Intelligence Community

Collaboration
Meaningful reform without more red tape.

Alan M. Taylor

Policy Recommendation • Brigham Young University • June 2, 2010

Political Science 377 - National Security Affairs
All Right Reserved © 2010, Alan Taylor
 Intelligence Community Collaboration: meaningful reform without more red tape

Historical Background

In the post 9/11 world, the United States faces a diverse collection of threats that rose to

fill the void left by the global-scale threats of the Soviet era. Such smaller, more numerous

threats have tested the capacities and culture of the United States intelligence agencies and made

it clear that adaptations are necessary to stay a step ahead of our enemies. The Cold War posture

held by the members of the intelligence community prepared them to face a host of state-

sponsored threats, conventional warfare, nuclear weapons proliferation, and large-scale conflicts

- but left them ill-equipped to confront the smaller decentralized threats. It is imperative, now

more than ever, to facilitate effective and swift collaboration among members of the intelligence

community, by incentivizing collaboration through an interface that utilizes cutting edge-

technology, and implementing a formalized, structured analysis process that decreases the

probability of discounting critical information.

Any meaningful reform measures that could be taken should take into account the history

of how the intelligence community has become what it is today. In the past 20 years, the

intelligence community has undertaken a number of evolutionary changes, attempting to adapt

the changing needs of the world in which it must operate. In that span of time, the principal

threat of the Cold War has disappeared, and terrorism has taken the place of preeminence among

the threats that the intelligence community is tasked with mitigating. Continuing efforts to adapt

to these growing threats have revealed shortcomings not only in each individual member of the
intelligence community, but more alarmingly in their lack of cohesion as a community. The

stubborn refusal of the branches of the armed services to cooperate led to the creation of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and it could be said that the perceived lack of cohesion among

members of the intelligence community was the impetus for the reforms that were put in place in

the years following 9/11. Operation Eagle Claw (which was an attempt to rescue the American

Embassy staff held prisoner in Iran), was akin to 9/11 for the intelligence community, in that both

were taken to be indicators that reforms were urgently needed in both cases. The intelligence

community has met with similar difficulties in fomenting willing collaboration among its

members as did the branches of the armed services prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Current US Policy

The inception of the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the National Security Act of

1947, and its charter as intelligence community ring-leader, was a step in the right direction; the

CIA was given the charge of acting as a central repository for intelligence collected and produced

by the individual members of the community, and its Director was given supervisory authority

over the other agencies in the community. Despite the authority that was given to the Director of

Central Intelligence -- who had the responsibility of coordinating and directing the intelligence

community at large in addition to the Central Intelligence Agency itself -- his jurisdiction

overlapped with the Defense Department, the State Department, and the FBI, among others. As

Richard Betts noted shortly after the occurrence of 9/11, and during the time when policy makers

were still ruminating over reform measures:

 The position of DCI was meant to centralize oversight of the dispersed

intelligence activities of the military services, the State Department, and the new

Central Intelligence Agency, and to coordinate planning and resource allocation

among them. The DCI'S ability to do so increased at times, but it was always

limited by the authority of the secretary of defense over the Pentagon's

intelligence agencies. (Betts, 2002, 55)

The source of the ‘failure of the intelligence’ could not be laid at the feet of the DCI alone, given

that his authority did not include the most important controls in a bureaucracy: budgetary

decisions, and hiring and firing of personnel. Even if he had exercised the full extent of his

authority to coordinate the efforts of the entire 16-member crew of the intelligence community,

he still lacked the authority needed to replace individuals who were not willing to play as a team,

and withdraw funding from those programs which were not contributing to the mission of the

intelligence community as set by the DCI. Ironically, the Secretary of Defense has more control

in this regard than the Director of Central Intelligence did -- nearly 80% of the members of the

intelligence community report to the Secretary of Defense, who controls not only their budget,

but has the final word in the hiring and firing of the directors of those agencies. From the start,

the Director of Central Intelligence had no truly effective tools at his disposal with which to

direct the efforts of the intelligence community at large. Enter the reform legislation of 2004,

now known as IRTPA, which created a provision for the establishment of the Directorate of

National Intelligence (designed to supersede the position and augment the authority of the DCI),

and the National Counter-Terrorism Center - the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention

Act of 2004.
 In a sense, IRTPA was two steps forward, and one step back. As Arthur Hulnick claimed,

IRTPA was “…a seriously flawed document that paid lip service to the demands of intelligence

reform, but it was mangled by conservatives in Congress and ignored by the White House during

legislative negotiations.” (Hulnick, 2008, 622) With the creation of the Directorate of National

Intelligence in 2005, the DNI (which supplanted the DCI) was given access to some of the

controls which should have been given to the Director of Central Intelligence in the National

Security Act of 1947, it also added another layer of red tape through which intelligence products

had to travel before they could be delivered to policy makers. Though the DNI was charged with

creating a unified mission for the members of the intelligence community, it still was given only

marginally more control over the budget, and personnel management of each of the agencies in

its jurisdiction. In essence, IRTPA failed to effectively resolve the organizational impediments to

making a truly cohesive community of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination.

Arguably, IRTPA did not produce what law-makers had hoped because it failed to take into

account the input from the members of the intelligence community which the 9/11 commission

discredited. Policymakers alone are not well enough equipped to determine what needs fixing in

the intelligence community. As Gibson warned in 2005, “The damage done to intelligence by

association with bad governance will surely prompt one of three responses for the intelligence

function: no change; fundamental change to reflect contemporary society; something in

between.” (Gibson, 2005, 29) The product of reforms which emanate from a body that is

sequestered from the entity which it is trying to improve, compounded by exposure to rashly-

considered agendas of each reelection-minded lawmaker, will sure fail to deliver the needed

adaptations which brought about failures in the first place. This failure, especially in the wake of
the reforms of 2004, are evident in the recent examples of the ‘Christmas Bomber’, and the

Times Square incident of May 2, 2010.

Future reforms will need to confront the most prominent of the problematic areas which

continue to plague the intelligence community, and bog down the production and timely

dissemination of intelligence products. First among these, is the capacity of the coordinating

force behind the intelligence community to establish a clear mission and objectives for all

members of the intelligence community. Implicit with this authority is the ability to enforce that

decision with budgetary measures, and making changes in the directing staff of each agency

when needed. This would need to include all those members of the intelligence community

which currently answer to the Secretary of Defense. As it currently stands, the Director of

National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of

State, and the Secretary of Energy share jurisdiction over respective members of the intelligence

community - with nearly 4 out of 5 of them under the Secretary of Defense. As long as the

responsibility for these agencies remains decentralized, it is fair to assume that the unified

mission that the DNI was designed to impose will remain elusive. Resolving disputes over

jurisdiction is not, however, easy to accomplish when there is no compelling urgency (such as

the crisis presented by 9/11) to ‘shake things up.’ Although the DNI was established as a

curative measure for organizational ills, rather than facilitating the flow of information in the

community, and rectifying the fundamental organizational flaws, the DNI has essentially become

a vaguely more authoritative target for blame. This is evident in the publicity surrounding the

resignation of Dennis Blair from the position of DNI following brief a tenure of just over a year,

during which the Christmas Bomber, and Times Square Bomber incidents took place. In the
wake of these two incidents, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued another report,

condemning the recurrence of intelligence failures in the Community, despite Blair’s efforts to

the contrary. The dilemma of the DNI is intractable in nature and yet, delaying reforms until

another catastrophic failure of intelligence were to occur would be to waste valuable time,

resources, personnel, and risk the unthinkable. Even in the event of a crisis of similar or greater

magnitude, it is not likely that the resulting evolution of the intelligence community will be able

to entirely sweep aside the flawed elements of the bureaucracy which currently govern it. If

jurisdiction remains decentralized, along with its respective budgetary controls, effective top-

down budgetary controls are likely out of the question. Fortunately for the intelligence

community (and those whom they serve and protect), a crisis is not necessary in order for some

less obtrusive, yet just as effective, adaptations to take place.

