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B.M. No.

712 July 13, 1995

Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING


OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from
the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period
did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be


granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as
a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve
not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute
is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, citing Re Law Examination of


1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere
greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow
path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a
high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. .
. . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself
therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability,


so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts
could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in
courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in
fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always
been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar
with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his community a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain
in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test
of fitness.

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect
of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed,
said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a


proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time


of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.

Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would


seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real
need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such
a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by


appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father
and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell


far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte"
who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of
good moral character.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to considerde novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991


RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It

embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law

practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal


instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that
"They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar" I am quoting from the provision
"who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as

regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the


practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to
just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that
service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent
to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that
the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve
legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction
given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM


Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's
role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).

MR. OPLE. Thank you.


... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal

medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.


11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information

accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved


corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and
the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively
little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a crossdisciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions
by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional
context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now
have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is


assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He
is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer
who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. (
Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in
the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign

country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area


coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in
the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvardeducated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly

collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three


factors are apropos:

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decisionmaking within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends
are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has


been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with


governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements
for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make


better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the


Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and
to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computerbased models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric

as firms change to stay competitive in a global,


interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally
with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution'
or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is
to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he

took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts


as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis


supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt


restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks
of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so


than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in
the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must


be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143


SCRA 327, the Court said:

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which

modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the


eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that
he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:


(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by
the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,


vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

AQUINO, J.:

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body


in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court
would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 )
on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on
September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:


We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit
of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at


Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu
Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose
Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused
to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino
stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following
month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in
March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her
boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had
sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused
his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that
she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another
man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind
because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling
his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He
continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He
sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she
and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's
parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after

he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate


preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his
love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time
and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He
was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4,
1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973
for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April
25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended,
he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her
lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money.
She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there
only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when
she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the
assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical
treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that
he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly
promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral
defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his
promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He
is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining

membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be


terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what
is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straightlaced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of
six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct
was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the
canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because
his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex
where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual
congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should
be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the
surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and
the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex
toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or
crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may
tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533,
535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the
following cases:

(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of


Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill,
although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child
in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and
during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow
of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which
she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they
were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after
such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child
(Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil.
768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta
vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar
by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant,
and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil.
450).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations
for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her
husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and
begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This
case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where
lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H.
Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent
sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making
reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing
and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and
the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of
her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for
disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs.
Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA
667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case
No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress
with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to
give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he


was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life
till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the
altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or
in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my
life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).

A.C. No. 7136

SO ORDERED.

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath."

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning
in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find
fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:


He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who
was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or
"Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or
early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home
from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept
at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration
at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends.
Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded
contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding
to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I
laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that
in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS
AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS
I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on
which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR


ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion
of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the
report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married
to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and
his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family,
demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until
we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of
the Complaint regarding his adulterousrelationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep
his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful


relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally
meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere
piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution
and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article
XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own
family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the Complaint, the reason being thatunder the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene
gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth
as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy

of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming


respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who
was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied
having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his
marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent
and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's ComplaintAffidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26,
2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06


CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the aboveentitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant
22
to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case
for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As
the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh.
"C") and the news item published in theManila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there
are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation
of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to
wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was
low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an


admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between
him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in
the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene
supplied the information that respondent was the father of the
child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity
of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall
have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
ishaving flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
thequalifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal
knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of
Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years
old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the
desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison
of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on

the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in
his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand,
declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that
the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than
that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by
a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a

ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action


includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal


law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifestsdeliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

under scandalous circumstances.34


The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under
scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has beencarrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession. This detestable behaviorrenders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:

x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had
an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law


in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of
the Constitution reading:

xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the


foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes
this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live

together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on March 22,
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of
facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on
motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied
by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital
affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being
married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state thatbefore complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had

already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the


dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint
for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish
all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew
Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment
of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted
her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.
Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a
few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital
of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the
girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of
the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the
point for bothrespondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant

complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if


respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is
not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this
Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they mayproceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06
passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

A.C. No. 5700

January 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, represented


by Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr.,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) against Atty. Dante A.
Carandang.
The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of
Bingo Royale, Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines.
On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a "Grant of
Authority to Operate Bingo Games." Article V of this document mandates
Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is
divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly


immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting


to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001. Instead of demanding the
payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty.
Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installment of P300,000.00
from July 2001 to June 2003.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of


the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court
of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce
checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at
the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by
reason of Bingo Royales "Closed Account."

SO ORDERED.
Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12,
2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the
checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
criminal complaints for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
respondent.

PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is


liable for serious misconduct, violation of the Attorneys Oath and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In his "Opposition" to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable
for issuing bouncing checks because they were drawn by Bingo Royale. His
act of doing so "is not related to the office of a lawyer."
Respondent explained that since the start of its operations, Bingo Royale has
been experiencing financial difficulties due to meager sales. Hence, it
incurred arrearages in paying PAGCORs shares and failed to pay the
amounts of the checks.
On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of Bingo Royale.
This prompted the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City, a complaint for damages against PAGCOR, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-1671.
Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent now maintains
that the dishonor of the checks was caused by circumstances beyond his
control and pleads that our power to disbar him must be exercised with great
caution.
On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 1
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila, the
Investigating IBP Commissioner, made the following findings and
observations:
Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is
clearly a choice for an individual (especially one learned in the law), whether
in a personal capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and
weighing the consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI, he
cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the company he
runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell
due. The desire to continue the operations of his company does not excuse
respondents act of violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover,
inability to pay is not a ground, under the Civil Code, to suspend nor
extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent contends that because of
business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be excused from
making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors
will merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and,

consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to
creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with this contention.
As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an
offense that involves public interest. In the leading case of People v. Taada,
the Honorable Supreme Court explained the nature of the offense, thus
xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment xxx. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand
fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and the legal processes. It also
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01).
By issuing the bouncing checks in blatant violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v.
Taguines, 254 SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this
Castillo case, suspension for one year is the deserved minimum penalty for
the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for the property
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility. Moreover,
conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for
disbarment (De Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).
Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVI-2003-177 adopting and approving Commissioner Aguilas Report and
Recommendation with modification in the sense that the recommended
penalty is reduced to suspension of six (6) months, thus:

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B. P. Blg. 22.


