Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECEMBER
MANFRED DRACK
WiLFRIED APFALTEK
DAVID P O U V R E A U
KEYWORDS
ABSTRACT
In this ariide, me revitw how lino enmient Viennese system Ikinkeix Paul A Wens and Ludxidg
von Berfnlanffji, begun to develop their own perspectives Coward ii system, tfirary of life in the 1920s.
Their luoi-k is especially rooted in pxperimental biology as performed at the Biologische Versuchsamtatt,
as tvell as in philosophy, and they converge in basic imicepts. H> underline the concefHual connections
of their thinking, among them the organism as an organized system, hietarchical organization, and
primary activity. With their system thinking, both biologists shared a .strong desire to nverrome what
they vieu>ed as a "mnhanistir" approach in biology. Their interpretations are relevant tot.heren.aissance
of system thinking in biology"systems biology." Unless otherwise noted, all transUuions are our oum.
2007
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VoLUMi: 82
ogy." The early writings of Weiss and BertaN TERMS OF publications, "systems biol- lanffy- can be fruitful for modern research;
ogy" is currently an exploding field (ste, they already developed many concepts that
e.g.. Chung and Ray 2002; Grant 2003). Note, can shed light on certain contemporary dehowever, that sy.steni thinking is not at all new bates and perhaps only need to be adapted lo
in biology. In the .sciences of life, it can be current intentions.
The puipose of this article is therefore twotraced back at least to the German "teleo-mechanicist" tradition inatigurated by Imman- fold. We first provide a historical overview of
uel Kant's Critics ofjndgernmt, of which Johan- the works of these system thinkers, and then
nes Muller and Karl von Baer were the main refiect the early system conceptions on recent
proponents (Kant 1789: Lenoir 1982), More developments in biology.
generally, integrative (or "holistic") thinking
CONTEXT OF EARLY "VIENNESE"
is not a "discovery" of the 20th century. It has
SYSTEM THKORY
a rather long history going back to ancient
Greek thinkers: Aristotle already claimed that
The fin de siecle and the following years
"tlie whole is of necessity prior to the pan" were characterized by innovations in many
(Aristotle 1966:I253a20). Between the I4th fields, among them science, arts, and poliand 16th centuries, it was a major intellectual tics. In particular, the developments in phystrend, which strongly reemerged at the turn ics and psychology, together with problems
of the 19th ceniury in German Romanticism in biology; provided an impetus that led to a
and post-Kantian idealism. Among others, sophisticated system conception of organNicholas of Gusa, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, isms.
and Johann WoIIgang von Goethe are considAu important revolution took place in
ered "precursors" of modern systems think- physics, which many scholars from other dising (Bapp 1921: Bertalanffy 1926a; Harring- ciplines liked to cite. A statement by Max
ton 1996). One of the leading figures, who Planck, inspired by the new qtiantum merecurrently referred to those thinkers, is the clianics and referring to the false dictum that
philosopher and theoretical biologist Ludwig all physical processes caji be displayed as a
von Bertalanfiy (1901-1972), mostly known stringing together [Aneinanderidhungl of lofor his project on a "general system theory" cal processes, summarizes the relevance for
(GST). Unsurprisingly, he is still regularly system conceptions: "The physical world is
quotediUtliough mostly laconicallyby ad- not simply a sum of spatial and temporal sinvocates of "systems biology" in the early 21st gle worlds running one be.sides die others,
century (e.g., Chong and Ray 2002).
and tnany phenomena escape [entzi^'hni .sirli]
Pursuing the historical roots of biological the understanding when one does not consystems tlieory inevitably leads to eaily 20th sider a physical object [Gebilde] as a whole"
century Vienna. Ludwig von Bertaianffy lived (Planck 1929:17).
