit "C").
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three
contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is
the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the
area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has
been reduced to 3,000 square meters. To summarize:

Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the

Republic of the Philippines, represented by Defendant Civil
Aeronautics Administration and Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel
of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21,
1965 between defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil
Oil Philippines, Inc. over the same parcel of land, but reduced to
3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant
Civil Aeronautics Administration and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines,
Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square
meters, for 25 years.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it
appears that defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration as LESSOR, leased the
same parcel of land, for durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit:
(1) Defendant Rosario C. Leveriza, and that plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., as
LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) defendant
Rosario C. Leveriza and (2) defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration, Inc., for
durations of time that also overlapped.
For purposes of brevity defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be
referred to hereinafter as defendant CAA.
Rosario C. Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now
deceased. This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued,
namely: Defendants Primitive Leveriza, her second husband, (now also
deceased), Fe Leveriza Parungao, her daughter by her second husband, and
Antonio C. Vasco, her son by her first husband. For purposes of brevity, these
defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., shall be referred to hereinafter simply as the
Plaintiff. (pp. 95-99, Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff in this case seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and
Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and
depends has already been cancelled by the defendant Civil Aeronautics
Administration and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only
valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present
litigation is concerned. On the other hand, defendants Leverizas' claim that
Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and
still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA
which should be declared void.
Defendant CAA asserts that Exhibit "A" is still valid and subsisting because its
cancellation by Guillermo Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul
Contract A because of the violation committed by defendant Leveriza in leasing
the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of
defendant CAA. Defendant CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been
approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid. ...
xxx xxx xxx
After trial, the lower court render judgment on April 6, 1976 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after having thus considered the evidence of all the parties,
testimonial and documentary, and their memoranda and reply-memoranda, this
Court hereby renders judgment:

1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June

28, 1966, and has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that
date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any
effect as of June 28, 1966 because of the cancellation of Contract
A;
3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1,
1968, and that it is still valid and subsisting;
4. Ordering defendant CAA to refund to defendants Leverizas the
amount of P32,189.30 with 6% per annum until fully paid;
5. Ordering defendants Leverizas to refund to plaintiff the amount
of P48,000.00 with 6% interest per annum until fully paid;
6. Dismissing defendants Leverizas' four counterclaims against
plaintiff;
7. Dismissing defendants Leverizas' cross-claim against
defendant CAA;
8. Dismissing defendant CAA's counterclaim against plaintiff;
9. Dismissing defendant CAA's counterclaim against defendant
Leverizas.
No pronouncements as to costs.
On June 2, 1976, defendant Leveriza filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case and lack of evidentiary
support of the decision which was denied in the order of November 12,1976 (Rollo, p. 17).
On July 27, 1976, the CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot
lease was properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the
President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease
contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General
Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and
Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however
denied on November 12, 1976 (Rollo, p. 18).
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, being in full accord with the trial court, rendered a
decision on February 29, 1984, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court dated
April 6, 1976, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION (CAA)
HAD THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO LEASE, EVEN WITHOUT APPROVAL
OF THE THEN SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS,
REAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

II
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION HAD
STATUTORY AUTHORITY, WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE THEN
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, TO CANCEL A
LEASE CONTRACT OVER REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH CONTRACT WAS APPROVED, AS REQUIRED BY
LAW, BY THE SECRETARY.
III
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE CONTRACT OF SUBLEASE (CONTRACT B) ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST AND RESPONDENT MOBIL
OIL PHILIPPINES, INC. WAS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION.
The petition is devoid of merit.
There is no dispute that Contract "A" at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue
therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the
ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil Philippines without the consent of
CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil Philippines
(Contract "C").
Petitioners contend that Contract "A" is still subsisting because Contract "B" is a valid sublease
and does not constitute a ground for the cancellation of Contract "A", while Contract "C", a
subsequent lease agreement between CAA and Mobil Oil Philippines is null and void, for lack of
approval by the Department Secretary. Petitioners anchor their position on Sections 567 and
568 of the Revised Administrative Code which require among others, that subject contracts
should be executed by the President of the Philippines or by an officer duly designated by him,
unless authority to execute the same is by law vested in some other officer (Petition, Rollo, pp.
15-16).
At the other extreme, respondent Mobil Oil Philippines asserts that Contract "A" was validly
cancelled on June 28, 1966 and so was Contract "B" which was derived therefrom. Accordingly,
it maintains that Contract "C" is the only valid contract insofar as the parcel of land in question is
concerned and that approval of the Department Head is not necessary under Section 32 (par.
24) of the Republic Act 776 which expressly vested authority to enter into such contracts in the
Administrator of CAA (Comment; Rollo, p. 83).
On its part, respondent Civil Aeronautics Administration took the middle ground with its view that
Contract "A" is still subsisting as its cancellation is ineffective without the approval of the
Department Head but said contract is not enforceable because of petitioners' violation of its
terms and conditions by entering into Contract "B" of sublease without the consent of CAA. The
CAA further asserts that Contract "C" not having been approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, is not valid (Rollo, p. 43). However, in its comment filed with the
Supreme Court, the CAA made a complete turnabout adopting the interpretation and ruling
made by the trial court which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of
Appeals), that the CAA Administrator has the power to execute the deed or contract of lease
involving real properties under its administration belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
without the approval of the Department Head as clearly provided in Section 32, paragraph (24)
of Republic Act 776.
The issue narrows down to whether or not there is a valid ground for the cancellation of
Contract "A."
Contract "A" was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically
"for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles
going in and out of the airport."

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the
provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises
but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be
secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and
conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and
conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms
and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this
contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract "B")
with Mobil Oil Philippines without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract
was made in a letter dated June 28, 1966 of Guillermo P. Jurado, Airport General Manager of
CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza, as follows:
(Letterhead)
June 28, 1966
Mrs. Rosario Leveriza
Manila International Airport
Madam:
It has been found out by the undersigned that you have sublet the
property of the CAA leased to you and by virtue of this, your lease
contract is hereby cancelled because of the violation of the
stipulations of the contract. I would like to inform you that even
without having sublet the said property the said contract would
have been cancelled as per attached communication.
Very
truly
yours,
For the
Directo
r:
(Sgd.)
Illegibl
e
(Typed
)
GUILLERMO P.
JURADO
Airport General
Manager
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that the
Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain that it is
only the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the President, or by
delegation of power, the Director of Civil Aeronautics Administration who could validly cancel the
contract. They do admit, however, and it is evident from the records that the Airport General
Manager signed "For the Director." Under the circumstances, there is no question that such act

