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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA

AMERICAN CAPITAL ASSURANCE


CORP., a Florida Corporation,

Appellant,

vs. DCA Case No.: 1D09-2940


Lower Tribunal Case No.:
COURTNEY MEADOWS 2008-CA-16821
APARTMENTS, LLP,
A Florida Corporation,

Appellee.
__________________________________/
_____________________________________________________________

REPLY/CROSS-APPEAL ANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLANT


AMERICAN CAPITAL ASSURANCE CORP.
_____________________________________________________________

Appeal of Non-Final Order from the Circuit Court (Hugh A. Carithers, J.)
of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida
_____________________________________________________________

GUY E. BURNETTE, JR., ESQ.


Florida Bar No. 236578
PATRICIA A. HORAL, ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 0044197

GUY E. BURNETTE, JR., P.A.


3020 N. Shannon Lakes Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32309
Telephone: (850) 668-7900
Facsimile: (850) 668-7972
Counsel for Appellant

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Table of Contents ……………….………………………………………………...2

Table of Citations………………………………………………………..…………4

Statement of the Case and of the Facts .....................................................................7

Summary of Argument ...........................................................................................10

Argument…….........................................................................................................11

ISSUES

I. AMERICAN CAPITAL DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO


DEMAND A SWORN PROOF OF LOSS………………………….11

II. AMERICAN CAPITAL DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO


APPRAISAL………………………………………………………12

A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY SETS FORTH NO


TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH A PARTY MUST INVOKE
APPRAISAL………………………………………………..……12

B. FLORIDA LAW IMPOSES NO TIME LIMIT FOR INVOKING


APPRAISAL WHEN NONE IS SPECIFIED IN THE
POLICY………………………………………………………….16

C. AMERICAN CAPITAL’S PRE-SUIT CONDUCT DID NOT


WAIVE APPRAISAL OR CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR
AFFIRMANCE UNDER A TIPSY COACHMAN
THEORY………………………………………………………17

III. IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS IN CONFLICT WITH


THE PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IF EVERY TIME AN INSURER PAID A CLAIM
THAT WAS LATER DISPUTED AS TO AMOUNT BY THE
INSURED, THE INSURER WOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED APPRAISAL………………………………..…………..19
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IV. Cross Appeal - WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HELD THAT THE
DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE TO REPAIR THE HEAT,
VENT, AND AIR CONDITIONING, TO GLAZE THE WINDOWS,
AND TO PAINT THE GAZEBO WAS AN ISSUE FOR
APPRAISAL, AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH DECISION WAS IN
ERROR……………………………………………………………23

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….25

Certificate of Service…………………………………………………………….26

Certificate of Compliance………………………………………………………..27

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TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suarez,
833 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2002)…………………………………………………20

American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Terry,


277 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)……………………………………….13

American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Taylor,


476 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)………………………..……………...19

Bear v. New Jersey Ins. Co.,


189 So. 252 (Fla. 1939)…………………………………………………….13

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Palmer,


297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)………………………………………...13

Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Cuban-Hebrew Congregation of Miami, Inc.,


5 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)……………………………………...16, 20

Denman Rubber Mfg. Co. v. World Tire Corp.,


396 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)………………………………………19

Donald & Co. Sec. Inc. v. Mid-Fla. Cmty. Servs., Inc.,


620 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)……………………………………….18

Edney v. State,
3 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…………………………………………17

Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,


523 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)……………………………………….18

First Floridian Auto & Home Ins. Co. v. Myrick,


969 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)……………………………………...16

Fla. Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani,


934 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)……………………………………….11

Gainesville Health Care Center, Inc. v. Weston,


857 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)………………………………………..21
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Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. West Fla. Village Inn, Inc.,
874 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…………...……………………………19

Gray Mart, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,


703 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)………….………………………16, 17

J. Sourini Painting, Inc. v. Johnson Paints, Inc.,


809 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)………………………………………...24

Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,


828 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2002)………………………………………………..16

Llerena v. Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co.,


379 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)……………………………………… 14

Meade v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co.,


423 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1982)…………………………………………………20

Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Desalvo,


666 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)………………………………...….16, 21

Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,


819 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2002)…………………………………………………12

Soloman v. Chance Harvesting Co.,


489 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)………………………………………..24

Three Palms Pointe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,


250 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2003)……………………………………20

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Milgen Dev., Inc.,


297 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…………………………………….…19

USF&G v. Romay,
744 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…………………….………….….11, 21

U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Franko,


443 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)………………………………………..21

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Wickham v. Famco Servs., Inc.,
350 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)……………………………………24

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STATEMENT OF CASE AND OF THE FACTS

There are a few key facts that warrant emphasis in this brief in addition to

the statements of facts in the Initial Brief and the Answer Brief/Cross-appeal.

Aside from these facts, American Capital Assurance Corp. (“American Capital”)

relies on its statement of facts from the initial brief.

The insurance policy at issue between Courtney Meadows Apartments, LLP

(“Courtney Meadows”) and American Capital includes the following pertinent

language:

E. Loss Conditions
The following conditions apply in addition to the Common
Policy Conditions and the Commercial Property Conditions.
....
2. Appraisal
If we and you disagree on the value of the property or the
amount of loss, either may make written demand for an
appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a
competent and impartial appraiser. The two appraisers
will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either may
request that selection be made by a judge of a court
having jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately
the value of the property and amount of loss. If they fail
to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire.
A decision agreed to by any two will be binding. Each
party will:
a. Pay its chosen appraiser; and
b. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and
umpire equally.
If there is an appraisal, we will still retain our right to
deny the claim.

3. Duties In The Event Of Loss Or Damage


You must see that the following are done in the event
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of loss or damage to Covered Property:
....
(7) Send us a signed, sworn proof of loss containing the
information we request to investigate the claim.
You must do this within 60 days after our request.
We will supply you with the necessary forms.
....
4. Loss Payment
a. In the event of loss or damage covered by this
Coverage Form, at our option, we will either:
(1) Pay the value of lost or damaged property;
(2) Pay the cost of repairing or replacing the lost or
damaged property, subject to b. below;
(3) Take all or any part of the property at an agreed
or appraised value; or
(4) Repair, rebuild or replace the property with
other property of like kind and quality, subject to
b. below.
....
c. We will give notice of our intentions within 30 days
after we receive the sworn proof of loss.
....
g. We will pay for covered loss or damage within thirty
days after we receive the sworn proof of loss, if you have
complied with all of the terms of this Coverage Part and:
(1) We have reached agreement with you on the
amount of loss; or
(2) An appraisal award has been made.

(Appellant Appx. C, Ex. A).

On October 22, 2008, American Capital sent Courtney Meadows a letter

requesting that it fill out an attached “Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss,” in

accordance with the terms of the policy, because there was a dispute as to the cost

of the claim. (Appellee Appx. L). American Capital attached a check payable to

Courtney Meadows in the amount of $168,285.98 based on Jeremy


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Gildenmeister’s final estimate of damages. (Appellee Appx. L). In response,

Courtney Meadows sent a letter to American Capital, dated November 11, 2008,

stating that it did not accept the $168,285.98 check and would not complete the

sworn proof of loss. (Appellee Appx. M). Thereafter, in a letter dated November

18, 2008, American Capital indicated that it did not1 agree with Courtney

Meadows’ estimates of damages and wished to invoke appraisal. (Appellee Appx.

O).

Instead of proceeding with appraisal, Courtney Meadows filed suit for

breach of contract and declaratory judgment on December 23, 2008. (Appellant

Appx. C). American Capital filed a motion to dismiss or abate the action and to

compel appraisal based upon its November 18, 2008, demand. (Appellant Appx.

F). The trial court denied the motion with regard to the damages listed in

Gildenmeister’s estimate, finding that American Capital waived the sworn proof of

loss and appraisal. (Appellant Appx. A). However, the trial court also found that

American Capital was entitled to appraisal to determine the cost to fix the heat,

vents, and air conditioning units, to glaze the windows, and to paint the gazebo,

even though these damages were included in Gildenmeister’s estimate. (Appellant

Appx. A).