there and was infltienced by biologists Hans
At about tbe same time, a conceptual shift
Leo Przibram (1874-1944), the founder of a occurred in another field, namely psychology,
laboratory for experimental biology, and his which was also extended to the realm of physstudent Paul Alfred Weiss (1898-1989), both ics. Based on the conceptions of tbe Austrian
of whom were also ba.sed in Vienna. We will philosopher Christian von Ebrenfels, (iestnlt
more closely examine the convergences of theory was developed (Ash 1995); it emphathe experimental and theoretical works of sized the claim that an entity's total characWeisswho allegedly claimed that "he was re- teristics cannot be discovered by simply sumsponsible for Bertalanlfy s initial appreciation ming up iis partial characteristics. Wolfgang
of the systems nature of development and Kohlei, one of tbis tbcdry's leading figures,
behavior" (Haiaway 1976:38)and Berta- derived concepts based on physical systems
lanfly's "system theory" of life; we extract ba- as known from thermodynamics and elecsic concepts that were already developed long trostatics. He considered Khrenfels's two cribefore the recent empbasis on "systems biol- teria ("oversummativity," i.e., the whole is
INTRODUCTION
DECEMBER
2007
more than the sum of the parts; and "transposition," e.g., a melody can be played in a
different pitch, but stays the same) as constitutive for Gestalt (Kohler 1920). Similarly,
Bertalanfly (1928:69-70) characterized a
(iesUilt as compri.sing properties that cannot
be found by simple addition of the compotienLs' properties and that furthermore disappear when the Gestalt is destroyed; he used
the term "Gestalt" synonymotisly to "systemic
state" [Systemzustank] (Bertalanfiy 1929c:89).
BertalaiiHy ^vitnessed a controversy among
biologi.sis at the turn of the century between
"mechanicisin" and "\itHlism" (for contempo
rary analysis of this controversy see, in particular, Haldane 1884; Loeb 1906; Schaxel 1919;
Needham 1928; Woodger 1929; Bertalanfiy
1932; M Haitinann 1925; and M Hattmann
1937; for a recent discussion see Pouvreau
2005b). "Vitalism" can have two meanings, a
metaphysical or a methodological one. Metaphysically, it a.s,serts that biological phenomena
cannot be explained withotit tlie action of a
nonspatial principle harmonizing tlie matter
and energies involved in living phenomena.
Metliodologically. it is not antinatui alistic and
only as.serLs that, at least provisionally, biology
should have its own categories, methods, and
laws. As for the term "mechanicism," it was
sometimes loosely referred at that time to
the opposed view that should be termed
"physicalism" in order to avoid confusion;
that is, the idea that the sole concepts, methods, and laws of physics and chemistry enable biological phenomena to be grasped.
But this was not the only meaning. More generally and precisely, "mechanicism" seems
(and seemed) to refer to a complex group of
more or less coherently related positions. The
more fundamental position is the "analyticosummative" approach to biological phenomena: its basis is tlie (methodological or metaphy.sical) postulate that any entity can be
analyzed in parts whose properties can be
studied ill isolation from others without inconvenience (tbe relationships among the
parts being "external," not "constitutive").
Throtigh decomposition into "independent"
causal chains and their "linear" composition,
the properties of the whole are then supposed to be derivable from the knowledge
thus acquired. "Mechanicism" would then be
351
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OF BIOLOGY
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353
The "Prater Vivarium" is depicted in the left foreground as seen from the Riesenrad. Vienna's giant ferris
wheel. Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek/Wien L 39.274<:,
alter graduating from tlie LIniversity of Vienna in 1899, Przibram went to Strasbotirg
in order to study at the laboratory of physiological chemist Franz Hofmeisier (Reiter
1999:591), which was very avant-garde at that
time. In 1904, he received a Halnlitation "for
zoology with special consideration of experimental morphologv" at the University of Vienna. He started his nniliivolume work Experimenlal-Zoologie (Przibram 1907) with the
first volume on embryogenesis. researching
issues that were later also addressed by Bertalanffy (e.g., 1937:91-99; 1942:289-291),
THE VISIONARY OF THE BIOLOGISCHE
such as growth rates and allometric growth.
VERSUCHSANSTALT
Although Hatschek followed the scientific
One of the founders of the "Prater Vivarstyle of Haeckel, Przibram was influenced by
ium." Hans Leo Przibram, studied zoology in
Locb (Reiter 1999) and strove to put into
Vienna under ilie guidance of Berthold Hatpractice Rotix's programintegrating analytschek, a well-known comparative morpholoical approaches from mechanical anatomy
gist with a special focus on vertebrate baupldne
and evolutionary niorpholog\' (Nyhart 1995).
