Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, J. Behav. Dec.

Making (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1942

Multiple Framing: Verbal, Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

STEVEN GARELIK1 and X.T. (XIAO-TIAN) WANG1*
1
University of South Dakota, USA
ABSTRACT
Verbal framing effects have been widely studied, but little is known about how people react to multiple framing cues in risk communication,
where verbal messages are often accompanied by facial and vocal cues. We examined joint and differential effects of verbal, facial, and vocal
framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and lifedeath situations. In the multiple framing condition with the factorial design (2
verbal frames 2 vocal tones 4 basic facial expressions 2 task domains), each scenario was presented auditorily with a written message
on a photo of the messengers face. Compared with verbal framing effects resulting in preference reversal, multiple frames made risky choice
more consistent and shifted risk preference without reversal. Moreover, a positive tone of voice increased risk-seeking preference in women.
When the valence of facial and vocal cues was incongruent with verbal frame, verbal framing effects were signicant. In contrast, when the
affect cues were congruent with verbal frame, framing effects disappeared. These results suggest that verbal framing is given higher priority
when other affect cues are incongruent. Further analysis revealed that participants were more risk-averse when positive affect cues (positive
tone or facial expressions) were congruently paired with a positive verbal frame whereas participants were more risk-seeking when positive
affect cues were incongruent with the verbal frame. In contrast, for negative affect cues, congruency promoted risk-seeking tendency whereas
incongruency increased risk-aversion. Overall, the results show that facial and vocal cues interact with verbal framing and signicantly affect
risk communication. Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words

framing effects; risky choice; emotional cues; tone of voice; facial expression

INTRODUCTION
In their seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the concept of decision framing with the Asian disease
problem. They showed that decision makers show a reversed
choice preference to either a risk-seeking or a risk-averse option of equal expected value based on the valence of phrasing
in terms of either survival or mortality. Framing effects occur
when frames that cast the same critical information in either
a positive or a negative light cause individuals to have different choice preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman,
2001; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150).
As illustrated in the Asian disease problem, equivalent
choice outcomes can be framed with either positive valence
or negative valence (e.g., lives saved vs. lives killed, survival
rate vs. mortality rate, gain vs. loss, threat vs. opportunity,
success vs. failure, and benets vs. costs). Such reversals in
risk preference due to valence framing of virtually equivalent
choice outcomes raise radical doubts about basic assumptions in economic theories of rationality. The classic framing
effect is thus viewed as an irrational decision bias and a cognitive illusion because it violates the invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which requires a rational decision
maker to have a consistent preference order among identical
choice prospects independent of the way the prospects are
presented or framed.
To determine whether a framing effect is rational or not, an
important operational standard is the presence of preference
reversal. Some framing effects involve irrational preference
reversals (e.g., the opposite choice preferences under different
framings) while others involve a shift in choice preference

*Correspondence to: X.T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang, Psychology Department, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD 57069, USA. E-mail: xtwang@usd.edu

Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

(e.g., making one option even more attractive than another).

A choice preference shift differs from a preference reversal in
that the proportion of risk-averse or risk-seeking choices is signicantly greater than 50% under one framing condition and
signicantly less than 50% in an alternative framing condition.
Wang (1996a) makes the distinction between bidirectional
framing effects, which involve a reversal in risk preference,
and unidirectional framing effects, which involve a preference
shift (e.g., from risk-seeking under positive framing to even
more risk-seeking under negative framing, or from risk-averse
under negative framing to even more risk-averse under positive
framing).
Meta-analyses (Khberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998) show
that the effect of framing is overall signicant, but framing effects have their boundaries and preconditions. Many researchers
have explored the premise and moderators of framing effects,
which include sex of the decision maker (Fagley & Miller,
1990, 1997), cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 1998), personal involvement (Levin et al., 1998, p. 160), reection on
and rationale for the decision (Fagley & Miller, 1987; Miller
& Fagley, 1991; Sieck & Yates, 1997; Takemura, 1994), personal knowledge about the risks involved (e.g., Bohm & Lind,
1992; Levin & Chapman, 1990), perceived ambiguity of the
values presented in the problem descriptions (Khberger,
1995), task context (e.g., medical vs. statistical, Bless, Betsch,
& Franzen, 1998), need for cognition (LeBoeuf & Shar,
2003), perceived interdependence between and caring about individuals at risk (Bloomeld, Sager, Bartels, & Medin, 2006;
Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001), and social group size and
composition (Bloomeld, 2006; Shimizu & Udagawa, 2011;
Wang, 1996a, 1996b; Zhang & Miao, 2008).
The aforementioned studies have taken into consideration
individual and situational factors that determine the process
and magnitude of framing effects. This line of research calls
for an overarching theory of framing effects that addresses
these ecological, social, and dispositional constraints and

