PEOPLE OF THE PHILS, represented by Provincial Prosecutor

FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR

CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR
HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD
ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
1. S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before RTC
of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207
Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, Search Warrant against Mr. Hussain was
issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings,
papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, tshirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to
$3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which
were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was
however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on
respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of
dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search
warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm
pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for
explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers
and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There
was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged; ** and on the same date, submitted
their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to
Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15, 1996;

5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading

(consolidated comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1
which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building
as it is correspondingly called only Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and
4;
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety
Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its
own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the
Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the
order quashing the search warrant**;

9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996
above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil
action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper,
however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal
promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of
merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:[6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the
place described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by
the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not
objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30,
1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners)
were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent
to, Abigails Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually
depicted the particular place to be searched -- was effectively confuted
by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not dated,
not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the
Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **
directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the
Order ** dated December 15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address given
in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995
requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader. The
untenability of the claim is made more patent by the Peoples admission,
during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,

that said sketch was in truth not attached to the application for search
warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for reconsideration.[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.:[8]
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different
from the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the
reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1
Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of
being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN
BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH
to say in TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the
Search Warrant the words KATABI, or KADIKIT or
KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their
mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE
or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member
of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the
living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the
law.[9]
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours
as required by the warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3
days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.[10]
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the

prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another
court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that
search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for
orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the
search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal
case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent
Judge, in light of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing
to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to
the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and

6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove

the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly
resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search
warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents
were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the
Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that tone of said
officers, infact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched
prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who
eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of
the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they
knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate
apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the
Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was
ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty
depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the
affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be
searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search
warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong
Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And the scope of
the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges
admonition in the warrant that the search be limited only to the premises herein
described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least
five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety
Store, and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These
are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there

are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of
one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others,
and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one of the
residential units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next to the
store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers
failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in
the warrant. Even after having received the warrant -- which directs that the
search be limited only to the premises herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store -- they
did not ask the Judge to correct said description.They seem to have simply
assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge
Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization of the
general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos,
Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case
of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the
affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which,
upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The
application in said case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly
concealed in two places: one at No. 19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the
other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two
(2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to
the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants apparently indicated
the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the
supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this
Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to
suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one
place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified

two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of
Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the
judge intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82
[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously typographical error,
the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court
file.[12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious
typographical error involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be
searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and
without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency
calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants
in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and
the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place
that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor
licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that
specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory,
in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from

them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may

properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be
left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of
Judge Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A
perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely
to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995
and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by
Judge Bacalla.[13] In Judge Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite
apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the
facts on which the search warrant was founded.

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched,[15] the
manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so
described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched;
and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant
provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the searchand-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[16]

The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established

probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While
this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the
search warrant -- which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately
searched in virtue thereof -- was not that which the police officers who applied
for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to
search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the
warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as
regards Abigails Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 -- the first of
the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in
which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
providing that:[14]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the things to be seized.,

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other
points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not
(1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment
units -- the place to be searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to
the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in
the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or
(3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which
the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to
receive evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to
present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil action
ofcertiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The
resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that
the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the
search warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the
speciousness of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were
precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times
had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office
opines that where a search warrant has been issued by the court other than the
one trying the main criminal case, the proper recourse of persons wishing to
quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and not before that in
which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.
[17]
In support, it cites the second of five (5) policy guidelines laid down by this

Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals [18] concerning possible conflicts of

jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the
criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case. Said second guideline reads:[19]
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other
they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued
by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is
afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash
the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the
issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time for the first time in
either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However,
the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of
the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are
subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is
clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly applies
to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash
a search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and
not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion
rule, provided however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in

the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the
motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in
the appopriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch
216 of the RTC at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the
other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the
warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the RTC of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion
to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not
otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No
such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been
commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress
evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3
above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have
acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals of September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the RTC dated
February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for
the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. ROSA ARUTA

Rosa Aruta was engaged in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five
hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag.
She was arrested and charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
testimonies of P/Lt. Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their
testimonies, the court a quo found the following:

Abello was tipped off by his informant (Benjie), that a certain Aling Rosa would
be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said
tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt.
Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB
building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters
BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building
at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a
male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team Aling
Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked
Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in
a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with
the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta
was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive
results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

accused-appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court
ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in
evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her
version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where
she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman
asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello
and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM
Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the
identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found
after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to
her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting
the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the RTC of Olongapo City
convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of
Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.2crlwvirtualibrry

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above
technical report, the prosecution rested its case.

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence

alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for
a warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one

of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched
must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was
applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant
for the reason that the same would be considered a general search warrant which
may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak
yet the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v.
Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the
person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable
shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other
forms of restraint.6crlwvirtualibrry

These submissions are impressed with merit.

3

In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites
for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus,
the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest.4crlwvirtualibrry

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure

of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their
application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so
basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often
violated.7crlwvirtualibrry
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;9crlwvirtualibrry

evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected
with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched.13crlwvirtualibrry
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for
probable cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized
could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable
cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or
belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.

6. Stop and Frisk;10 and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.11crlwvirtualibrry
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law
enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The
essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

In People v. Tangliben,14 acting on information supplied by informers, police

officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San
Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also
on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who
was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag
but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves.
Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally

signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise
refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their
informant regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were
confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the
Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business
address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations
and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that
Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that
Aruta was acting suspiciously.

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man

weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules
of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The
same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to
search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial

In People v. Malmstedt,15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles

coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his
person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially
since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations
also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court

held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and
facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In
present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a
search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was
not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving
vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the
other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of
the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search
accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is
admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this
involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers
erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search
warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,17 the policemen conducted a
surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug
addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man
in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what
he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to
accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area
was a haven for drug addicts.

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the
bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and
circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information,
constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures
in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable
cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been
established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement
officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain
Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would
be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant
alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant
pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked
by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him;
(5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accusedappellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received
information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be
arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the
vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information
they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was
brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized
from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received
confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their
informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on
board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of
probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of

1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The
failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas
constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accusedappellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section
5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor
of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence
against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.18crlwvirtualibrry

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin19 where, this

Court observed that:

xxx xxx xxx.

x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime

nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither

was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accusedappellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would
not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no
reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a
crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could
neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the
search and seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as
seizure of evidence in plain view under the second exception. The marijuana
was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and
the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the
arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as

a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the
instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of
the street and not while inside the vehicle.

People v. Solayao,20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.21 In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he
and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case,
there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of
the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To
reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended.
Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee
from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such.
Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.

Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what
happened after that?

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized

under exigent and emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De
Gracia.22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being
used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was
fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants
of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were
large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby
courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing
circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short,
there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same
could not be said in the instant case.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search
and seizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless
search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General
argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and
inspection citing People v. Malasugui23 where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his
person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt.
Abello, thus:

A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and

confronted her with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we
can see the bag she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.24crlwvirtualibrry

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui
case is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for
the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected
immediately thereafter equally lawful.25 On the contrary, the most essential
element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the
instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly,
the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified
and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be
used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accusedappellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be
construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the
unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,26 where
this Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs
containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively
waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonias
testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by

Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two
chairs.

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of

the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. (Citation omitted).

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate
an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the
transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of
his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the
search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
duty.(Emphasis supplied)

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.28(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a

waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:27

A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish

the right. As clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,29 where prosecution
witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search
conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to
object-

A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).
Q - When he said that, what did you do?

x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to

A - We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?
A - He said you can see it.

Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic)
that was contained in the bag.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents
and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said
it was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which
may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to
condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next
argues that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a
search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellants name was
known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in
theAminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within
which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the

things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant
so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made.30crlwvirtualibrry
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have
secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the
Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized
and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to
be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accusedappellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to
be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned
themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant.
The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has
held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible.31 (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by
actively participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have
waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the
arrest as her plea of not guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.32 The plea and active
participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform
the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not
extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes
admissible upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records
show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,33 which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an
invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by
an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified
warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop
an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or
the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it,
waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be
making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid
warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to
be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.In the case at
bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the
admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellants
objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and
seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights
under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a
search warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so.
Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree,
hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The nonexclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.34crlwvirtualibrry
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be
held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most
jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based
on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the

prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.35crlwvirtualibrry
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.36crlwvirtualibrry
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the RTC, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS, v. RUBEN MONTILLA
An informer told the police that a drug courier would be arriving in Brgy
Salitran, Dasmarinas from Baguio City. He pinpointed Montilla when he alighted
from a jeep.
Ruben Montilla, alias "Joy," was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total
weight of 28 kilos.
She was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the RTC of Dasmarias,
Cavite.

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City,
he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any
luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had
earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which
he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was
accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias,
Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even
robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin,
corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory
where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,5 although, as the trial court
observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he
was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court,
after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no
reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the
reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to
whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile
defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him
on the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28
kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the
alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is
supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon
appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that
informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted
the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant
was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II
thereof, as amended, is as follows:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
some of the various modes of commission6 being the sale, administration,
delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the
epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and
extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote
by including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the
commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such
as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in
transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the
transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he
administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The governing rule with
respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes
provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to
have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as
allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense
should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information
cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.7 In appellant's case, the
prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana
from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs,
appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence,
appellant's asseverations must fail.

The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian
informer should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was
"vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or
recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed
by the State against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far
from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the nonpresentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted
as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the
trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in
which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer
could be dispensed with by the prosecution,8 more so where what he would have
corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally
not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve
their invaluable services to the police.9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution
whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that
course.10 Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process
of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,11 but
which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the
course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention
of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19,
1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer
of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had
the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should
therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the
arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not
persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.12 Evidence secured on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for

being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1)
customs searches;13 (2) searches of moving vehicles,14 (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view;15 (4) consented searches;16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful
arrest;17 and (6) "stop and frisk" measures18 have been invariably recognized
as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at
Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning"
of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time,
this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information
relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the
subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the
informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which
particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this
asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed
and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought by
someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied
for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court
that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying
therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time
is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be
considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance
team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran
at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning"
arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and
around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the

place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he
would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising
for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a
reliable source in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although
information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague
and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect
from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it
proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of
understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to
adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter,
instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and
the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified
as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the
arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.19 On the other hand, the apprehending officer must
have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be
classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a).20 These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on
persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable
cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent
man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.21crlwvirtualibrry

Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary

measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for
effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our
statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a
higher degree or quantum,22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to
"probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived
the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings
complained of,23 or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable
inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe
that the accused person had committed the crime.24crlwvirtualibrry
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright,
at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of
Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required
in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof.25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used
in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause
to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."26 It should,
therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should
be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney
the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by
pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer
told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and
carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized
that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent
looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached
appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and
show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and
readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the
prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought
appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag
and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of

any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of
things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers
and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not
merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so
informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously
have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to
require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually
losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which
by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded
and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The
search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting
prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings
without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the
evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and
after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to
open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all
likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal
activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have
the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other
rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly.27 Thus, while it has been held
that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to
mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law,28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for,
here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening
the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly
be construed as a clear waiver of his right.29crlwvirtualibrry

4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally,

properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly
confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic
chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in
court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have
to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and
formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the
traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. The articles
were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken
to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and
which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from
appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from
appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin
and SPO1 Talingting who categorically related that when they had
ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared to
be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the
latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the
report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than
that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from
Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of
the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian
hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in
violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities,
claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was
not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point.
The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of
Republic Act No. 743830which defines certain rights of persons arrested,
detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting,
detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for
violations thereof.

Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the

lower court will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted
or confessed anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory
evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission
was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly
established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object
evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court
below.
WHEREFORE, Ruben Montilla y Gatdula = GUILTY

that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as
he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected
drug.[5]
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De
Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and

shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded

SO ORDERED.

positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS v JACK RACHO

a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with Racho
for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section
5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of
the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the

Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. [4] The

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora

agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He

to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the

also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their

appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a

van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to

Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red

Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the

and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the

police station for investigation.[9]

national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [10] convicting appellant of

confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having

Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the

alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle

penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him

of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision.[11]

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and
seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet.
Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is
in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed
innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[14]

proceeding.[17]Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring

discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of

that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to

his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless

commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in

search is inadmissible in evidence against him.

Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the

warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the

The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of

lawful arrest.

his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the
issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest,

the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having

the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.

voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have

Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede

waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect

the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the

may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the

search.[21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine

jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore

whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although

cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]

probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a

PROBABLE CAUSE = reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to

us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband

believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is

was lawful.[16]

charged.[22]

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a

Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the tipped

warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in

information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only

Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question:

the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain

whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid

that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance

warrantless arrest.

that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.[39]

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information

alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence,

addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has

the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. [24] We

Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this

find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

[26]

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based

and People v. Nuevas.[27] In previous cases decided, we required the showing

on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of

of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.

appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and
his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the

of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the

presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have

accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had

of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. [40]

committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the

arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]

tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender
a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was
committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given
by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet ofshabu would not have
been confiscated.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice

would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding
if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an
illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones lawbreaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law

and to preserve the peace and security of society, we

nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly,
the end never justifies the means.[42]
WHEREFORE,

Jack

Raquero

Racho

ACQUITTED for

insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the
immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons
for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS vs. ANITA CLAUDIO
Anita Claudio transported 1.1 kilos of MJ for the purpose of selling them from
Baguio to Olongapo.
Witnesses:
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic
Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila
testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong
Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen
marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen consisted
of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking
"MB Store" (Exh. "B").
Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married, policeman and residing at
34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that
he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present.
He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as
operative. His job then was among other things to follow up
reports in their office, recover stolen items and apprehend
suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with
the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came

from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30

o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock
in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to
Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the
Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the back.
While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the
same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag
which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The
bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag
made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the
accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his
suspicion and made him felt nervous. With the feeling that there
was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic
bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was
able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic
bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt
marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote
tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the
bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because
he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS
Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until
they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the
bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right
after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as
a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of
the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said
bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us
settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her
plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her,
boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain
vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was
searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat.
Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic

bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana

weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect
marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of
one year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the
marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from
her possession with Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco,
accused and himself Identified photographs shown to him in
open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was
likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic
container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as
the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials
on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and time,
although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be
soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when
confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City, witness
Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes,
the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at
the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l").
Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City
because as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio
City on July 15,1981 and underwent treatment of his heart
while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical
treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and
returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21,
1981, witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw
her was in Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he
took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven
plastic bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of
placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Witness Obia
became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they
reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri

bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline.

Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and
thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to
go with her in order to settle the matter to which he refused.
Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed
her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and
had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after
having taken his medicine that his apprehension was contained
and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag in
San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom
of the bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this
incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness
likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31
Canada St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a
policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the
Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As
Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day, Pat. Daniel Obia arrived at the
Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he
apprehended Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for
possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves
were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as
camote tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The
marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name
National Book Store colored black and white.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the
vegetables, he interviewed apprehending officer Obia and
reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the
sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the
Investigation room seated on a chair. After appraising her of her
constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was
willing to give her written statements to which the accused

refused. Hence, no statements were taken of her. However,

pictures were taken inside the investigation room. Exhs. "D"
and "E," series which were already previously Identified by Pat.
Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures
as that of Pat. Obia and the accused and also of himself.
Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were
turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29
Alba Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since
March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21,
Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was
already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS
Unit. On July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU and
received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected
marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he
conducted a field test on this marijuana which he received from
Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July
22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the
specimen, he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test dated July
22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the
presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance
that can be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl.
Abello Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt.
Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the
Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the
PC Crime Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40
years old, married, residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac,
Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with
Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol
Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper from
Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and

2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline
Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue.
He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory
Liner bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus.
When he heard Pat. Obia he approached him and asked him
what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was
still then inside the bus. Pat. Obia then brought the woman to
the police department who was bringing with her a buri bag.
They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle
while Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in his
motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the
Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there
when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of
the woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the
first time inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag
covered with newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the
marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of
Cpl. Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and
himself. Policeman Bagang Identified the accused in open
Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it
was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was
dried but not well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the
buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas, Witness Identified
in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the
accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat.
Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper
wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the
accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going
to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger
long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question
the place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station.

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS
IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4,
ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS
NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4,
ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME
MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec.
8, Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the
prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act
No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows
that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration,
distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was caught
transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her
guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of
the possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her
possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the
case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such
considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled
with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything
except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as
unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person

lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia
did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is
in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does
not deny having had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she
claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a complete turnabout, in
the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere
fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to
alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted
mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have
regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v.
De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the
prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant
in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City
but rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was
arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only
by the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive
testimony (People v. De La Cruz,supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED = GUILTY

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS, v. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

SYLLABUS
1. PC officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was
carrying, and that their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was
not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest
and warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the
Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained was inadmissible.
2. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations
of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as
the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification
by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a

judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
DECISION
PC officers received a tip from one of their informers that the Aminnudin was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
identified by name.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank from M/V Wilcon in Iloilo
City after the informer had pointed to him.
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical
and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
According to the prosecution, the In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing. 11 He alleged that
he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force
him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was
still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like
and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also
argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of
the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused
that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two
watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00
for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept
the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not
to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was

the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and
had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or
voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which
may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record.
But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst
the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial courts conclusion that
the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain
about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that
time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free
since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for
his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is
Aminnudins claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making
the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against
him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his
part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the
arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as
incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for
the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and
seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had
earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies
as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest,
20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter,
we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano
Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by
a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was
not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention
of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held
that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that "search warrant was not necessary."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were
caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations
of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise
time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more

flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very
own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that
he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will
be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should
never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest
because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against
those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more
so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of
every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution
covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank
of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss
of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminal
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply
not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if
the law violated is the Constitution itself.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after

fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at
will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSE: and the accusedappellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence
against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.

HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILS, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Phils for the third time as a
tourist.
---Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men (7) to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The
two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards
the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated
at the rear thereof.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there
were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the
personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense,
he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that
the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the
two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him
by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
Dangwa Station.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative
of marijuana.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his
passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his
pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it
to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came
back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to
get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his
neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity.
When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not

inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he
told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling
bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section
4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section
4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. 4chanrobles virtual law library
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5However,
where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer
or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11and attempted to flee.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs,
their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very
same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to
Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension
of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance
at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando
Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by
the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search
warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein,
and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present
his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities,
to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of
the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose
a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the

wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish)
as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity
by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

STONEHILL, ROBERT BROOKS, JOHN BROOKS and BECK vs.HON.

JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES
G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, CFI of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City
42 search warrants were issued against petitioners and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences,
and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents

and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,

balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code."chanrobles virtual law library
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court - because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to
be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law - on March
20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules
of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that,
in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was
partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized
from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants.
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in
this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the

Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal = general warrants.
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it
is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and
void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences
are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN v.
HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO

DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR

ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE
virtual 1aw library
Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co and
Seggerman for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, to make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter.
the following day, De Leon and his witness, Logronio, went to the CFI of Rizal.
They brought with them the following papers: respondent Veras aforesaid letterrequest; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before
respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search
warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note,
he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the statements of De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that
the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of
respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent
Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons application for search
warrant and respondent Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was
then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search
warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that
no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant.
The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes
of documents.
petitioners filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null
and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and
severally, damages and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru
the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court,
presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing

the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April
16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his
witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is
necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a
probable cause
= no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge
of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio).

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses
under the Tax Code.
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19,
1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were
issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for
violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code.
no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
(general)
In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score,
petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in
Stonehill.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted.
Search Warrant = null and void

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Complainant, v. HONORABLE PIO

MARCOS, District Judge, Second Judicial District, CFI of Benguet and
Baguio City, Branch I, stationed at the City of Baguio,Respondent.
Sec of Justice Vicente Abad Santos filed an admin complaint against Judge Pio
Marcos (CFI of Benguet and Baguio) because:
- Judge Marcos issued a warrant past 12 midnight, which was served 2
hours later
- that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both
illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations
- that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized
- that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his
witnesses
- that articles not mentioned were taken
- the inventory were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until
April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April
19.
JUDGE MARCOS:
- the application for the search warrant was filed by the Chief of Police
of Baguio City, Colonel Victorino S. Calano, supported by the affidavit of
Amansec, who was subjected to intensive examination and interrogation, the
other witness, Sergeant Victorino de Vera of the Philippine Constabulary, also
being thus examined and interrogated, all three of them describing with
particularity and in detail the place to be searched and the things to be
seized;
- that the applicant and his witnesses arrived at his place at about 10:30
p.m. and the warrant issued at 11:45, the promptness with which he acted being
due to the urgency of the matter;
- that there was only one specific offense therein covered, namely
robbery in band with the use of a firearm then in the possession of the alleged
leader Rogelio Roxas, who had allegedly taken by force a treasure in the form
of a golden Buddha; that after the interrogation, he was convinced that the
offense of robbery in band was committed and that the Buddha had to be seized
before dawn as it would be taken out of Baguio and smuggled out of the
country; that the delay in the delivery to the court could be explained by the
conclusion reached by him that from the angle of security and safety, the articles
seized should be kept and guarded by the CIS agents at Camp Holmes, only a
few kilometers from Baguio, under tight security and personal responsibility of