1
As previously explained in the initial brief, this correspondence contained a typo
in that it stated American Capital agreed with the damages submitted by Courtney
Meadows. The correspondence should have stated, “do not agree.”
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

American Capital did not waive its right to a sworn proof of loss. There is no

time limit specified under the policy within which American Capital was required

to request a proof of loss. American Capital timely requested Courtney Meadows

to fill out a proof of loss, and Courtney Meadows wrongfully refused.

American Capital also did not waive its right to appraisal. The plain

language of the policy sets forth no time limit for American Capital to invoke

appraisal. Florida law also imposes no time limits for invoking appraisal when the

policy is silent as to any such time limit. Courts have routinely approved of

compelling appraisal even after suit has been filed.

American Capital’s conduct in this case does not support a finding that it

waived appraisal under a tipsy coachmen theory. American Capital invoked its

right to appraisal without unnecessary delay and before suit was filed. Any failure

to provide Courtney Meadows with requested information pre-suit did not waive

American Capital’s right to appraisal.

If this Court holds that American Capital waived appraisal, the decision

would be in derogation of the well-established public policy favoring alternative

dispute resolution over formal litigation. Further, a finding of waiver would mean

that every insurer that pays a claim that is later disputed as to amount would have

waived its right to appraisal.

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Courtney Meadow’s argument on cross-appeal illustrates an inconsistency

within the trial court’s order. The trial court order should, at the least, be clarified

to indicate whether or not American Capital is entitled to appraisal regarding the

cost to fix the heat, vents, and air conditioning, to glaze the windows, and to paint

the gazebo.

ARGUMENT

I. AMERICAN CAPITAL DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO


DEMAND A SWORN PROOF OF LOSS.

When determining the nature of parties’ rights under an insurance contract,

courts are required to “consider the plain language of the policy at the time of the

loss.” See Fla. Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani, 934 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2005). The language of the policy in this case did not set forth a time limit

within which American Capital was required to demand a sworn proof of loss from

Courtney Meadows.

In the general practice of attempting to resolve insurance claims, insurers

require insureds to submit proofs of loss to lock the insured into a final position

regarding alleged damages. See, e.g., USF&G v. Romay, 744 So. 2d 467, 469-70

(Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (en banc). As such, proofs of loss are generally requested only

after both sides have had the opportunity to investigate the extent of the covered

loss. See Id.

In this case, contrary to the trial court’s holding, American Capital did not
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waive its right to have Courtney Meadows submit a sworn proof of loss. In fact,

American Capital requested Courtney Meadows complete a sworn proof of loss in

a letter dated October 22, 2008. American Capital requested this proof of loss

following both parties’ investigations, upon discovering that a significant

discrepancy existed between each party’s proposed value of the claim. Courtney

Meadows wrongfully refused to complete this even though the language of the

policy required it to fill out a proof of loss within sixty days of American Capital’s

request as a duty in the event of a loss. There is nothing in the policy language that

suggests that American Capital waives its right to a sworn proof of loss by

admitting that a claim is covered under the policy. Therefore, the trial court erred

in finding that American Capital waived its right to a sworn proof of loss.

II. AMERICAN CAPITAL DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO


APPRAISAL.

A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY SETS FORTH


NO TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH A PARTY MUST
INVOKE APPRAISAL.

The general rule is that insurance contracts are to be construed in accordance

with the plain language of the policy. Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,

819 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 2002). Accordingly, “[w]hen an insurance contract is not

ambiguous, it must be given effect as written.” Id. (citations omitted).

The policy language in this case merely says that where there is a

disagreement as to the value of the loss, either side may invoke its right to
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appraisal in writing. There is no reference to a time period within which such right

must be invoked. Moreover, under the policy, the sworn proof of loss has no effect

on the parties’ rights to invoke appraisal under the policy. As such, even if

American Capital had waived its right to the sworn proof of loss, such did not

make its invocation of appraisal untimely or ineffective.

Despite the operative language in the policy, the trial court cited several

cases in support of its finding that American Capital was untimely in its attempt to

invoke appraisal. These cases are each distinguishable from the instant case,

however. Each of the policies that were interpreted in these cases set forth a

specific deadline for the insurer to pay the claim or invoke appraisal following

receipt of the sworn proof of loss.

