Brief Fact Summary.

Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion,

sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas
statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy.

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent
defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she
was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed
physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she
was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on
behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments
Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving
from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law
abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was
not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common
law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The
first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The
second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with
abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the States
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician, and may not be
criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate
abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the States interest in
promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except
where necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the
potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to
privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case
of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is
narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.