By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct. In Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals,4 we
defined misconduct as follows:

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and


APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering that the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote respect of law
and the legal processes, and also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.2

Misconduct has been defined as "wrong or improper conduct;" and "gross"


has been held to mean "flagrant; shameful" (Webster). This Court once held
that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.

Section 1, B. P. Blg. 22 provides:


Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check on behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is
liable.
3

In People v. Tuanda, we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as


follows:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment xxx. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.

In Lizaso v. Amante,5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity, thus:
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney
shall be a person of good moral character. xxx So it is held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the principles which his license and the law confer upon
him. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent likewise violated the Attorneys Oath that he will, among others,
obey the laws; and the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the
following provisions:
Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious
misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As recommended by the IBP Board of

Governors, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the land for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
spread a copy of this Decision on the personal record of Atty. Carandang.
SO ORDERED.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her


Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the
IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12,
2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the
conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, [7] which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006


ROBERTO SORIANO vs. Attorney Manuel Dizon,
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,
filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with
the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2]and constitutes sufficient ground
for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in
default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,
2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case
on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. [5] Accordingly,
the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,
2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his
way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac
with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by
the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not
just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio
community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum
and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew
that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking
pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately
and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on
the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and
was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his
arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified
and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The
taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to
return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired
and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so
the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by
Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano. [8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of
Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,

Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On
January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was
granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of
the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has
yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability
to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of
such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral
character, based on the following facts:
1.

He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only


because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,]
not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant. [12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa,
as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question,
the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has
been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a
labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral
turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The
Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was
not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral
turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether
any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact
and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral
turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and

total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of


that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was
then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored
and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from
the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who
released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several
times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but
only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot
complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown
by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his
arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of
the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not
in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault
was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral
turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and
feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness,
which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the
persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy
of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of


the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. [19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the
courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath [20] and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in
even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court
when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has
been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to
complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully
restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the
exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral
character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is
so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of
good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and
duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid
of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by
making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other
persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who
examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The

injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright


unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to
death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed
the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness. [29] The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good
faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be
disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
[31]
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he
committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
our profession of odious members.

admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.


Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the
attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would
demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the
bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a
member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6705

March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the
Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his
profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would
beirreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every
lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating


Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and
Special Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the
former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager


and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of


the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the


operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and
its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant


was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was
adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed


a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie LimSantiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat
employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct
the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in
relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent
should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the
case filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and
threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the
private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor.
Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000
as retainers fee for the months of January and February
1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May
1995, 17and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent
had resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts
that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues
that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish
lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed
her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit
was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges
filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted
on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam
Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with
my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to
me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was
not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he
was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of
the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims
that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention
the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as
government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent


contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for
representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as
representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant,
Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and
control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily
by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token consultancy
fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments
do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover,
these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the abovementioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein


Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of
Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees
of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240,
are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries
pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that
case are very much familiar with Respondent.

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the
criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and
set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last
34
35
4 January 1999. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma.
Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the
case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

37

Due

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the
IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP
Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended
the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts
with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S.
No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to


Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence
or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter
in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p.
231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not
represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten,
however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with
respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this
case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he
previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S.
No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict.
Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been laborrelated, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent
was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid
salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997,
the employees and management involved are the very personalities he
dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat.
Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its
management.
xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from


herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for
rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It
covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law,
legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat
and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence
insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure
to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against
the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is
thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
44
interests." However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition
to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure
of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a

member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the


imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in
"unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of
[his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent
represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine
conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled
the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat
employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to nonpayment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence
must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former
client, any confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect
to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow
that respondent used any confidential information from his previous
employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government
prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for
representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after
the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her


allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code.

government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation


of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful
conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a


government prosecutor

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be


permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the
law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the
following grounds:

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as


x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his
oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54
52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat


intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996
as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not
distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with
the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to
complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he
signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers fee." 53 Thus,
as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under
the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondents admission
that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent


The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees
engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for
respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

February 27, 2006

A.C. No. 6353

SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS Vs. ATTY. RUDY T.


ENRIQUEZ

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows
that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in
the end.[6]

RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an
attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
[1]
Disbarment filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33, DumagueteCity where complainants are the defendants. According to the
complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her
favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American
citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of
public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]

In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss, [7] respondent enumerated


matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of
complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment
was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the
complainants, and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual
basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8] Forthwith,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory
conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties
were then directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had
maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his
acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint
complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no
longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage
to David Williams.

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit
(Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then
knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa
Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married
an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in the Philippines, thereby
making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she executed to buy property in
Negros Oriental.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner


Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification
that respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study each
and every opinion he may give to his clients.

2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites


Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would
not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she
renounced it in a specific act.
2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring
that her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her
citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution
supports his position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations.
As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa
Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her
Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases
cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer
to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a)
elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration
of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In
line with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep
themselves abreast of legal developments. To do this, the lawyer must
walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must
acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the
Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars,
regulations and other rules promulgated by other competent authorities
engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is one of
continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law
and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to
obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.) [9]

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of


Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest
laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to
keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and
legal problems confronting a client.[12] In this case, the law he apparently
[13]
misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, the most basic law of the
[14]
land.
Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best
of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the
law and legal developments, and participate in continuing legal education
programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending
cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by
the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for
clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws. [17]
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating
Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must
be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the
Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering further that this is
respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as
recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly
invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it
unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be determined
on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez
is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may
give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

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