Global Review (Winter2012)

Global Review
Contents
Winter 2012
Roundtable
Chinas Role in the International Conflict-management
The Sudan - South Sudan Reconciliation: More Patience and
Efforts Needed
ZHONG Jianhua
China's Relations with Two Sudans: From One Country, Two

Systems to Two Countries, One System
ZHANG Chun
China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a

Case
JIAN Junbo
Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping

Operations
XUE Lei
The EU and the Sudans

Dame Rosalind Marsden
12
15
Development through Peace: Could Chinas economic

cooperation with South Sudan be more conflict-sensitive?
Thomas Wheeler
China, Sudan and South Sudan Relations

Leben Nelson Moro
23
The history of South Sudans Chinese future
19
Daniel Large
27
Articles
Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning in

the First Decade of the New Century
CHEN Dongxiao
31
On the Dynamics of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy in the

Middle East
SUN Degang
47
Does culture affect in the financial decision making of rational

man? Chinese vs. Anglo-Saxon Perspective
Clemente Hernandez-Rodriguez & Mauricio Cervantes-Zepeda
67
The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its Implications for

China-Africa Green Cooperation in Rio+20
YU Hongyuan
76
The Sustainable Development of Sino-African Cooperation:

Actors, Gaps and Reforms
ZHU Ming & Ph.D Candidate
93
Abstracts
Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning in the
First Decade of the New Century
CHEN Dongxiao
Chinas diplomatic planning have been enriched and improved in the first decade of
the new century suggesting rapid transition and upgrading of Chinas diplomacy.
Among which, China has introduced the idea of new-type partnership to build up
the big-power strategic mutual trust and balanced development in the new period,
and China has applied the new thinking of sharing responsibilities, expanding
common interests and seeking win-win outcomes to seek common development
with the developing countries, a demonstration of creative thinkings in Chinas
diplomatic planning; China is more active in pushing for the two upgrades of
building new order in the peripheries, and China has applied a new-type mutually
beneficial strategy to step up cooperation with the developing world, a
demonstration of a stronger capability of Chinas diplomatic planning; and China
has aligned Chinese interests with its internationally-expected identity and
responsibility in the international system, and China is increasingly reckoning
constructive contribution as the major content of Chinas interaction with the
outside world, a demonstration of a broadening diplomatic vision of China.
On the Dynamics of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle

East
SUN Degang
Mediation diplomacy is an essential channel for sovereign states, regional and
international organizations to participate in global governance, enhance political
influence and facilitate relations with other big powers. In the new era, US, EU,
Russia, UN, Arab League and African Union have initiated their respective
mediation diplomacy of various forms and substance. With the Middle East as a
case in point, this paper analyzes the four variables of Chinas mediation
diplomacy in the Middle East in the new era, i.e. the relevance of Chinas interest,
the projection of Chinas influence, the expectation of the international community,
and the difficulty of the conflict resolution. Through a thorough trade-off of the
above-mentioned variables, Chinas mediation diplomacy reveals divergent forms,
which can be categorized into four groups, namely, In-depth Involvement,
Pro-active Participation, Limited Arbitration and Standing Aloof. The four
categories of Chinas mediation diplomacy shed light on the divergence of Chinas
participation in the Middle East conflict resolutions of Sudanese issue, Iranian
nuclear issue, Syrian crisis, and internal Somali discords.
Does culture affect in the financial decision making of rational man?

Chinese vs. Anglo-Saxon Perspective
During this research we asked about the financial system to individuals from two
groups of residents, in Shanghai, China: Chinese citizens and English-speaking
Foreigners. According to the hypothesis of rational individuals outcomes out of
such a survey would be similar, but if somewhat culture affects the decision making
in financial issues; we might find very different answers due to belonging to
different cultural groups. Empirical evidence found in our survey shows different
answers, which supports the hypothesis that culture matters for the financial
decision making.
The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its

China-Africa Green Cooperation in Rio+20
YU Hongyuan
Implications
for
Among all challenges caused by climate change, food crises, water scarcity and
energy insecurity, pose the nexus threat to the world. This paper explores the
connections between water, energy, food production and the hard and soft
dimensions of their impacts on international security and cooperation based for
China and African countries. It first looks at the water-energy-food nexus caused by
climate change and the consequences faced by China and African countries. Then,
it describes Chinas and African countries domestic and international responses to
nexus crisis. Finally, some of the implications of China-Africa cooperation and the
implications for global green development is discussed.
The Sustainable Development of Sino-African Cooperation: Actors,

Gaps and Reforms
ZHU Ming
In the past, Chinas relations with Africa are relatively limited, either mainly on
political issues before reform and opening-up policy in 1978 or on economic
cooperation which is mainly after 1978. Since 2000, the relations between Africa
and China have entered into a new age featured with surprisingly faster, deeper and
wider cooperation dimensions, which is quite different from the past period. With
the framework of FOCAC, both sides try to develop a kind of multi-dimensional
partnership, which should involve civil society, think tanks, enterprises etc. But due
to the not fully developed capacities of both sides, the Capacity Gap problem has
emerged. Both Africa and China need to do a lot more to cultivate more powerful
non-state actors to increase the dynamics of mutual cooperation.
The Sudan - South Sudan Reconciliation:

More Patience and Efforts Needed
ZHONG Jianhua
The Sudan - South Sudan issue is one of Africa's longest, toughest problems with
profound and lasting significance. Due to the multiple factors such as complicated
history, mixed races, and religious conflicts, two civil wars broke out between the
Northern and the Southern Sudan in the last century, lasting almost 40 years. In
2005, under the mediation of the international community, the two parties signed
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the longest civil war in the
history of the African continent. A referendum was held in early 2011 in accordance
with the CPA to determine if the Southern Sudan should declare its independence
from Sudan, with 98.83% of the population voting for separation. On July 9th of the
same year, the Government of Southern Sudan declared its independence as the
Republic of South Sudan. The now two countries have paid a tremendous cost for
this hard-won peaceful separation. However, the shadow of conflicts resulting from
the decades-long civil wars is still hanging over the two countries. The road towards
enduring peace is still full of twists and turns. Because of the boundary demarcation
disputes and differences over oil revenues sharing and the status of the Abyei region,
frictions have never stopped between the two countries and sometimes erupted into
fierce border conflicts.
In order to ease the tension, the international community made a collective
response and concerted efforts at a critical moment. This April, the African Union,
as the major mediator, initiated a "Road Map" solution and afterwards convened a
number of negotiations between the two sides. In support of the African Union's
"Road Map", the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 2046 and 2047 in this
May and held consultations and reviews on the Sudan South Sudan issue on a
regular basis. On September 27th, coordinated under the African Union and
witnessed by the international community, the two countries, after a number of
intensive meetings, signed in Addis Ababa the Cooperation Agreement between the
Republic of South Sudan and Republic of Sudan, including a string of agreements
concerning oil revenues sharing, fiscal arrangements, and status of nationals of
H.E. Amb. ZHONG Jianhua is Chinese Governments Special Representative on African Affairs.
Winter 2012
ZHONG Jianhua
other state, etc. These agreements will definitely play a positive role in easing the
two sides' relations, stabilizing their domestic situations, and maintaining regional
stability at large.
At present, the Sudan - South Sudan reconciliation issue is moving in the
direction of peaceful solution and the two sides are given a favorable opportunity
for a real start of peace and a new era of cooperation and mutual benefit. How to
enlarge consensus, promote negotiations, maintain and solidify the current proactive
momentum, and speed up the appropriate settlement of the remaining issues
between the two sides have become the international community's common
challenge and mission. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and
true friend of both Sudan and South Sudan, China has consistently supported and
contributed to the peace process between the two countries. Both in bilateral
relations with the two countries and on multilateral occasions such as in Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and China-Arab States Cooperation Forum,
Chinese leaders always tried to persuade the two sides to settle relevant issues
through peaceful negotiations. Since appointed as the Chinese Governments
Special Representative on African Affairs, I have visited the two countries for
several times and kept regular contacts with relevant sides. The diplomatic efforts
made by China in solving the Sudan South Sudan issue have been productive, not
only easing the regional tension and promoting the two sides' reaching an
agreement on oil revenues sharing, but also consolidating China's relations with
both countries.
As an African saying goes, to be without a friend is to be poor indeed. China
always thinks that as neighboring countries indispensable to each other, Sudan and
South Sudan should be friends living in harmony and partners that develop
themselves hand in hand. This is also a wish shared by the international community.
In the next stage, the two countries will have negotiations on the implementation of
the agreements and other unsettled issues. The international community is supposed
to keep its patience and take good care of the seed of peace that has been planted
between the two sides, cultivating it into a luxuriant tree of happiness that shelters
the two countries' people and the people in surrounding areas.
Global Review
China's Relations with Two Sudans:

From One Country, Two Systems
to Two Countries, One System
ZHANG Chun
Either before or after the peaceful separation, the relationship between former
northern and southern part of Sudan, now Sudan and South Sudan, is full of
disputes and even conflicts and wars, which imposes great pressures on Chinas
foreign policy. However, China tried hard to play a constructive role in both
promoting the realization of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) concluded in
2005 and mediating the contradictions between the two parties after the separation
in 2011, while the policies in different periods are a bit different.
The difference is: its a policy of one country two systems in the first period and
of two countries one system in the second. Since the signing of CPA in 2005,
China has closely engaged into its implementation. To better deal with the
SPLM-led Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), China introduced the policy of
one country, two systems. Since 2005, China and GoSS have established formal
relations, with President Hu Jintao and President Salva Kiir met twice in 2007 and
later China opened a new consulate in Juba in 2008, an example followed by many
Chinese companies. Most significantly, the Chinese Governments Special
Representative for African Affairs, with special interests in Sudan and Darfur issues,
always attaches great importance to the implementation of CPA. While there are
skepticism from the international community, China confirmed the international
community that it supported the full implementation of CPA and would collaborated
with the USA to promote it. Former Envoy Ambassador LIU Guijin met with
Americas special envoy to Sudan Princeton Layman at least 5 times in the half year
Dr. ZHANG Chun is Deputy Director, Center for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
Daniel Large, Chinas Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political
Trajectories in Peace and War, The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 610626.
Winter 2012
ZHANG Chun
before the referendum, the latter expressed that he believed China had delivered the
right message to both parties of Sudan.
Though the two countries are separated peacefully, the story is not over with a lot
of unsettled disputes, which requires policy adjustment for not only China, but other
external partners including USA, EU, and many others. The reason lies in the
changing fact that there are two countries now. In this context, Chinas policy after
the separation is a policy of two countries, one system. The term one system
means that China has not changed its goal of helping both parties to find a way for
development through resolving their disputes. Here we need to reaffirm that the
goal of the first stages one country, two systems policy always puts the economic
development at the center stage while disputes resolving simply is one of the
preconditions.
In the Chinese eyes, whether the Southern part gains independence or not,
economic development is fundamental to the dispute solution. With the
independence of the South, now its time to shift focus from reconciliation to
development by joining hands together. To meet this goal, both sides need to
abandon the mindset of zero-sum game through weakening the other party for more
reasonable bargaining chips during the negotiations.
However, the reality is that both parties practiced such a wrong win set supported
either by furious or victorious passions. On the Sudanese side, accepting the
separation of South Sudan is the biggest concession, thus it seems reasonable to
hope for greater rewards from the international community and South Sudan in
particular. However, supported by victorious passion, South Sudan chose not to
reward Sudan and even provoked Sudan with assumption that its support will keep
support for it as usual. Thus, a kind of security dilemma is rising. Entering 2012,
since the unilateral decision of South Sudan to stop its oil production and not to
use oil infrastructure in Sudan and the decision of Sudan to close its border with a
shoot-to-kill policy for any smugglers of goods to the South, the bilateral relations
UN Disappointed China not Arrest Sudanese President, US Content with China, Ifeng.com, 2
July 2011, http://news.ifeng.com/world/detail_2011_07/02/7394697_0.shtml, 21-11-2012.
Global Review
China's Relations with Two Sudans
deteriorated and reached the breaking point when South Sudan invaded Heglig and
destroyed the oil infrastructure there, which in return agitated the racist attitude of
President Bashir and provoked the strong condemnations from the American side
who is a longstanding friend of the South. There are lots of stories of this kind in
the recent development of this relationship.
China tries hard to persuade the two parties to return to the right track and gain a
real success. Through his shuttle diplomacy, Chinas new Special Envoy
Ambassador ZHONG Jianhua convinced both sides that they should be sensitive to
the expectations of their people and the international community and to take the
talks seriously so as to find win-win solutions that would improve their strained
relations. China warns both sides that economic costs for lasting conflicts cant be
afforded by two peoples. Generally, the economies of the two countries have been
badly affected by their strained relations. While the South has temporarily lost oil
revenue that constituted 98% of its budget, Sudan has lost more than 30% of its
revenue from oil-related fees from the South, and almost more than 80% of its
foreign exchange earnings. Besides, therere more serious and long-term economic
impacts. For example, the monthly inflation rate, which used to be one digit, has
reached more than 30% in Sudan and around 25% in the South in the first half of
2012. The exchange rate, which was less than 3 Sudanese Pounds and 3 South
Sudanese Pounds per dollar, has reached almost 6 Sudanese Pounds and 5 South
Sudanese Pounds in the parallel market during the same period.
China used wisely its leverages to push Sudan and South Sudan to shift their eyes
to rebuild their economy by joining hands together. While Sudan has a better
understanding about this, South Sudan needs time to realize it. For example, in the
first half of 2012, South Sudan strongly held that the mega project of Lamu-Juba
corridor could be the substitute for the pipeline through Sudan port. This policy
stance means that South Sudan takes a zero-sum game theory and tries to cut clear
with Sudan economically, which is a lose-lose scenario that China does not agree
with. Thats why China did not provide supports for this mega project until the two
Luka Biong Deng, Strained Sudan-South Sudan Relations: Who pays the price? Sudan
tribune, 24 June 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/Strained-Sudan-South-Sudan,43030.
Winter 2012
ZHANG Chun
parties almost reached oil revenue share agreement in August 2012.

Either one country, two systems or two countries, one system, Chinas real
policy goal hasnt changed a bit, with respecting formal state sovereignty and
promoting economic development of Sudan and South Sudan as the core. That is
the secrect of the success of Chinas African policy in general and two Sudans
policy in particular.
China Welcomes Oil Deal between Sudan, South Sudan, Xinhua News, 6 August 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/06/c_131765167.htm; Jane Perlez, South
Sudan to Get Aid From China; No Oil Deal, New York Times, 25 April 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/china-to-aid-south-sudan-but-pipeline-efforts-stal
l.html?_r=0.
Global Review
China in the International Conflict-management:

Darfur as a Case
JIAN Junbo
Due to Chinese typical economic and strategic interests, diplomatic philosophy,
cultural and psychological tradition, Chinas positions, principles and approaches on
the Darfur issue-resolution was somehow different from those of Western countries,
which also characterized the conflict-management of China in this issue. This
article will review the Chinas policy on Darfur issue and analyze the role that
China played in it, then generalize this states conflict-management approach on
international hot issues.
I. Chinese policy over Darfur: from neutrality to engagement

Generally, Chinese policy on Darfur issue experienced three stages: indifference,
persuasion and actively involvement. This policy change reflected the Chinas
adherence to its national interests, its care for the international responsibility and the
change of international politics.
1. Stage one: indifferent to Sudans affair
When military conflicts happened in the Western part of Sudan, China didnt pay
much attention to them and even two people were kidnapped in March 2004 in that
region. Chinese leaders were successfully persuaded by Sudan government that
made Chinese leaders believe what happened in Western Sudan was just local
violence that could be controlled by government.
In addition, China refused to sanction Sudan when the UN planed to adopt one
US-supported resolution imposing sanction on Sudan. China explained that what
was happened in Darfur was not a racial genocide but an internal conflict between
different tribes who competed for resources.
Dr. JIAN Junbo is Assistant Professor of Fudan University.

Winter 2012
JIAN Junbo
2. Stage two: persuading Sudanese central government to accept the UNs

suggestions
However, Chinas policy toward Darfur issue had a subtle change from the
indifference or neutrality to actively persuading Omar Hassan al-Bashir authority to
accept UNs resolutions.
In August 2004, Lv Guozeng, the Chinese special representative to Darfur,
visited Sudan where he confirmed the roles of AU and the League of Arab States
(LAS) in dealing with Darfur crisis, and stated China hoped Khartoum could
comply with the UNs resolutions . He also argued China would provide 5 million
Chinese Yuan-valued materials as humanitarian assistance for Darfur crisis.
In November 2006, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao talk to Bashir in Beijing
that China supported the UNs 1706 resolution, hoped Sudanese government could
comprehensively cooperate with international society and implement the UNs
resolution and Darfur Peace Agreement. Chinese President Hun Jintao, also
extended the same message to Bashir, and especially hoped Sudanese government
could accept the AU-UN joint peacekeeping force.
3. Stage three: cooperation with international society
Since 2006, China took more active action to deal with the Darfur issue through
three ways- pressing Sudanese government to accept international resolutions;
promoting to build a joint peacekeeping troop; and coordinating with related actors
in international society.
-- Pressing Sudanese government
In March 2008, Liu Guijin, the Chinese special representative to Darfur, stated
that Sudans government must do much more, stopping competing for lands with
rebel groups. Meanwhile, China didnt veto the UNs 1769 resolution which
decided to appoint an UN-led peacekeeping troop to Sudan, working with the AUs
army, yet a joint-troop was opposed by Khartoum.
In this 1556 resolution, the UN asked Sudans government to relieve weapons of Arabian
militias in Darfur.
Wen Jiabao: China-Sudan Relations Are Equal and without any Private Interests, see
Chinas News website, 3 November 20006, http://www.sina.com.cn http://news.sina.com.cn/c
/2006-11-03/202211419625.shtml.
Global Review
China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case
The pressure to Khartoum also accompanied with Beijings balance policy in

North Sudan and South Sudan. For instance, it set up a consulate in Juba.
Furthermore, China contacted with South Sudans leaders of the rebelling groups,
e.g., having invited Salva Kiir, the Chairman of Sudan Liberation Movement to
visit Beijing two times.
-- Pushing to build joint peacekeeping force in Darfur
In July 2007, Security Council approved the UNs resolution which decided to
send an UN-led peacekeeping troop to Darfur based on Annan Plan. Although
China abstained from the resolution, this made the resolution effective, and then the
joint peacekeeping force quickly became possible. Helped by China, Sudan had to
agree to allow a joint peacekeeping to enter Darfur.
-- Coordinating with international actors
In May 2007, the Chinese special representative to Darfur Liu Guijin visited
Africa two times after he was appointed less than two months. He talked with
Sudan, the AU, the LAS and some Western powers, coordinating with them to reach
some shared positions and resolve the Darfur issue with political dialogues.
In Beijings opinion, not only Khartoum but also those rebelling groups should be
imposed pressures. Mr. Liu once said China was pressing Sudan to do more to end
the violence, but added that rebel groups also shared responsibility.
He also argued that the UN and AU should together handle those technological
issues regarding the deploy of peacekeeping troops; all concerned countries in this
region should take cooperative action; and the international society, including
Security Council members should work together, without sending wrong messages
to Sudan and the rebelling groups. He had also complained those rebelling groups
were not active to participate in the peace negotiation is a primary shortage.
Jim Yardley, China Defends Sudan Policy and Criticizes Olympics Tie-In, The New York
Times, March 8, 2008.
Gu Guoping, Dong Jirong, The Positions and Policies of China and the US on Darfur Issue:
Based on Each Official States and Speeches, International Forum, Vol. 1, 2010.
Chinese Special Representative to Darfur Hold a Press Conference, see Chinese Foreign
Affairs Ministry website: http: / /www1fmp rc1gov.
How Far Is Darfur from the Peace? International Herald, 2 November, 2007.see
Winter 2012
JIAN Junbo
For realizing stability and peace, Chinese representative to Darfur had also
visited London and Paris, to coordinate with European counterparts. Meanwhile,
Chinese representative in the UN also coordinate with other Security Council
members in order to put forward a commonly agreed UN resolution.
II. China in the conflict-management on Darfur issue:

dynamics, principles and approaches
In Darfur issue-resolution process, China played special roles based on special
interests and principles through typical approaches as a different player from other
powers, especially the US and the European Union (EU).
1. Dynamics: interests and image
Without question, Beijings policy toward Darfur and its change is embedded in its
typical preference on national interests. Because the deep economic ties with Sudan,
China didnt have the will to destroy the bilateral relationship, joining the
international society to against Khartoum when Darfur crisis was happened in the
early time.
However, when early crisis swiftly changed into a humanitarian crisis, China was
imposed more international pressure and quietly changed its policy. Clearly this
change was also resulted from the worry about the lasting violence in Darfur which
would harm Chinese enterprises interests.
On the other hand, Beijings policy alteration is also due to one considerationimage, although this can also considered as a quite typical interests. As a rising
power, one of Chinas ambitions is to be accepted as one responsible actor in
international society. When Darfur crisis escalated, China was challenged by more
international criticism, and then had to care about its international image. According
to this, China began to cooperate with international society.
2. Principles: sovereign independence, multilateralism, and development
Generally speaking, the principles China used in Darfur issue can classified into
three dimensions: sovereign independence, multilateralism and aiming to
http://news.sohu.com/20071102/n253021675.shtml.
Josh Kurlantzick, China, Myanmar and Sudan: Perusable Idea, New Republic, 4 September,
2010.
10
Global Review
China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case
development.
The Chinese special representative Liu Guijin had argued that China didnt agree
to deal with regional conflict by force and coerce; and the principle Chinese
government adhered was respecting Sudans sovereignty and territorial integrity.
After China decided to join in the international action for resolving Darfur issue, it
adhered to the multilateralism as an important principle. It strengthened all actions
aiming at Darfur issue-resolution should be under the UNs leadership and through
multilateral negotiations, dialogues and cooperation, not only among international
actors like China, the US, the AU and so on, but also among different political
groups in Sudan.
At the same time, Chinese considered that promoting Sudans development was
the fundamental and essential principle to reduce the conflict in Darfur, since the
poverty and backwardness was the root of the conflict. Zhai Jun, one Chinese
special representative to Darfur claimed the essential road to resolution of Darfur
issue was to realize the regions economic reconstruction and development.
3. Approaches: persuasion, cooperation, coordination and political dialogue
The approaches that China used in the Darfur issue-resolution are political
dialogues or diplomatic means. Liu Guijin had said "there is only one way to solve
the problem in Darfur only through dialogue and consultation." According to this,
sanction was not preferred by China, diplomatic approach- persuasion, cooperation,
coordination, negotiation and so like these, rather than sanction and unilateral action
was the unique way that China choose to use in Darfur issue. Liu Guijin had
concluded one of the principles used in Darfur issue was adherence to political
approach.
Chinese Representative Explained Chinese Governments Position over Darfur, see China
website, 22 February 2008: www.china.com.cn.
Gwen Thompkins, Chinese Influence In Sudan Is Subtle, NPR, July 29, 2008:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92282540.
Wang Yaping, China and Darfur Issue, cited from Carnegies Perspective on China, 8
September 2007.
Winter 2012
11
Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping