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

antecedents. This led to the development of the ambiguity
ambivalence (AA) hypothesis of framing effects and decision
biases (Wang, 2008a). The AA hypothesis assumes that (i)
decision cues are selected and used in accordance to their priorities. (ii) Cue priority reects ecological and social validity
of a cue in predicting specic risks. Primary cues are valid
ecological, social, and life-history variables. Secondary cues
are mainly communicational, such as verbal framing, facial
expression, tone of voice, and so on. (iii) Decision biases,
such as framing effects, tend to occur as a result of secondary
cue use when primary cues are either absent in risk communication (i.e., an ambiguity condition) or when primary or
secondary cues elicit conicting preferences (i.e., an ambivalence condition).
From this perspective, framing effects would occur as a
result of ambiguity and ambivalence in decision cues and preferences. Similar ideas can be seen in fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna
& Brainerd, 1991) and the discussion on the use of probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinblting,
1991) to deal with informational ambiguity as a premise of
framing effects (Chang, Yen, & Duh, 2002; Khberger, 1995).

INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE CUES IN RISK

COMMUNICATION
The voluminous studies of framing effects up until now have
largely focused on the effects of verbal framing. However, in
everyday life, people use multiple communication cues including verbal, facial, and vocal cues. Multiple-cue integration is
thus more representative of real-world communication. Transmission of affect-laden information can occur by means of diverse modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, and olfactory) through
their respective manifestations, such as facial expressions and
vocal intonation (Semin, 2007). These modalities, individually
or in combination, establish in a receiver a synthetic reproduction of the state of the sender.
Researchers have examined the role of emotional cues in
risky choice. The mood maintenance hypothesis proposed by
Isen and Patrick (1983) states that people try to maximize the
chance of acquiring or maintaining a positive mood and thus
will be more risk-averse in a positive mood (maintenance) and
more risk-seeking in a negative mood (acquisition). Lerner and
Keltner (2000) argue that different emotions have unique effects
on decision making beyond a dichotomous division of valence.
Emotions of the same valence such as anger, fear, and sadness
need to be evaluated separately along several appraisal dimensions (i.e., responsibility, anticipated effort, control, attentional
activity, pleasantness, and certainty) to identify their unique effects on risky choice. For example, anger is expected to have
high certainty and high control, whereas fear is expected to have
low certainty and low control. They found that fear promoted
pessimistic risk assessments and risk-averse tendency, while anger promoted optimistic risk assessments and risk-seeking tendency. Assessments from angry people were closer to that of
happy people than fearful people.
Johnson and Tversky (1983) showed that people tend to be
more risk-seeking when experiencing positive emotions and
more risk-averse when experiencing negative emotions. In
Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

similar research, Seo, Goldfarb, and Barrett (2010) found that

at low or moderate levels of pleasantness, framing effects were
strong. But as pleasantness increased, so did risk-seeking tendency, and the risk-averse tendency of framing in gain was
eliminated or reversed. In contrast, unpleasant feelings reduced
risk-seeking after a loss.
Little is known about how affect cues, when combined with
verbal framing, would affect risk assessment and risky choice.
Most of these previous studies of emotional effects on decision
making (Cassotti et al., 2012; Druckman & McDermott, 2008)
focus on the emotional state and emotional reactions of the decision maker. Their ndings indicate that affective information
is integrated into decision-making processes and can affect
risky choice. The present study differs in that it examines the
effects of affect cues used in risk communication, rather than
the emotional state of the decision maker, on risk preference.
For instance, in the Cassotti et al. (2012) study, photos of
faces were used as mood inducers for the participants, separately from the decision problems they later responded to. In
contrast, the facial expressions and tone of voice in the present
study were used as affect cues of a messenger who presented
the decision problem to the participants. Thus, the current research focused on the effects of affect cues exhibited by the
messenger, rather than identifying effects of emotions felt by
the recipient (the decision maker) on decision making.
Compared with the studies on effects of emotional state on
decision making, fewer studies have explored the effects of affect cues besides verbal framing on decision making. Scherer,
Ladd, and Silverman (1984) showed that vocal cues interact
with verbal messages and can jointly affect judgment. Likewise, Haley and Fessler (2005) found that visual cues affect
generosity in economic games. These studies indicate that both
visual and auditory cues interact with verbal information and
jointly affect decision making.
In this study, we examined framing effects in a communication context involving affect cues (facial expressions and vocal
intonation) combined simultaneously with verbal framing while
participants answered risky choice questions. We adopted a factorial design to explore the interactive and additive effects of
verbal, facial, and vocal cues. We refer to this condition of risky
choice with combined communication cues as multiple framing. In particular, we examined joint and differential effects
of verbal, facial, and vocal framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and lifedeath situations. To study the effects
of multiple framing, we adopted a factorial design of 2 verbal
frames 2 vocal tones 4 facial expressions 2 task domains.
Each scenario was presented by both a written and auditory message with a photo of the messengers face.

HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS

Hypothesis 1: Bidirectional versus unidirectional effects
The rst question we asked was if additional affect cues, when
combined with verbal framing, make decisions more consistent.
Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, and Hughes (2001) found that people
make more consistent judgments when focusing on emotional
evaluations of stimuli rather than rational evaluations of the
J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm

S. Garelik and X. T. Wang

same stimuli. Ragsdale (1991) also found that emotions more
accurately predict decision outcomes and can even reveal
voters preferences before they have nalized their decisions.
These ndings offer evidence that the inclusion of affect cues
would make people more consistent in their judgments. Similarly, Wang (2008b) showed that affective heuristics predicted
a voters presidential choice equally well or better than cognitive
heuristics. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004) argued that rational decision making requires both affective and
cognitive processing. All of these studies suggest that affective
information supports more consistent decision-making processes. Based on these previous studies, we predict that classic
framing effects with a preference reversal (i.e., bidirectional
framing effects) would occur when only verbal framing is used.
In contrast, when facial and vocal cues are presented simultaneously, the combination of cues would overall help make more
consistent choices and thus reduce or eliminate bidirectional
framing effects.

Hypothesis 2: Cue congruency effects

Hypothesis 2 addresses cue congruency effects. Based upon
the AA hypothesis, verbal framing would be most effective
when other cues are absent, incongruent, and/or ambiguous
(Wang, 2008a). Thus, we predict more evident framing effects
when the valence of facial and vocal cues is incongruent with
the verbal frame (e.g., positive framing accompanied with at
least one negative facial expression or tone of voice, and vice
versa).
Besides verbal framing effects, congruency among cues
may also affect risk preference. Because positive frames promote risk-aversion and negative frames enhance risk-seeking
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Levin et al., 1998; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981), we predict a stronger risk-averse preference
for conditions where positive affect cues are congruent with
verbal framing and more risk-seeking preference for conditions
where negative affect cues are congruent with verbal framing,
and vice versa for conditions where affect cues are incongruent
with verbal framing.1

Hypothesis 3: Effects of different types of affect

Hypothesis 3 examines the effects of different affect cues on
risk preference. According to both Johnson and Tversky
(1983) and Seo et al. (2010), one would predict that happiness
would increase risk-seeking tendency while sadness would decrease risk-seeking tendency. Based on the cognitive appraisal
model (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), the certainty and control dimensions are important factors in determining risky choice.
Happiness is associated with high levels of certainty and individual control and should promote optimistic risk assessments
and thus a risk-seeking preference. Sadness is expected to be
associated with high certainty and low individual control and
thus result in a relatively risk neutral preference. Fear is characterized by low certainty and low control and should result in
1

The second portion of Hypothesis 2 was developed as an extension of the

rst portion of that hypothesis, thanks to the suggestion of a reviewer.

Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Verbal, Facial, and Vocal Framing

risk-aversion. Surprise, having low certainty with a moderate
amount of control, should result in risk-seeking preference.
Based on these previous studies, we predict that happiness
and surprise are likely to promote risk-seeking preference
while sadness and fear are likely to promote risk-averse preference. Similarly, for tone of voice, positive valence (happy
voice) is expected to increase risk-seeking tendency while negative valence (sad voice) is expected to increase risk-averse
preference.

METHODS
Participants
For the factorial design with multiple frames, 80 students (41
men and 39 women) from various undergraduate courses at
the University of South Dakota participated in this study for
extra credit. The mean age was 20.15 (ranging from 18 to
34) years.
A verbal framing only condition was used as a control to
test Hypothesis 1 and a separate group of 39 participants (18
men and 21 women) were recruited from the same participant
pool. A total of 119 participants were recruited for both
experiments.

Instrumentation
Choice questions were presented by computer to the participants. The MATLAB software program was used for randomizing and presenting the stimuli and recording responses. All
answers from the participants were entered by keyboard.
MATLAB randomized the order of choice questions for each
participant.

Experimental design
We employed a 2 4 2 2 factorial design involving a total
of 32 risky choice scenarios. All the variables in the factorial
design were within-subject. Each scenario had two choice options, either a probabilistic outcome or a certain outcome of
equal expected value. Each scenario represented one unique
combination of the four factors: the verbal frame (positive or
negative), the facial expression (happy, sad, fear, or surprised)
portrayed in photos of faces, the tone of voice of the auditory
message (happy or sad), and the task domain (lifedeath or
monetary). We chose the four facial expressions based on
previous studies on basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, &
Ellsworth, 1972; Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1987), without including anger and disgust. The exclusion of those two emotions was due to the possibility of eliciting mixed perceptions
(e.g., fear and anger, or fear and disgust).
The scenarios were read to the participants via headphone.
The pitch of the speakers voice was edited digitally to sound
gender neutral. Sixteen photos of faces (4 individuals 4 facial
expressions) were used.
The 32 scenarios consisted of eight unique decision problems: the Asian disease problem, a natural disaster problem,
a nuclear meltdown problem, and a terrorist attack problem
in the lifedeath domain, and a potential lawsuit, a business
J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

joint venture, a monetary gain, and a monetary loss problem
in the monetary domain (Appendix A). Each decision problem was used a total of four times for the participants in the
multiple framing condition and two times for the participants
in the verbal framing only condition. The order to present
these decision problems was randomized for each participant, to minimize any order effects.

Stimulus materials
The photographs for the facial expressions of four basic emotions were adopted from databases developed by Ekman and
Friesen (1975) and by Biehl et al. (1997). The sound clips were
rst recorded by a female narrator for each scenario. These
sound clips were then reduced in pitch by 20% to produce a
gender-neutral voice. All photographs and sound clips were
tested in a pilot study to validate the emotions. A post-manipulation check was used after the main experiment to further
conrm that participants perceived emotions as intended.

Experimental procedure
First, participants were introduced to the procedure of the experiment. They were instructed to make choices in each decision scenario, which was narrated by a messenger whose
photo was also displayed. All questions were presented by
computer, so the monitor height and speaker volume were adjusted to a comfortable setting for each person. At the start of
every trial, the photograph with the facial expression was
displayed for 1000 ms before the text of the scenario was
brought up on screen (which overlaid the photo, see Figure 1).
Then a recorded message (the decision problem for that trial)
was presented using the tone of voice selected for that combination. After each message, the photo and scenario text were
removed, and participants were prompted to choose between
Option A (certain outcome) and Option B (probabilistic
outcome).
In the verbal framing only condition, the sound clips and
photos were removed. Participants responded to 16 choice
problems (2 verbal frames 2 domains with 4 problems in each
domain).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We rst tested the predictions from Hypothesis 1 by comparing the choice results from the verbal framing only condition
and the multiple framing condition. The risk preference of
the participants in the verbal framing only condition is shown
in Table 1. Table 2 shows the risk preference of the participants
in the multiple framing condition across each independent variable (verbal frame, tone of voice, risk domain, and facial expression). Table 3 breaks down participants choices across
risky choice scenarios for both the verbal only and multiple
framing conditions. The risk preference data sorted by cue congruency is presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Similar to the analysis used in the study by Druckman and
McDermott (2008), a binary logistic regression was conducted
to analyze choice data in the verbal framing only condition.
Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Figure 1. Example of a facial expression with the superimposed text

of a choice question

The choice of participants (risk-seeking or risk-averse) was

used as the dependent variable while verbal frame and domain
were used as independent variables. The overall model for the
binary logistic regression was signicant (p < .001) and correctly predicts 57.5% of participants choices. There was no
signicant interaction between the independent variables.
The analysis showed that the classic bidirectional framing effect with a preference reversal, was signicant (p = .001, odds
ratio (OR) = 1.768), in the verbal framing only condition. The
majority of participants were more risk-averse in the positive
frame but more risk-seeking in the negative frame. Task domain was also signicant (p < .001, OR = 0.537); participants
were more risk-seeking in the lifedeath domain than in the
monetary domain (Table 1). This result is consistent with previous ndings (Wang, 1996b) and suggests that risky choice is
task-domain specic (Fagley & Miller, 1997; Kruger, Wang,
& Wilke, 2007; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009; Weber, Blais,
& Betz, 2002). Risky choice scenarios within domain were not
signicant overall (p = .535 in the lifedeath domain and
p = .466 in the monetary domain). We then conducted another
binary logistic regression analysis for the multiple framing
condition, with verbal frame, facial expression, tone of voice,
and task domain as independent variables and choices (riskseeking or risk-averse) as the dependent variable. The overall
model for the binary logistic regression was signicant
(p < .001) and correctly predicts 59.6% of participants
choices. There was no signicant interaction between the independent variables.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, no preference reversal due to
verbal framing was found in the multiple framing condition. A
unidirectional framing effect was signicant (p < .001,
OR = 1.704), meaning a shift in risk preference rather than a
J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm

S. Garelik and X. T. Wang

Verbal, Facial, and Vocal Framing

Table 1. Choice preference in the framing only condition

Frame

Risk-averse
Risk-seeking

Domain

Positive

Negative

Life/Death

Monetary

169 (54.2%)
143 (45.8%)

126 (40.4%)
186 (59.6%)

124 (39.7%)
188 (60.3%)

171 (54.8%)
141 (45.2%)

Note: The total frequency of choice responses was 624 (8 questions 2 frames 39 participants).

Table 2. Risk tendency for factorial condition

Frame

Tone of voice

Domain

Facial expression

Positive

Negative

Happy

Sad

Happy

Sad

Fear

Surprise

Life

Money

48.6%
51.4%

35.9%
64.1%

40.9%
59.1%

43.7%
56.3%

39.5%
60.5%

44.2%
55.8%

41.7%
58.3%

43.6%
56.4%

35.5%
64.5%

49.1%
50.9%

Risk-averse
Risk-seeking

Table 3. Choice preference by scenario for both conditions

Verbal framing only

Multiple frames

Scenario

Risk-averse

Risk-seeking

Risk-averse

Risk-seeking

Asian disease
Natural disaster
Terrorist attack
Nuclear meltdown
Lawsuit
Joint venture
Monetary gain
Monetary loss

35.9%
41.0%
41.0%
41.0%
59.0%
53.8%
53.8%
52.6%

64.1%
59.0%
59.0%
59.0%
41.0%
46.2%
46.2%
47.4%

33.4%
36.6%
34.7%
37.2%
45.6%
51.9%
48.8%
50.0%

66.6%
63.4%
65.3%
62.8%
54.4%
48.1%
51.2%
50.0%

Table 4. Classication of cue congruency by verbal frame, facial expression, and tone of voice
Cue congruency
Congruent cue conditions
Partially incongruent cue conditions

Fully incongruent cue conditions

Verbal frame

Vocal tone

Facial expression

Signicance

Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative

Happy
Sad
Sad
Happy
Happy
Sad
Happy
Happy
Sad
Sad
Sad
Happy

Happy
Sad
Fear
Sad
Fear
Happy
Sad
Fear
Happy
Sad
Fear
Happy

p = .166

Effect size

p < .001

Odds ratio = 1.65

p = .020

Odds ratio = 1.58

Table 5. Choice preference by cue congruency with verbal frame for each affect cue
Emotional cue
Happy tone
Happy face
Sad tone
Sad face
Fearful face

Risk-seeking preference
when consistent with frame

Risk-seeking preference
when inconsistent with frame

Signicance

Effect size

52.2%
58.1%
62.0%
61.9%
66.6%

66.1%
62.8%
50.6%
49.7%
50.0%

p < .001
p = .222
p < .001
p = .002
p < .001

Odds ratio = 1.81

Odds ratio = 1.22
Odds ratio = 0.62
Odds ratio = 0.61
Odds ratio = 0.50

Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)

DOI: 10.1002/bdm

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

reversal in risk preference was observed. Participants were
risk-seeking in the positive frame and even more risk-seeking
in the negative frame.
The effects of facial expression (p = .259) and tone of voice
(p = .142) were not signicant. Task domain was again significant (p < .001, OR = .565); participants were more risk-seeking in the lifedeath domain than in the monetary domain
(Table 2). Risky choice scenarios within domain were not signicant overall (p = .433 in the lifedeath domain, p = .424 in
the monetary domain). As shown in Figure 2, the two verbal
framing effects were clearly different between the verbal framing only condition and the multiple framing condition, where
additional facial and vocal cues eliminated risk preference
reversal. The unidirectional framing effect found under the
multiple framing condition suggests that the risk preference
of the participants became more consistent with multiple cues.
A chi-squared test comparing choice preferences in the verbal framing only and multiple framing conditions conrmed
that the choice percentages in the two conditions were signicantly different from each other ( 2 = 12.091, p = 0.001,
phi = 0.139). Participants were more risk-seeking in the multiple framing condition than in the verbal framing only condition. Chi-squared tests were also conducted to look at choice
data for each condition and validate the results of the logistic
regression analyses. The results of these tests were consistent
with the results of the logistic regression in both conditions.
Hypothesis 2 stated that incongruent valence for facial
expression and tone of voice would lead to stronger framing effects. Choice data were classied into three groups according
to cue congruency between verbal framing and facial and vocal
affect cues. A happy tone and happy facial expression were
considered positive while a sad tone, sad facial expression,
and fearful facial expression were considered negative. Surprise was not included in these analyses, because its valence
is not clearly positive or negative. The trials used in each congruence condition and the overall congruence effects are presented in Table 4.
In the congruent group, the valence of all affect cues was
congruent with verbal framing. In the partially incongruent