For example, in Bear v. New Jersey Insurance Co., 189 So. 252 (Fla. 1939),

the terms of the policy required the insurer to pay the claim or demand appraisal

within sixty days from the receipt of the formal proof of loss. The court held that

the insurer’s admission of liability “in some unagreed amount” acted to waive the

requirement of a sworn proof of loss. Id. Similarly, in American Bankers

Insurance Co. of Florida v. Terry, 277 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the

policy at issue contained a sixty-day time limit within which to choose to proceed

with arbitration. See also, Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1974) (construing a policy that required payment within sixty days of

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submission of a sworn proof of loss); Llerena v. Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co.,

379 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (interpreting a policy that requires, within

sixty days of the filing of the proof of loss, either party to demand appraisal).

In contrast to these cases, in the instant case, there is no language in the

policy that requires appraisal to be invoked, if at all, within any set time from

receiving or waiving the sworn proof of loss. Despite the clearly differentiating

language of the policy in the instant case from the policies in the cases the trial

court cited, the trial court stated in its order, “Where an insurer admits liability and

coverage for the loss, even in an unagreed amount, formal proof of loss is waived

and the time in which the insurer is required to demand appraisal under the terms

of the policy begins to run.” However, in the policy at issue, it cannot be stressed

enough that there is NO TIME LIMT specified within which the parties must

demand appraisal or it is waived.

The thirty-day time limits mentioned in the policy apply only with regard to

the time for informing the insured of the method for paying the loss after receiving

a sworn proof of loss and the time for payment of the award after an agreement or

appraisal award. Specifically, the policy states,

g. We will pay for covered loss or damage within thirty days after we
receive the sworn proof of loss, if you have complied with all of the
terms of this Coverage Part and:
(1) We have reached agreement with you on the amount of
loss; or
(2) An appraisal award has been made.
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Accordingly, in the instant case, there was no trigger of any thirty-day time limit

for payment, even if American Capital waived its right to a sworn proof of loss.

The parties did not reach an agreement as to the amount of loss, and there was no

appraisal award made. Therefore, nothing triggered the thirty-day time limit under

the policy within which American Capital was required to pay the claim. The trial

court inexplicably interpreted the language of the policy to include a thirty-day

time limit from some waiver of a sworn proof of loss as being a limitation on

American Capital’s right to seek appraisal.

In its order, the trial court repeatedly referenced the policy language of

section E4(a)(3). Section E4(a) provides,

a. In the event of loss or damage covered by this


Coverage Form, at our option, we will either:
(1) Pay the value of lost or damaged property;
(2) Pay the cost of repairing or replacing the lost or
damaged property, subject to b. below;
(3) Take all or any part of the property at an agreed
or appraised value; or
(4) Repair, rebuild or replace the property with
other property of like kind and quality, subject to
b. below.

Subsection (3) applies in the case of insured property or equipment that may be

claimed by the insurance company, for salvage or otherwise, in the event of a

covered loss, for an agreed upon or appraised value, as an option for a method of

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payment. Subsection E4(a)(3) has nothing to do with the prior provision explaining

the process for invoking appraisal in section E2.2 Therefore, the trial court erred

in finding that American Capital’s attempt to invoke appraisal was untimely.

B. FLORIDA LAW IMPOSES NO TIME LIMIT FOR


INVOKING APPRAISAL WHEN NONE IS SPECIFIED IN
THE POLICY.

There is no time limitation under the law for invoking appraisal when a time

limit is not set forth in the insurance policy. In fact, appraisal may be invoked even

after an insured files suit. See e.g., First Floridian Auto & Home Ins. Co. v.

Myrick, 969 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Cuban-

Hebrew Congregation of Miami, Inc., 5 So. 3d 709, 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Gray

Mart, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 703 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

Appraisal is appropriate when the insurer admits that there is a covered loss but

there is a dispute as to the amount of damage. See Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 828 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 2002).