Whatever the ‘intelligence failure’ of 9/11 may be blamed on, it is clear that the

intelligence community was not blindsided by the threats that made September 11th synonymous

with terrorism. In the investigations that ensued, records indicated that members of the

intelligence community, including the Director of Central Intelligence, were well aware of

Osama bin Laden, and were moving to counter the threat al-Qaeda presented. George Tenet, then

holding the position of DCI, wrote a memo to members of the intelligence committee in

December of 1998, which stated the following: “We must now enter a new phase in our effort

against Bin Ladin. . . . We are at war . . . I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either

inside CIA or the Community.” (Zegart, 2005, 83) Without a doubt, they had access to useful

intelligence about the terrorist threats that were extant at the time.
 Strengths and Weaknesses of Current US Policy

If awareness of the threat wasn’t the source of the failure, then some other part of the

intelligence cycle must have broken down. It’s clear enough that they were able to collect

enough information about bin Laden and al-Qaeda, but were not able to anticipate the time and

location of the attacks of September 11th. Either in the collection process, or the analysis phase

the intelligence cycle hit a snag - the critical information of ‘when and where’ was not unearthed

in time to prevent the attacks. Analysts across the entire community were not able to discover,

amid the piles of information available to them, the sudden alteration of the status quo that the

terrorist attacks brought.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, policy makers clamored for ‘changes’ in the

intelligence community. However, as Zegart pointed out in 2005 regarding the intelligence

failure:

Change…is not the same as adaptation. As sociologists have long pointed out,

organizations are always changing. The key issue is whether those changes matter,

or more precisely, whether the rate of change within an organization keeps pace

(or lags behind) the rate of change in its external environment.

(Zegart, 2005, 82)

Rather than simply seeking for change, reforms should aim to produce adaptations which will

equip the agencies in question to avoid the same sorts of ‘failure’ of which they were repeatedly

accused after 9/11. Claims of intelligence failure will not magically disappear in the wake of a

reform. After all, as John Hedley pointed out, “…allegations of intelligence failure are a

‘given,’ if for no other reason than the fact that politicians and public servants abhor being
caught off guard.” (Hedley, 2005, 436) Whether labeled ‘change’ or ‘adaptation,’ reforms are

likely to meet with stiff resistance in implementation, due to the bureaucratic nature of the

organization they are designed to improve.

The bureaucratic framework of each of the agencies in the intelligence community often

acts as an inertial force that resists changes. The crisis of 9/11 proved to have enough

momentum to overcome the inertial forces of bureaucracy to push through a few changes in the

years following, but the resulting reforms were not the panacea that policy makers hoped they

would be. The families of 9/11 victims, the legislators whose constituents were affected, and

those who hold policymaking positions in the legislature that were specially concerned with

intelligence matters all had vested interests in ‘fixing’ the intelligence community. Barring the

occurrence of another crisis of the same magnitude (which, as we’ve seen, has produced hastily-

crafted, less-effective legislative reforms), intelligence community officials should look to other

methods of introducing needed adaptations. Instead of seeking to implement reform from the top

down, it’s time to look for solutions that come from the bottom and work their way up based on

merit. As difficult as it may be to encourage this sort of grass-roots mentality in a bureaucracy,

one advance in this arena has shown remarkable promise: the advent of Intellipedia.

Policy Recommendations

The advances in information technology have ushered in an era of rapid (indeed, often

instantaneous) communication - making it possible for organizations to perceive and respond to a

changing environment as quickly as information can travel. The ramifications of this capability

for the intelligence community are broad, but implementation of this capacity among members of

the intelligence community is far from optimal. The greatest benefits of maintaining a system of
rapid communication (both inter-, and intra-agency) will be realized in the innovation-friendly

environment it will create. With adaptations to changing external requirements, one can expect

some growing pains to accompany them - including some foul-ups that may continue to be

labeled ‘intelligence failures.’ As Betts noted, “The current crisis presents the opportunity to

override entrenched and outdated interests, to crack heads and force the sorts of consolidation

and cooperation that have been inhibited by bureaucratic constipation. On balance,

reorganization will help-but at a price: mistakes will increase, too.” (Betts, 2002, 52) While

mistakes may seem unacceptable when discussing the side-effects of reform, it should also be

noted that under no circumstances would it be reasonable to expect flawless performance from a

community that is tasked with global threat detection and mitigation. In the wake of his

resignation, Dennis Blair evinced his frustration with the challenges faced by the DNI the

intelligence community is “aggressively focused on potential threats" but "institutional and

technological barriers remain." (Washington Post, 21 May 2010) Countenancing errors may

prove to be less of a relapse, and more an necessary element of the evolution of the intelligence

community, as it strives to make necessary adaptations.