(body plans) and himself a student of
The goal was to find the specific "forces" that
Hacckel and Rudolf Leuckart. After studies in
act upon the development of organi.sms.
Leuckarts laboratory (with ils highly attracLoeb and Roux (also a student of Haeckel)
tive microscopic equipment) in Leipzig, and
1920 to 1934, 39 of the 109 scietitisLs (practicum sttidents or research personnel) of the
Biologische Verstichsanstalt were women
(Reiueui 2004:368). One example is Alma
Malilcr, who worked as an assistant in Paul
KatTimerer's laboratory (Everdell 1997:325).
Due lo a .series of public, high-level lectures
"big show-lectures" (Kammerer to Hugo Iltis
on July 6, 1910, cited in GHboff 2006:530)
the "Prater Vivarium" was quite popular in Vienna (Hofer2002).
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51U.429-B.
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portions) should be described, also in relation organisms are not mere playthings of envito physical measures such as surface tension. ronmental forces.
The investigation should reveal "constants"
that explain similar forms in various species
PAUL WEISS'S SYSTEM CONCEPTIONS
(Przibram 1923:23-25). Przibram also di^
In 1918, Weiss took up mechanical engicusses Fredeiic Houssay's project of a "morphologie dynamique" (Przibram 1923:9-11); neering, physics, and mathematics at Vithe fundamental idea here is to tmite mor- enna's Technische Hochschule, now called
phology and physiology, an improvement Vienna University of Technology. After one
compai ed to D'Arcy W Thompson's approach year of training in engineering, he decided to
of mathematical morphology. Thompson's study biology at the University of Vienna (for
theory, or ratlier inductive method, which has Weiss's background and professional career,
little predictive valite, is likewise criticized see Brauckmann 2003). By 1920, he had alby Przibram (1923:13-14) and Bertalanffy ready managed to receive one of the highly
(1937). Przibram's oudook toward a "matli- coveted permanent positions at tbe "Vivarematical morphology" is very similar to the ium" laboratories, where he later conducted
notion on which Bertalanffy (1932:105) later work for his doctoral thesis (Weiss 1922;
builds his concept of "higher order statistics" Hofcr 2000:149). After Paul Kammerer re(i.e., describing the average behavior of tired and left Vienna, Weiss, as his immediate
higher units of cells or organisms, regardless successor, was appointed Adjunkt in early
of physicochemical single events). This is 1924. But he left tlie "Vivarium" in 1927 when
similarly already expressed by Przibram. His he applied for dispense of his working duties
example is the first formulation regarding (letter of March 25, 1928 and ptotocol no. 44
the course of organic global growth (precisely of January 31, 1929, Vivarium papers. K2) in
the field where Bertaiantly' later brings bis Vienna in order to conduct research in Monmain contribution to mathematical biology, aco, Paris, and Berlin. He definitively resigned
see Pouvreau 2005b; Pouvreau and Drack from his salaried Adjunkl position in 1929. In
2007): "It is, however, not always necessary to 1931, he was appointed Sterling Fellow at Yale
know tlie contribution or the nature of the Universit)'. He went to the University of Chiinvolved components of morphogenesis cago in 1933 and became an American citizen
[Formbildung] to arrive at mathematically for- in 1939 (Haraway 1976; Brauckmann 2003).
mulated and theoretically usable laws" (PrziTbe "Prater Vivarium" became especially
bram 1923:25). With regard to the statistical
view on nature since Ludw'ig Boltzmann, Przi- important for Weiss and his later system
bram is influenced by his contemporary, thinking; so much so tbat at the Alpbach symphysicist Franz Exner (Coen 2006). Przibram positmi iti 1968, Bertalanffy, when discussing
envisions and already initiates "a mathemati- Weiss's talk, stated that, to bis knowledge,
cal theory of the organic on the basis of quan- Weiss was the first to introduce (he term "systitative inquiry, of tying tip witb geometry, tem" in biology in 1924 (Koestler and Smypbysics, cbemistry, and of sharp definitions of thies 1969). As a matter of fact, Bertalanffy
biological terms." He expects this "mathe- (e.g., 1932:87) knew very well that the philosmatical biology" to serve "as a safeguard of opher Nicolai Hartmann (1912). with whom
humankind against the forces of natttre and he was very much in line, had already held
namely as a bulwark against prejudice, super- "system" as the fundamental category of bistition and untenable speculation" (Przibram ology as well as of otber fields (Pouvreau
2005a). The concept of tbe "harmonic equi1923:64).