group, the valence of either tone of voice or facial expression

was incongruent with verbal framing. In the fully incongruent
group, the valence of both tone of voice and facial expression
were incongruent with verbal framing. A separate logistic
regression was run for trials with each type of congruency.
As predicted, the verbal framing effect was still signicant
for fully incongruent trials (p = .020, OR = 1.581) and partially
incongruent trials (p < .001, OR = 1.654) but was no longer
signicant for congruent trials (p = .166). This suggests that
participants resorted to and relied more on verbal framing
when dealing with inconsistent facial and vocal cues. The disappearance of framing effects in the congruent condition was
mainly due to the enhanced risk-seeking tendency in the positive verbal frame. Given that cue congruency was a withinsubject manipulation, these results show that participants were
more consistent (either risk-seeking or risk-averse) when emotional cues were congruent with verbal framing.
We also looked at cue congruency in valence for each individual tone and facial expression with verbal frame. These tones
and expressions were coded as either congruent or incongruent
with verbal frame. A logistic regression was conducted to compare risk preference under congruent versus incongruent conditions for each positive and negative cue. The results of those
analyses are presented in Table 5 below.
The results of Table 5 show that cue congruency is affectspecic. Positive cues increased risk-aversion when congruent
with verbal frame but promoted risk-seeking tendency when
incongruent with verbal frame. In contrast, negative cues
increased risk-seeking tendency when congruent with verbal
frame but promoted risk-aversion when incongruent with verbal frame.
We did a similar analysis for cue congruency between tone of
voice and facial expression. Cue congruency between those two
cues did not signicantly affect framing or choice preference.
Hypothesis 3 stated that positive emotions displayed in both
facial expression and tone of voice would promote risk-seeking preference while negative emotions for both types of cues
would promote risk-averse preference. Using binary logistic
regression, the results of the analysis showed that the effect

Figure 2. Percentage of risk-seeking choices in the verbal framing only condition (the left two bars) and the multiple framing condition (the
right two bars). A bidirectional framing effect with a risk-preference reversal is observed in the verbal framing only condition (45.8% riskseeking in the positive frame, 59.6% risk-seeking in the negative frame) while a unidirectional framing effect without a risk-preference reversal
is observed in the multiple framing condition (51.4% risk-seeking in the positive frame, 64.1% risk-seeking in the negative frame)

Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)

DOI: 10.1002/bdm

S. Garelik and X. T. Wang

of facial expression was not signicant (p = .259) as was tone
of voice (p = .142). These results do not support Hypothesis 3.
However, when a happy facial expression was present, participants became equally risk-seeking under both positive and negative verbal frames and thus eliminated framing effects in the
happy facial expression condition (p = .222).
A closer examination revealed some other effects. Previous
research has indicated that men and women may respond to
emotional stimuli differently (Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson,
2004). Logistic regression analyses were conducted looking
at the choices made by male and female participants separately.
The results of those analyses showed that facial expression was
still not signicant for either men (p = .218) or women
(p = .699). Tone of voice was also not signicant for men
(p = .953). However, tone of voice was signicant for women
(p = .044, OR = 0.793). Specically, a happy voice made
women more risk-seeking while a sad voice reduced their
risk-seeking preference.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we tested cue use and integration in risky choice
in a more natural context where the decision maker received
multiple cues: facial, vocal, and verbal. We asked three major
questions. First, are affect cues not only integrated into decision making but also prompt more consistent choice preferences? A bidirectional framing effect was observed in the
verbal framing only condition while a unidirectional effect
was observed in the multiple framing condition. This nding
suggests that compared with the verbal framing only condition,
additional emotional cues eliminated irrational reversals and
made decisions more consistent. Druckman and McDermott
(2008) found that the decision-makers emotional state can reduce the effects of verbal framing. Our results extend that nding to the affect cues of a messenger.
The second question we addressed was related to cue congruency. This question was derived from the AA hypothesis
(Wang, 2008a) that states that ambiguity in decision cues and
preferences is a major precondition for framing effects. Our
results revealed that congruency in valence of multiple cues
removed verbal framing effects, while verbal framing effects
remained strong with any incongruence between verbal framing and facial or vocal cues. Recent studies in neuroscience
can shed some light on the role of emotional cues in risky
choice. A meta-analysis by Wang, Rao, and Zheng (forthcoming) indicated that one of the major brain regions that is implicated in framing effects is the anterior cingulate cortex, which
is often recruited when decision cues are in conict (e.g.,
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004).
In addition, the cue congruency effects found in this study
were affect-specic and affected choice outcome. These results
suggest that positive and negative affect cues can shift risk preference toward risk-seeking or risk-aversion depending on their
congruency with the verbal frame used in risk communication.
The third question we addressed was related to the specic
role of emotions in risky choice. Although the overall effects
of affect cues did not differentially affect risk preference, there
Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Verbal, Facial, and Vocal Framing