Colonel Calano; and that as to those things taken or seized not covered by the
warrant, the persons aggrieved could file a motion for their return, his duty to act
on the matter starting to commence only when it is submitted judicially.
Respondent Judge prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
Justice Gatmaitan of the Court of Appeals conducted a thorough investigation:
1- the failure to follow the legal procedure by respondent Judge when he
issued the warrant
2- the defects manifest on the face thereof as two offenses were included
and the description of the premises to be searched and the objects to be seized
being too general
3- the absence of a probable cause
4- the articles seized having included objects not mentioned in the
warrant and the delay in the delivery thereof to respondent Judge.
2 As to the second ground consisting of the warrant itself being defective
because it was issued for two offenses and the description of the premises to be
searched and the objects to be seized being too general, Justice Gatmaitan
discussed the matter thus: "Since the warrant really stated that it was issued for,
Illegal possession of firearms and Violation of Central Bank Rules and
Regulations, and the body recited that, Accused Rogelio Roxas illegally
possess[es] firearms and ammunition without license or permit to possess the
same and a golden Buddha which he is keeping and concealing at his premises at
No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City in violation of Central Bank Rules and
Regulations; Investigator must concur with complainant that this warrant
violated Sec. 3 of Rule 126 which provides that, No Search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense. Investigator must even add that the
particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not determined; as to the attack
on the description of the premises to be searched and the objects to be seized,
what Investigator understands is that the test of a good description for purposes
of sufficiency of the warrant is that it be one that would not permit seizure of the
wrong property, . . . indeed the very jurisprudence cited by Complainant . . .
where the search warrant described the objects as, books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
money lender charging a usurious rate of interest in violation of the law, this
description was held to be good enough, the Supreme Court reasoning, Taking
into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is

difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description

so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of
the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him
to identify the articles in question, which he did, . . . so that here, since certainly,
no one would be mistaken in identifying the Buddha, whose image is well
known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without
permit to possess, and all located at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as
description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have
suffered fatal defects."
3 As to the third charge that the search warrant was issued without
probable cause, Justice Gatmaitan started with the affidavit of Amansec showing
that" on or about 6:30 a.m. of March 31, 1971, I went to Baguio City and while
I passed by a house at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City I was attracted by
several persons inside the house; That I peeped from outside the house and when
the curtain was moved I saw a Buddha that was inside the house; That I observed
what was going on inside the house and I heard someone say that the golden
Buddha was actually for sale and when I observed them closer I overheard that it
was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos; That I peeped again and I actually
saw for myself again the Buddha and I heard one of the persons inside whom I
later found out to be Mr. Rogelio Roxas that it was a golden Buddha but that a
down payment was needed; That I am executing this affidavit because I actually
saw the Buddha and that I also saw a firearm and some bullets inside the
house. . . . which can easily sustain, contrary to complainants position, that
Amansecs knowledge was not hearsay at all; as to Sgt. De Vera, it will be seen
that according to his testimony, Q. Upon arrival in Baguio, did you seek the
coordination of the Police Force in Baguio? A. Not upon our arrival, but late in
the evening, sir. Q. What else did you do between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. that
same day, April 4, 1971, when you went to see Col. Calano? A. We conducted a
survey and tried to find out and I found out that the Buddha is really existing in
the house of Rogelio Roxas, at No. 47 Ledesma Street. Q. Were you able to
pinpoint where the Buddha is? A. Yes, sir. We went to the place at No. 47
Ledesma Street, Baguio City to determine that. Q. What did you find out? A.
That it was really existing . . . from which investigator concludes that Sgt. de
Veras knowledge neither was hearsay either; now complainant point[ed] out . . .
certain alleged discrepancies between the affidavit of Amansec and his
interrogation, . . . but perhaps, neither should it be overlooked that all these if
they existed at all were directed to the conscience of examining Judge, who was

the one called upon to grade their credibility, to act with precision; the point is
that while at the beginning the knowledge of witnesses had come thru their
information from their undercover men, the fact also was that they were able to
confirm the same with their own eyes, the existence of the suspected articles
within the premises, and that was what they certified under interrogation,
from respondent, as declared no less by complainants own witness, the Clerk
of Court, Fernando R. Romero who was present thereat." 4 As to the fourth
accusation of gross inefficiency, based on the delay in the return as well as the
delivery of the objects seized, Justice Gatmaitan did concur "with complainant
that the return was quite delayed; for in the words of Sec. 11, Rule 126, the
searching officer should forthwith deliver the seized articles, yet, while search
had been made on the night of 5 April, or better stated, early morning of 6 April,
1971, the return was made only on 13 April, 1971. As to the Buddha, it was
stated in the return that it was, under the control and custody of Government
Security Agents for safekeeping and will be turned over to this Honorable Court
when directed to do so. . . . Now if it be remembered that Police chief Calano
kept the Buddha in his residence in Camp Holmes, . . . for several days, that
provided the most fertile ground for suspicion of possible substitution; however,
Investigator will concede that the duty to make immediate return devolved upon
the searching party, perhaps a Judge cannot, considering that he has other duties,
be expected to immediately act and require immediate return; perhaps, if there
might and probably could be, danger of substitution, the attention of the Judge
should be immediately called to that, here it was not ever, at least, there is
nothing in the evidence to that effect; . . . However, the searching officers duty
is to immediately return to the Court with the seized articles; here the raiding
party returned 7 days later, but without the Buddha, although Investigator sees
that on that date, 13 April, 1971, when the return was made without the Buddha,
respondent issued the order reading, "In the 1st Indorsement dated April 5, 1971
sighed by the Acting Chief of Police of Baguio, the following articles were
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 296 issued by the undersigned, to wit:
One (1) Buddha allegedly golden about 28 inches in height more or less; . . . . All
these articles were delivered to this Court, except the first item which is one (1)
Buddha allegedly golden about 28 inches in height more or less. To complete
the record of search warrant No. 296, the Acting Chief of Police is hereby
ordered to deliver to this Office the one (1) Buddha allegedly golden about 28
inches in height more or less. [It is so ordered]. City of Baguio, Phils, this 13th
day of April,

1971. . . . Although not mentioned in the memorandum but mentioned in the

complaint, is the fact that articles not mentioned in the warrant, i.e., 1 old saber
with scabbard, and 14 pieces of brassbars, appearance similar to gold bars. were
seized . . . as to this, respondents answer that Fiscal had the right to take
action, as well as aggrieved person to file corresponding pleading in court, . . .
this is correct. Therefore, as to the delay in the return and the seizure of other
articles not mentioned in the search warrant, Investigator must conclude that he
can find no way to blameRespondent." 5
The conclusions reached by Justice Gatmaitan follow: "From foregoing,
Investigator has come to the conclusions that Respondent: 1st Issued subject
search warrant after examining the witnesses as well as complainant thereof
under oath, that the examination sufficiently complied with the requirements as
to the description of the place to be searched and the object to be seized and that
the knowledge of the witnesses was not hearsay but on their own knowledge;
however, insofar as the fact that the written deposition of witness Sgt. De Vera
was not taken down and the same attached to the record, Respondent violated
Sec. 4 of Rule 126; 2nd There was probable cause to issue the warrant; but
the warrant itself suffered of the defect that it was for two (2) offenses and one of
these was not even specified by stating with precision what Central Bank circular
or regulation had been infringed, contrary to Rule 126, Sec. 3; 3rd As to the
delay in the return, and as to the seizure of brass bars and a saber not mentioned
in the warrant, Therein Investigator has not seen that Respondent should be made
liable." 6
Then came his recommendation: "In view whereof, while Investigator believes
that aforecited defects in the search warrant might perhaps have justified setting
it aside on certiorari, this being however an administrative case, maybe
something more should have been shown to justify punishment, for otherwise,
all Judges whose orders are assailed and annulled under the extraordinary legal
remedies must be visited with definite sanctions, something more should have
been shown, some partiality, bias, prejudice, wrongful motive, but which
Complainant has not shown nor even attempted to show, and Investigator after
some reflection having come to believe that in the extreme urgency in which
Respondent had found himself, even other Judges, even Investigator himself,
would have fallen into the same mistakes, therefore, he respectfully desists
from recommending a specific severe or even less than severe punishment,
this subject of course to this Highest Courts other wiser criterion." 7

Marcelino B. Florentino for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library

What immediately attracts attention in the above sentence of Justice Gatmaitans
recommendation is the extreme care he took to indicate that he is not to be
understood as intruding in any way with the full discretion that appropriately
belongs to this Court. It reflects his high sense of delicadeza. Nonetheless, it
would appear obvious, considering the exhaustive report and the language
employed after his painstaking appraisal of the evidence of record, that there is
not sufficient warrant for any disciplinary action against Respondent. As he
correctly pointed out, a certiorari proceeding could have been availed of for
corrective purposes. Moreover, it must have been Justice Gatmaitans sense of
realism fortified by long years of service as a trial judge and possibly excessive
modesty that did lead him to say that he could have fallen into the same mistake.
As was categorically affirmed by retired Chief Justice Makalintal in Dizon v. De
Borja: 8 "To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short
of harassment and would make his position unbearable." 9 Nonetheless, it is not
inappropriate to place on record that a trial judge in the position of respondent
ought to have abided with the settled juristic norm that a search warrant should
not be issued for more than one offense and that the depositions of the witness
should be made in writing and thereafter attached to the record.
One last word. It is to be recalled that, as noted at the outset, respondent judge
retired on July 11, 1975. The writer of this opinion is of the view, following
Diamalon v. Quintilla, 10 that as an administrative proceeding is predicated on
the holding of an office or position in the government, the resignation or
retirement calls for its dismissal. Nonetheless, in Perez v. Abiera, 11 this Court,
in an opinion by Justice Muoz Palma, ruled: "In short, the cessation from office
of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other
similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative
complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to
be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat." 12
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross inefficiency against Judge
Pio Marcos is dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be placed on his record.
MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JAVIER
PABALAN, Judge of the CFI of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO
LUMANG, Respondents.

Jose L Yumang for respondent Sgt. Ernesto Lumang. Hon. Javier Pabalan for
and in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with the claim that a
search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the
Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should have been nullified, but was not in
the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. 3 More specifically, it
was the failure of the application for the search warrant as well as the search
warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as
his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity
the place to be searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to
justify the assertion of illegality. When required to answer, respondent Judge did
not bother to refute specifically the allegations of the petition for certiorari, but
merely contented himself with inviting attention to the challenged order as well
as the resolutions denying the motion for reconsideration and with the statement
that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an assertion
thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he
"has no request to make in this particular case leaving the issues entirely to the
discretion of the Supreme Court." 4 The tone of diffidence, almost of apology, is
easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that respondent Judge
failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory
perusal of the application for search warrant 5 by respondent Lumang and the
search warrant itself, 6 yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored
what the Constitution requires on two points, the existence of a probable cause
and the particular description of the things to be seized. The limitation as to the
specific offense as mandated by the Rules of Court was not observed either.
Even on the assumption then that he could not chanrobles virtual law library
relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4 provides: "The

municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him." be held chargeable with knowledge of the leading
Stonehill decision, 7announced barely twenty days before the search warrant in
question was issued, still from Alverez v. CFI 8 the first to be decided under the
1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937, toOca v. Marquez, 9 that came out in
1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the view that for a search warrant to
escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity
with the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable procedural rules.
The finding then should have been against the validity of the search warrant.
Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited itself to requiring the return solely of
the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles
of Streptomycin, all of which may be considered as personal effects of
petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken falling under the category of things
forbidden by law and therefore need not be restored, 10it can be sustained. So we
rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent
Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the
belief that petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was
not even indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their being at
Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other
contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had verified the report and that therefore
he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband. 12 The
application was accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C.
Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine
Constabulary. 13 Again, mention was merely made of their information about
narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners. They did allege therein
that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that
petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such
traffic and that after verification, he was not registered in the Immigration
Office. 14 Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967, the search warrant was
issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. 15 Again, there was
reference to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the
complete and detailed description of the properties to be seized, the search
warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the

warehouse and premises of petitioners. 16 In the resolution upholding the validity

of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the following: "On July 10,
1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in
chamber before the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were
Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The three
submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search warrant
which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint affidavit supporting the search warrant
asked. As Sgt. Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing
were asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by the
Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge
of Molina and Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint
affidavit. The inquiry was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in
ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction
was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining
barrios. After the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and
answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search
warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant which is
Exhibit C." 17chanrobles virtual law library
As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution and the
procedural law in terms of the existence of a probable cause, a particular
description of the property to be seized and the requirement that there be only
one specific offense, is quite manifest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in
Stonehill v. Diokno 18 is highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in
connection with - this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.' In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes

the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in
this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a 'violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code,' - as alleged in the aforementioned applications - without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes." 19That same
approach is reflected in the two subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v.
Ruiz 20andAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. 21 It bears repeating, as
was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno, that the averments as to the alleged
commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner wereabstract. As admitted in
the challenged order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently, reference was made to
"the routine taking of [their oath] and examination questions and
answers ..." 22Nor can such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge
conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified merely because
respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind
[him]." 23Moreover, contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to take
the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. 24 There
was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard as to the
quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause, as so clearly
enunciated in Stonehill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that
there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." 25 As was admitted by the judge in the challenged
resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which
was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in
Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they
were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be
admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation. Nonetheless, and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the
Constitution is quite explicit that there be a particular description of the things to
be seized. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain
why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various
kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself
would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of
this constitutional provision, the elimination of general warrants, was thus

frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to
the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and
therefore must be strictly complied with. 26To quote from the landmark American
decision of Boyd v. United States: 27 "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principis." 28chanrobles virtual law library
3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite
that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." 29Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods
exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes.
Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from the activity designated
as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the
challenged order, reference was made to at least three charges having been filed,
the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on
tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium. It would seem that once again
what was correctly pointed out by Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v.
Diokno as unjustified and unwarranted finds application. Nor can there be any
plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the
Stonehill opinion having been rendered only twenty days previous to the
issuance of the search warrant, respondent Judge could not be held chargeable
with a knowledge thereof, considering that as far back as July 30, 1965, two
years earlier, in Oca v. Marquez, 30 this Court, through the then Justice J. P.
Bengzon, enunciated: "The decision herein has applied the provisions of th Old
Rules of Court since this case arose under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and
Bar is however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the issuance of
search warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which among other things requires that a search warrant must be in
connection with one specific offense." 31chanrobles virtual law library
4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is
prohibited by law. This is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back
as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32a 1920 decision, it was held: "That although in the
issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the
requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not
entitled to the return of the opium. and its paraphernalia which were found and

seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated
because of such omission of the judge." 33Among the authorities cited is Cooley:
"'Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for
goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the
revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or
Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers
kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous
material so kept as to endanger the public safety.'" 34So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v.
Almeda, 35handed down in 1940, Justice Laurel, speaking for this Court, stated:
"If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as alleged
by the respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of the
Usury Law, their return to the petitioners cannot be ordered." 36Magoncia v.
Palacios, 37 promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto
de Uy Kheytin contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron la
devolucion del opio de que se incautaron los constabularies al registrar su casa
armados con un mandamiento de registro expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones
de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites
exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el mandamiento
de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin
mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la
peticion, declarando que la irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de
registro ne era suficiente causa para ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez
recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al acusado
del paltik, 42 municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana
discrecion al denegar la peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal
Provincial y al Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos
como prueba en la vista." 38chanrobles virtual law library

prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself ..., the said
rule has no applicable force in the present case. ... In the application for the
issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the articles seized
were 'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of
lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is
now suggested (memoranda of respondents) that the only object of the agents of
the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from
employing them as a means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state
of the record, without deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact
use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared
to order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57 Phil.
384, 394-395.)" 40 chanrobles virtual law library

5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use that
may be made by the prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under an
invalid search warrant. Here, again, the Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice Laurel is
illuminating, especially in view of the inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized
under the present Constitution 39At this stage, the question does not have to be
faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow: "While we reiterate the rule that the
seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant ' for the purpose
of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose
possession they were found is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision

Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Taada, Carmon and Taada and
Alidio, Elegir, Anchete and Catipon petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of September 12,
1967 denying the motion of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well as the
resolutions of October 26, 1967 and January 29, 1968 denying the motions for
reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of this Court being that the search
warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the decision of this Court that
notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of
respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the
articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water
and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search warrant. No costs.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON.
JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J.
ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL CUARESMA, Respondents.

Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M.

Amores for respondent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.
ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose
Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return
immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been
illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of
NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel
Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal
case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian
Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Phils, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket
Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following
language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under
oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. William Li Yao or his
employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic
Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property
(Subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense
used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters
Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of
Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check
vouchers, income tax returns, and other papersconnected therewith ... for the
years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft
Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building
and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the
presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors

of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2)
carloads of documents, papers and receipts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in
contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3,
of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 - The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 3 - Requisites for issuing search warrant - A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule
126, Rules of Court)chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 5 - Issuance and form of search warrant - If the judge or justice of the peace
is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant in the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 8 - Time of making search - The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be

served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. - The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in
whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the
presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found
the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision abovequoted - to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to
his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and
scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."chanrobles virtual law library

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

I.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct
offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud,
in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules
providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the
same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense - either in the American books on Criminal procedure or in American
decisions." 2 It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v.
Secretary of Justice3 where this Court said:

Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that
it authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described
and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise
openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the
following personal property:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Property subject of the offense;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
andchanrobles virtual law library
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the
offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized
and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling
the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form
when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the respondent judge
intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent
impossibility because the description of the property to be searched and seized,
viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation
receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to
have been committed by the corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion
and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how the above-described
property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact
that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he
authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three
classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search
warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply
authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal
properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which includes
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really
seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business, 4 petitioner in
several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure
of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave
prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its
numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the
government itself, and of the general public. 5 And correlating the same to the
charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous
general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil.
896, cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain
the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in

the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and
seizures" may not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this
constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under
the search warrant issued in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
III.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed
Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the
things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance,
8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only
as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various
sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in
the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the
seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the
respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his
constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day
with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their
passport.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IV.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule
126. 6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left
blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the
evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of
October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein.
Authorities 7 are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night
time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the
directive on the face of the warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples

Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality
thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling
(Stonehill case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States
declared: 9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no
value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or
dropped by the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as
manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early
resolution of this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
V.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to
1964, and the application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The
time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of
doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an
eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this
point:

From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the
following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search
warrants:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit
and issuance of the search warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation
of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the
search warrant issued, but,generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three
weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four
weeks will be held to be so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the
affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the
affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the
offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of
establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of
October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby
ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or
taken thereunder. Without costs.
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Airport Customhouse, Pasay
City, Petitioner, v. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit
Criminal Court, 7th District, stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and CESAR T.
MAKAPUGAY, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-34038
On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo, filed
against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal

Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4713, (b) Central Bank Circular
No. 265, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as
The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937,
in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act, claiming that Cesar
T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally,
willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of
untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker
Scotch Whiskey, also untaxed, without the necessary permit from the proper
authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did
not declare the said articles. The Customs Examiner assigned further asked him
if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. And in
utter disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars, particularly C.B. Circular 265,
as amended, the respondent brought into the country various Philippine Money
in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly
hidden in one of the pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs
examiner, without any prior permit from the Central Bank authorities . . ." (p. 11,
rec.).
Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the
preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order,
dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent
the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one
(1) box of airconditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40)
cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny
Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).
Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner
release the articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the
order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon." The refusal
prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience"
under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay
City.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul
and set aside the order dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge
has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints
directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a
criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without
authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before
Customs authorities.
In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and
subsequently both parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral
argument.

G.R. No. L-34243

On June 22, 1971, respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter-complaint with
respondent Judge against petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of
Section 3602 relation to Section 2505 of Republic Act 1937, otherwise known as
the Tariff and Customs Code, supposed to have committed in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Mr. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a
Philippine Air Lines plane, Flight 307, on June 22, 1971, criminally, feloniously,
and with intention to defraud the government did not declare the contents of his
pieces of baggage in the Baggage Declaration Entry nor with the assigned
Customs Examiner . . . When his pieces of baggage were examined, instead of
personal effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration Entry, what were found
were various assorted Watches, Bags, Montagut shirts and Dress materials which
are highly taxable.
"The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said
articles in the Baggage Declaration Entry, and before the Customs Examiner
despite inquiries made, constitute a criminal offense within the meaning of
Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Phils . . . (p. 19, rec.).
The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-854-P.C.,
the respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners
counsel, conducted the preliminary examination and investigation,
simultaneously in the manner provided for by Section 13, Rule 112 of the New
Rules of Court, and thereafter on October 6, 1971 issued the following
order:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, there being a preliminary investigation and examination
conducted by the Court and considering that the respondent was given a chance
to defend himself let a Warrant of Arrest he issued for his apprehension. The
respondent is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his
provisional release.
"Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 13, Rule 113 thereto, the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file
the corresponding information against the respondent before this court of
competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt hereof"
(p. 23, rec.).
Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, impugning the validity of the order of respondent Judge dated

October 6, 1971, on the same ground as the petition in G.R. No. L-34038.
On October 20, 1971, the Supreme Court adopted resolution requiring
respondents to file an answer and likewise issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, "restraining respondent Judge, his representatives, assigns or persons
acting upon his orders, place or stead, from executing, enforcing and
implementing order of October 6, 1971 . . ." (p. 32, rec.).

examination and investigation (p. 23, rec.), which was denied by respondent
Judge in his order dated February 27, 1973 (p. 31, rec.). Counsel for petitioners
then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court, which respondent Judge
granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from this
Tribunal.
Accordingly, herein petitioners filed this petition.

In compliance therewith, respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of

answer on November 29, 1971 (pp. 43-44, rec.), which was granted by this Court
in its December 13, 1971 resolution (p. 62, rec.).

On March 2, 1973, this Court required respondents to answer the petition and
issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from . . .
causing and effecting the arrest of petitioners herein" (p. 39, rec.).

On the other hand, respondent Collector of Customs, through the Solicitor

General, filed a manifestation on February 1, 1972, adopting as his answer to the
petition, the legal grounds in the original petition in G.R. No. L-34038, Collector
of Customs, etc. versus Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, etc., et al (p. 72, rec.).

In his answer filed on March 14, 1973, respondent Judge, invoking the same
arguments in G.R. No. L-34243, held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal
Courts are vested with the power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. Private respondents conformed thereto.

On June 13, 1972, the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case
submitted for decision after noting the failure of petitioner to file his
memorandum (p. 94, rec.).

G.R. No. L-38688

G.R. No. L-36376

On February 22, 1973, private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia
Torillo, filed a complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court, indicting
petitioners with violations of the Anti-Graft Law.
The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22,
1973), respondent Judge forthwith issued an order of the following
tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considering that the complaint filed . . . sufficient in form and substance, the
same having been filed in accordance with Section 13, Rule 112 of the New
Rules of Court, and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in
the case of Mateo v. Villaluz, let the preliminary investigation of this case be
set on February 24, 1973 at 8:00 oclock in the morning" (p. 22, rec.).

On May 23, 1974, private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint
directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge
charging herein petitioner with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which complaint
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Prel. Inv.-116-Rizal.
At the hearing of May 27, 1974, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" (p. 9, rec.) based on the ground
that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct the same.
After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent Judge denied
petitioners motion. An oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp.
14-15, rec.).
Hence, this petition.

On the day set, petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who
proceeded to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. The same was reset
on February 26, 1973.

On May 31, 1974, this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and
issued a restraining order, "enjoining respondent Judge, his agents,
representatives, and/or any person or persons acting upon his orders or in his
place or stead from proceeding further with the preliminary investigation . . ." (p.
24, rec.)

Immediately before the hearing of February 26, 1973, Petitioners, through

counsel, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation"
contesting the power of the respondent Judge to conduct the preliminary

On June 17, 1974, it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in
nature, the Court required herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Phils
as party-respondent (p. 26, rec.). In conformity thereto, petitioner through

counsel, filed on June 28, 1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp.
49-50, rec.).

to the petition, and that this case be submitted for decision together with the
aforementioned cases (p. 137, rec.).

Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Phils,
respondents in answer, frontally met the averments of petitioner.

The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.