potential" system as applied to the biological
Furthermore, Przibram also opposes the organism was already the core of Driesch's
idea of a mere passive organism. When talk- thinking since the end of the 19th century
ing about "'self-construction' [Selbst^stalt- (Driesch 1899). But even Driesch was not the
ung] of organisms" (Przibram 1923:21), he first one to refer to the organism as a system;
empha.si/es the pivotal agency (i.e.. inherent as mentioned above. Hering did so before
activity) of living beings. In tbis view, living bim.
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final position (Weiss 1922:S; 1925:223). When bors the concept of inseparable systems with
discussing the sj'mmetrical position in rela- an argument derived from the dynamic protion to two light sotirces, Weiss claimed that, cesses involved:
after disturbance, an equilibrium state is
If in the developmental process [Gestaltagain found by the animals. "It is always a reungsprozess] each part would simply be
action of the affected system from within itself,
connected
to its neigbboring parts withwhich after each disturbance causes the reout
taking
a specific subordination
turn lo a state of uniqtie definileness" (Weiss
within
the
whole
system, theti the small1922:20, our emphasis).
est de\iation of a partial process at the
beginning would at the end lead to masNEW APPROACHES
sive discrepancies. This contradicts the
IN DF.VEt.OPMENTAt. BIOLOGY
observation (Weiss 1926;7),
With his early work in developmental biolWeiss's criticism of misleading terms reogy, Weiss focused on regeneration and transplantation in vertebrates. Those studies flects his opposition to the concepts on which
proved certain prevailing concepts and dis- tliey are based. Terms like "eqtiipotent" or
cussions to be inaccurate (e.g., the debate on "omnipotent" seem improper to him because
preformism versus epigenesis). Weiss also the "material parts" of the early germ have no
tried to overcome the debate on mosaic ver- ability or potential to build up the whole in
sus regulative development, which was also in- an organizational perspective. Rather, the
fltienced by Hans Spemann's "organizer ef- parts should be called "nulUpotent" because
fect." He argtied that one cannot distinguish the specificity of their development is deterbetween them based on a .strict timeline (stich mined by their position, and differentiation
as the eight cell stage); rather, every devel- is dominated by the factors prevailing at a ceroping orgatiism at some time incltides cells tain position (Weiss 1926:10-11. V^). ln this
that are determined and cannot develop in context, he derived a field theory for develother ways, Weiss's studies in developmental opmental biology comprising five aspects
biology also tise the system concept. He (Weiss 1926; Weiss 1928;1570; listed as "field
clearly states that ontogenesis cannot be un- laws" in Bettalanffy- 1932:328):
derstood by examining single isolated aspects
1. Every field has axial structure, which
only. Again, be refers to (kstalt tlieory and
leads to hetero-polarity [Heteropolaritdl]
uses it to describe the occtirrences found in
in at least one axis.
the organism (Weiss 1926).
2. When material is separated from a fieldThe developmental biologist Weiss notes
bearing system, tlie field is contained in
that, in the organism, spatial heterogeneity is
the remainder in its typical structure.
accompanied by substantial heterogeneity;
3. Wlien unorganized but organizable mathus, spatial form must not he viewed as sepaterial meets a field area, then it is inrated from the variations in the involved macluded,
terials or sub.stances. With the morphological
4. The field components are different acstructure, certain functions are determined
cording to their directions. When two
and everything that appears as distinct differfields are brought together they can add
entiation was, in a former phase, a latent abilup or result in a mixed field depending
ity. Biological form is defined as "tlie typical
on their orientation.
localization, i.e,, arrangement and allocation
5. A field has the tendency to take up and
of different sub-processes within the respecincorporate eqtiivalent fields from its
tive material systems." Accordingly, already
surrotmdings.
the fact "tliat at this location tliese and only
these and at that location those and only
those processes are inttoduced is for us
'form'; not only that those different processes
actually create a certain spatial Gestalt" (Weiss
1926:5). Developmental biology again har-
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a singled-out fraction of nature can rightfully be accorded the designation of "system" (Weiss 1977:18).
