Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Marcos v Manglapus
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote
of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding
that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare
and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September
28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In
a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of
Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for
the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioners, raising the following major arguments:
1.
to bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the
inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but
also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights
guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2.
the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3.
there is no basis for barring the return of the family of
former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the
Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the
necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc,
Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the
Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing
President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of
Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor
General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and
academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he
asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses
under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of
Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to
destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant
shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p.
29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be
denied for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1.
It must be emphasized that as in all motions for
reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner
herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider
the decision of the Court.
2.
After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in
the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no
Silverio v CA
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio
vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January
1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of
Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case
No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time,
he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing
of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed
an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to
issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the
ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April
1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign
Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application
therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based
primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the
Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet
been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on
the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence
to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the
country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and
permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met
a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for
Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed,
we resolved to give due course and to decide the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders,
dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts
allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled
arraignments could not be held because there was a pending
Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right
to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even
on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1)
Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash
has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed
long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after
several arraignments had already been scheduled and
cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said
Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February
1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to
by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the
following circumstances:
1.
The records will show that the information was filed
on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case
had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were
cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused
Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to
appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United
States of America;
2.
Since the information was filed, until this date,
accused Silverio had never appeared in person before the
Court;
3.
The bond posted by accused Silverio had been
cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued against
him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has
given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The
limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case
No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April
1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as
Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances,
the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after
several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and
cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2)
Petitioner's further submission is that respondent
Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to
travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner,
the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants
of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both
instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation
of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into
custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so
required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel
(Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May
1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if
abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani
A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without
prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987
Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the
liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts
the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds
of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
Cojuangco v SANDIGANBAYAN
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does nor matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or
that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
Nevertheless, petitioner claims exception to this rule by making
this distinction:
b.
The preliminary investigation in Crespo vs. Mogul,
supra, was conducted by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and, following established procedure with respect to such
preliminary investigations, the preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal, in the language of Crespo, is
"terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court" (at p. 470). On the other hand, the instant case involves
a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor pursuant to Sec. 11[4](a), and under Sec.
27 of R.A. No. 6770. In preliminary investigations conducted by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the respondent has the
right to file a motion for reconsideration of any resolution within
five (5) days from receipt of written notice, and pursuant to
Sec. 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman), the respondent has the right to
file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Until the motion
for reconsideration is resolved, preliminary investigation is not
terminated notwithstanding filing of information in court. In the
instant case, no copy of the Resolution of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which brought about the filing of the
Information, was served on the petitioner; consequently, when
the Information was filed, the preliminary investigation had not
yet been terminated. It follows that the Resolution of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (approved by the Ombudsman)
resolving in petitioner's favor the "Motion for Reconsideration"
he had filed, now finding no probable cause, was an integral
part of the preliminary investigation, not subject to review by
the Sandiganbayan (see Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 230
SCRA 33 [1994]. 38
Petitioner's reliance on Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan is not, in
our view, persuasive. In that case the petitioners were not
given any chance at all to seek reconsideration from the
Ombudsman's final resolution because they were not furnished
with a copy of the final resolution of the Ombudsman that could
have enabled them to file a motion for reconsideration. As a
result, the Court declared that "petitioners were not only
effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's final resolution but also
deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the information against them. 39
In the case at bar, however, notwithstanding the filing of the
Information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was able to
file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
Resolution with leave of court, and in fact his two motions for
extensions to file the same were granted by the respondent
court. 40 This eventually paved the way for the filing of
subsequent Memorandum of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman,
recommending the dismissal of the case against him. However,
since the Information has already been filed before the
Sandigabayan, the resolution of the aforesaid recommendation
now lies within the jurisdiction and discretion of respondent
court. Parenthetically, in the Torralba case, we did not
altogether deprive the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction to
proceed with the case, despite the defect in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, since we declared that:
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however,
does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it
obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's
jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by
deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the
Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings
therein and to remand the case to the Office of the
Clearly, consistent with the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul, after the
filing of the information in court, "any disposition of the case as
to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
409. It has been more than three (3) years since the
Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan. More than one and a half (1/2)
years have elapsed since the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed its Manifestation seeking the dismissal of the case. Based
on the Office of the Special Prosecutor's finding of the absence
of probable cause, petitioner filed on December 13, 1996, an
"Urgent Motion To Dismiss". Three times, on March 24, 1997,
June 18, 1997 and January 23, 1998, petitioner has sought
resolution of his "Urgent Motion To Dismiss." These
notwithstanding, the dismissal of the information as to
petitioner remains pending and petitioner continues to be
under criminal indictment constrained to suffer without
justification in law and the Constitution, the humiliation, the
restraints to liberty and the tormenting anxieties of an accused.
SO ORDERED.
Yap v CA
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and
travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and
imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,
petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two
months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of
prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no
case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of
appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the
cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion
was denied by the trial court in an order dated February
17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail
For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending
Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be
required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or
in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to
the court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply,
contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was
violative of his right against excessive bail.
The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on
October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor
General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail
For Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal"
is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr.,
a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the
amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand
(P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz.
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident
therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is
hereby directed to issue a hold departure order against
accused-appellant; and
SO ORDERED.
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of
Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to
petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing
so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high
risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the
country several times during the pendency of the case, for
which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount
of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in
the Constitution.8 The obvious rationale, as declared in the
leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail
in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to
bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the
pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its
supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after
holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same
by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable
conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a
right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an
exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower
court judge would apparently yield to the command of the
fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely
verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the
position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable
to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he
must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath
as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be
beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were
informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of.
There would have been no disappointment of expectations
then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a
promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following
factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail.
Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly
not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the
same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an
appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically
to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.12 In
the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the
country several times while the case was pending, the Court of
Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the
issuance of a hold-departure order against him.
Mirasol v DPWH
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the
Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 147, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-034, as
well as the RTCs Order dated 16 June 2003 which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners assert that
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Department Order No. 74 (DO 74), Department Order No. 215
(DO 215), and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) violate
Republic Act No. 2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access
Highway Act. Petitioners also seek to declare Department
Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO
1)2 unconstitutional.
Antecedent Facts
there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are safe
modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1 introduces an
unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from
other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue
that AO 1 violates their right to travel.
Petitioners arguments do not convince us.
We emphasize that the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Communications issued AO 1 on 19 February
1968.
Section 3 of RA 200029 authorized the issuance of the
guidelines. In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO
123 after EO 546 devolved to the DOTC the authority to
regulate limited access highways.
We now discuss the constitutionality of AO 1. Administrative
issuances have the force and effect of law.30 They benefit from
the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed
by statutes.31 These two precepts place a heavy burden upon
any party assailing governmental regulations. The burden of
proving unconstitutionality rests on such party.32 The burden
becomes heavier when the police power is at issue.
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to
regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state.33
The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most
essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers.34
The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of
police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness.35 What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact
definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of
reasonableness exists,36 for its determination rests upon
human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.37
We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions.
It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll
way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure
public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited
access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes
should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle
height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of
these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of
these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll
way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a
toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines
in the manner of its use and operation. Inevitably, such rules
will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights
are restricted does not invalidate the rules.
Consider Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of
rallies inside toll ways.38 The regulation affects the right to
peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves
restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus,
the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited
to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on
constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes
a restriction on those rights.
None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and
capricious. The DPWH, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the toll ways were not designed to
accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll
ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. The
DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on
cites that the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is
the predominant cause of accidents.39 Arguably, prohibiting
the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best"
measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the
toll ways.
However, the means by which the government chooses to act
is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply
whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power
measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that
the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished,
or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose
intended.40 Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure
of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based
Reyes v CA
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact, to wit: