FBDC v.

CIR
ONE LINE: Administrative rule or regulation
cannot contravene the law on which it is
based. (
Sec.4.105-1 of RR 7-95 is an administrative rule
and regulation implementing an existing law
Term used inTanada v Tuvera)
NATURE:
Motion for Reconsideration of SCs Decision dated
April 2, 2009 which granted the
consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation (Corp.) where the C CIR
was (1) restrained from collecting from the Corp. the
amount of P28,413,783.00 representing the
transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth
quarter of 1996; and (2) directed to refund to the
Corp. the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as output
VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the
persisting transitional input tax credit available to
the Corp. for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit
corresponding to such amount.
FACTS:
In the April 2, 2009 Decision, which is what CIR
wants to be reconsidered in this case, the
Courtstruck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for
being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR had
no power tolimit the meaning and coverage of the
term"goods"in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans
statutory authority or basis and justification to make
such limitation. This it did when it restricted the
application of Section 105 in thecase of real estate
dealers only to improvements on the real property
belonging to their beginning inventory.
ISSUES:
1. WON CIR Revenue Regulations 7-95
validly repealed Section 105 as amended by
EO273.2. WON CIR
Revenue Regulations #6-97 repealed CIR Revenue
Regulations #7-95
HELD:
1. NO, admin rule and reg less than statutes 2.
YES, no repealing cause does not mean alack of
intent to repeal.
1. + EO No. 273 [1987] contains first VAT law.It
amended several provisions of the InternalRevenue
Code of 1986 (Old NIRC). In anticipation of the

probable burdens of the shift to the VAT system

itallowed newly VAT-registered persons to avail of a
transitional input tax creditas provided for in
Section105 of the Old NIRC. Section 105 as amended
by EO 273.
Sec. 105. Transitional Input Tax Credits. A person
who becomes liable to value-added tax or any
person who elects to bea VAT-registered person shall,
subject to the filing of an inventory as prescribed by
regulations, be allowed input tax on his beginning
inventory of goods, materials and supplies
equivalent to 8% of the value of such inventory or
the actual value-added tax paid on such goods,
materials and supplies, whichever is higher, which
shall be creditable against the output tax.
+ RA 7716 [1996] - amended Sec. 100 of Old NIRC
by imposing for the first time
value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The
amendment basically states that a 10% VAT shall be
imposed upon goods or propertiesamong others. It
clarified that the term goods and properties shall
mean all tangible and intangible objects which are
capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of
trade or business; xxx However, RA 7716 did not
amend the provisions of SEC 105 of the Old NIRC,
regarding transitional input tax credit.
Taxation; Transitional input tax credit; Prior payment
of taxes is not a prerequisite before a taxpayer could
avail of the transitional input tax credit. To reiterate,
prior payment of taxes is not necessary before a
taxpayer could avail of the 8% transitional input tax
credit. This position is solidly supported by law and
jurisprudence, viz:
First. Section 105 of the old National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) clearly provides that for a
taxpayer to avail of the 8% transitional input tax
credit, all that is required from the taxpayer is to file
a beginning inventory with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). It was never mentioned in Section
105 that prior payment of taxes is a requirement.
Second. Since the law (Section 105 of the NIRC) does
not provide for prior payment of taxes, to require it
now would be tantamount to judicial legislation
which, to state the obvious, is not allowed.
Third. A transitional input tax credit is not a tax
refund per se but a tax credit. Logically, prior
payment of taxes is not required before a taxpayer
could avail of transitional input tax credit. As we