Weiss concludes that his results "proved totally incompatible with the mechanistic doctrinesor rather, rationalizationsof animal
behavior prevailing at that time" (Weiss
1977:17). With such doctrines, he refers especially to Loeb's tropism theory, by which
the behavior of an animal is reduced to a
mere physicochemical reaction triggered by
factors exclusively coming from outside the
organism, and where the mechanisms thai
govern orientation towaid light and gravity
are tlie same in plants and animals. Weiss
(1925:171, 177-178) rejects this "fatal mistake," which consists of identifying similar
phenomena [Erscheinungsformev.] as the result
of similar mechanisms. According to Weiss,
the reduction of biological problems to mere
physical and chemical aspects fails to touch
the core of the problem of life.
Besides animal behavior, a field in which he
performed only a few studies. Weiss is also
similarly critical of developmental research,
where his main interest lies, and to which
Loeb also made conuibutlons (Weiss 1922).
A CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS
Dt-XEMBER 2007
ical reaction, a single mtiscle fiber contraction, a con ti action ofthe muscle, a movement
of the organ, or a move by the whole organism), new features appear that cannot be explained simply by constituents of lower levels
alone, By splitting the whole into lower-level
elements through quaniitative analysis, the
fealiires of the whole may become lost even
methodologically. This would also be true for
inorganic entities such as molecules or atoms.
Although a quantitative approach should be
applied, it can never lead to a complete account of a complex entity, because when such
an entity is fragmented, some characteristics
are lost. "Higher complexes" can be viewed as
units for which certain laws can be found
without reducing them to their components
(Weiss 1925:173-174).
Another possible term in a conceptual apparatus is the "system." In his chapter on "laws
of systems," Wei.ss proposes an early system
definition: "As a .system we want to define
each complex tliat, when parts of it are modified, displays an effort to stay constant with
regard to its outside" (Weiss 1925:181, 183),
In other words, the state of a system should
be stable within and distinct from tlie outside
conditions. Therefore, Weiss defines a system
by its behavioral feature of reaction. This notion wa.s not new and can be found in Hering, as mentioned previously; in Gustav
Fechners's "principle of tendency towards
stability," according to which every natural
system, closed or open to external influences, tends toward relative stationary states
(Heidelberger 2004); and in Henri Le Chatelier's principle for chemical reactions,
where the change in one of tlie parameters
leads the others to modify' in a direction that
compensates this change and enables the system to return to an equilibrium siate. As
Weiss interprets it, a constiint system state in
the whole, when parts are altered, could only
be achieved by inverse changes in its parts,
which is done by the system itself (system reaction). He continues:
The appearances of regulation and adaptation are typical system reactions of
the organism. They are so widespread
that their mere existence suffices to
make the organism recognizable as a system (Weiss 1925:185).
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that Weiss (1926:43) provides. The fundamental distinction between "rules" and "laws"
bad already been emphasized by Roux and
Prizbram in biology, but also by physicists
such as Walter Nernst (Przibram 1923; Nernst
1922); and it was a recurrent theme in subsequent reflections on theoretical biology,
particularly by Max Hartmann (1925) and
Bertalanfiy (1928). It is another expression of
the Kantian distinction between "natural science" as "a whole of knowledge ordered by
principles" a priori, of which "the certiiinty is
apodictic," and "natural history" as a "description of nature," of which the certainty is only
empirical, and that is knowledge only in an
inappropriate sense (Kant 1786).
We agree with Khittel when he states tliat
Weiss's epistemological background is rather
.simple, and that he uncritically combines dieory and experiment (Khittel 2000:160). Weiss
is satisfied with posing questions to nature
that are answered by the experiment and
does not go deeper into cpistemology.