One assumption that should be done away with in order for the bureaucratic nature of the

intelligence community to shed its paralytic reaction to change and adaptation, is that innovation

must originate from senior levels of the community. Dr. Calvin Andrus, who has retrospectively

been credited with inspiring the development and implementation of the information-sharing

network now in use by the intelligence community, highlighted the importance of fostering an

environment where changes can originate from any level in the community. In 2005 he wrote:
 Much of the self-corrective knowledge in the Intelligence Community resides in

personal points of view. Currently, almost no official outlet exists for points of

view in the IC. A healthy market of debatable ideas emerges from the sharing of

points of view. From the ideas that prosper in a market will arise the adaptive

behaviors the Intelligence Community must adopt in order to respond to the

changing national security environment. Not all good ideas originate at the top.

(Andrus, 2005, 65)

Andrus’ call for an open exchange of ideas would allow anyone in the intelligence community

with access to the network to publish their own personal views about methods, practices,

policies, and accuracy of intelligence products - all without having to seek the approval of a

supervisor or section chief. Such a marketplace of ideas may be deemed as a threat to the status

quo; and so it is. However, those opposed to such an open-ended flow of ideas should also

realize that the preservation of the status quo represents a danger to the entire intelligence

community, precisely because it compels individuals to resist change even while their

environment changes around them. It was this sort of thinking that caused analysts to dismiss

the vital clues of ‘when and where’ for the attacks on September 11th, 2001. Continuing to

operate in such a rigid manner will quash any effective reform before it even gets off the ground;

as Richard Betts noted -

…expertise can get in the way of anticipating a radical departure from the norm,

because the depth of expert knowledge of why and how things have gone as they

have day after day for years naturally inclines the analyst to estimate that

developments will continue along the same trajectory. It is always a safer bet to
 predict that the situation tomorrow will be like it has been for the past dozen years

than to say that it will change abruptly. (Betts, 2002, 49)

The good news is, the technology is already in place to make information-sharing an integral part

of the way that the intelligence community gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence. In

lieu of attempting to perform a massive organizational shift of the leviathan intelligence

community, this network allows for individuals to circumvent the chain of command in order to

air their ideas for innovation and adaptation. The drawback to the existence of such a venue, of

course, is that the bad ideas will intermingle with good ones -- there will be no senior staff to vet

the contributions before they are circulated. Dr. Andrus admits that the creation of such a

marketplace of ideas “...may be one of the largest paradigm shifts ever for the IC. It will be

uncomfortable for some because it will be in the blogosphere where the Community will ride

along the edge of chaos,” but also that, “…for every 99 mediocre ideas, there will likely only be

one brilliant idea. A few brilliant ideas… are worth the investment of many mediocre (and

chaotic) ones. It is these few brilliant ideas that will provide the direction for the Community to

adapt to the changing national security environment.” (Andrus, 2005, 67) Such a network would

be much more cost effective than trying to effect a large-scale organizational coup, such as

placing all intelligence community members under the sole authority of the DNI. Simply

making this interaction possible will not be enough, however. Not long after his work was

published, an information sharing network (known as Intellipedia) styled after Wikipedia.org was

created to facilitate collaboration and the exchange of ideas among the members of the

intelligence community. While it has gained some notoriety among individuals in the

community, participation is still optional, and little formal recognition is afforded to those who
make valuable contributions. To see this marketplace of ideas reach its full potential as a

fountain of ideas for adaptation, the individuals who could contribute the most to the project will

likely need a tangible incentive to do so. As it stands right now, efforts expended by the

personnel in the intelligence community to update old information, create new information, and

collaborate with those in other agencies will only be reflected as an extra-curricular activity. It

currently plays no part in the Performance Annual Review (which evaluates the work of each

individual in each agency) even if the effort they expended in updating their wiki page, blog, or

other such page in the network was regarded as a landmark contribution to the corporate

knowledge base of the intelligence community. If their contributions, for better or for worse, to

the knowledge-base that Intellipedia encompasses were to become part of their PAR, then not

only could their valuable contributions be given formal recognition (even financial bonuses,

where exceptionally meritorious work is produced), and become a consideration when deciding

which personnel to promote, but it would also be the source of a tremendous incentive for each

individual to start making valuable inter-agency contributions.