was a gender-specic effect of tone of voice. Female participants
were more risk-seeking with a positive tone of voice and more
risk-averse with a negative tone of voice. This nding indicates
that women may be more sensitive than men to hedonic cues in
decision making (see also Hall, 1978). Gender-specic effects of
affect cues on decision making were also found in other studies.
Eriksson and Simpson (2010) found that emotional reactions to
decision outcomes are more evident in women, and this effect
mediates gender difference in risk preference. Similarly, Fagley,
Coleman, and Simon (2010) showed that emotions associated
with decision outcomes can moderate framing effects, particularly in women.
Although facial expressions did not have a main effect on
verbal framing in the present study, a happy facial expression
resulted in more risk-seeking choices in the positive frame than
other facial expressions. As a result, happy facial expressions
diminished verbal framing effects. Cassotti et al. (2012) had reported similar ndings in an emotional priming context, where
a positive emotional prime made framing effects disappear. In
addition, we nd that the inclusion of affect cues overall
promotes risk-seeking preference. This result may be because
of a human preference for consistency (e.g., Aronson, 1969;
Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1962; Heider, 1946). The
inconsistent information (e.g., positive frame and negative
facial expression) may be construed negatively as loss in information processing and thus shift choice preference toward
risk-seeking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). It is also possible
that participants experienced elevated arousal levels from the
emotional cues, causing an overall shift toward risk-seeking
preference (Williams, 2009).
In sum, our results further demonstrate that verbal framing
effects are powerful and robust. Verbal framing effects are
most evident when the valence of some other communicational
cues is incongruent. People are attentive to multiple cues of valence framing when making risky choices. Affect cues overall
promote risk-seeking preference and make choices more consistent. These results call for future studies of risky choice in
natural communication contexts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was partially supported by Grant SES-1123341
awarded to X. T. Wang.
APPENDIX A: FRAMING QUESTIONS
Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
Positive Frame:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientic estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is one-third probability that
600 people will be saved and two-thirds probability that no
people will be saved.
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Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Negative Frame:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an
unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientic estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted, there is one-third probability that
nobody will die and two-thirds probability that 600 people
will die.
Natural Disaster Problem
Positive Frame:
You have just heard news that the region in which you live
will be hit by a massive hurricane, which is expected to kill 900
people. One option is to evacuate the region, and the other is to
fortify the houses to protect against the storm.
If you evacuate, 300 people will be saved.
If you fortify, there is one-third probability that 900 people
will be saved and two-thirds probability that no people will be
saved.
Negative Frame:
You have just heard news that the region in which you live
will be hit by a massive hurricane, which is expected to kill 900
people. One option is to evacuate the region, and the other is to
fortify the houses to protect against the storm.
If you evacuate, 600 people will die.
If you fortify, there is one-third probability that nobody will
die and two-thirds probability that 900 people will die.
Nuclear Meltdown Problem
Positive Frame:
You have just received a report that a nuclear power plant is
facing an imminent meltdown, which is expected to kill 900
people. Two alternatives are present for dealing with the situation. The area can be quarantined against radiation or a team
can be sent into the plant to prevent the meltdown.
If the quarantine is used, 300 people will be saved.
If the meltdown is contained, there is one-third probability
that 900 people will be saved and two-thirds probability that
no people will be saved.
Negative Frame:
You have just received a report that a nuclear power plant is
facing an imminent meltdown, which is expected to kill 900
people. Two alternatives are present for dealing with the situation. The area can be quarantined against radiation or a team
can be sent into the plant to prevent the meltdown.
If the quarantine is used, 600 people will die.
If the meltdown is contained, there is one-third probability
that nobody will die and two-thirds probability that 900 people
will die.