Operations
XUE Lei
I. Overview of the Peace Operations and Chinas Contribution

Currently, there are three ongoing UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the
two Sudans. The first is the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
established under UN Security Council Resolution 1769 as of 2007, which provided
the mandate for a combination of previous African Union Mission in the Sudan
(AMIS) and UN support. The second is the United Nations Interim Security Force
for Abyei (UNISFA) established under UNSC Resolution 1990 as of 27 June 2011.
Its aim is to monitor and verify the redeployment of Sudan governmental armed
forces and Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) from the Abyei Area. The third
one is the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
established under UNSC Resolution 1996. These three missions manifest different
features of UN peace operations. The UNISFA carries on with it the traditional
simplistic characteristics of peacekeeping operations, i.e. monitoring relevant
parties compliance with and implementation of ceasefire agreement. The UNAMID
include the hybrid operation of AU and UN to address conflict prevention and peace
maintenance work in the Darfur region of Sudan. And the UNMISS is actually a
comprehensive peacebuilding and nation-building mission after the independence
of South Sudan, which covers a wide range of issues and activities such as security
sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR), as
well as economic development and social reconstruction. The co-existence of three
types of peacekeeping operations has again demonstrated the complicatedness of
the challenges faced by both Sudan and South Sudan.
As a responsible major power and a country with friendly relations with both of
the two countries, China actively participated in the peacekeeping operations in this
region. Generally speaking, Chinas contribution to peacekeeping operations is
manifested in three aspects. First, on the conceptual level, China always sticks to
the development-oriented or development first policy, which means that the
Xue Lei is research fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
12
Global Review
Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping Operations
peacekeeping operations should be conducted in the way conducive to dealing with

the root causes of conflicts and forging solid base for subsequent large-scale
rebuilding work. Second, up to now China has only dispatched non-combatant
troops to join peacekeeping forces, with engineering corps and medical teams
constituting the major components of Chinese peacekeepers. This reflects to some
extent Chinas worry about the situation of peacekeeping troops being endowed
with too much power of using force. Yet in practice the non-combatant feature of
Chinese peacekeepers has become a unique advantage and contribution to
peacekeeping operations. Chinese peacekeepers have completed large-scale
economic and social reconstruction work for the local community, including the
building of basic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supply facilities, etc..
The hospital established by Chinese medical team also contributed a lot to the
health of local people. Such work has actually made a great contribution to the early
recovery of conflict-affected local community and laid a solid foundation for the
subsequent comprehensive rebuilding process. Third, aside from its role of a troop
contributing country (TCC), China also works as a police contributing country
(PCC) in this region. The riot police or civilian police dispatched constitutes an
indispensable part of the process of restoration of justice and order in the local
community. The engagement of Chinese police staff with local police staff is also
much helpful to capacity building in local police institution and personnel. In a
word, China is fulfilling its promise of being a genuine and responsible partner of
the two countries through its active role in the relevant peacekeeping operations.
II. Chinas Policy Considerations in Participating

in Peace Operations
Chinas deeper involvement into UN peacekeeping operations will inevitably lead
to a comprehensive change in the UN conflict management system. First, the power
configuration in the decision-making and implementation process of UN
peacekeeping operations may experience great transformation. With the western
security apparatus dominated by the US tilting more towards the war on terror and
the subsequent campaigns to suppressing the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan
since the 9/11 terrorist attack, the involvement of western countries in UN-led
peacekeeping operations has been sharply weakened, especially in the African
continent which has long been one of the focal areas of UN peacekeeping
operations. The immediate consequence of this strategic shift of western countries
policies is the aggravated problems of shortage of military personnel, resources, and
equipments, in particular the shortage of some critical equipments such as the
Winter 2012
13
XUE Lei
transport helicopters, which has become a significant bottleneck constraining the

implementation of peacekeeping operations. Against this backdrop, the growing
involvement of emerging countries including China, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, etc. will be conducive to the mitigation of constraints the UN now faces.
And such a kind of gradually growing contribution to UN peacekeeping operations
by emerging countries will definitely be followed with the change of power
configuration in international conflict management system. Second, with the rising
complexity of both the international and domestic environment for peacekeeping
operations, the differences surrounding the guiding peacekeeping principles also
loom large. The so-called PKO Three Principles include the following points: (1)
impartiality (neutrality); (2) consent of relevant governments or parties; and (3) use
of force limited to circumstances of self-defense. These principles have been the
guiding principles and remain the cornerstone of UN PKOs. However, the western
countries have endeavored to expand the scope of conflict situations applicable to
peacekeeping operations, with the intention of including confrontational conflict
situation into the scope of peacekeeping operations so as to expand the power of
peacekeeping forces in terms of using force. And the emerging powers insist that
peacekeeping operations should remain in the field of neutral stance to prevent
escalation of inter-state or intra-state conflicts. The peacekeeping forces should not
have too large scope of power in terms of using force and interfering into internal
affairs of host states. With the growing influence of China and other emerging
powers on coordinative work and decision-making process of peacekeeping
operations, its hoped that the confused or even inappropriate situation in relation to
norms and principles of peacekeeping may be clarified or corrected. Third, the
UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations also provided China with the means and
channels to exert influence. As an emerging power in current times, the path for
Chinas rise is definitely completely different from the rising paths of the old
powers. In terms of management and resolution of international conflicts, Chinas
role is manifested more in the use of UN-led multilateral platforms, the focus on
political and diplomatic measures, and the stress on involvement and consent of all
relevant parties. The UN-sponsored peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes are
the most appropriate for the above-mentioned Chinas policy considerations.
Therefore, in the future we may see more of this mutually-enhancing relation from
the interaction between China and UN peace operations.
14
Global Review

As EU Special Representative, I have a wide ranging mandate from EU Foreign

Ministers covering all aspects of EU policy towards Sudan and South Sudan. At the
core of this mandate is the promotion of peace and stability in Sudan and South
Sudan. This is one of the European Union's top priorities in Africa.
Both Sudan and South Sudan face considerable challenges. These continue to
cause human suffering as well as instability and insecurity in the wider region. The
conflict in Darfur continues, with 1.7 million Darfuris still living in IDP camps and
300,000 in refugee camps in Chad. The fighting that erupted in Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile states in 2011 has caused large-scale civilian casualties, displacement
and an exodus of over 240,000 refugees into South Sudan and Ethiopia. More than
100,000 people have been displaced from Abyei. Inter-communal clashes in South
Sudan, particularly in Jonglei state, have also resulted in displacement and loss of
civilian life.
In order to address these challenges, EU Foreign Ministers decided last year to
pursue a Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. This is designed to
promote the emergence of two viable, stable and prosperous states. The EU is using
a wide range of instruments - political, diplomatic, development assistance, security
and stabilisation, and human rights, as well as humanitarian assistance - in a more
coherent and joined-up fashion.
A cornerstone of the Comprehensive Approach has been to support the African
Union's mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan. The EU has lent
political, financial and technical support to the AU High-Level Implementation
Panel (AUHIP), led by former President Thabo Mbeki. The EU also welcomed the
clear leadership demonstrated by the AU Peace and Security Council, in particular
when it adopted the AU Roadmap on 24 April, subsequently endorsed by the UN
Security Council in Resolution 2046. My team and I have been present in Addis
Ababa during the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in order to support
the AUHIP.
H.E.Dame Rosalind Marsden is EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan.
Winter 2012
15
I also coordinate closely with key regional players and Special Envoys from the UN,
US, and Norway, and, of course, my Chinese counterpart. This coordination,
together with the strong lead given by the AU, has ensured an unprecedented degree
of international consensus that has been indispensable to making progress in
resolving the outstanding issues.
The Addis talks culminated in the signing of nine agreements by Sudan and
South in Addis Ababa on 27 September. These agreements represent a major step
towards normalising relations between the two countries. The implementation of the
agreements will benefit the people of both countries. The EU stands ready to
support the implementation process.
While the agreements are a great achievement, the critical issues of the final
status of Abyei, the disputed and claimed border areas and the conflict in Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile states remain unresolved. Resolving these issues is
essential for full normalisation of relations between Sudan and South Sudan and for
full implementation of the AU Roadmap and UN Security Council Resolution 2046.
The EU supports the clear lead given by the African Union.
The EU remains gravely concerned about the fighting in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile states and the serious humanitarian situation this has caused. The EU has
repeatedly insisted on immediate access for international humanitarian agencies to
all civilians affected by the conflict. It is also imperative that the Government of
Sudan and SPLM/North engage immediately in direct talks in order to reach a
cessation of hostilities and a political settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011
Framework Agreement and with a view to an inclusive national dialogue that meets
the needs and aspirations of all Sudanese citizens within an open and democratic
framework. There can be no military solution to this conflict.
Darfur is also an issue of major concern for the EU. The security situation in
Darfur is serious with an increased threat of physical violence to civilians from
armed groups, inter-communal tensions, aerial bombing and fighting between
forces of the Government and the armed movements, particularly in North Darfur.
The EU is concerned about continuing restrictions on humanitarian access in some
parts of Darfur, including the eastern Jebel Marra, and on UNAMID's freedom of
movement, particularly to areas of recent conflict. Forty seven UNAMID
peacekeepers have been killed in Darfur but none of the perpetrators has yet been
brought to justice.
16
Global Review
Also in the case of Darfur, dialogue and negotiations are necessary to resolve the
conflict. That is why the EU welcomed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
(DDPD) signed in May 2011 as the basis for reaching a comprehensive and
inclusive peace. The EU has urged the signatory Parties to redouble their efforts to
achieve rapid and tangible progress in implementing the DDPD.
The EU remains strongly committed to helping the people of Darfur. We will
continue to demonstrate that commitment through our support for the peace process;
and political and financial support for UNAMID to fulfil its protection of civilians
mandate (EU Member States fund 45% of UNAMID's budget through their
assessed contributions to the UN). The EU is also funding a large humanitarian
assistance programme, including support for some early recovery activities. The EU
would like to do more to help but our ability to do so depends on progress in three
areas: access for international humanitarian and development workers, security and
implementation of the DDPD.
The EU is committed to promoting democratisation, good governance and human
rights. The EU supports the promotion by the African Union of a holistic approach
to the quest for peace, justice and reconciliation and the need to prioritise
democratisation in both Sudan and South Sudan as a sine qua non for stability and
equitable governance. Local civil society groups in both Sudan and South Sudan
have an essential role to play in this endeavour. The EU is a strong supporter of
civil society organisations in both countries.
Besides our political engagement, humanitarian and development assistance is a
core part of our engagement in both Sudans. Since 2005, the EU has committed
development assistance of over 650 million euros to South Sudan. Since 2010, the
EU has committed 285 million euros to developing the following sectors: education,
health, agriculture, food security and democratic governance. The EU has also
deployed a Common Security and Defence Policy mission in order to strengthen
security at Juba Airport.
Development assistance to Sudan is more limited given the Government of
Sudan's decision not to ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement. Even so, in 2011 the
EU provided around 47 million euros to vulnerable populations in conflict-affected
areas in the agriculture, health, and education sectors. In 2012, the EU provided 10
million euros for agriculture and basic services in North and South Darfur.
Winter 2012
17
Humanitarian assistance continues to be another core strand of the EU's policy

towards Sudan and South Sudan. There are still considerable humanitarian needs in
both countries. The EU's humanitarian programme for the two Sudans is one of the
largest EU humanitarian programmes in the world. The European Commission's
budget for Sudan and South Sudan towards the end of 2012 was 127 million euros.
The EU will remain closely engaged in Sudan and South Sudan and will continue
to work with our international partners to promote two stable, democratic and
prosperous states.
18
Global Review
Development through Peace: Could Chinas Economic

Cooperation with South Sudan Be More
Conflict-sensitive?
Thomas Wheeler
While China has already provided some development aid, it is likely that in the
future it will be a source of considerably more financial assistance to the
Government of South Sudan (GoSS), especially for the construction of
infrastructure. This holds substantial promise for post-conflict reconstruction and
economic development in the worlds newest nation. However, on-going insecurity
remains a significant obstacle. For many of South Sudans people, the absence of a
peace dividend is perhaps one of the biggest post-independence disappointments.
Alongside the continued tensions with its northern neighbour, inter-community
conflicts have escalated to alarming levels, taking lives, displacing families and
wreaking humanitarian havoc. This insecurity prevents the delivery of important
development projects and deters commercial investment. It is widely accepted that
development cannot occur in conditions of heightened conflict and insecurity. The
World Bank notes that no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to
achieve a single Millennium Development Goal.
While insecurity might restrict economic growth, the reverse is also true:
economic engagement, no matter how well-intentioned, can inadvertently fuel
conflict. Explaining Chinas economic co-operation with a pre-secession Sudan that
was mired with conflict, some Chinese officials espoused the theory of peace
through development. However, as is acknowledged in China, the reality of
economic co-operation presents a far more complex picture. For example, while
Sudan saw GDP growth figures above 10 percent in 2006 and 2007, the country
was far from peaceful in that period.
Thomas Wheeler is Project Coordinator, Saferworld.

Saferworld China and South Sudan Saferworld Briefing (2012). Also see International Crisis
Group Chinas New Courtship in South Sudan Africa Report 186 (2012).
World Bank, World Bank Development Report 2011.
Saferworld China and conflict-affected states (2012) and Large, D Between the CPA and
Southern Independence: Chinas Post-Conflict Engagement in Sudan (2012) SAIIA, Occasional
Paper No.115.
Winter 2012
19
Thomas Wheeler
Chinese state banks, and Chinese companies, have long been big players in
Sudanese infrastructure development, funding and building railway tracks, water
pipelines, electricity grids, ports and bridges. As the largest consumer of Sudanese
oil, and the biggest shareholder in its oil blocks, China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) made significant investments in the infrastructure required to
extract it. Much of this economic co-operation between China and pre-secession
Sudan likely brought real and tangible benefits for development and, ultimately,
some peoples wellbeing.
Nonetheless, it could never be totally isolated from a context of conflict which
was (and remains) so common to Sudan. In some cases, Chinas economic role may
have inadvertently exacerbated the pre-existing factors that drive conflict. For
example, Chinese dam construction projects were reportedly associated with
displacement and violent protest in regions where political relations were already
tense. The creation of Sudans oil infrastructure, including roads, was associated
with extremely high levels of violence between the Sudanese security services,
armed groups and civilians in oil-rich areas. As argued by one South Sudanese
politician, this history remains a major hurdle in China-South Sudan relations.
Large scale development assistance to South Sudan may come to address one
major criticism that is common among officials and civil society in the
country,which is that, before independence, the benefits of economic co-operation
with China including infrastructure development and jobs overwhelmingly
favoured the North. They say they have built things hospitals and schools but
this is in the North, not in the South, summarises one South Sudanese observer.
Feelings of marginalisation from economic development underpinned armed
rebellion down the path of succession for many Southerners. A substantial boost in
Chinese economic engagement in South Sudan may go some way to redressing
these feelings. In this way, as Chinese officials and academics have long argued,
economic engagement can positively address root causes of conflict. But another
fact also becomes evident: perceptions of where, and to whom, the benefits of
economic co-operation are distributed matters more for stability than whether it is
For example see: Bosshard P, New Chinese dam project to fuel ethnic conflict in Sudan,
Huffington Post, 26 January 2011, and: UN expert urges Sudan to respect human rights of
communities affected byhydro-electric dam projects, Sudan Tribune, 28 August2007.
Deng L, South Sudan: China a strategic partner of the new nation, Sudan Tribune, 16 April
2012.
Saferworld interview, Unity State, South Sudan, August 2011.
20
Global Review
Development through Peace
delivered at all.
These are obviously extremely complex issues raising difficult questions about
responsibility: was it Chinese companies, or warring parties that turned oil fields
into battlefields? Is it Chinese state banks who should decide whether, where and
how an infrastructure project is implemented, or the national government in whose
country it is being built? If people are displaced, who should ensure that they have
new homes to go to? And who is it that should decide where the fruits of economic
development go?
Clearly, there are no straight forward answers. Of course the GoSS holds primary
responsibility in ensuring that assistance from China is shared equally between the
countrys people, that development is catalysed and that conflict is not exacerbated.
But in order for Chinese officials and companies to support such efforts, they must
acknowledge that economic co-operation will potentially have an impact on the
high levels of violent conflict in South Sudan and at the very least take concrete
measures to ensure that no harm is done.
One way in which to meet this objective is through adopting the three steps of
conflict sensitivity. First, Chinese actors involved in economic co-operation should
understand the conflict context through consulting with all the stakeholders
including the GoSS, state governments, politicians, civil society groups, elders and
local communities. Second, based on this understanding they should identify how
their engagement might impact on conflict by conducting a thorough risk analysis
before starting a project. Third, they should use this information to minimise
negative impacts and promote positive ones, working closely with the host
government and other involved actors. However, in some cases, the risks may
simply outweigh the benefits, meaning that the whole project should be
reconsidered.
For Chinese companies, in both the infrastructure and extractive sectors, conflict
sensitive approaches offer significant benefits for risk management in a dangerous
environment. Better understanding the operating environment and seeking
acceptance from local communities and conflict actors maybe less costly and more
effective than relying exclusively on armed protection from state security services,
who are very often targets themselves. For the Chinese government, applying
conflict sensitivity to its development co-operation can be a way to co-ordinate and
achieve its FOCAC commitments for peacebuilding and contributing to
Winter 2012
21
Thomas Wheeler
post-conflict development. For both Chinese commercial actors and the government,
the approach will help guard against reputational costs that will be felt far beyond
South Sudan.
Future economic co-operation with China can potentially boost development in
South Sudan. It is clear that this is conditional on stability. It is for South Sudans
government, politicians and civil society to achieve peace and security. Outsiders
cannot do this for them; they can only support their efforts. Through reflection on
Chinas role in the recent past, Chinese decision-makers can ensure that how they
choose to help in the future is in line with peace and development.
22
Global Review

Leben Nelson Moro
Introduction
The arrival in the old Sudan of Chinese oil companies in the 1990s and the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between President Omer al
Bashirs government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/ Army
(SPLM/A) in 2005 greatly shaped the relations between China, Sudan and South
Sudan. With expanding investments, and increasing demands to secure them, China
upped its relations with the old Sudan.
Three phases of relations are discernible: the first was a period of low key ties
before the arrival of Chinese oil companies; the second was characterized by
substantial ties with al Bashirs government; and the third was marked by continued
expansion of ties with al Bashirs government and cultivation of relations with the
leaders of SPLM/A. It is argued that Chinese relations with the old Sudan as well as
Sudan and South Sudan blossomed mainly due to mutual interest in development of
oil resources. Given that the development of oil resources is a political matter,
Chinas oft-stated policy of non-interference and no-strings attached has been
questioned. In this article, the reasons for this will be analyzed.
Low key relations

The old Sudan was among the first countries to recognize the Peoples Republic of
China in 1959. Relations increased after President Jaafar Nimeiri (1969-1985)
visited China in 1970. During the visit, he asked for help in several areas but was
reportedly advised to turn to the US for assistance with oil prospecting as China did
not have the right technology.
Dr. Leben Nelson Moro is the Director of External Relations at the University of Juba, South
Sudan, and teaches at the Universitys Center for Peace and Development Studies.
Old Sudan refers to the united Sudan before the secession of the Southern region on 9 July
2011.
Ali Abdalla Ali The Sudanese-Chinese Relations: Before and After Oil, Khartoum, Sudan,
2006, p. 47.
Winter 2012
23
Leben Nelson Moro
Trade and assistance increased. In 1973, for example, 26 percent of old Sudans
cotton exports went to China, representing 13.6 percent of total exports. Besides
cotton, the old Sudan sold gum arabic, oil seeds and other goods. It imported
textiles, building materials and light industry machinery. Moreover, China gave
loans to the old Sudan on easy terms, which led to the establishment of a number of
projects, such as the Friendship Palace, Hassa Heissa Friendship Textile Mill and
Bridge on Blue Nile. Its ties had no-strings attached. However, they were really
more symbolic than politically consequential.
President Nimeiri turned to US companies for support with the search for oil. In
1978, Chevron discovered oil in the Unity State of Southern Sudan. At that time,
Nimeiri was building ties with Middle Eastern countries close to the US, which was
keen to contain the regime of Gaddafi of Libya and that of Menguistu of Ethiopia.
Chevron rapidly built infrastructure to exploit the oil. It planned for pipelines from
the oil fields to Port Sudan. By 1986 oil was supposed to reach international
markets. However, this was thwarted by SPLA attacks. In 1985, Nimeiri was
overthrown.
In 1992, Chevron wound down its activities under US pressure and SPLA threats.
The US banned engagement by American companies with the oil sector in 1997,
accusing the government of Al Bashir, which came to power in 1989, of abusing
human rights and supporting terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. This was to
mark a new pace of Chinese involvement in the old Sudan.
Expanding relations
Chinas relations with the old Sudan grew. Like Nimeiri, al Bashir travelled to
China in 1995 to request help with development of oil resources. This time around
China accepted as it had the technology and interest. It needed oil from abroad to
sustain economic growth. In 1993 China had gone from being a net exporter of oil
to a net importer.
In 1996, despite the SPLA threat, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)
acquired interests in the old Sudan. Petronas from Malaysia, where al Bashir
Ibid, p.14.
Dan Large, Chinas Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political
Trajectories in Peace and War, The China Quarterly, 2009, p.613.
24
Global Review
attended military school, also entered into the country. Indian companies later
joined. Together, they took over oil operations and continued from where Chevron
left off. The atmosphere of conflict, which discouraged risk-averse Western
companies, worked in their favor as competition was low.
In 1999, the old Sudan exported oil for the first time. Six years later, production
reached nearly 500,000 barrels per day. In 2007, oil revenues were estimated at 4
billion US dollars, and economic growth exceeded 10 per cent. China also reaped
huge benefits. It satisfied eight percent of its oil needs with supplies originating
from Sudan.
This achievement had to be protected from the SPLA and other threats, however.
China supported Sudan to secure oil flow. It used its veto to protect al Bashirs
regime in the UN Security Council from sanctions. It also supplied arms, which
were used to secure oil installations.
Clearly, relations were characterized by mutual benefit for al Bashirs regime,
China and its oil companies. However, the move towards peace within the country,
which was being pushed by the US and other Western countries, could destabilize
them.
Balancing relations
In 2005, the regime of al Bashir and the SPLM/A signed the CPA. Without US
pressure this agreement would not have been reached. China quickly established
ties with SPLM/A leaders as they were going to control most of the oil fields from
which Chinese and other companies extracted oil.
Broadly, this experience raised questions about Chinas policy of dealing only
with governments. Traditionally, the state in China is strong and the driver of social
International Crisis Group God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan,
Africa Report, No. 39, 2002.
Leben Nelson Moro, Oil, Conflict and Displacement in Sudan, DPhil thesis, University of
Oxford, 2008.
S.L. Field, The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry, IUD Ocassional Paper,
Braamfontein, South Africa.
Daniel Large and Luke Patey, Caught in the Middle: China and India in Sudans Transition
DIIS Working paper, p.6.
Winter 2012
25
Leben Nelson Moro
change. The big companies are owned by the state and work closely with the
government. There are no significant NGOs. Accordingly, China focuses on
building relations with other states.
The case of the old Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan posed challenges for this
policy. China built good relations with al Bashirs regime which was pursuing
devastating wars in the south and later in Darfur. China avoided establishing
relations with the rebels in the south who were to become the leaders of South
Sudan. Other countries dealt with the SPLM/A before coming to power. So, China
was to play catching up when the SPLM/A came to power after 2005.
China has been trying hard to build equal relations with the leaders of the South
and North, which separated in 2011. It has been doing well in this respect. However,
China might learn from the past and not limited its future engagement only to
government leaders, particularly unpopular ones like al Bashir, but also engage with
other players, such as civil society actors and opponents of those in power.
Dissidents or rebels of today might become the leaders of tomorrow!
Conclusion
Chinas relations with the old Sudan evolved from low to high engagement since
the 1950s. Crucial in this transformation was the role played by oil companies that
helped President al Bashirs regime to exploit oil resources. However, this
development posed a significant challenge to Chinas oft-stated policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In fact, development of oil
resources has always been a political issue with close links to internal political
developments.
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 meant that
China had to deal with SPLM/A leaders who were to rule the Southern region,
which broke away in 2011 to form the Republic of South Sudan. Belatedly, China
forged relations with the new leaders so that oil companies could continue their
operations. It is trying to balance relations with Sudanese leaders and South
Sudanese leaders. However, it should consider engaging with other actors such as
civil society leaders.
26
Global Review