For example, in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Desalvo, 666 So. 2d 944, 945-

46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the insured filed suit over a dispute as to the value of the

covered loss, and the insurer moved the trial court to stay the action and submit the

issue to appraisal in accordance with the policy provisions. The trial court denied

2
It should be noted that Americian Capital adhered to the terms of this policy by
sending Courtney Meadows a check for $168,285.98 based on Gildenmeister’s
estimate in accordance with payment option E4(a)(2) of the policy.
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the motion. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded with directions to

compel appraisal in accordance with the terms of the policy. Id. at 947.

Here, unlike the insurers in the above cases, American Capital invoked its

right to appraisal in writing pursuant to the terms of the policy before Courtney

Meadows even filed suit. Even if American Capital had attempted to invoke this

right after suit was filed, however, the above cases illustrate that such an attempt

would still not be considered untimely or amount to a waiver. Therefore, this

Court should reverse and remand for the parties to submit the loss in question to

appraisal in this case, as it did in Desalvo.

C. AMERICAN CAPITAL’S PRE-SUIT CONDUCT DID NOT


WAIVE APPRAISAL OR CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR
AFFIRMANCE UNDER A TIPSY COACHMAN3 THEORY.

Courtney Meadows argues, as an alternate basis for affirmance, that

American Capital waived appraisal by its pre-suit conduct through its investigation

of the claim and dispute with Courtney Meadows over the extent of damages. The

most recent Florida case interpreting waiver of appraisal through a party’s conduct

is Gray Mart, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). In Gray Mart, the court

determined that the insurer waived its right to appraisal by actively litigating the

case for fourteen months and demanding appraisal only one month prior to the

3
See, e.g., Edney v. State, 3 So. 3d 1281, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (explaining
that the trial court may be affirmed if it reached the right result for the wrong
reason under “tipsy coachman” rule).
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scheduled date of trial. Id. at 1171, 1173. The Gray Mart court noted, “the right to

an appraisal may be waived if a party maintains a position inconsistent with the

appraisal remedy.” Id. at 1172. The court further held that a showing of prejudice

is required to find a waiver of appraisal. Id. at 1173 (certifying conflict with

Donald & Co. Sec. Inc. v. Mid-Fla. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 620 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1993), and Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 523 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA

1988), which both held that no prejudice is required to effectuate a waiver).

Here, in contrast to Gray Mart, American Capital invoked its right to

appraisal prior to Courtney Meadows even filing suit. Unlike the insurer in Gray

Mart, American Capital never actively litigated the matter with Courtney Meadows

before invoking appraisal. Further, Courtney Meadows would not have been

prejudiced by undergoing appraisal upon American Capital’s request because, at

that time, it had not yet filed suit and had not been forced to proceed through

litigation. Therefore, under the Gray Mart standard governing waiver of appraisal

proceedings through a party’s conduct, American Capital’s actions did not amount

to a waiver and are not a basis for affirming the trial court’s decision under a tipsy

coachman theory.

Moreover, Courtney Meadows argument that American Capital’s alleged

failure to provide it with a copy of Gildenmeister’s report regarding the value of

the loss somehow waived American Capital’s right to appraisal is without legal

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support. There is no case that has held that a party’s failure to provide information

to the opposing party in an insurance dispute constitutes a waiver of that party’s

right to appraisal under the policy. Accordingly, the Court should find that

American Capital did not waive its right to appraisal based on its pre-suit conduct.

III. IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS IN CONFLICT WITH


THE PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IF EVERY TIME AN INSURER PAID A CLAIM
THAT WAS LATER DISPUTED AS TO AMOUNT BY THE
INSURED, THE INSURER WOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED APPRAISAL.

Courts must interpret insurance policy provisions in a way that

accomplishes the full intent of the parties, provides meaning to the provisions, and

avoids an absurd result. See American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d

281, 283-84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Accordingly, insurance policy provisions

should be given “reasonable, practical, and sensible” interpretations. Denman

Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. World Tire Corp., 396 So. 2d 728, 729 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1981); see also Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. West Fla. Village Inn, Inc., 874 So.