G.R. No. L-39525

On October 24, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv. No.
72-Rizal, Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District, as well as the warrant, if
any, that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner" and to
enjoin permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary investigations
and from ordering petitioners arrest.
On October 30, 1974, the Court required the respondents to file their answer
within ten (10) days from notice thereof and issued, effective immediately, a
temporary restraining order against respondent Judge (p. 64, rec.).
On November 13, 1974, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation requesting to
be excused from filing an answer considering that in three other cases (The
Collector of Customs v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34038; Nicanor
Marcelo v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34243; and Francisco Felix v.
Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-38688) which involve the same legal issue,
his office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under
Republic Act No. 5179 (p. 81, rec.).
On November 20, 1974, private respondent filed his answer (pp. 87-104, rec.).
Petitioner, on January 22, 1975, filed a motion praying that the instant case be
consolidated and decided jointly with G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and
L-38688 as they involve the same issue; and that the memoranda filed for
petitioners in said four cases be reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for
petitioner in this case, which should be deemed submitted for decision together
with the aforementioned cases (pp. 122-124, rec.). Said motion was granted in
the resolution of February 10, 1975 (p. 129, rec.).
In his pleading dated February 5, 1975, private respondent (pp. 130-132, rec.)
stated that he joins the petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant
case with cases Nos. L-34038, L-36376 and L-38688 and prayed that the
memorandum filed by respondent in L-38688 be considered reproduced and
adopted as the memorandum for private respondent in this case, in addition to
the affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private respondents answer

On January 11, 1974, herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint
against Pedro E. Nieva, Jr., herein petitioner, together with his wife Pacita and
daughter Patricia N. Sacasas, with the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial
District, Pasig, Rizal, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA No. 3019) in connection with the P230,000.00 industrial loan obtained by
the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the complainant, Jose
Arellano, from the Development Bank of the Phils, where herein petitioner holds
the position of Auditor. The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel.
Inv. CCC-VII-72 Rizal (pp. 1-2, 90-91, pp. 14-16 [Annex "A" ] rec.).
On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court, respondent Judge
issued an order that reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mateo versus Villaluz,
Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos, is hereby ordered to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case within five (5) days from
receipt hereof and to file the necessary information in a court of competent
jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants.
". . ." (pp. 2, 91 [Annex "B" ], pp. 21-22, rec.).
On May 22, 1974, investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos endorsed the records
of the case back to respondent Judge, because
". . . . (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant
suit is the same set of facts and circumstances and involving the same parties in a
case of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION new pending preliminary
investigation and also before this Honorable Court. Hence, this endorsement in
order to avoid duplication of effort and time in the resolution and disposition of
the same incident."cralaw virtua1aw library
In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24, 1974 file with the Circuit Criminal
Court pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice
and the Department of National Defense dated April 29, 1974, herein private
respondent prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course and
that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the respondent Judge (pp. 3,
92, 104 [Annex "I" ], rec.).

Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1, 1974 (p. 3, pp.
40-49 [Annex "F" ], rec.), which was amplified in another pleading dated
September 24, 1974 (pp. 3, 50-59 [Annex "G" ], rec.).
Under date of June 18, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to strike out
herein petitioners opposition to complainants ex-parte urgent motion for
preliminary investigation in view of the failure of herein petitioners counsel to
comply with the order of the Court to furnish a copy of his opposition to
complainant Jose Arellano (pp. 93, 105-106 [Annex "2" ], rec.).
On September 24, 1974, herein petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to
strike out herein respondents opposition (pp. 7, 55-59 [Annex "G" ], rec.). On
the same day, a hearing was conducted by the respondent Judge on the urgent
motion for preliminary investigation and immediately thereafter, he denied said
opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H", p. 6 pp. 3, 93, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. L-40031

In an order dated August 8, 1974, respondent Judge denied the same (p. 22, rec.).
On January 28, 1975, this Court by resolution required respondents to file an
answer to the petition and not to move for the dismissal of the same. The Court
further resolved to consolidate the case with Cases Nos. L-38688, L-34038 L34243, and L-36376 (p. 26, rec.).
In a manifestation filed on February 10, 1975, the Solicitor General requested
that he be excused from filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G.R.
Nos. L-34038, L-34243 and L-38688), which involve the same legal issue, the
counsel for the People has taken the position that respondent Judge has no
authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases
which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 5179.
Private respondent, on the other hand, through the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office of the Department of Justice, filed his answer on February 20, 1975,
maintaining that respondent Judge has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation, invoking particularly Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to Sections 1, 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179.

On November 2, 1973, Jose Arellano, private respondent herein, filed with the
Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, a complaint charging herein petitioner
with estafa, allegedly committed under the circumstances provided for in
paragraph 4 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (p. 12, rec.). Said
complaint was subsequently docketed as CCC Case No. Prel. Inv. -65-Rizal.
Thereupon, respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary investigation
in question. After the termination of the proceedings, respondent Judge issued on
May 31, 1974 the challenged resolution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The one common legal issue posed by these six case, is whether a Circuit
Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations.

"Wherefore, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court,
Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary
information for the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita Nieva, in a court of
competent jurisdiction, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof.

WE therefore examine the law.

"Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent

Mrs. Pacita Nieva, and for her provisional liberty, she is hereby ordered to post a
bond in the amount of P20,000.00" (p. 24, rec.).
On July 26, 1974, petitioners counsel filed an urgent motion to declare the
preliminary investigation proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court to conduct the same, re-echoing the
arguments invoked by petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and
L-38688 (p. 14, rec.).

Neither the explanatory note to House Bill No. 9801 (now R.A. No. 5179) nor
the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit Criminal Courts are
clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and
investigations (Congressional Records of House, March 28, 1967, pp. 41-45;
May 15, 1967).

Petitioners, in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power, rest their
claim on Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the CFI as presently constituted, there
is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction, concurrent
with the regular CFI, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes
against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
whether simple or complex with other crimes;

"b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, . . .;
"c. Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code
and Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code"
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners argue that said courts, having been conferred limited jurisdiction,
cannot exercise such power of preliminary investigation, the same not being
embraced and contemplated within its given function to "try and decide" specific
criminal cases.
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be
tried by Circuit Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they cannot try
and decide all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance as courts of general jurisdiction. They can only take cognizance of cases
expressly specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they have the same powers and
functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to
effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain and
evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law, Republic Act No.
5179:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the
judges of the CFI and the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases
therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cages cognizable by them
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
x

"SECTION 6. . . . Unless inconsistent with the provision of this Act, the Circuit
Criminal Courts shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary
Act and the Rules of Court upon regular Courts of First Instance, insofar as may
be necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect.
Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the
authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13
and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the
CFI. Upon complaint filed directly with the CFI, without previous

preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge

thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred to in
the second paragraph of Section 2, hereof for preliminary examination and
investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation
simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should he
find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense
charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the
fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information" (Emphasis supplied).
"SECTION 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city
fiscal or by state attorney in cases cognizable by the CFI. Except where an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, justice of the peace
or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections, no
information for an offense cognizable by the CFI shall be filed by the provincial
or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be
heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by
issuing a corresponding subpoena . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may be
exercised by judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts, is without doubt, "not
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 5179," and likewise,
"necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, Congress further confirmed that the CFI has the power to conduct
preliminary investigation by approving on September 8, 1967 Republic Act No.
5180, prescribing a uniform system of preliminary investigation by all
government prosecutors, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except
when an investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First Instance, city or
municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court
of the Phils, no information for an offense cognizable by the CFI shall be filed
by the provincial or city fiscal or any of his assistants, or by state attorney or his
assistants, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary
investigation conducted by him by issuing a corresponding subpoena . . .
"SECTION 2. The provisions of Section fifteen, Rule 112, of the New Rules of
Court of the Phils, shall be observed in the investigations of persons in
custody."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the above quoted provisions, Republic Act No. 5180 likewise continues the
procedure prescribed in the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, particularly Rule
112 thereof.

The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 was not modified
by the amendatory Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 issued respectively on
December 6, 1972 and March 23, 1976.
More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1978 Constitutions vests this essential
power in all courts to first determine probable cause before ordering the arrest of
those charged with a criminal offense (Section 1[3], Art. III, 1935 Constitution;
Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The determination of "probable cause" is the
sole object of preliminary examinations. Surely, Congress could not have
possibly intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional
prerogative, which is part of the basic constitutional right of an individual whose
person cannot be legally seized without prior preliminary examination by a
judge.
WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose
of alleviating, the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate
the disposition of criminal case pending or to be filed therein (People v.
Gutierrez, etc., Et Al., 36 SCRA 172; Osmea v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. L32033, Sept. 30, 1971, 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal
cases and help curb the progression of criminality in the country (Paraguya v.
Tiro, 41 SCRA 137). As opined by Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
in the Gutierrez case, supra,." . . Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but
additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective
districts . . .", which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmea case,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I
cannot find any justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any
part at all in the distribution or assignment of cases among the different branches
of any CFI, of which the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court if one. I took this
view in my concurring opinion in the case of People v. Gutierrez, cited in the
main opinion of Justice Villamor, and I cannot see why I must opine differently
now . . ." (41 SCRA 211).
If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of
the cases therein as well as stem the tide of criminality, it is only logical that such
authority vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance is likewise
conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the Courts of First Instance
would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary investigations in
those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently
delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts of
First Instance.

That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly intended, by Sections
3 and 6 thereof, to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in
regular Courts of First Instance including the authority to conduct preliminary
examinations and investigations, is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which confers on Circuit Criminal Courts, Courts,
of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the
"preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within
a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing." Before the amendment,
the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of the
preliminary investigation. Section 39, as amended, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 39. Jurisdiction. The CFI, Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court shall concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, that in cities or
provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said
courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under
sixteen years of age.
"The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated
within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
"Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a
prima facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in
court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If
the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is
found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper
prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the
records of the case.
"Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than
ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said
cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of
submission of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic Act No.
6425 affirms the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary
examination and investigation in all the cases falling under their jurisdiction and
additionally fixes the period for preliminary investigation, the filing of the
information and the rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Under the amendment, the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive, but

still retains concurrent, jurisdiction with the CFI and Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Its authority to conduct
preliminary examination and investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 5179, remains intact and undiminished; because the amendatory decree
expressly directs that "If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge
and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information should be
filed by the proper prosecuting officer . . ." There is nothing in the amendatory
decree from which it can be reasonably inferred that since the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act is no longer
exclusive, Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to
conduct preliminary examination and investigation.
Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts, including the Courts of First
Instance, to conduct preliminary examination, other special laws specifically vest
such authority exclusively in the CFI in cases of violation of the Revised
Election Code (Sec. 187, 1947 Revised Election Code, as amended; Sec. 234,
1971 Rev. Election Code) and of the Anti-Subversion Act when the penalty
imposable for the offense is prision mayor to death (Sec. 16, Rep. Act No. 1700).
It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential
Decree No. 44 (and also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not
the CFI Judge nor the Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. As
heretofore stated, it is an elementary precept in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish, WE should not distinguish (Colgate Palmolive
Phils, Inc. v. Gimenez, L-14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 267). The statute cannot
give a restricted meaning to the generic term "judge" used in the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Furthermore, in People versus Manantan (L-14129, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 684),
a justice of the peace, Accused of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the law refers merely
to a justice, judge, or fiscal and that being a justice of the peace, he is beyond the
coverage of the said Code. The Supreme Court in denying such contention, held
that there was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in
said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic term
"judge." The term "judge", not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges, including justices of the peace.
The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro
(41 SCRA 137) involved not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct
preliminary investigation, but its jurisdiction to try and decide certain cases.
They do not at all reveal an iota of any further restriction on the limited
jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing
laws.