Terrorist Attack Problem

Positive Frame:
Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

You have received a report that the U.S. has received intelligence of an impending terrorist attack, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two countermeasures are proposed. The rst
is to station the military in the target area, and the second is
to launch a pre-emptive strike. The expected results of these
plans are as follows:
If the military is deployed, 200 people will be saved.
If a pre-emptive strike is launched, there is one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and two-thirds probability
that no people will be saved.
Negative Frame:
You have received a report that the U.S. has received intelligence of an impending terrorist attack, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two countermeasures are proposed. The rst
is to station the military in the target area, and the second is
to launch a pre-emptive strike. The expected results of these
plans are as follows:
If the military is deployed, 400 people will die.
If a pre-emptive strike is launched, there is one-third probability that nobody will die, and two-thirds probability that 600
people will die.

Lawsuit Problem (adapted from Highhouse & Yuce, 1996)

Positive Framing:
Imagine that you are the senior executive at BTE. Your
company is facing a lawsuit for a patent violation. The damages for this infringement are expected to be 3 million dollars.
You can settle outside of court or attempt to win the case.
If you settle, one million dollars will be saved.
If you go to trial, there is a one-third probability that you
will save all three million dollars and two-thirds probability
that no money will be saved.
Negative Frame:
Imagine that you are the senior executive at BTE. Your company is facing a lawsuit for a patent violation. The damages for
this infringement are expected to be three million dollars. You
can settle outside of court or attempt to win the case.
If you settle, two million dollars will be lost.
If you go to trial, there is a one-third probability that you will
lose nothing, and two-thirds probability that three million dollars
will be lost.
Joint Venture Problem (adapted from Highhouse & Yuce, 1996)
Positive Frame:
Imagine that you are the chief executive ofcer of a large
company. Your company and your main competitor ATC are
both interested in investing in a new market. Your analysis
indicates that if your company teams up with ATC, the prot
on the investment will be 30% for certain. However, if your
company competes with ATC, you will get either a prot margin
of 60% or a small prot margin of 15% after tax. Your chance of
getting the large prot is quite high, which is one in three.
Negative Frame:
Imagine that you are the chief executive ofcer of a large
company. Your company and your main competitor ATC are
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S. Garelik and X. T. Wang

both interested in investing in a new market. Your analysis indicates that there is potential for an 80% prot. If your company
teams up with ATC, the prot on the investment will be reduced
by 40% for certain. However, if your company competes with
ATC, you will either keep a prot margin of 80% or get an even
smaller prot margin of 20%. Your chance of getting the small
prot is quite high, which is two in three.

Money problemGain Situation (adapted from Wang, 2006)

Positive Frame:
You have gained $200 from one of your stocks and have to
choose one of the following options:
If you choose bonus Option A, you will receive an additional $100.
If you choose bonus Option B, there is a 50% chance that you
will receive an additional $200 and a 50% chance that you will
receive no additional money.
Negative Frame:
You have gained $800 from one of your stocks but have
to accept one of the following investment costs:
If you choose investment Cost A, you must return $200.
If you choose investment Cost B, there is a 50% chance that
you will return $400 and a 50% chance that you will keep all
money received.
Money ProblemLoss Situation (adapted from Wang, 2006)
Positive Frame:
One of the investments in your stock portfolio has lost
$400, and you must choose one of the following options:
If you choose stock insurance, you will gain back $100.
If you choose reinvestment, there is a 50% chance that you
will gain back $200 and a 50% chance that you will gain back
no money.
Negative Frame:
One of the investments in your stock portfolio has lost
$200, and you must choose one of the following options:
If you choose stock insurance, you will lose an additional
$100.
If you choose reinvestment, there is a 50% chance that you
will lose $200 and a 50% chance that you will lose no additional money.
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Authors biographies:

Steven Garelik is a graduate student in the Human Factors

Psychology Program at the University of South Dakota.
His recent research examines the effects of blood glucose
on intertemporal choice and delay discounting and the roles
of verbal framing and emotional communication cues in
risky choice.
X.T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang is a Professor of Psychology at the
University of South Dakota whose research interests involve
behavioral decision making, risk management, and evolutionary psychology. His recent research was supported by
NSF, Max Planck Institute, the Institute of Psychology of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Jinan University, Peking
University, and Singapore Management University.
Authors addresses:
Steven Garelik, University of South Dakota, USA.
X.T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang, University of South Dakota, USA.

J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)

DOI: 10.1002/bdm