enjoys the presumption of regularity, not to mention the unassailable fact that such act was
subsequently affirmed or ratified by the Director of the CAA himself (Record on Appeal, pp. 108110).
Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in
effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or
cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract "A" which
has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of
aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not
redundant.
It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was effective, a subsequent
billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in effect waived or nullified the rescission
of Contract "A."
It will be recalled that the questioned cancellation of Contract "A" was among others, mainly
based on the violation of its terms and conditions, specifically, the sublease of the property by
the lessee without the consent of the lessor.
The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed it transpired,
after the cancellation of Contract "A" is obviously an error. However, this Court has already ruled
that the mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest. In San Mauricio
Mining Company v. Ancheta (105 SCRA 391, 422), it has been held that as a matter of law
rooted in the protection of public interest, and also as a general policy to protect the government
and the people, errors of government personnel in the performance of their duties should never
deprive the people of the right to rectify such error and recover what might be lost or be bartered
away in any actuation, deal or transaction concerned. In the case at bar, the lower court in its
decision which has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordered the CAA to refund to the
petitioners the amount of rentals which was not due from them with 6% interest per annum until
fully paid.
Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract "A", claiming that Contract "B" was a
mere sublease to respondent Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and requires no prior consent of CAA to
perfect the same. Citing Article 1650 of the Civil Code, they assert that the prohibition to
sublease must be expressed and cannot be merely implied or inferred (Rollo, p. 151).
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non- necessity for a prior
consent interprets the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Contract "A" to refer to an assignment of
lease under Article 1649 of the Civil Code and not to a mere sublease. A careful scrutiny of said
paragraph of Contract "A" clearly shows that it speaks of transfer of rights of Rosario Leveriza to
the leased premises and not to assignment of the lease (Rollo, pp. 48-49).
Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to Contract "A" that Mobil Oil
Philippines would be the owner of the gasoline station it would construct on the leased premises
during the period of the lease, hence, it is understood that it must be given a right to use and
occupy the lot in question in the form of a sub-lease (Rollo, p. 152).
In Contract "A", it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner) who will manage and
operate the gasoline station. The fact that Mobil Oil was mentioned in that contract was clearly
not intended to give approval to a sublease between petitioners and said company but rather to
insure that in the arrangements to be made between them, it must be understood that after the
expiration of the lease contract, whatever improvements have been constructed in the leased
premises shall be relinquished to CAA. Thus, this Court held that "the primary and elementary
rule of construction of documents is that when the words or language thereof is clear and plain
or readily understandable by any ordinary reader thereof, there is absolutely no room for
interpretation or construction anymore." (San Mauricio Mining Company v. Ancheta, supra).
Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot execute without approval of the
Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the

Philippines, citing Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provide as
follows:
SEC. 567. Authority of the President of the Philippines to execute contracts
relative to real property. When the Republic of the Philippines is party to a
deed conveying the title to real property or is party to any lease or other contract
relating to real property belonging to said government, said deed or contract
shall be executed on behalf of said government by the President of the
Philippines or by an officer duly designated by him, unless authority to execute
the same is by law expressly vested in some other officer. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 568. Authority of national officials to make contract. Written contracts not
within the purview of the preceding section shall, in the absence of special
provision, be executed, with the approval of the proper Department Head, by the
Chief of the Bureau or Office having control of the appropriation against which
the contract would create a charge; or if there is no such chief, by the proper
Department Head himself or the President of the Philippines as the case may
require.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease
real property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines under its administration even without
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is expressly
vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have,
among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila
International Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or
operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties
as: ... (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or
lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements which may be
proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other
real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the
approval of the President of the Philippines. ...
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while
Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of
the lease in Contract "C" is real property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by
the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer
expressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the
third category. Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not because it is an entity duly designated by the
President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration by reason of its creation and existence, administers
properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties that the
Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and
execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and
to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements
which may be proper or necessary. The exception, however, is the sale of properties acquired

by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President
of the Philippines. The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso
in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the
Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration does not need the prior approval of the President
or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in the execution of Contract "C."
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates
that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable
(Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),. that specific statute prevails over a general
statute (De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail
(Wil Wilhensen, Inc. v. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order
RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my
appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am
enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the
appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers
and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee
on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable
Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume
and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither
violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7,
Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way
amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the
primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties
and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to
the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services
Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be
under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment
reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in
the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as
expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable

purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue
involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our

common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not
shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of
his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in
civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the
Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned
with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained
interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency
to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The
familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to
such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are fulltime positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge
of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular
functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It
is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench
in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending
E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work
and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue
involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our
common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters

which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not
shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of
his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in
civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the
Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned
with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained
interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency
to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The
familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA,
MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII
(Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et
al., respondents.
Nos. L-49717-21 February 8,1979.
LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for
Region XII, and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents.
L-49705-09 Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents.
L-49717-21 Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioner.
Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General, for Public respondents.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction
filed by six (6) independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa
who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which, however, was not
registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely
Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio
Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the decision of the respondent Commission on
Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from the Of the respondent Regional Board of
Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for
representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for
certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a
candidate for representative in the same election in that region, to review the decision of the
Comelec declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the eight
winners in said election.
The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L- 48097, wherein Tomatic
Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent dent
Board in Cotabato city and in which canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total of 4,107 voting
centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results as follows:

NAMES OF
CANDIDATE
S

NO.
OF
VOTE
S

1. Roldan,
Ernesto (KB)

225,67
4

2. Valdez,
Estanislao
(KBL)

217,78
9

3. Dimporo,
Abdullah
(KBL)

199,24
4

4. Tocao,
Sergio (KB)

199,06
2

5. Badoy,
Anacleto
(KBL)

198,96
6

6. Amparo,
Jesus (KBL)

184,76
4

7.
Pangandama
n,
Sambolayan
(KBL)

183,64
6

8. Sinsuat,
Datu Blah
(KBL)

182,45
7

9. Baga,
Tomas (KBL)

171,65
6

10. Aratuc,
Tomatic (KB)

165,79
5

11.
Mandangan,
Linang(KB)

165,03
2

12. Diaz,
Ciscolario
(KB)

159,97
7

13. Tamalu,
Fred (KB)

153,73
4

14. Legaspi
Bonifacio
(KB)

148,20
0

15. Guro,
Mangontawar
(KB)

139,38
6

16. Loma,
Nemesio
(KB)

107,45
5

17.