Thus, in the Paderna case, supra, involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax
Code, Mr. Chief Justice Castro, then Associate Justice, speaking for the Supreme
Court in ruling that the Circuit Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case, stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed blue seal cigarettes of
an appraised value of less than P500.00 . . . and the penalty provided under
Republic Act 4713 is a fine of not less than P50.00 nor more than P200.00 and
imprisonment of not less than 5 not more than 30 days because the value of the
cigarettes does not exceed P500.00, this case falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the city court . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
". . . Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8, 1967,
provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have limited jurisdiction
concurrent with the regular CFI, to try and decide the following criminal case
falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter.
x

"The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the
type of cases but on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case
at bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the City Court, it
cannot, even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken
cognizance of by circuit criminal courts, the jurisdiction of which is concurrent
with that of courts of First instance where the latters jurisdiction is original and
exclusive."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case, supra,
involving indirect bribery committed by a public officer. In passing upon the
issue of the Circuit Criminal Courts limited jurisdiction, the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The law (R.A. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts
(which is even made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to committed by
public officers; . . . only where they are falling within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the CFI. In short, circuit criminal courts jurisdiction was limited
merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179, for which the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for
more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper cases), or fine of more than P3,000.00 (or
P6,000.00 as the case may be), or both such fine and imprisonment (Sec. 44[f] in
relation to Sec. 87[c], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended; Esperat v. Avila, L25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596; Mangila v. Lantin, L-24735, October 31,

1969, 30 SCRA 81; People v. Tapayan, L-36885, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA
529; Andico v. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968, 23 SCRA 93).

concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice
of law in the Phils" (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution).

"Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, suspension and public
censure. (Art, 211 RPC), the case is clearly removed from the competence of the
circuit criminal court to pass upon. It is not denied that the crime of indirect
bribery is essentially one committed by public officers. Jurisdiction of the court,
however, is determined not only by nature of the offense charged in the
information, but also by the penalty imposable thereto . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to

In these two cases, it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to
acquire jurisdiction, the offense must not only be one of those enumerated under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179; it should also be within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular Courts of First Instance. In the aforesaid
cases, the Circuit Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and
decide the offenses involved, by command of the specific provisions of its
charter, the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal Code; and not by a directive of
the Supreme Court, which merely applied in said cited cases the statutory
prescriptions. The Supreme Court cannot legally define additional restrictions,
which is the sole prerogative of the law-making authority.
The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court, being a rule of procedure, the same should be
rendered inoperative by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court cannot, by
promulgating a rule of procedure, arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to
the lower courts.
It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction
to hear and decide certain cases. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the rulemaking authority the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure and to amend the existing laws thereon. The law or rule on
preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure.
The 1935 Constitution states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify, substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules

"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however,
may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the National Assembly. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights" (Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement
Section 3 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution). Section 13 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court
was not an innovation as it merely restated Section 13 of General Order No. 58,
Section 37 of Act No. 1627, and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules
of Court, in obedience to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1935 Constitution. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights but
continues the procedure already operative prior to the 1935 Constitution.
WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which is the
predecessor of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is an adjective or
procedural rule (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
While admitting that Courts of First Instance were previously clothed with the
power of preliminary investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627,
nevertheless it is argued that this same section was amended when the Judiciary
Act of 1948 was enacted since under Section 99 of said Judiciary Act, "All laws
and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" were repealed. The
inconsistency, it is claimed, lies in the fact that while the authority of municipal
courts and city courts to conduct preliminary investigation was reiterated in said
Judiciary Act, there was no mention therein whether CFI Judges are still
possessed of such authority.
If such repeal was intended, it is unconstitutional; because the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973 vest in the judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search
warrant after conducting a preliminary investigation or examination. Congress
could not divest the court of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it,
for the constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not qualified by
some such phrase as "unless otherwise provided by law." For a clearer
appreciation, the Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search warrant
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized" (Art. III, 1935 Constitution, Emphasis supplied).
"SECTION 3. The right of the people to be secure in the persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and
for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized" (Art, IV, 1973 Constitution,Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until
now only the judge can determine the existence of probable cause and can issue
the warrant of arrest. No law or presidential decree has been enacted or
promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular "responsible officer."
Hence, the 1973 Constitution, which was ratified and took effect on January 17,
1973, should govern the last four cases, namely, Nos. L-36376, L-38688, L39525 and L-40031, which arose after January 17, 1973.
But even under the 1935 Constitution, the term seizures or seized comprehends
arrest. Thus, in Vivo versus Montesa (July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155), reiterating
the doctrines in the cases of Qua Chee Gan, Et. Al. v. Deportation Board (L20280, Sept. 30, 1963) and Morano v. Vivo (L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
1963) 162), WE ruled unanimously through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of Investigation and before a
final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution, providing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

"It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of
arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in
previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left
undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable
cause. And in Qua Chee Gan, Et. Al. v. Deportation Board, L-20280,
promulgated on September 30, 1963, this Court pointed out that Executive Order
No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure
for deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under
investigation, but did not authorize his arrest.
"Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the
issuance of administrative warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same
case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than
the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish
between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a
final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency
duly authorized for (he purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the
Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would
be a warrant of arrest of to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect
compliance of an order of contempt.
The(n) contention of the Solicitor general that the arrest of foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as
already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the
deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the
alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President
Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.
"Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano v. Vivo (L-22196,
30 June 1967, 20 SCRA, 562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished between
administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as

preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court remarked in said

case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require
judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of
arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such
as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation" (L-24576, pp. 161-162).
The foregoing doctrine was last reiterated in Ang, Et. Al. versus Galang, etc. (L21426, Oct. 22, 1975).
Under the American Constitution, the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but
also invitations for police interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk
measures. In the 1968 case of Terry versus Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court enunciated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs seizures of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime
arrests in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized
that person (392 U.S. 1, 16 88 S.C.T. 1868, 20 L.E.D. 2d 889; 903 [1968].)"
That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately
intended by the founding fathers of the 1935 Constitution, which words are
likewise employed in 1973 the Constitution, Delegate Miguel Cuaderno
categorically recounted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant,
to effect that in each case the order must be supported by the testimony of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, made before the judge, and also
an amendment providing that prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be
bailable before conviction unless the evidence of guilt is strong, were approved
upon the initiative of Delegate Francisco. It was the prevailing opinion among
many delegates that some courts had been rather easy in the issuance of orders of
arrest or search warrants, and quite strict in the matter of bail in cases where
persons had been charged with capital offenses" (Cuaderno, the Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p. 65 Emphasis supplied).
Delegate Jose Aruego added:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment

which was adopted by the Convention, the amendment being the insertion of the
words, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The idea in the Francisco
amendment was not new in the Phils; for it was provided for in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the Phils. The dignification of the idea into a
constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon, in order to make the
principle more sacred to the judges and to prosecuting officials. The amendment
was intended to be a remedy for the evils pointed out in the debates, caused by
the issuance of search warrants, many of which were in blank, upon mere
affidavits on facts most of which were generally found afterwards to be false"
(Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 160).
The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to
"municipal judge" as to exclude the judges of the CFI and Circuit Criminal Court
(People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 690-695). WE are not justified to create a
distinction where the Constitution does not make any.
In general, "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to
preside and to administer the law in a court of justice (Ark. School Dist. No.
18 v. Grubbs Special School Dist., 43 S.W. 2d 765, 766, 184 Ark. 863, 48 CJS
946).
According to intent or context, the term "judge" may include an assistant judge
(N.H. City Bank v. Young, 43 N.H. 457); a county or court justice (Mo. State
v. OGorman, 75 Mo. 370); a justice of the peace (N.Y. People v. Mann 97 N.Y.
530, 49 Am. R. 556).
The term "a judge", in Gen. St. C. 47, Art. 1 & 22, providing that "a judge" may
cause any house or building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables,
etc., is equivalent to "any judge" and comprehends an entire class, and cannot,
without disturbing its meaning, be restricted in its applicants to judges of county,
city and police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law and equity
court has authority to issue a warrant for such a search (Com. v. Watzel, 2 S.W.
123, 125, 84 KY 537).
Admittedly, Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which
provides: "All laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed." The question may now be asked: What is the nature of this
repealing clause? It is certainly not an expressly repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [1934], Vol. 1, p. 467). Rather, it is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an
irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the

case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore; for repeals and
amendments by implication are not favored (Jalandoni v. Andaya, L-23894, Jan.
24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261, 265-6; Villegas v. Subido, L-31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41
SCRA 190; Quimseng v. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182). Indeed, the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws; so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper
step is to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8
F[2] 439; Webb v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P[2] 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W.
Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876). The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of
Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exist between the terms of the new and of the old statues (Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377). Here, there is not such
inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different
persons and different methods applicable under different circumstances. Thus,
while Section 87 of the Judiciary Act provides that municipal judges and judges
of city courts may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense alleged
to have been committed within their respective municipalities and cities . . .;
Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part that such power of "every justice of the
peace including the justice of Manila, . . . shall not exclude the proper judge of
the CFI . . . from exercising such jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
WE should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a
clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest
from the language of Section 99 of the Judiciary Act, apart from the fact that
Congress by itself alone had no power to amend the Constitution.
The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct
preliminary investigation could be traced to the Constitution, adding that the
Charter of Manila and other cities confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities
the power to conduct preliminary investigations.
The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of
such a power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation on quasijudicial officers like the city fiscals of chartered cities (see the instructions of
President McKinley to First Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill 1902,
Jones Law of 1916, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).
But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals
and City Attorneys of other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary
investigations did not and does not include the authority to issue warrants of
arrest and search warrants, which warrants the courts alone can issue then as

now. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures

under the 1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a search warrant
or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally determined the existence
of probable cause upon his examination under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses; although as ruled in one may rely on the investigation conducted by
the fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 741-42).
It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the "judge" is directed to
conduct a preliminary examination issuance of the warrant of arrest by express
constitutional conferment.
But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National to grant the power to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary
examination to "other responsible officer." Until such a law is enacted by the
National Assembly, only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary
examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant.
Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation, only
the judge can validly issue the warrant of arrest. This is confirmed by Section 6
of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which directs the judge to issue
the warrant of arrest when he is "satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the
municipal mayor under Sec. 5) that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has
committed it, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and
investigation (minus the authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is
purely statutory. On the other hand, the judge derives his authority not only from
the Rules of Court, but also and originally from the fundamental law to
which all other laws are subordinate. If an objection must be raised, it should
against the authority of the fiscal to exercise such power preliminary
investigation, which, as has been stated, is merely statutory. No less than the
Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct such examination and
investigation.
The case of Albano versus Alvarez (December 22, 1965, 15 SCRA 518) is
authority for the proposition that Sec. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court contains an innovation, which requires that, when the CFI itself
conducts the preliminary investigation, it must not only conduct the preliminary
examination proper but preliminary investigation as well since Section 13
commands the CFI to conduct both the preliminary examination and
investigation simultaneously (523-524). Said Albano case does not negate, but
recognizes the authority judge of the CFI to conduct such preliminary

investigation.
It is true that this COURT held expressly and implied under the charters of the
cities of Manila, Bacolod and Cebu, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is exclusively lodged in the city prosecutor (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859, 868-869, May 12, 1948; Espiritu v. De la Rosa, 45 OG 196;
Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, June 23, 1955; and Balite v. People, 18
SCRA 280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the charters of the cities of Manila,
Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to
city prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd
Edition, 1960), which cannot be deprived of such authority to conduct
preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates from
the Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is amended, the judge cannot be
divested of such a power, which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the present city charters
conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of arrest,
it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. As
heretofore intimated, the present practice or rule of court authorizing the judge to
issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the
city fiscal, seems violate the 1935 Constitution, which requires the judge himself
to conduct the preliminary examination. Neither the judge nor the law can
delegate such an authority to another public officer without trenching upon this
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges
cannot exercise the power of preliminary examination and investigation, and that
as a necessary consequence, they cannot also issue warrants of arrest, obviously
collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable be anomalous situation
wherein the CFI the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts
inferior to them to conduct the preliminary examination to issue the needed
warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their power to try and
decide the cases falling under their respective jurisdiction. This situation would
make the Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent
upon state prosecutors and municipal courts, which are inferior to them, for their
proper functioning. The possibility that the administration of criminal justice
stand still will not be very remote.
The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to
alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases filed therein (Osmea v. Secretary of Justice, supra;
People v. Gutierrez, supra). Such being the admitted purpose, the power to
conduct preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a

Circuit Criminal Court Judge; for aside from being one of the instruments by
which a case may be accelerated and disposed of, it is a duty which truly lies
within the scope of the office, essential to the accomplishment of the main
purpose for which the office was created (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1935 Constitution; Sec.
3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution), even if regarded as incidental and collateral, is
germane to, and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose
(Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635).
WE RULE that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution and
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 constitution provide the source of the power of
all Judges, including Judges of the CFI, the Circuit Criminal Courts, and other
courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine probable
cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the
proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government
prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information.
II
It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal
procedure.
During the Spanish regime, the rules of criminal procedure were found in the
Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal
Code. These two laws were published in the Official Gazette in Manila on March
13 and 14, 1887 and became effective four (4) months thereafter (U.S. v.
Tamparong, 31 Phil. 32-33; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969, ed., p. 8).
While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided for a preliminary
summary oral trial by the justice of the peace or gobernadorcillo, it did not
require any preliminary examination or investigation before trial. The sumario
was abolished by General Order No. 58 (U.S. v. Tamparong, supra; Navarro,
Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., pp. 171, 174; Revilla, Vol. 2, Philippine Penal
Code and Procedure, 1930 ed., pp. 1134-35).
When the Phils came under American sovereignty, General Order No. 58 was
promulgated by the U.S. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative
powers as commander-in-chief of the occupation army and took effect on April
13, 1900. General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 of August 10,
1901, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903, Act No. 1627
of July 1, 1907, the Jones Law of 1916, Section 2474 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, and Act No.
4178 of December 5, 1934.