Daniel Large
The creation of ties between South Sudan and China has been one of the more
striking aspects of recent Sudanese politics and international relations. Chinas new
Juba consulate, opened in September 2008, came months before February 2009 and
the start of an extended series of celebrations commemorating the Golden Jubilee
fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official diplomatic China-Sudan
relations.
Now, after South Sudans independence in July 2011, swift diplomatic
recognition by China and the formal opening of Jubas embassy in Beijing in April
2012, China-South Sudan relations are topical. Taking a step back from the heat of
the immediate moment, however, this article considers the question of how should
we think about the history of South Sudans Chinese future. It does so via some
broad thematic points, and locates these relations in historical time, both in terms of
history as it has happened to date and is in the process of unfolding today.
A new history
Chinas history of its Sudan future has only very recently come to encompass the de
facto and then the de jure reality of two Sudans. When relations between Sudan and
China changed from traditional to strategic after 1989, this reinforced the
dominance of a northern-centric political geography of relations. This, of course,
carried an official narrative and a sanctioned history of its own, which continued its
own version of a history of Sudans future China relations that had been forged in
the nineteenth century. This is when the founding mythology of the colonial bridge
linking Sudan and China began.
Dan Large is Research Director of Africa Asia Centre, SOAS, University of London.
Winter 2012
27
Daniel Large
The Historical Mythology of China-Sudan Relations:

Questioning Genesis
The first area concerns the unique historic links between Sudan and China, which
have provided generations with a historical narrative on which to base relations. As
seen, for example, during Premier Zhou Enlais state visit to Khartoum in 1964,
these have been fashioned into a colourful narrative distilled into the form of the
perfect anti-hero, Chinese Gordon, who was viewed as a bridge linking Sudan and
China.
Gordon, who took part in the capture of Peking (Beijing) in 1860 and
commanded the Chinese force that quashed the Taiping Rebellion (1863-1864), was
shot to death in 1885 by a very tall black Sudanese. The meaning of Sudanese
from around the mid-nineteenth century was associated with the black peoples of
Southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains, who were recruited into the Egyptian
army then controlling Sudan or the slave armies of northern Sudanese traders.
The upshot is that it is likely that the founding myth of Sudan-China relations is
based upon the actions of a Southern Sudanese. For a history appropriated by
successive ruling elites in Khartoum, and in view of Southern Sudans comparative
lack of a meaningful history of Chinese connections until recent years, this might
provide a subversive twist and the basis of a new historical connection between
South Sudan and China. In an important sense, however, the Mahdist rebellion
united disparate groups of Sudans peripheries into a common purpose. In this way,
it makes little sense to reattribute a Southern identity to this founding episode.
However, politics always appropriates and reinterprets history to its own ends.
Before and after the January 2011 referendum, efforts were made to strengthen
the basis of Chinas relations with the GOSS. As well as the better covered
See Richard Hill, The Gordon Literature, The Durham University Journal,Vol. 47, 1955, p.
97.
J.A.R.Reid, The death of Gordon, Sudan Notes and Records Vol. XX (1937), p. 173.
Available in www.sudanarchive.net.
Johnson, The Death of Gordon, op cit., footnote 51. p.309.
28
Global Review
economic diplomacy or high-level political missions, the Chinese consulate and

later its Embassy made active efforts to demonstrate a continuity of socio-cultural
links between China and South Sudan. One dynamic appeared to be a desire to
compensate for the recognised imbalance in Chinas relations with Sudan founded
in Khartoum; a necessary adaptation and one that has paved the way for greater
links between Juba and Beijing.
China and Southern Sudans Economic Development

The second area concerns the current significance that China is now being accorded
to independent South Sudans development prospects, which evokes a very different
form of historical interest. One history of Sudans China future from the nineteenth
century foresaw a prominent Chinese role in economic development. In the late
nineteenth century, various schemes were devised and some implemented
predicated upon the superiority of Chinese labour in opening up Central Africa to
more effective European resource exploitation.
In certain respects, the Chinese have long been associated with schemes of
improvement, bound up in imaginaries of modernising projects using outside labour.
Such projections were by no means confined to nineteenth century
Egyptian-governed Sudan. Since 2005, and the entry of the first Chinese
entrepreneurs who pioneered business ventures outside the oil sector in Southern
Sudan after (and even before) the CPA, an independent Chinese role has been
unfolding. Emin Pasha would be intrigued and, conceivably, feel partly vindicated,
even if this is of a qualitatively different kind of engagement than he envisaged.
The Weight of the Past: a Mixed Legacy

The mutual ignorance that formerly existed in China about South Sudan and vice
versa was long conspicuous. Overcoming the history of the war years and the
He wrote in May 1881 that if it is possible for Central Africa to be opened up, it can only be
accomplished by means of the Chinese? Schweinfurth, G. F. Ratzel, R.W. Felkin and G. Hartlaub
eds., Emin Pasha in Central Africa: being a collection of his letters and journals (London:
George Philip and Son, 1888), pp. 417, 419.
Winter 2012
29
Daniel Large
legacy of Chinas role in Sudans North-South and South-South civil wars after the
1989 NIF coup remains a challenge in relations going forward. Because of Beijings
strong and multifaceted support for Khartoum it is understandable that there were
and remain strong feelings about China. However, Chinas adept diplomacy and the
SPLMs savvy incorporation of China into its own political agenda during the CPA
using China not just in its domestic struggle with the NCP but also in its
international diplomacy demonstrated how at the elite level pragmatism founded
in mutual interest trumped this history, opening a new historic phase.
South Sudan China relations have been reset in political terms, though recent
oil politics have not been easy or straightforward and the legacy of the past is mixed.
The war years will continue to inform perceptions of China in South Sudan,
especially for those in the oil producing areas. At the same time, Chinas history of
support to Southern Sudan after 1972 and more recent attempts to be more
cooperative with independent South Sudan through various gestures of assistance,
and the processes to enhance mutual understanding point toward a better future.
Conclusion
South Sudans relations with China were born and baptised in political fire. That
looks likely to continue, despite the September 2012 agreement on oil and security
related matters between Sudan and South Sudan. The history of South Sudans
China future remains bound up in Sudans relations with China and the continuing
reality, albeit a contested on subject to ongoing violence, of two importantly
inter-related and inter-dependent countries.
Todays expectations that China can deliver in South Sudan where others have
failed hark back to the likes of Emin Pasha and the transformative visions centred
on (controlled) Chinese agency. Given the enormity of South Sudans development
needs today, a hopeful but cautious realism should thus temper any notion of
Chinas ingrained advantage or superiority; recent years have shown that China is
just as subject to the constraints of operating in South Sudan as any other investor.
The history of South Sudans China future will likely become important if current
trends continue, but this scenario depends upon this future history being made.
30
Global Review
Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic

Planning in the First Decade of the New Century
CHEN Dongxiao
Chinas general diplomatic planning is increasingly enriching and improving to
have formed a diplomatic framework, in which diplomatic working at the levels of
states, regions and realms complement and reinforce each other, bilateralism and
multilateralism combine, and political, economic and cultural diplomacies interact,
having omnidirectionally advanced Chinas diplomatic working, wrote PRC
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on the magazine Seek Truth in October 2012 in
reviewing the diplomatic achievement China accomplished in the last decade. To
this author, this omnidirectional diplomatic planning is by connotation: a, to
continually advance the construction of a new-type great power relations on
cooperation and dynamically balanced; b, to build up a new, periphery order driven
by the strategic upgrading of the good-neighborly relationship and motivated by the
goal of the commonwealth of interest; c, to underscore a mutually beneficial
development with developing countries; and d, to strengthen a new posture of
global cooperation and governance based on co-governance and sharing
responsibilities, expanding common interests and seeking win-win outcomes. The
omnidirectional diplomatic planning has accelerated the transition and upgrading of
Chinas diplomacy in terms of mindset, capability and vision, and laid down the
direction of the diplomatic planning for the next decade.
I. Call on New-type Diplomatic Thinking

The effort to break through the diplomatic stereotype and to foster a new-type
diplomacy will boost Chinas diplomatic transition and upgrading in the first decade
of the new century. It is the most important innovation of the new-type
diplomacy--the peace and development strategy with Chinese characteristics--to
have recognized the general trend of globalization and multi-polarization and
broken through the traditional theories of international relations and traditional
Prof. CHEN Dongxiao is Deputy Director of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
Yang Jiechi, Review and Outlook of Chinas Diplomacy in the Last Decade, Seek Truth,
no.20, 2012.
Winter 2012
31
CHEN Dingxiao
mindset regarding the rise of big powers. The innovations were carried out in
Chinas diplomatic planning that can be outlined in two aspects as follows:
1. The new-type partnership viewpoint is applied in building the strategic mutual
trust and balanced development of big powers. China has constantly placed the
big-power relations on the key position of the diplomatic chessboard. With the end
of Cold War and the evolution of the globalization, Chinas big-power diplomacy
has experienced deep transition, i.e., China is building a new-type big-power
relationship axised on cooperation and with general and dynamic equilibrium. The
transition is based on Chinas recognition of the substantial change of the
international configuration and big-power relations.
First, the scope of the big-power diplomacy is broadened. China is following the
waves of newly emerging powers and multipolarization of international power
structure in general and, in particular, China is extending its big-power diplomacy
from the traditional Western-power orientation to the newly-emerging-power
orientation, since the newly-emerging-powers are rising in a grouped and
mushroomed fashion, which is altering the Western-centric international power
structure that lasted for the last 500 years. On this basis, China further called for
building an inclusive big-power network including traditional powers, emerging
powers and regional powers, and China stands ready to work with others,
developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized
norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the
challenges and the opportunities before the world today.
China not only rejects the concept ofG2, but also dismisses the Cold War
mentality of confrontation between different alliances and sowing discord to
strengthen exclusive and even confrontational military alliance systems. In the
realm of security, China should work for common security in a spirit of democracy,
inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win progress. Internal affairs of a country
Qiu Yuanping, Successful Exploration of Chinas Peaceful Development Road, Seek Truth,
no.20, 2012.
BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity, Delhi Declaration, 9 March
2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/zlb/smgg/t918949.htm.
Remarks by State Councilor Dai Bingguo at the Joint Press Conference of the Fourth Round of
the China-U.S.Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
China's Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council, September 2011,
Beijing, 2011/09/29.
32
Global Review
Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning
should be handled independently by the country itself and international affairs

should be managed collectively through consultation by all. We should be
committed to multilateralism and international cooperation, and promote democracy
in international relations. These assumptions reflect the new thinking by which
China is actively making plans and arrangements to form a omnidirectional,
dynamically balanced big-power diplomatic network and to place the priority of the
big-power diplomacy on advancing a just, fair and effective global governance
framework.
Second, the connotation of big-power diplomacy is re-examined. Competitive
cooperation as an idea has become the main axis among big powers, especially
between traditional and emerging powers, vis-a-vis the traditional big-power
relations featuring strategic confrontation and even military conflict, a
commonplace in history. On the surface, competitive cooperation manifests
competition and cooperation that are complicatedly interwoven, inter-gamed and
mutually impacted, where cooperation is conducted within competition and vice
versa; cooperation is true but impacted by competition, and competition is
restrained by cooperation. In fact, with competitive cooperation, big-power
relations is undergoing historical transformation, i.e., in treating their relations big
powers resort less to force, violence, coercion and war, and they instead pursue
competitions in economic, systematic, normative and developmental models to
secure comparative advantage and take on strategic dialogue and policy
coordination to manage their divergence and even conflict, and they only strengthen
their cooperation if they face challenges and security threats in common.
It is true that competitive cooperation is by no means free of conflicts among big
powers, including security dilemmas and even strategic mutual suspicions to
varying degrees, especially the historically left-over territorial disputes and disputes
of territorial seas, which remain a sensitive security issue at present day. Big powers
are far from stopping their scrambling for geopolitical and geo-economic
advantages. Gaps in ideologies and value systems are still the major obstacles to the
Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity Remarks by President Hu Jintao at the BRICS Leaders
Meeting, Sanya, 14 April 2011.
According to the 2009 statistics of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, inter-state
conflicts declined greatly in number to compare with other periods of history, see: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI YearbookOxford University Press,
Winter 2012
33
CHEN Dingxiao
strategic mutual trust among big powers. However, in contrast to those in other
historical periods, the present big-power relations involve a complex posture
featuring agreement with differences and rivalry without conflict. China
believes that profound physical, conceptual and mechanical incentives can be
identified behind the present big-power competitive cooperation. By physical
incentive, it means that the world is getting smaller and has become a "global
village"; Countries are more closely linked and interdependent with their interests
more closely integrated than ever before; to some extent, the world has become a
community of interests; those selfish practices of conquering or threatening others
by force, or seeking development space and resources by non-peaceful means are
losing ground. By conceptual incentive, it means that the globalization evolves to
boost the historical transition of international agendas. In the words of President Hu
Jintao, We should view security in a broader perspective. Security is not a
zero-sum game, and there is no isolated or absolute security. No country can be safe
and stable in the absence of peace and stability of the world peace and regions.
China insists that no big power can be immune from those global security threats,
nor can it cope with them alone. Policy coordination and collective cooperation
have become the only option for all big powers in response to the increasingly
severe transnational and global challenges. This historical trend in turn has
boosted the influence of the new security concepts of cooperative security, common
security and relative security in the international community. Mechanism incentive
refers to the trend that big-power coordination mechanism and norm-setting have
made much greater progress today than it did in the Cold War period or earlier. In
addition to the formal international multilateral coordination institutions, various
and frequent, high-level bilateral strategic dialogues have been built among big
powers, so did various smaller multilateral and multilateral dialogues to step up
policy coordination and strategic communication.
Third, re-orientation of new-type big-power relations. It has become a key to
Chinas big-power diplomatic transition to explore new-type big-power relations
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), International Strategy and
Security Review-2011/1012, Shishi Publication House, 2010, p.9.
Beijing, 2011/09/29.
Statement by President Hu Jintao at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General
Assembly, New York, 23 September 2009.
Beijing, 2011/09/29.
34
Global Review
now that big-power diplomacy is widened in its scope and that their
competition-cooperation is increasingly complicated. Chinas big-power diplomacy
faces three tests throughout the new historical period. Test one is how China can
transcend the stereotype of zero-sum game and confrontation among big
powers, especially between China--the largest emerging power, and the United
States--the largest established power. Since the turn of the millennium, China has
actively called on newly emerging powers to stick to peaceful development road
thanks to globalization and the themes of peace, development and cooperation of
the era, and work together with the established powers to build a new-type,
mutually-beneficial partnership on the basis of respecting core interests and vital
concerns. President Hu Jintao put forward five points at the Opening Session of the
Fourth Round of The China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues, To build such
a new-type relationship between China and the United States as two major countries,
we need to think creatively, to trust each other, to act in a spirit of equality and
mutual understanding, we need to work actively, and to nourish our friendship,
which reflects Chinas newest thinking on the new-type Sino-U.S. relationship and
is responded positively by U.S. Test two is how to get rid of the parochial
ideological diplomacy, especially the severe restraint of the cold-war thinking
imposing on the big-power relations. We should be more tolerant to one another
and live together in harmony; Mutual learning and tolerance among different
civilizations are an inexhaustible source of strength for social progress; We should
advocate a spirit of openness and tolerance and allow different civilizations and
models of development draw on each other's strength through competition and
comparison and achieve common development by seeking common ground while
reserving differences, pointed out by President Hu Jintao in his statement at the
General Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, reflecting a
new value system explored and created by China and its new diplomatic concept to
maintain peace, prosperity and justice of the world. Test three is how to prevent
global governance in the new period from collective actions with leadership
absence, a predicament to big powers. For instance, on the world economic
governance, Chinese government actively calls for sharing responsibility and
leadership of big powers, and emphasizes to adopt an attitude responsible to
Promote Win-Win Cooperation and Build a new-type Relations Between Major Countries,
Address by President Hu Jintao at the Opening Session of the Fourth Round of The China-US
Strategic and Economic Dialogues, Beijing, 3 May 2012.
President Hu Jintaos statement at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General
Assembly.
Winter 2012
35
CHEN Dingxiao
history and the future, bear in mind the common interests of mankind, build on
what we have already achieved and continue to work in concert for strong,
sustainable and balanced growth of the world economy. Moreover, on
international security governance, China calls for seeking security through
development, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and innovation to cope with the
growingly severe traditional and non-traditional security challenges. These are the
concepts of Chinas new-type diplomacy featuring unity, cooperation, mutual
support and joint effort to address problems.
2. Chinas relations with developing countries are redefined as seeking common
development with the developing countries with the new thinking of sharing
responsibilities, expanding common interests and seeking win-win outcomes. It
has been Chinas established diplomatic strategy since the onset of the new century
to consolidate the diplomatic status of developing countries as the basic status in
Chinas overall diplomacy. In this regard, China has to be clear about its own status
and stage of development. China must correctly define its own status of a
developing country before it can correctly define the historical stage of its relations
with developing countries. At the same time, China must make sure that what the
international community sees is a real China, and that they reasonably view Chinas
achievement, difficulties and challenges, as well as its international contributions
and capacity, before China can cultivate a propitious environment of social
mentality and opinions home and abroad for China to build a mutually-beneficial,
cooperative relations with developing countries.
Since the onset of new century, as China has made great progress in its
cooperation with developing countries, the international opinions, especially those
of the West, began to doubt China as a developing country. On the one hand, the
Western developed countries deliberately exaggerate development gaps and
different interests between China and the developing countries on the ground of
economic globalization, and they allege that China is not a developing country and
that Chinas dominance over the world is irreversible on the ground of Chinas
economic achievement, high-new-technology, foreign aid, international
Build on Achievements and Promote Development, Remarks by President Hu Jintao at the

Fifth G20 Summit, Seoul, 12 November 2010.
Vice President Xi Jinping addresses the Opening Ceremony of the World Peace Forum in
Beijing, July 7, 2012
36
Global Review
influence, etc. The above allegations, whatever their purpose, have compromised
and even weakened Chinas status as a developing country and have impacted
Chinas long-earned, equal, friendly, and mutually-assistant sentiments with
developing countries. On the other hand, the Western countries purposefully
highlighted the deficiency and flaw in the internal governance of the developing
countries as the fundamental reason of their development backward, while the
Western countries omitted the fact that the Western-led international system has
structurally and systematically restrained the systematic development of the
developing countries.
Thus, in the effort to consolidate Chinas relations with developing countries it is
important that the above Western bias should be reversed through competition for
greater international voice. On the one hand, Chinese government and leaders take
on various bilateral and multilateral occasions to brief the world of Chinas status
quo and the direction of its development, stating that Chinas development is a
long and arduous task.The scale and complexity of the challenges that we face in
the course of development are unmatched anywhere else in the world and have been
rarely seen in human history; China is still in the primary stage of socialism and
remains a developing country, and it is hoped that a real China be known to the
world.
Chinas unswerving policy to persist as a developing country is not only in
consistent to Chinas basic national condition, attributes and ability, but also helpful
for defining the basic scope of the Chinas national interests, and for the world to
identify Chinas position in the structure of the international balance of power,
which enables China to assume international responsibility and obligation on a
reasonable principle.
On the other hand, as for the Western accusation on the ill-governance of
Jin Ling and Su Xiaohui, Chinas Status as a Developing Country in Western Perspective,
International Studies, no.3, 2010, p. 17-19; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World,
Penguin Books: London, 2012; and Arvind Subramanian, The Inevitable Superpower, Why
Chinas Dominance Is a Sure Thing, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 90 Issue 5, p66-78.
World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa:from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Nov. 1989, and World
Bank, Governance and Development, 1992.
Cooperation and Openness for Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Progress, Remarks by President
Hu Jintao at the BRIC Summit, Brasilia, 16 April, 2010.
Getting to Know the Real China, Statement by Premier Wen Jiabao at the General Debate of
the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 23, 2010.
Winter 2012
37
CHEN Dingxiao
developing countries, China stresses that the broad developing countries are in a
disadvantageous position in the current international system and reiterates that the
international community should share more responsibility and carefully listen to the
appeal of the developing countries and the most underdeveloped countries,
without wide development and equal participation, there will be no talk of
common prosperity of the world, nor talk of building fair and just international
economic new order, and only the shared interest, responsibility and mutual
benefit can bring common interest to the international community. China have
understood that the broad developing countries are the major force to push for the
international system to transform in fair and just direction, the major force of the
democratization of international relations, and the major force on which China
relies in its constructive participation in the transformation of international
multilateral mechanism and international system. Since the onset of new century,
Chinese government and leaders has constantly emphasized that China is a
long-term member of the developing countries, and it is a core value of the Chinas
diplomacy to seek political, development and security interest in favor of the broad
developing countries, and pointed out that China will intensify cooperation with
fellow developing countries, and support that they have a greater say in
international affairs. We will remain forever a good partner and brother of
developing countries.
II. Enhancing Capabilities of the New-type Diplomacy

On July 20, 2009, President Hu Jingtao raised the newest requirement on building
Chinas diplomatic capacities in his speech at the 11th Conference of Chinese
Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, pointing out emphatically that China has to
continue to improve its work of diplomatic capabilities and quality so that China
will become politically more influential, economically more competitive, more
endearing in its national image, and morally more attractive. The first decade of
the new century saw enrichment and refinement of Chinas diplomatic planning,
especially the implementation of Chinas periphery strategy and developing-country
strategy, which further consolidated the foundation and mechanization of Chinas
Chinese top legislator Wu Bangguo delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Third
World Conference of Speakers of Parliament on July 2010.
Getting to Know the Real China, Statement by Premier Wen Jiabao at the General Debate of
the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2010.
President Hu Jingtao remarks at the 11th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed
Abroad, July 20, 2009: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/9687354.html.
38
Global Review
relations with periphery and developing countries, an important evidence of the

transition and upgrading of the diplomatic capabilities.
1. China will more proactively upgrade two aspects of building the new periphery
order. The first aspect is to upgrade economic cooperation in order to upgrade the
mechanization of China-periphery relations. As China has the most neighboring
countries, which differentiate largely in national conditions and share the most
complicated mutual relations, China has put the periphery strategy as the first of the
four strategic priorities since the early new century, observed the principle of being
a good neighbor and a good partner of neighboring countries, and constructed a
regional economic cooperation framework with the leading engine of China, which
in turn supported, consolidated and safeguarded the periphery strategy.
This can be outlined in the following two points: On the one hand, China has
constructed a network of bilateral partnerships with almost all neighboring
countries, and the number of strategic partnerships is increasing. China
maintained its position as the biggest export market of Asian countries and
remained the largest trade partner of the DPRK, Mongolia, Japan, the ROK,
Vietnam, Malaysia and India respectively. China's investment in Asian countries has
grown rapidly. As of November 2011, China's non-financial direct investment in
Asian countries totaled US$18.03 billion. China is the No.1 source of foreign
investment in Myanmar, Cambodia, the DPRK and Mongolia. It will also build a
Free Trade Area (FTA) in each of the ASEAN member countries and lift up
economic and trade cooperation through cluster investment. China cooperated
closely with Asian countries in the sectors of finance, new and high-tech, new
energy, environmental protection energy saving and developmental aids. In 2011,
China signed the bilateral currency swap agreement with Thailand, Pakistan and
Mongolia worth RMB70, 10, and 5 billion respectively and expanded the currency
swap with the ROK to RMB360 billion. The total amount of bilateral currency
swap agreements China signed with Asian countries reached RMB775 billion. The
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China UnionPay set up branches in
Laos, Singapore, Pakistan and India for business expansion. The partnership with
periphery region has especially increased the mutual economic and trade
Le Yucheng, 60 Years of the New Chinas Diplomacy: Achievement and Experience, 60
Years of New Chinas Diplomacy, ed. by Zhao Jinjun, Beijing University Press, 2010, p.5-6.
Standing Together to Cope with Challenges, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin Talks
about Asian Situation and China's Diplomatic Work with Neighboring Countries.
Winter 2012
39
CHEN Dingxiao
cooperation tie that played a role of ballast to the overall China-periphery relations.
On the other hand, the overall leading role of the sub-regional economic
cooperation mechanism is enhanced. China has tried hard to push for ASEAN+1
and ASEAN+3-led economic cooperation, and taken first to kick off China-ASEAN
free trade area, which encouraged Japan, ROK, Australia, New Zeeland, India and
ASEAN to have signed free trade area agreement. ASEAN+3 mechanism has made
great achievement in financial cooperation: they have implemented the Chiang Mai
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and built up a regional foreign reserve bank
worth of $120 billion and Regional Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility,
which have made great contribution to the East Asian economic and financial
stability. China has worked vigorously to advance connectivity construction with
periphery countries, and China is ready to establish all-dimensional, in-depth and
strategic connectivity with ASEAN, which will further enhance Chinas key
position in the regional economic cooperation.
The second aspect is to proactively pursue a regional political, security
cooperation strategy on both eastern and western lines. On the western line,
China regards SCO as a center to construct a stable periphery strategy and China is
exploring a new-type regional cooperation road based on the new security concept
of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation, on the implementation
of building border military mutual trust, and on partnership but not alliance in a
sense of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security. In
recent years, China has deepened Sino-Russian strategic partnership and steadily
advanced intra-SCO economic and cultural exchanges aimed at rendering SCO into
a harmonious and amicable home, a source of strong support for regional security
and stability, a driver of regional economic development, and an effective platform
for international exchanges with greater international influence.
Liu Zhenmin, East Asian Cooperation: Opportunity and Challenge, see:

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/ywcf/t982229.htmThe Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting
among the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, Joint Declaration on the
Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, 13 May 2012.
Work Together Towards Deeper Cooperation and Sustained Development, Address by Vice
President Xi Jinping at the Opening Ceremony of the 9th China-ASEAN Business and Investment
Summit and 2012 Forum on China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Nanning, 21 September 2012.
Upholding Lasting Peace, Promoting Common Prosperity, Remarks by President Hu Jintao at

the 12th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Beijing, 7 June 2012.
40
Global Review
On the eastern line, as regional political, security order is caught up with

aggravating clashes between new and old configurations, China is building up
diplomatic capabilities of managing regional hot-spots, shaping regional order and
providing more public goods for regions. Since the onset of the new century,
China-Asia-Pacific relations is emerged with two great issues. On the one hand, as
Asia-Pacific region soared in its economic and strategic status, small and middle
countries and groups within the region seek autonomy which overlapped with
strategic re-pivoting to Asia-Pacific on the part of powers within and without the
region, especially the United States. On the other hand, as Chinas comprehensive
rise has produced an on-going systematic shock on the periphery countries, the
lack of inclusive, effective, comprehensive security architect in the region is
looming large, which has worsened the binary configuration of the so-called
economic dependence on China, and security dependence on U.S. emerged from
the region. In addition, the growing complex security challenge has furthered the
dual effect of the competition-cooperation in the region. Chinese government is
embarking on building the following five capabilities in dealing with the growing
development in the periphery situation. First, China will stick to the peaceful
development path; try hard to dissolve the structural shock of the comprehensive
rise of China given the discourse of power shift; and to persist in striving for a
peaceful international environment to develop ourselves, and promote world peace
through our own development; and stay concentrated and guard against
complacence and impetuosity in respect of the strategic direction of peaceful
development. Second, China will do its best to enhance the economic cooperation
level of mutual benefit, win-win, common development, and step up the role of
strategic economic cooperation as stability valve and ballast to the overall
relations, and cultivate the awareness that Asia-Pacific region become a highly
interdependent community of interests and destiny. Third, Sino-U.S. relations is
used as a leverage to promote Sino-U.S.+X trilateral diplomacies. China has
introduced the Sino-U.S. Asia-Pacific security consultation into Chinas
Asia-Pacific strategic planning for the sake of promoting Chinas cooperation with
other countries and groups via Sino-U.S. cooperation and actively advance trilateral
Qiu Yuanping, Successful Exploration of Chinas Peaceful Development Road, Seek Truth
magazine, no.20, 2012.
Liu Zhenmin, East Asian Cooperation: Opportunity and Challenge, see:

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/ywcf/t982229.htm; The Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting
among the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, Joint Declaration on the
Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, 13 May 2012.
Winter 2012
41
CHEN Dingxiao
diplomacy led by Sino-U.S.+X relations, which can lead to benign interactions

among China, U.S. and neighboring countries. Fourth, China pushed for evolution
and transition of the regional cooperation mechanisms by promoting ASEAN-led,
inclusive, multilateral security cooperation dialogues, and encouraging ASEAN to
exercise unite and self-dependence and play a central role, which can prevent
ASEAN not only from becoming an outpost of U.S. containment of China, and but
also from forming a united front against China in respect of Chinas core interests
of territorial sovereignty. Fifth, stability and territorial sovereignty are equally
important regarding the sea territorial disputes in East China Sea and South China
Sea, a policy not only fully demonstrates Chinas resolution and confidence in
adhering to principle and protecting sovereignty, but also helps to reach agreement
with ASEAN on implementing the follow-up Actions Guideline of Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and setting up 3 billion fund to
promote China-ASEAN maritime cooperation, maintaining general stability of the
South China Sea situation. On the issue of East China Sea, especially when Japan
had brazenly ignited Diaoyu Island dispute that broke the consensus reached by
China and Japan on the issue, China is steadfast in defending its sovereignty, which
earned China a strategic upper hand. In sum, China endeavors to build up an
Asia-Pacific cooperation framework, which is based on common interests, centered
on ASEAN, bolstered by big-power coordination, and pragmatically cooperative.
2. China pursues the new-type mutually beneficial strategy to enhance and
develop its capabilities to cooperate with the developing world. Since the onset of
new century, the measures China has taken to enhance the capabilities can be
described as follows: a. the mechanized mutually beneficial cooperation. China has
successively issued policy documents on Africa and Latin America, which mapped
out policy directions and priority areas. China has also established BRICS summit
mechanism, continuously deepened Chinas relations with various regional
organizations of Africa, Latin America and Arab countries by successively setting
up China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China-Arab Cooperation Forum and
China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development & Cooperation Forum, etc.
In recent years, developing countries have undergone a severe development crisis
thanks to economic globalization and international financial crisis. Chinese
government has taken many occasions to urge international society to strengthen
Yuan Peng, Strategic Thinking on Building New-type Big-Power Relations of China and U.S.,
Contemporary International Relations, no.5, 2012, p.8.
42
Global Review
cooperation, viewed the developmental issue with a more macro perspective, and
actively explored new ways and new areas for South-South cooperation and
South-North cooperation, in order to push for extending Chinas bilateral
cooperation with developing countries to multilateral one.
b. China takes a strategic approach to the developmental aid. China has further
combined the two development strategies--developmental aid and developing two
markets (markets home and abroad) and using two resources(resources home and
abroad) in the first decade of the new century to have basically fulfilled the strategic
goal of mutual benefit and common development set up between China and African
Countries. On the conference of China governments work of developmental aid
held in August 2010, China reemphasized the priority tasks of improving and
strengthening foreign aid in the new situation, including optimizing structure of aid,
enhancing quality of projects, enriching content of aid, so as to combine the
increase of economic aid to developing countries and strengthening of independent
development capability with the deepening of Chinas pragmatic, complementary,
mutually beneficial cooperation with developing countries.
c. Reforms of international system are approached in a way of forming blocs.
China has worked together with developing countries to push for reform and
reconstruction of international order. Relying on the collective efforts of the broad
developing countries, China has elevated the status of developing countries
including China in the international economic governance mechanisms of G20, IMF,
world Bank, and through its coordination and cooperation with developing
countries, China has defended the basic right and developmental right of developing
countries in areas of climate change, developmental cooperation, human rights
protection, energy security and food security.
III. Broadening the Vision of New-type Diplomacy

Chinas diplomacy in the new period is increasingly transcending regional and local
visions and instead taking on a global perspective in shaping its own diplomacy
agenda, assuming international responsibility due to a big power in order to build a
Conquer Poverty and Share the Achievements of Human Progress, Remarks by Premier Wen
Jiabao, at the High-Level Side Event on the LDCs and Rio+20, 21 June 2012.
Guide reading on Central Committee on formulating the country's 12th Five-Year Program
(2011-2015) on National Economic and Social Development.
Winter 2012
43
CHEN Dingxiao
fairer and more reasonable international order and endeavoring to build a new,
multilateral and issue-oriented diplomacy centering on co-governance and
coupling with capability and responsibility.
1. Chinas identity in the international system is confirmed that takes into account
both Chinese interest and international expectation. a. China has shifted its
international identity from an outsider or a revolutionary to a participantand
a constructor. China is a responsible country and Chinese people will remain
trustworthy friends and reliable partners of the people of the world. China is a
participant, defender and constructor of the international system, pointed out by
Premier Wen Jiabao. Chinas formal accession to WTO in 2001 marks Chinas
comprehensive participation into the current international system. China has made
substantial and constructive contribution to the international system reform in the
wake of 2008 financial crisis. China not only advocates the spirit of pulling
together in times of trouble to overcome difficulties, puts forward principles and
proposals including comprehensive, balanced, incremental and effective
development, and steps up assistance to the developing countries, but also
expedites its own transformation of development model in order to promote the
global economic recovery. b. China has generally completed the participation in
the international system in all-directions, in broad areas and on deep levels. China
has joined 130-some global and regional, governmental organizations, signed about
200,000 bilateral treaties and over 300 multilateral treaties covering areas of politics,
economics, security, science, education, culture, health, etc. Chinas access to the
international system in a way that shifting from features of passivity, negative, and
resistent in the period before the onset of reform and opening-up to features of
active, preemptive, and integrated thereafter, and from bilateralism to
multilateralism over the two periods, a tremendous change indeed. c. China has
tried to shape the sense and identity in common with those of the international
community in its participation into the international system. The gaps of
perspectives between China and international actors are narrowed. Chinas
awareness of international society has entrenched. For China, the international
community is increasingly interdependent and mutually beneficial in the global era.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao addresses the second meeting of the China-European Union
Forum in Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 13, 2006.
Build on Achievements and Promote Development, Remarks by President Hu Jintao at the

Fifth G20 Summit, 12 November 2010.
Pan Zhongqi, Chinas Participation, Profit and Influence in the World Order, World
Economics and Politics, no.3, 2007, p.52.
44
Global Review
China has done well in living up to the international treaties, and Chinas
socialization level is deepened. China has a strong political will in strengthening
international cooperation and its foreign policy is highly cooperative.
2. Constructive contribution has increasingly become the major content of
Chinas interaction with the outside world. a. As one of the core states that is
shaping the forthcoming international system, China has revised the connotation of
the international order. China is trying hard to call for building a peaceful,
gradualist, multilateral, mutually beneficial, diversified, cooperative and
co-prosperous, new international order, and proposed systematic initiatives of
building a harmonious world aiming at stepping up the ideas of transforming the
international system and global governance. Those initiatives include the notions
that China sticks to the concept of building a fair and just international order, the
concept of mutually beneficial international development, the new security concept
of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal and coordination, the concept of international
responsibility that allows proactivity and achievement, the concept of
good-neighborly regional cooperation, and the concept of comprehensive national
interest, and China pursues an actively defensive national defense policy and keeps
prudent and cautious in handling international affairs. In this process, China shall
enrich the connotation of the multilateral diplomatic theory, widen the strategic
planning of multilateral diplomacy and build up policy instruments of Chinas
multilateral diplomacy.
b. China comes up with new thinkings of Chinas diplomacy in the new period.
They regard the idea of a harmonious world as the core concept of Chinas
multilateral diplomacy; regard the new developmental concept--the scientific
development in the constructions of politics, economics, culture, society and
ecology--as the path to realize the peaceful development road with Chinese
characteristics; regard building up Chinas cultural, soft power--Chinas
developmental model, life style, cultural values and its endearing, appealing,
influence and competitiveness to the world--as the necessary guarantee of shaping
Chinas relations with the world; regard launching public diplomacy and humanity
diplomacy as major platform of promoting Chinas new thinking and influencing
international opinions; and regard joining and innovating international cooperation
Zhu Liqun, et al., China and International System: Process and Practice, p.315-343.
Qiu Yuanping, Successful Exploration of Chinas Peaceful Development Road, Seek Truth
magazine, no.20, 2012.
Winter 2012
45
CHEN Dingxiao
mechanisms as the institutional bolster to realize Chinas new thinkings. All in all,
with the advent of the new century, Chinas new diplomatic thinking around the
peaceful development with Chinese characteristics broke through the established
theories of international relations and conventional mindset regarding the rise of
great powers, and made an important contribution to the development of the 21st
century international relations and global governance.
c. China has pushed for the reforming and shaping of the regional and
issue-oriented multilateral mechanisms, combined the long-term goals with
short-term breakthroughs, seized the exceptional opportunities emerging from the
international financial crisis, and regarded it as the priority realms for enhancing
Chinas participation in setting the international rules to enhance the capability of
the international financial institutions in their response to the financial
internationalization, and enhance discourse power and power of participation of the
developing countries. At the same time, China has pushed for institutional
cooperation with developing powers to create strategic environment and
institutional guarantee for Chinas peaceful development and deepened financial
and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance Chinas capability
and influence in participating in reforms of international financial and economic
systems.
d. China has developed the economic diplomacy. By the strategic transition of
economic diplomacy, China has integrated political and economic cooperation,
synchronized cooperations both on the levels of states and regions, and developed a
relatively complete system of both looking abroad for investment and attracting
overseas investment in favor of Chinas development strategy.
Qiu Yuanping, Successful Exploration of Chinas Peaceful Development Road, Seek Truth,
no.20, 2012.
46
Global Review
On the Motivation of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy

in the Middle East
SUN Degang
Regional international integrations boomed since the end of WWII. Regional
cooperation become tides of the times be it NAFTA after the American-styled
imperial management model, EU after the European-styled united-state
management model, or the MERCOSUR, APEC, ASEAN and SCO that took the
form of informal mechanisms. By contrast, the Middle East region is the only
exception given the reason of historical, cultural, religious, ethnic and sectarian
conflicts. Whether the Middle East is a geographic concept, a political concept, or a
cultural concept remains a dispute in academics. This essay largely regards it as a
geographic concept including Western Asians, North Africans and Eastern Africans.
In contrast to other regions, the Middle Eastern international relations is more
uncertain and volatile, and with outstanding, traditional and non-traditional issues
like territorial disputes, ethnic feuds, religious contradictions, terrorism and WMD
proliferation, etc. Since the end of WWII, sovereign states and international
organizations like U.S., EU, Russia (USSR), China, League of Arab States, African
Union, and UN have engaged in the settlement of the Middle East hot-spot issues,
and expanded their political influence through political mediation and participation
in the regional governance of the Middle East. For example, Kissinger's shuttle
diplomacy in the Middle East in the wake of the fourth Middle East war in 1973
ended up with U.S. gaining the upper hand in the U.S.-Soviet games. Thus,
mediation diplomacy is an important means for international actors to lift their
hard- as well as soft-power.
I. Raise of the Issue

With Chinas international status growing continuously and its overseas interests
Dr. SUN Degang is Associate Professor at Institute for Middle East Studies of Shanghai
International Studies University.
Su Changhe, Empire, Supra-state, and Future East Asia, Guoji Guancha (International
Watch), no.2, 2003, p.1.
William Burr, ed., The October War and U.S. Policy, The National Security Archive, October 7,
2003; Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, New
York: Praeger, 1981; pp. 197-225.
Winter 2012
47
SUN Degang
expanding, the Middle East region is increasingly becoming Chinas big

periphery, and participation in addressing the Middle East hot-spot issues is an
important means for China to protect national interest and assume international
responsibility. The Middle East is even more important to China in strategic
terms--it is a fulcrum on which China cooperates and competes with other big
powers, directly relevant to Chinas post-cold war strategic opportunity period.
This essay argues that China in fact has obtained two strategic opportunity periods
between the end of cold war in 1991 and the dramatic change in the Middle East in
2011. The two periods, about a decade long for each, were invariably started and
ended with important clashes between the West and Islamic countries in the Middle
East. Chinas rapid, economic and social development in the last two decades in the
end of cold war was precisely accredited to the grab of the two strategic opportunity
periods.
Since 2011, multi-polarization has further developed as the West declined, the
newly emerging powers rose and regional middle and small countries united for
self-entrenchment. Following the dramatic change in the Middle East, the
long-pressed, anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. forces would play an important role in
domestic politics of the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. The Irans nuclear issue
and the dramatic change in the Middle East will prevent the United States again
from re-pivoting to Asia-Pacific handily, which bestows China a third strategic
opportunity period. China has to actively intervene into the Middle East affairs
through political mediation as one of the important instruments before China can
participate in addressing hot-spot issues in the Middle East, enhance Chinas
political voice in the region and veer the hot-spot issues to the direction in favor of
the national interest of China. There are two outstanding issues yet to be discussed
academically about Chinas mediation actions in the Middle East in the new period,
which began with the event that China sent its first special envoy to the Middle
East.
1. What is the motivation of the intervention? Is it driven by interest or by
international responsibility? Is the intervention relevant to the expectation and
Xu Jian, International Environment and Chinas Strategic Opportunity, Peoples Publication
House, 2004.
Sun Degang, Chinas Quasi-alliance Diplomacy in the New Period, World Economics and
Politics, no.3, p.74. The first opportunity period is emerged from the Gulf war in 1991 and the
second is from global counter-terrorism and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
48
Global Review
On the Motivation of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle East
concerns of the international community to some extent? To what extent is Chinas

mediation impacted by Chinas limitation to understand the difficulty of addressing
the Middle East issues?
2Why China intervenes in various hot-spot issues in the Middle East to various
extents ? As is known to all, the Middle East issues can break down into two
categories: the traditional issues such as Palestine-Israel issue, Western-Sahara issue,
Cyprus issue, Iran nuclear issue, and the non-traditional issues like Somali pirates,
Bahrain internal conflict; or into three categories of internal issues such as political
contradiction in Yemen, regional issues like contradictions among the Middle East
countries, such as Palestine-Israel issue and Western-Sahara issue, and
trans-regional issues like contradictions between the Middle East and extra-Middle
East countries, such as U.S.-Iran contradiction around the Irans nuclear issue. As
those issues are different in their positions in Chinas diplomacy, and in which
China puts in diplomatic resources to different extents and China intervened with
different approaches and goals. Why? These are the two questions yet to be
discussed exclusively.
II. Literature Review

Mediations are ubiquitous in social, business, ethnic, political and interstate
relations, concerning psychology, sociology, economics, management, law,
diplomacy, ethnology and political science, a trans-disciplinary subject.
Mediation refers to invention into conflict by a third party with non-coercive and
neutral ways and with peaceful management and behavior to address the conflict,
whose direct outcome is to transform the bilateral relations into trilateral relations.
Since the 20th century, mediation as an obligation in settling disputes were carried
in multilateral and bilateral treaties, such as Hague Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in 1907, and American
Treaty of Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in 1948. Although,
mediation is an archaic diplomatic act, international researches on the subject are
few, which can break down into the following four categories.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lela Porter Love, and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Mediation: Practice,
Policy, and Ethics, New York: ASPEN, 2006.
Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Studies in International Mediation, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002, p. 5.
Ye Xingping, On International Mediation, Wuhan University Journal (philosophy and

sociology), 1997, no.2, p.18.
Winter 2012
49
SUN Degang
Category one examines the concept and theory of mediation. The research results
of this category mainly include works and essays of Western scholars discussing
definitions, categories, motivations, mechanisms and performance and using
qualitative and quantitative methods that enshrine Western theories and practices of
mediation.
Category two mainly examines mediation cases of national and international
organizations including the United States, Israel, Qatar, the United Nations, that
usually using historical approaches and case studies.
Category three examines mediation in respect of diplomacy and negotiation,
believing that mediation is an instrument of crisis management and conflict
prevention with the intervention of a third party.
2002; Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, eds., International Conflict Mediation: New
approaches and findings, London and New York: Routledge, 2009; Jacob Bercovitch, etc., The
SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009; Eileen Carroll and Karl
Machie, International MediationThe Art of Business Diplomacy, The Hague, London and
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000; Folberg Golam, Lawyer Negotiation: Theory, Practice,
and Law, New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lela Porter Love, and
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Mediation: Practice, Policy, and Ethics, New York: ASPEN, 2006;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ed., Mediation: Theory, Policy and Practice, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001;
Marieke Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1998; Burcu Savun, Information, Bias, and Mediation Success,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol, 52, No. 1, 2008; Saadia Touval and William Zartman, eds.,
International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985; Dennis J.
Sandole, etc., Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, London and New York: Routledge,
2009; Ye Xingping, On International Mediation, Wuhan University Journal (philosophy and
sociology), 1997, no.2; Qi Haixia, On Performance of Internatoinal Mediations, International
Political Science, 2005, no.4.
effrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, New York:
Praeger, 1981; Dale Bagshaw and Elisabeth Porter, eds., Mediation in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace, London and New York: Routledge, 2009; K. Venkata
Raman, ed., Dispute Settlement Through the United Nations, New York: Oceana Publications,
1977; Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for
Arab-Israeli Peace, London: Routledge, 1999; Mordechai Gazit, Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest
for Peace, London: Frank Cass, 2002; Sun Degang, The Fourth the Middle East War in 1973 and
the U.S. Mediaiton Diplomacy, American Studies, 2010, no.1; Liu Baotang et al., On Envoy
Mediation of Chu State, Journal of China foreign affairs university, 1996, no.1; Ding Long and
Zhao Yuanhao, Qatar Foreign Policy and Practice, Arab World Studies, 2010, no.1.
Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London:
Harvard University Press, 1982; Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, When Do They Say Yes?
An Analysis of Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008; Francois Debrix, Rituals Of Mediation: International Politics
50
Global Review
Category fourth mainly examines Chinas Middle East diplomacy in the new
period, e.g., the special envoy mechanism explored by Liu Zhongmin of Shanghai
International Studies University and the 6-party talks of Korean nuclear issue,
discussed by Zhu Feng of the Institute of International Relations, Beijing
University.
In general, academic research on mediation today are evolved in three tiers. The
first is the tier of mediation diplomatics including basic theories of crisis
management, conflict settlement and preventive defense; the second is the tier of
big-power and regional countries mediation on the Middle East issues including
comparative studies on mediations conducted by UN, Arab League, African Union,
the Gulf Cooperation Council, U.S., Russia, EU, Japan, Qatar, Egypt, Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. The third is the tier of Chinas the Middle East diplomacy
in terms of instrument, target, mechanism, resources (including bilateral and
multilateral mediations). Those research outcomes feature pluralism of subjects,
creativeness of approaches and novelty of dimensions, though with obvious
weaknesses.
1. In theoretical terms, they were more concerned with the performance of
mediation by focusing on whether multilateralism is more efficient than
unilateralism and whether symmetry powers work better than asymmetry powers in
the third-party mediation, while they overlooked the analysis on the motivation of
the neutral, third party.
2. They elaborate on the mediations conducted by Western countries, Qatar,
Algeria, UN, Arab League, African Union and international organizations at the
expense of Chinese mediations, especially those conducted in the Middle East in
recent years. This essay therefore tries to make up for the weaknesses by examining
And Social Meaning, New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2003; Oran R. Young, The
Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967;
Howard Raiffa, Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making,
Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.
Liu Changmin, International Mediaiton in Korean Nuke Settlement, China University of

