MANAHAN vs People

G.R. No. 47899 September 30, 1942

Moran, J.:

FACTS:
In the night of January 28, 1937, petitioner, armed with a revolver and with five
companions, by means of threat and intimidation against Catalino Padayao, one of
the servants of Meliton Carlos, took from the latter's camarin about fifteen sacks of
palay through an opening made on the floor of said camarin. In the following night,
petitioner and his companions, by the same means employed against Catalino
Padayao and Felicidad Cabungal, the latter also a servant of Meliton Carlos, again
took six sacks of palay through the same opening.The Court of Appeals declared the
petitioner guilty of robbery under Article 294, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, with
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mananhan should be convicted of Article 303 instead of Article 294,
No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
No. Article 303 refers to robbery committed through the use of force upon things,
and the robbery charged here is one with violence against or intimidation of
persons. It is true that the opening of hole on the floor of the camarin implies force
upon things; but, as we have once held, when the robbery committed with force
upon things is also accompanied with violence against or intimidation of persons,
"the latter element supplies the controlling qualification" since, with that
circumstance, "there is greater disturbance to the order of society and the security
of the individual".

MELENCIO SAYO vs CHIEF OF POLICE

G.R. No. L-2128
May 12, 1948
Feria, J.:
FACTS:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of
Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against
them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition
for habeas corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained
or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the
provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not
be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because
they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement
of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without
warrant.
The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary
investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all
person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces
are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of
filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper
municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation
so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the
defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the

preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious

prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City
of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested
without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any process
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due
investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the
person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for
days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OLIMPIO DE PERALTA

G.R. No. L-17332
August 18, 1921
Villamor, J.:

FACTS:
About the month of October, 1919, and for sometime previously Cecilio Toledo held
the position of president of the "Philippine Marine Union," and in such capacity, he
had the privilege of occupying, as his dwelling, a room of house No. 507 of
Jaboneros Street of this city, which was rented to said association. About the middle
of said month of October, Toledo was discharged from the position of president and
was succeeded by Olimpio de Peralta. The latter, for the purpose of looking for a
desk glass which he believed was the property of the union, entered the room in
question in the morning of the 16th of the same month. This gave rise to the
information for trespass to dwelling against Peralta, in which it is alleged that he
entered the room of Toledo against the will of the occupant. Trial was had and the
accused was sentenced to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay
a fine 400 pesetas, and costs. From this judgment the present appeal was taken.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Peralta committed trespass to dwelling.

HELD:
No. The accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and without the
permission of the occupants entered the room with the object of taking away the
desk glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had expressed his will in the sense of
prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering his room, and the mere fact that the
latter entered it, without the permission of the occupant, does not constitute the
offense of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491 of the Penal
Code. In order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be
against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of
permission should not be confused with prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of
Spain, as well as in those of this jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this
crime is committed when a person enters another's dwelling against the will of the
occupant, but not when the entrance is effected without his knowledge or
opposition.

As Groizard says, "It is not necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at
the door of a house or enter it, to obtain previous permission from the owner who
lives in it. With the utmost good faith may a person, to whom entrance has not been
denied beforehand, suppose that the owner of the room has no objection to
receiving him in it." And in the present case it is to be supposed that the members
of the "Philippine Marine Union," among them the accused, had something
familiarity which warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of the
association, particularly when we consider the hour at which the act in question
happened (between half past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact that the door
of the room was not barricaded or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the
room in question was part of the house rented to said association.

PEOPLE vs ARANDE COLINA ADLAWAN

[G.R. No. 131839. January 30, 2002]
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:
At 2:00 a.m. of November 15, 1992, Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco were
alerted by a commotion outside. When they rushed out, they saw the deceased
raising his hands in front of accused-appellant, who was then in the company of
Barangay Tanod Jerry Diaz and Jet Bonita. Likewise present was accused-appellant's
father, Barangay Tanod Crispulo Adlawan, who was lying on the ground
unconscious. All of a sudden, accused-appellant drew a gun from his waist, pointed

it at the deceased, saying, this is the one. He immediately fired the gun, hitting
the deceased on the chest. The latter staggered toward the direction of Benjamin
Basubas. He was able to hold on to a deaf-mute bystander, but fell on a shallow
canal and landed on his belly with his head resting on the bank of the
canal. Accused-appellant followed the deceased, turned the latters head and
delivered a fatal shot hitting him above the right ear. Thereafter, accused-appellant
surrendered the gun to a group of Barangay Tanod.
On the other hand, the accused contend that he acted in incomplete
defense/defense of a relative as he then thought that his father was killed by the
deceased. Accused-appellant lunged at the deceased, twisted his hand, forcing the
muzzle of the gun to be pointed at the deceaseds chest. Suddenly, the gun went
off, causing the deceased to fall in a canal. Accused-appellant was able to get hold
of the gun and again fired at the deceased. Thereafter, he fled and hid in Manila
until January 23, 1997, when he finally decided to surrender to Mayor Alfredo M.
Ouano and P/Supt. Rolando Borres. The lower court found the accused guilty of
murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of murder.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, depriving the victim
of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor. At the time accused-appellant fired the first shot, the deceased
was unarmed and had his hands raised. The deceased was therefore in no position
to put up any defense such as would present a risk to accused-appellant. Moreover,
the second shot fired by accused-appellant clearly foreclosed any doubt as to the
attendance of treachery. When he turned the head of the deceased before he fired
the second shot, accused-appellant was manifestly determined to have a better
shot at the head of the deceased who was already lying helpless on the ground.