101,35

Macapeges,
Malamama
(Independent
)

(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention omitted)" (Page 6,
Record, L-49705-09.)
A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had
conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election
records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of
Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely,
Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in North
Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan, Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan,
Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan,
Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan, Palimbang,
President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns
from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before the start of the hearings, the
canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May 15, 1978,
the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be
done in Manila. This order was the one assailed in this Court. We issued a restraining order.
After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the
following guidelines to be observed thereat:
1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in the Comelec main office
in Manila starting not later than June 1, 1978;
2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission on Elections shall see to
it that all the material election paragraph corresponding to all the voting center
involved in Election Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are taken to its main
office in Manila, more particularly, the ballot boxes, with the contents, used during
the said elections, the books of voters or records of voting and the lists or records
of registered voters, on or before May 31, 1978;
3. That as soon as the corresponding records are available, petitioners and their
counsel shall be allowed to examine the same under such security measures as
the respondent Board may determine, except the contents of the ballot boxes
which shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or
respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident, the
purpose of such examination being to enable petitioners, and their counsel to
expeditiously determine which of them they would wish to be scrutinized and
passed upon by the Board as supporting their charges of election frauds and
anomalies, petitioners and their counsel being admonished in this connection,
that no dilatory tactics should be in by them and that only such records
substantial objections should be offered by them for the scrutiny by the Board;
4. That none of the election returns reffered to in the petition herein shall be
canvassed without first giving the herein petitioners ample opportunity to make
their specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient basis for
the rejection of any of the returns, and, in this connection, the respondent
Regional Board of Canvassers should give due consideration to the points raised
in the memorandum filed by said petitioners with the Commission on Election in
the above cases dated April 26, 1978;
5. That should it appear to the board upon summary scrutiny of the records to be
offered by petitioners indication that in the voting center actually held and/or that

election returns were prepared either before the day of the election returns or at
any other time, without regard thereto or that there has been massive substitution
of voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by the same groups of
persons or individuals or outside of the voting centers, the Board should exclude
the corresponding returns from the canvass;
6. That appeals to the commission on Election of the Board may be made only
after all the returns in question in all the above, the above five cases shall have
been passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no proclamation made until
after the Commission shall have finally resolved the appeal without prejudice to
recourse to this court, if warranted as provided by the Code and the Constitution,
giving the parties reasonable time therefor;
7. That the copies of the election returns found in the corresponding ballot boxes
shall be the one used in the canvass;
8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost dispatch, to the end that a
proclamation, if feasible, may be made not later than June 10, 1978; thus, the
canvass may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the possible number of
votes in the still uncanvassed returns with no longer affect the general results of
the elections here in controversy;
9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such other directive not
inconsistent with this resolution y necessary to expedite the proceedings herein
contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein intended. (Pp. 8-9, Record.
On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified:
... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers just referred to need
not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular voting centers as to
which the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot
boxes be opened in order that the votes therein may be counted because said
ballots unlike the election returns, have not been tampered with or substituted,
which instances the results of the counting shall be specified and made known by
petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, 1978; it
being understood, that for the purposes of the canvass, the petitioners shall not
be allowed to invoke any objection not already alleged in or comprehend within
the allegations in their complaint in the election cases above- mentioned. (Page
8, Id.)
Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners presenting
objections, most of them supported by the report of handwriting and finger print experts who had
examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700 which they
specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in
the Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the voters lists
and voting records were not available- and could not be brought to Manila, petitions asked that
the results therein be completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent
Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting to be as follows:

NAME OF
CANDIDATE

VO
TES
OB
TAI
N

VALDEZ,
Estanislao

436,
069

DIMAPORO
, Abdullah

429,
351

PANGANDA
MAN,
Sambolayan

406,
106

SINSUAT,
Blah

403,
445

AMPARO,
Jesus

399,
997

MANDANG
AN, Linang

387,
025

BAGA,
Tomas

386,
393

BADOY,Ana
cleto

374,
933

ROLDAN,
Ernesto

275,
141

TOCAO,
Sergio

239,
914

ARATUC,
Tomatic

205,
829

GURO,
Mangontaw
ar

190,
489

DIAZ,
Ciscolario

190,
077

TAMULA,
Fred

180,
280

LEGASPI,
Bonifacio

174,
396

MACAPEGE
S,
Malamana

160,
271

(Pp. 11-12,
Record.)

Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec.
Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for decision.
However, on August 30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution stating inter alia that :
In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly :
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and
registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and
registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to
decide to open the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested
persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7,
1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affects (Page 12).
Record, L-49705-09 .)
On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file their respective written
comments on the reports they shall periodically receive from the NBI-Comelec team of fingerprint and signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from their receipt
thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al., "Petitioners submitted their various comments
on the report 4, the principal gist of which was that it would appear uniformly in all the reports
submitted by the Comelec-NBI experts that the registered voters were not the ones who voted
as shown by the fact that the thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the
thumbprints of the voters in Form 5. " But the Comelec denied a motion of petitioners asking
that the ballot boxes corresponding to the voting centers the record of which are not available
be opened and that a date be set when the statements of witnesses referred to in the August
30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on the ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary
to proceed with such opening of ballot boxes and taking of statements.
For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed with Comelec on December
19,1978 a Memorandum. To quote from the petition:
On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a Memorandum for the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the Comelec's Resolution of

December 11, 1978, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto and made a part
hereof as Annex 2, wherein they discussed the following topics: (I) Brief History
of the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and Submission Before the
Honorable commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad Cautelam. And the fourth topic,
because of its relevance to the case now before this Honorable Court, we hereby
quote for ready reference:
IV
OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE
ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978
We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by this Honorable
Commission should be limited to the precincts and municipalities involved in the
KB'S Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence had been
submitted by the parties, and on which the KB submitted the reports of their
handwriting-print. Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of the KB. For
under the Supreme Court Resolution of May 23, 1978, original jurisdiction was
given to the Board, with appeal to this Honorable Commission-Considerations of
other matters beyond these would be, in our humble opinion, without jurisdiction.
For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable Commission that we stand by
the reports and findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts as submitted by them to
the Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the said Regional Board
of Canvassers in its Resolution of July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the
majorities we have already above mentioned. The Board did more than make a
summary scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme Court Resolution,
Guideline No. 5, of May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we cannot
file any Memorandum within the non-extendible period of seven (7) days, we
would just stand by said COMELEC/NBI experts' reports to the Regional Board,
as confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam).
The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports of the NBI-COMELEC
experts. For lack of material time due to the voluminous reports and number of
voting centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our impression that the
COMELEC will exercise only its appellate jurisdiction, specially as per resolution
of this Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L-48097), we, the KBL, did
not comment any more on said reports. (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.)
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases,
declaring the final result of the canvass to be as follows:

CANDIDA
TES

V
O
T
E
S

VALDEZ,
Estanisla
o

3
1
9,
5
1

DIMAPO
RO,
Abdullah

2
8
9.
7
5
1

AMPARO,
Jesus

2
8
6,
1
8
0

BADOY,
Anacleto

2
8
5,
9
8
5

BAGA,
Tomas

2
7
1,
4
7
3

PANGAN
DAMAN,
Sambolay
an

2
7
1,
3
9
3

SINSUAT,
Blah

2
6
9,
9
0
5

ROLDAN,
Ernesto

2
6

8,
2
8
7

MANDAN
GAN,
Linang

2
5
1,
2
2
6

TACAO,
Sergio

2
2
9,
1
2
4

DIAZ,
Ciscolario

1
8
7,
9
8
6

ARATUC,
Tomatic

1
8
3,
3
1
6

LEGASPI,
Bonifacio

1
7
8,
5
6
4

TAMULA,
Fred

1
7
7,
2
7
0

GURO,
Mangonta
war

1
6
3,
4
4
9

LOMA,
Nemesio

1
2
9,
4
5
0

(Page 14,
Record,
L-4970509.)