The experimental biologist Weiss never developed a "system theory." Rather, from the
insight he obtained by his experiments and
observations, he described what such a theory
must comprise and where the problems lie
with the "analytico-stimmative" approach, as
well as its abstraction and shortcomings. This
sheds light, on Weiss's statement that he only
had "marginal ccmtacts with the field [of
general systems theory]" in his later life
(Weiss 1977:18). Weiss was only minimally
concerned wiih systems beyond tbe single
organism, btit he does consider them occasionallyfor example, at the Alpbach symposium (Koesder and Smyihies 1969); he also
refers to communities and societies when
talking about systems (Weiss 1970b:9).Oneof
his last descriptions of systems broadens the
scope even more: "a system is an evipimnl enlily which in our experience hm sufficiently durable
identity to be defined on a maaoscak as a whob>,
although from our knou'U'dge of the parts alone into
which we can physically or mentally fractionate tfie
entity on the miaoscale, xve could nei'er retrieve the
rule of order discernible in the intact macrosystem"
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BERTALANFFY'S
ORGANISMK: CONCEPTS
Osierreichische Nalionalbiblioihek/Wien NB
553.771-B.
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Bertalanffy after 1945. As for the period before 1945, no letters to or from Bertalanffy
are conserved in this estate, because his home
was burned at the end of World War II.
EARLY WORKS OF BERTALANFFY
In the course of his studies, Bertalanffy focused on philosophy, having Robert Reiningerthe leader of neo-Kantianism in Austria
and president of the Viennese Philosophical
Society (1922-1938)and Moritz Schlick
among his teachers. Bertalanfly recognized
his student days in Vienna as a time of high
intellectual intensity, triggering many developments that later became important for him
(BertalanfTy 1967). Concerning the positivist
ideas of the "Vienna Circle" around Schlick,
Bertalanffy logically regards empiricistn as an
erroneotis doctrine. He holds that empirical
data have to be ordered by laws, because "one
cannot base and develop any science solely
on experience and induction" (BertalanfEy
1927a:660). Referring to Kant (1787:A51/
B75), he liked to say that, though theory widiout experience is mere intellectual play, experience without theory is blind (Bertalanffy
2003:101). Furthermore, when Bertalanffy
outlines the difference between science and
metaphysics, mythical thinking, and mysticism, he argues that a dialogue between them
is neces.sary. For example, he writes: T h e
most noble task of science is that mysticism
does not bring us back to the night of ignorance and faith, but that it becomes itself a
means for the deepest understanding of nature" (Bertalanffy 1927b:264). Convergences
with positirism can nonetheless also be
found: especially a taste for logical analysis of
concepts, the rejection of substantialism (see
Mach 1906 and 1933), and the will to save the
dignity of science in tbe face of the rise of
irrationalisma characteristic trend in the
interwar German and Atistrian contexL
Bertalanffy's doctoral thesis (Bertalanffy
1926a) was concerned with intrigtiing questions: Can tmits of higher order (integrating,
from Fechner's point of view, the living organism) be methodically investigated in an
abstract manner? Can they be made empirically plausible? To what degree can an inductive metaphysics he based on a generalized
363
integration
[hUegralionsstuJeri]" (Bertar
364
cal Biology) dedicated to implementing thetiretical biology. It is not by chance that works
of Przibram (1923), Weiss (1926), and Bertalanffy (1928) were published in that series.
In the same year, he published an essay on
the basics of theorization [TheoneiUnldung] in
biology (Schaxel 1919). He also popularized
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The role of the experiment is overestimated by empiricists and, from a logical point
of view, notjtistified. The law does not belong
to the empirical realm. Furthermore, it cannot be induced because, in such a procedure,
the "disturbances" in reality have to be known
before the law is derived from empirical data,
which is logically impossible (Bertalantfy
1928:93). Laws therefore have to be derived
"hypothetico-deductively," with experiments
being an incentive and instance of proof
(Bertalanffy 1932:27-28). A final mistake of
empiricists is the illusion that a "hypothesis
free" science could possibly exist. All the activities of science contain a certain theoretical
momentum. Scientists who are unaware of
that instance might easily become victims of
metaphysical or ideological bias.
