Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from
the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period
did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain
in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test
of fitness.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect
of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed,
said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to considerde novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that
"They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar" I am quoting from the provision
"who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decisionmaking within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends
are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computerbased models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 )
on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on
September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations
for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her
husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and
begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This
case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where
lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H.
Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent
sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making
reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing
and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and
the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of
her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for
disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs.
Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA
667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case
No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress
with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to
give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
August 1, 2007
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath."
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning
in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find
fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I
laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that
in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS
AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS
I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on
which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in
his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand,
declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that
the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than
that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by
a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has beencarrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession. This detestable behaviorrenders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had
an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on March 22,
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of
facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on
motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied
by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital
affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being
married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state thatbefore complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce
checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.
However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at
the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by
reason of Bingo Royales "Closed Account."
SO ORDERED.
Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12,
2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the
checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
criminal complaints for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
respondent.
consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to
creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with this contention.
As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an
offense that involves public interest. In the leading case of People v. Taada,
the Honorable Supreme Court explained the nature of the offense, thus
xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment xxx. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand
fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and the legal processes. It also
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01).
By issuing the bouncing checks in blatant violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v.
Taguines, 254 SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this
Castillo case, suspension for one year is the deserved minimum penalty for
the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for the property
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility. Moreover,
conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for
disbarment (De Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).
Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVI-2003-177 adopting and approving Commissioner Aguilas Report and
Recommendation with modification in the sense that the recommended
penalty is reduced to suspension of six (6) months, thus:
In Lizaso v. Amante,5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity, thus:
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney
shall be a person of good moral character. xxx So it is held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the principles which his license and the law confer upon
him. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent likewise violated the Attorneys Oath that he will, among others,
obey the laws; and the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the
following provisions:
Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious
misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the land for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
spread a copy of this Decision on the personal record of Atty. Carandang.
SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,
filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with
the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2]and constitutes sufficient ground
for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in
default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,
2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case
on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. [5] Accordingly,
the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,
2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his
way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac
with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by
the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not
just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio
community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum
and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew
that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking
pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately
and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on
the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and
was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his
arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified
and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The
taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to
return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired
and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so
the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by
Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano. [8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of
Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On
January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was
granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of
the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has
yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability
to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of
such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral
character, based on the following facts:
1.
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa,
as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question,
the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has
been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a
labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral
turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The
Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was
not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral
turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether
any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact
and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral
turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the
Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his
profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would
beirreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every
lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent
had resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts
that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues
that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish
lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed
her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit
was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges
filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted
on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam
Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with
my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to
me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was
not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he
was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of
the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims
that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention
the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as
government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant,
Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and
control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily
by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token consultancy
fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments
do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover,
these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the abovementioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the
criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and
set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last
34
35
4 January 1999. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma.
Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the
case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
37
Due
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the
IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP
Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended
the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts
with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S.
No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his
oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54
52
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows
that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in
the end.[6]
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an
attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
[1]
Disbarment filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33, DumagueteCity where complainants are the defendants. According to the
complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her
favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American
citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of
public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no
longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage
to David Williams.
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit
(Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then
knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa
Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married
an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in the Philippines, thereby
making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she executed to buy property in
Negros Oriental.
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations.
As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa
Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her
Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases
cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer
to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a)
elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration
of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In
line with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep
themselves abreast of legal developments. To do this, the lawyer must
walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must
acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the
Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars,
regulations and other rules promulgated by other competent authorities
engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is one of
continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law
and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to
obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.) [9]
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly
invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it
unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be determined
on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez
is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may
give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.