Politics and Law Press, 2007; Liu Zhongmin, Hot-spot Research in China: Feature, Concept and
Implication, Northeast Asia Forum, 2009, no.3, p.5; Sun Fang and Zhuo Bohong, Mediiation in
the Geomundo Island Event in Late Qing Dynasty, Huaiying Industrail College Journal, 2006,
no.2; Jiang Zhaijiu, Chinese Participation in the 6-party Talks: the Role and Future of Mediation,
Contemporary Asia-Pacific, 2007, no.2 Zhu Feng, Chinas Diplomatic Mediation and the 6-party
Talks on Korean Nuke Issue, Foreign Policy Review, 2006, no.2.
Winter 2012
51
SUN Degang
the motivation and model of Chinas the Middle East diplomatic mediation.
III. Core Concept: Mediation Diplomacy

in Terms of Diplomacy Categorization
The term mediation diplomacy in this essay refers to behavior of a neutral, third
party assumed by sovereign state or international organization that offers to
intervene in conflict via non-coercive means and managing crisis and settling
conflict by peaceful means. The mediation diplomacy as a special diplomacy
category should be available with the following elements: a. the player should be a
diplomatic actor, i.e., sovereignty state, international organization and its
representative, but not the civil mediators addressing family, enterprise and social
disputes. b. the mediator should be willing to settle crisis and contradiction. c. the
mediator offers to intervene in conflict and, by building trust with conflicting
parties, comes up with trade-off alternative rather than coercive means. d. the
mediator tries to use peaceful means rather than violent means to manage and solve
conflict, though short of humanitarian intervention. As shown in Fig.1, mediation
diplomacy turns adversary, two-party zero-sum game into three-party win-win
cooperation in conflict management, i.e., turning bilateralism into trilateralism,
turning conflict into cooperation, turning security competition into political
compromise and turning international politics into state-interstate political
interaction.
Indirect interaction between conflicting parties
Representative
Representative
of country A
of country B
Mediation of the
third party
Trust in
Trust in
Domestic politics
Domestic politics
of country
of country
B
Indirect interaction between conflicting parties
Figure 1, Mediation Diplomacy Illustration

52
Global Review
Mediation diplomacy is different from diplomatic mediation in that the former is

a kind of diplomacy while the latter is a peace-making behavior, a diplomatic
activity. Cases of mediation diplomacy abound in international relations.
Statistically, between 1945 and 1874, there were 310 cases of large-scale
international conflicts erupted in the world, of which 82% were followed up with
mediation suggestions raised by third parties. Kal Holstis research shows that the
third-party mediation offers accounted for 45% of the 94 cases of post-war,
interstate conflicts. In whatever percentage of 82% or 45%, mediation
diplomacies are common. Common though, they extremely vary in performance.
For examples, in the wake of the China-India border conflict, Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
and other five Asian and African countries forwarded mediation option but failed at
last; upon the eruption of the fourth Middle East war in 1973 when Israel encircled
Egyptians third army, Kissinger took on the mediation diplomacy to have
unprecedentedly brought the two countries to the table and ended up with peace of
the two countries.
On the one hand, mediation diplomacy must be supported by powerful actors. On
the other, smaller powers would take advantage of their special relations with the
conflicting parties to reach multiplied result. For example, when the United States
and Iran were imminent in shooting each other following Irans Islamic revolution
in 1979, Algeria stepped in to have weathered the storm, which positively improved
the image of Algeria.
Mediation diplomacy in China has a long history dated back to ancient times.
Especially in the Spring and Autumn Period, strategists and thinkers frequently
mediated among vassal states. Mediation diplomacy of the Chinese government in
modern times is as much active. For example, in April 15, 1885, the British
Asia-fleet abruptly occupied Geomundo island of Korea, controlling the channel
through which the Russians Far-east fleet getting into Yellow Sea from Sea of
Japan. As a suzerain state, Qing-dynasty government played off the contradiction of
Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict, In William I. Zartman, I. and J. Lewis
Rasmussen eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, Washington:
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 131.
Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict, In William I. Zartman, I. and J. Lewis

Rasmussen eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, Washington:
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 131.
Saadia Touval and William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 22-23.
Winter 2012
53
SUN Degang
Britain and Russia on the ground of protecting the suzerainty of Korea, which
resulted in the relaxation of the dispute and Russias commitment not to occupy
Korean territory and British withdrawal from the island, a victory for Chinas
mediation diplomacy for the time-being. Since August 2003, China has staged the
six-party talk mechanism on Korean nuke issue which further exhibited Chinas
vibrant mediation diplomacy. In the Middle East, China participated in peaceful
solution of the Sudan issue, Irans nuclear issue, Palestine-Israel peace process,
Libya crisis and Syria crisis, which also highlighted Chinese-styled mediation
diplomacy.
IV. Theoretical Hypotheses: The Impacts

on Chinas the Middle East Mediation
Chinas mediation diplomacy in the Middle East in the new period was necessary.
1. The Middle East region as a whole is endowed with vast natural resources though
acute with territorial, ethnic and sectarian contradictions. Countries in the region are
facing three challenges, namely, social transition at home, configuration transition
of the region, and transition of international system. Various crises, contradictions
and conflicts break out uninterruptedly. Therefore, China as a permanent member of
the UN Security Council assumes a distinctive responsibility. 2. As China
constantly pursues a peaceful, neutral and non-alignment policy, never forges
strategic alliance with any country in the region and keeps friendship relations with
all parties in the region, China can become a fair and just mediator on the
conflicts. 3. As none of U.S., EU, Japan, Russia and India, be them traditional or
emerging powers, is capable of orbiting the Middle East region into their respective
backyard or sphere of influence, Chinas mediation diplomacy will not only
help to push for the regional governance, but also help to construct new-type
big-power cooperation. 4. One year on since the Arab revolt, the Arab countries
have widely pursued a balancing strategy between big powers, and welcomed the
rising China to participate in the settlement of the Middle East issues, which
provided Chinese mediation with a good external condition. 5. China has
Sun Fang and Zhuo Bohong, Mediiation in the Geomundo Island Event in Late Qing
Dynasty, Huaiying Industrial College Journal, 2006, no.2.
Liu Changmin, International Mediation in Korean Nuke Settlement, China University of

Politics and Law Press, 2007, Chapter IV.
Sun Degang, on China-Arab Strategic Cooperation, Arab World Studies, 2010, no.6, p.30.
Bahgat Korany, and Ali E. Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Cairo and New York:
The American University in Cairo Press, 2008, pp. 545-596.
54
Global Review
accumulated experience of mediation diplomacy on settling the issues of Darfur,

Palestine-Israel peace process, Irans nuke, domestic conflicts in Libyan and Syria
respectively, which laid down the foundation for forming the theory and practice of
the mediation diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.
Chinese mediation diplomacy in the Middle East started with setting up the
special envoy mechanism on Palestine-Israel issue in Sept. 2002. Over a decade of
development, Chinas mediation diplomacy in the Middle East started from scratch,
probed in practice, and opened a new path. The realms of the mediation diplomacy
expanded continuously, which included Palestine-Israel issue, Sudan issue, Irans
nuke issue, Somali issue, domestic conflicts in Libya and Syria, etc. Take the
special envoy mechanism as an example, China has established a special envoy for
each of Korean nuclear issue, Sudan issue, and Palestine-Israel issue, of which two
were dealing with the Middle East issues, an evidence that the Middle East has
become an important arena on which China stages bilateral and multilateral
relations with other powers and participates in the Middle East governance. Over
the last decade, Chinas mediation in the Middle East has matured, showing firm
stance on principles and flexibility on policy instrument and intervening deeper on
some issues (e.g., Sudan issue and Irans nuke issue) than on other issues (e.g.,
Cyprus issue and Yemen issue). What are the reasons behind the differentiation?
This essay identifies four motivations: relevance of interest, impact of power,
international concern and intractability of the crisis settlement. All the four have
determined the depth of Chinas mediation.
A. Relevance of interest
Hypothesis one, the more the Middle East hot-spot issue associates with Chinese
realistic interest, the more likely China involves in the mediation.
Generally speaking, that a third party comes to mediation is largely up to the
reckoning of its own interest. In the new period, Chinese interest in the Middle
East exist in four aspects: first, normal supply of energies, stable price of energies,
and growing business interest; second, keeping balance of power in the region that
prevents any regional and external powers from monopolizing the Middle East
affairs and seeking hegemony over the region; third, preventing the region from
2002, p. 7.
Winter 2012
55
SUN Degang
appearance of anti-China government and impairing otherwise good relations with

China; four, keeping peace and stability in the region and prevent the region from
political turmoil.
The first of the above four interests is the realistic interest of China, which is
more immediate and tangible. When this interest is at stake, China will more likely
put in diplomatic resource and launch mediation diplomacy. For example, upon the
outbreak of Irans nuke crisis, China proactively participated in the 5+1 talks, and
actively pushed for the peaceful settlement of the issue. An important reason is:
Irans oil relates to the lifeline of Chinas national economy and Iran is an important
trade partner of China with huge cooperation potentiality, including cooperation
projects in energy, infrastructure construction and trade. By contrast, China has little
realistic interest in west Sahara, hence with limited input of diplomatic resource,
though China participates in the UN peace-keeping action in west Sahara, but not
mediation diplomacy yet.
B. Influence of power
Hypothesis two: the stronger China can exert its influence on hot-spot issues in the
Middle East, the more likely China will engage in mediation diplomacy. Mediation
diplomacy is as much related to the capability of the mediator as related to his will.
The neutral, third party will more likely to conduct mediation diplomacy if he is
capable, and have the resources available, to pressure and influence the conflicting
parties and their behaviors. For example, that president Carter succeeded in
persuading Egypt and Israel to the David Camp negotiation with baits of economic
aid and security guarantee is mainly attributed to the fact that the United States is
the only power that can do so.
Likely, China maintains constructive cooperation relations with all conflicting
parties of Sudan, a large influence over southern and northern Sudan, which will
only further intensify along with arms sale, economic aid and trade cooperation.
Cao Gangchuan met with his counterpart, Chief of Joint Staff of Sudanese armed
forces Haj Ahmed El Gaili in April 2007 to issued a joint statement by reiterating
Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967, pp. 80-90.
Marieke Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 89-118.
56
Global Review
bilateral cooperation relations in all fields. Upon the tensions broke out in
southern and northern Sudan, Chinese president visited Sudan and sent special
envoy Liu Gui to the mediation between the southern and northern Sudan. They
finally separated peacefully in 2011 thanks to the active mediation of China. By
contrast, Chinese influence is too limited on the southern and northern Cyprus for
China to wage mediation diplomacy on the Cyprus issue.
C. International attention
Hypothesis three: the higher the international concerns is over the hot-spot issues in
the Middle East, the more likely China will come to the mediation diplomacy.
Chinas decision to mediate in the Middle East is not only out of realistic interest,
but also out of international responsibility. Over recent years, along with the rise of
Chinas comprehensive national strengths, comes higher international expectation.
China is expected to assume international responsibility, to provide public goods,
and to maintain international law and order. As a permanent member of Security
Council and a large developing country, China is responsible for maintaining
stability in the Middle East region, to strengthen crisis management in the region
and to promote conflict settlement in the region. No hot-spot issues in the Middle
East other than the issue of Palestine-Israel can pull the nerve of the whole world
and become the barometer of the Middle Eastern political ecology. Being well
aware of the high international attention to the Palestine-Israel issue and the overall
situation of the Middle East is at stake to the issue, China decided to send special
envoy to the issue since 2002, actively conducting mediation diplomacy between
the Arabs and Israelis, which has vigorously pushed for the Palestine-Israel peace
process. Undoubtedly, Chinese realistic interest is so limited on the issue that its
mediation diplomacy is more of a response to the international responsibility than
an account of realistic interest. By contrast, since the international attention is low
over the territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the issue has been
under control, China has not yet come to the mediation.
D. Intractability of the crisis settlement
Hypothesis four: the easier the hot-spot issue in the Middle East can be settled,
Cao Gangchuan met with Chief of Joint Staff of Sudanese armed forces Haj Ahmed El Gaili,
PLA Daily, April 3, 2007, p.1.
Winter 2012
57
SUN Degang
China is more likely to involve in the mediation diplomacy.

For the past ten years, the degree of Chinas enthusiasm in settling hot-spot issues
in the Middle East was conversely proportionate to Chinas assessment of the
difficulties of the settlement. Generally speaking, China would less likely put in
diplomatic resources and come to mediation if the issue concerned is hard to be
solved, and vice versa. For example, in the wake of the outbreak of Sudan crisis, the
central government in Khartoum agreed to hold referendum on southern Sudans
independence, which greatly increased the chances for the success of Chinas
mediation diplomacy effort and therefore allowed special envoy Liu Guijin to
conduct frequent mediation diplomacy. By contrast, China did not participate in the
mediation between Iran and United Arab Emirates on islands issues, nor in
mediation between various armed forces of Somalia, mainly because the two crises
were intractable and the conflicting parties are unlikely to reach compromise in
short term, for which China did not want to run too much diplomatic risk.
The following section will analyze some real cases to test the above four
hypotheses.
V. Empirical Analysis: Four Categories of Chinas Mediation

Diplomacy in the Middle East
The Middle East is a region of the most salient hot-spot issues in the world and
becoming the priority and conundrum of global governance, which include
Arab-Israeli peace process issue, territorial disputes of Mid-Eastern countries,
WMD proliferation in the region, ethnic and sectarian conflict issues, etc. The
dramatic change in the Middle East broke out in the late 2010 has made social,
sectarian and ethnic contradictions even worse. Domestic hot-spots in Libya, Syria,
Yemen and Bahrain emerged from the surface of water to become new host-spot
issues in the Middle East. Therefore, U.S., EU, Russia, the UN, League of Arab
States, African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other powers,
international organizations and the Middle Eastern countries thronged to the
mediation diplomacy, which maintained stability of the region, preventing hot-spot
issues from upgrading, enhancing their international influence and enabling the
58
Global Review
Middle East issues become an important arena of big-power relations.

Table 1 demonstrates that an important means with which the big powers use to
participate in the Middle Eastern governance is mediation diplomacy whose
subjects comprise not only world powers and international organizations, but also
the Middle East countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Table 1 also shows that
China did participate in the settlement of hot-spot issues in the Middle East though
to different degrees and Chinas mediation diplomacy is selective. Chinas
mediation diplomacy in the Middle East break down into four tiers: deep
intervention, proactive participation, limited mediation and generally detached.
A. Deep intervention
The term deep intervention refers to Chinas huge put-in of diplomatic resources
including sending special envoy and tackling hot-spot issues. Chinas realistic
interest are directly related to the hot-spot issues; China maintains good relations
with conflicting parties; the international community pins high hope on the
settlement of hot-spot issues; and hot-spot issues are strongly controllable. In the
process of those mediations, Chinese government paid high attention, top leaders
including president, premier and ministers often directly participated in the
mediations and designed negotiation proceedings for the sake of allowing disputed
parties be able to reach compromise in a short time, or at least preventing crises
from upgrading.
Table 1: the Middle Eastern hot-spot issues and mediation diplomacies
the Middle Eastern
crisis
Sudan issue
Conflicting parties
Nature of conflict
Mediator
Contradiction
between Southern and
northern
Sudanese
and between northern
and Darfur
UN,
African
Union,
U.S.,
EU, China
Irans nuke issue
Iran, U.S., Israel
Southern Sudanese for

independence,
southern-northern for
border
and
oil,
Khartoum and western
Darfur on religious
contradiction
Iran hostility with Israel
and West
UN, U.S., UK,

France,
Ding Long and Zhao Yuanhao, Qatar Foreign Policy and Practice, Arab World Studies, 2010,
no.1, p.9.
K. Venkata Raman, ed., Dispute Settlement through the United Nations, New York: Oceana
Publications, 1977.
Winter 2012
59
SUN Degang
Germany,
Russia, China
Palestine state building UN, U.S., EU,
Palestine-Israel borders, Russia, China,
refugees return, claims
on Jerusalem
Palestine-Israel issue
Arab
countries,
Palestine, Israel
Civil war in Libya
Kadafi
government
and Libya Interim
Committee
Power struggle
Syrian crisis
Basher government
and oppositions
Power struggle
Somali issue
Armed factions and

political forces
Northern and southern
Cyprus
Morocco and Algeria
On the form of coalition

government
For peace between the
north and south
Claims
on
Western-Sahara
Claims on sovereignty
on Abu Moussa Island,
greater Tunb and lesser
Tunb
Cyprus issue
Western-Sahara issue
Disputes on Gulf
islands
Iran and United Arab

Emirates
Lebanon issue
Suni, Shiite, Christian

sects
Power struggle
Yemen crisis
Saleh's Government
and opposition
Power struggle
Bahrain crisis
Bahrain government
and opposition
On direction of political
reform
France, Russia,
China, League
of Arab States,
African Union
UN, League of
Arab
States,
Russia, China
UN,
African
Union, U.S., EU
UN, U.S.
UN,
African
Union
Trilateral
Committee of
Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Oman,
UN, U.S., EU,
Qatar
UN,
Gulf
Cooperation
Council
Gulf
Cooperation
Council
In the crisis management, China often approaches with aids and pressure. On the
one hand, China provided all parties with necessary economic aids, skewed trade
policy, tariff reduction on import commodities, invited leader of all parties to visit
China and provide military aid and military training projects in order to reach
agreement between conflicting parties. On the other hand, China would leverage
cutting economic aids and limiting high-level exchanges as to pressure all parties in
order to reach effect of negotiation in a short time. For example, SINOPEC gained
profit in Sudan totaled $25.8 billion or net profit of $14.69 billion to compare with
GDP of Sudan worth $38 billion of the same year. China and Sudan are like a
commonwealth of interest, which is the practical foundation of Chinas mediation
Li Hongwu and Li Xinfeng, Studies on Darfur Issue in global Dimension, World Knowledge
Press, 2008, pp.119, 246.
60
Global Review
diplomacy. Chinas combination policy of aids and pressure, its offer of solutions
and its mediation diplomacy for the sake of peaceful separation of the two parties
have prevented them from large-scale military conflicts. China also actively
mediated on the Darfur issue and raised constructive proposals that contributed
wisdom to the peace and stability of Darfur region. In February 2007, President Hu
Jintao visited Sudan, talked with President Bashir, and met with First Vice President
Mayardit and Vice President Ali Taha.
In May 2007, China set up the special envoy mechanism on Darfur issue and
Ambassador Liu Guijin visited southern Sudan, other African Countries, Europe
and U.S. for many times, actively communicated with UN, African Union, League
of Arab Countries and EU, and took advantage of Chinas assumption of the
rotating president of the Security Council to push for the 1769 resolution that
resulted in reaching the agreement of UN, African Union, and Sudan government
on AU-UN "hybrid operation" and sent a 315 troops of multidimensional operation
force. Chinas mediation in Sudan is of the category of deep intervention.
B. Proactive participation
Proactive participation refers to Chinas put-in of a great deal of diplomatic
resources, which includes sending special envoy to participate in the settlement of
hot-spot issues and usually with the participation of Chinese national leaders in the
mediation. In contrast to the category of deep intervention, in proactive
participation China usually does not direct the rhythm of negotiations, nor sets
agenda and provides economic aids and political pressure to impact negotiation.
China is pleased to see the solution of hot-spot issues, though it declines to put in
diplomatic resources to speed up the process of negotiation, nor expects to see
outcomes of negotiations in a short time. For examples, Chinas special envoy has
been conducted shuttle diplomacy for years. Wang Shijie, Sun Bigan and Wu Sike,
former and incumbent special envoys, often shuttled between Pakistan, Israel,
Egypt and Jordan for promoting peace and negotiation. China also actively
participated in 5+1 mechanism to urge dialogue and negotiation on Irans nuke
issue and sought solution through multilateral mechanisms under UN mandate. For
Foreign Policy Research Division, China Diplomacy 2008, World Knowledge Press, 2008,
p.173.
Li Hongwu and Li Xinfeng, Studies on Darfur Issue in global Dimension, World Knowledge
Press, 2008, p.119, and pp.21-22.
Winter 2012
61
SUN Degang
example, on April 18, 2006, the vice foreign ministers of 6 countries held
close-door meeting in Moscow; on June 1 the same year, the meeting was held in
Vienna and reached agreement to launch a new program for settling Irans nuclear
issue; on April 16, 2008, directors of foreign ministers of six countries and Director
General for External Relations of the Council of European Union held meeting in
Shanghai in discussing program of resuming negotiation on Irans nuclear issue;
and in April 2012, the meeting of 5+1 was held in Istanbul, Turkey, on which
China proposed again to address Irans nuclear issue through diplomatic means
within the UN framework. As did on Palestine-Israel issue, China proactively
participated in the mediation, though China did not seek in dominating
agenda-setting nor proposed programs.
C. Limited mediation
Limited mediation refers to the category of the mediation that China puts in little
diplomatic resources, either participating in mediation for the time being, or does it
on a modest level. Generally speaking, those hot-spot issues are little related to
Chinas realistic interest; the conflicting parties in concern are limited to Chinese
influence; the international attention is low; or no peaceful solution is available in
the short term. In those cases, Chinese special envoys, if any, will be sent
temporarily and symbolically. For example, when Syrian crisis deteriorated in 2012,
Syrian opposition parties were invited to Beijing on February 9. In February 17,
Chinese special envoy, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and his 5 people entourage
arrived in Damascus for a visit of two days. Zhai Jun met Syrian leaders and
political parties in order to make some contribution to and play a constructive
role in addressing the Syrian issue. In the category of limited mediation, Chinas
top leaders seldom participate in mediations in person. They instead send officials
of Chinese Embassies or lower officials to the mediations, or invite conflicting
parties to China. For example, on June 21-22, 2011, Mahmoud Jibril, head of the
executive committee of Libya's ruling National Transitional Council (NTC) visited
Beijing and China launched limited mediation diplomacy between Kadafi
government and NTC. In this kind of mediation, China expounds its position and
principle of negotiation rather than lays down timetable and venue.
Steven Erlanger, As Nuclear Talks with Iran Restart, New Hopes for Deal, New York Times,
April 12, 2012.
Chinese government arrived in Damascus, Peoples Daily (overseas), April 18, 2012, p.4.
Libyas opposition leader visits China, Global Times, June 21, 2011
62
Global Review
D. Generally detached
The generally detached mediation can be viewed as indirect mediation, which
means that China would take part not proactively, but indirectly in crisis
management conducted by international organizations like UN. Those hot-spot
issues are less related to Chinas realistic interest; China and conflicting parties
have little to speak of strategic confidence; China can do little to influence the
parties; the international community, especially big powers, pay little attention to
the issues; or they are long-term hot-spot issues that cannot be solved in the short
term. For example, China did not participate proactively in the mediation on issues
of Lebanon, Somali, Yemen, Bahrain, western Sahara, Iran and the United Arab
Emirates, but instead played a indirect role via UN. This is a generally detached
category of mediation diplomacy.
Table 2: Four categories of Chinese mediation diplomacy in the Middle East
Crisis in the
Categories
Relevance
Influence
International
Intractability
Middle East
of mediation
of interests
of power
attention
of crisis
strong
big
high
average
strong
medium
high
great
strong
medium
high
great
medium
little
high
great
medium
little
high
great
medium
little
medium
great
weak
little
low
great
weak
little
low
great
Sudan issue
Irans issue
Deep
intervention
Proactive
participation
Palestine-Israe
Proactive
l issue
participation
Libya civil
Limited
war
mediation
Syria crisis
Somali issue
Cyprus issue
West Sahara
Limited
mediation
Generally
detached
Generally
detached
Generally
Including southern Sudans independence issue and western Sudans Darfur issue.
Since Khartoum government agreed the southern Sudan to hold referendum for independence,
the issue is not difficult to solve. But southern Sudan,northern Sudan and Darfur are contradicted
on resource allocation, which are difficult to solve by mediation.
Winter 2012
63
SUN Degang
issue
detached
Disputes on
Generally
Gulf islands
detached
Lebanon issue
Yemen crisis
Bahrain crisis
Generally
detached
Generally
detached
Generally
detached
medium
medium
medium
great
weak
little
low
great
medium
little
high
little
weak
little
high
average
Three basic rules can be identified in Table 2: first, Chinas mediation