It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:

The Comelec committee grave abuse of dicretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction:
1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration records and voting
records from the other voting centers questioned by petitioners after it found
proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting records and registration
records examined by Comelec and NBI experts;
2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of
voters and voting records could not be recovered by the Commission in spite of
its repeated efforts to retrieve said records;
3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very
high percentage of voting and in not considering that high percentage of voting,
coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing of election
returns;
4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting
centers whose records are not available for examination to determine whether or
not there had been voting in said voting centers;
5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those
that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Manila pursuant to the
directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this Honorable
Court;
6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of
the voting records and registration records show that the thumbprints of the
voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the registered voters as
shown in CE Form 1;
7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the
voting centers, municipal treasurers and other election officials in the voting

centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to the
affidavits of watchers of petitioners;
8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners those
included among the returns questioned by them in their Memorandum filed with
the Commission on April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was attached as Annex
'I' to their petition filed with this Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which the
Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be considered by the Board in the
course of the canvass (Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.)
On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the Comelec comitted the following
errors:
1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs. Commission on Elections
(November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly the highly restrictive
criterion that when the votes obtained by the candidates with the highest number
of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC
ruled to exclude from the canvass the election return reflecting such rests, under
which the COMELEC excluded 1,004 election returns, involving around 100,000
votes, 95 % of which are for KBL candidates, particularly the petitioner Linang
Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair, unjust and oppressive.
2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz Case is not the total exclusion
of election returns simply because the total number of votes exceed the total
number of highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast by persons
Identified as registered voters were added to the votes cast by persons who can
not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad arguendo, that
all of them voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total is much below the
number of votes credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and that 'of the
2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one-half (1,012) were cast by persons
definitely Identified as not registered therein or still more than 40 % of substitute
voting which was the rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman (Diaz
Case, November 19,1971,42 SCRA 426,432).
3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of Bashier and Basman
vs. Commission on Election(February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238) which was the
one followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit:
In Basman vs Comelec (L-33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the Supreme
Court upheld the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the
Commission setting the standard of 40 % excess votes to justify
the exclusion of election returns. In line with the above ruling, the
Board of Canvassers may likewise set aside election returns with
40 % substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occured and
the excess was such as to destroy the presumption of innocent
mistake, the returns was excluded.
(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22), which this Honorable Court
must have meant when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. 7), it referred
to "massive substitution of voters.
4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the records in more than
878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the
Regional Board of Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate
jurisdiction is examination of more election records to make a total of 1,085
voting centers (COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond
its jurisdiction and a denial of due process as far as the KBL, particularly the
petitioner Mandangan, were concerned because they were informed of it only on
December, 1978, long after the case has been submitted for decision in
September, 1978; and the statement that the KBL acquiesced to the same is
absolutely without foundation.

5. In excluding election returns from areas where the conditions of peace and
order were allegedly unsettled or where there was a military operation going on
immediately before and during election and where the voter turn out was high (90
% to 100 %), and where the people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling
without jurisdiction and in violation of due process because no evidence was at
all submitted by the parties before the Regional Board of Canvasssers. (Pp. 2325, Record, L-47917-21.)
Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the
nature and extent of the Supreme Court's power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is
expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the
Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions
invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review.
This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings
of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph,
Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review" shall be on the
ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions refer not only to election
contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat
differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commissionmay be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof"
(Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city official" (Section 2(2).)
Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the first legislative constructionof the
pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all preproclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in
such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests, "the decision of the
Commission shall be final, and executory and inappealable." (Section 193)
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite
tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent
constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The
framers of the new Constitution must be presumed ot have definite knowledge of what it means
to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme
Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's
actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there
was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope
of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.
Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified peritinent constitutional
provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even
inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its
imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and extent of the
inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as
distinguished from review. We are of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are
consistent with the apparent new constitional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that
actuations of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically
connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court", when it comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the
premises.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari
deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is
otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational

deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an
indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters taht by their nature ought to be left for final
determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme
Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections.
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage,
endowed with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is but proper that the
Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action
and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in
the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all suspicions
of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of
politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the
respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the
same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn
from the political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree
or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that could
arise from such background or orientation.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to
be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions
of the parties in this cases.
THE MANDANGAN CASE
Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first.
The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that it was an
error of law on the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant circumstances
hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead of that of Bashier vs.
Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied
due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its inquiry beyond the election records of "the
878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of
Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting, from
voting centers where military operations were by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said
voting centers had to be transferred to the poblaciones the same being by evidence.
Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are not
mutually exclusive of each other, each being an outgrowth of the basic rationale of statistical
improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether they be apply
together or separately or which of them be applied depends on the situation on hand. In the
factual milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and
petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting centers showing that the votes of the
candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the candidate obtaining the highest number of
votes exceeds the highest possible number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as
spurious and manufactured just because the total number of excess votes in said voting centers
were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents
relative to the highly questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the past in the
provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as attested by its numerous
decisions in cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back
from the standards it has enunciated in those decisions.
In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive
importance to bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the
Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision on over the board of
canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the
Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely
referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the

guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is
that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative
law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or
office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to
do or ought to have done.
Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to the
contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its
inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that
Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged
constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes
and p in doing what petitioner it should not have done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that
Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et al. have asked, since said complaints had
impugned from the outset not only the returns from the 878 voting centers examined by their
experts but all those mentioned in their complaints in the election cases filed originally with the
Comelec enumerated in the opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that
much field to work on.
The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding the voting
centers affected by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not considered by the
board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones. And, if only
for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of
due process for the Commission to have taken into account, without the need or presentation of
evidence by the parties, a matter so publicly notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and
order in localities in the provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial notice
of, the same being capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129)
In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We cannot,
however, go along with the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected Chief Justice, that
from the fact that some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones there is
already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should have also subjected all the
returns from the other voting centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same
degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels that had the Commission
done so, it would have fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due
process, for it is relatively unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of
peace and order in those other voting centers without at list some prima facie evidence to rely
on considering that there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in
question are so close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the inescapable
conclusion that the relevant circumstances by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were
Identical to those in the former.
Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of merit.
THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION
Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and the sight
do not require any extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the elections in the voting
centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or earlier, to which
the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note that apparently petitioners are not seriously
pressing on it anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any reference thereto during
the oral argument of their counsel and the practically cavalier discussion thereof in the petition.
In any event, We are satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its
resolution now before Us that it took pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the
evidence presented by both parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to the
weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence is
contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We
are not prepared to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions
adverse to petitioners' position. If errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of

judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial
evidence.
As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is that the results in the voting
centers mentioned in this assignment of error had already been canvassed at the regional
canvass center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board of
canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only because in the
guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have been referred to is, rightly or wrongly, the
resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily include the setting aside and
repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City.
The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the corresponding
voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which have never been
brought to Manila because they, were not available The is not clear as to how many are these
voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in the Comelec resolution in question,
the number mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly challenged in the petition. Under
the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
including in the canvass the election returns from these voting centers and, somewhat
alternatively, it is alleged as fourth assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of the
ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers was arbitraly denied by respondent Comelec.
The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted the Commission in regard to
the 408 voting centers reffered to as follows :
The Commission had the option of excluding from the canvass the election
returns under category. By deciding to exclude, the Commission would be
summarily disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting centers affected
without any basis. The Commission could also order the inclusion in the canvass
of these elections returns under the injunction of the Supreme Court that
extremes caution must be exercised in rejecting returns unless these are
palpably irregular. The Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the
election returns mentioned and uphold the votes cast by the voters in those
areas. The Commission held the view that the failure of some election officials to
comply with Commission orders(to submit the records) should not parties to such
official disobedience. In the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the
Supreme Court ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified because the officers appointed under the law to direct the
election and guard the purity of the ballot have not complied with their duty. (cited
in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)
On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is stated that:
At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting centers were examined
by the Comelec and 141 of such returns were excluded, as follows:
SUMMARY

PROVINCE

TOTAL

EXCLUDED

INCLUDED

Lanao del Norte

30

30

Lanao del Sur

342

137

205

Maguindanao

21

20

North Cotabato

Sultan Kudarat

12

10

totals -----

412

141

271

(Page 301, Record.)

This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.
Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or unavailability of the CE Forms 1 and 5
corresponding to the more than 400 voting centers concerned in our present discussion the
Comelec examined the returns from said voting centers to determine their trustworthiness by
scrutinizing the purported relevant data appearing on their faces, believing that such was the
next best thing that could be done to avoid total disenfranchisement of the voters in all of them
On the Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right thing to do was to order the opening of the
ballot boxes involved.
In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's explanation in its resolution is:
... The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have directed the opening of
the ballot boxes. But the Commission did not see the necessity of going to such
length in a that was in nature and decided that there was sufficient bases for the
revolution of the appeal. That the Commission has discretion to determine when
the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in the guidelines set by the
Supreme Court which states that '. . . the ballot bones [which] shall be opened
only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent
Commission, after the need therefor has become evident ... ' (guideline No. 3;
emphasissupplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1, 1978, amended the
guidelines that the "ballot boxes for the voting centers ... need not be taken to
Manila EXCEPT those of the centers as to which the petitioners have the right to
demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened ... provided that the
voting centers concerned shall be specified and made known by petitioners to
the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3,1978 ... ' (Emphasis
supplied). The KB, candidates did not take advantage of the option granted them
under these guidelines.( Pp 106-107, Record.)
Considering that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities to Identify on its own the
voting centers without CE Forms I and 5, thereby precluding the need for the petitioners having
to specify them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the ballot boxes in question
should have appeared to it to be quite apparent, it may be contended that Comelec would have
done greater service to the public interest had it proceeded to order such opening, as it had
announced it had thoughts of doing in its resolution of August 30, 1978. On the other hand, We
cannot really blame the Commission too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued
by Us left it with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion independently of
what We had ordered. What could have saved matters altogether would have been a timely
move on the part of petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our resolution.
After all come to think of it, that the possible outcome of the opening of the ballot boxes would
favor the petitioners was not a certainty the contents them could conceivably boomerang
against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been found to be regular and

preponderantly for their opponents. Having in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their
motion for only on January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of the resolution,
We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978, Comelec certainly cannot be
held to be guilty of having gravely abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the returns
from the voting centers reffered to in the second and fourth assignments of error in the canvass
or in denying petitioners' motion for the of the ballot boxes concerned.
The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related matters and maybe discussed together.
They all deal with the inclusion in or exclusion from the canvass of returns on the basis of the
percentage of voting in specified voting centers and the corresponding findings of the Comelec
on the extent of substitute voting therein as indicated by the result of either the technical
examination by experts of the signatures and thumb-prints of the voters threat.
To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not examine and study 1,694 of the
records in an the 2,775 voting centers questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be more exact,
the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four categories namely: 1,001
under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military
operations, 105 palpably manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded by the board of canvass
on other grounds. Thus, 45.45 % of the of the petitioners were sustained by the Comelec. In
contrast, in the board of canvassers, only 453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed
as to 6 of these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec over and above those excluded by
the board. In other words, the Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by the board.
Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of error that Comelec refused to
consider high percentage of voting, coupled with mass substitute voting, as proof that the
pertinent returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is already shown in the
above specifications. To add more, it can be gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065
voting centers in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City where a high percentage of voting appeared,
the returns from the 867 voting centers were excluded by the Comelec and only 198 were
included a ratio of roughly 78 % to 22 %. The following tabulation drawn from the figures in the
resolution shows how the Comelec went over those returns center by center and acted on them
individually:
90% 100% VOTING
MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR
NO. OF V/C THAT V/C WITH 90% to 100%
MUNICIPALITIES FUNCTIONED VOTING

M
a
r
a
w
i
C
i
t
y

15
1

No.
of
V/C

Ex
clu
de
d

Incl
ud
ed

112

10
7

B
a
c
o
l
o
d

28

28

27

B
a
l
a
b
a
g
a
n

53

53

49

B
a
l
i
n
d
o
n
g

22

22

15

B
a
y
a
n
g

29

20

13

B
i
n
i
d
a
y
a
n

37

33

29

G
r
a
n
d
e

B
u
a
d
i
p
o
s
o

41

10

10

B
u
b
o
n
g

24

23

21

B
u
m
b
a
r
a
n

21
(Al
l
ex
clu
de
d)