General Order No. 58 amended (Sec. 1) the Criminal Code of Procedure

enforced during the Spanish regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to
conduct preliminary investigation (Sec. 13) for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest" and authorized "a judge or a justice of the peace" to issue a search warrant
upon his determination of the existence of probable cause therefor "particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized" (Secs.
95 and 97). The term "magistrate" comprehended the CFI (Temporosa v. Yatco,
79 Phil. 225, 226 [1947]; Marcos v. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104-107 [1939]; People v.
Red, 55 Phil. 706, 710 [1931]; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, 441 [1925];
Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., 1973; Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1965
ed., p. 270).
"A magistrate is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
person charged with a public offense. People v. Swain, 90 P. 720, 722 5 Cal.
App. 421, citing Pen. Code, S807.
"A magistrate is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
person charged with the commission of a crime. The following persons are
magistrates:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Justice Imperial, sustained the power of the CFI to conduct preliminary

investigations under Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58 (68 Phil. 96,
106-107), which was impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa versus
Yatco, Et Al., supra.
While General Order No. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate, a generic term
which includes judges of the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace;
Section 1 of Act No. 194 is less categorical by employing the clause "jurisdiction
to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of
First Instance."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority
when it merely provided that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be
prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said
Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal
courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore
provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration
and amendment as maybe hereafter enacted law; . . ." (Sec. 9, Emphasis
supplied).

(1) the justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) the judges of the Circuit Court;
(3) the county judges and justices of the peace;
(4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the
duties of a justice of the peace. Wallowa County v. Oakes, 78 P. 892, 46 Or. 33"
(26 Words and Phrases, pp. 44, 45).
Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901 amended General Order No. 58 by empowering
"every justice of the peace . . . to make preliminary investigation of any crime
alleged to have been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and
determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First
Instance" (Emphasis supplied).
The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. 194 is that
before its passage, the justice of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary
investigation of any offense triable by the CFI, which alone can conduct such
preliminary investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction pursuant to
General Order No. 58. But its enactment did not divest the CFI of such authority.
In the 1939 case of Marcos, Et. Al. versus Cruz, the Supreme Court, through

Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 further amended Act No. 194 by extending the
power to conduct preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the
provincial capital or of the town wherein the provincial jail is situated of crimes
committed anywhere within the province but again utilized the equivocal clause"
jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Courts of
First Instance; . . ." (See. 7, Act 590, Emphasis supplied).
Act No. 1627 of July 1, 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when it authorized
expressly every justice of the peace, including the justice of the peace of Manila,
to "conduct preliminary investigation of all crimes and offenses alleged to have
been committed within his municipality and cognizable by Courts of First
Instance, but this shall not exclude the proper judge of the CFI or of a municipal
court from exercising such jurisdiction. The justice of the peace of a capital or of
a municipality in which the provincial jail is located, when directed by an order
from the judge of First Instance, shall have jurisdiction to conduct investigation
at the expense of the municipality wherein the crime or offense was committed,
although alleged to have been committed anywhere within the province, to issue
orders of arrest, . . ." (Sec. 37, Act No. 1627, Emphasis supplied).
The Jones Law of 1916, like the Philippine Bill of 1902, merely provides "that
the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional

jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" (Sec. 26, Jones Law).

versus Cruz (68 Phil. 96, 99, 106-107).

Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power
of the CFI of Manila conduct preliminary examination

Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution, the preliminary
investigation before the justice of the peace or municipal court consisted of two
stages, namely, preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
where only the complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the
peace; and the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard. The
Judge of the CFI conducts only the first stage, that is, preliminary examination
for purposes of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, to be followed by the actual
trial (Marcos, v. Cruz, supra; People v. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555 [1946]).

"SECTION 2474. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court.

Preliminary examinations in municipal court and Court First Instance. Every
person arrested shall without unnecessary delay, be brought before the municipal
court, or the CFI for preliminary hearing, release on bail, or trial. In cases triable
in the municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a
preliminary examination, except a summary one to enable the court to fix the
bail, in any case where the prosecution announces itself ready and is ready for
trial within three days, not including Sundays, after the request for an
examination is presented. In cases triable only in the CFI the defendant shall not
be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal
of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an
information against him in proper form. But the CFI may make such summary
investigation into the case as it may deem necessary to enable it to fix the bail or
to determine whether the offense is bailable" (Emphasis supplied).

Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, while amending Section 13 of General Order
No. 58, re-states the power of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary
examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary examination or investigation from May 14, 1935 to January 17,
1973, is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, which
guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures . . . and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized." Construing the
foregoing constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Supreme Court, through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, pronounced that the
determination of the existence of "probable cause must depend upon the
judgment and discretion of the judge . . . issuing the warrant. . . . His conclusion
as to whether probable cause existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is
satisfied that probable cause exists from the facts stated in the complaint, made
upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is
sufficient upon which to issue a warrant of arrest. He may, however, if he is not
satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the
warrant . . . There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion
that probable cause exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone,
or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the
opinion of the judge . . . The preliminary investigation conducted by the
petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under Republic Act No. 732 . . . does not, as
correctly contended by the respondent Judge, dispense with the latters duty to
exercise his judicial power of determining, before issuing the corresponding
warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. The Constitution
vests such power in the respondent judge who, however, may rely on the facts
stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation by the prosecuting
attorney" (Amarga v. Abbas, March 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 739, 741-742).

Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order
No. 58 but still retained the authority of the magistrate to conduct the
preliminary examination. As heretofore stated, Sections 13 and 14 of General
Order No. 58, as amended, were applied by the Supreme Court in Marcos, Et. Al.

While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to

government prosecutors, only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the
1935 Constitution and prior thereto (Sayo, Et. Al. v. Chief of Police, Et. Al. 80
Phil. 859; Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933; Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The

It is clear that both the Manila CFI and municipal court can conduct a
preliminary hearing or examination. Section 2474 aforequoted, adds, however,
that the City Fiscal impliedly may conduct such preliminary examination;
because it provides that in "cases triable only in the CFI the defendant shall not
be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal
of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an
information against him in proper form." It will be noted, however, that it is only
after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary examination that the accused
ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a preliminary examination by the Judge of
the CFI who, however, retains inferentially the discretion to conduct another
preliminary investigation because the CFI Judge is not foreclosed by the
preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. But, when the City Fiscal
has not conducted any preliminary examination, the CFI Judge himself certainly
can proceed with such preliminary examination, which the defendant can
demand as a matter or right.

valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest.
Arrest without a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or
private individual a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b) when an offense
has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule
113, 1964 Revised Rules of Court).
In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When the seizure of a
person is made without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is
not based on a determination by the judge of the existence of probable cause, the
arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the
municipal or city judge, the City Fiscal and the Judge of the CFI the power to
conduct preliminary examination or investigation.
On June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the AntiSubversion Law, was approved. The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly
provides that the preliminary investigation of offenses defined and penalized
therein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper CFI. This
grant obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscals or other government
prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary investigation in all other cases
is affirmed in first clause of Section 5 thereof.
Sections 13 and 14 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4
of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No.
5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act 5180 was approved on
September 8, 1967, which affirms the prerogative of the Courts of First Instance
conduct preliminary investigation of offenses punishable said courts.
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6,
1972 and March 23, 1976, amending Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the
opening clause of Section 1 of said Republic Act 5180 affirming the power of the
CFI to conduct preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules
of Court.
Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known as Republic
Act No. 6388, vests in the CFI "exclusive original jurisdiction to make

preliminary investigations, issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any
criminal case or proceeding for violation of" the Election Law. This provision
was a reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No. 1582 of 1907; Com. Act
No. 357 of 1938; and Republic Act No. 180 of 1947, as amended).
After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, the source of
the authority of the judge to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of
issuing a warrant of arrest, is still the Constitution, this time the 1973
Constitution, which likewise guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures for whatever nature and for
any purpose . . . and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized" (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973
Constitution). The 1973 Constitution, instead of employing the generic term
warrants to comprehend both search warrants and warrants of arrest, as did the
1935 Constitution, expressly specifies "search warrants or warrants of arrest."
The purpose of such specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case, supra, that
the 1935 Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable searches but not
against unreasonable arrests, despite the fact that the constitutional guarantee
expressly affirms "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures . . . and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the persons . . . to be seized" (Par. 3, Sec. 1, Art. III,
1935 Constitution).
In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny
equal, if not greater, importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or
arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property rights and right against self-incrimination.
It will also likewise be noted that the 1973 Constitution also authorizes the lawmaking authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such
preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. As
enunciated in the Amarga case and in U.S. versus Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42),
the government prosecutors may be authorized to conduct such preliminary
examination and their determination of the existence of probable cause may be
relied upon by the judge, who may, as a consequence, issue the warrant of arrest;
although the judge himself is not precluded from conducting his own preliminary
examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting attorney as to the
existence or non-existence of probable cause.
III

1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R.
No. L-34038 (Collector of Customs, etc. v. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, Et. Al.)
dismissed the criminal complaint filed by petitioners therein against private
respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case may not be re-filed
without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge
seriously erred in so issuing said order, contravening as it does a basic legal
principle on double jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of
discretion. The constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the
first preliminary examination or investigation, but only after the first trial which
results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the
case without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; Taladua v.
Ochotorena, Et. Al. 25595, February 15, 1974; Republic v. Agoncillo, L-27257,
August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579; People v. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 1249; People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioners counsel, "dismissal at
preliminary investigation is never prejudice. Re-filing of the same is allowed if
evidence has become sufficient to warrant conviction of private Respondent."
There has been no deviation from such established jurisprudence exemplified in
People v. Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), wherein the Court held that "the finding in the
preliminary investigation that no prima facie case existed against the accused
does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction. Such finding is not final
acquittal as would preclude further proceedings" (Emphasis supplied).
2. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law, respondent
Judge also directed through the same order the return of the articles allegedly
seized from the person of respondent Makapugay. This portion of the questioned
order is fraught with undesirable consequences.
As stated heretofore the dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage
of preliminary investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction
if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same. But with the challenged order
commanding the return of the articles subject matter of the complaint, the refiling of the same becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order
would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence
indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the
private Respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the
customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment
imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs
authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the

Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the

Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for
the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the
Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court (Sections 2205
and 2303, Tariff and Customs Code; Papa, Et. Al. v. Mago, Et Al., Feb. 28, 1968
22 SCRA 857 Virata, Et. Al. v. Aquino, Et. Al. Sept. 30, 1973, 53 SCRA, 24; see
also Vierneza v. Commissioner, July 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement
& Machinery v. Commissioner, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 905; Lazatin v.
Commissioner, Et Al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016; Asaali, Et. Al. v.
Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382; Sare Enterprise v.
Commissioner, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 112; Geotina, etc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, Et Al., August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362; Commissioner v. Court of Tax
Appeals, Et Al., January 31, 1972; Lopez v. Commissioner, Et Al., January 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 327; Geotina v. Broadway, etc., Et Al., January 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 410; Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, Et Al., September 12, 1974,
59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, Et. Al. v. Pamaran, etc., Et Al., March 15, 1974, 56
SCRA 16). Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the CFI as well as the Circuit
Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile, Et. Al. v.
Venuya, Et Al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the
prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code (Diosamito, Et. Al. v. Balanque, Et
Al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; Seares v. Frias, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA
533); because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not
criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in
the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin v. Commissioner, Et Al., July 30,
1969, 28 SCRA 1016).
Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never
brought to his attention (p. 038, rec.) and that he could not have foreseen the
possibility that petitioner would be instituting seizure proceedings . . . and
besides, it is understood that the order of the court commanding the release of the
subject articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or
withholding the same for some other lawful reason (p. 039, rec.).
The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no
intimation that the "release . . . was on a premise that herein petitioner was not
holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason." On the contrary,
the tenor of the order is so absolute and so emphatic that it really leaves no
alternative for petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles.
The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report seizure (p. 14, rec.) and a
warrant of seizure and detention (p. 15, rec.) were made by petitioner Collector
of Customs on June 30, 1971 and on July 9, 1971 respectively. It is patent that
respondent Judge knew actually of the existence at least of the report of seizure

of June 30, 1971, which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July 6,
1971. He should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure and detention will
logically be issued as in fact it was issued on July 9, 1971, because it was the
petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the criminal complaint directly with
him on July 1, 1971. Respondent Judge chose to ignore the presence of the report
of seizure dated June 30, 1971, six days before his order of dismissal and the
filing of the criminal complaint on July 1, 1971. Prudence should have
counselled him, so as not to frustrate the petitioner Collector of Customs in
enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against ordering the release of the seized
articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs
whether the latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People
v. Gutierrez, supra, "It is not enough that a Judge trusts himself or can be trusted
as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance
attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trustworthiness." We have
enjoined judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not to
dispose of a case according to their personal views (Albert v. Court of Firs
Instance, 23 SCRA 948).
IV
In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, Et. Al. v. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, Et. Al.), the
arbitrary denials displayed by respondent Judge of motions presented before him
likewise invite some cautionary reminders from this Court.
In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within
which to elevate the matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of
the issue, a grant of twenty-four hours to prepare a petition for certiorari is a
virtual denial of the motion. And petitioners motion for an extension at least one
(1) day was peremptorily brushed aside respondent Judge with one single word
DENIED.
The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme
Court within the constricted period of time granted them is beside the point.
More important is the consideration by this Court of the dangers posed by
respondent Judges peremptory denial of a reasonable time.
Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending
before them. But more commendable would be for judges to contribute their
share in maintaining the unswerving faith of litigants in the courts of justice. WE
once again stress that "One important judicial norm is that a judges official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety" ; (Luque v. Kayanan, 29

SCRA 165).
V

But while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct
preliminary examination (p. 36), pursuant to OUR constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1973 Constitution) as a
matter of policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal
Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before
their courts (see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973). The
primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the
existing Courts of First Instance; as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load
of the Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal
cases involving serious offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, as
amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore, should not encumber themselves
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints,
which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who
in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such
preliminary examination and investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court can directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for
the same purpose (Sec. 3, Republic Act. No. 5184).
Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear
and dispose of the 34 criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala,
aside from the 479 pending cases of voluntary submission by drug addicts, as of
January 31, 1975 (A.M. No. 230-CCC, Item 42, Agenda of March 13, 1975), as
revealed by his letter dated February 26, 1975, wherein he requested the
Supreme Court to renew the temporary detail in his sala of Municipal Judge
Hermenegildo C. Cruz of Mandaluyong, Rizal, to assist him. This significant fact
should further dissuade him from actively conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal cases directly filed with him.
Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit, may
be assigned by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months, unless
with their consent, to assist Judges of regular Courts of First Instance with
clogged dockets (Sec. 5[3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE

PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS ISSUED
THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No. L-40031, THE PETITION IS
HEREBY DISMISSED; AND IN G.R. NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6, 1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS
NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL
CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE
RETURN TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES
SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT OF SEIZURE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE
PERMANENT. NO COSTS.
JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, Petitioner,
vs. EDUARDO BERDIAGO alias EDUARDO BERTIAGO; and HON.
ANDRES REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, CFI of
Rizal, Respondents.
Solicitor, General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for
petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Amelito R. Mutuc for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
An order of the lower court quashing a search warrant issued at the instance of
petitioner Jose T. Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, to gain custody
of a seized vehicle pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention against private
respondent Eduardo Berdiago 1 was assailed in this certiorari and mandamus
proceeding with a prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction. 2 The invocation
by the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of this Court, Antonio P.
Barredo, of the controlling force of Papa v. Mago 3 and the persuasive character
attached to the ruling of an American leading decision, Carroll v. United
States, 4 clearly indicative of the tenuous nature of the claim of private
respondent that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, 5 led to a resolution by the Court of July 12,
1968, requiring that respondents answer the petition and issuing the preliminary
mandatory injunction sought requiring respondent Berdiago "to deliver the
custody and possession of said car to respondent court; and furthermore

requiring respondent court to take possession and custody of the said Rolls
Royce car from respondent Berdiago or from whomsoever has possession and
custody thereof and let petitioner to take delivery and custody thereof; ... ." 6 The
stress, and quite understandably, in the extensively-researched answer filed on
behalf of respondents by their able counsel, former Ambassador Amelito R.
Mutuc, was on the primacy of the immunity the Constitution guarantees against
an unreasonable search and seizure. More specifically, it was contended with
vigor and plausibility that respondent Judge quashed the search warrant on
showing of lack of probable cause, a requirement not only of the Constitution but
of the Rules of Court 7 and the Tariff and Customs Code. 8 While no objection
could validly be raised against such a proposition, it cannot apply to this
controversy. It is undoubted that prior to the issuance of a search warrant, there
was a previous discovery of the failure to pay the correct amount of customs
duties. That was probable cause enough. It let to the institution of a seizure and
forefeiture proceeding. Moreover, the law has always looked with disfavor on
attempts at nonpayment or underpayment of customs duties. It is essential that no
undue obstacle be placed on intensive efforts to assure the collection of what is
properly due the government. The Mago decision was thus merely a reflection of
what has long been the settled doctrine on the matter in the Phils. It is futile to
assert then, considering the circumstances to be more specifically referred to,
that the requirement of lack of probable cause was not met. We find for
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The petition includes as one of its Annexes the warrant of seizure and
detention. 9 It was issued on the basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent
documents were used by respondent Berdiago in securing the release from the
Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, 2 door, Hardtop with
Motor No. CRX 1379, which arrived in the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968 on
board the vessel, Jose Abad Santos, it being made to appear that such car was a
1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much lower
customs duty in the amount of P3,255.00, when the correct amount due was
P219,783.00. 10 There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the
sum to cover the deficiency, respondent manifesting his willingness to do so but
failing to live up to his promise contained in a letter of April 24, 1968, leading to
Seizure Identification Case No. 10941 against the car.11 As it was kept in a
dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly authorized agents of
petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling

house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein, pursuant to Section 2209
of the Tariff and Customs Code; he issued the search warrant on May 30,
1968. 12 Thereafter, on June 3, 1968, there was an urgent motion to quash the
same by respondent Berdiago. 13 Then, on June 6, 1968, an opposition to said
motion to quash was filed by petitioner, based on the allegation of a violation of
Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 14 It was moreover pointed out
that respondent Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned the
dwelling house which was searched. 15 Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the
challenged order quashed such search warrant. 16Hence this
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To repeat, the plea of petitioner must be heeded. A case of a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge when he quashed the search warrant
had been shown. What lessens the gravity of such lapse from controlling
doctrines was the commendable attitude displayed in stressing the worth of a
constitutional right. Where attempts at evasion of payment of customs duties are
concerned, however, this Court has not been indisposed to he as receptive to
claims of its violation, especially where they rest on no substantial
basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. In the leading case of Papa v. Mago, 17 with Justice Zaldivar as ponente, there
is this pronouncement, which he aptly noted by the then Solicitor-General
Barredo, calls for application: "The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers
and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from
imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing
under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The
goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry." As long as the importation
has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. The record
shows, ... that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as
shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry"

and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination
and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. ... The articles contained in
the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture .... And this Court
has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is
subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to
seizure and forfeiture." 18 chanrobles virtual law library
2. Nor did Mago announce a novel doctrine. It is merely a recognition of the
state power to assure that fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers would be
doomed to failure. That same year in 1968, inAsaali v. Commissioner of
Customs, 19 the opinion stressed in rather emphatic language why it must be
thus: "The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize,
if not to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in
its wake would be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent
Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals,
were to be set aside and this appeal from the decision of the latter were to
succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not call for a contrary
conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the
government were not to be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an
admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed epidemic
proportions." 20Moreover, as far back as 1920, in Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 21 there was the explicit affirmation of the principle that "dutiable
articles on which the duties have not been paid" belong to a different category
from the search and seizure "of a man's private papers" as they "rightfully belong
to the custody of the law." 22 chanrobles virtual law library
3. There is this clarification of the matter in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar in
Mago "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The
Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The
Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Phils contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a

search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said 'dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ... .' It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. " 23 There is
justification then for the insistence on the part of private respondent that
probable cause be shown.24 So respondent Judge found in issuing the search
warrant. Apparently he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant
for seizure and detention came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent
Judge apparently overlooked that long before the search warrant was applied for,
to be specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration and underpayment was
already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself
agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum demanded. 25 As
the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police
Service 26 applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been
no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by
law noted in the Mago opinion namely to assess and collect all lawful revenues,
to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and
customs law would not have been performed. While therefore, it is to be
admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later, on July 5, 1968 to
be exact, than the search warrant, which was issued on May 30, 1968, there were
indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly there
was probable cause as defined in United States v. Addison, 27 Identifying it with
"such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious
man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper." 28 There was evidently need for the issuance of a search
warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter
quashed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. That is about all, except for a reference in the petition to an excerpt

from Carroll v. United States, 29tracing such an approach to the landmark Boyd
decision cited in Uy Kheytin. It was emphasized therein in the opinion of Chief
Justice Taft that what was said by Justice Bradley in Boyd stated the doctrine that
had gained approval and acceptance. It was summarized thus: "The seizure of
stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited
for a breach of the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on
them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and
the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the
commencement of the government." 30 It is not for this Court to do less than it
can to implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenues laws.
The evils associated with tax evasion must be stamped out - without any
disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any constitutional right. The facts, appreciated
in their true light, fail to show that the issuance of the search warrant
contravened the immunity against unreasonable search and seizure. Its being
quashed then amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of June 20, 1968 of
respondent Judge denying the petition for custody of the car by petitioner and
quashing the search warrant nullified and set aside. The writ of preliminary
mandatory injuction issued by this Court is maintained in full force and effect,
the custody and possession of the Rolls Royce car, model 1966, 2 door Hardtop
with Motor No. CRX 1379 to remain in the custody of the Customs authorities
until the termination according to law of the seizure and forfeiture proceeding.
Costs against private respondent.