diplomacies in the Middle East varied; second, Chinese mediation in the Middle
East hinges on its relevant interest, its relevant influence, international attention,
and intractability of the issues to be solved. China will be more motivated to come
to the mediation when its relevant interest, relevant influence, and international
attention go up, while the intractability goes down, and vice versa. Third, Chinas
mediation is dynamic rather than static. Chinas input of diplomatic resources and
the depth of its involvement in mediation vary to different stages, different
backgrounds and different leaderships.
VI. Conclusion
As China further grows in its comprehensive national strength, the Middle East
becomes an important part of Chinas bigger-periphery diplomacy and thus an
important strategic bolster of Chinas peaceful rise. Chinas mediation in the Middle
East is an important part of Chinas omnidirectional diplomacy, which is positively
significant to enhance Chinas protection of its overseas interest, its image of a
responsible power, its soft power, and its coordination with other powers.
Chinas mediation in the Middle East covers hot-spot issues with following
features: first, mediation among different parties and ethnicities of sovereign states,
such as Darfur issue, Libyan issue and Syrian issue. It should not be ruled out that
China will involve in addressing the internal conflicts of Lebanon, Yemen and
Somali under the framework of multilateral organizations. Second, China launches
mediation diplomacy among the Middle East countries to address their territorial
and resource disputes between Israel and Palestine, and between Iran and United
Arab Emirates. Third, China mediates between extra-regional powers and the
Middle East countries on issues like Irans nuclear issue. To this research, therefore,
64
Global Review
Chinas mediation diplomacies in the Middle East are mainly determined by four
factors: relevance of interest, impact of power, international attention and
intractability of the crisis settlement, which conversely determines the form of
Chinas mediation diplomacies that turns out to be four: deep intervention,
proactive participation, limited mediation and generally detached.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has every reason to
play a more positive role in addressing the Middle East issues. Moreover, Chinas
mediation diplomacy plays a role of bridge among conflicting parties of the Middle
East. China is different from U.S., Europe and Russia. China never colonized in the
Middle East, nor left historic burden in the region. In addition, Chinese culture is
peaceful and reconciliatory, and Chinese doctrine of mean emphasizes
eclecticism, unbiased, detached and non-interference in domestic politics of other
countries. China will only put forward constructive resolutions, sometimes
individually and sometimes in concert. Chinese diplomats are more patient than
their Western counterparts and usually take conviction and persuasion rather than
pressure and coercion, helpful for reaching agreement. Chinas mediation
diplomacy in the Middle East is increasingly sophisticated, and will be very likely
to become a public good that China provides the international community with and
enhance the image of a responsible power of China and its soft-power construction.
Those being said above, Chinas mediation diplomacy has its downsides. First,
the Middle East is low in its position in Chinas general diplomatic vision at least to
date. It is not even behind world powers and periphery countries, but also behind
Africa and Latin America in Chinas diplomatic prioritization. Thus, the diplomatic
resources that China puts in the Middle East diplomacy is severely insufficient and
the unique role of the Middle East in extending Chinas strategic opportunity period
is prevented from being viewed from a strategic high. Second, some in Chinese
academics and politics believe that the Middle East hot-spot issues are so
complicated and intractable that they waste diplomatic resources and mediation
diplomacy. But they actually overlook the issues to stand as a new field for
big-power strategic cooperation and for U.S., EU, Russia, China and groups of
powers to build up a more stable cooperation relationship.
Chen Jiehua, Chinas Diplomatic Strategy in the 21st Century, Current Affairs Publication
House, 2001, p.67.
Sun Degang, Chinas Quasi-alliance Diplomacy in the New Period, World Economics and
Politics, no.3, p.57.
Winter 2012
65
SUN Degang
Third, China lacks a powerful pool of talent and reserve of knowledge to support
its mediation diplomacy in the Middle East. Only by mastering the Middle East
languages, Islamic history, culture, national conditions and political system, can
diplomats in the mediation enhance their own personal attraction and strategic
communication ability, and enable Chinese option acceptable to all parties. In sum,
Chinas mediation diplomacy in the Middle East started from scratch, deepening
gradually, to enhance Chinas international influence, moral attraction, cultural
affinity, and also consolidate the diplomatic theory and practice with Chinese
characteristics.
66
Global Review
Does culture affect in the financial decision making of

rational man? Chinese vs. Anglo-Saxon Perspective
Goal
In traditional finance theory, models assume a rational man that is used to make
decisions that always maximize his benefit. In this model, it does not matter if the
rational man is German or Chinese because the decision making does not depend on
a nationality or a culture. In this paper, we designed an experiment in which we
polled individuals, from two different cultural schemes, about the same financial
phenomenon.
First, we take into account that the observed phenomenon is the same. If culture
does not affect the making of financial decisions, the survey results from both
groups will be quite similar. On the other hand, if culture is a variable to consider in
the different models of the financial market behaviors, the results of the survey of
both groups will be significantly different. Summarizing, in this paper we try to
show evidences, so that we can prove that the variable culture is important and it
should be considered in the different kind of financial models.
Introduction
After many years of research, the efficient market and the rational man hypothesis
have failed. Other models have proved that there is something else required on the
equation.
First, research was started to work with the individual psychological bias, in
other words, Behavioral Finance. Recently, it has surged a series of papers in which
Clemente Hernandez-Rodriguez is Professor at the Instituto Tecnolgico y de Estudios

Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM) Campus Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mxico; Mauricio
Cervantes-Zepeda is Director of Asia Pacific Center, Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios
Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM) Campus Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mexico. The authors
appreciate the support of this research via the Research Chair Asia Pacific: China. Business and
Competitiveness. Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Campus
Guadalajara, Mexico.
Winter2012
67
the cultural and financial variables have been related. The application of cultural
concepts in financial areas has result attractive and it has won multiple adepts.
Stultz & Williamson have provided a detailed conceptual discussion about the
culture and its importance in finance. They proposed that the culture, measured
through religion and language, affects to variables such as the rights of investors.
Even, they show evidence that religion is a better predictor of rights of investors
than the level of countrys international trade liberalization. Nonetheless, they find
that the effect of culture decreases when the level of international trade
liberalization increases. Grinblatt & Keloharju proposes that investors tend to invest
more in enterprises that are physically closer to their residence, communicating to
people in the same native language, and with a CEO who has the same nationality
or culture of the investor.
Guiso et al provides an extensive discussion about how culture affects the
investment decisions in financial markets. At the moment of deciding whether to
invest in shares, the investor is afraid of being cheated and this perception of risk is
influenced not only by the individual characteristics of the company where he is to
invest, or the capital market where he is to participate; but also by individual and
cultural characteristics of investors. Less reliable investors tend to invest less in the
stock market. According to Guiso et al, this explains why many of the United
States richest people do not invest in the Stock Exchange. It also explains
differences of participation in the Stock Exchange among countries.
Markus & Kitayama proposed that individuals from individualistic cultures tend
to see themselves as autonomous and independent persons. In collectivist
cultures, the individuals perceive themselves as connected and less differentiated
from others. In individualistic cultures, like the United States, individuals give
more value to their forecasts in function of their personal skills and they are used to
Stulz, R. M., & Williamson R., Culture, Openness, and Finance, Journal of Financial
Economics, vol.70, no.3, 2003, pp.313-349.
Grinblatt, M., & Keloharju, M., How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence
Stockholdings and Trades, Journal of Finance, vol. 56, no.3, 2001, p.1053.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. y Zingales, L., Trusting the Stock Market, ECGI Finance Working
Paper, 2007.
Ibid.
Markus, R., & Kitayama S., Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and
Motivation, Psychological Review, vol.98, no.2, 1991, pp.224253.
68
Global Review
see themselves more like winners; therefore, they overestimate their own abilities,
such that they feel that they are above average. This situation does not happen in
collectivist cultures as Japan.
Traditional explanations for the differences in financial systems fall primarily on
the legal framework, and on the reduction of risk. These two concepts are not
mutually exclusive. The individual perception of uncertainty is strongly influenced
by national culture. Hofstede documents that a variety of perceptions towards risk
in a wide sample of different countries. Kwok & Tadesse show that; the
configuration of the financial system of a country is related to cultural dimensions;
such as, to risk aversion. Countries with a strong risk aversion, as a cultural
dimension, are associated with financial systems that are more focused on banking
than focused in the Stock Exchange. These papers also provide a link between
literature on culture and financial literacy.
Another study that examines the cultural and financial variables is the one
conducted by Chui, Titman and Wei. They show that cultural differences between
nations affect yields in capital markets. Specifically they find a statistically
significant positive relation between individualism with the purchase and sales
volume in the stock market and the price volatility as well as the size of the prize
"Momentum". Momentum Award is the utility that has a zero cost portfolio. It
invests in last year's profitable stocks and taking a short position in the losers.
Breuer & Quinten make a call to create a field of research named "Cultural
finance. It is proved with methods taken from Game Theory and Institutional
Economy the importance of cultural values in making financial decisions.
Hofstede, G., The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories, Journal of
International Business Studies, vol.14, no.2, 1983, pp.75-89.
Kwok, C. & Tadesse S., National Culture and Financial Systems, Journal of International
Business Studies, vol.37, no.2, 2006, pp.227-247.
Chui A., Timan S., Wei J., Individualism and Momentum around the World, The Journal of
Finance, LXV (1), 2010, pp.361-392.
See Jegadeesh N. & Titman, S., Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications
for Stock Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance, vol.48, no.1, 1993, pp.6591.
Breuer, W. & Quinten, B., Cultural Finance, Working Paper (disponible en SSRN), 2009.
Winter 2012
69
Methodology
Nowadays, Shanghai city presents a unique position to make a comparative
research study of cultural perception. On the one hand, the Chinese Financial
System is in a time of great change. In 2001, China signed its adherences
commitment in order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), which meant
that it would commit to a profound reform of their financial system. They want
them to go from a state system to an open market allowing the involvement of
international banking in China, and in turn, internationalizing the Chinese banks.
When a system is in changes, the users become more sensible and critical in
order to evaluate whether these changes are being taken to improve or they are a
throwback. On the other hand, the Shanghai city is a very cosmopolitan city, with a
big foreigners community which is mainly Americans, Europeans, especially
Germans, and other from the rest of the world.
Taking advantage of these two situations: a financial system in flux and a
multicultural city, we did a survey to assess whether there are differences in
perception due to cultures. This means that we do the same survey about the
financial system to Chinese citizens and foreigners (Anglo-Saxons); both groups
should be residents of Shanghai. If there are significant differences, in the responses
of the two groups, it could be attributed to the cultural differences. It will be taken
care that the variables, of both groups, are similar except for nationality.
In this survey, we will try to see if variables as confidence, risk aversion,
individualism, proximity, or cultural distance, affect or not the Chinese financial
systems perception.
The experiment
We gathered two groups, both with the following characteristics: individuals in full
work cycle, between 25 and 50 years old, who worked in the city of Shanghai for at
least the last two years. We want them between 25 and 50 years old to make sure
that they are in contact with the financial system (through a checkbook, savings
account, internet banking, among others). It was a requirement for them to have a
university degree (except for an entrepreneur interviewed who just had a high
school degree), to speak English, and to work professionally within middle
management, direction or if they used to be owners of their own company.
70
Global Review
Companies could be small (restaurant, office consultant, designer, among others)

but were avoided businesses like informal trade or unregistered businesses in order
to avoid skewing the results.
The first group consists of Chinese citizens no matter their native city. The
second group only consists of Anglo-Saxon citizens mainly Germans, British, and
Americans.
Results
Main characteristics of the polled groups
Table 1 shows the main control characteristics of both groups. We can see that age,
gender, and professional activity of both groups are very similar. One noticeable
difference is in the level of income; even though the level of jobs is generally
similar between both groups, the expatriate from a foreign company enjoys a higher
level of salary and benefits than the residents of Shanghai; as seen in the sample.
Table 1. Statistical data from both encuested groups
Statistical data from polled individuals
Anglo-Saxons
Average Age
Average Income
Chinese
37
35,545
34
26,477
Male
Female
29
21
26
24
Scolarship
High School
University
Post Graduate
35
14
42
8
Professional activity
Mid management
34
32
Direct
Enterpreneur
9
7
7
11
(annual in US Dollars)
Gender
Winter 2012
71
Furthermore, it is seen a greater number of executive employees with graduate

education in the foreigners' sample than in the Chinese's sample. However, for
practical purposes of this study, we consider both groups sufficiently homogeneous
so that the results will not be distorted by some of these differences. The
important thing was to count with two groups; in spite of their small size, they were
very representative of the economic agent that participates in making financial
decisions of financial companies. In other words, there are prepared individuals,
owners, or those that belong to mid or high direction of companies which had good
economic and income level.
Surveys answers
In Appendix 1, it is found the entire survey with the sum of answers per choice. The
results are the following: First, we asked whether for their bank services they used
to use mainly Chinese banks, foreign banks in China, foreign banks overseas, or
another option. The most practical option, for any resident in Shanghai, are the two
first options. Actually, Chinese banks show bigger branches than foreign banks that
are starting to get in the Chinese market. The 76% of Chinese people in the group
prefer to use Chinese banks against the 32% of Anglo-Saxons. This is consistent
with the cultural closeness effect documented by Grinblatt & Keloharju. They say
that we prefer companies of our own culture that are closer to us.
The second question is to know which of the bank services are used the most. For
Anglo-Saxons in the group predominates credit card: 45%, the checkbook: 42% and
the internet banking: 22%. For each group of Chinese, the service that was used the
most is the savings account: 25% and credit card: just 23%. This shows evidence of
a cultural difference that is significant: Chinese people prefer to save money than to
use credit cards in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon.
In order to invest their money surplus, Chinese prefer Chinese funds (inversion
societies, or mutual funds): 52% and Chinese banks: 38%. However, the foreigners
prefer funds located in foreign: 74%. Again, this is consistent with the effect
reported by Grinblatt & Keloharju about cultural closeness.
Regarding the relative savings (based on monthly income) 62% of the Chinese
Grinblatt, M., & Keloharju, M., How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence
Stockholdings and Trades, Journal of Finance, vol. 56, no.3, 2001, p.1053.
Ibid.
72
Global Review
claim to have savings of over four months, versus 24% of Anglo-Saxons.

Regarding general perception of Chinese bank, its had a better perception of
Chinese people than of Anglo-Saxons (cultural closeness effect). On whether it is
reliable, 64% of Chinese say yes, compared to 42% of foreigners. Whether it is
transparent, 52% of Chinese think so, against 30% of foreigners. Whether it is
manipulated by the government 70% of Chinese think that is not, against 68% of
foreigners. Whether it is corrupt: 70% of Chinese think that it is not, against 52% of
foreigners.
However, although Chinese group shows to have more confidence in his bank,
when we ask them whether they consider it efficient in comparison with the
international banking just 24% says that it actually does, in comparison with 46% of
foreigners. This may be because Chinese having no experience with international
banks and due to the massive publicity that carry out international banks undervalue
its attributes with respect of the foreigner that has had experience with both banking.
Additionally, this highlights the cultural closeness effect even though they
recognize that their products are not better than international ones they prefer them
because they are from their culture.
In question 6, we did the same questions as in last section, but now it is about the
Shanghai stock exchange and the answers are very similar. The Chinese group is
more confident than the foreigner, but the foreigner relatively sees it more
efficiently than the Chinese. It should be noted that both groups increased much the
answers: I do not know, because everyone is customer from banking, but not in the
stock market.
About the loans profile that they use, according to question 7, we found that 80%
of the sample of Chinese people already has some kind of mortgage loan against
38% of foreigners. The reason of this difference is mainly because Chinese people
want to stay in the city and invest in a dwelling and also it is easier for them to
acquire the loan. As long as foreigners usually are passing temporarily, and also it is
harder for them to have a loan.
The same situation is found in cars case. For foreigners, it is difficult to drive in
Shanghai (if they do not speak Chinese and they cannot read the road signs, then it
is very hard to drive in China), hence they prefer public transportation, or they
prefer to use a car with companys chauffeur. Regarding the use of the credit card is
Winter 2012
73
a little higher in whites: 90%, against 82% in China. The point that attracts the most
attention is that 70% of Chinese say to have a family loan against only 14% of
foreigners. This is an effect very significant in a collectivist society where the social
network aims itself socially and financially.
In Question 8 we questioned whether they perceive an improvement in Chinese
banking services in the last 5 years. The 76% of Chinese say that they have
improved and 24% that have improved drastically. 72% of foreigners say that they
have improved and just an 8% perceive that they have improved drastically. A
possible explanation is that in general a foreigner has less time to reside in China
and their comparative horizon is less than Chinese who did see in the beginning of
the decade a bank without computers when everything was based in countless
copies and stamps which does more drastic its comparison with foreigners that
arrived in a China with a automatized banking.
Regarding the improvement of Shanghais stock exchange in the last 5 years,
foreigners are still more skeptical than Chinese. The 76% of Chinese say that
Shanghai stock exchange has improved against only 18% of foreigners. This could
be because this group is limited in the series B where theres less options and
liquidity than in series A of exclusive Chinese access.
In question 10, we asked them about insurance they have. We found a big
difference, the group of 50 Anglo-Saxons in overall they declared to have 103
insurances with an average of 2 per person against 47 of Chinese group that is less
than a half. If we link this with question 7 where we see that Chinese count with
more familiar credits, we will support that Chinese culture is collectivist and it
generates an aim familiar network, and lend support in misfortune, against
Anglo-Saxons. Furthermore, if the Anglo-Saxon is an expatriate and he is away
from his family, other than its natural individualism, the sensation of isolation
increases and from there the necessity of consuming more insurances than Chinese
because Chinese feel protected by their social network.
Finally, we ask exclusively to foreigners how do they feel about banking and
stock exchange in comparison with their country. Regarding banking, the 60%
considered it deficient or very deficient. Independently of which is the reality, it
persists the effect of: mine is better.
74
Global Review
Conclusions
We analyzed the survey results about Chinese financial system out of two groups
living in the financial transformation phenomenon from the same place, Shanghai.
They had similar characteristics like age, gender, professional position, but with
different cultures that lead us to conclude that culture is a differentiator ingredient.
The evidence provided suggests that cultural characteristics influence the answers
and the way of acting from individuals, finding substantial differences between both
groups. Hence, this research provides evidence to show that culture affects man in
making decisions related to money, their personal finance and the financial system
and it disagrees with the assumption in traditional models where men are purely
rational and the moves simply by the maximization of economic benefits.
As future research we could repeat a similar experiment but only with employees
of the financial system, as money managers, so that, we can take advantage of the
increase in foreign companies and foreigners in China's financial system,
specifically in the city of Shanghai.
Winter 2012
75
The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its Implications

for China-Africa Green Cooperation in Rio+20
YU Hongyuan
Global warming and the resulting climate change present the world with major and
potentially devastating challenges. They lead to environmental degradation/scarcity
and a radical reform of the energy mix among industrial countries, in addition to
other resource scarcity concerns. A generation has passed since the states
governments began to seriously consider that the climate change has emerged as
one of the top security challenges of the early 21st century, and presented the world
with an array of shared economic, resource, environmental and energy challenges;
global climate change poses a real and present danger of environmental destruction
and human dislocation on a scale that weve never seen.
Such nexus challenges of water, energy and food have generated a perceptible
shift of security values in the world since 2011. UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-Moon argued, "In many parts of the world, water scarcity is increasing and rates
of growth in agricultural production have been slowing. At the same time, climate
change is exacerbating risk and unpredictability for farmers, especially for poor
countries who are the most vulnerable and the least able to adapt, ensuring
sustainable use of most critical finite resources is the key." Intergovernmental
Prof. YU Hongyuan is Deputy Director of Institute for Comparative Politics and Public
Policy Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
Some of these ideas and a discussion of climate change can be found in: Yu Hongyuan,
Environmental Change and Asia-Pacific: China Responds to Global Warming," Global Change,
Peace, and Security, vol. 17, issue 1, 2005; Knowledge and Climate Change Policy Coordination
in China, East Asia: An International Quarterly. vol. 21, no. 3; Global Environmental Regimes
and Policy Coordination in China, Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 9, no. 2, 2004; and
Global Warming and China's Environmental Diplomacy in Nova Science Publishers, 2008.
Transcript of remarks by Senator John Kerry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject:
U.S.-China Partnership on the Road to the U.N. Climate Change Conference 2009, National Press
Club, in: Federal News Service, 29 July 2009.
Anthony Smallwood, The Global Dimension of the Fight Against Climate Change, Foreign
Policy, vol.167, 2008, pp.8-9.
76
Global Review
The Energy-Water-Food Nexus
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) always argues that Africa is most threatened by
global warming. While not responsible for the threat of climate change, African
countries are extremely vulnerable to energy-water-food nexus challenges by
climate change. Thomas Schelling argues that China and Africa will suffer from
climate change more than developed countries. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report estimates that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use could rise by 45
percent to 110 percent between 2000 and 2030. The report indicates that
two-thirds to three-quarters of the increased emissions would come from
developing countries. The report also makes it clear that the greater the efforts to
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, the less severe would be the impact of
climate change. Considering China and South Africa are key stones for BAISC
group, we should attach much more importance to China and African countries'
cooperation and joint actions on nexus challenges by adapting and mitigating global
warming for current and future generations.
I. Water-energy-food Nexus
Climate change presents the world with a broad range of stakeholders from the
water, energy and food sectors in an effort to improve understanding of the
interdependencies and develop a joint perspective on the common challenges.
Global energy consumption is projected to grow by close to 49% from 2007 to 2035.
Food production requires water and energy, the extraction of water requires energy,
and energy production requires water. Food prices are highly sensitive to energy
costs which indirectly affect the GDP of a country as high costs of processing,
irrigation, fertiliser and transportation affect production and lead to lower exports.
Its becoming ever more difficult to provide universal access to water, food and
energy in the crisis time of climate change, close to 1 billion people are
undernourished, 0.9 billion lack access to safe water and 1.5 billion have no source
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Scientific Basis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
http://www.ipcc.int.
Thomas C. Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense?' Foreign Affairs, 81, 3, 2002, p.2.
IPCC, Climate Change 2007Mitigation of Climate Change of Working Group III to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Winter 2012
77
YU Hongyuan
of electricity.
Figure 1 Water-energy-food nexus
Firstly, energy is fundamental to the prosperity and security of nations. However,

any successful international effort to mitigate threats to human and national security
posed by climate change must inevitably include controlling access to fossil fuel
energy. Evidently, preventing catastrophic climate change is actually an energy
challenge which has caught great attention of the entire human race. The human
dependence on modern energy service or sustainable future in a modern society is
ten to one hundred times greater than it was in an agrarian society. Climate change
is caused mostly by traditional energy using - notably the burning of coal, oil and
other fossilfuels - resulting in the greenhouse effect.
Secondly, water is human basic need and required to produce food. Roughly 70
percent of global freshwater is used for agriculture, food and water scarcity will
interconnect. By 2030, demand for water is expected to grow by some 40%, and
for food by 50%, requiring a radical rethink of the world's approach to natural
resources and consumption. According to the Comprehensive Assessment of Water
Management in Agriculture a fifth of the worlds population live in areas of
IEA Data, http :/ / data. iea. org/ ieastore/ stat slisting, Asp. 2009-4-1.
Stockholm Environment Institute, 2011Understanding the Nexus, Background paper for the
Bonn2011 Nexus Conference,
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001 (3 vols.), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Granit.J., Lfgren.J. (eds.), Water and Energy Linkages in the Middle East Regional
Collaboration Opportunities, SIWI Paper 16 (SIWI, Stockholm), 2010.
Water-food-energy nexus in Asia, The Jakarta Post, October 7, 2010.
78
Global Review
physical water scarcity. The definition of water scarcity is a region where water
resources development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits and
more than 75% of river flows are withdrawn for agriculture, industry, and
domestic purposes. 2.6 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation
facilities and 884 million people do not use improved sources of drinking water.
The future water use scenario data by McKinsey & Company indicates that by 2030,
we will face a 40% global supply gap of accessible, reliable water supply for
economic development.
Thirdly, water is required to produce energy and energy is necessary to manage
water for different uses. The two assets are strongly linked and the provision of both
is part of basic foundation to stimulate growth and improve livelihoods. World-wide,
about 20% of all electricity is generated by hydropower. As economies develop,
however, the water demands for energy production rise rapidly. In the European
Union (EU), for example, approximately 44% of water is used for energy
production, and in the U.S. the annual rate is over 40%. Billions of people lack
access to modern water and energy services. This fact, coupled with population
growth and growing economies at the national and regional levels, will mean that
the demand for water and energy services will grow significantly over the coming
decades.
Thus, the energy-water-food nexus security caused by climate change presents a
huge challenge to all human beings and needs global cooperation between
developed and developing countries. Increased demand for water, food and energy
Jakob Granit, Andreas Lindstrm & Josh Weinberg, Policy and Planning Needs to Value
Water, The European Financial Review, April - May 2012, pp. 22-26.
Bishwanath Goldar, Water Pricing and Abatement of Industrial Water Pollution: Study of
Distilleries, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2009, Vol.4, Iss.2, pp. 95-113.
Diana Glassman, Michele Wucker, Tanushree Isaacman, and Corinne Champilou: "THE
WATER-ENERGY NEXUS: Adding Water to the Energy Agenda", The World Policy Institute,
March 2011.
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Pros
pects: The 2006 Revision, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_
Highlights_rev.pdf.
Winter 2012
79
YU Hongyuan
will increase demands placed on resources particularly during climate change.
II. The nexus Challenges for China and Africa