2d 26, 29-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (explaining that contracts for insurance should be

constructed in a manner that is “reasonable, practical, sensible, and just”). If one

interpretation of the policy language “would lead to an absurd result, that

interpretation must be abandoned and one more consistent with reason and

probability adopted.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Milgen Dev., Inc., 297 So. 2d 845,

847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).


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The caselaw interpreting insurance policy language specifically involving

appraisal has been evolving recently. Historically, appraisal provisions were

viewed synonymously with arbitration clauses. However, in Allstate Insurance Co.

v. Suarez, 833 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2002), the supreme court upheld the Third

District’s decision that the umpire in an appraisal proceeding was not required to

apply the Florida Arbitration Code. This case clarified that appraisals and

arbitrations are distinct proceedings and that appraisals are not required to be

conducted pursuant to statutes governing arbitrations. See id. However, Suarez did

not hold that all the cases dealing with appraisal that reference statutory provisions

governing arbitration were wrongly decided. See generally, id. In fact, since

Suarez, courts have recognized that rules governing arbitration can still be looked

to by analogy for guidance when making decisions regarding appraisal

proceedings.

For example, in Citizens Property, 5 So. 3d at 711, a case which postdates

Suarez by several years, the Third District looked to Meade v. Lumbermans

Mutual Casualty Co., 423 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1982), for guidance in interpreting an

appraisal decision. The Meade court had examined an arbitration award to

determine whether it contained a repayment requirement. 423 So. 2d 908. The

Citizens court recognized that while the Florida Arbitration Code is no longer

controlling on appraisals, it can be looked to by courts for guidance by “analogy.”

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Id. at 712. Similarly, in Three Palms Pointe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 250

F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1361-62 (M.D. Fla. 2003), which also post-dates Suarez, the

court recognized that under Florida law, it was proper to use the Florida

Arbitration Code’s confirmation process to confirm an appraisal award, despite the

differences between arbitration and appraisal proceedings.

Accordingly, although Courtney Meadows correctly observed that the

supreme court found appraisal and arbitration to be distinct in Suarez, it is still

undisputed that public policy and an interest in judicial economy favors the use of

alternative dispute resolution, such as appraisal. See, e.g., Gainesville Health Care

Center, Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Desalvo, 666 So.

2d at 946-47; U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Franko, 443 So. 2d 170, 171-72 (Fla. 1st DCA

1983). Moreover, there must be an honest disagreement between the parties

following an exchange of relevant information before any alternative dispute

resolution proceedings under the terms of the policy become operative. See

Romay, 744 So. 2d at 469-70.

In this case, it was only after Courtney Meadows’s refusal of American

Capital’s check for insurance proceeds based on Gildenmeister’s estimate that

American Capital was made aware that there would be no agreement as to the

value of the covered loss and that is should seek appraisal. Courtney Meadows

informed American Capital of this disagreement in a letter dated November 11,

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2008. In response, American Capital invoked its right to appraisal, in writing, in a

letter to Courtney Meadows dated November 18, 2008. American Capital did not

employ stalling tactics or attempt to delay resolution of this action. Rather,

American Capital made every attempt to resolve this dispute without litigation. As

soon as American Capital was informed that the parties’ had vastly differing

positions regarding the value of the covered loss, it invoked its right to appraisal.

Thereafter, Courtney Meadows nonetheless filed a lawsuit, presumably to gain

additional damages and attorney fees, even though American Capital was

voluntarily submitting to appraisal and would promptly honor any appraisal award.

American Capital has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to stay the court

proceedings so that this claim could be resolved through appraisal, consistent with

the policy of favoring alternative dispute resolution.

If this Court upholds the trial court’s determination that American Capital

waived appraisal by voluntarily paying Courtney Meadows for its loss when there

was no time period in the policy within which to invoke appraisal, it would lead to

absurd results. Such a holding would mean that any time the insured admitted

coverage or voluntarily paid the insured for a loss that was later disputed in

amount, it would waive appraisal. This position is not only disfavored under the

policy language, as previously discussed in Issue II(A), it is also in stark contrast to

the long-followed public policy in favor of alternative dispute resolution whenever

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possible in lieu of formal court proceedings. Accordingly, this Court should find

that American Capital is entitled to appraisal under the terms of the policy and

consistent with the law favoring alternative dispute resolution.