have declared in our September 4, 2012 Decision,

[t]ax credit is not synonymous to tax refund. Tax
refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer
overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority.
Tax credit, on the other hand, is an amount
subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. It is
any amount given to a taxpayer as a subsidy, a
refund, or an incentive to encourage investment.
MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP v.
COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNALREVENUEMINDANAO I GEOTHERMAL
PARTNERSHIP v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNALREVENUE
DOCTRINE:
SUMMARY OF RULES ON PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS
INVOLVING VAT(1) An administrative claim must be
filed with the CIR within two years after the close
of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sales were made.(2) The CIR
has 120 days from the date of submission of
complete documents insupport of the administrative
claim within which to decide whether to grant a
refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day
period may extend beyond the two-year period from
the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is
filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the
120-day period expires without any decision from the
CIR, then the administrative claim may be considered
denied by inaction(3) A judicial claim must be filed
with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the
CIRs decision denying the administrative claim, or
from the expiration of the 120-dayperiod without any
action from the CIR.(4) All taxpayers, however, can
rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its
issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by
this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an
exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional
120+30 day periods.
FACTS:
Mindanao I and II (Mindanao) are value-added
taxpayers, and Block Power Production Facilities
accredited by the Department of Energy. They had a
Build-Operate-Transfer contract with the Philippine
National Oil Corporation EnergyDevelopment
Company (PNOC-EDC), whereby Mindanao converts
steam supplied to itby PNOC-EDC into electricity, and
then delivers the electricity to the National
Power Corporation (NPC) in behalf of PNOC-EDC.The
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2000 (EPIRA,
RA 9136), amended theTax Reform Act of 1997 (RA
8424), when it decreed that sales of power by

generationcompanies shall be subjected to a zero

rate of VAT. Pursuant to EPIRA, Mindanao Iand II filed
their claims for the issuance of tax credit certificates
on unutilized or excessinput taxes from their sales of
generated power and delivery of electric capacity
andenergy to NPC.
The CTA En Banc denied Mindanao IIs claims for
refund tax credit for the firstand second quarters of
2003, and Mindanao Is claims for refund/tax credit
for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of
2003, for being filed out of time.The following are
relevant dates:
MINDANAO ll GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.
193301 and G.R. No. 194637, March 11, 2013
Taxation; prescriptive periods to file VAT refund. We
summarize the rules on the determination of the
prescriptive period for filing a tax refund or
credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in
Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code, as follows:
(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR
within two years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
sales were made.
(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission
of complete documents in support of the
administrative claim within which to decide whether
to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The
120-day period may extend beyond the two-year
period from the filing of the administrative claim if
the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year
period. If the 120-day period expires without any
decision from the CIR, then the administrative claim
may be considered to be denied by inaction.
(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within
30 days from the receipt of the CIRs decision
denying the administrative claim or from the
expiration of the 120-day period without any action
from the CIR.
(4) All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10
December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in
Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the
mandatory and jurisdictional 120+30 day periods.
Dissension in the Court: February 2013
The primary issue in the three (3) consolidated cases
involving San Roque Power, Taganito Mining and
Philex Mining decided last February 12, 2013
revolves around the proper period for filing the