2.1 China and nexus challenges by climate change
In most cases, according to IPCC report, China is among the worst countries
affected by water-energy-food nexus challenges due to its vulnerable geographic
position and economic structure. With rapidly growing population and urbanization,
fresh water and food supply will be the most sensitive to climate change-induced
impacts.
Global warming has directly brought greater weather extremes, droughts in the
North and floods in the South of China.Water security in China will similarly be
threatened. The Chinese government acknowledges that climate change has
already caused changes in the distribution of water resources all over China.
Moreover, the government foresees that climate warming will possibly reinforce
the drought trend in northern China, and intensify water scarcity and contradiction
between water supply and demand.
Food security in China is most likely to be threatened by water scarcity by
climate change because China is particularly vulnerable to water shortages.
Chinese government acknowledged such adverse effects by stating that the impact
of future climate change on agriculture and livestock breeding will be mainly
adverse. It is likely there will be a drop in the yield of the three major crops, white,
paddy rice and corn. By 2030, overall crop productivity in China could
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Scientific Basis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
http://www.ipcc.int.
Xinhua News Agency, China National Action Plan on Climate Change,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-06/04/content_6196300.htm, Accessed on March3, 2008.
Xinhua News Agency, China National Action Plan on Climate Change,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-06/04/content_6196300.htm.Accessed on March3, 2008.
IPCC, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change; Nielson and McElroy, 'Introduction and
Overview', p. 24; Ying Aiwen, 'Impact of Global Climate Change on China's Water Resources',
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, vol.61, no.1, 2000, pp. 187-191.
China Xinhua News Agency, China National Action Plan on Climate Change, http://n
ews.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-06/04/content_6196300.htm, Accessed on March3, 2008.
80
Global Review
decrease by as much as 5-10 per cent if no action is taken. According to China's

climate change country study, if recent climate change trends continue, much of
Chinese agriculture is likely to face shorter growing periods and increased water
deficits, requiring more irrigation. Under these conditions, by 2050 Chinese crop
production (especially of wheat and corn) could decrease by 10%. In short,
possible impacts of climate change on Chinese agriculture could be highly
disruptive.
China energy dependency and scarcity will be worse with climate change, water
and food scarcity. Chinas energy demand mix is dominated by fossil energy, of
which coal constitutes 70.5% and oil 17.6%. Most experts believe that for the
foreseeable futureat least 30 yearsthis fundamental reliance on coal will remain,
if not increase dramatically. The dominant role of coal in Chinas energy mix
complicates Beijings ability to achieve certain abatement objectives. As the
Chinese government articulated in its 2008 white paper, Chinas coal-dominated
energy mix cannot be substantially changed in the near future, thus making the
control of greenhouse gas emissions rather difficult. Recently, China overtook
the United States to become the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. By
2020 China's average per capita energy consumption is expected to match the
current global average, meaning that China alone will account for almost one-third
of the world's total GHG emissions between 1990 and 2020. According to OECD
National Intelligence Council 2009: 21-22.
Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study, China Climate Change Country Study,
p.109.
Interview with Xu Huiyou, China Agriculture Science and Technology Institute, 12 March
2003.
Nielson and McElroy, 'Introduction and overview', p. 24.
David Zweig, China's Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct2005, Vol. 84 Issue 5,
p25-38,
BP Statistical Energy Review_2011, http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalb

p_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/p
df/Chinese_statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2011.pdf.
BP Statistical Energy Review_2011, http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalb

p_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/p
df/Chinese_statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2011.pdf.
Full text of Chinas policies, actions for addressing climate change, BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific-Political, October 30, 2008.
Paul Harris and YU Hongyuan, Environmental Change and Asia-Pacific: China Responds to
Global Warming", Global Change, Peace, and Security, vol. 17, iss.1, (2005).
Winter 2012
81
YU Hongyuan
report, Carbon dioxide emissions in China could rise to over 11 bn tonnes in 2030,
compared with 8 bn tonnes in the US, about 4.5 bn tonnes in Europe (OECD
countries), and just over 2 bn tonnes in India. China is already the largest global
producer of coal, wind and solar power; has more nuclear reactors under
construction than anywhere in the world, and hosts the planets largest hydropower
station in the Three Gorges Dam.
Thus, the challenge to meet growing demand for water, food and energy is
perhaps very serious with global warming. China is heavily investing in
maximizing efficiency in water use for energy generation and food production, but
it must ensure enough water is available for production to be expanded. Even worse
than other countries, China accounts for about 35 percent of world steel production
and about 50 percent of the worlds production of cement. These industries and
associated activities are also thirsty for water and deepen the food production
decrease.
Table 1 Energy Structure in 2010
Oil(%)
Gas(%)
Coal(%)
Renewable
energy(%)
China
17.6
4.0
70.5
0.5
India
29.7
10.6
53.0
1.0
USA
37.2
27.2
23.0
1.7
World
33.6
23.8
29.6
1.3
"Melting Asia: China, India, and climate change", Economist, Vol. 387 No. 8583,pp.29-30
Transcript of remarks by Mr. Trevor Houser, Director, Energy and Climate Practice, Rhodium
Group, Session One of a Council on Foreign Relations Symposium on China and Climate Change
and Findings of CFRs Independent Task Force on Climate Change, Subject: Chinese Energy and
Climate
Strategy,
Federal
News
Service,
June
24,
2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16630/symposium_on_china_and_climate_change_session_one.ht
ml.
Christof Rhl, Global Energy After the Crisis, Foreign AffairsVolume 89, Issue 2, 2011,
pp.32.
82
Global Review
2.2 Africa and Nexus Challenges by Climate Change

According to the IPCC, the African continent is already warming faster than the
global average and the impact of global warming on Africa is devastating. The
main challenges facing Africans will emanate from tropical storms, hurricanes and
drought, more extreme water shortage and scarcity of foods, landslides, abnormal
sea-level rises, and other extreme weather expected as a result of energy-food-water
nexus by climate change.
Essentially, global warming leads to environmental degradation and resources
scarcity. Energy-food-water nexus by climate change are by all means worse than
anywhere in the world. African countries emit very small amount of carbon
emissions. However, many of them are energy insecure and depend on foreign aids
and investments. The costs to Africa for adapting to nexus security by climate
change would be sharply higher because of poverty and lack of investment. In
Africa, the need is urgent. Nearly half a billion people- almost 70% of the
population - have not enough access to electricity. As IPCC argued, Sub-Saharan
Africa is facing a water, energy and food crisis caused by climate change which
could cost it $17 billion per year.
Water challenges in Africa include: water scarcity, lack of clean water investment,
energy poverty for water management, which have decreased food production in
African. In the meantime, the higher worldwide food prices have and continue to
fall into conflicts with the demand of an increasing population in African continent.
The FAO estimates that some 925 million of the world's people regularly go hungry,
265 million of them in Africa since 2011. East Africa's most severe drought in 60
years has left 10 million people desperately short of food. "At the current rate of
temperature increase, global average temperature will have increased by 1.5 degrees
by 2050, making Africa lose 22 percent of it maize, 17 percent of its sorghum/millet,
18 percent of its groundnut and 8 percent of its cassava, 75 percent of the areas can
Africa Suffers Most from Lack of Progress in Climate Change Negotiation, US Fed News,
November 17,2010.
O. A. Ogunseitan, Framing Environmental Change in Africa: Cross-scale Institutional

Constraints on Progressing from Rhetoric to action against Vulnerability, Global Environmental
Change 13 (2003),pp.101-111.
IEA Data. http :/ / data. iea. org/ ieastore/ stat slisting. Asp. 2009-4-1.
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Scientific Basis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
http://www.ipcc.int
"How Africa Can Get the Energy It Needs Without Adding to Climate Change", All Africa,
November 11, 2011.
Winter 2012
83
YU Hongyuan
expect yield declines of at least 20 percent" said Dione.

Sub-Saharan Africa countries (719 million people) have severely limited access
to energy, consuming between them, if South Africa is discounted, less electricity
than New York State (19.5 million people). With its low per capita fossil energy
use, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest emissions of the greenhouse gases that are
the major cause of climate change. Lack of power has hampered Africa's efforts to
meet the UN-agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and contributes to
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children under five every year through
respiratory ailments caused by smoke fumes from open cooking fires. For
example, in Nigeria Less than 30 percent of Nigerias population in rural areas has
access to safe drinking water because the nations water supply has lagged behind
its water needs.
Moreover, urbanization in Africa is the lowest in the world, but its pace is the
fastest worldwide. In Africa, more than half of urban population lives in slums and
even in worse living conditions. Many areas in the city, equipped with no basic
infrastructure, are vulnerable to energy-water-food challenges.
III China and Africa Green Cooperation against Nexus Challenges

Energy-Water-Food nexus, connected to climate change, present a huge challenge
to all human beings. Cooperation between China and African countries, especially
in the aspects of financial and technological cooperation, is needed to achieve a
low-carbon development. Many developing countries at the industrialization stage
face the risk of following the Western countries economic model from the late
eighteenth century that was growth-oriented, unsustainable, and resource-intensive.
"Africa can Increase Food Yield despite Climate Change Challenges, ECA's Dione", African
Press Organization, December 6.
CGIAR/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX, "Africa Most Threatened By Global Warming",
May 24, All Africa, 2001.
United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators, July 14, 2009,
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx.2009-8-2
Changes in Climate Trends Impacting Livelihoods and Food Security in the Sahel and West
Africa All Africa, December 5, 2011.
Modupe Taiwo Odubela, "Attaining Sustainable Development in Nigeria: Water Quality

Monitoring Management," in Michael Atchia and Shawna Tropp (eds.), Environmental
Management: Issues and Solutions, Chichester: John Wiley, 1995, pp. 197.
84
Global Review
Table 2 energy poverty in developing countries

Affordability kWh/day at prices
Energy Budget
(cents/kWh)
Income $/cap/day
10%
6
10
20
India ($2)
$0.20
1.0
Egypt ($5)
China ($7)
Peru ($10)
Croatia ($30)
OECD ($100+)
$0.50
$0.70
$1.00
$3.00
$10.00
8
12
17
50
166
5
7
10
30
100
2.5
3.5
5
15
50
Thus, green development will be the necessary alternative for dealing with
Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges. China and the African countries need to
promote green development while joining the global struggle against global
warming and contributing to global economic growth. The cooperation between
China and African countries is central to global efforts against Energy-Water-Food
nexus with global warming. To make a breakthrough in Energy-Water-Food nexus
challenges, the developed and developing countries must find a balance between the
need for development, their energy consumption and carbon emissions.
3.1 The green development challenges before China and Africa
The changing world is offering developing countries, particularly China less and
less security, because of three things: (a) the battle for new energy commanding
heights, (b) the melting down of global financial system and (c) the mistrust and
misperceptions of different political and ideological systems.
As to the green development, there are more barriers for China and African
countries:
1. Politics. Developed World tends to see low-carbon technology as the core part
of the national competitive power in the future, and therefore lack the political will
to conduct transfer of such technology to the Developing World.
IEA Data. http :/ / data. iea. org/ ieastore/ stat slisting. Asp. 2009-4-1.
Winter 2012
85
YU Hongyuan
2. Market force. The instability of this market deters international technological

investment from entry, while much of low-carbon technologies are mastered by
enterprises from the Developed World. Such a situation encourages monopoly in
low-carbon-tech market, resulting in market failure and rising difficulties of market
entry to enterprises from the Developing World.
3. Finance: There are insufficient financial supports in technological transfer to
the Developing World, especially in areas which new, uncommercialized
low-carbon technologies harbor extra costs.
4. Policies. Most developing countries lack stable, well-defined and easy-to-use
policies to give incentive for technological developers and technology-transfer
receivers.
5. Incomprehensiveness. Much of the transfer deals focus more on technological
innovation but less on upgrade and maintenance, while professional trainings
required for maintenance operations never appear on the deals.
6. Transparency. Most enterprises from the developing world retain insufficient
understanding to transferrable technologies, financing means, and technical demand
from their respective industries, resulting in a lack of understanding of potential
benefits from low-carbon technologies.
7. Institutional mechanism. For instance, inter-governmental organizations for
communications and performance with governmental policies are in huge demand
of placement. Such case has always led to issues relating to multinational dispute
pending to be resolved by effective relevant institutions.
8. Facilities and resources. The developing countries lack proper facilities and
operational resources. For instances, lack of transparency on trading information
and standardized trading operations raises the cost of trading; overprotection in
intellectual properties rights drives up prices high enough to be unaffordable for
most developing countries; insufficient innovation mechanism restrict the ability for
enterprises in these regions to adopt such technologies.
3.2 China and Africa should strengthen unity and uphold the principle of "the
86
Global Review
common but differentiated responsibility"

Essentially, the implications of global governance on climate change focus on three
counts: Firstly, developed countries continue to dominate international climate
change negotiations. The fight against global warming can be described in terms of
common goods. Even though there are many internal contradictions among rich
countries, they share a common interest in trying to keep and widen the
development gap and in staving off the rise of emerging powers. As a result,
wealthy countries maintain their leading position in the post-Kyoto climate regime
building process. Developed countries initially communicated with and consulted
big greenhouse gas emitters in a bid to establish a rational and efficient post-Kyoto
system that would safeguard and coordinate balanced development between energy
consumption, the Earth's climate, and economic growth. At the same time,
developed countries tried to persuade developing countries to accept soft and hard
environmental constraints. Second, due to the early-development advantage of
developed countries and the late-development advantage of developing countries,
any major energy innovation would bring about a new industrial revolution and the
reallocation of global industry. Developed countries have even launched a climate
or carbon tax to put limitations on the economic growth of the developing world,
particularly China. Developing countries are gradually assuming the obligations of
stabilizing GHG. But because they lack new energy sources and advanced
technology, developing countries only become emerging markets for Western
multinational companies, while developed countries are making full use of climate
change opportunities to strengthen their technical and competitive edge. As a result,
they continue to dominate the international system. Obviously, the situation is the
same for the environmental trade regime, which would let developing countries,
bear the programmed baseline costs, while developed countries bear incremental
costs. Developed countries are doing that to increase the environmental constraint
for developing countries and eventually restrict the development of developing
countries with a harsh law.
China and African countries still stay at a stage of rapid industrialization,
urbanization and globalization. These countries not only need to improve their
economy development, but also need to keep away from the risk of globalization.
Those security problems centered on the nexus of water, food and energy, brought
Li Huailin , Nigeria supports Africa, G-77, China's position on climate change, Xinhua News
Agency December122009.
Winter 2012
87
YU Hongyuan
the developing countries with two aspects of challenges. Namely, on the one hand,
the risk of connecting the human rights and nexus security is increasing and
defending the sources and environment sovereignty is the common task of the
developing countries. On the other hand, balancing the relationship of water, food
and energy during the process of economic development and making smart choice.
Consequently China and African countries needs to maintain the solidarity of the
G-77 and China based on the coordination of the BASIC countries, forming a
unified position of objecting the connection between the human rights and the water,
food and energy issue.
China and African countries should continue to demand that developed countries
provide non-commercial technology assistance to developing countries to help them
cope with Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges and cultivate low-carbon emission
economies. For China and African countries, global warming issues are also
intimately linked to efforts to modernize the economy and the associated energy
strategy necessary to bring about such modernization. Furthermore,
Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges should be solved through international
coordination, cooperation and mutual assistance in clean energy development.
Developing countries are deeply dissatisfied with developed countries in this
respect because the latter refuse to pay necessary regard to the constraints imposed
by developing countries lack of development. Wealthy countries, for instance,
place a low priority on technology transfers, and insist on the high price of
intellectual property rights of these technologies.
3.3 China should help African Countries in green development
China and Africa is faced with unprecedented competitive pressure and
opportunities for development. The lack of natural resources and developed
infrastructure has crippled the development of Africa, particularly in green and low
carbon development. Climate change is both a challenge and an opportunity. Africa,
without any historical burden, can accommodate all advanced low-carbon
technologies. As long as Africa can persuade companies to invest here and focus on
these issues, there will be much scope for development. As for emission reduction
and sustainable development, it is necessary to promote the integration of overall
plans and policies on the international level. China already has rich experience in
the coordination of economic development and water, food and energy security.
China shall take full advantage of the Rio+20 Summit to advocate its experience
and achieve the goal of China-Africa cooperation on the area of water, food and
energy. Development and climate change, two interrelated issues, should be
88
Global Review
integrated in China-African cooperation. In addition, China and African countries

should also promote the transition of energy technologies and energy restructuring,
and financial support in the common progress. In the near future, the priority area
for China-Africa green cooperation could be the following areas: popularize
advanced technologies and products for energy conservation; adjust the mix of
energy consumption; intensify the capacity building for adapting to climate;
accelerate the R&D and application of low-carbon technologies, and market
building for carbon emissions trade.
First of all, Chinas Africa policies are those that acknowledge that environment
economy and empowerment are strongly interconnected. Today the livelihoods of
1.6 billion people across the world depend on forests, deforestation, climate change,
ecosystem destruction, food and water crisis and financial situations are problems
that call for courageous regulatory intervention. Rwanda for instance is one of the
three countries in Central and Western Africa to achieve a major reversal in the
trend of declining forest cover. China should change the policy orientation to Africa
of over-emphasis on economic and resource cooperation but relative neglecting
climate change and issues of the environment. Climate security issues should be
incorporated into the Chinas African strategy and long-term development
framework, to promote the building of comprehensive cooperation between China
and African countries.
Secondly, China should vigorously help African countries develop energy-saving
and energy efficiency technologies, renewable energy and new energy technology,
clean coal development and utilization of efficient technology, oil and gas resources
and coal-bed methane exploration and development and utilization of clean and
highly efficient technology, advanced nuclear energy technology, carbon capture
and storage technology, bio-sequestration technologies and carbon sequestration
projects in other technology, agriculture and land-use greenhouse gas emissions
control technology, because the technology is the most important long-term strategy
to deal with the climate change in Africa continent. For example, in August 2007,
UNDP, SU/SSC, CICITE officially signed the project document for South-South
Global Assets and Technology Exchange Program, which was implemented by
SUAEE. One year later, Nov. 2008, SS-GATE was established as an independent
entity in Shanghai, China. So far, there are over 1500 projects on the SS-GATE
e-platform, among which 80.7% are from the developing countries and 19.3% from
the developed countries. 70 successful deals have been made with a trading volume
of US$ 297.69 million so far.
Winter 2012
89
YU Hongyuan
Thirdly, Africa cannot effectively cope with todays challenges without

improving institutions and knowledge on climate change. Thats why it proposed to
refine tools to work to improve the network of meteorological observation, among
other solutions. China should help African countries strengthen the laws and
regulations, policies, system and management mechanism to actively address
climate change, and create a good institutional environment, policy environment
and market environment for low-carbon development of enterprises. China top
leaders always reiterate that China will continue to provide Africa with aid within
its ability to meet the challenges of climate change, and China will provide more aid
to Africa including in the sector of beating the challenges posed.
4.4 China-African cooperation for Post-Durban regime building
Three important achievements have been achieved in Durban: Kyoto extension,
Durban Platform to discuss post 2020 global emission scheme, and green climate
fund. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued it is an important advance in
human battle against global warming. In Durban conference, more importantly,
China demonstrates its global accountability and takes all-round diplomatic efforts
to make a breakthrough at the Durban Climate Conference. Cancun Climate
Conference 2010 resolved that any decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol
will be deferred until conference in Durban. In Durban 2011, considering such a
crisis and political dilemma as climate changes spread, discussed and negotiated all
over the world, the solutions with all-round knowledge based efforts has been built
partly by cooperation among and between China and African countries. China and
the EU actually played as the leading role to deal with the deadlock and reach
consensus on post 2012 climate change regime. China and African countries have
determined that it is in their self interest to be part of the solution in Durban 2011.
China together with Basic group and African countries have and will continue to
offer comprehensive proposals to reduce their emissions, which included specific
targets and timetables for Durban Platform on Enhanced Action.
China and African countries should be wary of a plot of different policy of "the
Group of 77 and China" by developed countries. In addition, as emerging major
developing countries have to face the pressure of the vast number of developing
countries, especially the least developed countries and small island States. To
alleviate the occurrence of the passive situation, China and African countries should
strengthen communication and exchanges with these countries, which is an
important strategic path for us. The "Kyoto Protocol" provides that the developing
countries are without the responsibilities of emission reduction, which has laid a
90
Global Review
broad basis for developing countries and its cooperation. To this end, China and
African countries should insist on the United Nations dominant position of
addressing climate change. We should safeguard the "G 77 plus China unity, and
emphasize the complementary roles on the eight-nation summit and other
multilateral consultations. China and African countries should also urge the
implementation of the green funds for the vast number of developing countries to
provide various forms of climate change adaptation and mitigation funding.
Climate change negotiations focus on emission reduction targets in real terms
than that of how developed countries to promote the technical and financial support
for developing countries. China and African countries should advocate the
establishment of new cooperation mechanisms. "Hand in hand to cope with global
challenges" should be the important principle of collaboration between China and
African countries. China and African countries should actively plan for a "one
voice" to jointly deal with challenges. China and African countries should play a
leading role in building their own course of sustainable development in the
above-mentioned problems, actively promote the technology and capital flows to
African countries, and encourage all of African countries to embark on low-carbon
economy and sustainable development.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results are clear: the nexus security of water-food-energy will
transcend general global governance and implies complicated conflicts of politics
and ideology. Because of climate change, water plays a central role in the nexus of
green development. The core issue of nexus security lies in the interaction of water,
food and security. Due to the nexus of the three sectors, it is hardly possible to
resolve the problem by single-sector governance or by one country alone. From the
perspective of resource interdependence, nexus security provides a new explanation
to global resource security, competition, cooperation and conflict, which help
advances water-energy-food research from technological level to diplomatic
strategy level and offers new instrument for global issues. Nexus security
emphasizes that the particular nexus of water-food-energy has an influence on
global strategy dynamics. The shortage of water is the major trigger of conflict.
Because half of global population relies on food from Americas and Australia, the
drought in Australia and the over-exploitation of water and biofuel in the US
increase tension among water, energy and food. Climate change plays a central role
in the nexus of green development. The core issue of nexus security lies in the
Winter 2012
91
YU Hongyuan
interaction of water, food and security under global climate change. Due to the
nexus of the three sectors, it is hardly possible to resolve the problem by
single-sector governance or by one country alone; international cooperation against
climate change should be put in the first priority, at most part, we should attach
great importance to China-Africa green relations.
The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones.
Whatever the outcomes and motivations, in order to deal with energy-water-food
nexus, China and African countries should understand it is in their economic and
national interest to stop waiting and move ahead for green and low carbon
development. They are putting concrete proposals for mitigation on the table in the
international negotiations, taking a constructive approach to energy-water-food with
green development issues in bilateral and multilateral venues, and taking unilateral
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at home. Despite bearing relatively little
responsibility for the current impacts of climate change, emerging economies have
determined that it is in their self interest to be part of the solution. China and
African countries can also work with other developing countries to offer
comprehensive proposals to green their development, which included specific
targets and timetables in Rio+20 this June. Together with other recently-announced
plans, these proposals marked a sea change in the international debate, breaking the
log-jam of the previous decade for the lag-behind of finance assistance and
technology transfer from developed countries.
92
Global Review
The Sustainable Development of Sino-African