The facilitation of interconnectivity between different agencies in the intelligence

community via Intellipedia has ramifications not only for the US Intelligence Corp, but

internationally as well. Despite the gargantuan budget of the Defense Department at the

intelligence community at large, it is not reasonable to assume that the assets at our disposal

could provide effective threat-detection coverage over every region of the world. Paradoxically,

where we need that coverage the most, we have the least ability to extend it: the Middle East, and

Southeast Asia. It’s not enough just to move in assets in the aftermath of a crisis, given that the

goal of the intelligence community is prevention, rather than retaliation. Regarding the relatively
sparse coverage that the US intelligence community had over the Middle East in the years

following 9/11, Stéphane Lefebvre wrote: “Given its human intelligence weaknesses in regions

such as the Middle East and Central Asia, the United States has no choice but to work with

friendly indigenous intelligence agencies.” (Lefebvre, 2003, 529) Despite our desire to do so, we

cannot be everywhere at once - which makes the ability to connect with allied intelligence

sources through a ubiquitous network all the more appealing. Where we find it difficult to place

intelligence assets, perhaps (collectively) our allies will find it easier. However, as is born out in

Lefebvre’s work, international collaborative intelligence efforts are not a new idea - and past

initiatives in this area have had mixed results. Perhaps the chief concern in opening Intellipedia,

or something like it, to international collaboration is “…the fear that the intelligence exchanged,

or knowledge acquired, through the relationship will be compromised or passed on to a third

party without the originator’s consent” and that “…the intelligence exchanged through a liaison

relationship could potentially be used for unintended purposes.” (Lefebvre, 2003, 535)

Unfortunately there is no shortage of historical examples of such incidents - Kim Philby, and A.

Q. Khan being two notable examples. Being able to cut through bureaucratic red tape in

collaborating with international intelligence agencies through an interface like Intellipedia has

much to offer in the way of preventing vital intelligence from slipping through the cracks in the

respective coverage of each. However, given the increased risk of a leak that such information-

sharing entails, intelligence organizations both within the US and around the globe would likely

limit the information they share to the narrow spectrum where the benefits of sharing outweigh

the risk of that information being compromised -- especially in light of recent successful cyber

attacks on the Indian Defense Ministry, where hackers were able to pilfer classified information
stored on a secure network. (New York Times, April 5, 2010). Sanitizing the information as a

protective measure would defeat the purpose of having an internationally-sanctioned

information-sharing network.

More important than the ability to share information, however, is the knowledge of what

to do with it after it has been collected, and before it is disseminated. As previously discussed,

the source of the 9/11 intelligence failure was not found to be any dearth of information, but

rather in the failure to recognize the most vital parts of the information that was obtained - to

(figuratively) separate the grain from the chaff. As Stephen Marrin wrote recently:

The literature on intelligence analysis frequently observes that analysis proceeds

at a frenetic pace, with information coming at analysts as if they were figuratively

drinking water from a fire hose. In addition, a frequent critique of the analytic

process is that it tends to emphasize short-term analytic reporting, known as

current intelligence, over longer analytic reports. This focus on current

intelligence has significantly eroded analysts’ ability to acquire topical expertise

because longer research reports are a primary means for an analyst to learn more

about a particular issue.” (Marrin, 2009, 133)

While acknowledging that expertise can sometimes lead to a routine of analysis that can serve to

preserve the status quo, it is also widely conceded that expertise is necessary in order to give

context to what is happening in the here and now. Expertise need not be eliminated in order for

effective analysis to occur - rather a new approach to analyzing current events while maintaining

a collective expertise is called for. While expertise may encompass the conventional wisdom on

a given topic or account, frequent exposure to a non-biased, formally structured analysis will
prevent the conventional wisdom from becoming too conventional. Speaking of a proposed

method of training incumbent and newly-minted analytical staff, Marrin remarked, “Analysts

only infrequently have the opportunity to think deeply and carefully about the issues they are

addressing. They therefore find various kinds of sabbaticals—such as rotation to a staff job or the

opportunity to pursue graduate education fulltime—to be conceptually refreshing.” (Marrin,