366
TI-IE QUARTERiy
ism." His "organismic program" aims at determining the corresponding laws that are
complementary (in Niels Bohr's sense) to the
analytico-summative approach. Ftirthermore,
tlie concept of teleology is rehabilitated: not
in a \italistic way (in the metaphysical sense),
but as a logical form of the maintenance of
the whole. The basic assumption that the
world is stratified (N Hartmann 1912) is used
in order to connect causality and finality in
connection with the concept of dynamic equilibrium: "Wliat in the whole denotes a causal
equilibrium process, appears for tlie part as a
teleological event" (Bertalanfiy 1929b:390;
1929c:102). His "de-anthropoinorphization"
of teleologyit might be less confusing to
employ the word "teleonomy" instead, which
was introduced by Pittendrigh (1958)and
use of a .systemic category is in line with other
authors such as Ungerer, Schaxel, Weiss, and
Nicolai Hartmann.
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VOLUME 82
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2007
CONmCTTON
367
368
Note that Bertalanffy's concerns went beyond the convergences with Weiss's concepts.
The program of his "organismic biology"
comprises fotir dimensions. It is (1) a scientific program for opening the way toward constructing exact theories of biological systems
of different levels. It also is (2) a natural philosophy of the biological world, where the two
principles mentioned above "probably have
in the organic realm a similar basic importance as the physical fundamental laws for inorganic nature" (Bertalanfly 1932:282). Essendal for this philosophy is the stratified
character of reality and the autonomy of its
levels, where fundamental system laws can be
found at each levela scheme already discussed in his doctoral thesis (Bertalanffy
1926a). Furthermore, the dimension of (3) a
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370
prevail in "systems biology." Here, the concepts of Weiss and Bertalanfly- might help
avoid the risk of "mechanicism." As shown,
some of these concepts have iUready been incorporated or encouraged to be integrated in
"systems biology." Primary actixit); however, is
not an issue in "systems biolog\" today, but
wa.s acknowledged as important by Weiss and
Bertalanffy.
Although skeptical about earlier system attempts in biolog), O'Malley and Dupre
(2005) emphasize that further philosophical
efforts have to be made within "systems biology." This is what they call "systems-theoretic
biolog)." as opposed to "pragmatic systems biology," which is concerned with interactions
of molecules on a large scale.
As we have demonstrated, Bertalanffy already contributed much to epistemological
issues in his early German ptiblications on organismic biology that approached tbe organism as a system. The data-driven approach
found in modern "systems biology" is often
seen as a necessary first step. Theory from
(not only) Bertalanffy's point of view, however, clearly plays an important role especially
at the start ofa new scientific endeavor: theo-
VOLUME 82
retical work mtist be combined with experimental efforts at every stage. This is precisely
what he intended with bis theoretical biology
based on an organismic approach.
As Kirschner (2005) remarks, "systems biology" is not a branch of physics. In the view
of Weiss and Bertalanffy, it was self-evident
that biology is an autonomous discipline and
has to work with its own conceptual apparatus. This prompted them to develop a system
theory of life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by Ausuian Science Fund
(FWT) Gram PI8I49-C04 f<> Rupen Ricdl (192r>20(J5). who unroruulately piLS.-d away shoriiy alicr the
research project was initiated. Riedl was one of Bertalanffy's students in 1940s posi-war Vienna and later
on actively emphasized the iniporuiite ol "Sy.stenitltfnrie" fsyslem ihcoryj and "lAngsschnitttheoiien" (longittidiiial-section theories)iioi only in biologi,', but also
in other sciences and in luinianities as well (e.g.. Riedl
1978. 2000). His emphiisis on the iniportunte of eslabliNhing a theoretical biolo|?v' was also influenced by
BertaianfTy. Later on, Woiss. a fathcdv friend a.s Riedl
liked lo say, also exerted an inlltience on him. We furthermore wish to thank Ludwig Huber and (lerd B
Mnller tor iheir support.
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