judicial claim for refund or credit of creditable input

tax. Under Section 112(A) and 112(C) of the Tax
Code, a taxpayer whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated can file his administrative claim
for refund or credit at anytime within two (2) years
after the taxable quarter when the sales were made
and, after full or partial denial of the claim or failure
of the Commissioner to act on his application within
120 days from submission of the same, he may,
within 30 days from receipt of the decision denying
the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day
period, file his judicial claim with the CTA.
These cases all involved the timely filing by the
taxpayers of their administrative claims with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. However, San
Roque and Taganito both prematurely filed their
judicial claims without waiting for the 120-day period
(for the Commissioner to act on their administrative
claims) to lapse, whereas Philex was a case of late
filing since it did not file its judicial claim until after
426 days beyond the 120 + 30 day periods. Voting 9
to 6, the majority, in a decision penned by Justice
Carpio, denied tax refund or credit to San Roque and
Philex, but granted the same to Taganito.
The majority denied refund to San Roque on the
basis, among others, that the waiting period for filing
a judicial claim is mandatory and jurisdictional and
has been in the Tax Code for more than 15 years
before San Roque filed its judicial claim in April 10,
2003 (barely 13 days after it filed its administrative
claim). The majority, however, granted refund to
Taganito who, although like San Roque filed its
judicial claim without waiting for the 120-day period
to lapse, was deemed to have filed its judicial claim
on time since it was filed on February 14, 2007 or
after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on
December 10, 2003 (which states that the taxpayer
need not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before
it could seek judicial relief with the CTA) but before
the October 6, 2010 Supreme Court (SC) decision in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia (reinstating the 120+30 day
periods as mandatory and jurisdictional). The
majority held that since the Commissioner has
exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret tax
laws under Section 4 of the Tax Code, a taxpayer
should not be prejudiced by an erroneous
interpretation by the Commissioner and, under
Section 246, a reversal of a BIR ruling cannot
adversely prejudice a taxpayer like Taganito who in
good faith relied on it prior to its reversal.
In denying Philexs judicial claim for refund filed on
October 17, 2007, the majority ruled that the
inaction of the Commissioner during the 120-day
period is a deemed denial and Philexs failure to
file an appeal within 30 days from the expiration of
the 120-day period rendered the deemed denial
decision of the Commissioner final and inappealable.

In his dissenting opinion, J. Velasco, joined by J.

Mendoza and J. Perlas-Bernabe, suggested that the
doctrine applicable to a claim for refund depends on
the operative case and the prevailing rulings and
practices at the time of filing the claim. In San Roque,
since both the administrative and judicial claims
were filed during the effectivity of RR 7-95 (which still
applied the 2-year prescriptive period to judicial
claims), San Roque can claim good faith reliance on
RR 7-95 and the then prevailing practices of the BIR
and CTA to believe that the 120 + 30-day periods are
dispensable so long as both administrative and
judicial claims are filed within the 2-year period. In
denying refund to Taganito, however, the dissenter
pointed out that Taganito cannot claim reliance in
good faith on RR 7-95 since it filed its judicial claim
after November 1, 2005 when RR 16-2005 took effect
and superseded RR 7-95 (including BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 relied upon by the majority in granting
refund to Taganito and which this dissenter believed
was a mere application of RR 7-95), deleting the
reference therein to the 2-year period for filing
judicial claims. Philex, on the other hand, filed its
claim belatedly under both the superseded RR 7-95
and the effective RR 16-2005. This dissenter thus
voted to grant refund to San Roque, but to deny it to
Taganito and Philex.
In his separate dissenting opinion, CJ Sereno,
concurred with J. Velascos dissent in San Roque and
Philex but disagreed with the latters stand in
Taganito since, at the time Taganito filed its
administrative and judicial claims for refund, the 2year prescriptive period remained the un reversed
interpretation of the court. Thus, Taganito cannot be
faulted for relying on court interpretations even with
the existence of RR 16-2005, and for preferring to
abide by court interpretations over mere
administrative issuances as the latters validity is still
subject to judicial determination. This dissenter
believed that the mandatory and jurisdictional nature
of the 120+30 day periods was only definitely and
categorically declared by the SC in Aichi on October
6, 2010 and should only be applied prospectively
from that time, and that previous regard to the
120+30-day periods is an exceptional circumstance
which warrants procedural liberality to taxpayers
who relied on such interpretations.
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Leonen, joined
by J. del Castillo, disagreed that SC interpretations of
the law take effect only prospectively, since the SCs
duty is to construe and not to make law, and its
interpretation became part of the law from the date
it was originally passed. This dissenter further
reminds us that an erroneous application of the law
by public officers does not preclude a subsequent
correct application of the statute, and the
Government is never estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its agents. Accordingly, while the
Commissioner is given power and authority to
interpret tax laws, it cannot legislate guidelines
contrary to the law it is tasked to implement. Hence

its interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored

if judicially found to be erroneous. And while
concededly any reversal of any BIR ruling cannot
adversely prejudice a taxpayer who in good faith
relied on it prior to its reversal, if it is patently clear
that the ruling is contrary to the text itself, there can
be no reliance in good faith. Further, that it is the
duty of the lawyers of private parties to best discern
the acceptable interpretation of legal text and, in
doing so, they take the risk that the SC will rule
otherwise, especially if the text of the law as in this
case is very clear. This dissenter thus voted to deny
refund to all three taxpayers.
CIR v. sony
FACTS:
Sony Philippines was ordered examined for the
period 1997 and unverified prior years as indicated
in the Letter of Authority. The audit yielded
assessments against Sony Philippines for deficiency
VAT and FWT, viz: (1) late remittance of Final
Withholding Tax on royalties for the period January to
March 1998 and (2) deficiency VAT on reimbursable
received by Sony Philippines from its offshore
affiliate, Sony International Singapore (SIS).
ISSUES:
(1) Is Petitioner liable for deficiency Value Added Tax?
(2) Was the investigation of its 1998 Final
Withholding Tax return valid?
HELD:
(1) NO. Sony Philippines did in fact incur expenses
supported by valid VAT invoices when it paid for
certain advertising costs. This is sufficient to accord
it the benefit of input VAT credits and where the
money came from to satisfy said advertising billings
is another matter but does not alter the VAT effect. In
the same way, Sony Philippines can not be deemed
to have received the reimbursable as a fee for a VATtaxable activity. The reimbursable was couched as an
aid for Sony Philippines by SIS in view of the
companys dire or adverse economic conditions.
More importantly, the absence of a sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties supports the nonVAT nature of the reimbursement. This was
distinguished from the COMASERCO case where even
if there was similarly a reimbursement-on-cost
arrangement between affiliates, there was in fact an
underlying service. Here, the advertising services
were rendered in favor of Sony Philippines not SIS.
(2) NO. A Letter of Authority should cover a taxable
period not exceeding one year and to indicate that it
covers unverified prior years should be enough to

invalidate it. In addition, even if the Final Withholding

Tax was covered by Sony Philippines fiscal year
ending March 1998, the same fell outside of the
period 1997 and was thus not validly covered by the
Letter of Authority.
LVM v. ft sanchez
FACTS.:
LVM Construction Corporation (LVM) is a duly licensed
construction firm primarily engaged in the
construction of roads and bridges for DPWH
LVM was awarded the construction of the Arterial
Road Link Development Project in Southern Leyte
(the Project)
It sub-contracted 30% of the contract amount with the
Joint Venture composed of respondents F.T.Sanchez
Corporation (FTSC), Socor Construction Corporation (SCC)
and Kimwa Construction Development Corporation (KCDC)
LVM was the Contractor and the Joint Venture as SubContractor The Sub-Contract Agreement executed
by the parties provided that:
3)payment to the SUB-CONTRACTOR shall be on
item of work accomplished in the sub-contracted
portion of the project at awarded unit cost of the project
less 9%. The SUB-CONTRACTOR shall issue a BIR
registered receipt to the CONTRACTOR
4)10% retention to be deducted for every billing of
sub-contractor as prescribed under the Tender
Documents.
13) The payment to the SUB-CONTRACTOR shall
be made within seven (7) days after the check
issued by DPWH to CONTRACTOR has already
been made good
For work rendered in the premises, Joint Venture sent
LVM a total of 27 Billings LVM paid the Joint
Venture a partial sum claiming that it had not yet
been fully paid by the DPWH
Having completed the sub-contracted works, the
Joint Venture subsequently demanded from LVM
the settlement of its unpaid claims as well as the
release of money retained by the latter in
accordance with the Sub-Contract Agreement.
In a letter, LVM explained the Joint Venture of the fact
that its auditors have belatedly discovered that no
deductions for E-VAT had been made from its
payments on Billing Nos. 1 to 26 and that it was,
as a consequence, going to deduct the 8.5%
payments for said tax from the amount still duein
the premises
The Joint Venture claimed that, having issued Official
Receipts for every payment it received, it was
liable to pay 10% VAT thereon and that LVM can,