IV. Cross Appeal - WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HELD THAT


THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE TO REPAIR THE
HEAT, VENT, AND AIR CONDITIONING, TO GLAZE THE
WINDOWS, AND TO PAINT THE GAZEBO WAS AN ISSUE FOR
APPRAISAL, AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH DECISION WAS IN
ERROR.

In a correspondence with William Kull on November 11, 2008, counsel for

Courtney Meadows indicated that Courtney Meadows did not dispute

Gildenmeister’s estimated costs to repair several items: $25,783.54 for the heat,

vent, and air conditioning; $1,306.85 for window glazing and repair; and $873.82

for painting the gazebo. In its cross-appeal, Courtney Meadows argues that

American Capital should have paid it these sums and that the trial court erred in

ordering these damages subject to appraisal.

In its final order, the trial court appeared to make inconsistent findings. In

the body of the order, the trial court indicated that American Capital is entitled to

appraisal to determine the cost to repair the damage to the heat, vents, and air

conditioning units, to glaze the windows, and to paint the gazebo. However, in the

conclusion of the order, the trial court stated that it denied American Capital’s

motion to compel appraisal with regard to all of the Gildenmeister’s estimates that

were provided to Courtney Meadows on October 3, 2008. In his report,


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Gildenmeister provided estimates of the costs to repair the heat, vents, and air

conditioning, to glaze the windows, and to paint. As such, it is unclear what the

trial court’s ruling is with regard to these damages.

In general, a trial court’s inconsistent orders preclude appellate review. See

J. Sourini Painting, Inc. v. Johnson Paints, Inc., 809 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA

2002); Wickham v. Famco Servs., Inc., 350 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA

1977). In J. Sourini, the court reversed the judgment and order and remanded for a

new trial on all issues because “the trial court’s findings [were] contradictory and

its legal conclusions inconsistent.” 809 So. 2d at 99. Similarly, in Soloman v.

Chance Harvesting Co., 489 So. 2d 195, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), this Court

reversed and remanded an order containing inconsistent findings for the trial court

to enter an order with consistent findings.

Likewise, in this case, the trial court’s final order should be reversed because

it contains inconsistent holdings with regard to whether appraisal is required for

these damages. The matter should be remanded for the trial court to clarify its

conclusion.

Additionally, there is a slight conflict between Courtney Meadow’s position

and American Capital’s position regarding these damages. Courtney Meadows

claims that the $1,306.85 was to be for window reglazing only, while

Gildenmeister’s estimate lists such as the cost for window glazing and repair.

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Similarly, Courtney Meadows stated that the $873.82 was for repainting the

gazebo, whereas Gildenmeister lists that sum for painting in general. In light of

these conflicts, American Capital seeks that these damages be subjected to

appraisal along with the rest of the damages estimated in Gildenmeister’s report.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, American Capital respectfully requests this Court reverse

the trial court’s order denying appraisal with regard to the damages listed in

Gildenmeister’s estimate.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the above and
foregoing document on P. Campbell Ford, Esq., Ford, Miller & Wainer, P.A., 1835
N. Third Street, Jacksonville, FL 32250 and Diane H. Tutt, Esq., Diane H. Tutt,
P.A., P.O. Box 292436, Davie, FL 33329-2436, by placing the same in the U.S.
Mail, properly addressed and First Class postage prepaid this the 8th day of
September, 2009.

Guy E. Burnette, Jr., Esquire


Florida Bar No.: 236578
Patricia A. Horal, Esq.
Florida Bar No.: 0044197
3020 N. Shannon Lakes Dr.
Tallahassee, FL 32309

Attorneys for Appellant

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that Appellant’s Reply Brief complies with
the font requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)-(b).

Guy E. Burnette, Jr., Esquire


Florida Bar No.: 236578
Patricia A. Horal, Esquire
Florida Bar No.: 0044197
3020 N. Shannon Lakes Dr.
Tallahassee, FL 32309

Attorneys for Appellant

27 Found at:
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