Cooperation: Actors, Gaps and Reforms
ZHU Ming
The relations between Africa and China have experienced an extremely
fast-growing period since the beginning of this century, and its speed is quite rare in
history. As for the unique close political ties, it has been a 22 years long tradition by
2012 that Chinese Foreign Minister always makes his first official visits to Africa at
the beginning of each year. Whats more, the booming economic ties are even
labeled by some observers as Africas Silk Road. Already Africa's single biggest
trading partner, China is set to become the continent's largest export destination in
2012 according to South Africa-based Standard Bank.
Whats more, both countries proclaimed the establishment of a new type of
strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and
mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges at the Summit
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006. The FOCAC (the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation) is held every three years since it was founded in 2000.
Outside praises and criticisms of the FOCAC are intertwined. At every summit,
Beijing issued its new Africa policy principles and a 3-year Action Plan in details.
Being a multilateral policy platform, FOCAC together with Beijings existing
bilateral relations with African nations, enrich Beijings Africa policy instruments
and play a key coordinating role in Chinas grand Africa policy.
To start this analysis, the present author believes that two issues are essential to
be observed here. The first is the needs and challenges of Africa. It is very often
Zhu Ming is Research Fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and Ph.D
Candidate of Shanghai Normal Universtity.
China Business News, 6 January 2012, p.A6.
Harry G. Broadman, Africas Silk RoadChina and Indias New Economic Frontier, Washington,
D.C.World Bank, 2006.
Lanre Akinola,China to Become Africa's Biggest Export MarketThis is Africa22 March

2012.
Declaration of the Beijing Summit Of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, November

2006, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t606841.htm.
Winter 2012
93
ZHU Ming
mentioned that China and Africa always face same or similar challenges, which
have been the solid basis of mutual cooperation. The second is to what extent China
and Africa can help each other under the framework of FOCAC. Through the
analysis, the author points out the issue of Capacity Gap produced by insufficient
actors.
The Rising Needs and Challenges of Africa

According to the 2011 Revision of the World Urbanization Prospects, Africas
urban population will soar from todays 414 million to over 1.2 billion and in Asia
the dramatic increase will be from 1.9 billion to 3.3 billion over the next four
decades. India, China, Nigeria, the United States and Indonesia are estimated to
have the largest increase in urban population, the UN report says. The estimated
increase in urban population of Nigeria between 2012 and 2050 will be higher than
that of the past 40 years. And Over the past decade six of the worlds ten
fastest-growing countries are African. In eight of the past ten years, Africa has
grown faster than East Asia, including Japan. Even allowing for the knock-on effect
of the northern hemispheres slowdown, the IMF expects Africa to grow by 6% in
2011 and nearly 6% in 2012, about the same as Asia.
Graph 1: Growth rates of urban agglomerations, 2011-2025
SourceUnited Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World
Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision. New York 2011.
Africa Rising, The EconomistDecember 3 9, 2011, p.15.
94
Global Review
The Sustainable Development of Sino-African Cooperation
Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision. New York 2012.
Meanwhile, the tough challenges facing Africa are still there. The past East
Africa and the ongoing Sahel drought have shown how weak and un-sustainable of
these affected African states are when they face natural disasters. The aid system of
the international community is also flawed in coping with such a crisis in time.
Besides food security, climate change, regional conflicts and many other challenges,
all these traditional and non-traditional threats demand the solid efforts and
measures of Africa and other nations including China. Due to the long history of
good relations with China, Africa and China always work hand in hand to handle
challenges. In 2008, when China suffered from the devastating earthquake in
Sichuan province, many African countries lent a hand to China within their
capacities. Such kind of mutual-assistance partnership is further enforced against
the background of Chinas fast developments.
An evaluation report about FOCAC is published by the Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies (SIIS) in 2008, which timely highlighted the roles of public
opinion and its future trend, arguing that the successes of the Beijing Olympics and
Beijing Para-Olympics have boosted Chinas position in international politics in
three aspects. The developing countries cherish a greater great power expectation
over China. The developed countries have increased the great power demand over
China as well. Notwithstanding, the great power responsibility is growing even
within China at elite and popular level per se. The 2010 Shanghai World Expo will
strengthen and consolidate Chinas international position further. The international
community will accept the fact of a rising China to a larger extent. Thereby, the
African countries would have higher expectations on China-Africa relations. The
expectations will be reinforced once the commitments made at Beijing FOCAC
Summit are delivered in time, or even ahead of time and over-fulfilled.
More analysis are via ZHU Ming, The Political Obstacles behind the East Africa Famine,
China Social Sciences Today, 4 August 2011, p.13.ZHU Ming, The Governance Deficit of the
East Africa famine, Wenhui Daily, 19 August 2011, p.7.
LI Weijian, ZHANG zhongxiang, ZHANG Chun, ZHU Ming, Beijing Summit & the Third
Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa CooperationAppraisal and Prospects
Number 2, Report of SIIS Project (Shanghai: SIIS, December 2008)pp.29-30.
Winter 2012
95
ZHU Ming
Chinas Challenges: Capacity Gap

This prediction has come true after 4 years, not to mention that the ongoing global
financial crisis has de facto upgraded Beijings global position and African
countries expectation towards China. China has become the No.2 economic power
in the world in terms of GDP. Made in China is everywhere in the world. The
number of Chinese businessmen, companies in Africa is rising. But more literatures
focus on the political, economic sides of China-Africa relation, and are always
targeted on government side, lobbying or asking them to do more and better. In
other words, state as traditional actor has got quite a lot of outside attention, while
the weakness of Chinas non-state actors is largely neglected.
Frankly speaking, the non-state actors of Africa and China are still not strong
enough to carry out effective mutual cooperation yet. It is still a not so short road to
go. Meanwhile, the diversification of international and domestic actors and their
related interests in Africa will form a certain level of pressure on the development
of the Forum. Internationally, various countries are paying more and more attention
to Africa. Not only traditional powers and newly rising powers have either
strengthened or created platforms dealing with their relations with Africa, but also
international organizations are increasingly taking notice of Africa. Worthy of
greater concern is the increased interest of non-government actors like NGOs and
transnational corporations. They usually focus on particular problems and have
significant potential to initiate new international agendas. Thus, they can put more
pressure on the behaviors of national actors and international organizations.
But up to now, Beijing is still relatively weak in those sectors, despite the number
of domestic non-state actors is booming. For instance, as for the number of think
tanks, China is said to be No.1 in the world, but the number of top global ones is
quite small. That is to say, Capacity Gap does exist. In the author's opinion, the
Gaps analyzed here can be divided into three categories.
a) NGOs
From 19 to 20 July 2012, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers in charge
of economic cooperation of the People's Republic of China and 50 African countries
LI Weijian, ZHANG Zhongxiang, ZHANG Chun, ZHU Ming, Toward a New Decade:
Research on the Sustainable Development of FOCAC, West Asia and Africa, Issue 9, 2010,
pp.5-10.
96
Global Review
and the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, met in Beijing for the
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
In order to implement the outcomes of the conference and chart the future course of
China-Africa cooperation in all fields in the next three years, the two sides jointly
formulated and adopted with consensus this Action Plan. In terms of
people-to-people exchanges, the Plan says that:
The two sides noted the holding of the first and second China-Africa People's
Forum and the important declarations issued and believed that the forum serves as
an important platform for comprehensive exchanges and practical cooperation
between people's organizations of China and Africa. The two sides agreed to
institutionalize the forum to give fresh impetus to the China-Africa traditional
friendship.
It is pointed out that as for the global influences of NGOs, the Africans were
watching, the Asians listening, the Latin Americans talking while the North
Americans and Europeans were doing business. By 2011, China has 462
thousand officially recognized NGOs. But almost all of them have little experience
or history in effective international cooperation with their foreign counterparts.
That is no strange that although Beijing has sent one high-level NGO delegation
to Nairobi in 2011 to host the first China-Africa Peoples Forumthe conference is
successful in having had a good beginning but too early to have a deeper enough
cooperation yet. During that conference, African NGOs asked to get direct financial
support from their Chinese counterparts, but Chinese NGOs also faced their own
budget limits, and it was hard to meet the African demands at once. Meanwhile,
the Western NGOs have a longer and deeper cooperation with their African
counterparts. African NGOs are relatively more likely to get fiscal support from
Europe or America. For instance, the Netherlands, a medium-sized European state,
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action
Plan (2013-2015), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954620.htm
Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth Jay Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler,The Sovereign Limits of
Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the
Environment, Human Rights and Womenin Rorden Wilkinson ed.The Global Governance
Reader, London and New YorkRoutledge, 2005, p.299.
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Statistical Communiqu, 21 June
2012, http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/mzyw/201206/20120600324725.shtml.
International Herald Leader (China), September 2011, p.7.
Winter 2012
97
ZHU Ming
has invested 40 million euros on DRC NGOs. Both China and African should not
only to promote direct exchanges between NGOs, relevant resources are also
needed to facilitate such kind of grass-roots exchange process.
b) Media
Traditionally, the mark of a great power was its ability to prevail in war. But in an
information age, success depends not just on whose army wins but also on whose
story wins. Although Beijing has invested huge resources on its public diplomacy
and soft power section in order to improve its global image, the mainstream global
media is still located in London, Paris, New York, not in Beijing or Shanghai. That
is to say, the western media enjoys the un-challenged privilege to judge China
Africa relations from their perspectives and interests. Now fruitful cooperation
between Beijing and Africa has been the HIGHLIHGT to each side, but it has also
been the HOTSPOT of criticisms of contemporary Sino-African ties. This world
is far from a balanced one. Some have megaphones, some only small microphones
and some none. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi says.
The fast-growing Sino-African relationship has however not been without
controversy, and China regularly finds itself the subject of allegations that it
undermines human rights and governance in its dealings with African governments.
Mr. Lu Shaye, Director-General of Department of African Affairs of China's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that around 80% of international news
resources is from the western media, which are naturally with some prejudices.
Data is via Uitgaven NGO's werkzaam op Internationale Samenwerking in 2009 in Dem. Rep.
of the Congoaccessed on 9 May 2011.
Joseph S. Nye Jr.Power ShiftsTime9 May 2011p.23.
ZHU Ming, A brief Analysis of Chinese Aid Threat Challenges and Pressures facing
Chinas Diplomacy , in Shanghai Social Science AssociationSSSAed., Chinas Future:
Questions and Challenges (Shanghai People Press, 2008), pp.75-87. ZHU Ming, The
Perceptions of African scholars on Chinas soft power in Africa and the FOCAC , Wenhui Daily,
4 December 2011, p.3.
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Answers Questions from Domestic and Overseas Journalists on
China's Foreign Policy and External Relations 7th March 2012.
Lanre Akinola,China to Become Africa's Biggest Export MarketThis is Africa22 March

2012.
The speech delivered by Mr. Lu Shaye, Director-General of Department of African Affairs of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 May 2012, http://www.focac.org/chn/xsjl/zflh
yjjljh/t930097.htm.
98
Global Review
It is pointed out that China has ventured into Africa as a friend. This has forced
the West, aware of its crimes, to sit up because it knows that it could now "lose the
continent". Demonizing China is now the main goal of Western propaganda. The
West is promoting its own politico-economic system as the only one possible in the
world.
C) Chinas construction companies in Africa
A bit different from the above two sectors, China is good at infrastructure. In the
past, the Tanzania Zambia railway served as the symbol of China-Africa
friendship. Last year, the new AU headquarter building had become a new symbol.
Graph 2Sectoral distribution of concessional Loans from China
(By the end of 2009)
Source and Note

1White paper: China's foreign aid (April 2011).
2The Chinese data here is by the end of 2009, according to a white paper on China's foreign
aid issued by China's Information Office of the State Council on April 21, 2011.
Up to now, the Chinese assistance to Africa mainly flows to the hardware

(infrastructure etc) section, which means that the Chinese enterprises have been the
main actor of the Chinese assistance to Africa. China has also begun making its
mark as an emerging donor. In January a new $200m African Union headquarters
was commissioned in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Funded entirely by China, the
opening ceremony was attended by Jia Qinling, Chairman of CPPCC, who told
Andre VltchekWhen will West ever Learn History LessonChina Daily26 October 2011
p.9.
Winter 2012
99
ZHU Ming
those in attendance that "the towering complex speaks volumes about our friendship
to the African people, and testifies to our strong resolve to support African
development."
During the Chairman Mao era (1949-1976), all Chinese enterprises did not need
to worry about economic issue, the whole Chinese economic system then was
planned economy. Such a non-benefit driven feature of Chinese enterprises has
matched quite well with the high politics profile of Chinese ODA to Africa. But
since the 1980s, due to the reform and opening-up policy, more and more Chinese
enterprises have transformed to be more and more independent economic units in
market economy circumstance. That is to say, the economic face is rising while the
political face is declining.
Graph 3: Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households and
the Real Growth Rates, 2006-2011
SourceNational Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Communiqu of the People's Republic

of China on the 2011 National Economic and Social Development, February 22, 2012.
According to one JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization)s comparative

research, Japanese construction companies have suffered from its high-cost
Lanre Akinola, China to Become Africa's Biggest Export MarketThis is Africa22 March
2012.
100
Global Review
disadvantage compared to Chinese ones. The annual salary of Chinese engineer is

just 14% of a Japanese engineer. But such a kind of low cost advantage of China
is gone now. Due to the fast economic growth of China, the domestic income level
is also rising fast. In 2011, the annual per capita net income of rural households was
6,977 yuan, up by 17.9 percent, or a real increase of 11.4 percent over the previous
year when the factors of price increase were deducted. And Chinas
underdeveloped inland areas have also been on the fast track, which have offered
more jobs to young peasant workers. All these make the charming of overseas work
are not so in the interests of Chinese people, especially for them to work in a remote
and risky continent like Africa.
Policy Recommendations
Regarding the above mentioned flaws, lessons and progress that China has made in
the past decades, several practical reforms could be enacted in the following areas.
a) Think for Africa and BEYOND Africa (From A to A)
Despite the high speed, the history of such a kind of all-dimensioned cooperation
beginning from the 2000 FOCAC is relatively short. In order to outline a better
future, we need to draw lessons and experience not only from the history of
China-Africa relations, but also from other researches beyond China-Africa
relations. For example, China has promised to play more positively in promoting
the regional integration process of Africa. China could borrow lessons from Chinas
regional cooperation with its neighboring Asian countries. It is because such a kind
of China s Asian regional cooperation is more and deeper than Chinas regional
cooperation with Africa. The reasons behind it need not to be emphasized.
China, facing the positive problem of being a capital surplus economy, is
diverting more funds to assist the development of Asian infrastructure, and is
involved in high-level talks with several countries to provide funds and loans for
high-speed rails and related projects across the region. China and Thailand are set to
agree on a plan to build high-speed rail lines that will pass from Southern China
through Laos to Thailand, and then to the border of Malaysia. In 2010, the Thai
Parliament approved the deal in a project likely to cost some US$27 billion. But
Nihon Keizai Shimbun , 5 April 2012, p.4.
National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Communiqu of the People's Republic of
China on the 2011 National Economic and Social Development, February 22, 2012.
Winter 2012
101
ZHU Ming
some ASEAN countries are afraid that such projects might de facto divide ASEAN
into two blocs, which are pro-Beijing ASEAN land bloc (including Laos, Thailand,
etc.) and pro-Washington ASEAN sea bloc (including Singapore, Philippines, etc.).
The possible internal split would surely be bad to the integration process of ASEAN
in their eyes.
Such a kind of un-intended double-edge effect of Chinas foreign policy is
emerging not only in Asia, but also in Africa. Some Africans are worried that
Beijings favorable policies towards LDCs of Africa may enable them to depend
more on Beijing instead of on cooperating with their neighbors to promote Africas
regional integration. That is to say, due to the larger scale and scope of
China-Africa cooperation, the relevant research needs to be more comprehensive,
multi-dimensional, far-sighted. Only after that, both Africa and China would be able
to better manage these never-met-before circumstances.
b) Internal reforms of both sides are quite essential.
A nations policy is based on its material capacity or hard power. But it is not a
spontaneous process. Without the relevant domestic policy consensus or willingness,
any good ideas would be still on paper instead of actions. Not to mention that,
Chinas own capabilities are still limited, thats why Beijing still prefers to keep low
profiles facing higher external demands including offering more aid abroad. Facing
this financial crisis, more and more developed and developing countries are arguing
via different channels that Beijing is able and should do more to fight against this
crisis hand in hand with the international community. But Beijing still keeps a low
profile and its reply is a bit conservative. Before G20s London Summit, Beijing
repeatedly insists that what China should and could do first is to keep our house in
order.
Just as what the author has analyzed above, there are quite a lot of obstacles at
present blocking Chinese and Africans to engage each other in a more relaxed way.
More relevant academic papers are available via MA Ying, For Mutual Communication of
Infrastructure and Cooperation between China and Southeast Asia Commemorating the 20th
Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue PartnershipGlobal ReviewMarch/April 2011.ZHOU
Shixin, The Cooperation of China and ASEAM in the Grand Mekong River Region, Around
Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, 2011
Interview with Zimbabwean scholars in Harare, Janruary 2011.
ZHU Ming, Politique Africaine de la Chine: Perspectives et Devenir Facteurs indits et

IncidencesLes Temps ModernesNo.657, janvier-mars 2010pp.203-204.
People Daily of China, April 1, 2009p.3.
102
Global Review
Some Chinese businessmen in Africa always complain about the low efficiency of
their African counterparts and governments. Africa needs to do something to
facilitate inward investments (not only towards Chinese FDI surely). Some
regulations of Beijing are also needed to be upgraded, such as the aid policy,
immigration policy.
These kinds of reforms are mainly not in the charge of Foreign Ministry. But they
have had negative impact on our diplomatic ties. The author believes that top-down
reform approaches are needed to push such reforms step by step.
c) TWO Scientific Approaches
The mutual development cooperation of China and Africa in the field of natural
science (in the form of R&D) would help Africa with the production or even export
of more technology-intensive products (Made in Africa). Or Africa would
continue to worry or even complain about just being the resource supplier to China.
For example, "Africa must not jump blindly from one type of neo-colonialism into
Chinese-style neo-colonialism," cautioned Rene N'Guetta Kouassi, the head of the
African Union's economic affairs department.
The intellectual support in the field of social sciences from both Africa and China
is quite essential to our policymakers, businessmen, etc.. David M. Lamptona
leading American scholar on Chinese studies argues that Chinese power has three
faces. They are might, money and minds. Looking back, we find fruitful examples
indicating how important intellectual contributions could be, e.g. Adam Smith to the
rise of Great Britain, Karl Marx to the founding of the Soviet Union. According to
one recent worldwide research on think tanks, most top think tanks are located in
developed countries and best ones are almost all in western countries. For instance,
among the top thirty international development think tanks, all the top twenty-two
are either from North America (America and Canada) or Europe (France, UK etc).
Only the 23rd one is from China. The existing underdevelopment situation of the
academies of Africa and China are not ideal yet, unable to meet the needs from
Africa Fears Neo-colonialism with China's Foray: Analysts, AFP (Addis Ababa), 30 Sept
2009.
David M. LamptonThree Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds, University of
California Press, 2008.
James G. McGann, The Global GO-TO THINK TANKS REPORT 2011 - The Leading Public
Policy Research Organizations In The World, Philadelphia, PAUniversity of Pennsylvania19
January 2012.
Winter 2012
103
ZHU Ming
governments, companies, etc..
Conclusion: Win-Win or Weak-Weak Cooperation?

Jean Pierre Onvehoun Ezin is the African Unions (AU) Commissioner for Human
Resources, Science and Technology, one of the 10 Commissioners representing the
53 AU member states. Ezin once said thatEurope is the partner we know best and
who knows us best, but we want a more effective cooperation. What he said is
mostly true. One reason is that both China and Africa are still weak in terms of
non-state actors, not to mention, very frequent and fruitful partnership and
cooperation pushed by non-state actors. In fact, in todays globalized world,
bilateral relation is pushed not only by governments, but also by foundations,
transnational companies (TNCs), think tanks, etc..
It has been a consensus that both China and Africa are trying to establish a new
type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership. One core feature is a win-win
cooperation. For instance, in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's speech at 4th
Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, win-win progress
and win-win cooperation are mentioned more than once. But we also have to
admit that in quite a lot of areas, the actors of Africa and China are weak, that is say,
the relevant cooperation has to be taken on the basis of weak-weak partnership.
Such a condition surely produces the question of in-sufficient dynamic and
un-sustainable development.
In conclusion, on the road to sustainable development of China-Africa relations,
both sides are facing the challenge of capacity gap. Prof. David Shambaugh, who is
Professor at the George Washington University and is recognized internationally as
an authority on contemporary Chinese affairs, points out that despite fast growing,
Chinas influence is globally broad but not deep enough yet. Both Africa and
China need to do a lot more to cultivate more powerful non-state actors to increase
the dynamics of our cooperation.
Debra PercivalWe Must Be in the Driving Seat of the Eight AU-EU PartnershipsThe
CourierIssue No. XIX , September/October 2010, pp.4-5.
The speech is via Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic PartnershipFull text of
Chinese premier's speech at 4th Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation(November 8 ,2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t625623.htm.
On 19th September 2011, Prof. David Shambaughs speech titled "China and Global
Governance: Past & Future" in the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.
104
Global Review

Global Review (Winter2012)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Review (Winter2012)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Review

China's Relations with Two Sudans: From One Country, Two

China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a

Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping

The EU and the Sudans

Development through Peace: Could Chinas economic

China, Sudan and South Sudan Relations

The history of South Sudans Chinese future

Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning in

On the Dynamics of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy in the

Does culture affect in the financial decision making of rational

The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its Implications for

The Sustainable Development of Sino-African Cooperation:

On the Dynamics of Chinas Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle

Does culture affect in the financial decision making of rational man?

The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its

The Sustainable Development of Sino-African Cooperation: Actors,

The Sudan - South Sudan Reconciliation:

China's Relations with Two Sudans:

China's Relations with Two Sudans

parties almost reached oil revenue share agreement in August 2012.

China in the International Conflict-management:

I. Chinese policy over Darfur: from neutrality to engagement

Dr. JIAN Junbo is Assistant Professor of Fudan University.

2. Stage two: persuading Sudanese central government to accept the UNs

China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case

The pressure to Khartoum also accompanied with Beijings balance policy in

II. China in the conflict-management on Darfur issue:

China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case

Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping

I. Overview of the Peace Operations and Chinas Contribution

Chinas Role in Sudan and South Sudan Peacekeeping Operations

peacekeeping operations should be conducted in the way conducive to dealing with

II. Chinas Policy Considerations in Participating

transport helicopters, which has become a significant bottleneck constraining the

The EU and the Sudans

As EU Special Representative, I have a wide ranging mandate from EU Foreign

Dame Rosalind Marsden

The EU and the Sudans

Dame Rosalind Marsden

Humanitarian assistance continues to be another core strand of the EU's policy

Development through Peace: Could Chinas Economic

Thomas Wheeler is Project Coordinator, Saferworld.

World Bank, World Bank Development Report 2011.

Saferworld interview, Unity State, South Sudan, August 2011.

Development through Peace

China, Sudan and South Sudan Relations

Low key relations

Leben Nelson Moro

China, Sudan and South Sudan Relations

Leben Nelson Moro

The history of South Sudans Chinese future

The Historical Mythology of China-Sudan Relations:

Johnson, The Death of Gordon, op cit., footnote 51. p.309.

The history of South Sudans Chinese future

economic diplomacy or high-level political missions, the Chinese consulate and

China and Southern Sudans Economic Development

The Weight of the Past: a Mixed Legacy

Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic

I. Call on New-type Diplomatic Thinking

Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning

should be handled independently by the country itself and international affairs

Transition and Upgrading of Chinas Diplomatic Planning

Build on Achievements and Promote Development, Remarks by President Hu Jintao at the