in turn, claim therefrom an equivalent inputtax of

10%.
With its claims still unpaid despite the lapse of more
than 4 years from the completion of the subcontracted works, the
Joint Venture, thru its Managing Director,
Fortunato O. Sanchez, Jr., filed against LVM
complaint for sum of money and damages which
was docketed before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission
Having submitted a Bill of Particulars in response
to LVMs motion, Joint Venture went on to file an
Amended Complaint claiming amounts of unpaid
balances and interests as well as attorneys fees
LVM maintained that it did not release the 10%
retention for the 26 Billing on the ground that it
had yet to make the corresponding 8.5%
deductions for E-VAT which the Joint Venture
should have paid to the BIR and as a
consequence, there was a need to offset the
sums corresponding thereto from the retention
money still in its possession.
Moreover, LVM alleged that the Joint Ventures
claims failed to take into consideration its own
outstanding obligation
representing the liquidated damages it incurred
as a consequence of its delays in the completion
of the project

CIACs decision: granted the Joint Ventures

claims for the payment of the retention money
for the 26 billings as well as the interest and
also the unpaid balance billing.

CIAC ALSO DISREGARDED THE

CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR
LVMS CLAIM THAT IT HAD THE RIGHT TO
OFFSET ITS E-VAT PAYMENTS FROM THE
RETENTIONMONEY STILL IN ITS POSSESSION
AND RULED THAT THE VAT DEDUCTIONS THE
DPWHMADE FROM ITS PAYMENTS TO LVM
WERE FOR THE WHOLE PROJECT AND
ALREADYINCLUDED ALL ITS SUPPLIES AND
SUBCONTRACTORS
Instead of withholding said retention
money, LVM was determined to have to its
credit and for its use the input VAT
corresponding to the 10% equivalent VAT
paid by the Joint Venture based on the BIRregistered official receipts it issued.
Finding that the delays incurred by the Joint
Venture were justified, the CIAC likewise
denied LVMs counterclaim for liquidated
damages for lack of contractual basis.18\

LVM appealed to CA but the latter upheld

CIACs rejection of LVMs insistence on the
offsetting of
E-VAT payments from the retention money, it
ruled that there was no provision in the SubContract Agreement that would hold
Sanchez liable for EVAT on the amounts paid
to it by LVM.
As pointed out by the CIAC, the contract
documents provide only for the payment of
the awarded cost of the project less 9%. Any
other deduction must be clearly stated in
the provisions of the contract or upon
agreement of the parties. xxx The tribunal
finds no provision that EVAT will be deducted
from the sub-contractor. xxx If [the Joint
Venture] should pay or share in the payment
of the EVAT, it must be clearly defined in the
subcontract agreement.
CIAC pointed out that Sanchez was required
to issue official receipts registered with the
BIR for every payment LVM makes for the
progress billings, which it did.
For these official receipts issued by Sanchez
to LVM, Sanchez already paid 10% VAT to
the BIR, thus: The VAT Law is very clear.
Everyone must pay 10% VAT based on their
issued official receipts.
These receipts must be official receipts and
registered with the BIR.
LVM must pay its output Vat based on its
receipts
Complainant (Sanchez) must also pay
output VAT based on its receipts
The law however allow each entity to
deduct the input VAT based on the official
receipts issued to it. Thus, LVM has to its
credit the 10% output VAT paid by Joint
Venture based on the official receipts
issued to it. LVM can use this input VAT to
offset any output VAT LVM must pay for any
of its other projects."

