FEDERALIST NO.

10 (On Republics and Factions)

To the People of the State of New York:
IN governments by the people, factions are dangerous. The countrys main
advantage is its ability to break and control them.
By a faction, I mean a small or big group that is united and motivated by a purpose
that goes against the rights of others and/or their community. There are two cures for
faction: (1) remove its causes, (2) control its effects. And there are two ways to remove
the causes: (1) destroy liberty and (2) give everyone the same opinions.
The first cure is worse than the disease. To abolish liberty because it creates faction
makes as much sense as abolishing air because it supports fire. And the second cure, as
long as our mental powers arent perfect, and we are free to use them, people will have
different opinions... Because people have different talents and abilities the reason some
people make more money than others also prevent us from having the same opinions
In short, causes of faction cannot be removed but only (hopefully) controlled to minimize
its effects
From this, you may conclude that a democracy, where people govern in person, cannot
fix the problems of factionsA republic where people make decisions through elected
representatives offers the cureThe two great differences between a democracy and a
republic are: 1. The small number of representatives elected to government by the people.
2. The greater number of people, and bigger territory, over which the republic may
extend. The first difference clarifies public opinion by taking a whole bunch of opinions
and mashing it into a few opinions (representatives), whose wisdom can best make sense
of the countrys true interest, and is least likely to ignore that interest for the sake of
doing whats convenient In controlling faction, a large republic like the proposed
United States has the same advantage over a small republic that any republic holds over a
pure democracy: the ability to place many strong obstacles in the way of selfish
majorities
On the other hand, the effect may be reversed. Dishonest men may use trickery,
bribery or other ways to win elections and then betray the peoples interests. This raises
the question whether small or large republics can elect better representatives. Larger
republics are the best choice, because: A. However small, the republic must have enough
representatives to outweigh the few bad ones. B. However large, representatives must be
few enough to avoid the confusion of over-representation. So, if the ratio of good
candidates in the large republic equals that in the small, the large republic will offer more
choices and a better chance to elect a good representative group.

FEDERALIST NO. 44 (on the Elastic Clause)

3. The power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Article I
Section 8 (18) of the U.S. Constitution (Congress has the power to make all the laws it
needs to in order to do its job)
Few parts of the suggested Constitution have been attacked more extremely than this. Yet
without this power, the Constitution would be a dead letter (worthless). People who
attack it, therefore, can only mean that the way its written is wrong. But what better way
could replace it? There are four other ways the convention could have done this.
(1) Copying Article II of the Articles of Confederation, not letting Congress do anything
that the Constitution does not specifically say it can do. (2) Try to list exactly what is
necessary and proper. (3) Trying to list exactly what is not necessary and proper. (4)
Dont say anything about what is necessary and proper and leave it for Congress to
interpret.
If the convention used method (1), the new Congress, like the old, would be forced
to interpret the term specifically (a) so strictly that they strip the government of all real
authority or (b) so broadly so that specifically really has no meaning.
Since the new government has bigger and broader powers than it did under the
Articles of Confederation, it would have to choose between betraying the public by doing
nothing or going against the Constitution by using powers that may be necessary and
proper, but not specifically given.
If the convention listed, item by item, the powers necessary and proper for Congress
to carry out its functions (its job), it would have to include every law on every subject to
that the Constitution applies to, making sure to account for all existing and all possible
future conditions.
If they tried to name the exact powers not necessary or proper for carrying out their
functions, the job would have been just as difficult as trying to list all the powers that
were necessary and proper. If, to avoid this silliness, they had tried to list just some of the
powers that are not necessary and proper, they would only include the ones that nobody
would have thought were necessary and proper anyway.
If you ask what will happen if Congress deleted this part of the Constitution, and
uses powers that are not necessary, I answer: the same as if any government should abuse
any other Constitutional power.

FEDERALIST No. 47 (On Tyranny)

Some people say that the way the branches are organized puts some branches in
danger because other branches have more powersThe objection is based on a valuable
political truth: Putting all of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the same
hands may be considered tyranny.
If the federal Constitution were set up in a way where the powers were mashed all
together into one branch of government, then it would deserve to be criticized. But this is
not the case, and those who are against the Constitution misunderstand how the
separation of powers works. To understand this important issue, one must understand the
reasons liberty depends on separation.
The prophet always consulted and cited on this subject is Baron de Montesquieu,
(1689-1755), the philosopher and law expert who helped lead the early French
Enlightenment era. Montesquieu saw the English Constitution as the model that
constitutional governments should follow. (In England) The chief executive (the prime
minister) is essential to legislative branch The judges often attend and participate in
Parliamentary discussions, but they dont vote on laws.
From these facts, we can assume that, in saying There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or group of officials, or,
if the power of judging isnt separated from the legislative and executive powers,
Montesquieu did not mean that these branches should never cooperate with or influence
each other.
The president (in America) with the whole executive power cannot alone make
laws, but he can veto them, nor can he oversee justice (judge) in person, though he
appoints those who do. Judges can take no executive action, though their power results
from executive action (the president appoints judges). Nor can they make laws, though
lawmakers may advise them. The legislative branch cant decide on a judicial case, but it
can remove judges from office.
Montesquieus reasoning on separation also demonstrates his meaning. He says:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or group, there
can be no liberty, because situations may arise where we would like to avoid the same
monarch or senate making tyrannical laws and executing them in a tyrannical manner.
Again:
If the judicial branch joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the people
would be exposed to random control, because the judge would also be the lawmaker.
Were it joined to the executive branch, the judge might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor.