2009, 134) In some ways, a structured format of analysis (which takes into account the

conventional wisdom while preventing bias that would perpetuate the status quo) has already

seen implementation through training within each agency. Of this training, Marrin wrote:

“While the individual members of the U.S. Intelligence Community have been

creating analytic training centers, they have also begun to devote more attention

to the teaching and application of structured analytic techniques such as Analysis

of Competing Hypotheses, brainstorming, key assumptions check, red cell

analysis, devil’s advocacy, Team A=Team B, alternative futures, and others. In

contrast to the old way of doing analysis, which involved reading a lot and

coming to a judgment about the issue, based on the individual analyst’s expertise,

the new way of doing analysis involves the application of structured techniques,

which are more amenable to formal instruction. (Marrin, 2009, 133)

While neither formal training or increased inter-agency collaboration through Intellipedia (along

with a system of incentives for engaging in both) will produce a flawless performance from the

intelligence community, it will produce a marked improvement relative to the recent past. One

reason for this, is that it is designed to carry forward the worthwhile elements of analysis from
past experience - where in the past, this was done only informally at best. Marrin points out a

few of the weak points of an informal tradition of analysis-instruction:

Until now, intelligence analysis has been managed largely as a craft rather than as

a profession. Because of this, intelligence analysis has neither well defined

systemic formal knowledge—such as a coherent doctrine or theory—nor

standards that are formulated or enforced by other members of the profession.

Knowledge regarding intelligence analysis methods has not been cumulative, and

the various attempts to improve organizational performance have remained

isolated from other efforts. (Marrin, 2009, 139).

The marriage of both a formalized training which encourages objective analysis of available

data, and a democratized network where anyone in the intelligence community can engage in

inter-agency collaboration will serve not only to improve the current ability of intelligence

production, it will also integrate a framework which will keep the entire community abreast of

the changes that will inevitably occur in the future. At the very least, it will curb the occurrence

of human error, which have been blamed for the intelligence failures in the past year. While this

may seem cynical, the mandate of a crisis makes it easier to introduce larger-scale organizational

changes. For the interim, it may be easier to initiate changes from the ground up through wiki-

type interfaces like Intellipedia, and through training analysts in structural analysis which makes

it harder for the community at large to be caught by surprise when there is a change to the status

quo.

As always, with evaluating the effectiveness of reformative measures in the intelligence

community, it is not reasonable to expect a failure-free track record. No matter what resources
are thrown at the problem, it will likely never attain perfection at preventing the occasional

disaster from occurring. Rather than trying to achieve a perfect ‘batting-average’ (Betts, 2002),

or waiting for a disaster to create a mandate for sweeping change, realize that perfection is not

practical, and look for alternatives to organizational change that will decrease the slope of the

learning curve, and build a more unified intelligence community from the ground up.
 References:

Andrus, Calvin. 2005. Toward a complex adaptive intelligence community. https://www.cia.gov/

library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/

html_files/Wik_and_%20Blog_7.htm.

Betts, Richard K. 2002. Fixing intelligence. Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1: 43-59.

Gibson, Stevyn D. 2005. In the eye of the perfect storm: Re-imagining, reforming and refocusing

intelligence for risk, globalisation and changing societal expectation. Risk Management 7, no. 4:

23-41.

Hedley, John Hollister. 2005. Learning from intelligence failures. International Journal of

Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 18, no. 3: 435 - 450.

Hulnick, Arthur S. 2008. Intelligence reform 2008: Where to from here? International Journal of

Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 21, no. 4: 621 - 634.

Lefebvre, Stéphane. 2003. The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence

cooperation. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 16, no. 4: 527 - 542.

Markhoff, John. Barboza, David. "Researchers Trace Data Theft to Intruders in China" New

York Times, April 5, 2010.

Marrin, Stephen. 2009. Training and educating U.S. Intelligence analysts. International Journal

of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 22, no. 1: 131 - 146.

Miller, Greg. "Dennis Blair to Resign as Director of National Intelligence" Washington Post,

21 May 2010.

Zegart, Amy B. 2005. September 11 and the adaptation failure of U.S. Intelligence agencies.

International Security 29, no. 4: 78-111.