ISSUE S
1.WON respondents liability to pay value added tax need not
be stated in the sub-contract agreement form part of, and are
deemed incorporated and read into said agreement. (YES)
2.WON respondents are deemed to have already paid value
added tax merely because respondents had allegedly issued
receipts for services rendered.
R U L I N G : The petition is bereft of merit.
1st ISSUE: FOR LACK OF ANY STIPULATION
REGARDING THE SAME IN THE PARTIES SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT, SC RULED THAT SHOULD
NOT DEDUCT ITS E-VATPAYMENTS FROM THE
RETENTION MONEY DEMANDED BY THE JOINT
VENTURE.

a contract constitutes the law between the

parties who are, therefore, bound by its
stipulations which, when couched in clear and
plain language, should be applied according
to their literal tenor
there was no agreement regarding the offsetting
The record shows that, except for deducting sums
corresponding to the 10% retention agreed upon,9%
as contingency on sub-contract, 1% withholding tax
and such other itemized miscellaneous expenses,
LVM settled the Joint Ventures Billing Nos. 1 to 26
without any mention of deductions for the E-VAT
payments it claims to have advanced. It was, in
fact LVMs Managing Director, Andres C.Lao,
explained (in a letter) the Joint Venture in
writing of its intention to deduct said
payments
From the letter, it is evident that LVM
unilaterally broached its intention of
deducting the subject E-VAT payments only
on 15 May 2001 or long after the projects
completion on 9 July 1999
In the absence of any stipulation thereon,
however, the CA correctly disallowed the
offsetting of said sums from the retention
money undoubtedly due the Joint Venture.
Courts are obliged to give effect to the
parties agreement and enforce the contract
to the letter
San Roque v. CIR
FACTS: San Roque, a corporation engaged in
operating power-generating plants and under
contract with the Govt., allegedly had unutilized
input VAT credits in2007. On May 28, 2008, it filed
an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input
VAT for the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2007 (first claim),
and another admin claim for unutilized VAT credit for
the 3rd and 4th quarters on March 30, 2009 (second
claim) with the CIR. In view of CIRs inaction and to
suspend the running of 2-year prescriptive period, it
filed a judicial claim with the CTA on March 13, 2009
for the first claim and on June 26, 2009 for the
second claim.
HELD: The 30-day period within which to file an
appeal with the CTA as provided in Sec 112 of NIRC
is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith would
bar the appeal and deprive the CTA of
its jurisdiction.Such period is not merely directory but
mandatory and it is beyond the power of the courts
to extend the same. This rule applies to cases of tax
refund or issuance of tax credit certificate where the
taxpayer may, within 30 days upon receipt of

decision denying the claim or after expiration of

120 days, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the CTA. Both administrative claims were filed
on time. However, the judicial claim forthe first claim
was filed out of time or 140 days after the filing of
admin claim beyond the 120-day period. On the
other hand, the second
judicial claim was prematurely
filed, or only after 88 days from filing
of the administrative claim
LUZON Hydro Corp v. CIR
Facts: LHC is duly registered as a VAT taxpayer. A
Power Purchase Agreement(PPA) with the Napocor
was entered into by The Consortium of Northern Mini
Hydro Corp.; Ever Electrical Manufacturing Inc.;
Aboitiz Equity Ventures Inc; Pacific Hydro Limited.
The PPP was for the development of Bakun
hydroelectric facilities.LHC filed administrative claim
with BIR for refund of its unutilized VAT from June to
September 2006 in the amount of P4,151,852.39.CTA
3rd Division: Dismissed the claim for having been
filed beyond the 30-day period for claiming
refund.Issue: WON the administrative and judicial
claim were filed within the reglementary period
allowed by law. The administrative claim was filed
within the reglementary period of 2 years from the
close of the taxable quarter, the judicial claim was
filed beyond the period mandated under Section 112
(C).Note: This case only discussed procedural issues
as regards the mandatory period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration which is 15 days. When a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable and any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and
executor judgment, is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for
that purpose
.Held: The assailed decision was received by LHC on
November 26, 2010 and petitioner had 15 days or
until December 11, 2010 to file its Motion for
Reconsideration. However, petitioner filed its motion
only on December 22, 2010 or nine days after the
lapse of the prescribed period.