FEDERALIST NO. 51 (On the Power of the Federal Government)

To effectively separate the powers which everyone agrees is essential to our
liberty it is obvious that each branch must have a will of its own and be made so that its
members have as little power or influence as possible in appointing members of the
others.
But the best way to prevent the executive, legislative and judicial powers combining
into one branch is to give the leaders of each branch the tools and motivation to
fight off the others Human nature shows that we need to control government abuses.
But government itself shows human nature better than anything else. If men were angels,
no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, controls on
government would not be necessary. The great difficulty in building a government to be
run by men over men is that, first, the government must be able to govern the governed
and, second, it must be forced to control itself.
In republican governments the legislative branch is naturally the strongest branch.
The way to check and balance power within the legislative branch is to divide it into
different parts we call them Houses and make sure that each house is as
independent of each other as possible. And even these safeguards within the legislative
branch may not be enough.
As the strength of the legislative branch requires that it be divided, the weakness of
the executive branch may require that it be strengthened. An absolute power to reject or
veto laws seems, at first glance, the executives natural weapon or check on the
legislative branch In a regular republic (i.e., without the state governments that is
normal in America), all power to run the federal government is given up by the people
and abuses are controlled by dividing the government into separate parts. In Americas
compound republic, the peoples power is first divided between two governments
federal and State and then the portion of authority allotted to each is subdivided among
distinct, separate branches. This gives the peoples rights a double security: (a) The
different governments control each other and (b) each is controlled by itself.

FEDERALIST NO. 84 (On the Bill of Rights)

Most important of these arguments against the new Constitution is that it contains
no bill of rightsBills of rights began as agreements between kings and subjects to make
sure the people would keep certain rights not given to the king. An example is the
MAGNA CARTA, acquired by the barons, sword in hand, from King John.
It is obvious, then, that they do not apply to constitutions based on the power of the
people and carried out by their direct representatives. Here, strictly speaking, the people
give up nothing and, as they keep everything, they have no need for a bill of rights. We,
the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ORDAIN and ESTABLISH this Constitution for the United States of
America.
Furthermore, I argue that bills of rights are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would be dangerous. They dont allow the government to use powers
that it is not given and, thereby, create a excuse for the government to claim more powers
than were granted. Why declare that things cant be done for which there is no power to
do them? Why, for instance, should we say that freedom of the press will not be limited
when no power is given to enforce limits?...
There is one remaining view of this matter. After all is said, the Constitution is
itself, a BILL OF RIGHTS And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the
countrys bill of rights. Isnt one purpose of a bill of rights to state and spell out the
citizens political rights in the organization and process of the government? This is
precisely done in the Constitution, including various safety measures for public security
not found in any State constitution.
Rightly so, Americans are convinced that Union is the basis of their political
happiness. Reasonable men of all parties, with few exceptions, agree that the
present system (Articles of Confederation) cant save it without major changes, that we
should give the national government new, wider powers under a different system because
it is unsafe to hand over such powers to a single group.

FEDERALIST No. 69 (On the Executive Branch)

If we compare how public or out in the open the appointments by the President and
an entire House of Congress are with the privacy in the New York state government
with the governor hidden in a secret apartment with at most four and often two people
and if we also consider how much easier it must be to influence those few people, there is
no doubt the governors power outweighs the Presidents.
So, except for his treaty-making power, it would be difficult to determine whether
the President or our governor would have more power. There is no question the British
king has far more power and the difference is more obvious in this comparison:
The President of the United States would be elected for four years; the king is a king for
life, and when he dies, his son takes over.
The President could be punished (impeached) and disgraced; the king cannot be
punished.
The President can veto laws passed by Congress, but Congress can override his veto;
Parliament (British Congress) cannot override the kings veto.
The President would command the national army and navy; so does the king, who can
also declare war.
The President can make treaties as long as he gets the okay from the Senate; the king
makes treaties all by himself.
The President would be able to nominate ambassadors and Supreme Court Justices, but
he would the okay from the Senate; the king makes all appointments all by himself.
The President can do no favors for anyone; the king can grant citizenship to immigrants
and make noblemen of commoners.
The President has no power over trade or money; the king has in many ways the final
say over trade, and setting weights and measures, setting taxes on trade, and printing
money.
The President has no power over religion; the king is the head of the Church of
England.
What can we say to people that claim these two people are the same? Well say the
same thing we tell those who claim that a government that is run by elected servants of
the people is a monarchy.