B
u
t
i
g

35

33

32

C
a
l
a
n
o
g
a
s

23

21

21

42

39

38

B
u
n
t
o
n

i
t
s
a
a
n
R
a
m
a
i
n

G
a
n
a
s
s
i

39

38

23

15

L
u
m
b
a

64

63

47

16

L
u
m
b
a
t
a
n

30

28

17

11

L
u
m
b
a
y
a

37

33

28

B
a
y
a
b
a
o

n
a
g
u
e

M
a
d
a
l
u
m

14

13

M
a
d
a
m
b
a

20

20

15

M
a
g
u
i
n
g

57

55

53

M
a
l
a
b
a
n
g

59

47

42

M
a
r
a
n
t
a
o

79

63

41

22

M
a
r
u
g
o
n
g

37

35

32

M
a
s
i
u

27

26

24

P
a
g
a
y
a
w
a
n

15

13

P
i
a
g
a
p
o

39

39

36

P
o
o
n
a
B
a
y
a
b
a
o

44

44

42

P
u
a

23

20

20

l
a
s

S
a
g
u
i
a
r
a
n

36

32

21

11

S
u
l
t
a
n

35

31

31

T
a
m
p
a
r
a
n

24

21

15

T
a
r
a
k
a

31

31

31

T
u
b
a

23

19

19

G
u
m
a
n
d
e
r

r
a
n

T
O
T
A
L
S
:
M
a
r
a
w
i
&

L
a
n
a
o

1,
21
8

1,06
5

86
7

19
8

d
e
l
S
u
r

We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, that there is
enough showing in the record that it did examine and study the returns and pertinent records
corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of petitioners' complaints below. In one part
of its resolution the Comelec states:
The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own the Books of Voters
(Comelec Form No. 1) and the Voters Rewards Comelec Form No. 5) to
determine for itself which of these elections form needed further examination by
the COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission, aware of the nature of this preproclamation controversy, believes that it can decide, using common sense and
perception, whether the election forms in controversy needed further examination
by the experts based on the presence or absence of patent signs of irregularity.
(Pp. 137-138, Record.)
In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission, the bare charge of petitioners
that the records pertaining to the 1,694 voting centers assailed by them should not create any
ripple of serious doubt. As We view this point under discussion, what is more factually accurate
is that those records complained of were not examined with the aid of experts and that Comelec
passed upon the returns concerned "using common sense and perception only." And there is
nothing basically objectionable in this. The defunct Presidential Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals examine passed upon and voided millions of votes in several national elections
without the assistance of experts and "using" only common sense and perception". No one ever

raised any eyebrows about such procedure. Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that
Comelec preliminary screened the records and whatever it could not properly pass upon by
"using common sense and perception" it left to the experts to work on. We might disagree with
he Comelec as to which voting center should be excluded or included, were We to go over the
same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse of discretion would not come out,
considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without
any rational basis, particularly if it is considered that in many respects and from the very nature
of our respective functions, becoming candor would dictate to Us to concede that the
Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances closely and
accurately. By and large, therefore, the first, third and sixth assignments of error of the
petitioners are not well taken.
The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The Identification of the ballot
boxes in defective condition, in some instances open and allegedly empty, is at best of
secondary import because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were after all
examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry into this point would be of real
value in an electoral protest.
CONCLUSION
Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of
the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later,
so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less than the
Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the
conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are strong considerations
warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional
faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and
he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask
for more time to put down at least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see
the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record
their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their
respective reactions in proper perspective.
In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the following portion of the
ratiocination of respondent Board of Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission with
approval in its resolution under question:
First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that canvassing boards
must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting returns and they may do so only
when the returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an election return is
obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the
canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most
convincing proof. Any plausible explanation one which is acceptable to a
reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation,
should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting t of those who
exercised their right of suffrage. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-35918, Jude 28,1974;
Villavon v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v. Comelec 22 SCRA
978). In the absence of strong evidence establishing the spuriousness of the
return, the basis rule of their being accorded prima facie status as bona fide
reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation
purposes must be applied, without prejudice to the question being tried on the
merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial and real in the
corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec L-33692, 33699, 33728,
43 SCRA 238, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where it has been
duly de ed after investigation and examination of the voting and registration
records hat actual voting and election by the registered voters had taken place in
the questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and
excluded with the resting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded
prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting for canvassing
and registration purposes. Where the grievances relied upon is the commission
of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the proper remedy is election
protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al. Supra). (P. 69, Record, L-49705-09).

The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the citations to be doubly sure
they were not taken out of context, considering that most, if not all of them arose from similar
situations in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We are satisfied they
do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they actually came from the pens of different
members of the Court, already retired or still with Us, distinguished by their perspicacity and
their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional and legislative intent expounded at
the outset of this opinion and evident in the modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the
Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have concerned Us herein, particularly the
elevation of the Commission as the "sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of
all electoral contests, We find the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they reveal through the
clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star by which the future should be guided in delineating
and circumscribing separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its equally
important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the purity and sanctity of elections in this
country.
In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due
course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and
Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such dismissal.
Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J. took no part.
Aquino and Abad Santos, Jr., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 96349 July 18, 1991
EUGENIO O. ORIGINAL, IRENEO N. AARON, JR., RENE LEDESMA, ROLANDO VALLE,
ORLANDO MONTANO, STEVE ABITANG, NERI JINON, WILFREDO DELEONIO, RENATO
BORRO, RODRIGO DE VERA, ALVIN BAYUANG, JESUS MELENDEZ, NUMERIANO
CAJILIG JR., RUFINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOVELINO G. TIPON, petitioners,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 96284 July 18,1991
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL, INC.
AND PETROPHIL CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
Orders dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the
second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in
effect, allegedly, a denial of due process.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents oil
companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases (docketed as
ERB Case Nos. 90-106, 90-382 and 90-384, respectively).
On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per
liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. Maceda v.
ERB, et al., G.R. No. 95203), seeking to nullify the provisional increase. We dismissed the
petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even
without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or
not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny
the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order

or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given exparte and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise,
operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to
both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the
grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements
of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an
authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final
outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from
conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority-which is of course, the
better procedure however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct
one. (pp. 129-130, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the
applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16, 1990. Petitioner
Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing on October 17, 1990.
To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the ERB set the
continuation of the hearing to October 24, 1990. This was postponed to November 5, 1990, on
written notice of petitioner Maceda.
On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or
admit amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of petroleum products.
The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended petitions on November 6, 1990 at the
same time requiring applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two
newspapers of general circulation (p. 4,Rollo and Annexes "F" and "G," pp. 60 and 62, Rollo).
Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990 with
ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits (p. 6, Rollo). ERB
subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence, as follows:
CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:
Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex presented its evidence-in-chief and
there is an understanding or it is the Board's wish that for purposes of good order
in the presentation of the evidence considering that these are being heard
together, we will defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's witness and
ask the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors
win have a better Idea of what an of these will lead to because as I mentioned
earlier, it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these
applications on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject, modify or
whatever, the Board win do it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way to have
(sic) the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are
asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then
the examination will come later, the cross-examination will come later. . . . (pp. 56, tsn., November 23, 1990, ERB Cases Nos. 90-106, 90382 and 90-384). (p.
162, Rollo)
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his
cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each
of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted
in the denial of due process.
We disagree. The Solicitor General has pointed out:
. . . The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular
witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court
and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order
prescribed by the rules is not improper (88 C.J.S. 206-207).

Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the

ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasilegislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings
(Sec. 29, Public Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346, U.S. 389, 98 L. ed.
132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
Hearings Before the ERB provides that
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy
Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any
other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader
interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from
these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of
the Order.
(pp. 163-164, Rollo)
Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial evidence on record to support the
provisional relief.
We have, in G.R. Nos. 95203-05, previously taken judicial notice of matters and events related
to the oil industry, as follows:
. . . (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2)
the exchange rate has fallen to P28.00 to $1.00; (3) the country's balance of
payments is expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at P2.855 Billion
as of the first nine months of the year.
. . . (p. 150, Rollo)
The Solicitor General likewise commented:
Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested
provisional relief were: (1) certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil
suppliers to the private respondents; (2) reports of the Bankers Association of the
Philippines on the peso-dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and (3) OPSF
status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs. The ERB was likewise guided in the
determination of international crude oil prices by traditional authoritative sources
of information on crude oil and petroleum products, such as Platt's Oilgram and
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. (p. 158,Rollo)
Thus, We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price, as We note that
the Order of December 5, 1990 explicitly stated:
in the light, therefore, of the rise in crude oil importation costs, which as earlier
mentioned, reached an average of $30.3318 per barrel at $25.551/US $ in
September-October 1990; the huge OPSF deficit which, as reported by the Office
of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Billion (based on filed claims only and
net of the P5 Billion OPSF) as of September 30, 1990, and is estimated to further
increase to over P10 Billion by end December 1990; the decision of the
government to discontinue subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary pressures;
the apparent inadequacy of the proposed additional P5.1 Billion government
appropriation for the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso in relation
to the US dollar to P28/US $, this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant
applicants oil companies further relief by increasing the prices of petroleum
products sold by them. (p. 161, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G.R. No. 96349) also claim that the
provisional increase involved amounts over and above that sought by the petitioning oil
companies.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the increase in crude oil prices, all the
applications of the respondent oil companies filed with the ERB covered claims from the OPSF.
We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990 granting a provisional price
increase on petroleum products premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims, crude cost peso
differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies are
"entitled to as much relief as the fact alleged constituting the course of action may warrant,"
(Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. L-28297, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA
261 citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Aguilar v. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470) as follows:
Per Liter
Weighted
Petron Shell Caltex Average
Crude Cost P3.11 P3.6047 P2.9248 P3.1523
Peso Cost
Diffn'l 2.1747 1.5203 1.5669 1.8123
Forex Risk
Fee -0.1089 -0,0719 -0.0790 -0.0896
Subsidy on
Sales to NPC 0.1955 0.0685 0.0590 0.1203
Total Price
Increase
Applied for P59.3713 P5.1216 P4.4717 P4.9954
Less: September 21 Price
Relief
Actual Price Increase P1.42
Actual Tax Reduction:
Ad Valorem Tax
(per Sept. 1, 1990
price build-up) P1.3333
Specific Tax (per
Oct. 5, 1990 price
build-up) .6264 .7069 2.1269

Net Price Increase

Applied for 2.8685
Nonetheless, it is relevant to point out that on December 10, 1990, the ERB, in response to the
President's appeal, brought back the increases in Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels
mandated by the December 5, 1990 Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively), as follows:
Product In Pesos Per Liter
OPSF
Premium Gasoline 6.9600
Regular Gasoline 6.3900
Avturbo 4.9950
Kerosene 1.4100
Diesel Oil 1.4100
Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.2405
LPG 1.2200
Asphalt 2.5000
Thinner 2.5000
In G.R. No. 96349, petitioner Original additionally claims that if the price increase will be used to
augment the OPSF this will constitute illegal taxation. In the Maceda case, (G.R. Nos. 9520305, supra) this Court has already ruled that "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds
generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is
authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137.
The petitions of E.O. Original et al. (G.R. No. 96349) and C.S. Povedas, Jr. (G.R. No. 96284),
insofar as they question the ERB's authority under Sec. 8 of E.O. 172, have become moot and
academic.
We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional increase in oil price. We have stated
that this "is a question best judged by the political leadership" (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, G.R. Nos.
95119-21, supra). We wish to reiterate Our previous pronouncements therein that while the
government is able to justify a provisional increase, these findings "are not final, and it is up to
petitioners to demonstrate that the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent
increase."
In this regard, We also note the Solicitor General's comments that "the ERB is not averse to the
idea of a presidential review of its decision," except that there is no law at present authorizing
the same. Perhaps, as pointed out by Justice Padilla, our lawmakers may see the wisdom of
allowing presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial
body, it is still "an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should
be appealed to the President under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies," especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives
of almost an Filipinos.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.
Davide, J., concurs in the result.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993,
she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides
that "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 grants the Commission the power, among others, to administer and
enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 Provides, among others, that The Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of
1987 provides that "The third level shall cover Positions in the Career Executive
Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate,
integrate and unify the administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.

WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the power and authority
to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil
Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications
thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service
Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board,
shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 934359 which abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to
abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain
unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from considering
appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal
issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:

ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC

I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID
ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY
APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS
SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE
A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE
PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY
BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO.
114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE
INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition. 3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:
Article IV Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of wellselected and development oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the
Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive
Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the Commissioner
of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private
sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and
methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public

Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or
convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to
and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode
of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit,
abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be
headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following
offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a
Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of the
offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on their operations, and
perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members shall have the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and
assistance; render counselling services; undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and
regulations; and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans,
programs and projects; undertake research and studies on the different aspects
of public personnel management; administer management improvement
programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with
personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records

maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension

services; and provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration
of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide
leadership and assistance in developing and implementing the overall
Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and
formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper implementation
of the Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and
assistance in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards
relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive
benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and
assistance in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force
in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff development;
administer service-wide scholarship programs; develop training literature and
materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and evaluate training
programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies,
standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and audit
personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated
authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional
Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in
the development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations
in the accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the
adjustment and settlement of employee grievances and management of
employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in
the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and
awards systems, position classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the
enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement
and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. The Commission shall have not less than
thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and such field
offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the rank
of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra.
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive

outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is
to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached
agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service
Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause
of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and
ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Guillermo H. Pulia for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 14, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz which held that herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was illegally
dismissed; and of the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which dismissed
petitioner's appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time.
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal
Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1,
1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly
salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner
company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the
same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to
the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of
living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances
and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly,
on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record,
pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a
Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground
that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid, pp. 2-22).
In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated April 30, 1986
(Ibid., p. 94), private respondent filed his Comment on May 23, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 97-101) and
public respondent on July 2, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 120-124).
On June 6, 1986, petitioners filed their Reply to private respondent's Comment (Ibid, pp. 102105) and on July 25, 1986, their Reply to public respondent's Comment (Ibid., pp. 126-131).
In a Resolution dated August 18, 1986, the Second Division of this Court resolved to give due
course to the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., P.
132).
In compliance with the above mentioned Resolution, petitioners filed the,.r memorandum on
November 10, 1986; while private respondent filed his Memorandum on October 17, 1986
(Ibid, pp. 139-144), and public respondent on November 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 160-166).

Before going however, into the merits of the case, an important point to consider is whether or
not it is still within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the
period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the
Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of
Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to
the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for
extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time (Rollo, pp. 31-32).
Petitioners claim, among other things, that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a
technicality (Rollo, p. 9). It invokes the Rules of Court provision on liberal construction of the
Rules in the interest of substantial justice.
It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision refers to the Rules of Court. On the other
hand, the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and
leave no room for interpretation.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and
policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans
Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in
this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent
promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly
efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and
attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike
but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order
No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate
the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth,
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND
E. MARCOS

Presid
ent
Republic of the
Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for
lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the
trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the
former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in
the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement
then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended
by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That
is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking
of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees,
orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no

showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner
has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we
reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more
clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate
Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against
it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow
room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go
no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the
free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then
resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and
open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or
the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It
has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and
empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of
the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so,
as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed
in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes
be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm
at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the
increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government
would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme
Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent
the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic
had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore,
because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling
had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding
of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police
power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these

animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would
still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional
cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous
hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held inPesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order
in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being
a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his
own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of
Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question
the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the
challenged measure would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him
for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in
Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the
free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert
them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST
DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION) and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated June 15,
2000 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, [1] giving notice to the parties of
the promulgation of the resolution on the case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the
afternoon and to prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from promulgating the so
called Guianiponencia.[2]
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the
position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections. [3] On May 16, 1998, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor,
Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election
returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest
number of votes, filed with the Comelec, an election protest [4] challenging the results in a total of
201 precincts.[5] The case was assigned to the First Division (formerly Second), Commission on
Elections.[6]
On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a
proposed resolution in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito
dissented. Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote but said
that she would wish to see both positions, if any, to make her (my) final decision.[7]
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service. On
March 3, 2000, the President of the Philippines appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the
seat vacated by Commissioner Guiani. Commissioner Javier assumed office on April 4, 2000.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received a
purported resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani and
Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting. The result was in favor of respondent
Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes. [8] On February 28, 2000, the
Comelec, First Division, declared that the thirteen-page resolution is a useless scrap of paper
which should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no promulgation of the
Resolution in the instant case. [9]
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the promulgation of
the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon.
[10]
However, on April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to cancel promulgation challenging
the validity of the purported Guiani resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion,
on the same date, postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved.[11]
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely, Commissioners Luzviminda
G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier, sent a joint memorandum to Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito, presiding Commissioner, stating:

Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to the Commission En Banc that
this case be submitted for a reconsultation by the members of the First Division, it is our position that we
promulgate as soon as possible the Guiani Resolution of the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs.
Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G. R. No. 73777) and other doctrinal cases on the
issue. After all, this Commission stood pat on its policy that what is controlling is the date
the ponente signed the questioned Resolution as what we did in promulgating the case of Dumayas vs.
Bernal (SPC 98-137).
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the subject resolution
and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en
banc or through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court. [12]
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order
setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. [13]
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, petitioner
interposed the instant petition.[14]
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the promulgation of
the resolution of the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon, and
prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and
directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate the
resolution reached in the case after such deliberation.[15]
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Comelec
from implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the promulgation of the resolution set on June
20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon. At the same time, the Court directed the respondents to
comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. [16]
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment. [17] Respondent Ramirez admitted
that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his retirement on
February 15, 2000.[18] He submitted that Comelec, First Division, its membership still constituting
a majority, must elevate the protest case to the Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.[19]
In his comment filed on August 29, 2000, the Solicitor General interposed no objection to
the petition.[20]
At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of
the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is
prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.[21] [emphasis supplied]
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. [22] This decision must be a final
decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,[23] not of a division,[24] certainly not an interlocutory
order of a division.[25] The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. [26]

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[27]

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law.[28] Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.[29]
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory.[30] Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a division may
be raised to the en banc via a motion for reconsideration.[31]
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar.
It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division. [33] Admittedly,
petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the divisions resolution or final decision.[34] In fact,
there was really no resolution or decision to speak of [35] because there was yet no promulgation,
which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Petitioner went
directly to the Supreme Court from an order of promulgation of the Resolution of this case by
the First Division of the Comelec.[36]
[32]

Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction
of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the
case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having
been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in
certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. [37] In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration
ismandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.[38]
We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections, [39] that in a situation such as
this where the Commission on Elections in division committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is
not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its
present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. This is the case relied upon by the dissenting justice to support the proposition that
resort to the Supreme Court from a resolution of a Comelec Division is allowed. [40]Unfortunately,
the Kho case has no application to the case at bar. The issue therein is, may the Commission
on Elections in division admit an answer with counter-protest after the period to file the
same has expired?[41] The Comelec First Division admitted the answer with counter-protest of
the respondent. The Supreme Court declared such order void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [42] However, an important moiety in the
Kho case was not mentioned in the dissent. It is that the Comelec, First Division, denied the
prayer of petitioner for the elevation of the case to en banc because the orders of admission

were mere interlocutory orders.[43] Hence, the aggrieved party had no choice but to seek
recourse in the Supreme Court. Such important fact is not present in the case at bar.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15, 2000, which
is a mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29. We quote the
order in question in full, to wit:
Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the Joint
Memorandum of Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier to the Presiding
Commissioner of the First Division dated 14 June 2000 paragraph 5 of which states:
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the subject resolution
and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en
banc or through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court.
the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday, June 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros, Manila.
No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be entertained.
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their Attorneys, notice of this Order
through telegram and by registered mail or personal delivery.
SO ORDERED.